The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male and is an African-American. He was employed by Respondent in 2005 and continued his employment until May 2009. Petitioner worked the area of the property known as “Fun World.” Petitioner was a ride attendant and was assigned to operate one of the rides available to the public in the park. Respondent is a flea market and family amusement park, operated for the public on Highway 17-92, in Sanford, Florida. At the time of the allegations of this case, Respondent had approximately 24 employees: ten Caucasian, ten black or African-American, and four Hispanic. Fun World has a number of rides described in the record of this case. Petitioner’s assignment varied based upon the need of the park. Petitioner was assigned to the Tilt-A-Whirl ride, at the times most pertinent to the allegations of the case. A series of incidents ultimately led to Petitioner leaving employment at Fun World. First, Petitioner described an incident wherein he was in need of using the restroom. He did not see his supervisor or another ride attendant who could watch his ride, but due to his personal need, he left his station unattended. A second employee observed the unattended ride and told a company manager that Petitioner had left his ride with people waiting and, thereby, made the ride unavailable to the public. Thereafter, Petitioner and the other ride attendant, a Caucasian male, exchanged harsh words. Based upon Petitioner’s admission of what he said, Petitioner received a warning and counseling regarding his behavior and verbal threat to the co- worker. A second incident resulted in Petitioner's being sent home, because he attempted to clock-in late. Respondent has a strict policy that requires employees to clock-in at a designated time. If an employee is going to be late, he must call in advance of the clock-in time and advise a supervisor or manager that he will be late. On one date mentioned by Petitioner, he was on time to work, and in the general vicinity of the time clock, but was technically late to the clock-in process. Respondent sent Petitioner home and advised him he was not needed that day. Another employee was allowed to clock-in after Petitioner had been denied. That worker, a high school football player, had called in to let Respondent know he would be five minutes late. Petitioner and the football player are the same race. Based upon what he believed was disparate treatment, Petitioner determined that Respondent’s management was “out to get him.” First, Respondent had taken the Caucasian co-worker’s side in the dispute arising from the unattended ride issue. Secondly, Respondent had allowed an employee, who was much later than he, to clock-in. Respondent’s acts regarding Petitioner’s assertions had nothing to do with Petitioner’s race. Moreover, Petitioner’s race had nothing to do with why he ultimately left employment with Respondent. The final issue came to light after the aforementioned incidents. Respondent received a telephone tip that Petitioner was selling ride tickets off property. In theory, Petitioner failed to turn in tickets at the ride site, then pocketed tickets for resale off property. To follow up on the allegation, Respondent audited the Tilt-A-Whirl ride tally sheets to compare the number of riders to the number of tickets turned in by Petitioner. Simply stated, Petitioner was required to keep tabs on the number of riders based upon the hour, the ride, and the type of rider (ticket holder or banded pass) before each ride started. For up to eight times per hour, the ride could be operated, and, for each ride, the designated information was to be entered on the tally sheet. At the end of the day, Petitioner was to turn in the tally sheet with his notations for all of the pertinent data. Tickets turned in for the ride were to be placed in the ticket box. The number of tickets in the box should correspond to the tally sheet data. The ticket box was locked and was to be opened by management. Petitioner’s tickets did not match the tally sheet data. When confronted with the discrepancy, Petitioner was given the option of leaving employment or having Respondent call in law enforcement to address the ticket discrepancy. Petitioner clocked out and left the property. Respondent did not act based upon Petitioner’s race, but due to the fact that it was concerned that tickets were missing and unaccounted for from Petitioner’s ride.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Timothy J. Faison Post Office Box 470572 Lake Monroe, Florida 32747 Sid Levy Flea World 610 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Samuel J. Marshall, was born on November 19, 1936. In March 1986 he began employment as a truck driver hauling sand for Taylor Concrete and Supply, Inc. (Taylor) at its Palatka, Florida plant. When he began his employment with Taylor, Marshall advised his supervisor that because of his religious beliefs, he could not work on Saturdays. The name of the religion is not of record. Marshall says that after giving such notification to his employer, he was never required to work on Saturdays during his tenure with Taylor. This was not contradicted. In 1989, Taylor sold the plant to respondent, Tarmac Florida, Inc. (Tarmac). As an employer with more than fifteen full-time employees, Tarmac is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Shortly after the sale, petitioner was advised that his position as a sand truck driver was being eliminated but he could transfer to a position as a ready-mix driver in the ready-mix division at the same plant. Petitioner accepted this offer effective November 28, 1989. Because the new position required the driver to work every other Saturday, petitioner advised the new plant manager, Byron White, that he could not work on Saturdays because of his religious beliefs. After Marshall produced evidence to verify his claim, White excused Marshall from working on Saturdays. Tarmac employee timecards confirm that Marshall was never required to work on a Saturday. Petitioner was required to undergo a brief period of training by riding for several weeks with a senior driver, James Bolt. During petitioner's training period, Bolt was engaged in the illicit practice of selling any concrete left in his truck at the end of the day to third parties and then pocketing the money. This was obviously contrary to company policy. Petitioner was aware of this activity but said nothing. On occasion, Bolt would give petitioner some of the illicit proceeds, which he accepted. In the first week of February 1990, or after he had completed his training with Bolt, petitioner went to White and told him that there was "illicit" activity being conducted at the plant, but he refused to disclose the nature of the activity or the name of the individual engaged in that enterprise. He also failed to tell White that Bolt had given him money. White communicated this conversation to the regional manager, Jack Stegall, but because they had no specific information on which to proceed, they were unable to investigate the allegations. Tarmac has a number of plants within each division. It is not uncommon for drivers to be transferred from one location to another, based on the varying demands of the different plants. In June 1990 Stegall decided to transfer two drivers from the Palatka plant to the Green Cove Springs plant due to increased business at the latter facility. Petitioner and another driver, Dennis Folmer, then approximately thirty years of age, were selected for transfer since they had the least seniority in the Palatka ready-mix division. After learning of Stegall's decision, petitioner contacted Stegall and advised him that he believed the company policy required that transfer decisions be made based on seniority with the company, rather than seniority in a particular position. Stegall then checked with the human resources department and learned petitioner was correct. Petitioner's name was thereafter removed from the transfer list and James Bolt, who had less seniority than petitioner, was placed on the list. During his meeting with Stegall, petitioner informed him about the illegal concrete sales that had occurred during his training period. After petitioner was told to inform White about this matter, he took White to the locations where he was with Bolt when the concrete was illegally sold. He also turned over to White the $30 he had received from Bolt. Based on Marshall's revelation, on June 25, 1990, Bolt was terminated as an employee for the unauthorized sale of concrete. Because he had come forward and disclosed the illegal activity, petitioner was only given a one-week suspension without pay. Petitioner did not question nor challenge the suspension and admitted to White that he was involved in the sales. Also, on July 11, 1990, he was given a warning notice prepared by White and which read in part as follows: Sam confessed to selling unauthorized concrete on three separate occasions. Sam also reported others involved. For this reason only Sam was given one week off. If for any reason this happens again or attempt (sic) to, Sam will be terminated. Although petitioner was handed a copy of the notice, he refused to sign it, threw it back at White and walked away. At the same time petitioner notified Stegall of the illegal concrete sales, he also asked Stegall about the possibility of transferring to Tarmac's Deland facility, which was closer to his home. Stegall indicated he would try to assist petitioner with a transfer, if possible. The next day, petitioner drive to the Deland facility and spoke with the Deland plant manager who indicated there was a ready-mix driving position available. The plant manager also agreed to contact White on petitioner's behalf. Even so, because the Palatka facility was short two drivers due to the transfer of Bolt and Folmer to Green Cove Springs, White could not afford to allow petitioner to transfer to Deland. He did promise petitioner that he would arrange for a transfer as soon as an opportunity arose which would not adversely impact the Palatka facility. After petitioner's suspension for his participation in the illegal sale of concrete, Tarmac received complaints from other Tarmac employees regarding petitioner. Believing this conduct to be detrimental to the integrity of the company and a disruption of the harmony of the work unit, Minor Turrentine, then the Tarmac area production manager, advised petitioner that if he continued to talk about the illegal sale of concrete with other drivers and customers, he would be terminated for breaching company policy, that is, disclosing confidential information that was contrary to the company's best interests. He was also given a written warning on July 16, 1990, which read as follows: You were recently suspended for your admitted involvement in certain activities that are against company policy. It has been reported that you have openly discussed these matters with employees at various locations. Be advised that any further discussion concerning your suspension and the circum- stances surrounding it will be considered breach of confidentiality, which is a violation of company policy. Any further violation of company policy will subject you to severe disciplinary action, up to and including discharge. After White received further complaints regarding petitioner, Tarmac terminated petitioner's employment effective August 21, 1990, for breaching company policy. The separation notice, which was dated the same date, gave the following reason for his termination: Employee was formally warned on July 16 to discuss no further his recent suspension. Discharged for further discussion on or about 8/20/90. There is no evidence as to whether petitioner was replaced by another driver, and if so, the age of that driver. When terminating petitioner, Tarmac did not do so because of petitioner's age or religious beliefs. Indeed, Marshall conceded at hearing that he had no direct proof of discrimination but merely believed he was improperly terminated for those reasons. As evidence of age discrimination, petitioner speculated that Tarmac may have been attempting to lower its insurance rates by removing an older person from its payroll, a belief based solely on a conversation he had with an insurance agent a few weeks prior to hearing. However, at least three other ready mix drivers at the Palatka plant are older than Marshall. He also speculated that because he was not required to work on Saturdays, this caused ill-will among his co-workers, and Tarmac terminated him for his religious beliefs. Again, there was no proof, either circumstantial or direct, to support this assertion. Regarding the claim that Tarmac's decision to transfer petitioner to Green Cove Springs in June 1990 was in retaliation for him telling White that working Saturdays was against his religion, the evidence shows that petitioner was removed from the transfer list once his seniority was brought to the company's attention. Petitioner also suggests that he was denied a transfer to the Deland facility in June 1990 as retaliation for his religious beliefs. However, the evidence shows that it was not feasible for Tarmac to transfer him at that time due to a shortage of drivers but Tarmac promised that an effort would be made to comply with his request when it was feasible. Petitioner did not state whether he desires reinstatement to his former position. In his petition for relief, petitioner did request "70 percent of (his) average yearly base pay since August 20 on". However, petitioner's salary at the time of discharge is not of record. Further, there was no evidence presented to establish his salary nor the monetary losses, if any, petitioner has suffered by virtue of his termination. He is currently employed with another company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5927 Respondent: Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 7-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12-13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 14-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 16-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 20-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 24. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordinate, a conclusion of law, or not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Samuel J. Marshall S. R. Box 1075 Georgetown, Florida 32139 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Donna M. Griffin, Esquire 1408 North Westshore Boulevard Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33607
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by James H. Peterson, III, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Said Order Closing File was predicated upon Respondent’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, filed April 26, 2010. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and that this case is DISMISSED. Filed May 7, 2010 8:00 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. DONE AND ORDERED this L 4, of May, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. atl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this 4h day of May, 2010. nite lies. yak. Dealer ia araes NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF:vlg Copies furnished: Laurie Michele Chess, Esquire Jones Walker 601 Brickell Key Drive, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33131 Joseph H. Smolinsky, Esquire Weil, Gotshal, and Manges, LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10153 J. Andrew Bertron, Esquire Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 J. Martin Hayes, Esquire Akerman Senterfitt 106 East College Avenue, Suite 1200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James H. Peterson, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Section
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner should be licensed as an independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida.
Findings Of Fact By stipulation of fact, the parties agreed: Petitioner applied for a motor vehicle dealer's license for a dealership to be operated at 2401 Central Avenue in St. Petersburg, Florida. The application was denied by the Department because it appears the applicant has no experience in the motor vehicle business and, in fact, applied for the license to allow an individual by the name of Lloyd Blocker to operate and have continued involvement in the motor vehicle business. Petitioner was aware at the time of his application that Mr. Blocker had been denied a motor vehicle license in Florida in February 1994 and had been convicted of a felony in Alaska involving the unlawful rolling back of odometers in motor vehicles. In addition, Mr. Rinier was aware that the Department of Motor Vehicles would not allow Mr. Blocker to hold a license to deal in motor vehicles in Florida. Mr. Rinier and Mr. Blocker have an ongoing business dealing with the sale of motor vehicles. Mr. Rinier knows and knew at all times pertinent hereto that Mr. Blocker could not operate such a business on his own. The Department of Motor Vehicles contends that Mr. Blocker cannot operate or be involved in any facet of the motor vehicle business in any capacity. If Mr. Rinier were to provide written assurances that Mr. Blocker would not be involved in any way with a business operated under a license if issued, it would issue a license, assuming Mr. Rinier were otherwise qualified for licensure. Mr. Rinier is unwilling to provide that assurance in writing. However, Petitioner contends his sole desire is to make money from the operation of a dealership. If the license were issued, ownership of the business would be and remain in the Petitioner's name. He had already paid lease costs and all other costs relating to the business, and he will not operate it without Mr. Blocker's participation in some form. The present relationship with Mr. Blocker involves sale of the buildings where the dealership would operate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order denying a motor vehicle dealer license to Petitioner, Harvey G. Rinier. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Waller, Esquire John L. Waller, P.A. 467 Second Avenue, North _ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1997. St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Gabrielle L. A. Taylor, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Room B-439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by Susan Belyeu Kirkland, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to the Petitioner’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED Filed November 16, 2011 2:59 PM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this le day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Sandra C. Lambert, Director Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A435, MS 80 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this fa day of November, 2011. ous Nalini Vinayak, Deafer Administrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. SCLjdce Copies furnished: Jason T. Allen, Esquire Bass, Sox and Mercer, P.A. 2822 Remington Green Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Bianca G. Liston, Esquire McDonald Toole Wiggins Post Office Box 4924 Orlando, Florida 32802 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in business activities requiring a motor vehicle dealer license while its license was suspended.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a motor vehicle dealer that, at all material times, has been located at 5800 Northwest 27th Avenue, Miami. Except for the period of suspension discussed below, at all material times, Respondent has been licensed to operate as a motor vehicle dealer, holding license number VI-1005997. In the course of business, Respondent acquired possession of a 2007 Suzuki motor vehicle, bearing VIN KL5JD66Z97K644005. Respondent acquired title to the Suzuki by a state of Maryland Certificate of Salvage issued by Nationwide Insurance on August 13, 2010. The certificate shows "damage greater than 75% and repairable" and Respondent as the buyer. Following an informal hearing on May 2, 2012, Petitioner issued a final order on June 18, 2012, that, among other penalties, suspended Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license for 90 days, effective July 1, 2012, for issuing more than two temporary tags to the same person for the same vehicle, in violation of section 320.27(9)(b)17, Florida Statutes, and for issuing fraudulent temporary tags, in violation of section 320.131, Florida Statutes. On August 12, 2012, Respondent sold the Suzuki to 4A Body Shop, Inc. On August 2, 2012, Respondent executed the documentation necessary to complete this transaction.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Clark, Agency Clerk Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-430 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Mail Stop 61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Herminio Frometa 5800 Northwest 27th Avenue Miami, Florida 33142 Dennis S. Valente, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Boyd Walden, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-435 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 Steve Hurm, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Avenel Cesaire, holds commercial driving school instructor's certificate number 6027. Respondent, Avenel Cesaire d/b/a Cesaire's Driving School, holds commercial driving school license 2256. Respondent's chauffeur license number C260-000-53-363-459 is currently under suspension. Each license was issued by the Department. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed as a driving instructor and engaged in the business of instructing persons in the safe operation of motor vehicles so they might be licensed by the State of Florida. During October and November 1984, former driver license examiner Mary Louise Smith (Smith), at the insistence and request of Respondent, issued driver licenses to Respondent's students without them having passed the required written or oral examination. Ms. Smith and Respondent were intimate. Ms. Smith first met Respondent at her place of employment: the Department's driver license examination station at 3095 Northwest 79th Street, Miami, Florida (the station). The parties began dating in June 1984 and continued to date until late November 1984, when she was discharged from her employment. During the course of their relationship, Respondent gave Ms. Smith $50-100, as frequently as twice a week. Prior to his students reporting to the station for testing, Respondent provided Ms. Smith with the names, and identification, of those students who needed "assistance." Ms. Smith issued or caused to be issued, driver licenses to such students without examination or, if examined, without regard to their failure to pass the examination. By aiding or assisting persons in obtaining driver's licenses without having first demonstrated their knowledge of the skills mandated by Section 322.12, Florida Statutes, and Rule 15A-1.12, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent caused to be licensed persons not deemed competent to operate motor vehicles upon the roads of the State of Florida. Such acts constituted a clear and serious danger to the public health, safety and welfare.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order permanently revoking Respondent's commercial driving school license number 2256 and commercial driving instructor's certificate card number 6027. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 9th day of May, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Suzanne H. Printy, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Eric William Hendon, Esquire 8011 Northwest 22nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33147 Leonard R. Mellon, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by John G. Van Laningham, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Said Order Closing File was predicated upon Petitioner’s Withdrawal of Protest and Consent to Entry of Final Order with Prejudice filed, January 9, 2015. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. Filed January 15, 2015 9:32 AM Division of Administrative Hearings Fa DONE AND ORDERED this _|9 day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon Gp Julie Baker, Chief Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 County, Florida. Filed in the official records of the Division of Motorist Services this [5 day of January, 2015. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/wev Copies furnished: Nicholas A. Bader, Esquire Bass Sox Mercer, P.A. 2822 Remington Green Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32308 NO Hal K. Litchford, Esquire Baker, Donelson, Berman, Caldwell and Berkowitz, PC Post Office Box 1549 Orlando, Florida 32802 Jose M. Padron, Sr. JM Motorsports, LLC 16900 South Dixie Highway Miami, Florida 33157 John G. Van Laningham Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Section
