The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioners in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (Florida FHA); and, if so, the relief to which Petitioners are entitled.
Findings Of Fact Sun Lake is an apartment complex located in Lake Mary, Florida. Ms. Pollock is the property manager of Sun Lake, and has been employed in this capacity for approximately seven years. Mr. Green is an African-American male. The brothers leased and resided in an apartment at Sun Lake from 2012 through July 31, 2017. Mr. Green asserted that Jude is disabled, however, no other evidence to support that assertion was provided. Mr. Green alleged that Respondent failed to provide Petitioners accommodations that were requested in December 2016: change their apartment locks to the brothers’ “own private locks”; stop the trash service pick-up to the brothers’ apartment; and establish a community garden within the Sun Lake property. It is undisputed that Respondent ceased the trash service pick-up, but the evidence was insufficient to support whether the apartment locks were or were not changed. There was insufficient evidence to support a finding of fact regarding the establishment of a community garden within the Sun Lake property.5/ Mr. Green suggested a December 2016 police report was fraudulent because a name on the report was incorrect, and he had not filed a police complaint regarding noise above their apartment. The evidence was insufficient to support a finding of fact on this allegation. Mr. Green admitted to withholding rent on several occasions as a method to have the requested accommodations secured. Ms. Pollack confirmed there was a valid lease agreement between Sun Lake and Petitioners. Further, she provided that Respondent did, in fact, stop the trash service pick-up to their apartment as Petitioners requested. Ms. Pollack lacked specific knowledge regarding whether Petitioners’ apartment door locks were changed, but offered that Respondent must maintain an apartment key. This is done in order to secure access to each apartment in a timely manner for health and safety reasons. Respondent’s maintenance staff would not enter any apartment without a specific request for service. Ms. Pollack provided the multiple dates on which Petitioners’ rental payments were late. Petitioners and Respondent became involved in eviction proceedings in circuit court. At some point, Petitioners and Respondent entered a settlement stipulation that Petitioners would vacate their apartment earlier than their lease agreement, and pay the rental fees and other associated fees to Respondent. Following Mr. Green’s testimony, and both the direct and cross-examination testimony of Respondent’s sole witness, Ms. Pollock, Mr. Green moved to dismiss the case. No credible evidence was presented that Respondent discriminated against Petitioners in any fashion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Petitioners’ Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2019.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of discriminating against Petitioner in employment based on his age, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born on September 13, 1955. He was initially employed by Respondent in 1996. He remained employed with Respondent until he was terminated in late November 2000. At the time of his termination, Petitioner served as the Assistant Director of Parks. His immediate supervisor was Julio Martinez, who was the Director of Parks. On July 18, 2000, Yioset de la Cruz was elected Mayor of Respondent. Mayor de la Cruz had been employed by Respondent during the administrations of Mayors Oliveros, Fatima, and Morejon. However, Mayor Morejon terminated the employment of Mr. de la Cruz, as well as several other employees who had served under Mayor Fatima. Running on the promise to clean up the city, Mr. de la Cruz won 57 percent of the vote and defeated then-Mayor Morejon. When he assumed office, Mayor de la Cruz had to address several pressing financial issues, including a projected deficit of $540,000 for the fiscal year and the cancellation of Respondent's insurance by The Florida League of Cities. At the same time, the people of Hialeah Gardens had become dissatisfied with the maintenance and operation of their city parks, which are the most visible reflection of the quality of their city government. Appointing Arturo Ruiz to oversee the parks and their maintenance and operation, Mayor de la Cruz nonetheless remained directly involved in parks administration by imposing new discipline upon parks workers to ensure public satisfaction with the maintenance and operation of city parks. Shortly after disciplining Petitioner for improper use of his city telephone, Mayor de la Cruz visited Respondent's office, which was located in one of the major city parks, to assure that city park employees had completed their preparations for the long holiday weekend of Thanksgiving 2000. Unable to find Petitioner at his office, Mayor de la Cruz asked to see Petitioner's time card and found that he had not punched out for the day. After driving through nearby parks in search of Petitioner, Mayor de la Cruz returned to the office, where the secretary belatedly informed him that Petitioner had called in to say that he had fallen ill and asked that another employee punch him out for the day. After Mayor de la Cruz and the secretary finished speaking, Mayor de la Cruz spoke with Petitioner by telephone. When Mayor de la Cruz attempted to discuss the matter with Petitioner, Petitioner became disrespectful and insubordinate. Petitioner began screaming and swearing at the Mayor, who responded by promptly firing Petitioner. The evidence in this case is clear that Mayor de la Cruz fired Petitioner due to his insubordination, not due to his age.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Request for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary A. Costales Law Office of Gary A. Costales, P.A. 2151 LeJeune Road, Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 J. Frost Walker, III, Esquire Law Office of J. Frost Walker, III 100 West Sunrise Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33133 Derick Daniel, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relation 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Violet D. Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Respondent, the Department of Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as the "Department") is a state agency charged with the responsibility to manage Florida's parks and recreation areas pursuant to Chapter 258, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. The Department is also charged with responsibility to administer, supervise, develop and conserve the natural resources of the State pursuant to Chapter 370, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. At issue in this proceeding are certain actions taken by the Department, primarily through the Department's Division of Recreation and Parks (hereinafter referred to as the "Division"), with regard to Amelia Island State Recreation Area (hereinafter referred to as the "AISRA"). The AISRA is located at the southern tip of Amelia Island, Nassau County, Florida. Petitioner Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), of Nassau County, Florida, is the governing body of Nassau County, Florida, a non-charter county of the State of Florida. The Board is authorized to enact ordinances not inconsistent with general or special law pursuant to Section 1(f), Article VIII of the Constitution of Florida. The Board is interested in insuring continued vehicular access to the southern end of Amelia Island within the AISRA. In part, the Board's concern is caused by a belief that the southern end of the AISRA is a good fishing area. The Board's concern is also based upon a belief that access to the southern end of the island will be severely restricted to the old and disabled if vehicular traffic is prohibited in the AISRA. The Board has authorized participation in this proceeding. Petitioner Amelia Island Company is a Florida corporation: Amelia Island Company has developed a resort and residential community known as Amelia Island Plantation (hereinafter referred to as the "Plantation"), on Amelia Island. Amelia Island Company also owns Amelia Island Inn, 2 undeveloped tracts of land, a beach club, a conference center, a tennis facility and golf courses. All of these properties are located within the Plantation. The eastern boundary of the Plantation consists of Atlantic Ocean beach. Ocean. Some facilities of Amelia Island Company front on the Atlantic The Plantation is located north of the AISRA. Amelia Island Company manages approximately 525 residential units within the Plantation pursuant to rental contracts with the unit owners. The units are rented and guests have the right to use the Plantation beach. Some owners and guests of the properties located within the Plantation use the AISRA for fishing. The weight of the evidence failed to prove how many people use the AISRA or how often. Petitioner Amelia Island Plantation Community Association (hereinafter referred to as the "AIPCA"), is an association: The members of AIPCA represent the residential communities within the Plantation, including Amelia Island Company and individual property owners. Members participate in the AIPCA through eighteen condominium associations representing the individual property owners. The AIPCA maintains the Plantation beach. The AIPCA owns the roads, parks and some other facilities within the Plantation. Petitioner Amelia Island Rental Property Owners Association (hereinafter referred to as the AIRPOA) is an association: AIRPOA consists of approximately 410 residential unit owners whose units are located within the Plantation. AIRPOA member units are rented through the Amelia Island Company. The AIRPOA has supported activities designed to stop beach driving on the Plantation beach. Petitioner Dune Club Company II is a Florida corporation: The company owns undeveloped land which it intends to develop as multifamily condominiums. The land owned by Dune Club Company II is located in the Plantation. Therefore, future owners of condominiums will have the right to use the Plantation beach. Petitioner Amelia Island Holding Company is a Florida corporation: The corporation owns undeveloped land within the Dunes Club development, which is located within the Plantation. Future owners of property within this development will have the right to use the Plantation beach. Petitioner Piper Dunes is a Florida corporation: Piper Dunes is developing multifamily condominiums within the Plantation. Future owners of Piper Dunes' condominiums will have the right to use the Plantation beach. Petitioners Dunes Club Community Association, Dunes Row Community Association, Beachwalker Villas Association, Inc., Captain's Court Villas Association, Inc., Inn Rooms at Amelia, a Condominium Association, Inc., Sandcastles at Amelia Island Condominium Association, Inc., Sea Dunes Condominium Association, Inc., Shipwatch Villas Association, Inc., Spyglass Villas Owners Association, Inc., Turtle Dunes Condominium Association, Inc., and Windsong at Amelia Island Plantation Community Association, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as the "Plantation Associations") are Florida corporations and condominium associations: The Plantation Associations are comprised of residents and owners located within the Plantation. The Plantation Associations' members are all proximate to the Atlantic Ocean beach of the Plantation. The governing boards of the Plantation Associations have been active in attempting to restrict driving on the beach running through the Plantation. A substantial number of property owners of the Plantation Associations use the beach running through the Plantation for sunbathing, swimming, surfing, walking, jogging, and other beach activities. Geography. Amelia Island is located at the most northeasterly corner of Nassau County, Florida, and the State of Florida. Amelia Island is bounded on the east by the Atlantic Ocean and on the west by the Intercoastal Waterway. Where the Intercoastal Waterway meets the Atlantic Ocean at the southern tip of the island is named Nassau Sound. The AISRA is bounded on the southwest by Nassau Sound, on the southeast by the Atlantic Ocean, on the north-northwest by Highway A1A and on the north by a relatively large area of undeveloped, privately-owned land. It is approximately one-half mile from the areas which have been designated by the Department as parking areas in the AISRA to the southernmost tip of Amelia Island. The distance can make it more difficult for fishermen to access the southern end of the island. The Creation of the AISRA. The previous owners of the property which makes up the AISRA transferred the property by warranty deeds dated July 1, 1983, December 19, 1983 and June 28, 1985 to the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Trustees"). See Petitioners' exhibit 16. The Division took over management of the property which makes up the AISRA pursuant to a Lease Agreement and pursuant to a Management Agreement for Certain Submerged Lands Bordering State Lands (hereinafter referred to as the "Management Agreement"). The Lease Agreement, dated November 19, 1984, and the Management Agreement were entered into between the Trustees and the Division. Petitioners' exhibit 16. The Lease Agreement was amended on June 22, 1987. Petitioners' exhibit 16. The Management Agreement was amended on January 19, 1988. Petitioners' exhibit 16. In general, the property was leased to the Division for recreation and conservation purposes. The Division is given authority to manage the property for public health and safety, for protection of the property and to be managed as a recreation area. In part, the Management Agreement, as amended, gave the Division authority over: All those sovereign submerged lands lying within 400 feet of the mean high water or ordinary high water line . . . . The Lease Agreement and Management Agreement require that the Division, within twelve months of entering into the Lease Agreement, adopt a Management Plan providing for the "basic guidance for all management activities." Management Plans are to be reviewed by the Trustees every five years after the first Management Plan is adopted. No Management Plan has been adopted by the Department. The evidence in this proceeding failed to prove that the Trustees have taken any action against the Division for failing to adopt a Management Plan as contemplated by the Lease Agreement. The evidence also failed to prove that the Petitioners are privy to the Lease Agreement or Management Agreement. Administratively, the Division treated the AISRA as part of the Talbot Island State Geo Park. The Geo Park is made up of Big Talbot Island State Park, Little Talbot Island State Park, Fort George Island Cultural Site and the AISRA. Therefore, because the administrative offices of the Talbot Island State Geo Park were not located at the AISRA, the AISRA has received minimal attention since its creation. Beach Driving and Parking; Prior to, and Immediately After, the Acquisition of the AISRA by the Department. Prior to the creation of the AISRA, people drove and parked motor vehicles on the beach which is now part of the AISRA. People were able, depending on the tides, to drive on the beach of the AISRA from the southwest end of Amelia Island from Highway A1A at Nassau Sound, around the southern tip of the island, and north on the Atlantic side of Amelia Island. After the Division acquired responsibility for the management of AISRA, the Division, and thus the Department, did not take any action to prohibit all driving and parking on the beach in the AISRA. See, however, section J, infra. Legislative Prohibition Against Driving on Coastal Beaches. Prior to 1985, driving and parking on the beach fronting the Plantation, as well as other beaches under the jurisdiction of the Board, was permissible. In 1985, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 161.58, Florida Statutes. In relevant part, Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 88-106, Laws of Florida, provided that "[v]ehicular traffic . . . is prohibited on coastal beaches " As amended, Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, allows a "local government with jurisdiction over a coastal beach or portions of a coastal beach" to authorize vehicular traffic "on all portions of the beaches under its jurisdiction" [emphasis added], upon three-fifths vote of the local government's governing body and if certain conditions concerning existing off-beach parking are met. The Special Act, Chapter 89-455, Laws of Florida. A dispute over Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, arose between the Board and various private landowners on Amelia Island, including some, if not all, of the Petitioners in these cases. The Board was opposed to the ban on vehicular traffic on the beaches of Amelia Island provided by Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, while the private landowners were in favor of the total ban. As a result of the dispute between the Board and private landowners, the Board and private landowners approached the legislative representatives for their area. As a result of this effort, the Florida Legislature enacted a special act, Senate Bill 1577, Chapter 89-445, Laws of Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Special Act"). The Special Act represented a compromise between the positions of the Board and the private landowners. Chapter 89-445, Laws of Florida, provides as follows: . . . . Section 1. (1) Scott Road shall be relocated south of the Amelia Surf and Racquet Club Condominium in Nassau County. As part of this relocation, off-beach parking spaces for 100 vehicles must be provided. In addition, access for motorized vehicles onto the Atlantic Beach area must be provided. Parking on the beach is permitted in Nassau County in the area known geographically as Peters Point Road to Scott Road, as relocated after September 30, 1989. Parking on the beach in such area is prohibited after Nassau County issues a certificate of occupancy for the planned Ritz Carlton Hotel. On-beach parking shall continue to be permitted in the following nonresort areas: The Peters Road intersection with the beach area north to the city limits of Fernandina Beach. The Lewis Street intersection with the beach area north to the developed resort area parcel and south to the developed resort area parcel. The southerly end of Amelia Island from the Nassau Sound side to the developed resort area parcel on the Atlantic Ocean side. The term "developed resort area" means any property that is subject to a development order as of the effective date for this act if such development order indicates resort activities. (4)(a) On-beach parking in front of an undeveloped resort area parcel shall be prohibited upon the issuance of a certificate of occupancy for that parcel, contingent upon the existence of adequate off-beach parking during the peak period. (b) For purposes of determining the existence of adequate off-beach parking, the parking available at sites off the beach, measured for the entire beach, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Nassau County Commission must be considered. The peak period must be determined as measured by the Department of Natural Resources formula as published in the Administrative Weekly in May 1989, except that 70 percent of peak user must be the standard. Those sites which are permanent on-beach parking sites must be included in the determination. Section 2. Any resort area parcels which are developed and which are not contiguous must have lanes of traffic connecting with defined lanes identified by traffic-path indicators. Section 3. A motorized tram system is hereby authorized on the Atlantic Ocean beaches within the jurisdiction of Nassau County. Section 4. This act shall take effect March 1, 1990. . . . . County Ordinance 89-23. Subsequent to the enactment of the Special Act, the Board enacted Ordinance 89-23, which provides as follows: ORDINANCE 89 - 23 AN ORDINANCE DETERMINING, PURSUANT TO RULE 16B-45, FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, THAT LESS THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE PEAK USER DEMAND FOR OFF BEACH PARKING IS AVAILABLE; PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. WHEREAS, Paragraph 161.58(2)(b), Florida Statutes, mandates that vehicular traffic be prohibited from coastal beaches except where a local government has determined by October 1, 1989, in accordance with the rules of the Department of Natural Resources that less than fifty percent (50 percent) of the peak user demand for off-beach parking is available; and WHEREAS, the Board of County Commissioners had determined that it is in the public interest to preserve the maximum access to the public beaches of Nassau County; and WHEREAS, the public was in jeopardy of losing access to a majority of beaches in Nassau County unless action was taken by the Board on behalf of the citizens of the County in order to preserve the citizens' right to their beaches; and WHEREAS, the Legislature adopted Senate Bill 1577, which is a local bill pertaining to vehicular access to the Nassau County beaches; and WHEREAS, the Department of Natural Resources has adopted Rule 16B-47, Florida Administrative Code; and WHEREAS, pursuant to Rule 16B-47.004, the Board of County Commissioners desires to continue to authorize vehicular traffic on its County beaches. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED this 12th day of September, 1989, by the Board of County Commissioners of Nassau County, Florida, as follows: SECTION 1. TITLE This Ordinance shall be known as the "Authorized Beach Vehicular Traffic Ordinance". SECTION 2. INVENTORY OF AVAILABLE OFF-BEACH PARKING The following is an inventory of the available off-beach parking within the Board of County Commissioners of Nassau County's jurisdiction: Pasco access - 10 parking spaces Peters Point Park - 200 parking spaces Scott Road - 50 parking spaces Burney Park - 200 parking spaces Dunes Club access - 30 parking spaces South End Ramp - 25 parking spaces TOTAL OFF-BEACH PUBLIC PARKING SPACES 515 SECTION 3. PEAK USER DEMAND FOR OFF-BEACH PARKING The Board of County Commissioners has determined from the Kings Bay Area Recreation Master Plan dated March 8, 1985, that: In 1985, the study indicated that peak day on-beach demand was 4,775 people per day. The study further indicated that 1,640 parking spaces would be needed for the year 1985. The study further projected that in 1990 the peak day beach users would be 5,669 and require 1,995 parking spaces. The study further indicates that in the year 2000 the peak day beach users would be 7,487 and require 2,602 parking spaces. The above represents peak day beach users and off-beach parking spaces required from Sadler Road to the South End of the island. SECTION 4. AVAILABLE PERCENTAGE OF PEAK USER DEMAND FOR OFF-BEACH PARKING The Board of County Commissioners has determined, based upon the above referenced study, that there is less than fifty percent (50 percent) of the peak user demand for off-beach parking available and, as a result, the Board hereby authorizes vehicular traffic to continue to utilize the County beach areas within its jurisdiction. Commencing March 1, 1990, the county beach areas available to vehicular traffic shall be set forth in the Special Act referred to as Senate Bill 1577. SECTION 5. EFFECTIVE DATE This Ordinance shall take effect upon being filed in the Secretary of State's office. . . . . Amelia Island Company v. Nassau County, Florida. Despite the enactment of the Special Act and Ordinance 89-23, some of the Petitioners were not satisfied because vehicular traffic continued along the beaches in front of their property. Consequently, a number of the Petitioners, including Amelia Island Company, brought an action for declaratory judgment against the Board in the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Nassau County, Case No. 90-397. Parking was only authorized by the Special Act and Ordinance 89-23 on beaches fronting undeveloped property. Parking was not authorized on beaches fronting developed property such as the property of most of the Petitioners. Those Petitioners which were involved in the litigation in the Circuit Court were interested in insuring that vehicles were not allowed to drive along the beach in front of their developed areas in order to access the beach in front of undeveloped areas. On February 1, 1991, the Circuit Court entered a Final Judgment in Case No. 90-397 (hereinafter referred to as the "Final Judgment"), and another related case which had been consolidated with it. Among other things, the Court concluded in the Final Judgment, the following: Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, "prohibits vehicular traffic on all beaches in the State of Florida except where the local government authorizes such traffic and determines that 'less than 50 percent of the peak user demand for off-beach parking is available.'" The Special Act "authorizes vehicular traffic on beaches within the exclusive jurisdiction of Nassau County." [Emphasis added]. The Court further stated: Senate Bill 1577 [Chapter 89-455, Laws of Florida], creates an exception for beaches under the exclusive jurisdiction of Nassau County by authorizing parking in certain areas and directing the creation of lanes of traffic on its beaches. It goes without saying that for one to use the parking areas on the beaches designated by the legislature, one must be able to drive. . . . The Court must conclude that Senate Bill 1577, by inference and implication authorizes vehicular traffic on the beaches within the exclusive jurisdiction of Nassau County. As a result, it conflicts with Chapter 161, Florida Statutes, and the Special Act takes precedence. Consequently, even if the Ordinance is invalid, Senate Bill 1577 authorizes vehicular traffic on the beaches within the exclusive jurisdiction of Nassau County. Ordinance 89-23 "permits vehicular traffic within the exclusive jurisdiction of Nassau County." [Emphasis added]. Ordinance 89-23 was enacted consistent with the exception against vehicular traffic on coastal beaches of Section 161.58, Florida Statutes. Ordinance 89-23 is valid. As a result of the Final Judgment, beach driving was still permitted on Nassau County beaches that fronted developed and undeveloped property. The Final Judgment did not specifically address the beach of the AISRA. In fact, the Final Judgment is expressly limited to beaches "within the exclusive jurisdiction of Nassau County." The Final Judgment was appealed to the District Court of Appeal, First District. The District Court reversed the Final Judgment in part and affirmed it in part. Amelia Island Company v. Nassau County, 585 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In pertinent part, the District Court concluded the following: In sum, the trial court correctly found that Nassau County Ordinance 89-23 is valid, but the final judgment is in error to the extent that it interprets the ordinance and SB 1577 as authorizing unrestricted vehicular traffic over the entire beach. Instead, the county beach areas available to vehicular traffic . . . include only areas reasonably necessary to permit use of all specified beach parking in the manner permitted under the terms of the special act. Accordingly, the final judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of judgment in conformity with this opinion. Amelia Island Company, 585 So.2d at 1064. On April 28, 1992, the Circuit Court entered a Final Judgment (hereinafter referred to as the "Final Judgment on Remand"), on remand from the District Court. Among other things, the Final Judgment on Remand lists those areas "on the beaches within the jurisdiction of Nassau County" where driving is prohibited. No reference to the AISRA is contained in the listing. There is a relatively large area of undeveloped privately-owned land north of the AISRA and south of the land owned by some of the Petitioners. As a result of the Special Act and Ordinance 89-23, parking is allowed on the beach bounding this undeveloped property. As a result of the Final Judgment on Remand, vehicular traffic was authorized to travel to the undeveloped property beach. Such access was available, however, by traveling around the southern tip of Amelia Island through the AISRA. Consequently, vehicular traffic would not be allowed on the beaches fronting the property of the Petitioners (other than the Board) so long as beach driving is allowed through the AISRA. The Final Judgment on Remand, however, recognized that it was possible that beach driving could be prohibited in the AISRA despite Ordinance 89-23 and the Special Act. Although the Circuit Court and District Court did not specifically construe section 1(3)(c) of the Special Act, the Final Judgment on Remand includes the following reference to the southern end of Amelia Island: 6. In the event the access to the south end is closed to public use by any state or federal law or regulation (and for so long as such access is closed), access to the parking areas permitted by Section 1(3)(c) of the Senate Bill will be permitted from the Lewis Street access south to the southerly end of Amelia Island. In addition, in the event any state or federal law or regulation closes or limits the access to the south end of any part of a twenty-four hour period, then during such time, access to the south end will be permitted from the Lewis Street south (unless such closure or limitation is applicable to all the beaches under the jurisdiction of Nassau County), in accordance with the provisions of Senate Bill 1577. Recognizing that beach driving could be prohibited in the AISRA, which would in turn prevent access to beaches of the privately-owned undeveloped tracts of property immediately to the north of the AISRA, the Final Judgment on Remand recognized that beach driving would have to be allowed from north of the privately-owned undeveloped tracts of property. The only northerly access to the beaches of the undeveloped privately-owned property is a road located north of the property owned by Petitioners (excluding Nassau County). Consequently, beach traffic would have to travel along the beach of the Plantation to reach the undeveloped privately-owned property if beach driving were prohibited in the AISRA. Powers and Duties of the Division; The General Prohibition Against Driving and Parking in State Parks. Section 258.004, Florida Statutes, sets out, in general, the duties of the Division as follows: 258.004 Duties of division.- It shall be the duty of the Division of Recreation and Parks of the Department of Natural Resources to supervise, administer, regulate, and control the operation of all public parks, including all monuments, memorials, sites of historic interest and value, sites of archaeological interest and value owned, or which may be acquired, by the state, or to the operation, development, preservation, and maintenance of which the state may have made or may make contribution or appropriation of public funds. The Division of Recreation and Parks shall preserve, manage, regulate, and protect all parks and recreational areas held by the state and may provide these services by contract or interagency agreement for any water management district when the government board of a water management district designates or sets aside any park or recreation area within its boundaries. In order to implement the Division's responsibilities pursuant to Chapter 258, Florida Statutes, the Department enacted Chapter 16D-2, Florida Administrative Code. Section 258.007, Florida Statutes, sets out the power of the Division to adopt rules. In relevant part, the Division is given the following rule- making power: (2) The division shall make and publish such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary or proper for the management and use of the parks, monuments, and memorials under its jurisdiction, and the violation of any of the rules and regulations authorized by this section shall be a misdemeanor and punishable accordingly. Pursuant to the authority and duties assigned to the Division by Chapter 258, Florida Statutes, the Department has adopted rules governing vehicles and traffic on lands within the Department's jurisdiction, including state recreation areas such as the AISRA. Rule 16D-2.002, Florida Administrative Code. See also Rule 16D-2.001, Florida Administrative Code. In particular, the Department has provided the following with regard to driving: Restriction to Roads. No person shall drive any vehicle on any area except designated roads, parking areas, or other such designated areas. Rule 16D-2.002(4), Florida Administrative Code. Pursuant to this rule, driving is not allowed anywhere in a state recreation area except to the extent specifically designated by the Division. With regard to parking, the Department has provided the following: Parking. All vehicles shall be parked only in established parking areas or in such other areas and at such time as the Division may designate. Rule 16D-2.002(5), Florida Administrative Code. Pursuant to this rule, parking is not allowed anywhere in a state recreation area except to the extent specifically designated by the Division. The evidence failed to prove that Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code, are invalid or otherwise not applicable in this case. Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code, apply to the AISRA. As evidenced in findings of fact 29, 57 and 59, following the acquisition and lease of AISRA to the Division, the Division (and, therefore, the Department) failed to totally enforce Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code. Instead, the Division allowed most of the historical beach activities, including beach driving and parking, to continue despite the general prohibition against driving and parking unless otherwise designated by the Department pursuant to Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code. In effect, by failing to enforce Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code, the Division authorized driving and parking in the AISRA without taking any action to formally "designate" authorized parking or driving areas as contemplated by Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code. The Department's Subsequent Decision to Enforce Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code. In part, because of the fact that the AISRA was a satellite of Talbot Island State Geo Park, Robert Joseph, the Park Manager, did not take any action to totally enforce the ban of Rules 16D-2.002(4) or (5), Florida Administrative Code, on beach parking and driving in the AISRA, when the AISRA was first created. Mr. Joseph's decision was also based, in part, on the fact that such activities had historically been allowed. Therefore, Mr. Joseph was concerned about the impact that enforcement of the rules would have on the public. Mr. Joseph did take action to enforce the prohibitions of the rules on the dunes of the AISRA and in areas covered by vegetation in the AISRA. Mr. Joseph believed that the issue of beach driving and parking would have to be looked at closely in the future. In subsequent years, after the services of environmental specialists of the Department became available to evaluate the AISRA, the rules banning parking and driving in state parks were enforced in the AISRA to the extent that it appeared that shore bird nesting areas were being negatively impacted by driving and parking. Eventually, Mr. Joseph became convinced that the ban on parking and driving of Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code, needed to be enforced throughout the AISRA. Mr. Joseph made this decision based upon the following general observations: Driving on the beach of the AISRA had been increasing since the Department's acquisition of responsibility for the AISRA, further endangering the resources of the AISRA; and There was an increase of safety hazards as a result of the increased vehicular activity. In light of Mr. Joseph's fear that the proposed enforcement of the Department's rules banning parking and driving in the AISRA would be controversial, Mr. Joseph decided to make a recommendation to his supervisors that beach driving be prohibited in order to allow their input. Mr. Joseph recommended an immediate and total ban on all beach driving. Mr. Joseph's recommendation was ultimately reviewed by the District Manager for the district of the Division in which the AISRA is located, the Assistant Division Director, the Division Director and the Department's Policy Coordinating Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "PCC"). Among those serving on the PCC were the Assistant Executive Director of the Department, Deputy Assistant Executive Director of the Department and the Director of the Division. The recommendation was also reviewed by the Chief of the Bureau of Natural and Cultural Resources of the Department. The PCC is an advisory committee which considers various issues which the Department must confront. The PCC makes recommendations to the Executive Director of the Department concerning a variety of policy decisions. After considering Mr. Joseph's recommendation at a meeting of the PCC on July 22, 1991, the PCC adopted the following: Amelia Island State Recreation Area Beach driving will be phased out beginning with a night driving ban effective January 1, 1992 and ending with a total ban on April 1, 1992. The status and legal implications of Chapter 89-445, Laws of Florida, will be investigated and clarified as it relates to driving on the island. Ultimately, Mr. Joseph's recommendation, as modified by the PCC, was reviewed, further modified and accepted by the Executive Director of the Department. Implementation of the Department's Decision to Enforce Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Joseph was ultimately informed that he should prohibit beach driving in the AISRA in the manner ultimately explained on the Information Sheet at issue in this proceeding. On or about April 1, 1992, Mr. Joseph caused signs to be posted in the AISRA notifying the public of the Department's decision concerning beach driving and parking (hereinafter referred to as the "Signs"). It was indicated on the Signs, when and where driving and parking on the beach of the AISRA was allowed and not allowed. The Signs were intended to notify the public that there were two designated parking areas in the AISRA. One parking area was designated at the southwestern edge of the AISRA adjacent to Highway A1A. The other parking area was designated at the northeast edge of the AISRA on the Atlantic ocean side of the AISRA. The Signs were also intended to notify the public that driving on the beach was restricted from April 1 to October 31, 1992. The Signs indicated that between April 1 to October 31, 1992, driving was not allowed south of the two designated parking areas. Although couched in terms of a restriction, the Signs also have the effect of designating where and when vehicular traffic is allowable in the AISRA as contemplated by Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code. Subsequent to placing the Signs in the AISRA, Mr. Joseph became concerned that there was confusion over exactly what the Signs allowed and prohibited. Consequently, Mr. Joseph decided to distribute the Information Sheet in an effort to better inform the public of what was acceptable in the AISRA. The Information Sheet (without the map that was attached thereto) provided the following: AMELIA ISLAND STATE RECREATION AREA BEACH ACCESS INFORMATION SHEET DNR's policy to regulate beach driving is clearly established. The Division of Recreation and Parks (DRP), with management authority for Amelia Island State Recreation Area (AISRA), is charged with the multiple tasks of providing maximum access for recreational pursuits with protection of Florida's natural values and rare and fragile resources. Beginning April 1, 1992, and continuing until October 31, 1992, a seasonal program of beach access will prohibit vehicular beach access to the southernmost tip of Amelia Island within AISRA. Pedestrian access to the south tip is encouraged during this period. Vehicular parking will be allowed during this period from AISRA boundaries to signs posted on the beach. Access to, and parking on the beach in these areas will be allowed on the hard sand beach area below the high tide line. No driving or parking will be allowed above the high tide line. The entire beach will be closed to parking and driving during high tide and after sunset. The seasonal program of beach access will continue until October 31, 1992, whereupon beach driving and parking will again be permitted on the entire beach within AISRA below the high tide line. Absence of vehicles from the south tip will further protect one of only three designated Critical Wildlife Areas (CWA) in Northeast Florida. Several listed species utilize the Amelia Island CWA, including american oystercatchers and the threatened least tern. During nesting season, park visitors should avoid walking within a 100 yard perimeter of the designated CWA. Adult birds must remain on the nest during the day to protect eggs and hatchlings from the intense heat from the sun. Even temporary abandonment may cause the eggs to literally bake. The boundaries of the CWA will be designated by red and white nesting area signs. The program will improve nesting habitat for marine turtles. The absence of artificial lights, and vehicular traffic will combine with the natural beach profile to enhance nesting. Amelia Island State Recreation Area now offers a recreational experience available nowhere else on Amelia Island. The ability to walk a stretch of the island which is undeveloped, pristine, and un-impacted, with a chance to view native wildlife that has been excluded elsewhere to the brink of extinction. For more information, please contact the Talbot Islands State Park Ranger Station on Little Talbot, or call (904) 251-2320. SUMMARY OF RESTRICTIONS (April 1, 1992 - October 31, 1992) No driving on the beach after sunset. No driving on the beach at high tide. Driving allowed on hard sand beach only. (below previous high tide line) See attached map for authorized parking areas. Petitioners' exhibit 2 and Respondent's exhibit 1. The Information Sheet was distributed to persons entering the AISRA. Although the Signs and the Information Sheet are limited to a particular period of time, the evidence established that the decisions of the Department evidenced by the Signs and the Information Sheet will apply to future years also. The parties have characterized the action of the Department evidenced on the Signs and in the Information Sheet as a restriction on parking and beach vehicular traffic. Because driving and parking on the beach has historically continued in the AISRA, from a practical standpoint, the Signs and Information Sheet do impose a restriction. Technically and legally, however, without the designation of appropriate parking areas on the Signs and the Information Sheet, parking and vehicular traffic on the beach of the AISRA was already prohibited or restricted in the AISRA pursuant to Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code. The Signs and Information Sheet constitute a designation by the Department, pursuant to Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code, of when and where driving and parking is permitted in the AISRA and not a ban on driving or parking. The Signs and Information Sheet apply to any person who uses the AISRA. It has no application to other areas operated or managed by the Division. The Signs and Information Sheet inform the public of two separate decisions of the Department. The Petitioners have challenged the action of the Department evidenced by the Signs and Information Sheet to the extent that the public is informed of the Department's first decision: the decision to begin enforcement of the ban on driving and parking in state parks set out in Rules 16D-2.002(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioners have not, however, challenged action of the Department evidenced by the Signs and Information Sheet to the extent that the public is informed of the Department's second decision: the decision to designate the acceptable areas and times for beach vehicular traffic and parking in the AISRA. By enforcing the prohibition against beach driving in the AISRA, vehicular traffic is no longer able, at least from April 1 to October 31 of each year, to access the beaches of the undeveloped, privately-owned tracts of land north of the AISRA from the south. Therefore, pursuant to the Final Judgment on Remand, vehicular traffic is allowed to travel from the beach access road located to the north of the property of the Petitioners (other than the Board), to the south on the beaches running through the Petitioners' property. The challenge to the Signs and Information Sheet as an unpromulgated rule in case numbers 92-4912RU and 92-4913RX were dismissed by a Final Order entered simultaneously with this Recommended Order.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent committed violations alleged in an Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a school psychologist. At all times material to this case, Respondent was a member of the Classroom Teachers Association (CTA) Bargaining Unit. At all times material to this case, Respondent was receiving benefits under a valid claim for Workers' Compensation benefits arising from an accident on January 7, 2000. In conjunction with investigations as to Respondent's eligibility for Workers' Compensation benefits, video surveillance of Respondent's activities was conducted on several occasions. At the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year, Dr. Laakso worked for Petitioner as a school psychologist in Area 3, and was assigned to Palm Beach Lakes High School, Forest Hill High School, and Conniston Middle School. His immediate supervisor was Mary Kate Boyle, the Area 3 Exceptional Student Education (ESE) Team Leader. On January 7, 2000, Dr. Laakso was working in his car while parked in the Palm Beach Lakes High School parking lot, and when exiting the car, hit his head on the door jamb causing a compression of his spine. He then received a second injury to his back while pulling psychological testing kits out of his car. Dr. Laakso submitted this injury to Petitioner as a workers' compensation injury, and it was covered as such. Christopher Brown, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon and one of Dr. Laakso's workers' compensation physicians, treated Dr. Laakso. On February 8, 2000, Dr. Brown placed Dr. Laakso on a "no-work" status. Dr. Laakso suffers from cervical spinal stenosis, which is a narrowing of the spinal canal. Because Dr. Laakso had underlying spinal stenosis secondary to arthritis, combined with disc herniations, his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Brown, diagnosed Dr. Laakso's stenosis as severe. Also on February 8, 2000, Ms. Boyle held an investigative meeting with Respondent and his then-attorney, Stephen Fried, to discuss Respondent's continued absences since January 7, 2000 (the date of Respondent's workers' compensation injury) and his work status. In a letter to Dr. Laakso dated February 9, 2000, Ms. Boyle explained what her expectations were with regard to Respondent's absence and work status. On February 9, 2000, Dr. Laakso requested unpaid sick leave for January 11, 2000 to May 31, 2000, which the School Board granted. In March of 2000, Dr. Laakso was released back to light duty work, with restrictions. Some of the physical restrictions placed on Dr. Laakso's activities included no overhead use of the right upper extremity and no heavy use of the right upper extremity greater than 5 pounds. In addition, Dr. Laakso was told to be careful and to try not to hurt himself. Dr. Brown also imposed a 10 mile driving restriction on Dr. Laakso because Dr. Brown believed Dr. Laakso's spinal stenosis placed him at increased risk if he hit his head or was in a car accident. Dr. Laakso argued against the driving restriction because he was capable of driving and believed that the restriction would "mess things up" if he was unable to use his car. Dr. Laakso neither asked for the driving restriction nor represented that he needed the restriction.4 Dr. Laakso conveyed the driving restrictions to both Ms. Boyle and Linda Meyers in Risk Management. On March 21, 2000, Dr. Laakso was given a light duty placement in which he was assigned to Atlantic High School watching the school's security cameras. This assignment was for Dr. Laakso's regularly scheduled 7.5 hours a day, and was within the physical and driving restrictions imposed by Dr. Brown. While on light duty assignment at Atlantic High School, Dr. Laakso reported to Assistant Principal, Marshall Bellin. Dr. Laakso also submitted his time sheets to Mr. Bellin for Mr. Bellin's verification and signature. After Mr. Bellin signed the light duty time sheets, Dr. Laakso faxed them to Ms. Boyle for payroll purposes. Around this time period, in approximately April of 2000, the third party administrator, FARA, who handles the School Board's Workers' Compensation claims, hired private investigator Richard Mains to conduct surveillance of Dr. Laakso. Mains observed Dr. Laakso at various times from April 3, 2000 through October 2, 2000. Mains documented Respondent's driving to and from his Matlacha home and the activities in which he engaged while there. Mains did not know whether Dr. Laakso was taking pain or anti-inflammatory medication, or whether Dr. Laakso was under the influence of these types of medications at the times Mains observed him. On May 17, 2000, Ms. Boyle held another investigative meeting regarding Respondent's absences while on light duty. The minutes from that meeting indicate that Ms. Boyle expressed her concern to Dr. Laakso regarding his absences, discussed his light duty assignment at Atlantic High School, and directed him to call her beeper if he was going to be absent. He was also directed to provide a doctor's note if he was absent. Dr. Laakso remained in the light duty assignment at Atlantic High School for the remainder of the 1999-2000 school year. On Wednesday, August 9, 2000, the first day of the 2000-2001 school year, Dr. Laakso again reported to Atlantic High School to resume his light duty placement. On August 15, 2000, Marshall Bellin signed Respondent's light duty sign-in sheet, which covered Dr. Laakso's work attendance for August 9, 10, 11, and 14, 2000. Around August 14 or 15, 2000, Dr. Laakso received verbal notification that because his driving restriction had been lifted, he was being taken off light duty assignment and was to report to Area 3. Prior to this verbal notification, Dr. Laakso had not been advised by his physicians that his driving restriction had been lifted. However, he subsequently learned through someone at the Risk Management Department that, in fact, the driving restriction had been lifted. Upon hearing the news, Dr. Laakso contacted Dr. Brown. When he went to see Dr. Brown, Dr. Brown explained to Respondent that the Board had sent him a questionnaire asking whether he believed that Dr. Laakso could drive a car as opposed to whether he should drive a car. Dr. Brown further explained that he responded that Dr. Laakso could drive a car, but felt he had made a mistake as he felt it was still dangerous for Dr. Laakso to drive. Accordingly, on August 17, 2000, Dr. Brown reinstated Dr. Laakso's driving restriction of no more than 10 minutes. On August 17, 2000, Dr. Laakso sent a memo to Ms. Boyle indicating that his driving restriction had been reinstated. A copy of the note from Dr. Brown was attached to this memo. Because of her continuing concern regarding Respondent's absences, on October 2, 2000, Ms. Boyle held another "investigative meeting" regarding Dr. Laakso's absences. This meeting resulted in Boyle's issuing Dr. Laakso a written reprimand for unacceptable and unexcused absences, failure to call in intended absences as required, and insubordination. The written reprimand specifically addressed Dr. Laakso's absences on August 9, 10, 11, 22, and September 20, 27, 28, and 29. Ms. Boyle believed her issuance of the written reprimand dated October 2, 2000, was consistent with the progressive discipline policy. At the time that Ms. Boyle wrote the reprimand, she also notified the District's Professional Standards Department and requested a formal investigation of Respondent's absences. Ms. Boyle then contacted Ray Miller in Professional Standards to be sure that she was following appropriate procedure. In October of 2000, Ray Miller received Respondent's case for investigation, and the investigation was assigned case number 101. Specifically, Miller investigated allegations involving Respondent's misuse of leave, unauthorized absence, failure to call in and report absences as required, and insubordination for the time period of January 2000 through December 2000. At the time of his interview with Respondent, Miller had a surveillance video and a report of Respondent's activities for April of 2000. Respondent neither denied that he was the subject of the video nor that he failed to report and call in his absences. Shortly before December 4, 2000, Miller signed off on the investigative report for case number 101, and on December 4, 2000, Paul Lachance issued a letter to Dr. Laakso indicating that the investigation was complete, and that a determination of probable cause had been made. The investigative report was then reviewed by the Case Management Review Committee to determine whether there was just cause to recommend discipline and, if so, provide a discipline recommendation. The Committee found just cause and recommended Dr. Laakso's termination. A number of meetings were held in December 2000 with representatives of Petitioner, Dr. Laakso, and his then- attorney, Mr. Fried. As a result of these meetings, an informal settlement was reached; Dr. Laakso's employment was not terminated, but rather he was transferred to the Area 1 ESE office. By a letter to the file dated January 8, 2001, Paul Lachance, Director of Professional Standards, administratively closed case number 01-101 against Dr. Laakso with "no action." While assigned to Area 1, Dr. Laakso was under the supervision of Area 1 ESE Team Leader, Paul Sayrs. As supervisor, Mr. Sayrs was responsible for keeping track of Respondent's attendance. Accordingly, Sayrs directed Respondent to call and notify secretary Judy Fabris if he was going to be absent, who in turn would notify Mr. Sayrs. While assigned to Area 1, Dr. Laakso missed work for several days in January and February 2001, and was also out for most of March and April 2001. On April 4, 2001, Mr. Sayrs sent Dr. Laakso a letter listing the dates of his absences and directing him to submit a doctor's note for the dates listed, as well as for any future absences. The next day, April 5, 2001, Mr. Sayrs sent another letter to Dr. Laakso advising him he was currently absent without approved leave. Mr. Sayrs advised Respondent further that due to an absence of correspondence from Respondent, Mr. Sayrs would assume Respondent had decided to discontinue working for Petitioner and Respondent's name would be submitted to the School Board for acceptance of Respondent's resignation. Dr. Laakso immediately contacted Dr. Sachs regarding Mr. Sayrs' request for medical documentation, but was unable to get an appointment with Dr. Sachs until April 20th. However, prior to his April 20th appointment, Dr. Laakso forwarded to Dr. Sachs a copy of the District's letter, which indicated he would be terminated if he did not provide the requested documentation prior to his appointment on April 20th. In response, Dr. Sachs accounted for Dr. Laakso's absences, noting they were due to his symptoms and cervical condition. Additionally, Dr. Laakso followed through by faxing his Request for Leave of Absence without Pay form with his signature, dated April 18, 2001, directly to Dr. Sachs for his signature. The leave was ultimately granted retroactive to March 8, 2001, prior to Dr. Laakso's being terminated by the District. On April 18, 2001, Dr. Laakso sent a handwritten note to Dan McGrath explaining his absences. Dr. Laakso attached to his note to Mr. McGrath two documents from Dr. Sachs, one dated April 15, 2001, and the other dated April 6, 2000. On May 18, 2001, Paul Sayrs evaluated Dr. Laakso's performance. The evaluation sheet indicated that Dr. Laakso was "presently on a medical leave of absence." Dr. Laakso has a second home in Matlacha, located on the other side of Cape Coral. Matlacha is located in the Fort Myers area and is approximately 150 miles from the West Palm Beach area, roughly a three-hour trip using country roads. Because he had not been feeling well, Dr. Laakso had not been taking care of his property in Matlacha. As a result, he received notices from the county telling him he needed to clear up the property or face a potential daily fine of $225. Specifically, the county informed Dr. Laakso that he needed to mow the grass, move a boat, register a pickup truck, and park the truck somewhere where it was not in open view. He asked for an extension in which to do these things, which was granted. However, the county advised Dr. Laakso that if he did not get the work done by the date established, the daily fine would be imposed. Although while at his Matlacha home Dr. Laakso did work outside of the restrictions imposed on him by his physician, he could work for 20 or 30 minutes and then go inside and rest, unlike when he was at work for the School Board, which required he work a full eight-hour day. While he was on his Matlacha property, he continued his daily swimming as part of his physical therapy, which he had discussed with, and received approval for, from Dr. Brown. At no time did Dr. Laakso attempt to hide the fact that he drove to the Matlacha property or that he worked in his yard while there. In fact, he disclosed this information when deposed in his workers' compensation case, and he discussed it with his doctor. While the doctor did not give Dr. Laakso permission for this type of conduct, Dr. Laakso did discuss it with him.5 Following the closing of the first investigation numbered 101, the office of Professional Standards received a memo from Diane Howard, Director of Risk Management, dated January 9, 2001. Ms. Howard was requesting a reinvestigation of Dr. Laakso's absences. In response to this memo, Miller did not interview Respondent, but instead viewed surveillance videotapes from August 11 through October 1 or 2, 2000. In addition to the videos, Miller reviewed memos from Nancy Patrick, Mary Kate Boyle, and Paul Sayrs. Miller testified that the difference between this investigation and the previous one was that it involved a different period of time, both for the videos and regarding issues of Respondent's attendance in January, February, and March of 2001. The allegations against Respondent for this investigation were that he was obtaining leave due to sickness or illness and that he was performing actions that were inconsistent with his alleged illness or sickness. This second investigation followed the same pattern as the first and was sent to the Committee for review. The Committee again recommended Dr. Laakso's termination. Dr. Laakso timely requested an administrative hearing, and these proceedings followed. The collective bargaining agreement describes procedures for discipline of employees, including this: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. The collective bargaining agreement also requires progressive discipline (reprimand through dismissal) . . . [e]xcept in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the district or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered in this case dismissing all charges in the Administrative Compliant, reinstating Respondent to his position of employment with the School Board, and providing Respondent with such back pay and attendant benefits as are authorized by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2003.
The Issue By this petition the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish commission (GFWFC) seeks administrative review of Respondent's, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), denial of a permit to operate a swimming facility at the J. W. Corbett Wildlife Management Area, Palm Beach County, Florida, in connection with its operation of the Everglades Youth Camp. Four witnesses were called by Petitioner, Six witnesses were called by Respondent, twenty exhibits were offered into evidence, and sixteen exhibits were admitted. Objection to the admission of Exhibits 6, 7 and 8 was sustained on the ground that the photographs could not be identified by a witness who could testify to the accuracy of the photographs. Objection to the admission of Exhibit 14, a copy of a letter from Geotec, Inc., to the Youth Camp was sustained on the ground that it was hearsay. Subsequently, however, testimony was adduced that Respondent relied in part upon the exhibits not admitted in denying the permit requested.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, GFWFC, has operated a youth camp at the J. W. Corbett Wildlife Management Area in Palm Beach County for the past six years. The camp is attended by youths of both sexes, ages 8 to 14 years. Normal facilities expected at a camp of this nature, including a sewage treatment plant, are provided. During the summer camp period 90 to 110 campers per week are enrolled. At other times the facilities are utilized on weekends by scout groups and clubs. A six-acre lake with a maximum depth of 6 to 8 feet forms an essential part of the recreation facilities of the camp. Over the years GFWFC has removed silt from the lake and most of the area now used for swimming has a white sand bottom. There are no streams that feed the lake. The water level in the lake is maintained by the ground water table in the area. During the camp season the lake is used by swimmers twice per day--once in the morning and once in the afternoon. Bacteriological samples of the water are taken at weekly intervals during the camping season and more frequently if the coliform count is high. Medical records of the camp indicate the only water-related diseases experienced by the campers has been ear infections which average 5 to 10 per week. As a result of the incidence of ear infections the doctor recommended ear drops be administered to all swimmers. The Director of the camp recalled only one time when the coliform count reached 1,000 organisms per 100 milliliters. On that occasion he put chlorine in the lake and the coliform count returned to a low reading. Exhibit 3 shows most probable number (MPN) coliform count per 100 milliliters in the youth camp lake in July and August, 1974 and 1974, during the camping season to vary between 1 and 450, for an average of approximately 115 coliform organisms per 100 milliliters. Recently Petitioner pumped down the lake to remove accumulated silt, regrade the lake to reduce surface water runoff into the lake and to create an outfall to permit water to flow out of the lake. During this evolution the question of a permit arose and after application therefor was made by Petitioner, Respondent refused to issue the permit which is required by Chapter 514, F.S. for the operation of a public swimming place. In the application for permit (Exhibit 1) submitted by Petitioner the information required by 504.03 F.S. and Rule 10D-5.24 F.A.C. was included. Palm Beach County Health authorities consider no lake that does not receive flushing from a spring or artesian source to be a natural swimming place or able to qualify for a permit. These authorities recommended denial of the permit in the instant case. They consider all of the small lakes west of the coastal ridge in Palm Beach County to be not lakes, but mere depressions in the ground which receive their water supply from the ground water table. The reasons for denial of the permit by HRS are shown in Exhibit 2 as follows: "1. Non-compliance with Subsection 10D-5.24(1) FAC in that sanitary surveys show no water flow-through or feed to the requested pond area except by surface run-off and/or rainfall; water from ground water table may possibly provide a minimal source of water when the head pressure of the filled pond is eliminated. Accordingly, there is no flushing of said pond. The pond being in a non-fenced area in a natural habitat is not protected from animal body pollution, and additionally, will be receiving bather pollution. With no flow-through, bathtub-like conditions described above, the subject pond constitutes an area by or through which the health or life of individuals may be threatened or impaired or directly or indirectly disease may be caused (386.01 F.S. and 10D-5.24 FAC). The marl shores and sides of the pond retain water and thereby are capable of retaining water-borne diseases. There is a high likelihood the pond will be subject to high turbidity in the bathing area. In the past the bacterial quality of the pond water has been erratic. * * * 8. (sic) That the holding out of the pond subject herein by the Commission in a youth camp under the conditions described above places, and in fact encourages, the use of said facility by young people and subjects them to a high probability and potential risk dangerous to their health and the health of the community and the health of the people of the State of Florida, contrary to the injunction of the Legislature of the State of Florida to this agency to protect and oversee the public health (Chapters 381, 386, 514 F.S.)." In conducting a sanitary survey Palm Beach County officials consider all other forms of pollution in addition to the possible sources of sewage contamination and industrial wastes specified in Rule 10D-5.24(1) F.A.C. These "other forms of pollution" are interpreted by Palm Beach County officials to include plant nutrients, organic chemicals, heat, and any and all forms of pollution that could cause health problems including wild animals having access to the lake, sedimentation, turbidity of the water, decaying vegetation, and water retention capability of the lake boundary. Otherwise stated they consider all scientific information available on pollution in determining whether or not a natural swimming place will be granted a permit. There are no fresh water natural swimming places in Palm Beach County that have current permits. HRS in denying the permit in the instant case relied heavily upon the recommendation of Palm Beach County. HRS considers natural swimming places should be as free from pollution and communicable diseases as possible. Without some flushing of the system pollutants will increase, principally from use by bathers, and these pollutants will remain in the water for a long time. No evidence was submitted regarding the dissipation of pollutants by aeration, bacteria, animal life, etc. In order for the youth camp lake to meet the dilution criteria considered necessary by HRS, 50,000 gallons of water per day into the lake is required. Otherwise the water would need filtering and the addition of approximately 1,000 pounds of chlorine per day. In denying the permit HRS adopted the position of Palm Beach County that flushing of the lake was necessary in order to dilute the pollutants. Leon County Health officials use only the criteria listed in Rule 100- 5.24 F.A.C. in determining whether or not to recommend granting a permit for a natural public bathing place. The bacteriological survey is done by Leon County rather than by the applicant. Several lakes in Leon County have been issued permits. Some in U.S. National Forests were formerly permitted while operated by a concessionaire, but now that they are operated by the Forestry Division no permit is applied for. Some of the lakes used as natural swimming places in Leon County have no source of water supply other than the ground water table. The bacteria count is taken at weekly intervals and at lakes which get heavy usage the coliform count exceeds 1,000 organisms per 100 milliliters following heavy Sunday afternoon usage. The coliform count can be reduced by the use of chlorine; however, there is no assurance in natural swimming places that the chlorine will be evenly distributed or that all areas of the lake will receive chlorine. Other natural swimming places in Leon County are used by swimmers but a permit has not been recommended by the county because the coliform count is over 1,000 organisms per 100 milliliters. A national committee on water quality criteria for swimming pools and bathing places has recommended discontinuance of the use of total coliform count in determining the condition of the water from a public health standpoint. They would use only fecal coliform count and recommend that all factors that may pollute the water be considered and that dilution of the pollution by the flow- through of water should be a requirement for bathing places. Other witnesses for HRS attested to the dangers to the health of swimmers using the same water used by other swimmers, wild animals, and waterfowl. Swimmers pollute the water with fecal coliforms, virulent diptheria organisms from the nose and throat, as well as streptococci, staphylococci and other flagellates in nasal paryngeal passages. Wild animals, notably raccoons, carry rabies, meningitis germs and salmonella. Waterfowl cause other diseases and droppings from these waterfowl remain viable on the lake bottom for years. Similarly, tetanus germs are carried in water by the soil. As a result water related injuries are subject to tetanus infection.
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A. Filed January 21, 2011 10:24 AM Division of Administrative Hearings DCA Order No. DCA11-GM-007
Other Judicial Opinions OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies haye been furnished by U.S. Mail or Electronic May to each of the persons listed below on this day of January, 2011. / a Paula Ford Agency Clerk By U.S. Mail The Honorable Bram D. E. Canter Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 By Electronic Mail Amy Taylor Petrick, Esquire Assistant County Attorney Palm Beach County 300 North Dixie Highway, Suite 359 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Gary K. Hunter, Esquire Vinette D. Godelia, Esquire Hopping Green & Sams 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 33301 Richard Grosso, Esquire Robert N. Hartsell, Esquire Everglades Law Center, Inc. Shepard Broad Law Center 3305 College Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 DCA Order No. DCA11-GM-007
Findings Of Fact The Guana River Marsh Aquatic Preserve (the Preserve) is state-owned property. Title is held by the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. It includes some 13 miles of Atlantic Ocean beach within St. Johns County. Within the boundaries of the Preserve is included the Guana River State Park (the Park). It, too, is state-owned. It is managed and operated by the Division of Recreation and Parks (the DRP) of the Department of Environmental Protection (the DEP). Some of the Preserve's Atlantic Ocean beaches are included within the boundaries of the Park. The "wet sand," or "hard sand," area of the Atlantic Ocean beaches in the Preserve is the area of the beach between mean high water and mean low water. The mean high water line is essentially the landward extent of the ocean at mean high tide; the mean low water line is essentially the landward extent of the ocean at mean low tide. When the tide is low, this entire area of the beach is exposed. It remains wet and, generally, relatively hard-packed during the time it is exposed. However, there are beds of "red shell" in this part of the beach that are softer. In the summer, this part of the beach averages approximately 50 feet in width. In the winter, when the waves and tides generally are higher, it is narrower. In the Preserve, the mean high water line usually is indicated both by debris washed up during the highest tides and left on the beach and by a "shelf." This "shelf," made by the erosive action of the ocean waves during the highest tides and during storms, rises at an angle of approximately 45 degrees and can be from one to four or five feet high. Landward of this shelf is the "dry sand" or "soft sand" beach, also sometimes referred to as the "upper beach." It extends landward from the mean high water line to the vegetation line, where the dunes start. Usually, some pioneer vegetation is found in the uppermost reaches of this part of the beach, forming what is called the "foredune" area of the beach. The tides along the Atlantic Ocean beaches in the Preserve are semi- diurnal, i.e., there usually are two high tides and two low tides a day. These high and low tides last approximately one hour, and each day they occur approximately an hour later than they did the day before. There are five beach access points with motor vehicle parking areas located along U.S. Highway A1A within the Preserve. Three are within the Park. There is parking for approximately 120, 68, 79, 42 and 25 vehicles in these five parking areas. There also is a current proposal for the addition of three more access points in the Park, with parking for a total of 340 vehicles, five beach bathhouses, and five pedestrian overpasses. There are many other places where pedestrians can walk from A1A to the beaches, including 30 County-controlled access points. But there are no lawful parking areas adjacent to any of these other access points at this time, and parking on the right-of-way of A1A is prohibited. Currently, the only lawful motor vehicle access to the Atlantic Ocean beaches in the Preserve is to the south of the Preserve. Prior to the agency action challenged in these proceedings, motor vehicles lawfully could be driven onto the beach at this access point and be driven north into the Preserve, so long as they remained below the mean high water line. A former access near the north end of the Preserve has been cordoned off. To leave the Preserve, motor vehicles would have to be turned around and driven back south to the same motor vehicle access point. Due to the restricted access to the Atlantic Ocean beaches in the Preserve, not much use is made of those beaches. In comparison, beaches to the south are used much more heavily. Of the relatively few who use the motor vehicle access to the south and drive on the beach north through the Preserve, some ultimately use the beaches to picnic, swim, surf, beach-comb and similar activities; some probably just drive on the beach. There was no evidence quantifying the uses currently being made of the beaches in the Preserve. In the past, homemade motor vehicles called "skeeters" were built with a light-weight chassis and over-sized wheels. They were used for driving on both the hard and soft areas of the beaches, as well as illegally in the dunes. This practice has been curtailed due to better enforcement of the prohibitions against driving in the dunes, a generally heightened environmental consciousness among the public, and prohibitions against driving the "skeeters" on public highways. Generally, there has been less driving on the beaches of the Preserve in recent years, although the practice persists at a reduced level. At all times of the year, it sometimes is impossible to drive along the entire length of the beaches in the Preserve without driving on the soft sand area. This is especially true during the winter months when the waves and tides are higher and storms are more frequent. But even in the summer months, there are times when "red shell beds" in the "wet sand" part of the beach must be circumvented to avoid getting stuck. Especially when the tide is not at its lowest, the only way to avoid some of these "red shell" beds is to drive over the "shelf" and onto the "soft sand." Depending on the tides, this may also be necessary in order to turn a vehicle around on the beach. In many places, the "soft sand" area is not very wide, and it would be necessary under those circumstances to drive in the "foredune" area. The times of the daily high and low tides can be obtained relatively easily by members of the public. But there is no assurance that all persons who would drive on the beaches would know the times of the tides. Nor is there any assurance that persons who drive the "wet sand" or "hard sand" part of the beaches at low tide also would plan to both start their beach drive and their return trip during low enough tides to be able to avoid driving on the "soft sand" part of the beach. For these and other reasons, it would be difficult, if not practically impossible, to effectively monitor beach driving throughout the Preserve and consistently enforce a restriction to driving only on the "wet sand" or "hard sand" areas of the beach. In the summer months, sea turtles lay eggs in nests dug in the sand of the foredune and dune areas of the Atlantic Ocean beaches in the Preserve. After a period of incubation in the nests, the turtle hatchlings dig themselves out of the nests and crawl to the ocean to begin their lives in the sea. Driving motor vehicles over nests on those parts of the beaches in the summer months could crush eggs in their nests or pack the sand hard enough to reduce the number of hatchlings that emerge from the nest alive. In addition, driving motor vehicles in these area, even in other parts of the year, can leave ruts in the beach that disorient hatchlings that leave the nests in summer so that fewer reach the ocean alive. Sea turtles crawl out of the ocean to their nest sites at night. Artificial lighting can disturb their nesting and egg-laying activities. However, it seems that moving lights, or lights that turn on and off (in the manner of car lights), create more of a disturbance than stationary lights, such as those more often found at residences along the beaches in the Preserve. The Management Plan does not prohibit artificial lighting along the beaches in the Preserve, but it recommends that further attention be given to this problem and that ways to address the problem be explored and pursued in cooperation with the County. Various shore birds, including the threatened least tern, make their nests in the foredune area of the beaches in the Preserve. Driving on the foredunes destroys and disturbs nesting habitat and disturbs the nesting activities of these birds. In addition, both these ground nesting shore birds and a variety of migratory birds make use of different areas of the beaches to rest and feed. Driving on the beaches disturbs these activities, as well. The only known nesting colony of least terns in St. Johns County is located in the Park, where beach driving is prohibited. The Division of Parks and Recreation (DPR) of the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has utilized F.A.C. Rule 16D-2.002(4)-(5) to prohibit driving or parking motor vehicles on the beaches of the Park by not designating the beaches as driving or parking areas within the Park. At least parts of the beaches in the Park have been posted as areas where driving motor vehicles is prohibited. In order to develop a management plan for the Preserve, the manager of the Preserve personally researched the geology, climate and natural resources of the Preserve, as well as the records of the County, and also collected data pertaining to the Preserve from several state agencies. Over the course of a year, the manager's input was taken into consideration, and a management plan, called the Guana River Marsh Aquatic Preserve Management Plan (the Management Plan), was developed for the Preserve. It was adopted by the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund on December 17, 1991. The Management Plan recites in pertinent part: At the present time, motorized vehicular traffic is permitted, by county ordinance, below the natural vegetation line on the beaches adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean in St. Johns County. Vehicles are not allowed on the 4.2 miles of beach within Guana River State Park. The coarse coquina sand and steep profiles of the beaches in the preserve make driving on the wet sand area difficult. Drivers are forced to cross the dry sand area, damaging the foredunes, pioneer dune vegetation and sea turtle nesting habitat. Due to the negative environmental impacts resulting from this activity, motorized vehicular traffic shall not be considered an authorized activity on sovereign submerged lands within [Prime Resource Protection Area] PRPA beach management areas of the preserve, and therefore will be prohibited. Under the Management Plan, all of the Atlantic Ocean beaches in the Preserve are Prime Resource Protection Area, and the driving of motorized vehicles on them is prohibited. On June 11, 1993, the DEP's DRP sent St. Johns County a letter advising that, based on the Management Plan, DEP no longer would permit the driving of motor vehicles on the Atlantic Ocean beaches in the Preserve. The proposed amendment to F.A.C. Rule 18-20.004(7), incorporating the Management Plan, was noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly on August 6, 1993. On or about August 18, 1993, the DEP agreed not to enforce the beach driving prohibition in the Preserve until these cases are resolved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order enforcing the prohibitions contained in both F.A.C. Rule 16D-2.002(4)-(5) and the proposed amendment to F.A.C. Rule 18-20.004 against the driving of motor vehicles on the beaches on the Atlantic Ocean beaches in St. Johns County that are within the Guana River Marsh Aquatic Preserve. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3970 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Accepted and incorporated. 2.-6. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 7. Subordinate and unnecessary. 8.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First sentence, rejected as not proven. There also is access by boat and, albeit over longer distances, by foot. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted in part and rejected in part, as reflected in the Findings of Fact. Accepted as representative of dead low tide. Subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected in part: in that there are "red shell beds" in summer, too, and they can force drivers onto the "soft sand" areas in summer, too, depending on the tides; in that "dramatically" is argument and not proven; and in that Exhibit 2 depicts dead low tide in summer. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven. (Enforcement of such mitigation would be impracticable or impossible.) Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. 20.-21. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, accepted that the County uses "due care," but enforcement of a prohibition against driving anywhere except on the "hard sand" is impracticable or impossible. Rejected as not proven. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that there is "no way to get to many beach areas" or that limited access "restricts traditional use." (Access as limited, or more limited, is "traditional.") 25.-27. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. (How easy it is depends entirely on the tide, the number and location of people on the beach, and the presence of "red shell" beds.) Accepted and incorporated. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted and incorporated except to the extent conclusion of law and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 6.-20. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not concluson of law, subordinate or unnecessary. 21.-24. Rejected as being conclusion of law. 25.-33. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 34. Rejected as conclusion of law as to who is "responsible." 35.-54. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 55. Rejected as not proven. Also, conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel J. Bosanko, Esquire Assistant County Attorney St. Johns County Post Office Box 1533 St. Augustine, Florida 32085-1533 Edwin A. Steinmeyer, Esquire Barrie J. Sawyer, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue Whether Application #01109-L and Application #01109-J for a public water supply system to serve approximately 17,500 acres of land in Lee County, Florida, should be granted and a permit issued by the South Florida Water Management District.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that a water use permit be issued to the applicant pursuant to Applications #01109-J and #01109-L for a total annual allocation of 1.64 BGY for ten (10) years subject to the thirty-one (31) limiting conditions attached to the "Florida Cities Water Company" report, which report is a part of the record of this case. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of January, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen A. Walker, Esquire South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box V West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 Ross A. McVoy, Esquire 318 North Monroe Street Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Terry F. Lenick, Esquire Assistant County Attorney County of Lee Post Office Box 398 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 =================================================================
