The Issue Whether the applicants own the property in question? Whether the project would comply with the criteria of the South Florida Water Management District contained in Basis of Review for Surface Water Management Systems, specifically Sections 3.1.3 and 3.2? Whether flood protection would be inadequate or septic tanks unsuitable or whether the public health and safety would be compromised or the ultimate purchasers be deprived of usage of the property due to inundation in violation of Chapter 373, Florida Statutes (1981), or Rule 40E-4.301(1), Florida Administrative Code?
Findings Of Fact Ms. Williamson and Messrs. Leggett and Collins hold in fee simple a triangular 117.24-acre parcel in Okeechobee County as tenants in common under a warranty deed executed in their favor by one W. C. Sherman. They propose to develop the property as a trailer park (complete with airstrip) large enough to accommodate 109 trailers. To this end, soil would be dug up from the center of the property and used to raise the elevation of the surrounding land above the 100-year floodplain. (T. 47) The applicants have a dredging permit from the Department of Environmental Regulation authorizing them to excavate 629,889 cubic yards. They are proposing to dig to a depth of 76 feet below ground. This would create an 18-acre body of water ("Poe's Lake") which would overflow a V-notched weir into a county canal. The county canal would take the water to C- 38, one of the large canals to which the Kissimmee River has been relegated, at a point about 18 miles upstream from Lake Okeechobee. Runoff would wash over residential lots and roadways; the site would be graded to assure drainage into Poe's Lake. The minimum road crest elevation would be 30 feet NGVD ("[a]round twenty-nine feet" T.52), as compared to the control elevation for surface waters of 28.5 feet NGVD. WATER QUALITY The developers plan septic tanks for wastewater treatment. At the close of all the evidence, counsel for the applicants stated that sanitary sewers could be installed instead. Respondents' Proposed Recommended Order, p. With all the housing units in use, at least 10,900 gallons of effluent would seep into the ground from the tanks daily. There would be some evapotranspiration, but all the chemicals dissolved in the effluent would eventually end up in the groundwater. During the dry season, septic tank effluent would cause mounding of the groundwater and some groundwater movement toward, and eventual seepage into, Poe's Lake. The eventual result would be eutrophication and the growth of algae or macrophytes on the surface of Poe's Lake. This would cause dissolved oxygen violations in Poe's Lake. Discharges from the lake would inevitably occur, aggravating the situation in C-38, which already experiences dissolved oxygen levels below 5.0 milligrams per liter in the rainy summer months. Some fraction of the nutrients in the effluent from the septic tanks would ultimately reach Lake Okeechobee itself. The sheer depth of the excavation would create another water quality problem. Under the anaerobic conditions that would obtain at the bottom of Poe's Lake, bacteria acting on naturally occurring sulfates would produce hydrogen sulfide, ammonia and various other reduced organic nitrogen compounds. These substances are toxic to human beings and would, in some indeterminate quantity, enter the groundwater from Poe's Lake. This would affect the taste and perhaps the potability of water from any well nearby. It would be "possible to design a better system where there would be nutrient removal and a greatly reduced probability of violation of the dissolved oxygen criterion and obviation of the potential for ground water contamination." (T. 200) Installation of a baffle on the weir would serve to prevent buoyant debris from entering surface waters of the state. BASIS OF REVIEW Official recognition was taken of the "Basis of Review for Surface Water Management Permit Applications Within the South Florid Water Management District," parts of which all parties agree pertain in the present proceedings. Among the criteria stated in this document are: 3.1.3 Waste and Wastewater Service - Potable water and wastewater facilities must be identified. The Applicant for a Surface Water Management Permit must provide information on how these services are to be provided. If wastewater disposal is accomplished on-site, additional information will normally be requested regarding separation of waste and storm systems. 3.2.1.4 Flood protection - Building floors shall be above the 100 year flood elevations, as determined from the most appropriate information, including Federal Flood Insurance Rate Maps. Both tidal flooding and the 100 year, 3 day storm event shall be considered in determining elevations. b. Commercial and industrial projects to be subdivided for sale are required to have installed by the permittee, as a minimum, the required water quality system for one inch of runoff detention or one half inch of runoff retention from the total developed site. State standards - Projects shall be designed so that discharges will meet State water quality standards, as set forth in Chapter 17-3, Retention/detention criteria - Retention and/or detention in the overall system, including swales, lakes, canals, greenways, etc., shall be provided for one of the three following criteria or equivalent combinations thereof . . . Wet detention volume shall be provided for the first inch of runoff from the developed project, or the total runoff from a 3-year, 1-hour rainfall event, whichever is greater. Dry detention volume shall be provided equal to 75 percent of the above amounts computed for wet detention. Retention volume shall be provided equal to 50 percent of the above amounts computed for wet detention. 3.2.4.1 Discharge structures should include gratings for safety and maintenance purposes. The use of trash collection screens is desirable. Discharge structures shall include a "baffle" system to encourage discharge from the center of the water column rather than the top or bottom. 3.2.4.4.2 b. Control elevations should be no higher than 2 feet below the minimum road centerline elevation in the area served by the control device in order to protect the road subgrade. Simply detaining runoff before discharging it offsite will not insure that the water quality standards set forth in Chapter 17-3 will be met. Whether the standards are met depends on, among other things, the composition of the runoff. FWF'S INTEREST Among the purposes of the FWF, as stated in its charter, Shall be to further advance the cause of conservation in environmental protection, to perpetuate and conserve fish and wildlife, oil, water, clean air, other resources of the State and so manage the use of all natural resources, that this generation and posterity will receive the maximum benefit from the same. (T. 248-9) Four or five thousand Floridians belong to FWF. FWF members "make use" (T. 250) of the waters of Lake Okeechobee, the Kissimmee River and specifically of the waters in C-38. PROPOSED FINDINGS CONSIDERED The applicants and FWF filed post hearing memoranda and proposed recommended orders including proposed findings of fact which have been considered in preparation of the foregoing findings of fact. They have been adopted, in substance, for the most part. To the extent they have been rejected, they have been deemed unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, cumulative or subordinate.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That SFWMD deny the pending application for surface water management permit. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis J. Powers, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley, Criser & Stewart 400 South County Road Palm Beach 33480 Terrell K. Arline, Esquire 325-C Clematis Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Irene Kennedy Quincey, Esquire 3301 Gun Club Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Charles P. Houston, Esquire 324 Datura Street, Suite 106 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
The Issue The ultimate legal and factual issue in this matter is whether Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc. (Permittees), have provided the Southwest Florida Water Management District (District) with reasonable assurances that the activities they propose to conduct pursuant to Management and Storage of Surface Water (MSSW) General Construction Permit No. 49005837.017 (the Permit) meet the conditions for issuance of permits established in Rules 40D-4.301, 40D-4.302, and 40D- 40.302, Florida Administrative Code. In particular, the issues of fact to be litigated are whether the Project will cause adverse water quality impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands; whether the Project will cause adverse flooding of on-site or off-site property; whether the Project will cause impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities; and whether the Project will adversely affect the property of others.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., are corporations licensed to operate in the State of Florida. The District is the administrative agency charged with the responsibility to conserve, protect, manage, and control water resources within its boundaries pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder as Chapter 40D, Florida Administrative Code. Driscoll resides at 35716 Welby Court, Zephyrhills, Florida 33541, Lot 14, within the Timber Creek 2 Subdivision (Subdivision). Driscoll requested this hearing to show the District that there is a drainage problem on Lots 13 and 14, and the adjacent Geiger property to the south, which should be fixed at this time and as part of the Project. Driscoll wants "Engle Homes to propose a new solution to fix the entire Welby Court Geiger property problem," i.e., from Lots 4 through 14, and not a piecemeal solution as proposed in the Permit modification. The Subdivision Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., developed the Timber Creek 2 Subdivision. Lots 15 through 25 run east to west and are north of Welby Court. Lots 15 and 16 are located north of the cul-de-sac, on the eastern portion of Welby Court. Lots 3 through 14 run west to east, south of Welby Court. Lots 13 and 14 are south of the cul-de-sac on the eastern portion of Welby Court and are across the street and the cul-de-sac from Lots 16 and 15, respectively. Residences exist on Lots 5, and 7 through 14. Driscoll owns Lot 14, a corner lot, which is the southeastern most lot of the Subdivision. Don Geiger (Geiger) owns the land (approximately five acres) south of the property lines of Subdivision Lots 5 through Geiger's northern driveway, essentially a dirt road, runs parallel to Lots 5 through 14. Subsequent to the original construction activity involving the Subdivision, the developer realized that there was an "existing depression" (referenced on Engle Exhibit number 1), south of Lots 7 and 8, and on Geiger's property. Geiger complained to the District about standing water in this area. This depression area is approximately 90 feet long and 30 feet wide which needed to be "drained off" according to Geiger. The depressed area on Geiger's property was most likely caused when Lots 7 through 14 were graded and sodded, which raised the "lots up a few inches" above Geiger's driveway/property. Water is trapped during a storm event between the back yards and the depressed area. As a result, the southern end of the back yards, particularly Lots 7 and 8, and the driveway remain constantly wet. The Project On January 16, 2001, Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., filed MSSW Permit Application No. 49005837.017 with the District, to address the problems with the rear lot grading and the adjacent property. The actual Project area for the permit modification1 includes the southern portions of Lots 4 through 9 and south of the property lot line including Geiger's property. See Finding of Fact 5. The modified permit does not address the drainage area including the back yards of Lot 13 and Driscoll's Lot 14, and the other portion of Geiger's property/driveway to the south. On April 5, 2001, the District issued MSSW Permit No. 49005837.017 to Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., under the provisions of Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 40D-40, Florida Administrative Code, for the modification of a surface water management system to serve the Project area. The proposed Project will involve the construction of a concrete inlet box with a safety grate, storm sewers, and grass swales. Specifically, the project is intended to solve the drainage problems associated with the "existing depression" south of the boundary line for Lots 7 and 8 on Geiger's property (although Lots 4 through 9 ("area 1") are included within the Project area), and the back yards of Lots 7 and 8. A catch basin is proposed to be located south and on the lot line between Lots 8 and 9, which is expected to drain off the water in the depression area to the modified surface water management system. The inlet box will be placed in the corner between Lots 8 and 9. The collected water in the inlet box will be routed underground through a series of 18-inch storm sewer pipe straight north through a drainage easement between Lots 8 and 9 to Welby Court. The underground pipe ties into an existing pipe in front of Lot 9 on the street, then runs east along the Welby Court right-of-way and then north between Lots 19 and 20, and eventually north into a large permitted retention pond, located to the north of the Subdivision which will handle the stormwater. Driscoll's Alleged Drainage Problem There is another distinct drainage area, i.e., "area 2," which includes Geiger's property and the southern portions of Lots 13 and 14, where water drains from south to north into a roadside ditch to Geiger Cemetery Road ("area 3"), which runs south to north and east of Lots 14 and 15. During a September 2001 tropical storm, there was standing water on Geiger's driveway, directly south of Lots 13 and 14, which was present for more than 3 days. This was referred to by Mr. Barrett as a "small drainage problem that could easily be corrected." On the other hand, Geiger says that there is standing water on his driveway, south of Lots 13 and 14, "all the time." This caused Geiger to move his driveway "50 or 60 feet" south. According to Geiger, the berm, which runs across Lots 10 through 14, should be lowered and the backyards reconfigured. But this would be quite disturbing to the neighbors. Therefore, Geiger recommends the placement of drains south of Lots 13 and 14, which would direct the water out to the ditch at Geiger Cemetery Road and away from Driscoll's Lot 14. The modified Permit is not intended to solve this problem, although Driscoll wants this problem fixed. It is not necessary to resolve Driscoll's issue regarding whether there is a drainage problem in and around Driscoll's lot. The two drainage areas 1 and 2 discussed herein are not connected, although they are close in proximity. The solution to the first problem has no impact on the second, and there is no cited statutory or rule requirement that both issues must be addressed in this Permit application. This is Driscoll's quandary. Compliance with Rules 40D-4.301 and 40D-4.302, Florida Administrative Code The Project will not impact wetlands or surface waters. The Project will not adversely impact the value of functions provided to fish and wildlife, and listed species, including aquatic and wetland-dependent species, by wetlands or other surface waters and other water-related resources. The Project will not adversely impact the quality of receiving waters such that the water quality standards will be violated. The Project will not cause adverse secondary impacts to the water resources. The Project will not adversely impact the maintenance of surface or groundwater levels or surface water flows established pursuant to Section 373.042, Florida Statutes. The Project will not cause adverse impacts to a work of the District. The Project is capable, based on generally accepted engineering and scientific principles, of being effectively performed and of functioning as proposed. The Project will be conducted by an entity with financial, legal, and administrative capability of ensuring that the activity will be undertaken in accordance with the terms and conditions of the permit, if issued. The Project will comply with any applicable special basin or geographic area criteria established pursuant to Chapter 40D, Florida Administrative Code, by the District. The Project will not adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare. The Project will not adversely impact the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. The Project will not adversely affect navigation. The Project will not cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The Project will not adversely affect fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the Project. The Project will not adversely affect significant historical and archeological resources. The Project will not cause unacceptable cumulative impacts upon wetlands and other surface waters. The Project area is less than 100 acres. The Project does not require dredging or filling of wetlands, or construction of boat slips. The Project is not contrary to the public interest. The Project will not cause adverse water quantity impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands, and will not adversely affect or impact the property of others, including Driscoll's property, Lot 14. "Area 1," between Lots 4 and 9, is a separate drainage area, and the water from this area does not drain to Lot 14. Driscoll's property is not within the Project area, and the Project was not intended to resolve his alleged drainage problem. The Project will not cause adverse flooding to on-site or off-site property. The Project will not cause adverse impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities. Rather, the project is expected to improve the conveyance of water and drainage for "area 1" and the Project area.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order issuing Management and Storage of Surface Water General Construction Permit No. 49005837.017. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2001.
The Issue The issues are whether the proposed amendment to Rule 40E- 2.041(1), Florida Administrative Code, exceeds the agency's grant of rulemaking authority; enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific law implemented; or is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency discretion, and vests unbridled discretion in the agency.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Osceola Fish Farmers Association, Inc. (OFFA), is a non-profit corporation whose members consist of tropical fish farmers in Osceola County, Florida. The parties have stipulated that OFFA has standing to bring this action. Respondent, South Florida Water Management District (District or Respondent), is a public corporation operating pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, with its principal office in West Palm Beach, Florida. Among other things, the District has the authority to regulate the uses of water within its geographic boundaries, including Osceola County. On an undisclosed date, the District began test drawdowns (a lowering of the elevation of the water through control structures) in the Alligator Chain of Lakes just east of St. Cloud in Osceola County, where OFFA's members are engaged in tropical fish farming. The drawdowns were undertaken for the purpose of allowing the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FFWCC) to conduct demucking activities in the lakes to enhance aquatic habitat. Prior to beginning work, the FFWCC obtained an Environmental Resource Permit from the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). However, the District did not require either itself or the FFWCC to obtain a consumptive use permit on the theory that a lake drawdown for demucking activities was not a consumptive use and therefore did not require a permit. In an effort to halt future scheduled drawdowns, OFFA participated in a United States Army Corps of Engineers proceeding which culminated in the preparation of an Economic Impact Statement for FFWCC's drawdowns; filed a complaint with DEP under Section 373.219(2), Florida Statutes, alleging that an unlawful consumptive use (without a permit) was taking place (which complaint was found to be insufficient); filed an action for injunctive relief in circuit court under Section 403.412, Florida Statutes (which was dismissed or dropped for undisclosed reasons); and finally initiated a proceeding against the District under Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, alleging that the District had adopted "an incipient non-rule policy of exempting lake 'drawdowns' from water use permitting requirements" (DOAH Case No. 00-3615RU). To avoid the consequences of an adverse ruling in the latter action, the District began rulemaking proceedings to adopt an amendment to Rule 40E-2.041(1), Florida Administrative Code, to codify its policy relative to lake drawdowns. As amended, the rule reads as follows: Unless expressly exempt by law or District rule, a water use permit must be obtained from the District prior to any use or withdrawal of water. The drawdown of lakes for environmental, recreational, or flood control purposes is not regulated by Chapter 40E-2 or 40E-20, F.A.C. (Underscored language represents amended language). Petitioner has challenged only the amendment, and not the existing rule. The effect of the rule is obvious - a lake drawdown for one of the three stated purposes in the rule will not require a permit, while all other lake drawdowns will. As specific authority for the proposed amendment, the District cites Sections 373.044 and 373.113, Florida Statutes. The former statute authorizes the District to "adopt rules pursuant to [Chapter 120] to implement the provisions of this chapter," while the latter statute authorizes it to "adopt rules pursuant to [Chapter 120] to implement the provisions of law conferring powers or duties upon it." The District has cited Sections 373.103(1), 373.219, and 373.244, Florida Statutes, as the specific laws being implemented. The first statute provides that if specifically authorized by DEP, the District has the authority to "administer and enforce all provisions of this chapter, including the permit systems established in parts II, III, and IV of [Chapter 373], consistent with the water implementation rule"; the second statute provides in relevant part that the District may "require such permits for consumptive use of water and may impose such reasonable conditions as are necessary to assure that such use is consistent with the overall objectives of the district or department and is not harmful to the water resources of the area"; and the third statute provides for the issuance of temporary permits while a permit application is pending. In regulating the uses of water within its boundaries, the District administers a comprehensive consumptive water use permit program under Part II, Chapter 373, Florida Statutes. Both parties agree that under Section 373.219(1), Florida Statutes (2000), all "consumptive uses" of water require a permit, except for the "domestic consumption of water by individual users," which use is specifically exempted by the same statute. The global requirement for permits is also found in Rule 40E-2.041 (the rule being amended), as well as Rule 40E- 1.602(1), which provides in relevant part that unless expressly exempted by statute or rule, "[a] water use individual or general permit pursuant to Chapters 40E-2 or 40E-20, F.A.C., must be obtained prior to use or withdrawal of water " The term "consumptive uses" is not defined by statute, but the District has promulgated a rule defining that term. By Rule 40E-2.091, Florida Administrative Code, the District has adopted by reference a document known as the "Basis for Review for Water Use Permit Applications with the South Florida Water Management District." Section 1.8 of that document contains definitions of various terms used in the permitting program, including "consumptive use," which is defined as "[a]ny use of water which reduces the supply from which it is withdrawn or diverted." The District's policy for lake drawdowns, as proposed in the rule amendment, is inconsistent with this definition. On this disputed issue, Petitioner's evidence is accepted as being the most persuasive, and it is found that a lake drawdown for any purpose is a consumptive use of water. Section 373.219(1), cited as a specific law being implemented, provides that the District "may require such permits for consumptive use of water and may impose such reasonable conditions as are necessary to assure such use is consistent with the overall objectives of the district and department and is not harmful to the water resources of the area." The District construes this language as authorizing it to decide which uses of water are a "consumptive use," and which are not, and to implement a rule which codifies those decisions relative to lake drawdowns. Not surprisingly, Petitioner views the statute in a different manner and argues that the statute simply allows the District to create a permit program that is consistent with Chapter 373; that under the law a permit is required for all consumptive uses, including lake drawdowns; and that the District has no authority to carve out an exception for a lake drawdown from the permitting process, no matter what the purpose. As noted above, the District has identified three instances (for environmental, recreational, and flood control purposes) when a lake drawdown does not require a consumptive use permit. These terms are not so vague that a person of common intelligence would have difficulty understanding them. However, the proposed rule contains no prescribed standards to guide the District in its administration of the rule.
Findings Of Fact Application No. 76-00451 seeks a consumptive water use permit for an existing use involving 14 withdrawal points. The application seeks a total average annual withdrawal of 20.2584 million gallons per day and a maximum daily withdrawal of 45.8539 million gallons per day. The water will be used for citrus processing. The Southwest Florida Water Management District's staff recommends issuance of the permit with the following conditions: That the applicant shall install totalizing flow meters of the propeller-driven type on all withdrawal points covered by this permit. That the applicant shall record the pumpage from the above-referenced meters on a weekly basis and submit a record of that pumpage to the district quarterly, beginning on January 15, 1977. That the permit shall expire on December 31, 1980.
Recommendation It is hereby Recommended that a consumptive use permit in the amounts and from the points set forth in the application be granted subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 2 above. ENTERED this 13th day of October, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Southwest Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Lykes Pasco Packing Company Post Office Box 97 Dade City, Florida
The Issue Whether Petitioner Ross has standing to challenge the issuance of the WUP? Whether the District should approve the Application and enter a final order that issues the WUP?
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Ross Petitioner Ross is a resident of Pinellas County, (referred to by him at hearing as "the most urbanized county in the State of Florida"). Besides residing there, Petitioner Ross operates a farm on his property in the County. The City's experts reasonably projected and mapped a 0.5 foot drawdown contour surrounding the well field that is the subject of this proceeding. The contour defines "the cone of depression" associated with the well field. See Tr. 136. Mr. Ross' property is outside the cone of depression, to its south and west. The overall groundwater gradient in the area of the well field is from the east to the west. The water pumped from the well field does not pull water from the west because the pumping withdrawal will not reduce the potentiometric surface gradient enough to reverse the current gradient. Mr. Ross' property and the well on his property are "way outside," tr. 138, the well field and the 0.5 drawdown contour surrounding the well field. Based on the amount of drawdown reasonably projected by the well field, the effect on Mr. Ross' property could not be measured because it would be so slight. If the water in his well were to rise after the WUP is implemented, it would be impossible to tell whether the water rose "because the pump's turned off or because it rained the day before." Tr. 163. The District The District is the administrative agency charged with the responsibility to conserve, protect, manage, and control the water resources within its geographic boundaries. The District administers and enforces chapter 373, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Among those rules are those that relate to the consumptive use of water found in chapter 40D-2. The City The City of Tarpon Springs is the applicant for the WUP that is the subject of this proceeding. The City's application seeks to modify an existing permit. The Existing Permit The City has an existing Water Use Permit (the "Existing Permit") from the District. Originally granted in 1976, it allows for withdrawal of fresh groundwater for public supply. The Existing Permit was last renewed in October of 2005 for a ten-year period. It expires in October of 2015. Under the Existing Permit, the withdrawal capacity is 1.38 million gallons per day annual average and allows for seven production wells. The Application and its Modification The City submitted the Application in July, 2008. The Application at that time was for 25 wells in a brackish water well field for a proposed brackish groundwater reverse osmosis plant that the City plans to build. The City's intent originally was to apply for a permit separate from the Existing Permit.1/ In September of 2009, however, the City requested that the Application be considered a modification of the Existing Permit. In honoring the request, the District changed the number assigned to the Application to "20000742.010."2/ The Application was also modified with regard to the number of production wells in the brackish well field. The number was reduced from 25 to 22, "due to land acquisition efforts indicating that the maximum number of wells . . . required for the project would be 22." Tr. 54. The Application contains an introduction that summarized the City's water supply system and its water supply plans, a completed Individual Water Use Permit Application form, a completed Public Supply Supplemental form, and an Impact Analysis Report (the "Report"). The Report states that the ground-water flow model "MODFLOW"3/ was used to perform the impact analysis. Assessment of average annual and peak month withdrawal impacts in the Upper Floridan and surficial aquifers used the SWFWMD District Wide Regulation Model Version 2 ("DWRM2"). One of the enhancements the DWRM2 offers over earlier model versions is "integrated focused telescopic mesh refinement (FTMR) which allows the model grid user to refine the model grid spacing to focus on specific areas within the District."4/ The Report included the FTMR model grid, total drawdown scenarios in the Upper Floridan Aquifer and the surficial aquifer, and a peak month drawdown scenario. The Application also included a summary of the regional hydro-geology, a summary of the City's wastewater system, a description of the City's potable water supply, an historical operating protocol and a proposed well field management plan for the City's new brackish water well field, a service area and well field location aerial, a table showing the general hydrostratigraphy in northern Pinellas County, a summary of seasonal fluctuations which addressed the conditions for issuance of a permit as set forth in rule 40D-2.381, a summary of the City's reclaimed water system, well location maps, wetland maps, Water Use Permit maps and schedules, the City's well field protection ordinance, maps pertaining to the proposed service areas, a water conservation letter, and water conservation information. The 22 new production wells in the brackish water well field will provide enough water once treated at the proposed reverse osmosis membrane treatment plant to enable the City to supply the anticipated potable water demand for all of the City's customers through the year 2015. Installation of the additional production wells will increase the annual average quantity of groundwater pumpage to 4,200,000 gallons per day ("gpd") and the peak month quantity to 6,300,000 gpd. Review of the Application by the District led to four requests by the District for additional information. The City responded to each. The responses included a well construction and aquifer testing program report, a Water Quality/Water Level Well Impact Mitigation Plan, a Water Quality Action Plan, a revised Water Quality/Water Level Well Impact Mitigation Plan, a revised Water Quality Action Plan and a second revision of the Water Quality Action Plan, a second Water Quality/Water Level Well Impact Mitigation Plan, a proposed Environmental Monitoring Plan, a third revised Water Quality Action Plan, a third revised Water Quality/Water Level Well Impact Mitigation plan, and the final Environmental Monitoring Plan. Draft Water Use Permit On October 8, 2010, the District gave notice of its intent to issue a permit that would modify the City's Existing Permit for public supply use. Attached to the notice is a Draft WUP. The modification includes the development of a brackish water well field with 22 additional production wells to allow the City to self-supply the anticipated potable water demand in 2015 for a customer base of approximately 34,259 persons. The annual average quantity authorized by the WUP is 4,200,000 gpd and the permitted peak month quantity increases to 6,300,000 gpd.5/ Special conditions of the Draft WUP require the City to maintain meters on existing and proposed withdrawal points; record and report monthly meter readings; confirm meter accuracy every five years; monitor and report the water quality and aquifer water levels; maintain an adjusted per capita rate of 150 gpd or less; conduct and report water audits; submit annual reports of residential water use, reclaimed water supplied, per capita water use rates, and well field operations; investigate withdrawal-related well complaints; conduct a well field inventory prior to the activation of the proposed production wells; comply with the environmental monitoring plan; set water quality concentration limits prior to the activation of the proposed production wells; and submit an Annual Water Quality Report and an annual Well Field Report. Criteria in Rule for Issuance of WUPs The District utilizes rule 40D-2.381 (the "Rule") in its review of water use permit applications. The Rule opens with the following: In order to obtain a Water Use Permit, an Applicant must demonstrate that the water use is reasonable and beneficial, is consistent with the public interest, and will not interfere with any existing legal use of water . . . Rule 40D-2.381(1), Tab 1 of the Binder Containing the Matters Officially Recognized, pp. 7-8. The Rule requires that the applicant make the required demonstrations through the provision of "reasonable assurances, on both an individual and a cumulative basis that the water use," id., will meet 14 conditions listed in subsections (a) through (n).6/ Condition (a) Condition (a) requires that the City demonstrate that the water use is necessary to fulfill a certain reasonable demand. To meet this condition, the City provided a population estimate through the end of the permit term and also provided a per capita rate that the City had used in the last five years. Calculations set forth in a table prepared at the request of the City show the population projections and projected water demands over a period from 2008 through 2030. These calculations provide reasonable assurances that the proposed water use meets Condition (a). Condition (b) Condition (b) requires that the City must demonstrate that the water use will not cause quantity or quality changes that adversely affect the water resources, including both surface water and groundwater. The City provided a groundwater model showing the anticipated groundwater drawdowns within the Upper Floridan and surficial aquifers. The City also completed a study on the wells within the sections of the actual proposed well field. Based upon the modeling, the drawdowns are not large enough to cause any impacts to quantity or quality of the water in the area. The City has a Water Quality/Water Level Well Impact Mitigation Plan, should there be any complaints of impact, to correct any problems after implementation of the WUP. The well field is designed with 22 supply wells. All 22 wells need not be operated at the same time to meet the water demand. Wells beyond those needed by demand have been designed into the well field so that there can be rotational capacity. Pumping at lower rates from among the 22 wells on a rotational basis is a management tool for protecting the resource and minimizing the effects of the withdrawals. The City's monitoring program provides for the collection of water levels from a large number of wells either on a monthly or quarterly basis to assess water level fluctuations in the Upper Floridan and surficial aquifers. The City also has numerous wells that will sample for chloride sulfates, total dissolved solids (TDS) and other water quality constituents on a monthly and quarterly basis to ensure that the conditions of issuance continue to be met. The City will submit groundwater pumping data on a monthly basis from all the production wells so that the District can determine that the City is indeed adhering to the quantities reflected in the WUP. Groundwater in the Upper Floridan Aquifer flows in a westward direction towards the Gulf of Mexico. The location of the proposed wells is in an urban land use area near the Gulf Coast. The wells will capture brackish groundwater that would otherwise flow westward into the Gulf. Brackish groundwater from the City's service area is the lowest quality water available for public supply in the area. The City plans to construct a reverse osmosis facility to utilize available brackish groundwater. The brackish groundwater pumped from the well field is an alternative supply source. Isolated from the regional system, it will be used for public supply in the service area. The high number of low-capacity wells will provide rotational ability for the City to manage the quantity and quality of the water resource in the area of the well field. Maximum drawdown within the well field area due to the average annual withdrawal is approximately 3 feet, with an additional 1.5 feet during peak month withdrawal. This amount of drawdown is not likely to impact other wells in the area. Condition (c) Condition (c) requires the City to demonstrate that water use will comply with the provisions of 4.2 of the WUP Basis of Review, incorporated by reference in rule 40D-2.091, regarding adverse impacts to wetlands, lakes, streams, estuaries, fish and wildlife or other natural resources. The Anclote River and associated wetlands are tidally influenced and will not be adversely impacted by the proposed withdrawal. Other wetlands in the well field area examined by a District biologist identified several isolated wetlands of concern. Isolated wetlands are generally more sensitive to withdrawal of groundwater than wetlands connected to larger basins. Initially, the City's proposed drawdowns were deemed to be unacceptable to the District because of the impact to the isolated wetlands of concern. As a first step, the City reduced the quantities of water to be withdrawn. Subsequently, an extensive Wetland Monitoring Plan was developed that included a mitigation plan if adverse impacts did occur to wetlands. Storm-water runoff will be the primary factor controlling the functions of the wetland areas. Mitigation measures, should any adverse impact become too great, include reduction of well field pumping, augmentation with well water, potable water and other feasible sources, and the purchase of mitigation credits. Condition (d) Condition (d) requires the City to demonstrate that the water use will not interfere with a reservation of water as set forth in rule 40D-2.302. The groundwater modeling that the City provided the District indicates that there are no adverse impacts to the minimum flows and levels ("MFLs") in the Anclote River or the water level at the Tarpon Road Deep Well. There are, therefore, no impacts to reservations of water. Condition (e) Condition (e) requires the City to demonstrate that the water use will comply with the provisions of 4.3 of the WUP Basis of Review,7/ regarding MFLs. The closest MFL site is the Upper Floridan Aquifer monitoring well called Tarpon Road Deep, located approximately 2.4 miles southeast of the well field. The impact analysis model results show that at the annual average withdrawal rate of 4.20 million gallons per day ("mgd") approximately 0.1 feet of drawdown at this MFL site is currently projected to occur, assuming static pumping conditions in all other regional groundwater withdrawals. This amount of drawdown will not cause the water level at the Tarpon Road Deep Well to fall below its minimum level. The District is in the process of setting an MFL for the Anclote River. Based on the operation of the new well field and the City's continued operation of their freshwater discharge to the Anclote River from their reclaimed water facility, there will be no impact to the Anclote River. Condition (f) Condition (f) requires the City to demonstrate that the water use will utilize the lowest water quality the City has the ability to use, provided that its use does not interfere with the recovery of a water body to its established MFL and it is not a source that is either currently or projected to be adversely impacted. The City is using brackish water, the lowest water quality available to be used for public supply. The City will be treating it at a reverse osmosis water treatment plant. Water of this quality is not available for others to use without special treatment. Based upon the modeling provided by the City, there are no anticipated impacts to MFLs or any other water body resources. Condition (g) Condition (g) requires the City to demonstrate that the water use will comply with section 4.5 of the WUP Basis of Review,8/ regarding saline intrusion. Groundwater in the Upper Floridan Aquifer in the area of the well field is brackish. The well field's design allowing well rotation minimizes changes in water quality during operation. The amount of drawdown and the fact that water levels will remain above sea level suggests that saline water intrusion will not occur. The reported potentiometric surface in the area of the well is approximately five feet NGVD while the land surface is roughly five feet higher at approximately ten feet NGVD. The City's monitoring and mitigation programs will address adverse impacts from saline intrusion should they occur. Condition (h) Condition (h) requires the City to demonstrate that the water use will not cause the pollution of the aquifer. Soil and groundwater contamination is documented at the Stauffer Management Company site located approximately 3,000 feet west of the well field. The drawdown from the well field is calculated to be about one foot at the Stauffer site. That level of drawdown will not induce migration of contaminants because the upward head differential from the Upper Floridan Aquifer to the surficial aquifer will be altered and the Stauffer site is down gradient of the well field. Testimony from Mr. Wiley established that the aquifers should not be contaminated by the City's withdrawals despite the presence of the Stauffer site: [T]here is a known source of contamination approximately 3,000 feet from the new well field to the west, Stauffer Chemical Company. With the small amount of drawdown that's caused in the Upper Floridan aquifer and the surficial aquifer, there's no potential for the withdrawals to cause pollution of the aquifer. Tr. 254-55. Mr. Wiley's opinion was reached primarily based on the use of the groundwater flow model to determine the drawdown at the Stauffer site and through review of groundwater levels in the Floridan and the surficial aquifers. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") is in charge of managing the contamination at the Stauffer site. A remediation plan has been developed based, in part, on EPA records. The remediation plan includes the construction of a barrier wall in the subsurface around the contaminated area to prevent contaminated groundwater from migrating. The City's groundwater monitoring wells will detect movement of contaminants toward the well field. The monitoring of the wells and the mitigation plan will assist in preventing pollution of the aquifers. Condition (i) Condition (i) requires the City to demonstrate that the water use will not adversely affect offsite land uses existing at the time of the application. Primary existing land uses within the City's service area are residential, commercial, and light industrial. The proposed withdrawal will not adversely impact these land uses as shown in Figure 10 of the City Exhibit 1. Five sink holes are known to exist in the general area around the well field. The closest is approximately 1,000 feet from a proposed well location. Maximum drawdown at the distance is approximately 2 feet. This amount of drawdown does not significantly increase the potential for sinkhole activity. Condition (j) Condition (j) requires that the City demonstrate the water use will not adversely impact an existing legal withdrawal. The Pasco County Utilities' wells located to the north of the well field are listed on the WUP as plugged. Wells owned by Crest Ridge Utility Corp. are located within 0.5 to 0.8 miles of the well field. Drawdown at these wells, due to the average annual withdrawal, is approximately one foot, with an additional 0.4 feet during peak month withdrawal. This amount of drawdown will not create a water level impact at these wells. Maximum drawdown at domestic wells in the area due to the average annual withdrawal is approximately three feet, with an additional 1.5 feet during peak month withdrawal. This amount of drawdown is not likely to impact other wells in the area. The City's mitigation plan addresses any adverse impact that might occur from the City's withdrawal. Condition (k) Condition (k) requires the City to demonstrate that the water use will incorporate water conservation measures. The existing per capita use rate for the City's service area is 110 gpd. Its position well below the district goal of 150 gpd per person demonstrates that the City's water conservation measures are effective. The City uses an inclined block rate structure which encourages water conservation. It also encourages water conservation through a reclaimed water system that encourages conservation of public water supply. It currently uses a little over one million gallons per day of reclaimed water. The City also conserves water through a leak protection program, a water loss audit program, adherence to the District's watering restrictions and provision of a low-flow toilet rebate program through the County, a landscape code, and the provision of educational materials to users. Condition (l) Condition (l) requires the City to demonstrate that the water use will incorporate the use of alternative water supplies to the greatest extent possible. The City has an extensive reclaimed water program. It provides reclaimed water for its golf course, for residential irrigation, for public parks and recreation, and for public schools. The City expanded its reclaimed water storage system recently by doubling the amount of reclaimed water that it is able to store for redistribution. Condition (m) Condition (m) requires the City to demonstrate that the water use will not cause water to go to waste. The City performs an unaccounted-for water audit of its system as required by a special condition of its existing WUP. The unaccounted-for water use is approximately 4 percent, well below the District guidelines. Furthermore, the City's per capita use rate of 110 gpd is well within the District's goal of 150 gpd per person. The City also has an extensive reclaimed water system which offsets potable water supply and prohibits wasted drinking water as an irrigation source. Condition (n) Condition (n) requires that the City demonstrate that the water use will not otherwise be harmful to the water resources within the District. Facts found above support a conclusion that the City has provided reasonable assurances that it meets this condition. In addition, the water that is pumped locally by the City will offset the need for ground water that would have otherwise been obtained from elsewhere in the region. Notices The District published its Notice of Proposed Agency Action in the Tampa Tribune on October 22, 2010. The District published its Notice of Proposed Agency Action in the St. Petersburg Times on October 24, 2010.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a Final Order determining that Petitioner Ross lacks standing and that his Petition, therefore, be dismissed. Should it be determined in a Final Order that Petitioner Ross has standing, it is recommended that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a Final Order that issues Water Use Permit No. 20000742.010 to the City of Tarpon Springs. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Southwest Florida Water Management District (the District) should grant the application of the Misty Creek Country Club, Inc. (the Club), to modify MSSW Permit No. 400037.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioners are owners of property adjacent to Lake No. 7 of the Misty Creek Country Club in a development called The Preserves at Misty Creek-- specifically, lot 113 (Robert and Lee Werner), lot 114 (Charles and Rosemary Biondolillo), lots 115 and 115A (Ignatius and Judith Bertola), lots 117 and 117A (Don and Halina Bogdanske), lots 118 and 118A (Louis and Betty Mitchell), lots 119 and 119A (George and Dorothy Holly), lots 120 and 120A (John and Maureen Higgins), and lot 121 (William and June Spence). Respondent, the Misty Creek Country Club (the Club), operates a golf course and country club located at The Preserves at Misty Creek under a 99-year lease with Gator Creek Lands, the developer of The Preserves at Misty Creek. Existing System Design and Application for Permit Modification In 1985, Respondent Southwest Florida Water Management District, issued a surface water management permit for development of a 730-acre residential development and golf course. The District subsequently issued to the Club operation phase authorization for the surface water management system associated with the golf course portion of the development in March of 1992. Under the original permit, Lake No. 7 was part of the overall stormwater management system for the golf course. The lake is approximately seven and half to eight acres in size and is part of a total drainage basin of approximately twenty-eight acres. As originally designed, Lake No. 7 is a detention with filtration system. An underdrain in the side of the bank provides water quality treatment, filtering out oils and greases, fertilizers and other contaminants. A control elevation of 31.02 was established for Lake No. 7 through construction of a weir. Between elevation 31.00 and 31.02, water discharges through the underdrain system providing water quality treatment. Above elevation 31.02, water flows over the control structure into Lake No. 6, and ultimately discharges to Cow Pen Slough, which is Class III waters of the state. The Club presently has a water use permit from the District which allows withdrawal of groundwater for irrigation of the golf course. Groundwater is stored in Lake No. 7 prior to use for irrigation when needed to augment water in the lake. Special Condition Number 2 of the water use permit required the Club to investigate the feasibility of using reclaimed or reuse water in lieu of groundwater for irrigation purposes at the golf course. As a result of the investigation required by Special Condition Number 2 of the water use permit, the Club filed an application with the District to modify its surface water management permit to allow for the introduction of reuse water into Lake No. 7. Under that application, there would have been no significant modifications to the stormwater management system. Reuse water would have replaced groundwater as a source for augmenting water in the lake when needed for irrigation. An eight-inch service line would convey the reuse water to Lake 7, and a float valve would control the introduction of reuse water into Lake No. 7. When water levels in the lake fell below elevation 30.5', the float valve would open the effluent line to allow introduction of reuse water into the lake; when the water elevation in the lake reached 31.0', the float valve would shut off the flow of water. There would be gate valves on either side of the structure that could be manually closed, if necessary, to stop the flow of reuse water into the lake if the float valve malfunctioned. Club personnel would have access to the gate valves and could manually stop the flow of reuse water into the lake if necessary. On August 9, 1995, just days prior to the final hearing in this matter, the Club proposed to modify its application to make certain structural changes in the design of the surface water management system. Specifically, the Club proposed to plug the window in the weir, raise the elevation of the weir or control structure to elevation 33.6, raise the elevation of the berm along the north end of Lake No. 7 adjacent to the weir to elevation 33.6, and plug the underdrain. The purpose of the proposed modifications to the design of the system was to assure that no discharge from Lake No. 7 would occur up to and including the 100-year storm event. A 100-year storm event is equal to 10 inches of rainfall in a 24-hour period. Source and Quality of Reuse Water The Club also entered into an agreement with Sarasota County to accept reuse water from the county's new Bee Ridge wastewater treatment facility. That agreement specifies the terms under which the Club will accept reuse water from the County. The County's Bee Ridge facility is presently under construction and is not yet operating. As permitted by the Department of Environmental Protection, the Bee Ridge wastewater treatment facility will use a Bardenpho waste treatment system which is a licensed process to provide advanced waste treatment. The construction permit establishes effluent limits for the facility that are comparable to a level of treatment known as advanced secondary treatment, but the County Commission for Sarasota County has instructed the County staff to operate the Bee Ridge facility as an advanced waste treatment plant. Advanced waste treatment is defined by the quality of the effluent produced. For advanced waste treatment, the effluent may not exceed 5 milligrams/Liter of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) or total suspended solids (TSS), 3 milligrams/Liter of total nitrogen, or 1 milligram/Liter of total phosphorus. It also requires high level disinfection. Advanced secondary treatment requires the same level of treatment for TSS but the limit for nitrates is 10 milligrams/Liter. High level disinfection is also required for advanced secondary treatment. In Florida, reuse systems require a minimum of advanced secondary treatment. High level disinfection is the level of treatment that generally is accepted as being a reasonable level of treatment. The Bee Ridge permit issued to Sarasota County identifies the Club as one of the recipients of reuse water for irrigation. Condition Number 21 of that permit provides that the use of golf course ponds to store reuse water is not authorized under the County's permit until issuance of a separate permit or modification of the County's permit. Although the District did not require Misty Creek to submit any information about the modification of the County's permit, there was no basis for assuming that the County permit could not be modified. To the contrary, the permit provides that authorization may be obtained by permit modification. Under the late modification to the Club's application, the reuse water transmission line and float valve system, with backup manual gate valve system, is unchanged. So are the water elevations at which the float valve system will automatically introduce reuse water into Lake 7 and shut off. Sarasota County already has constructed the water transmission system that would deliver reuse water to the Club. At the request of the District, the Club provided copies of the drawings of the float valve structure as permitted by the Department of Environmental Protection. The District did not require certified drawings of that structure. But the District will require the Club to provide as-built drawings following completion of construction prior to the introduction of reuse water into Lake No. 7. Property Ownership Each of the Petitioners owns a residential lot adjacent to Lake No. 7. At the time of the Petitioners' purchase of the individual residential lots, the Club leased certain property immediately west of Lake No. 7 from the developer of The Preserve at Misty Creek. The leased premises included a piece of land extending into the lake known as the 19th green. As a result of negotiations between the Club and the developer, it was determined that the 19th green would be removed and the land between the approximate top of bank of Lake No. 7 and the private residential lots would be released from the Club's lease. The developer subsequently conveyed the property that had been released from the Club's lease to the individual lot owners (the "A" parcels listed in Finding 1). At the time of the conveyance of the additional parcels, the attorney for the developer prepared deeds for each individual parcel with a metes and bounds description off the rear of the residential lots to which they were being added. While the Club's application for modification of its surface water management permit was being processed by the District, counsel for Petitioners provided the District with copies of the individual deeds and questioned whether the Club had ownership or control of the land which was the subject of the application sufficient to meet the District's permitting requirements. In response to a request for information regarding the ownership of the property that was the subject of the application, the Club submitted to the District a topographical survey prepared by Mr. Steven Burkholder, a registered professional land surveyor with AM Engineering. The topographical survey depicted: the elevation of the water in the Lake No. 7 on the day that the survey was conducted, labeled "approximate water's edge"; the elevation of the "top of bank"; and the easternmost line of private ownership by Petitioners. Mr. Burkholder determined the line of private property ownership by reproducing a boundary survey attached to the individual deeds conveying the additional parcels to the Petitioners. He testified that he was confident that the topographical survey he prepared accurately represented the most easterly boundary of the Petitioners' ownership. The elevation of the line of private ownership as depicted on the survey prepared by Mr. Burkholder ranges from a low of approximately 34.5 to 35.2. The elevation of the line labeled "top of bank" ranges from a high of 35.6 to a low of 34.4. The elevation of the water in Lake No. 7 would be controlled by the elevation of the modified control structure which is proposed to be set at elevation 33.6. After modification of the surface water management system to retain the 100-year storm event, at no time would water levels in the lake rise above the existing elevation of the "top of bank." The Petitioners testified that they believed that they owned to the water's edge or edge of the lake, but Mr. Burkholder testified that a property boundary could not be determined based on an elevation depicting the water's edge because that line would change as the level of the water rose and fell. The Petitioners also presented evidence that the developer's attorney made representations to them that their ownership extended to the "approximate high water line." But there appears to be no such thing as an "approximate high water line" in surveying terms. Where the boundary of a lake is depicted on a survey it generally is depicted from top of bank to top of bank. In any event, the legal descriptions of the parcels conveyed to the Petitioners were not based on a reference to either a water line or the water's edge or the lake at all. Instead, the legal descriptions were based solely on a metes and bounds description off the rear of the residential lots. Notwithstanding some contrary evidence, if the Petitioners owned to the water's edge, such ownership would require the Petitioners to consent to or join in the amended application for the modification of the Club's surface water management permit. Information regarding the ownership or control and the legal availability of the receiving water system is required as part of the contents of an application under Rule 40D-4.101(2)(d)6. and 7., Florida Administrative Code. The amended application requires the ability to "spread" Lake 7 in the direction of the Petitioners' property. If the Petitioners own the property on which the Club intends to "spread" Lake 7 in order to make the amended application work, the Petitioners must consent or join. The issue of the legal ownership and control of the Petitioners and the Club currently is in litigation in state circuit court. If the state circuit court determines that the easterly boundary of the "A" parcels lies to the east of the "top of bank," consideration would have to be given to modifying any permit issued to the Club to insure that the designed "spread" of Lake 7 in a storm event up to and including a 100-year storm event does not encroach on the Petitioners' property. District Permit Requirements The District has never before processed an application for a surface water management permit allowing commingling of storm water and reuse water. The District applied Chapter 40D-4, Florida Administrative Code, in reviewing the Club's permit application. There are no specific provisions in Rule 40D-4 or the District's Basis of Review for Surface Water Management Permit Applications that address the commingling of stormwater and reuse water; on the other hand, no rules of the District prohibit the introduction of other types of water into a stormwater treatment pond so long as the requirements of Rule 40D-4 are met. The District has the authority to allow stormwater and reuse water to be commingled. Section 40D-4.301, Florida Administrative Code, contains the conditions for issuance of a surface water management permit. Permitting Criteria In order to obtain a surface water management permit to commingle stormwater and reuse water in Lake 7, the Club must provide reasonable assurances that the proposed modifications to its existing system will provide adequate flood control and drainage; not cause adverse water quality and quantity impacts on receiving waters and adjacent lands; not result in a violation of surface water quality standards; not cause adverse impacts on surface and groundwater levels and flows; not diminish the capability of the lake to fluctuate through the full range established for it in Chapter 40D-8, Florida Administrative Code; not cause adverse environmental impacts to wetlands, fish and wildlife or other natural resources; be effectively operated and maintained; not adversely affect public health and safety; be consistent with other public agency's requirements; not otherwise be harmful to water resources of the District; and not be against public policy. No surface or groundwater levels or flows have been set for this area of the District, so that permit criterion is not applicable to the Club's application. The Club's application will not impact wetlands or fish and wildlife associated with wetlands as described in F.A.C. Rule 40D-4.301(1)(f). There are no wetlands regulated by the District in the project site. The Club has submitted to the District an operation and maintenance plan for the modified surface water management system. The operation and maintenance plan is in compliance with the District's permitting criteria contained in Rule 40D-4.301(1)(g). The District's regulation with respect to the requirement that a project not adversely affect the public health and safety is based on the specific requirements of Chapter 40D-4, Florida Administrative Code, and the Club has complied with this criterion. The permitting criterion that a project must be consistent with the requirements of other public agencies was met by inclusion in the permit of Special Conditions Nos. 5 and 6, Limiting Condition No. 3 and Standard Condition No. 3, which require that the surface water management permit be modified if necessary to comply with modifications imposed by other public agencies. The District's regulation with respect to the requirement that a project not otherwise be harmful to the water resources within the District is based on the specific requirements of Chapter 40D-4, Florida Administrative Code, and the Club has complied with this criterion. The District's regulation with respect to the requirement that a project may not be against public policy is based on the specific requirements of Chapter 40D-4, Florida Administrative Code, and the Club has complied with that criterion. The project will not have an adverse impact on water quality or quantity in receiving waters or adjacent lands. Under the District's regulations, the project would not be permittable if it caused flooding on property owned by other persons. Two concerns regarding off-site flooding were raised by Petitioners: first, the potential for flooding of the Petitioners' property; and, second, the potential for flooding of secondary systems connecting to Lake No. 7 such as private roads in the development. The project would violate the requirements of Section 40D-4.301(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, which requires that a proposed project provide adequate flood protection and drainage, if raising the weir and berm elevation to 33.6 would cause the level of water in Lake No. 7 to move laterally up the bank and encroach on property owned by Petitioners. However, the Club has given reasonable assurances that the Petitioners own only to the "top of bank" and that raising the weir elevation to 33.6 would not cause water levels to rise above the "top of bank" of the lake. If it is determined in pending state circuit court proceedings that the Petitioners own beyond the "top of bank," any permit for the Club's project might have to be modified to avoid flooding the Petitioners' property. With respect to potential flooding of secondary systems, such as adjacent roadways, raising the elevation of water in Lake No. 7 would decrease the capacity of the storm sewers draining into the Lake. However, the proposed modifications would not increase the area of impervious surface in the drainage basin or decrease the size of the lake, and water levels in the roadways probably would not rise much higher than under present circumstances. The existing storm sewer system is only designed for a 10-year storm event, so the supplemental effect on roadway flooding from retaining a 100-year storm event in Lake No. 7 probably would be negligible. The Club gave reasonable assurances that any increase in water levels on the roadways from the proposed modifications would not be considered a significant adverse effect because it still would not affect public access. Sarasota County's land development regulations allow flooding in streets of up to 12 inches for a 100-year storm event, nine inches for a 25-year storm event, and six inches for a 10-year storm event. No portion of the proposed project area is within the 100-year floodplain. The project will not have an adverse effect on water quantity attenuation or cause flooding of the Petitioners' property or secondary systems, such as adjacent roadways. Petitioners have protested the effect that this project will have on water quality within Lake No. 7, itself. Surface water quality standards do not apply within a stormwater pond. Stormwater ponds are essentially pollution sinks intended to receive polluted runoff. Where there is no discharge from a pond, water quality treatment is irrelevant. Lake 7 is not a "water resource within the District" pursuant to Section 40D-4.301(1)(j), Florida Administrative Code, and potential impact on water quality in Lake No. 7 should not be considered. Section 40D-4.301(1)(j) limits the issues to be considered by the District to downstream water quality, water quantity, floodplain impacts, and wetlands impacts. The commingling of wastewater effluent treated to a level of advanced secondary or advanced waste treatment (reuse water) would improve water quality within a stormwater treatment pond at least 90 to 95 percent of the time. Stormwater is very low quality compared to reuse water. In most respects, reuse water also will be better quality than the well water presently being used to augment the pond. It is expected to be better quality than unimpacted water in the receiving waterbody with respect to nitrogen content and only slightly worse with respect to phosphorus content. The addition of reuse water should not promote more algal growth; rather, it should reduce the likelihood of algal growth. It also should not increase the incidences of fish kills in Lake 7. Nor should it alter the nutrient concentrations in Lake 7 so as to result in an imbalance of the natural population of aquatic flora and fauna. In the draft permit originally proposed to be issued to the Club, permit conditions required that water quality be monitored at the point of discharge to waters of the state. This requirement was eliminated from the revised permit as the District determined that it was not necessary in light of the modification of the system to retain the 100-year storm event. The subject design does not account for recovery of the water quality treatment volume within a specified period of time. However, there is no such requirement in District rules when a pond entirely retains the 100-year storm event, as is the case with this project. Even if there were a discharge from the surface water management system in a storm event up to and including a 100-year storm event, the Club gave reasonable assurances that water quality standards in the receiving waterbody would not be violated because of the effects of dilution. This project will not cause discharges which result in any violations of applicable state water quality standards for surface waters of the state. Based on a number of factors, including the peak rate factor, the curve number and the seasonal high water elevation, the water level in Lake 7 would reach an elevation of 33.57 if a 100-year storm event occurs. This results in the retention of the 100-year storm in Lake 7. The District only considers the 100-year storm event, by itself. It does not consider other rainfall events before or after it. However, the District does presume that ponds are at their seasonal high water level when the 100-year storm event occurs and that the ground is saturated. With respect to the seasonal high water level, there was substantial conflicting testimony. The Club's consultant used a seasonal high water level of 31.0' for Lake No. 7 in his calculations. This was based on a geotechnical engineering report prepared by Ardaman & Associates. A seasonal high water elevation of 31.0' was also used in the original permit application in 1985. In concluding that the seasonal high water level should be 31.0, the Ardaman report relied on several assumptions, including plugging of the underdrain and overflow weir and no discharges into or pumping out of the lake. These assumptions were made to establish an historical water level. The Petitioners' consultant disputed the determination in the Ardaman report that the seasonal high for Lake No. 7 was 31 on the grounds that the report indicated groundwater levels of 32.8 on three sides of the lake. He also felt that water levels would rise in the lake over time as a result of it being, allegedly, a closed system. While he did not have an opinion as to what the appropriate seasonal high should be, he felt it would be higher than 31 but lower than 32.8. However, he did no modeling with respect to calculating a seasonal high water level and would normally rely on a geotechnical engineer, such as Ardaman & Associates, to calculate seasonal high water levels. The District generally does not receive information as extensive and detailed as that included in the Ardaman report when it reviews permit applications. Among other things, the Ardaman report indicates a gradient across Lake No. 7 which makes the determination of the seasonal high for the lake difficult. The groundwater flow gradient results from the fact that the elevation of Lake No. 6 is approximately three feet lower than the elevation in Lake No. 7. The elevation determined by Ardaman may well be conservative in that the seasonal high of 31 is above the midpoint of the gradient. Although Lake 7 will be designed as an essentially closed system, it will have inflow from rainfall, surface runoff, introduction of reuse water and groundwater inflow, and outflows by way of evapotranspiration, withdrawal for irrigation purposes, and groundwater outflows. To alleviate any concerns about the validity of the seasonal high, it would be reasonable to include a permit condition requiring the Club to monitor the water level in Lake 7 on a daily basis, using staff gauges, after modification of the control structure. If such monitoring indicated that the seasonal high water level exceeds 31.0, the District could consider options to address that situation, including reducing the level at which reuse water is introduced into the lake or requiring water quality monitoring at the point of discharge to receiving waters. Groundwater quality is regulated by the Department of Environmental Protection, not by the District. The DEP permit issued to Sarasota County for disposal of reuse water at the Club golf course requires the installation of two groundwater monitoring wells, one in fairly close proximity to Lake No. 7. The Overlooked Pond There is a small retention pond northwest of Lake 7, near lot 113. Neither the Club nor the District considered the effect of the Club's late modification of its application on the retention pond northwest of Lake 7 and adjacent properties. Lake 7 and the retention pond to its northwest are connected by an equalizer pipe. As a result, water levels in the pond will be affected by water levels in Lake 7. There was no evidence as to the elevations of the banks of the retention pond. There was no evidence as to whether the modifications to the Club's application will result in flooding of properties adjacent to the pond. There was no evidence that the Club owns or controls the retention pond or the properties adjacent to it that might be affected by flooding that might result from the modifications to the Club's application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order denying the Club's amended application. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2196 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, there was other evidence from which it can be determined that Lake 7 is part of the Club's lease. Accepted and incorporated. However, there was other evidence from which it can be determined that Lake 7 is part of the Club's lease and from which the western extent of the Club's leasehold interests in Lake 7 can be determined. Accepted and incorporated. But the topographic survey, together with other evidence, does show the eastern extent of the Petitioners' property in relation to the "top of bank" of Lake 7 and the western extent of the Club's leasehold interests in Lake 7. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that uses must be "specifically authorized" in that the lease authorizes the use of the premises for a "golf course," which is presumed to include uses inherent to the operation of a golf course that may not be further specified in the lease, such as drainage facilities, like Lake 7, and facilities for irrigation of the golf course. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the Club does not pay for the maintenance of Lake 7, at least as between the Club and its lessor, which is the subject of the pertinent lease provision. (There was evidence as to a dispute between the Club and the Petitioners, or at least some of them, as to who is responsible for maintenance of land in the vicinity of the western extent of Lake 7 and the eastern extent of the Petitioners' property. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent that there are "A" parcels between lots 115 through 120 and Lake 7. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. Not clear whether all of the activities listed in the second sentence are done in the entire area up to the water's edge but, otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Accepted, but subordinate to facts contrary to those found, and unnecessary. Accepted; subordinate to facts found. Rejected. The intent of the parties is not clear and is the subject of litigation in state circuit court. 17.-18. Accepted that some probably used the words "to the water's edge"; others may have said "to the lake" or "to the approximate high water line." Regardless of what they said, the legal consequences are being litigated in state circuit court. Subordinate to facts contrary to those found, and unnecessary. 19.-20. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary.. Last sentence, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. The rest is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. The evidence was sufficient to place on Exhibit M-16 the boundary lines of the "A" parcels, as depicted on the Alberti boundary survey that was attached to the individual deeds to all of the "A" parcels, in relation to the "top of bank" of Lake 7 and other topographical features depicted on Exhibit M-16. The 0.679 acre total for the "A" parcels was merely transcribed from the Alberti boundary survey (probably incorrectly, as the boundary survey seems to indicate the acreage to be 0.674, plus or minus.) Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. The modification itself would not cause the water level to rise. If, due to the combined influence of all the pertinent factors, the water level in Lake 7 rises, it will spread more than before the modifications, up to a maximum spread of approximately ten feet. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. The Club gave reasonable assurances that the spread would be contained within its leasehold interest. However, consideration would have to be given to modifying the permit if the state circuit court determines in the pending litigation that the easterly boundary of the "A" parcels lies to the east of the "top of bank." Accepted and incorporated to the extent not conclusion of law. Accepted. Self-evident and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted, but subordinate, and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. It does not prohibit it; it just does not authorize it. It provides that authorization may be obtained by permit modification. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 32.-36. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. (Evidence was presented at final hearing.) 37. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that discharges will be "likely." (Accepted and incorporated that no discharges are expected as a result of storm events up to and including a 100-year storm event unless preceding conditions predispose the system to discharge during a 100-year storm event.) 38.-39. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. (As for 39., very little construction will be required for the proposed project.) Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. First, Lake 7 will not be "maintained" at 31'; rather, when it falls below 30.5', a half inch will be added. Second, it is not clear that the Ardaman report established an "artificially low seasonal high water level." (There is a hydraulic gradient across Lake 7 from east to west, approximately. The Ardaman report assumed no flow into or out of Lake 7; it also assumed no pumpage into or out of the lake.) Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it is based "solely" on that assumption. Accepted and incorporated that it is based on that and on other assumptions. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. (Evidence was presented at final hearing.) Rejected as not supported by evidence. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent that the impact is obvious--the water level in the pond will be approximately equal to the water level in Lake 7. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. The modification itself would not cause the water level to rise. If, due to the combined influence of all the pertinent factors, the water level in Lake 7 rises, so will the water level in the pond. 47.-48. Accepted and incorporated. 49.-50. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 51.-52. Accepted and incorporated. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-7. Accepted and incorporated. 8. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that there was more to the application than just substitution of reuse for well water. 9.-10. Accepted and incorporated. 11. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 12.-22. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. (The two District witnesses disagreed.) Even if true, subordinate to facts contrary to those found. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary, or conclusion of law. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not conclusion of law. 28.-29. Accepted; subordinate to facts found, and in part conclusion of law. 30. Accepted. First sentence, incorporated; second sentence, subordinate to facts found, and in part conclusion of law. 31.-35. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary, or conclusion of law. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary, or conclusion of law. Accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. 39.-40. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 41.-43. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not conclusion of law. Last sentence, accepted and incorporated to the extent not conclusion of law; rest, accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found, and in part conclusion of law. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted, but subordinate, and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. First sentence, accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found; second sentence, accepted and incorporated to the extent not conclusion of law. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 51.-52. Accepted and incorporated. 53.-55. Accepted, but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 56. Accepted and incorporated. 57.-62. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 63. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia A. Petruff, Esquire D. Robert Hoyle, Esquire Dye & Scott, P.A. 1111 Third Avenue West Bradenton, Flroida 34206 Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuser & Russell, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 815 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark F. Lapp, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899 Peter G. Hubbell Executive Director Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899 Edward B. Helvenston,Esq. General Counsel Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the District should approve FRI's consumptive use permit application, no. 2-019-0012AUR, pursuant to Chapter 40C- 2, Florida Administrative Code The FRI is seeking permission to withdraw an annual average daily rate of million gallons per day (mgd) of water and 762.85 million gallons per year of ground water for hydraulic dredging, cleaning and purification of sand at the Goldhead Sand Mine. Subject to certain limiting conditions to be set forth in the FRI's consumptive use permit, the water is proposed to be produced from three Floridan aquifer wells. District proposed to grant the permit application which was challenged by LBCA, resulting in the formal administrative proceeding. LBCA challenged the issuance of the permit to FRI on the basis of the FRI's alleged failure to comply with the applicable requirements of Chapter 3V3, Florida Statutes (E.S.), and Chapter 40C-2, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), and other applicable law. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT LBCA Exception Number 1 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 2 that a necessary component of FRI's operation is its withdrawal of approximately 2.09 mgd of ground water for the production of sand. The 2.09 mgd is the average daily usage rate to who the parties stipulated prior to the hearing. The maximum daily usage rate is 3.75 mgd. However, FRI cannot exceed 762.5 million gallons for the year which is an average of 2.09 mgd. (Prehearing Stip. pp. 1,9). In the LBCA Proposed Recommended Order paragraph 25, the LBCA states that the operation "necessitates FRI's pumping allocation of an average daily 2.09 million gallons of water from the Floridan aquifer." Additionally, LBCA acknowledges in its Exception No. 2 that it is "known that approximately 2 mgd are pumped into the system." If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry v. Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 530 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). This exception is rejected because the finding is supported by competent substantial evidence. (T. 41-42, 104, 913-914). LBCA Exception Number 2 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 8 and 28 that the receiving water from the mine site is primarily the surficial aquifer which recharges the downgradient lakes and that the surficial aquifer recharge will result in a positive or immeasurable effect on the lakes. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. It is improper for this Board to retry the case after the hearing has concluded by altering findings supported by evidence and reweighing evidence. Tampa Wholesale Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 376 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The decision to believe one expert over another is left to the hearing officer, and the decision cannot be altered absent a complete lack of competent substantial evidence from which the finding could be reasonably inferred. Fla. Chapter of Sierra Club v. Orlando Utility Comm., 436 So.2d 383, 389 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Freeze v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 556 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Fla. Stat.; Berry v. Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 530 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). This exception is rejected because the findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. (T. 105, 120-129, 146, 170, 187-190, 208-209, 235, 248, 256-257, 972-973, 1085-1093, 1139). LBCA Exception Number 3 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 11 that the aquifer characteristics in the Floridan aquifer beneath and around the mine site are relatively uniform. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 180, 926-927). LBCA Exception Number 4 The LBCA takes exception to a mischaracterization of the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 13 regarding lake leakance by stating that the hearing officer found that some of the lakes at issue do not have leakance to the Floridan aquifer. In fact, it is contextually clear that the Hearing Officer was referring to "many of the lakes within the region." This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 77-80). LBCA Exception Number 5 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 16 that very little, if any, of the groundwater flowing into the Floridan aquifer beneath Lake Brooklyn flows toward the mine site. In making its argument, LBCA inaccurately attributes testimony to FRI witness Fountain when the referenced testimony was testimony of LBCA witness Boyes. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 1145-1146). LBCA Exception Number 6 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 22 and 55 that the data collection effort of FRI and the District was far more extensive than is normally conducted for a mine of this size and that sufficient site-specific information was developed to be able to determine the effects of the proposed use of water at the mine operation. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The findings are supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 103, 201, 238, 918-919; FR Ex. 5). LBCA asserts that FRI did not evaluate the "worstcase" scenario in order to establish permit entitlemet LBCA provides no legal citations to support its exception. LBCA's assertion lacks legal as well as factual support. LBCA has criticized FRI's aquifer performance test and modeling effort without presenting the elusive "worstcase scenario" which presumably would show impacts greater than those modeled by FRI. LBCA seeks to impose a burden of proof which is insupportable in law. It is not FRI's burden to show a violation of the criteria in Chapter 40C-2, Fla. Admin. Code, is a scientific impossibility, only to show that the non-occurrence of such violation is reasonably assured by the preponderance of the evidence in the proceeding. The Corporation of the President v. SJRWMD and City of Cocoa, Case Nos. 89-828, 89-751 (SJRWMD Dec. 13, 1990), aff'd, 590 So.2d 427 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). An agency cannot assume the worst-case scenario unless that condition is reasonably foreseeable. Florida Audubon Society, supra..; Rudloe and Gulf Stream Specimen Co. v. Dickerson Bayshore, Inc., 10 F.A.L.R. 3426 (Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, June 8, 1988). As delineated in FRI's response to this exception, FRI and the Distract presented evidence of numerous investigations regarding this application, including testing and analyses of the impact of withdrawals at greater than the average and maximum daily pumping rates. (See Record citations on pp 17-20 of FRI's Response to Exceptions; T. 115-116, 126, 176-177, 918- 920). LBCA failed to present any citation to the record where it presented testimony evincing that another scenario which would result in greater impacts than those predicted by the applicant were reasonably like to occur. LBCA's speculation that another undefined scenario of pumping would show greater impacts was rejected by the hearing officer. The applicant has provided reasonable assurances with regard to the effects of the proposed withdrawal. LBCA Exception Number 7 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's purported inference in Finding of Fact 23 that the aquifer performance test (2T) measured impacts significantly greater than could be expected to occur under "worst case" conditions as a result of the mining operation. The finding actually states "the (aquifer performance) test measured effects of pumping from the mine production wells for periods ranging from 78 hours to 108 hours at approximately twice the average rate of 2.09 mgd." As discussed in the ruling on exception no. 6, LBCA's assertion of a "worstcase scenario" has factual support in the instant case. The applicant is required to provide reasonable assurance that the proposed use is reasonable, beneficial, will not impact existing legal uses and is consistent with the public interest. The applicant is not required to evaluate LBCA's unspecified worst case scenario or prove the use will not cause any impacts. Florida Audubon Society, supra..; Rudloe, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 113-115, 141, 920). LBCA Exception Number 8 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 23 that no changes in the lake levels are attributable to the pumping at the mine. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. In Finding of Fact No. 24, the hearing officer found that the effects of pumping were not distinguishable from the declines which occurred before and after the ADT test. Therefore, his conclusions are not inconsistent as alleged by the LBCA. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 120-130, 146, 759, 928- 933, 942, 944- 948, 1015-1016, 1122-1123, 1168; Dist. Ex. 5). LBCA Exception Number 9 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 24 that the actual effects of the pumping will be approximately one half of the observed amounts of the 2T test on an average pumping day. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 113-117, 923-996; Dist. Ex. 5). LBCA's claim that this finding is irrelevant since only a "worstcase" scenario is pertinent is likewise rejected. Initially, it is noted that LBCA cites no legal support for its arguments. Furthermore, there is no requirement in the District's rules governing consumptive use which mandates consideration of only "worstcase" scenarios. Furthermore, an agency cannot assume worst case scenarios unless they are reasonably foreseeable, which determination is a case by case factual issue. See Florida Audubon Society, supra., Rudloe, supra.. LBCA Exception Number 10 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 26 that Dr. Stewart testified that the Floridan aquifer is rarely completely homogenous and isotropic but that he and other modelers regularly make that assumption. This Board cannot judge credibility of witnesses or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 738). LBCA Exception Number 11 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 27 that the maximum drawdown in the Floridan aquifer under normal pumping conditions is modeled to be 0.1 to 0.2 feet beneath White Sands Lake. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 129, 182). For the same reasons stated in the ruling on exceptions no. 9 and 7, the LBCA's claim regarding irrelevancy is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 12 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 28 that a decrease in lake levels will be less than that of the decrease in the Floridan aquifer, depending on the rate of leakance and that the drawdown effect will not accumulate over time, but rather will remain constant after reaching steady state conditions. The LBCA is simply rearguing their case. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 118-120, 129, 237, 706-708, 758). LBCA's irrelevancy argument is rejected for the reasons stated in the ruling on exceptions no. 9 and 7. LBCA Exception Number 13 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 42 through 54 as being conclusion of law rather than findings of fact. The LBCA does not cite to the record or make legal argument to support the exception as required by Rule 40C-1 .564, F.A.C. Without said citation or argument, the exception is rejected. Corporation of the President, supra.. The hearing officer's recitation of the individual criteria of Rules 40C-2.301 (2), (4) and (5), F.A.C., serve as introduction to and reference for the specific findings with regard to each criterion to provide clarity in the order. To the extent that expert witnesses presented testimony on the criteria and how the applicant satisfied the criteria through proof, the elements are findings or fact. These additional reasons also serve as ground for rejection of the exception. LBCA Exception Number 14 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 56 that LBCA's referenced exhibits do not correlate with normal conditions when compared with longer periods of time. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. In addition, the hearing officer ultimately did not admit the exhibits and therefore, the Finding of Fact becomes irrelevant. (T. 1152-1168, 411-416, 930- 933, 948, 969; FR Ex. 50A, SOB). Contrary to Rule 40C-1.564(3), F.A.C., LBCA fails to state wish particularity citations to the record or legal basis as required by Rule 40C-1.564, F.A.C., in support of its attack on finding 56 and its inferential attack on findings 23, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and conclusions 62 and 63. The entire exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 15 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 66 that LBCA's exhibits 61, 64, 65, 71, 75, 76, 78-80, 82 and 83 have limited probative value to the extent it is predicated on FRI's rebuttal testimony. The LBCA argues that the rebuttal testimony is of low probative value. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and, therefore, the exception is rejected. (T. 1152-1168, 411-416, 930-933, 948, 969). Exception is also taken to Findings of Fact Nos. 32, 36, and 56 and Conclusion of Law 62 because LBCA argues that the testimony on which they are based exceeded the scope of direct examination and the LBCA was not given the opportunity to object. The correct time to object was when the alleged improper testimony was elicited. The LBCA did not object to preserve the record and therefore, has waived the objection. Section 90.104(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Finally, LBCA asserts that it was denied the opportunity to present rebuttal testimony in violation of Section 120.57(1)(b)4., Fla. Stat. To the contrary, LBCA was not denied the opportunity to present rebuttal testimony but failed to request surrebuttal and consequently failed to preserve any denial of that request by an objection on the record. (T. 1188-1190). Since LBCA never requested surrebuttal, the hearing officer never denied that request and, therefore, LBCA's argument is without merit. Furthermore, pursuant to the order of presentation under Rule 40C- 1.5434(1), F.A.C., which is followed in a permitting proceeding (applicant, petitioner, district), LBCA's entire case tended to be in the nature of rebuttal to the applicant's case. While the hearing officer did state that he did not ordinarily allow surrebuttal (T. 1169) before the rebuttal testimony was concluded, LBCA never affirmatively requested to present surrebuttal evidence or testimony nor did LBCA proffer any such evidence or testimony. Since no proffer was made of any relevant surrebuttal testimony which LBCA contends was excluded, and no objection was made in the record to LBCA's belief that it was prohibited from adducing surrebuttal evidence, it is now precluded from complaining about this perceived adverse ruling. King v. Estate of King, 554 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Holmes v. Redland Construction Co., 557 So.2d 911 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990); Roberts v. Hollway, 581 So.2d 619 (a. 4th DCA 1991); Diaz v. Rodriguez, 384 So.2d 906 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980). The exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 16 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 52 and 55 and Conclusions of Law 62 and 63. Findings of Fact 18, 19, 21, 52 and 55 and Conclusions of Law 62 and 63 are discussed in subsequent exceptions and therefore arc not addressed in this ruling on exceptions. LBCA's exception to Finding of Fact 20 fails to state with particularity any supporting citations to the record or legal argument as required by Rule 40C- 1.564 (3), F.A.C., and is therefore, rejected. LBCA takes exception to Finding of Fact 17 that the hearing officer incorrectly refers to three distinct water quality studies. In fact, the hearing officer actually refers to "numerous analyses" LBCA also objects to the reference to "unknown persons" in the finding and apparently to the statement: "They include analyses conducted by the District in 1989 and 1992, including sampling of water quality and an analysis of the background levels of certain parameters, and an assessment of data from HRS testing in March 1989 and May 1992." Clarification that HRS personnel conducted sampling in 1989 and 1992 is provided; however, since these personnel were never specifically named, to that extent the hearing officer's reference to "unknown persons" is accurate. (T. 1035, 379). The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 102-103, 130- 133, 451, 1023-1037, 1041- 1048, 1151-1152). LBCA Exception Number 17 The LBCA takes exception to that part of the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 18 that states: "This theory was predicated on... an assumption that a chemical reaction was occurring because herbicides were used in the dredge pond." LBCA fails to prove any supporting transcript citations in violation of Rule 40C- 1.564 (3), F.A.C. In Finding of Fact 18, the hearing officer reached the conclusion that none of the water quality samples taken from the mine site indicate a violation of state water quality standards. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. It is improper for this Board to retry the case after the hearing has concluded by altering findings and reweighing evidence. Tampa Wholesale Liquors, Inc., supra.. This Board cannot judge credibility of witnesses or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and the exception is rejected. (T. 133, 575, 1024-1025). LBCA Exception Number 18 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 19 by arguing that water quality on the mine site says nothing about off site impacts and positing that the finding is predicated on certain speculation. LBCA offers no helpful record citations supporting these allegations. Expert testimony established that water quality sampling by FRI and the District of the surficial aquifer at the locations chosen was where water quality impacts would be most likely to be revealed and consequently was a conservative approach. (T. 133, 144, 1029-1030, 1061, 1073). This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 130-139, 141-144, 575-576, 1028-1031, 1061-10 65, 1073, 1136-1139). LBCA Exception Number 19 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 21 by stating that it misleadingly implies that 212 homes were tested for water quality by HRS. To the contrary, the hearing officer's finding states "12 out of 212 homeowners" (emphasis added) south of the mine site were tested, not 212. In addition, the exhibits referenced do not reflect the testing of 212 homes. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and the exception is rejected. (T. 167-168, 379, 990, 1036-1037, 1041, 1048-1050, 1052-1053). LBCA Exception Number 20 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 21 on the basis that it is a legal conclusion which misrepresents and misapplies the state water quality standards. However, LBCA cites no authority or record citation for the argument as required by Rule 40C-1.564(3), F.A.C. The finding actually states "with the exception of one well... the water from the homeowners' wells did not exceed background water quality for iron and manganese"; clearly, this is a factual statement. This exception, under the guise of an unsupported legal argument, goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial, and uncontroverted, evidence which, incidentally, includes explanation and citation to the relevant exception/standard. Furthermore, the parties stipulated that official recognition was taken of chapter 17-520, F.A.C. The exception is rejected. (T. 1034, 1041, 1077-1078; Prehearing Stip. p 12; Rules 17- 520.420(2) and 17-520.200(11), F.A.C.) LBCA Exception Number 21 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 21 that the 1989 water quality samples by HRS were unreliable because of the uncertainty regarding the sampling technique protocol. This exception erroneously states there was no evidence of sampling protocol used by HRS. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 1039-1049). LBCA Exception Number 22 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 52 that the receiving body of water will not be seriously harmed, by characterizing the finding as being predicated on an unproven theory that the surficial aquifer receives all groundwater discharged from one site. LBCA has failed to read the entire finding which clearly reveals that the hearing officer did not confine his consideration to the surficial aquifer. He found that water quality standards would not be violated in the surfical aquifer, where the highest concentrations of any potential contaminants would appear, then they would not be violated in any intermediate aquifer similarly, no violations would occur in one Floridan aquifer. The decision to believe one expert over another is the role of the hearing officer, and the decision cannot be altered absent a complete lack of competent substantial evidence from which the finding could be reasonably inferred. Fla. Chapter of Sierra Club, supra.. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 105, 141-142, 1025-1030, 1034-1035). LBCA Exception Number 23 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 55 that water quality sampling was collected to evaluate a water budget for the dredge pond. In their responses to this exception, FRI explicitly notes it has no response to this exception and District counsel concedes that although water quality samples were taken from the dredge pond and a water budget was calculated for the dredge pond, these two procedures were not linked to one another. The testimony of FRI witnesses is that water quality sampling and data to determine the water budget for the dredge pond were performed. (T. 76, 103). Counsel for FRI and the District have stipulated that the testimony does not support the finding that the water quality samples were used to evaluate the water budget. Since, as stipulated, this portion of the hearing officer's finding is not supported by any evidence in the record, the exception is accepted. LBCA Exception Number 24 The LBCA takes exception to the nearing officer's Finding of Fact 55, arguing that the applicant did not perform an environmental assessment of Lake Brooklyn, and thus cannot fairly draw any conclusions about its operation's impact on that lake. The Finding of Fact describes the site-specific information which supports the application. The pertinent part of the finding states: "FRI conducted an assessment of the environmental impacts to the wetland and wildlife resources of the area lakes, including White Sands, Spring and Gator Bone Lakes." To the extent Lake Brooklyn is encompassed by use of the term "area lakes", the existence of an assessment of the impacts to Lake Brooklyn is supported by expert testimony. (T. 281, 899). Additionally, the finding is otherwise supported by competent substantial evidence. (T. 266-280). The exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 25 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 31 which states in pertinent part: "petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart opined that there is insufficient data to determine whether any impacts to lake levels are occurring." LBCA is essentially complaining that the entirety of Dr. Stewart's testimony should be credited not just a portion. The role of the hearing officer is to consider and weigh all the evidence, resolve conflicts and judge credibility of the witnesses. The hearing officer apparently did not view all of Dr. Stewart's testimony in the same manner as LBCA's attorney; such is his legal prerogative. If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry, supra.. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 784-786, 145- 146, 232-233, 285-286, 288-289, 897-898, 1085). LBCA Exception Number 26 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 24 that the rate of decline (in Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes) during the APT test was not distinguishable from the declines which occurred before or after the test. LBCA provides no record citations to support its argument that since the hearing officer rejected its use of certain APT data in an attempted correlation between pumping and Lake Brooklyn levels, that all the APT data was entirely discredited and could have no value in an analysis regarding Spring, White Sands or Gator Bone Lakes. If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 941-948, 1015-1016, 1123, 1168). RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW LBCA Exception Number 1 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 62 and 63 and Findings of Fact 42 through 54 (which LBCA alleges should be conclusions of law) that FRI has established its entitlement to the permit. LBCA argues that the applicant failed to present sufficient information about conditions at Lake Brooklyn. LBCA's numerous "factual" statements in this exception are unsupported by record citations. The burden of proof in an administrative hearing falls initially upon the party asserting the affirmative of an issue, i.e. entitlement to a permit. Rules 40C-1.545 and 40C-2.301(7), F.A.C.; Capeletti Brothers v. Department of General Services, 432 So.2d 1359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Department of Transportation v. J.W.C., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The party must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Florida Audubon Society v. South Florida Water Management District, 13 F.A.L.R. 4169 (undated). The applicant's burden is to establish reasonable assurances that the proposed use is a reasonable-beneficial use, will not interfere with any presently existing legal use of water, and is consistent with the public interest. Section 373.223, Fla. Stat. The burden of reasonable assurances is not one of absolute guarantees. City of Sunrise v. Indian Trace Community Dev. Dist., 14 F.A.L.R. 866 (January 16, 1992). The impacts which are reasonably expected to result from issuance of the permit must be addressed, not potential impacts or those that might occur Hoffert v. St. Joe Paper Co., 12 F.A.L.R. 4972 (December 6, 1990); Chipola Basin Protective Group Inc. v. Florida Chapter of Sierra Club, 11 F.A.L.R. 467 (Department of Environmental Regulation, December 29, 1988); Florida Keys Citizen Coalition v. 1800 Atlantic Developers, 8 F.A.L.R. 5564 (Department of Environmental Regulation, October 17, 1986). Once the party asserting the affirmative, FRI, has presented its prima facia case, the burden shifts to the LBCA to present contrary evidence. 1800 Atlantic Developers, supra.; Hoffert, supra.. LBCA cites Booker Creek Preservation, Inc. v. Mobil Chemical Co., 481 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) in support of the exception. In Booker Creek, the Court held that additional testing, beyond that offered by the applicant, should have been done before the permit could be issued. Booker Creek was limited to its unique set of facts by the case of Berry v. Dept. of Env. Regulation, 530 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). The Berry Court, in dealing with a dredge and fill permit, refused to extend the Booker Creek holding to such permits, noting that the permit under consideration in Berry, was not a pollutant discharge permit. The permit in issue here also is not a pollutant discharge permit. More importantly, like the applicant in Berry, FRI offered evidence of extensive testing and analysis regarding where water comes from and goes to at the mine site and in the surrounding vicinity. Finding of Fact No. 55. LBCA incorrectly argues that the modeling information submitted by FRI has no applicability to impacts at Lake Brooklyn, because the model "did not include Lake Brooklyn". Particularly, in view of findings of fact 23, 28, 31-36 (exceptions to which have been previously rejected), it is apparent that the hearing officer rejected LBCA's view of the "facts" stated in this exception. While the model boundary (which is based on water level data for Floridan wells in the region (T. 164)) is between Lake Brooklyn and the pumping wells at the mine, the drawdown at the model boundary is based on a distance-drawdown relationship that relates to the pumping rate at the mine. The 1991 transient model showed that within the 9 square mile boundary, the impacts at the boundary were no more than 0.1 feet. (T. 129, 178). The reduced boundaries in the 1992 model accurately predicted what was happening at the mine site. (T. 178). The distance-drawdown relationship established by the model shows that the drawdown contour ceases before the model boundary is reached and therefore, before Lake Brooklyn is reached. (FR Exs. 5, 22). Impacts to Lake Brooklyn were also assessed through the review of water levels in the Floridan aquifer well (C- 120) between 1960 and 1992. (T. 928-933). The data showed that water levels in the well at Lake Brooklyn actually continued to rise when the 1989 and 1991 pump tests were conducted. (T. 411-412, 931-933; SJRWMD Ex. 13). In addition, when the pumping wells at the mine were turned off, the water level in the well at Lake Brooklyn did not recover. This indicates that there were outside influences for the fluctuation in the well. (T. 415, 933). The data does not show impacts from the pumping at the sand mine. (T. 942). LBCA also erroneously states that groundwater in the Floridan aquifer beneath Lake Brooklyn flows toward the mine. (See ruling on LBCA's factual exception 5). As listed in responses to LBCA's factual exceptions, particularly those regarding exceptions 8 and 12, there is competent, substantial evidence to support the bindings regarding no adverse impact to Lake Brooklyn. The hearing officer found that the applicant met its burden or proof in Conclusion of Law 62. In Conclusion of Law 63, the hearing officer concluded that the LBCA did not meet its burden of presenting contrary evidence that the withdrawals at the sand mine correlate with the decline in water levels at Lake Brooklyn. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. This exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 2 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 63 that additional permit conditions in the case of a water shortage or a shorter permit duration are not necessary. The LBCA is reargue their case in the exception. The District has authority to require FRI to reduce its water use during a water shortage within the seven year life of the permit. Sections 373.175 and 373.246, Fla. Stat., and Rules 40C-2.381(2)(a)2. and 40C-21.271, F.A.C. Rule 40C-2.381(2)(a)2., F.A.C., which is incorporated into the permit as a limiting condition, states: Nothing in this permit should be construed to limit the authority of the St. Johns River Water Management District to declare a water shortage and issue orders pursuant to section 373.175, F.S., or to formulate a plan for implementation during periods of water shortage, pursuant to section 373.246, F.S. In the event a water shortage, is declared by the District Governing Board, the permittee must adhere to the water shortage restrictions, as specified by the District, even though the specified water shortage restrictions may be inconsistent with the terms and conditions of this permit. (emphasis added). Rule 40C-21.271, F.A.C., General Water Use Restrictions, specifies the restrictions which may be imposed during a water shortage on all water users and states, in pertinent parts: The Board may order use of general water use restrictions and the water use restrictions specified in Part VI for the appropriate water shortage phase for each affected source class. Further, the Board may order any combination in lieu of or in addition to the restrictions specified in Part VI of the restrictions described in Subsection (3), by use or method of withdrawal class, within each source class, if necessary to achieve the necessary percent reduction in overall demand. (emphasis added). General water use restrictions which may be imposed include provisions that facilitate the right of water users in an area to make voluntary agreements among themselves, with the concurrence of the Board or the Executive Director, providing for the mutual reduction, sharing, or rotation of use; restrictions on the total amount of water that may be used, diverted, impounded, extracted, or withdrawn during any day, month, or year during the declared shortage; restrictions on the timing of use, diversion, impoundment, extraction, or withdrawal of water; restrictions on pumping rates and schedules or diversion rates and schedules; or such other provisions or restrictions as are necessary to protect the water resources from serious harm. With the above cited authority, the District can require the withdrawals at the sand mine to be reduced during periods of water shortage within the seven year term of the permit by reducing the total amount withdrawn, controlling the schedule of withdrawals or "by other restrictions which arc necessary to protect the water resources." The hearing officer's conclusion is consistent with the rules and statutes which govern the Board. The exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 3 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 63 and Finding of Fact 47 that FRI satisfied the criteria regarding water conservation measures. See Rule 40C-2.301(4)(e), F.A.C. The LBCA reargues the facts which the hearing officer found to support the conclusion. However, the LBCA offered no evidence to rebut the testimony of FRI. In addition, the LBCA cites no authority that the hearing officer's conclusion is contrary to law. Florida Audubon Society v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 9 F.A.L.R. 565 (October 31, 1986). LBCA also renews its attack on the allocation amount, essentially iterating its factual exception which is rejected for the reasons set forth therein. It is improper for this Board to retry the case after the hearing has concluded by altering findings and reweighing evidence. Tampa Wholesale Liquors, Inc., 376 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). LBCA's exception lacks any record citations or legal authority in support of this exception. The conclusion and finding are supported by competent substantial, and uncontroverted, evidence and the exception is rejected. (T. 43-52, 106, 234- 237, 988-989, 1103- 1104, 1111, 1132-1133) LBCA Exception Number 3 (sic). The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 63, by arguing that the use of water from the surficial aquifer requires a separate permit. Section 40C-2.051, F.A.C., states: No permit shall be required under the provisions of this rule for the following water uses: Withdrawals of ground or surface water to facilitate construction on or below ground surface ..., in the following circum- stances: ground water may be withdrawn if it is recharged on site to the aquifer from which it was withdrawn by either infiltration or direct injection; surface water may be withdrawn only from wholly owned impoundments or works which are no deeper than the lowest extent of the uppermost water bearing stratum and which have no surface hydrologic connection off site, and the surface water must be recharged on site to the uppermost water bearing stratum by either infiltration or direct injection. This exemption from permitting is applicable here, and therefore, no additional permit is required. An agency's interpretation of its rules is afforded great weight. Franklin Ambulance Service v. DHRS, 45 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). LBCA offered no auth-orty or evidence that the District's interpretation is contrary to established law. This conclusion is supported by competent substantial evidence. The exception is rejected. (T. 38-39, 105, 249, 972, 1101-1102). RULINGS ON EXCEPTION TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONTAINED IN POST- HEARING EVIDENTIARY RULING LBCA excepts the hearing officer's rulings in Finding of Fact No. 56 and Conclusion of Law No, 66 excluding LBCA exhibits nos. 61, 64, 71, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82 and 83 as inadmissible for failure of LBCA to comply with subsection 90.956, Fla. Stat., regarding use of summaries of evidence. LBCA takes exception to FRI's objection post-hearing alleging that the exhibits had been admitted. In fact, the exhibits were not admitted at hearing. The LBCA's citation to the transcript is not the hearing officer's ruling on the exhibits. The hearing officer did not admit the ten exhibits on the record, as he did with every other exhibit that he admitted. The LBCA's assertion that it believed the exhibits were admitted is belied by LBCA's failure to list them as admitted in its Proposed Recommended Order on page 3. Therefore, LBCA's claim that FRI's continuing objection was a surprise is without merit. LBCA asserts that FRI cannot make a post-hearing objection to the exhibits in its Proposed Recommended Order and infers gnat FRI's objection to the admission of the exhibits was not preserved at hearing. Rule 40C-1.561, F.A.C., provides for the submission of legal briefs along with proposed findings of fact and conclusions or law. For matters that remain pending at the close of a hearing, a party may file a legal brief in support of its position. FRI did not object to the opinion testimony of the LBCA expert witness, only to the graphic depictions of such testimony. (T. 356). LBCA stated at hearing that the excluded exhibits were simply graphic depictions of the expert's opinion testimony. (T. 354). The record is abundantly clear that FRI preserved its objection to the exhibits and the hearing officer reserved ruling on their admission until the recommended order was issued. (T. 353, 358, 360, 363, 369, 370, 375, 377, 524, 531, 537, 1079-1080, 1178). LBCA essentially asserts that the exhibits are not "summaries" and therefore not subject to subsection 90.956, Fla. Stat., which, of course, the fact-finder found otherwise. LBCA's reliance on Marks v. Marks, 576 So.2d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) is misplaced. Marks did not hold that expert testimony is not subject to subsection 90.956, but only that an expert is not required to utilize subsection 90.956 when presenting underlying data relied on for his opinion. The hearing officer found that the hydrographs were summaries and the underlying information was not indicated on the summary. The hearing officer allowed FRI time to review the data and present rebuttal. The fact-finder is entitled to great latitude in admitting or excluding summary evidence. Wright v. Southwest Bank, 554 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1977)(trial court without jury is entitled to great latitude covering the admission or exclusion of summary evidence). LBCA has failed to show that the hearing officer abused this discretion in excluding the exhibits. LBCA also takes exception that LBCA was denied rebuttal, or surrebuttal, on FRI's rebuttal case. As discussed in the ruling on LBCA's Exception 15, LBCA failed to request rebuttal of FRI's case. The hearing officer allowed cross-examination and LBCA did not offer any additional evidence from LBCA witnesses. Since the LBCA never requested to offer rebuttal testimony, then the hearing officer could not and did not deny that request. It is well-settled that an objection must be preserved during an administrative proceeding or it will be deemed waived. DeMendoza v. First Federal Savings and Loan, 585 So.2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)(even if mistake was made in trial, party's waived its right to appeal the issue since it failed to call the deficiency to the court's attention during trial); Yachting Arcade, Inc. v. Riverwalk Condominium Assoc., 500 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)(party's failure to object to matters at administrative hearing made those matters unreviewable, even though party claimed fundamental procedural errors, it failed to show how it was prejudiced by any such action or omission; National Dairy Products, Corp. v. Odham, 121 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1959). Therefore, LBCA's exception based on the denial of rebuttal is rejected. LBCA argues that-the proper vehicle for the objection was a motion for rehearing. LBCA does not cite authority for its assertion. Since the hearing officer never ruled on the admissibility, there was no order on which to base a motion for rehearing. Nevertheless, the alleged error, if any, of excluding the exhibits, was harmless. Sims v. Brown, 574 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1991)(exclusion of manual was harmless since experts testified to the same matters in the manual); Little v. Banker's National Life Insurance Co., 369 So.2d 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)(harmless error to exclude letter since witnesses otherwise testified at length as to its contents and conclusions). The LBCA expert testified extensively regarding the basis of each excluded exhibit and the information it depicts in relation to the conclusions of his expert opinion which the hearing officer weighed in rendering his factual findings and conclusions. (T. 346, 349, 351, 352, 358, 359, 364, 366, 371, 373, 411, 456, 457, 458, 481, 486, 501, 504, 507, 509, 511, 512, 516, 517, 518, 519, 542). The hearing officer concluded that even if the exhibits had been admitted it would not have altered his factual findings stating that they had limited probative value. (Conclusion of Law No. 66). Therefore, the exception is rejected. RULING ON RECOMMENDED ORDER'S COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 120.59(2), FLA. STAT. LBCA asserts that the hearing officer failed to comply with subsection 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., by not providing a sufficiently explicit ruling on each of the parties' proposed findings of fact. Section 120,59(2), Fla. Stat., requires "a ruling upon each proposed finding" The Appendix to the Recommended Order does not contain an omnibus "blanket" ruling on all of LBCA's proposed findings which the courts have found inadequate. Cf. Island Harbor beach Club v. DNR, 476 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Health Care Management, Inc. v. DHRS, 479 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The Appendix clearly contains a ruling upon each of LBCA's proposed findings. Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., requires no more. LBCA relies on Island Harbor Beach Club v. DNR, 476 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), to support this argument. Island Harbor Beach Club, differs significantly from this case. The order Island Harbor Beach Club did not individually address each specific proposed finding as the Recommended Order in this case does. The only reference to proposed findings made in the Island Harbor Beacon Club order was a single paragraph which stated: The parties proposed findings of fact have been considered and where unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, cumulative, or subordinate. This differs from the Recommended Order in the instant case which specifically addresses each proposed finding and specifies where (by paragraph) in the Recommended Order that proposed finding is addressed. It is elementary to then read the paragraph referred to in the Recommended Order to determine what portion of the proposed finding was accepted. More applicable to this case is the case of Schomer v. Department of Professional Regulation, 417 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The order in Schomer did not contain specific rulings on each proposed finding submitted by the Appellant. The substance of the final order, however, demonstrated that each finding had been considered and ruled on. The Court noted that, for purposes of complying with Section 120.59(2) Fla. Stat., It would not elevate form over substance." An agency need not Independently quote verbatim each proposed finding and independently dispose of that proposed finding; rather, it is sufficient that the agency provide in its decision a written foundation upon which the reviewing court may assure that all proposed findings of fact have been consider and ruled upon and not overlooked or concealed. Id. at 1090. The Court held that it could discern from the substance of the order that each of the proposed findings were addressed, and to the extent the technical requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., were departed from, the departure did not materially impair the fairness or correctness of the proceedings. Id. at 1091. LBCA merely has to compare the hearing officer's findings with its proposed findings to discern those portions accepted. Therefore, the exception is rejected. RULING ON MOTION FOR REMAND Pursuant, to Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., LBCA has filed a Motion for Remand asserting that newly discovered evidence establishes that a finding by the hearing officer is inaccurate because of allegedly false testimony by District expert witness, Dr. Larry Lee. The hearing officer found that Lake Brooklyn had been in a period of decline before and after the 1989 aquifer pump test and that due to rainfall deficits Brooklyn Bay was separated from the main body of Lake Brooklyn for at least 18 to 24 months before and during the 1989 aquifer performance test. The hearing officer determined that the rate and character of declines during the pumping were not distinguishable from the declines occurring before and after the test. Thus, he found that impacts to Lake Brooklyn water levels from the pumping were indistinguishable from the declines due to drought. (Finding of Fact No. 30). LBCA asserts that a newly discovered Department of Transportation (D.O.T.) survey, dated October 11, 1988, shows that Brooklyn Bay was not segregated from the remainder of the lake due to drought conditions prior to the 1989 aquifer pump test as testified by Dr. Lee and seeks the Board to remand the issue to the hearing officer for consideration of this new evidence. The only reasons for remand regarding fact finding are if an erroneous legal conclusion by a hearing officer warrants taking of evidence on the issue, or if a factual issue was never ruled upon by the hearing officer. See Miller v. Dept. Envt'l Reg., 5504 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(agency's modification of legal conclusions necessitated factual findings on issue which hearing officer had initially disregarded as irrelevant) and Cohn v. Dept. of Prof. Reg., 477 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)(when the hearing officer fails to find a specific fact, agency must remand to the hearing officer to do so). Clearly, neither of these reasons have any application to Petitioner's arguments. Although subsection 40C-1.512, F.A.C., provides that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to District administrative proceedings to the extent not inconsistent with Chapter 120 or Chapter 40C-1, the applicability of Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., is problematic and inconsistent with a subsection 120.57 proceeding. First, the civil procedure rule only applies to final judgments and in this subsection 120.57 administrative proceeding LBCA is attempting to apply the civil procedure rule to a nonfinal recommended order. Second, LBCA has not expressly excepted Finding of Fact No. 30 as not supported by competent substantial evidence or that a Board rule or policy has been incorrectly interpreted /1 , but actually seeks the Board to allow LBCA to supplement the record after remand with new facts for the hearing officer to weigh in applying those facts to the applicable District rules. Thus, unlike a trial court, Finding of Fact No. 30 cannot be altered by this Board if supported by any competent substantial evidence. Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Fla. Stat.; Freeze v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 556 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); School Board of Leon County v. Weaver, 556 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The Board may only consider whether the findings actually made by the hearing officer are sustained by the evidence, and whether, if so, they support the recommended legal conclusions. Cohn v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 477 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Unlike a judge with plenary and equitable powers in a judicial setting, this Board, under Chapter 120, cannot authorize fact- finding after a hearing's conclusion except in the most narrow circumstances, none of which are applicable to the motion before the Board. Cf. Manasota 88, Inc. v. Tremor, 545 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(may remand if hearing officer makes erroneous legal interpretation); Cohn, supra.. (may remand if a necessary factual issue was not determined by the hearing officer); Friends of Children v. DHRS, 504 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(may remand if hearing officer makes erroneous evidentiary ruling). In effect, LBCA wants to utilize a civil procedure rule for the Board to authorize additional fact-finding on a matter already considered by the hearing officer regarding a finding supported by competent substantial evidence. Section 120.57, Fla. Stat., simply does not authorize the Board to take such action. Section 120.57(1)(b)10, Fla. Stat.; Dept. of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)(chapter 120 does not allow additional or cumulative evidence on matters already considered and the APA does not envision a never-ending process). Consequently, the application of Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., is inconsistent with Chapter 120 and LBCA is free to raise any alleged error at hearing on appeal of the final order. Even assuming Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., is applicable to this subsection 120.57 proceeding, LBCA has failed to clearly establish the extraordinary circumstances warranting the granting of its motion. The material issue of whether FRI's proposed pumping would impact the area lake levels already effected by a rainfall deficit was expressly raised by LBCA in its initial petition for hearing as far back as August 1992 and was also an issue stipulated in the Prehearing Stipulation prior to the February 1993 hearing. (Petition for Administrative Hearing paragraph f. 2, 3, 4.; Prehearing Stip. paragraphs B. 2, G. 1). Consequently, LBCA had over five months prior to hearing to elicit all relevant evidence to that Issue. If Rule 1.540(b) was applicable, LBCA's burden would be to clearly establish the following to receive relief: (1) it must appear that the evidence is such as will probably change the-result if a new trial is granted; (2) that it has been discovered since the trial; (3) that it could not have been discovered before one trial by the exercise of due diligence; and (4) that it is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching. City of Winter Haven v. Tuttle/White Construction Inc., 370 So.2d 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); King v. Harrington, 411 So.2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), rev denied, 418 So.2d 1279 (Fla. 1982). The predicate for LBCA's motion is that Dr. Lee's testimony regarding the lake separation was false, therefore LBCA could not have exercised due diligence in discovering the alleged new evidence. LBCA has filed no express exception with record support establishing that Finding of Fact No. 30 is not supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the Board by law cannot alter that factual finding. Section 40C-1.564(3), F.A.C.; Section 120.37(1)(b)10., Fla. Stat.; Freeze, supra.. Consequently, Dr. Lee's testimony is not false. Importantly, Dr. Lee's testimony was not the only evidence supporting this finding. LBCA's own witness, the president of the association, testified that Brooklyn Bay had been segregated for four or five years from the main part of the lake and that he had been able to walk across the lake without getting wet for the last four or five years. (T. 863, 870). Likewise, LBCA's own expert stated that Lake Brooklyn's condition between 1989 to 1991 had receded to such an extent as it was no longer a continuous lake. (T. 317). Accordingly, the predicate for LBCA's motion is factually inaccurate and misplaced. Furthermore, LBCA must clearly establish that even though the exercise of due diligence before the hearing, it would not have discovered the 1988 D.O.T. survey. Brav v. Electric Door-Lift Inc., 558 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(movant's burden to establish due diligence); Plisco v. Union Railroad Co., 379 F.2d 15 (3d DCA 1967)(motion for new trial on newly discovered evidence is granted only where extraordinary circumstances are present). Even though the effects of FRI's proposed pumping on lake levels in time of rainfall deficit was an issue dating back to August 1992, LBCA asserts that it could not have obtained the survey prior to hearing in February 1993 "because of the logistics of requesting public records and the delay in delivery of same." LBCA could have reasonably anticipated that witnesses would testify regarding the disputed issue, particularly its own witnesses, and obtained the survey with the exercise of due diligence. LBCA offers no basis why D.O.T. would not have supplied the survey as required by law or that LBCA could not obtain it and, in fact, the public records law contains a provision for obtaining immediate relief if a request for records is denied. See subsection 119.11, Fla. Stat. In Florida Audubon Society v. Ratner, 497 So.2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), a 1981 judgment had been entered finding that limestone mining would be inconsistent with the water management purposes of a water management district's flowage easement on platiff's property. Plaintiff sought a new trial because of newly discovered opposing evidence in a 1980 Corps of Engineers report on the effects of limestone mining. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court agreed finding that the granting of such motions was disfavored and that the report was prepared in September 1980 well before the trial and judgment in June 1981 and could have been discovered prior to the with the exercise of due diligence. Likewise in this proceeding, the proffered D.O.T. survey was prepared in October 1988, nearly four and one-half years before the February 1993 hearing and LBCA has failed to show that due diligence would not have discovered the survey prior to the administrative hearing in this proceeding. See also, Morhaim v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 559 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(no new trial granted based on post-judgment affidavits regarding evidence on known issue that could have been discovered prior to trial). LBCA also asserts that Dr. Lee misrepresented the contents of Clark's "Report of Investigations No. 33-Hydrology of Brooklyn Lake Near Keystone Heights, Florida" regarding its conclusions and his opinion concerning the separation of Brooklyn Bay from Lake Brooklyn and thus prejudiced LBCA's case. LBCA argument is an attack on the weight of the conflicting evidence which is the job of the hearing officer to resolve. An expert witness is not required to disclose the facts and data underlying his opinion. Marks v. Marks, 576 So.2d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). LBCA could have cross examined Dr. Lee regarding the separation. LBCA was aware of the "Clark Report" (T. 844) and even anticipated testimony regarding water levels in its case in chief (T. 846). Indeed, the report was listed by LBCA as its Exhibit 13 in the Prehearing Stipulation, although LBCA chose not to introduce it into evidence during the hearing. Dr. Lee testified not once but twice about the location of the staff gauge (T. 946 and 962-966). On cross, LBCA did not inquire about the location of the staff gauge or the lack of water beneath the bridge. (T. 991-1017). It was LBCA's burden to challenge the factual basis for Dr. Lee's opinion. City of Hialeah v. Weatherford, 466 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). An insufficiency in the expert opinion offered, if any, should have been addressed in cross-examination by LBCA, not by a post-hearing motion. LBCA alleges that the outcome would be different if the DOT survey were part of the evidence. The Board cannot accept new evidence or rule on the admissibility of evidence which was not presented to the hearing officer. The Finding of Fact to which LBCA refers states six reasons why the correlation between the pumping at the sand mine and its effects on Lake Brooklyn water level were not established. See Recommended Order, Finding of Fact 32. The location of the staff gauge in Brooklyn Bay rather than Lake Brooklyn was one of those six. LBCA's error was in not knowing the location of the staff gauge (T. 418-420) rather than the testimony of Dr. Lee. Therefore, LBCA's allegation that but for the testimony of Dr. Lee, the hearing officer would have found differently is unfounded. The mere chance that the hearing officer might have found differently is insufficient to remand the hearing for additional fact finding. Cluett v. Dep't of Professional Regulation, 530 So.2d 351, 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The courts look with disfavor on motions based on newly discovered evidence because to look with favor would bring about a looseness in practice and encourage counsel to neglect to gather all available evidence for a first trial by speculating upon the outcome, and then, being defeated, become for the first time duly diligent in securing other evidence to cure the defects or omissions in their showing upon the first trial. Rushing v. Chappell, 247 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); Henderson Sians v. Fla. Dept. of Transp., 397 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). It is well-settled that no abuse of discretion occurs on the part of an agency by refusing to direct a remand to receive evidence which could have been introduced during the course of the original proceedings. Department of Transportation v. J.W.C., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) LBCA has failed to clearly establish a right to relief and therefore the motion is denied. RULING ON MOTION FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION AND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD LBCA has filed a Motion for Official Recognition and to Supplement the Record seeking the Board to accept into evidence the October 11, 1988 D.O.T. survey which was the subject of LBCA's Motion for Remand and also the U.S.G.S. publication "Report of Investigations No. 33-Hydrology of Brooklyn Lake Near Keystone Heights, Florida", by Clark, also referenced In LBCA's Motion for Remand. The Board is not a fact-finder in this subsection 120.57 proceeding and it is reversible error for the Board to supplement the record through post-hearing evidence. Section 120.57(1)(b)10, Fla. stat., Marks v. Northwest Florida Water Management District, 566 So.2d 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)(court refused to take judicial notice of factual matter based on records that could have been offered at administrative hearing); Nest v. Dept. of Professional Regulation 490 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Shongut v Mark, 173 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)(Where matters raised on motion for relief from judgment could have been available to movant during trial proceedings, denial of motion was not abuse of discretion); Weaver, supra.. Moreover, the Motion for Remand has been denied. LBCA's post- hearing motions will be available as part of the record of this proceeding for purposes of any appeal which may be pursued. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: The Recommended Order dated June 4, 1993, attached hereto as Exhibit A, is adopted in its entirety except as modified by the final action of the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District (Ruling on LBCA Exception 23). Florida Rock Industries' application for consumptive use permit no. 2-019-0012AUR is hereby granted under the terms and conditions as provided herein. The post-hearing Motion for Remand, Motion for Official Recognition and Motion to Supplement the Record filed by LBCA are hereby denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of July 1993, in Palatka, Florida. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT By: JOE E. HILL CHAIRMAN RENDERED this 14th day of July 1993. By: SANDRA L. BERTRAM ASSISTANT DISTRICT CLERK
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Respondent, Florida Rock Industries (FRI or applicant), a Florida corporation, operates a nine hundred and eighty acre sand mine known as the Goldhead Sand Mine (Goldhead) in Clay County, Florida. The mine is located approximately six miles northeast of Keystone Heights and fifty miles southwest of Jacksonville. FRI has operated the mine since 1958. With the exception of eighty acres of land owned by FRI, the remainder of the land on which the mine is located is owned by Carroll-Phillips Investors and has been leased to FRI since 1973. The mine lies within the jurisdictional boundaries of respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District (District), a special taxing district created by the legislature and charged with the responsibility for administering and enforcing permitting programs for consumptive uses of water. FRI is accordingly subject to the District's regulatory authority. As a necessary component of its operation, FRI withdraws approximately 2.09 million gallons per day (MGD) of groundwater from the Floridan Aquifer which is used in the production of sand. This use of water is made pursuant to a consumptive use permit (no. 2-019-0012U) issued to FRI by the District on December 11, 1984, and which allows it to consume 762.85 million gallons per year of groundwater for hydraulic dredging, cleaning and purification of sand at the Goldhead mine. The permit was issued for seven years. In order to continue groundwater withdrawal and use, FRI has applied to the District for a seven-year renewal of its permit with no request for an increase in allocation. That request, which has been identified as application no. 2-019-0012AUR, is the subject of this proceeding. After conducting a review of the application, making site inspections, and performing various studies and analyses, on July 28, 1992, the District, through its staff, gave notice of its intent to approve the application with certain conditions. Thereafter, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, Lake Brooklyn Civic Association, Inc. (petitioner), a nonprofit corporation made up of property owners in adjacent areas of Clay County, filed a petition under Subsection 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, seeking to contest the proposed action. Petitioner is a citizen of the state and has an interest in activities that may injure or harm the state's water resources. Thus, it has standing to bring this action. As twice amended, the petition generally alleged that the consumptive use would (a) cause an unmitigated adverse impact on adjacent land uses, including a significant reduction in water levels in Lake Brooklyn and Spring, Gator Bone, and White Sands Lake, which lie generally to the south and southwest of the mine site, (b) cause a deterioration in water quality, (c) cause economic or environmental harm, and (d) be for purposes other than operating a sand mine. The broad three-pronged test to be used in determining whether the permit should be issued is whether the proposed consumptive use is a reasonable- beneficial use, whether it will interfere with presently existing legal uses of water, and whether it is consistent with the public interest. In addressing this test, the parties have presented extensive expert testimony involving highly technical subject matter. As might be expected, the experts reached different conclusions as to whether the criteria have been met. In resolving these conflicts, the undersigned has accepted the more credible and persuasive evidence, and this accepted testimony is recited in the findings below. The Mining Site Operations The entire mine site is around 7,000 feet east to west, about one mile north to south in a rectangular shape, and lies within the lake region of northeast Florida. The mine's product is silica sand used for concrete and masonry mortar for construction throughout northeast Florida. As such, it produces an economic benefit to the region. The mine is located on one of the few sites in the northeast Florida area with deposits suitable for construction purposes and is the closest sand mine to the Jacksonville market. In 1958, FRI installed three ten-inch diameter production wells in the center of the mine site. One well is 450 feet deep while the other two are 460 feet deep. The 1984 permit authorizes withdrawals of 762.85 million gallons of water per year, an average rate of 2.09 MGD, and a maximum rate of 3.75 MGD. This rate is consistent with the amount of water used at other mines in north Florida and is based on FRI's projected maximum annual use. The use is industrial commercial for sand mining while the source is the Floridan Aquifer, the lowest acceptable water quality source available capable of producing the requested amount of water. Water use withdrawal from the three wells is monitored by in-line flow meters installed in 1991 as a water control and conservation measure. The pumping rate depends on the number of fixtures and valves open in the system at the time of pumping. However, the actual rate of water production cannot be varied at any of the pumps since the wells are connected to "on or off" pumps. The need for water in the dredge pond and processing plant dictates how long FRI will have a pump in operation. Water from the wells is first discharged into a dredge pond, twenty feet deep, which is an approximately 155-acre excavation lake located in the southwest portion of the mine site. In periods of low water, the water is used to float the dredge, which requires some three feet of water to float, and in conjunction with a bulldozer, to wash sand down from the bank toward the dredge. After the dredge sucks up sand and water from the bottom of the pond, this mixture is slurried to an on-site processing plant where more water is added to sort and wash the sand. The end product (silica sand) is then loaded onto trucks which haul the product to the market. After processing, the moisture content of the sand product is only 5 percent. The tailings (unusable waste product) and wash water are then routed by a slurry pipe to settling areas and eventually recirculated through a system of ditches, canals and water control structures back into the dredge pond. No chemicals are used in the operation. Although FRI's contract with the lessor of the property requires it to maintain the dredge pond elevation at a specified elevation, this requirement cannot be fulfilled during drought conditions. The mining operation is a closed system to the extent there is no point source (surface water) discharge from the system. Even so, a significant amount of water loss occurs during the process, mainly through percolation into the ground. Other water loss occurs through evaporation. The receiving water from the site is primarily the surficial aquifer which recharges the downgradient lakes, including Gator Bone, White Sands, and Spring Lakes. Water may also travel through the surficial aquifer into the sinkholes on site and thence to the Floridan Aquifer. However, not all water is lost to sinkholes in the settling area because they are filled with fine materials. This is confirmed by the fact that water returns to the dredge pond. The mining operation has not affected this pattern. The lakes in the region are replenished solely by rainfall, either by direct rain on the lakes or through water seeping through sands. FRI plans to mine approximately thirty additional acres at the Goldhead Site during the next seven years. To this end, it has secured a management and storage of surface waters permit from the District which allows construction of this additional acreage. It also has acquired an industrial waste water discharge permit from the Department of Environmental Regulation. It is expected that within the next two to four years, FRI will abandon the current dredge pond and start a new one on the north side of the property to accommodate mining operations, or in the alternative, extend the current pond to the north. Water conservation A water conservation plan has been submitted by FRI. Measures already implemented include (a) using in-line flow meters to monitor amounts of withdrawal, (b) not pumping for more than seventeen hours per day to prevent exceeding the maximum allotment per day, (c) regularly monitoring withdrawals to ensure allocations as not being exceeded, (d) extending the plant discharge further past the sinkholes in the settling area to maximize return water to the dredge pond, (e) raising water levels in the settling area to facilitate flow back to the dredge pond, (f) during periods of drought using bulldozers instead of water spray to break loose sand formations, (g) curtailing production when further production would cause the plant to exceed allocations, (h) replacing water-cooled bearings in plant machinery with bearings that do not require water, and (i) restricting dredge mobility to allow operation in shallower water. No other water conservation measures are economically, environmentally or technologically feasible. Hydrogeologic characteristics at the mine site The mine site, which is located within the Upper Etonia Creek surface water drainage basin, generally slopes from 200 feet NGVD on the north to 120 feet NGVD on the south, and is underlain, in order, by approximately 10 to 50 feet of sand (known as the surficial aquifer), 200 feet of dense, moist clay (known as the Hawthorn Formation), and then a highly transmissive limestone formation (known as the Floridan Aquifer). The surficial aquifer flows from north to south across the site while water falling on the site primarily moves downgradient through the surficial aquifer. There are five sinkholes on the site, all having predated the mining activities, which may provide a conduit for recharge from the surficial aquifer to the Floridan aquifer. Except where the Hawthorn formation, a confining unit to the Floridan aquifer, is breached, recharge through the Hawthorn formation is very slow because of the dense clays of that formation. Aquifer characteristics within the Floridan aquifer beneath the site and immediately adjacent thereto are relatively uniform. As noted earlier, 5 percent of the water leaves the mine site as moisture in the sand product. The remaining 95 percent of water is immediately recharged on site to the surficial aquifer through various impoundments, and after entering the surficial aquifer, that portion of the water which is not recirculated to the dredge pond for reuse in the mining process moves either vertically into the Hawthorn formation, vertically into the Floridan aquifer through a sinkhole, downgradient through the surficial aquifer to one of the lakes south of the mine, or evaporates. It is noted that notwithstanding the mining operations, the flow in the surficial aquifer system still parallels the topography as it existed prior to mining, and the same saturated thickness within the surficial aquifer exists on site as existed before mining occurred. Hydrogeologic Characteristics of the Region The region in which the mine is located is very high in topographic altitude indicating that it is a groundwater recharge area. Like the mine site, the region has three distinct geologic units underlying the surface, including sands and clayey sands (surficial aquifer), thick clays (Hawthorn formation) and limestones and dolomites (Floridan aquifer). The Hawthorn unit serves as a confining unit or semi-confining unit between the surficial aquifer, or water table, in the upper unit and the Floridan aquifer in the lower unit. When solution channels develop within the limestones in the lower unit, the openings can cause the overlying units to collapse, forming sinkholes. Thus, when the Hawthorn formation is breached by the development of a sinkhole, water can move rapidly through the overlying units to the Floridan aquifer. Many of the lakes within the region exist over collapsed features within the limestone units beneath them and are referred to as sinkhole lakes. The rate of recharge from each lake depends on the rate of leakance into the Floridan aquifer. Some lakes leak fast, others not at all. For example, Lake Brooklyn fluctuates about two feet, Lake Johnson about thirteen feet, and Pebble Lake about thirty feet. Lake Brooklyn, which lies several miles to the southwest of the mine, is the fourth lake in a chain of lakes consisting of Blue Pond, Sand Hill Lake, Lake Magnolia, Lake Brooklyn, Keystone Lake, Lake Geneva, Oldfield Pond, and Half Moon Lake. All of these lakes are in a different surface water drainage sub-basin within the larger Upper Etonia Creek Basin than the mine site. The lakes above Lake Brooklyn in the chain are at higher elevations than Lake Brooklyn, and when rainfall is sufficient, water flows from Blue Pond to Sand Hill Lake, to Lake Magnolia, and then to Lake Brooklyn through Alligator Creek. Direct rainfall and surface water inflows from Alligator Creek represent the most significant sources of water to Lake Brooklyn. Other pertinent lakes in the area are Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes, which lie almost directly along the mine site's southern boundary and are each less than a mile from the mine's dredge pond. During the period records have been maintained for water levels in Lake Brooklyn, it has fluctuated over a range of slightly more than twenty feet. Although average rainfall within the Upper Etonia Creek Basin is approximately fifty-one inches per year, during the period from 1974 through 1990 the basin experienced a continuing period of below normal rainfall resulting in a cumulative deficit of rainfall for this period of minus seventy-eight inches. Since 1988, the lake region has experienced a severe drought. Because the lakes in the region have risen or fallen in correlation with periods of below normal or above normal rainfall, lake levels have fallen dramatically in recent years. Water levels in Lake Brooklyn began declining in 1974 at the same time the period of below normal rainfall began and continued declining until 1991, a year in which the region experienced above normal rainfall. These low water levels were exacerbated by the cessation of surface water inflows from Alligator Creek in late 1988 which continued until late 1992 when such flows resumed. The cessation of surface water flows into Lake Brooklyn during the period from 1988- 1992 were a direct consequence of the extended period of below normal rainfall in the region. Finally, very little, if any, of the groundwater flowing in the Floridan aquifer beneath Lake Brooklyn flows toward the mine site. Water Quality Impacts Numerous analyses have been conducted to determine water quality of the site, water quality in nearby homeowners' water systems, and water quality impacts of the proposed consumptive use. They include analyses conducted by the District in 1989 and 1992, including sampling of water quality and an analysis of the background levels for certain parameters, and an assessment of data from HRS testing in March 1989 and May 1992. In addition, FRI conducted water quality sampling on site in eight wells, the dredge pond and a settling pond. Finally, petitioner reviewed water quality samples from off-site private water supply wells taken on March 1, 1989, and on July 22, 1992, by unknown persons. As to this latter sampling, petitioner had no knowledge of the protocol used in obtaining the 1989 samples and offered no evidence of reliability of the 1992 data. Thus, the reliability of its assessment is in doubt. None of the water quality samples taken from the mine site indicate a violation of state water quality standards. However, petitioner posits that a chemical reaction is likely occurring at the deeper levels of the dredge pond, possibly causing undissolved iron in sediments to become dissolved, and then traveling in solution through the clays of the Hawthorn formation into transmissive units and finally to off-site homeowners' wells which may be in those units. This theory was predicated on the results of 1989 HRS sampling which revealed some wells near White Sands Lake experienced elevated levels of iron and manganese, and an assumption that a chemical reaction was occurring because herbicides were used in the dredge pond. However, only one application of a herbicide occurred, and that was in 1990, or one year after iron was detected in the off-site homeowners' wells. Petitioner agreed that the 1990 application of herbicide could not have affected the 1989 sampling. It also agreed that these reactions were less likely to be occurring in a pond with water flowing through it. In this case, water is circulated through the dredge pond by being pumped into it, pumped out of it, and allowed to flow back into the pond. FRI determined that no state water quality standards were exceeded for iron, manganese, zinc, turbidity, total dissolved solids, chloride and nitrate in the surficial aquifer and Hawthorn formations at the site. The wells used for monitoring water quality were installed and sampled using standard quality assurance techniques. Water quality from the surficial aquifer was emphasized because if iron or manganese were present in the water, it would most likely be detected in wells in the surficial aquifer because they are detected in wells immediately downgradient of the source. If the chemical reaction is occurring, water leaving the dredge pond is contaminated, and such water will follow the path of least resistance by going either to the Hawthorn formation or the surficial aquifer. Because of the geologic properties of the Hawthorn, this path is the surficial aquifer. At least 70,000 gallons per day enter the surficial aquifer from the bottom of the dredge pond. Since contaminated water would receive water quality treatment by absorption of the Hawthorn but not in the surficial, water in the surficial aquifer represents the worst case scenario as to the possible presence of contaminated water. The chemical reactions which petitioner believes may be occurring in the deeper portions of the dredge pond require the presence of an acidic environment and reduced oxygen levels in the water. FRI's water quality testing indicates that water in the dredge pond is not acidic, but rather is neutral. Therefore, any reaction which might be occurring could not be on a large enough scale to affect water quality. Moreover, even if the reactions were occurring, it was established that the clays in the Hawthorn formation would absorb iron, and such absorption would not take place in the surficial aquifer. Therefore, it is found that there would be no adverse impact to groundwater including the surficial aquifer and that water quality standards will be met. Although petitioner presented evidence that in 1989 HRS testing of 12 out of 212 homeowners south of the mine site indicated that three homeowners had iron concentrations in excess of state drinking standards and two had manganese concentrations in excess of state drinking water standards, this is insufficient to prove that the mining operation has an adverse impact on water quality. To begin with, some of the wells sampled were thirty to fifty years old even though the life expectancy of a well is fifteen to twenty years. Some were constructed of galvanized steel pipe, and those wells also indicated high turbidity levels. High turbidity levels are caused by a number of unrelated factors and will result in increased iron levels that are not representative of the quality of the groundwater in the formation, but rather of the iron-laden sediments in the formation, or from the casing material. With the exception of one well (the Sutton well), the water from the homeowners' wells did not exceed background water quality for iron and manganese. The elevated iron and manganese concentrations in the Sutton well are caused by a number of factors other than the mine. Then, too, a proper sampling technique may not have been followed during the 1989 sampling event thus rendering the results unreliable. Finally, properly constructed monitoring wells should be used to assess the quality of the groundwaters, and the wells sampled in 1989 and 1992 were not of that type. The Mine's Impact on Water Levels Perhaps the issue of primary concern to members of petitioner's organization is whether the mining operations have contributed to the decline in water levels of nearby lakes, including Lake Brooklyn. This is because of serious declines in the levels of those water bodies over the past years, and a concomitant decrease in the value of homes which surround the lakes. In an effort to resolve this and other water level issues, the parties made numerous studies of the current and anticipated water level impacts from the site. This data collection effort was far more extensive than is normally conducted for a mine of this size. They included aquifer performance tests by FRI and the District, steady state and transient computer modeling of impacts on the Floridan and surficial aquifers by FRI, an analysis of correlations of pumping and water level changes in lakes and aquifers by FRI and petitioner, photolinear and fracture trace analyses of structural conditions by FRI and petitioner, a stratigraphic analysis of a geologic core retrieved from the site by FRI, installation of deep and shallow wells for groundwater monitoring by FRI, groundwater flow mapping by FRI, review of literature by all parties, review and analysis of rainfall data by all parties, analysis of evaporation data by the District and petitioner, and an analysis of geophysical logs from wells by FRI and the District. Aquifer performance tests Aquifer performance tests, which enable hydrologists to reach conclusions regarding the characteristics of the aquifers tested, were conducted in January 1989 by the District and June 1991 by FRI. In a typical pump test, an aquifer production well pumps at a constant rate, while water levels are monitored in observation wells at specified distances from the pumping well. In this case, the tests measured effects of pumping from the mine production wells for periods ranging from 78 hours to 108 hours at approximately twice the average rate of 2.09 MGD. The zone of influence of pumping was measured at wells placed at the property boundaries, at Gold Head State Park, east of the mine, as well as wells to the south of the mine for the 1989 tests. During the 1989 tests, lake levels for Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes were recorded. The effects of pumping were approximately equal for wells spaced approximately equal distances along the east, south and west. Thus, for purposes of analysis, the Floridan aquifer was considered isotropic and homogeneous. This is consistent with assumptions commonly made by geologists in Florida. Computer models were calibrated with actual results of these tests to account for variations caused by this assumption. The District has concluded, and the undersigned so finds, that no changes in the levels of the lakes are attributable to pumping. Further, the aquifer itself will not be harmed by the use of the amount of water requested in the application. The tests indicate the maximum amount of drawdown in the Floridan aquifer from pumping at twice the average rate is 0.1 to 0.6 foot in neighboring wells. Effects of actual pumping will be approximately one-half the test observed amounts on an average pumping day. For example, based on the 1989 test results, drawdowns in the Floridan aquifer at the boundary of the FRI property during an average day of pumpage should not exceed 0.2 to 0.3 feet while drawdowns beneath Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes to the south of the mine should be less than 0.2 feet. The tests provide actual measurements of the effects of pumping. Indeed, all three lakes were declining before the 1989 test began and continued to decline after the test was ended. However, the rate of decline during the seventy-eight hours of the test was not distinguishable from declines which occurred before or after the test. Computer modeling As a supplement to the aquifer performance tests, FRI performed computer modeling to determine effects of the water withdrawal and use on the Floridan and surficial aquifers. These models are used by hydrologists to predict impacts associated with a particular source of stress, such as pumpage, to an aquifer and, in this case, occurred in three phases. The first was an impact model which determined the drawdown in the Floridan aquifer. The second occurred as a result of questions raised by residents of the sand mine area and included a "steady state" model simulation of impacts of the Floridan and surficial aquifers. The third occurred as a result of questions raised by petitioner and included new data along with both a "transient state" and "steady state" simulation. All three phases of modeling were consistent in finding that the effects of pumping are non-existent or negligible, that is, a predicted drawdown in various locations of the Floridan aquifer of from less than 0.1 to 0.3 feet on an average pumping day, and they corroborated the drawdowns observed during both the 1989 and 1991 aquifer performance tests. Petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart criticized FRI's 1992 "steady state" computer modeling on the grounds FRI had insufficient data to conduct the modeling, the constant head boundaries were set too close to the pumping, a transient model should have been run, and the modelers assumed that the Floridan aquifer is isotropic and homogeneous. However, Dr. Stewart failed to review or consider (a) any technical data or information gathered since September 10, 1992, (b) the 1991 transient model, (c) the December 1992 transient model, (d) the computer disc for the July 1992 steady state model, (e) the December 1992 steady state model, (f) the December 1992 calibration, (g) the basis for setting the constant head boundaries, or (h) the data from the 1989 and 1991 pump tests. All of this data was part of the evidence FRI's experts used in formulating their opinions. Dr. Stewart agreed that he could not form any conclusions on this data and that the Floridan aquifer is rarely completely homogeneous and isotropic, but that he and other modelers regularly make that assumption. The modeling was calibrated to replicate actual subsurface and pumping conditions. Maximum drawdown in the Floridan aquifer under normal pumping conditions is modeled to be 0.1 to 0.2 feet beneath White Sands Lake. This is drawdown with no replacement, although there will be leakance back to the Floridan aquifer through sinkholes on the site and surcharge to Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes through the surficial aquifer. The impact to the Floridan is minor compared to normal water level fluctuations in that aquifer of 3 to 5 feet per year. In fact, barometric pressure changes can cause water level changes of up to one foot per week. Lake levels Because many of the lakes in the area leak downward, water levels in the lakes could be affected by the changes in levels in the Floridan aquifer. Indeed, for lakes connected to the Floridan aquifer, changes in the level of the potentiometric surface (or pressure) in the Floridan aquifer can have an impact on the level of the lakes. However, a decrease in lake levels will be less than that of the decrease in the Floridan aquifer, depending on the rate of leakance. Consequently, even if Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands or Spring Lakes do leak to the Floridan aquifer, the amount of decline in lake levels attributable to pumping at the mine will be less than the 0.1 to 0.2 foot modeled by FRI. This drawdown effect will not accumulate over time, but rather will remain constant after reaching steady state conditions. Even if levels in Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes are affected by drawdowns in the Floridan aquifer, that effect will be more than offset by surcharge to the surficial and Floridan aquifers from the dredge pond. The net effect to the lakes would be either positive or immeasurable. This is confirmed by the computer modeling results. Lake stage and precipitation data for Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes indicates that these lakes, like other lakes in the region, rise and fall in correlation with precipitation patterns. For example, in 1991, a year with above normal rainfall, Spring Lake rose 4.1 feet in elevation, White Sands Lake 2.9 feet in elevation, and Gator Bone Lake rose 3.5 feet in elevation. Similarly, water levels were monitored before, during and after the 1989 aquifer performance test in a portion of Lake Brooklyn known as Brooklyn Bay. Because of low rainfall, Brooklyn Bay was separated from the main body of Lake Brooklyn for at least eighteen to twenty-four months before and during the 1989 aquifer performance test. The lake had been in the midst of a long term decline both before and after the test, and the rate and character of declines during the period of pumping were not distinguishable from the declines occurring before or after the test. It is accordingly found that the impacts on water levels in Lake Brooklyn, if any, as a result of pumping from the Floridan aquifer are immeasurable. According to petitioner's witness Boyes, activities at the mine have an influence on water levels in Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes by "increasing the rate of decline". However, the witness could not quantify the degree of impact but stated the impacts during the 1989 aquifer performance tests were a decline of .03, .03 and less than .03 foot, respectively, for each lake. The witness also opined that, based on District staff guage readings during the 1989 aquifer performance testing, pumping at the mine resulted in a .04 foot decline in lake level for Lake Brooklyn during the 1989 testing period. This decline had a net result of .8 acre decrease in the previously 600 acre plus Lake Brooklyn. By comparison, the drought caused a decline of 162 acres in 1989 and an additional 158 acres in 1990. It is noted that the decline in each lake would be less during average pumping conditions, or about one-half of the .04 foot decline, since average pumping is one-half of the aquifer performance test pump rate. Finally, petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart opined that there is insufficient data to determine whether any impacts to lake levels are occurring. It is found, however, that these drawdowns are less than the .1 to .2 foot modeled by FRI and should have no significant adverse impacts on water levels. Preferential flow theory Petitioner presented evidence of a purported correlation between pumping at the mine and water levels in a Floridan aquifer well located on the southwest side of Lake Brooklyn, 4.3 miles from the mine, and lake levels in Brooklyn Bay, 3 miles from the mine. According to petitioner, this serves as proof of a "preferential flow pattern" in the Floridan from Lake Brooklyn to the mine, and that this preferential flow results in a .04 to .05 foot drawdown in the Floridan aquifer at Lake Brooklyn. However, this correlation is deemed to be incorrect for several reasons. First, if a true correlation existed, recovery from pumping effects would occur after pumping ceased, but the Lake Brooklyn well showed recovery in the Floridan aquifer prior to cessation of pumping, and did not recover when pumping stopped at the end of the 1989 aquifer performance testing. Second, if the premise is correct, impacts from pumping would occur in wells closer to the pumping earlier than in wells farther away, but the Lake Brooklyn well, 4.3 miles from pumping, showed drawdown began before that of the Goldhead well, only 1,000 feet from pumping. Third, levels for the Lake Brooklyn well should have declined during both the 1989 and 1991 aquifer performance tests but the levels rose during the 1991 tests. As to the water level changes in the well during the 1989 test, witness Boyes believed these may reflect declines due to hydrologic conditions rather than the pump test. Fourth, if a true correlation existed, impacts would be experienced following the same hydrographic pattern as pumping, but the Lake Brooklyn well's hydrographics did not correlate to the pumping schedule at all times of the year. It should also be noted that at least two other large scale water users are withdrawing water from wells within 1.25 miles from the Lake Brooklyn well and may affect that well's water levels. Further, the variations in the well may be explained by many other variables, such as barometric pressure changes, diurnal fluctuations in water levels, rainfall, and pumping from closer wells. Finally, Brooklyn Bay is now physically separated from Lake Brooklyn, and it was improper for petitioner to rely on lake level information from Brooklyn Bay to support its theory regarding Lake Brooklyn. To further support its hypothesis that a preferential flow path exists between the mine and Lake Brooklyn, petitioner utilized a "photo linear analysis" or "fracture trace analysis", which is based on an interpretation of surface topographic features to determine the presence of subsurface hydrogeologic features such as solution channels in the limestones of the Floridan aquifer. However, without extensive subsurface testing, which is not present here, such analyses are only interpretative to determine what, if any, subsurface features are present and their hydrogeologic effect. It is noted that subsurface fractures are present less than 50 percent of the time, and if present, the features may be hydrologic barriers as well as preferential flow paths. According to witness Boyes, a photolinear feature (fracture) exists from Lake Brooklyn through Spring Lake and across the mine property to Goldhead State Park. If such a feature did exist, however, the drawdown during the aquifer performance tests and other pumping would be greater adjacent to Spring Lake than adjacent to Lake Brooklyn. This was not observed. Moreover, petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart thought the photolinear was only inferred and had a lower degree of confidence that it exists. FRI's witness Fountain established that elongated surface features are more likely to demonstrate linear subsurface features. Both witness Boyes and Dr. Stewart agreed with this conclusion. That being the case, the postulated Lake Brooklyn-mine photolinear is not demonstrated, and continuation of the elongated axis of Lake Brooklyn and Brooklyn Bay would bypass the mine site altogether. Because no investigations have been conducted to demonstrate that these postulated photolinear features exist, and the more reliable results of the aquifer performance tests indicate otherwise, the preferential flow path theory is deemed at best to be highly speculative. If the Lake Brooklyn-mine photolinear feature offered a preferential flow path as opined by witness Boyes, the resulting drawdown would be elongated with a zone of influence extending from the mine westward toward Lake Brooklyn. Therefore, areas closer but not on the feature would experience less drawdown than areas farther away which are on the feature, the zone of influence would extend from the mine's wells through Spring Lake toward Lake Brooklyn causing declined water levels along the feature, and areas closer to the pumping wells, such as Spring Lake, would experience a greater decline than areas farther away, such as Lake Brooklyn. However, evidence offered by petitioner shows that the water levels between Lake Brooklyn and the mine are actually higher than in surrounding areas. Finally, even if petitioner's preferential flow path theory were true, there is no evidence that the pumping from the mine is resulting in significant and adverse impacts as required by District rules. Therefore, it is found that the sand mine does not cause significant and adverse impacts on the water levels in the Floridan aquifer or on the water levels of Lake Brooklyn or Gator Bone, White Sands or Spring Lakes. Rather, the lake levels in each of the four lakes in issue here are directly or indirectly a function of rainfall. Intermediate and surficial aquifers Whether an intermediate aquifer is present beneath the mine site is subject to dispute. All parties agree that, on a regional scale, the Hawthorn formation contains some discontinuous water-bearing lenses that in some places produce water in quantities sufficient for household use. The lenses occur in carbonate deposits in the formation, although not all carbonate deposits or all water bearing units will necessarily transmit water. The evidence is less than persuasive that the Hawthorne formation contains carbonate units which are present on the sand mine site as transmissive beds. This finding is based on FRI's review of on-site core boring information and other data from the site. In addition, this finding is corrorborated by District witness Lee, who concluded that water from the site is not discharging into the Hawthorn, but rather into the surficial aquifer. This is because clays comprising the Hawthorn have low permeability, causing water to flow laterally through the surficial aquifer rather than into the Hawthorn. With respect to impacts to the surficial aquifer, FRI presented evidence that during mining operations, the surficial aquifer will be surcharged by up to five feet. When mining operations cease, water levels will return to natural conditions. This evidence was not contradicted. Impacts on Property Values and Recreation Testimony regarding the property values for lake front properties on Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes was offered by petitioner's witness Price. He established that values have declined since mid- 1989 as a result of a loss of recreational value suffered as water levels have receded. However, witness Price stated that he would not expect a 0.1 foot drop in lake levels to negatively affect property values. Since the declines predicted by petitioner are far less than a 0.1 foot drop, it is apparent that FRI's water use will not result in harm to property values in the area. Similarly, while it is true that declining water levels have impaired recreational uses of Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes, FRI's water use cannot be blamed for such impairment. Environmental Impacts The anticipated impacts of the water use on the wetlands and wildlife resources of the area were addressed by FRI witnesses Peacock and Lowe. According to Peacock, who analyzed the wetland vegetation, the dominant species and their adaptions, the wildlife resources and their adaptions, and the general ecology of the area, the water levels in the adjacent lakes have historically fluctuated greatly, and wildlife that use the lakes have adapted to these fluctuations. His opinion that the mine's water use will not have any significant adverse impact on the environment of Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, Spring or White Sands Lakes is hereby accepted. Based upon witness Lowe's inspection of the three downgradient lakes, his past knowledge of Lake Brooklyn, the aquifer performance tests, and Dr. Lee's conclusion that the maximum drawdown in the lakes would be 0.1 foot, Lowe opined that the proposed water withdrawal will not cause environmental harm. In addition, such a drawdown will not adversely affect off-site vegetation or cause unmitigated adverse impacts on adjacent wetlands or other types of vegetation. These conclusions were not contradicted and are hereby accepted. Compliance with rule criteria To obtain a consumptive use permit, an applicant must give "reasonable assurance" that the proposed water use is a reasonable beneficial use, will not interfere with any presently existing legal use of water, and is consistent with the public interest. These broad criteria are further explained by criteria enunciated in Rule 40C-2.301(3)-(6), Florida Administrative Code, and sections 9.0 et seq. and 10.0 et seq. of the Applicant's Handbook adopted by reference in Chapter 40C-2, Florida Administrative Code. Findings as to whether these criteria have been satisfied are set forth below. To obtain a renewal of a consumptive use permit, an applicant must first give reasonable assurance that the proposed use of water is a "reasonable beneficial use". For a use to be considered reasonable beneficial, the criteria enumerated in Rule 40C-2.301(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code, must be satisfied. First, paragraph (4)(a) of the rule and section 10.3(a) of the handbook require that the water use must be in such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization, and the quantity requested must be within acceptable standards for the designated use. The evidence shows that FRI has used a reasonably low amount of water necessary to continue operations at the mine, it has implemented some water conservation methods and tried or considered others that proved to be inefficient or not economically feasible, and the requested amount of water is within acceptable standards for sand mines operating within the District. Then, too, some ninety-five percent of the water pumped from the wells is recirculated for reuse in the mining process or is recharged back into the surficial and Floridan aquifers on site. Finally, there is no surface discharge of water outside the mining site. Accordingly, it is found that this criterion has been satisfied. Paragraph (4)(b) of the rule and section 10.3(b) of the handbook require that the proposed use be for a purpose that is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest. The proposed use of the water is to produce sand used in construction materials. This is a reasonable use of water and results in an economic benefit to the region by producing a valuable product. Accordingly, it is found that the use is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest. All parties have stipulated that the Floridan aquifer is capable of producing the requested amounts of water. This satisfies paragraph (4)(c) of the rule and section 10.3(c) of the handbook which impose this requirement. The next criterion, paragraph (4)(d), as amplified by section 10.3(d) of the handbook, requires that "the environmental or economic harm caused by the consumptive use must be reduced to an acceptable amount." The evidence shows that during mine operations, the surficial aquifer is being surcharged by up to five feet. When they cease, the water levels return to natural conditions. The maximum drawdown anticipated in the Floridan aquifer at the property boundary was 0.3 feet and less than or equal to 0.1 feet for most of the area outside the mine site. At most, this equates to a maximum lake level decline of 0.04 feet at Lake Brooklyn, 0.03 feet at Gator Bone and White Sands Lakes, and less than 0.03 feet at Spring Lake. Thus, FRI's usage of water has had, and will have in the future, little, if any, immediate or cumulative impact on the levels of the area lakes. Further, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that these lowered lake levels or aquifer levels will not result in environmental or economic harm to the area. In addition, the District has proposed to incorporate into the permit a condition that FRI implement a detailed monitoring plan which will detect any overpumping causing lake level changes and a concomitant adverse impact to off-site land uses. Therefore, this criterion has been satisfied. Paragraph (4)(e) and section 10.3(e) require the applicant to implement "all available water conservation measures" unless the applicant "demonstrates that implementation is not economically, environmentally or technologically feasible." The rule goes on to provide that satisfaction of this criterion "may be demonstrated by implementation of an approved water conservation plan as required in section 12.0, Applicant's Handbook: Consumptive Uses of Water." Because FRI's water conservation plan insures that water will be used efficiently, as required by section 12.3.4.1. of the handbook, this criterion has been met. The next paragraph provides that "(w)hen reclaimed water is readily available it must be used in place of higher quality water sources unless the applicant demonstrates that its use is either not economically, environmentally or technologi-cally feasible." Since the unrebutted testimony establishes that reclaimed water is not readily available to the mine site, it is found that paragraph (4)(f) has been satisfied. Paragraph (4)(g) of the rule and section 10.3(f) of the handbook generally require that the lowest acceptable quality water source be used. Since the evidence shows that the Floridan aquifer is the lowest acceptable quality water source, this requirement has been met. Paragraphs (4)(h) and (i) provide that the consumptive use "should not cause significant saline water intrusion or further aggravate currently existing saline water intrusion problems" nor "cause or contribute to flood damage." The parties have stipulated that these requirements are not in dispute. The next paragraph provides that the "water quality of the source of the water should not be seriously harmed by the consumptive use." The uncontradicted evidence shows that the source of the water for the proposed use will not be seriously harmed from either saltwater intrusion or discharges to the Floridan aquifer. Paragraph (4)(j) and section 10.3(g) have accordingly been met. Paragraph (4)(k) and section 10.3(k) require that the water quality of the receiving body of water "not be seriously harmed" by the consumptive use. In this case, there is no surface water discharge from the mine site. Thus, the only relevant inquiry here is whether the receiving water (surficial aquifer) will be "seriously harmed" by the consumptive use. To determine compliance with this criterion, the District compared water quality samples from the mine site and surrounding areas with the DER monitoring network to ascertain whether state water quality numerical standards and natural background levels were exceeded. The relevant standards are found in Rule 17-520.420, Florida Administrative Code. Monitoring data from eight wells and from the dredge pond indicate there are no water quality violations resulting from the sand mine operations. Petitioner has contended that water from the dredge pond provides a significant source of water to an intermediate aquifer, which would also be a receiving body of water. However, the evidence shows that any contaminants resulting from the dredge pond flowing into an intermediate aquifer will also be contained in the surficial aquifer. The clays of the Hawthorn formation would absorb and filter out iron and manganese as they traveled to a water transmissive zone. Therefore, the concentrations sampled in the suficial aquifer downgradient from the dredge pond represent the highest concentrations. Since the concentrations in the surficial aquifer do not violate water quality standards, the same finding as to concentrations in the intermediate aquifer can be made. Further, the rule criteria require consideration of the future water use's effect on water quality, and if the intermediate aquifer is in fact a receiving water as contended by petitioner, the reactions which could cause water quality violations are presently occurring. There is no reason to believe they would cease if the mine ceases operation, and the mining operation adds oxygen to the water, which reduces the possibility of the reaction described. Therefore, this criterion has been satisfied. The parties have stipulated that the requirements of paragraph (4)(l) have been fulfilled. Finally, rule 40C-2.301(5)(a) provides that a proposed consumptive use will not meet the criteria for issuance of a permit if such proposed water use will significantly cause saline water encroachment or otherwise cause water flows or levels to fall below certain minimum limits set forth in the rule. The evidence shows that, to the extent these criteria are applicable and in dispute, they have been satisfied. Miscellaneous The contention has been made that insufficient site-specific information was submitted by the applicant to determine the effects of the proposed use of water at the sand mine. In this regard, the evidence shows that FRI consultants installed monitoring wells, performed core borings, and took soil samples at the site. The geology of the site was verified by core boring, review of geologic logs and drilling wells. Slug tests were performed to measure the hydraulic conductivity of the material in which the monitor wells were set, and a step drawdown analysis was performed to measure hydraulic conductivity. A number of monitoring wells to measure water levels data were installed before and after running the 1991 aquifer performance tests, and groundwater modeling in both the transient and steady state modes were run using data that was collected in the field. In addition, water quality samples were collected to evaluate a water budget for the dredge pond, and FRI conducted an assessment of the environmental impacts to the wetland and wildlife resources of the area lakes, including White Sands, Spring and Gator Bone Lakes. Besides this submission and analysis, the District reviewed United States Geological Survey (USGS) topographic maps, potentiometric maps and aerial photographs of the area, water levels of the surrounding lakes, potentiometric surfaces in Floridan and intermediate aquifer wells, geophysical logs for wells, rainfall records, the core generated by FRI consultants, and scientific literature relied upon in making consumptive use permitting assessments. It also monitored the 1991 aquifer performance test and reviewed the resultant model. Before and after submission of the application, the District conducted aquifer performance testing at the site and evaluated the 1991 aquifer performance test conducted by FRI consultants. Finally, the District assessed water quality impacts of the sand mine in 1989 and in the present by site visit, sampling of the Floridan production well and dredge pond, and reviewing sampling data from both monitor wells and homeowner wells. It also reviewed information on water quality data gathered from other sand mines and applied data from the DER background monitoring network. Therefore, the contention that insufficient site-specific information was submitted and considered is rejected. Petitioner has offered into evidence petitioner's exhibits 61, 64, 65, 71, 75, 76, 78-80, 82 and 83. A ruling on the admissibility of the exhibits was reserved. The exhibits, which are based on data collected by the District and the USGS, are hydrographs showing water levels from lakes and monitoring wells during so-called "normal mine operations" on selected dates in 1988, 1989 and 1991. Although FRI was given copies of the exhibits ten days prior to hearing, it was not informed of the source of the data until final hearing. As it turned out, petitioner's witness had reviewed records over an extensive period of time and selected two or three days out of that time period as being representative of "normal" conditions. However, FRI established that, when longer periods of time were reviewed, the correlations alleged to exist by the graphs did not in fact exist and thus they did not represent normal conditions. Attorney's fees and costs FRI has requested an award of attorney's fees and costs on the theories petitioner interposed various papers and brought and participated in this action for "an improper purpose" within the meaning of Subsections 120.57(1)(b)5. and 120.59(6), Florida Statutes. In addition, petitioner has filed a motion for sanctions on the ground four motions filed by FRI were filed for an improper purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes. It may be inferred from the totality of the evidence that petitioner did not intend to participate in this proceeding for an improper purpose. Likewise, the same inference may be made with respect to the four motions filed by FRI. Therefore, fees and costs (sanctions) are not warranted for either party.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the District granting application number 2-019-0012AUR as proposed by the District in its notice of intent to approve the application issued on August 6, 1992. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 4th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5017 Petitioner: 1-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 5-6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 7. Rejected as being unnecessary. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 10-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6 and 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 15-16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 17-18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 25. Partially accepted in findings of fact 7 and 8. 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 27-28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 31-33. Partially accepted in findings of fact 14-16. 34-35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 36-42. Partially accepted in findings of fact 14-16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 31. Rejected as being irrelevant. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 32. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 52-53. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Rejected as being contrary to the more persuasive evidence. See finding 23. 57-58. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 59-61. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 64-71. Partially accepted in findings of fact 32-36. 72. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 73-74. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 75. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 76-77. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8 and 11. Rejected as being contrary to the more persuasive evidence. See finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. 83-120. Partially accepted in findings of fact 23 and 24. 121-139. Partially accepted in findings of fact 25-27. 140-144. Rejected since even if true, the impacts are not significant. 145. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 146-158. Partially accepted in findings of fact 18-20. 159-171. Partially accepted in finding of fact 39. 172-177. Partially accepted in findings of fact 40 and 41. Respondent (District): 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 2-4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 5-6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in findings of fact 1, 3 and 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 17-18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 19-22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. 24-40. Partially accepted in findings of fact 12-16. 41-51. Partially accepted in findings of fact 11. 52-59. Partially accepted in findings of fact 23 and 24. 60-64. Partially accepted in finding of fact 25. Partially accepted in finding of fact 45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. 67-69. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 72-73. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 74-77. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 24. 80-81. Partially accepted in findings of fact 23 and 24. 82-83. Partially accepted in finding of fact 29. 84. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 85. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. 86-90. Partially accepted in finding of fact 30. 91. Partially accepted in finding of fact 32. 92-94. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. 95. Partially accepted in finding of fact 34. 96. Partially accepted in finding of fact 36. 97-100. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 101. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 102-103. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 104-121. Partially accepted in findings of fact 19 and 20. 122-130. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 131-133. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 134-138. Partially accepted in findings of fact 40 and 41. 139. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. 140-141. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 142. Partially accepted in finding of fact 48. 143. Partially accepted in finding of fact 49. Respondent (FRI): Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in findings of fact 3 and 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in findings of fact 2 and 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6 and 7. 7-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 25. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 31. 22-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 32. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 34. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 35. 29-30. Partially accepted in finding of fact 36. 31-35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 38. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 40-41. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 42-45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 40. Partially accepted in finding of fact 41. Partially accepted in findings of fact 40 and 41. 49. Partially accepted in finding of fact 39. 50-51. Partially accepted in finding of fact 42. 52. Partially accepted in finding of fact 43. 53. Partially accepted in finding of fact 44. 54. Partially accepted in finding of fact 45. 55. Partially accepted in finding of fact 46. 56. Partially accepted in finding of fact 47. 57-58. Partially accepted in finding of fact 49. 59. Partially accepted in finding of fact 51. 60. Partially accepted in finding of fact 52. 61. Partially accepted in finding of fact 54. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, cumulative, not supported by the more credible, persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry Dean, Executive Director St. Johns River Water Management District Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Patrice Flinchbaugh Boyes, Esquire Post Office Box 1424 Gainesville, Florida 32602-1424 Peter B. Belmont, Esquire 511 31st Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33704 Wayne E. Flowers, Esquire Jennifer L. Burdick, Esquire Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Marcia Penman Parker, Esquire Emily G. Pierce, Esquire 1301 Gulf Life Drive Suite 1500 Jacksonville, Florida 32207
Findings Of Fact Lake Worth Drainage District requested a variance from the provisions of Rule 17-3.121(13) , Florida Administrative Code, related to dissolved oxygen parameters which would be involved in the installation of a canal known as the S-9 Canal to be located in Palm Beach County, Florida. That request was met by the Department of Environmental Regulation's Statement of Intent to Deny, leading to a request for formal hearing filed by Petitioner with the Department on May 26, 1983. On June 1, 1983, the Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing in that matter. The variance request became D.O.A.H. Case No. 83-1741. Contemporaneous with the variance request that was pending before the Department of Environmental Regulation, was petitioner's request for necessary construction permits to install the S-9 Canal. Again, the Petitioner was informed of the agency's intent to deny that permit request. As a consequence, Petitioner requested a formal hearing to question the Department's policy decision. That request for formal hearing was made on June 23, 1983. Effective July 1, 1983, the Department asked the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing related to that permit request. The case related to the dredge and fill permit is D.O.A.H. Case No. 63-2132. WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS In the final hearing, petitioner presented the testimony of Richard Wheeliahn, Assistant Manager for Lake Worth Drainage District; John Adams, General Counsel for Lake Worth Drainage District; Mike Slaton, supervisory biologist with the United States Corp. of Engineers; William Winters, Lake Worth Drainage District's in-house engineer; Rebecca Serra, South Florida Water Management District's Water Management Engineer, who was accepted as an expert in water management engineering; Raleigh Griffis, Agricultural Agent with the United States Department of Agriculture, accepted as an expert in the agricultural practices found within the area of the proposed S-9 Canal; William E. Hill, Consulting Engineer for Petitioner, who was accepted as an expert in civil engineering and drainage design; and Robert D. Blackburn, consultant to Lake Worth Drainage District, accepted as an expert in freshwater ecology to include water quality and biology. Respondent called as witnesses Dan Garlick, Environmental Specialist for the Department of Environmental Regulation, accepted as expert in dredge and fill matters; Keith McCarron, Environmental Specialist for the Southeast Branch of the Department of Environmental Regulation, accepted as an expert in dredge and fill matters and Helen Setchfield, Technical Assistant to the Department's Director of the Division of Environmental Permitting. In addition, Richard L. Miller, Rebecca Butts, Francis T. Kuschell, Donald King and Dan alley were public witnesses in favor of the proposed project. Rosa Druando and Sherry Cummings were public witnesses opposed to the project. Petitioner offered 45 exhibits which have been received. Respondent introduced two exhibits which were admitted. The public offered two composite exhibits which were admitted. SPECIFIC FACTS Lake Worth Drainage District is a governmental entity created by the Florida Legislature. The District's function is that of the control of water supply and elevation related to lands within its jurisdiction. Those areas in dispute in the present case are within that jurisdictional ambit. In this instance, Lake Worth Drainage District has proposed the construction of a drainage facility involving dredging and filling of approximately 45,000 cubic yards of material. In particular, Petitioner seeks necessary permits from Respondent to construct a canal known as the S-9 Canal, whose purpose would be to transport the flow of water from an agricultural operation north of the canal site. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 depicts the area in question with the north- south orange tape representing an unnamed drainage ditch or canal and the blue tape showing the proposed S-9 connecting it to the east-west orange tape line which is L23W. The primary type of water expected in the canal is stormwater; however, surface and groundwater will also be in the canal system at times. The agricultural operation is capable of discharging at a rate which would utilize 145 CFS of the potential capacity of the canal system contemplated for construction which ultimate capacity is 170 CFS. The proposed canal by its connection of the existing agricultural drainage ditch or canal and L23W, becomes part of a water transport system flowing to the Atlantic Ocean through the South Florida Water Management District and Lake Worth Drainage District canal network. The principal benefit of the construction of S-9 would be to create a uniform connection of water discharge from the agricultural operation into L23W. Secondarily, it would relieve periodic flooding of a residential area west of the unnamed drainage ditch and northwest of the proposed S-9 Canal. It is not designed to receive direct water input from that residential area. Only the agricultural operation has been granted permits to discharge into the unnamed canal through two pumping stations to the east of that canal and as a result of the present permit request through S-9 and thus to L23W. Those persons living in the residential area west of the unnamed canal have not sought necessary permitting for discharge into the proposed S-9 System. Moreover, even if permits were granted to the residents, the S-9 system would only allow the addition of 25 CPS over and above the 145 which the agricultural operation has preempted. The 25 CPS would not satisfactorily address high water problems found in the residential area. A more particular description of the limited value of the project's benefit to the homeowners is that it protects against occasional flooding which occurs when the farm operation discharges into the unnamed canal, causing water incursion in the southeast corner of the residential area to the west of the unnamed canal. If the S-9 Canal is constructed, it will be built within an 80 foot right-of-way held by petitioner. The canal as depicted in petitioner's Exhibit 35 admitted into evidence is 40-45 feet wide, approximately 5-8 feet deep and is configured in a u-shape transversing an area of 7,730 feet. The applicants in this present proposal have added a vegetated iittoral zone on one side of the canal and it covers approximately 20 percent or 1.9 acres of the canal surface. This zone affords a limited amount of treatment of the water in the system. In this regard, approximately 30 percent of the nutrients found within the water flowing in the system would be expected to be taken up or absorbed in the vegetational zone, except in the months of August and September, when optimum retention time within the system will not be afforded to allow the littoral zone to uptake 30 percent of contaminants in the water. A 21 foot maintenance berm would be constructed on the east side of the canal and bleeder pipes would be installed to control water elevations in the adjacent wetlands. The 170 CFS volume mentioned before is the design capacity of the proposed system. At that volume, the flow velocity is less than 2.6 feet per second, a velocity at which the canal's structural integrity would be expected to continue, i.e., erosion will not occur. The 145 CFS expected from the agricultural operation pursuant to permits for discharge issued by the South Florida Water Management District would promote a flow velocity of approximately 2 feet per second. This farm activity is known as the DuBois farm. (Its permit from the South Florida Water Management District allowing the 145 CFS to be discharged into the unnamed drainage ditch or canal is not contingent upon the construction of S-9.) The configuration of the S-9 Canal has been brought about principally to advantage the Petitioner in obtaining a construction permit from the United States Corps of Engineers. The Corps had an interest in protecting that corridor of land over which it has jurisdiction which is adjacent to the S-9 Canal and is described as a wetland area. A consequence of this choice of design for S-9 is the typical 72 to 80 hour travel time of water introduced into the system providing some settling of pollutants and some assimilation of pollutants within the littoral zone of the canal discussed before. 10..Necessary permits have been obtained from South Florida Water Management District and the United States Corps of Engineers to allow the construction of the proposed project. The configuration of this project takes into account the special concerns of those two agencies. In this sequence of collateral permitting, South Florida Water Management District has been responsible for an examination of stormwater quality considerations in deciding to grant a permit to Petitioner. With the construction of S-9 and connection of the unnamed canal to S- 9 and thus to L23W, all the waters within that conveyance system become Class III waters of the state in keeping with Chapter 403, Florida Statutes and its associated rules of the Florida Administrative Code. In effect, this is a dredge and fill activity under the Respondent's jurisdiction found in Rule 17- 4.20, Florida Statutes. As such, it becomes a stationary installation which can reasonably be expected to be a source of water pollution of waters of the state by discharge of pollutants into waters of the state as envisioned by Section 403.087, Florida Statutes. During the construction phase of the canal, water quality degradation can be controlled related to turbidity, transparency and other criteria. Upon connection of the S-9 Canal to L23W and the utilization of that system, problems will be experienced with dissolved oxygen levels and to a lesser extent, nutrients and total coliform. Oils and greases problems are possible though not probable. No other water quality impacts are expected after connection. In expectation of the difficulty in achieving compliance with Respondent's water quality standards related to dissolved oxygen, the Petitioner has sought a variance under Section 403.021, Florida Statutes. This request is necessary because the dissolved oxygen levels in the proposed S-9 Canal, the unnamed canal or drainage ditch and L23W are not expected to uniformly exceed 5 mg/1. See Rule 17-3.121(13), Florida Administrative Code. The problem with dissolved oxygen in the unnamed canal and L23W and expected in the S-9 canal is not an enigma. This condition is prevalent in the South Florida area to include Palm Beach County, the site of the project. The water in the canals and drainage ditches in the region is frequently in violation of the standards related to dissolved oxygen, given the elevations of the land, climatic conditions, type of plant life, water temperature and constituents of the water. The addition of S-9 to the system would neither improve nor significantly degrade the quality of water related to the dissolved oxygen values for Class III waters, of which this proposed system is constituted. This finding acknowledges the fact that dissolved oxygen values in the unnamed canal are superior to L23W. Nonetheless, upon completion of S-9 and connection to the two other canals, no significant positive improvements of dissolved oxygen will be realized. Moreover, considering the fact that the installation of the S-9 Canal will stop the flooding on the southeast corner of the residential area west of the unnamed drainage ditch or canal, an increased volume of water flowing into L23W at any given moment can be expected, compared to the present outfall primarily along the Florida Power and Light system road into L23W. This has significance related to the dissolved oxygen standard to the extent of an increased volume of water in which substandard dissolved oxygen levels are found being introduced into L23W. It is more significant related to nutrients and bacteriological quality of the water, in particular fecal coliform. While there is no reason to believe that the quality of cleansing of water involved in sheet flow into L23W related to nutrients and coliforms is remarkably better at present, given the sparse vegetation along the power-line road which leads to L23W, than would be the case with S-9 with littoral zone, the increased volume of cater being introduced at the connection of S-9 and L23W during times of peak discharge, can be expected to present greater quantities of nutrients and coliform. In essence, the treatment afforded by the littoral zone and the transport in the S-9 Canal, contrasted with the treatment afforded during the transport of waters by sheet flow along the relatively barren stretch of land adjacent to the power-line road is found to be comparable, and the differences relate only to volume of discharge. This difficulty with nutrients and coliform count has been confirmed by tests made in the unnamed canal showing excessive levels of nitrogen, phosphorus and coliform and the water treatment features of the S-9 Canal will not entirely remove these materials. Although the farming practices of the DuBois operation tend to alleviate some nutrient loading in the unnamed canal, the test results established that those practices do not entirely eliminate the introduction of those nutrient materials into the canal. Consequently, some problems related to the effects of nutrient loading on populations of flora and fauna in the proposed system can be expected. In the context of the variance request, alternatives to the construction of the S-9 Canal are here considered. The alternative to leave the circumstance as it now exists carries with it the risk of periodic flooding of the southeast corner of the residential property west of the unnamed canal. That area and the balance of the residential acreage are subject to flooding without regard for the agricultural operation to the east. To deal with the difficulty related to the elevated water table, rainfall events and the flooding due to farm operation, some persons who reside in that residential tract have employed their own pump systems and ditches and retention areas to combat problems related to the geography of their property. In addition, the property is protected to some extent from outside influences by the existence of a dike and associated ditch, which limit some off-property incursion of water and assists to an extent in the transport of water away from their property. Moreover, the DuBois farm operation recently has placed a barrier at the end of the unnamed canal which directs water south along the Florida Power and Light road into L23W. In addition, the farm management has held down the pump speed during a rain event to protect the residential area. Nonetheless, at times the dike in the southeast corner adjacent to the residential property has breached in heavy rain events. As an alternative, the installation of S-9 would be only partially effective in alleviating the adverse conditions in the residential area west of the unnamed canal. It principally helps the DuBois farm operation. The relief afforded the residents would be the cessation of flooding caused by the operation of the farm pumps to the east as they breach the area in the southeast corner of the residential property, the future possibility of introducing as much as 25 CFS into the S-9 System subject to appropriate permits and the more tenuous possibility that the farm operation and the residential area could share the remaining 145 CPS capacity in the proposed system. The latter point isn't tenable from an examination of testimony at hearing. First, because the farmer wishes to conserve fertilizer and to maintain the moisture gradient and he does this by pumping off stormwater in a rainfall event, which events are most prevalent during his agricultural season. Secondly, the residential area is most in need of relief when the farmer is. Finally, the question of necessary permits to share capacity is unclear. Other alternatives related to a more comprehensive protection of the residential area by diking, a direct connection canal system to L23W from the unnamed canal, or dispersed sheet flow through the wetland area adjacent to the proposed S-9 Canal are not viable either for reason of design infirmity or impediments from other permitting agencies or inadequate property rights. Therefore, the viable choices are to either leave the property as it now stands or grant a permit to allow the construction of S-9. Between the remaining choices, no particular advantage is gained by the construction of this project. Dissolved oxygen problems in L23W, the receiving body of water, will not improve with the S-9 construction in a significant way and given the increased volume of discharge into L23W promoted by this construction are made worse. Nothing in the construction is so compelling to cause the exercise of the Respondent's discretion in favor of the grant of a variance related to dissolved oxygen values. 16..In examining the variance request by affording deference to Petitioner's regulatory responsibility, the need of the Lake Worth Drainage District to provide relief to those residents who are paying for drainage services is conceded. To that end, the proposed project does provide a certain amount of relief but it does not have as its primary emphasis purported assistance to those residents. As often stated, its principal benefit is to the DuBois farm operation. Left unresolved is the major source of suffering which is the lay of the land, a source which has prevailed from the beginning of the utilization of that property on the part of the residents. Plainly stated, much of the residential area was from the beginning and continues to be under water. The removal of the farm flooding and the future possibility of introducing a small increment of discharge into the S-9 system from the residential area subject to necessary permitting does not modify the characterization of this project as being one primarily for the farmer and to a much lesser extent for the residents. On this occasion, Petitioner's choice to fulfill its change is not persuasive enough to create special permission to violate the dissolved oxygen standard. In summary, a variance from the dissolved oxygen standard for Class III waters is not indicated. On the question of the permit application, in addition to failing to give reasonable assurances related to dissolved oxygen, the applicant has failed to satisfactorily address the problems with nutrients and coliforms. Other water quality standards have been satisfactorily addressed. Again, most of the water that will be introduced into the proposed system shall be stormwater; however, there will be other water components in the system constituted of surface water an groundwater, which also carry nutrients arid bacteriological deposits. Surface and groundwater are involved, given the level of elevations in the area, the depths of the unnamed canal, S-9 Canal and L23W and the fact that the DuBois farm operation can extract waters from the E-l Canal to the east of the farm properties as well as discharge water into that canal. It will not always be possible to distinguish whether the water in the proposed system is stormwater, groundwater or surface water. Consequently, South Florida Water Management's permitting related to stormwater is not definitive.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Krista Howard,2/ is entitled to issuance of the Consolidated Environmental Resource Permit and Recommended Intent to Grant Sovereignty Submerged Lands Authorization, Permit No. 53-0351424-001-EI, as announced by Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection, in the Consolidated Notice of Intent to Issue Environmental Resource Permit and Lease to Use Sovereignty Submerged Lands issued on July 28, 2017, and subsequently amended on January 11, 2018.3/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Defenders is a Florida non-profit corporation that has been in existence since the mid-1980s or earlier. Defenders' primary purpose is to protect and preserve Crooked Lake so that it may remain an Outstanding Florida Water ("OFW") for all members of the public to use and enjoy. Defenders has more than 25 members who reside in Polk County, Florida. Its membership consists of approximately 100 family memberships, mostly comprised of persons who live on or near Crooked Lake. Petitioners Gerards are riparian landowners on Crooked Lake, whose property is located immediately adjacent to, and slightly to the northwest of, Respondent Howard's property. The Gerards' home address is 1055 Scenic Highway North, Babson Park, Florida 33827. Respondent Howard is the applicant for the Consolidated Authorization for the Dock. Howard's property, which is riparian to Crooked Lake, is located at 1045 Scenic Highway North, Babson Park, Florida 33827. Respondent DEP is the administrative agency of the State of Florida statutorily charged with, among other things, protecting Florida's water resources. As part of DEP's performance of these duties, it administers and enforces the provisions of chapter 373, part IV, Florida Statutes, and the rules adopted pursuant to that statute. Pursuant to that authority, DEP determines whether to issue or deny applications for ERPs. Pursuant to section 253.002, Florida Statutes, DEP also serves as staff to the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board of Trustees") and, in that capacity, reviews and determines whether to issue or deny, applications for approval to use sovereignty submerged lands.5/ DEP Review of the Application The Dock is proposed to be located on sovereignty submerged lands and in surface waters subject to State of Florida regulatory jurisdiction. Therefore, an environmental resource permit and a sovereignty submerged lands lease are required. On or about February 14, 2017, Todd Rickman, Howard's professional contractor who designed the Dock, filed an Application for a Sovereignty Submerged Lands Lease for Existing Structures and Activities6/ ("Application") with DEP's Southwest District Office, seeking approval to construct and operate the Dock. On or about March 15, 2017, DEP requested additional information regarding the project. Howard submitted the requested items, and the Application was determined complete on May 30, 2017. Notice of DEP's receipt of the Lease portion of the Application was provided as required by section 253.115. The comment period commenced on June 15, 2017, and ended on July 6, 2017. As previously noted, on July 28, 2017, DEP issued the Consolidated Notice of Intent, proposing to issue the Consolidated Authorization to construct and operate the Dock. On January 11, 2018, DEP amended the Consolidated Notice of Intent to accurately reflect the "clearly in the public interest" permitting standard for the ERP portion of the Consolidated Authorization, which is applicable to projects proposed in OFWs. Background Crooked Lake Crooked Lake (also, "Lake") is an approximately 4,247-acre freshwater lake in Polk County, Florida. It is an irregularly shaped karst lake roughly resembling an inverted "L," with the longer axis running north to south. It is located on the Lake Wales Ridge. Crooked Lake is designated an OFW by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-302.700(9)(i)9.7/ The Lake is classified as a Class III waterbody pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-302.400(15).8/ The elevations and bottom contours in Crooked Lake vary substantially throughout the Lake. Thus, water depths may, and generally do, vary substantially from one location to another throughout the Lake. The water levels in Crooked Lake fluctuate frequently and, at times, dramatically, depending on rainfall frequency and amounts. A graph prepared by Petitioners' Witness James Tully, using Southwest Florida Water Management District ("SWFWMD") historical water level data for Crooked Lake measured in National Geodetic Vertical Datum of 1929 ("NGVD") shows water levels historically fluctuating from as low as approximately 106 feet in or around 1991, to as high as 123 feet NGVD in or around 1951, 1961, and 2004. Rickman generated a water level graph using the Polk County Water Atlas ("Atlas") website. This graph, which covers the period of 2008 through mid-2017, shows that the water levels in Crooked Lake, for this most recent ten-year period, fluctuated approximately five feet, with the lowest levels falling slightly below 114 feet NGVD for relatively short periods in 2012 and 2013, and the highest level rising to approximately 119 feet NGVD in mid-2017. The competent, credible evidence shows that although water levels in Crooked Lake may occasionally rise to levels at or around 123 feet NGVD, those conditions have been associated with extreme weather events such as hurricanes, are atypical, and are relatively short-lived. The maximum water level in Crooked Lake is subject to control by a weir located south of the Lake. Discharge from the weir occurs at a control elevation of 120 feet NGVD. As such, the water level in parts of Crooked Lake may, at times, temporarily exceed 120 feet NGVD, but will eventually decrease to 120 feet NGVD as the water flows south and is discharged through the weir. To the extent rainfall does not recharge the Lake, water levels may fall below 120 feet NGVD. The ordinary high water line ("OHWL"), which constitutes the boundary between privately-owned uplands and sovereignty submerged lands, has been established at 120.0 feet NGVD for Crooked Lake. Crooked Lake is used for recreational activities such as fishing, swimming, boating, and jet ski use, and there are public and private boat ramps at various points on the lake that provide access to the Lake. There is no marina having a fueling station on the Lake. The credible evidence shows that the northeast portion of the Lake, where the Dock is proposed to be located, experiences a substantial amount of boat and jet ski traffic. This portion of the Lake also is used for swimming, water- skiing, wakeboarding, the use of "towables" such as inner tubes, and for other in-water recreational uses. The Proposed Dock Howard holds fee title by warranty deed to parcel no. 333028-000000-033140 located at 1045 Scenic Highway, Babson Park, Florida.9/ This parcel has approximately 110 linear feet of riparian shoreline on Crooked Lake. The Dock is proposed to be constructed and operated on sovereignty submerged lands adjacent to this riparian upland parcel, which is located on the eastern shore of the northeastern portion of Crooked Lake. The Dock, as proposed, is a private single-family residential dock that will be used by Howard for water-dependent recreational purposes, such as specifically, boating, fishing, swimming, and sunbathing. The Dock is not proposed to be constructed or used by, or to otherwise serve, commercial or multifamily residential development. The Dock is configured as a "T," supported by pilings and consisting of a 4-foot-wide by 152-foot-long access walkway, and an approximately 1,983-square-foot terminal platform comprised of a lower-level platform having four vessel slips and a flat platform roof. Two sets of stairs lead from the lower level of the terminal platform to the platform roof, which will be elevated eight feet above the lower-level platform and will have a railed perimeter. The platform roof will function as a roof for the boat storage area below and a sundeck. The four slips on the Dock's lower-level platform will be used for permanent mooring for up to six watercraft: a 23-foot-long ski boat,10/ a 20-foot-long fishing boat, and four jet skis. As proposed, the Dock will occupy a total area of approximately 2,591 square feet. The lower platform of the Dock is proposed to be constructed at an elevation of 121 feet NGVD. The roof/upper platform will be constructed eight feet above that, at an elevation of 129 feet NGVD. The pilings supporting the Dock will be wrapped in an impervious material to prevent leaching of metals and other pollutants into the water. Pursuant to the Specific Purpose Field Survey ("Survey") for the Lease submitted as part of the Application, the Lease will preempt approximately 2,591 square feet, and closely corresponds to the footprint of the Dock. The submerged lands surrounding the Dock that are not occupied by the footprint of the Dock, including the area between terminal platform and the shoreline, are not included in the preempted area of the Lease.11/ The Survey shows "approximate riparian lines" which delineate Howard's riparian area oriented to the center of the waterbody and to the primary navigation channel in the northeast portion of Crooked Lake. As shown on the version of the Survey initially filed as part of the Application, the Dock was proposed to be located approximately 4.7 feet, at its closest point, from the southern riparian line. However, in response to DEP's request for additional information, the Survey was modified in April 2017, to shift the Dock northward within Howard's riparian area. The Dock is now proposed to be located 25.1 feet, at its closest point, from the southern riparian line, and 29.4 feet, at its closest point, from the northern riparian line. The walkway of the Dock will commence at an approximate elevation of 120 feet NGVD, which corresponds to the OHWL established for Crooked Lake. As previously noted above, the walkway will extend waterward approximately 152 feet, where it will intersect with the terminal platform. The terminal platform will extend another 52 feet waterward. In total, the Dock is proposed to extend waterward approximately 204 feet from the OHWL. Although the Dock would be one of the longest and largest docks on Crooked Lake, the credible evidence establishes that there are several other docks of similar size and/or length on the Lake. Rickman testified that he obtained approvals for, or was otherwise aware of, several docks over 2,000 square feet on the Lake. Additionally, the evidence showed that eight other docks on the Lake are longer than the proposed Dock.12/ Rickman testified that most of the larger docks on Crooked Lake have roofs, and that most of these roofs are pitched, rather than flat.13/ As noted above, the water level in Crooked Lake frequently and, at times, extensively fluctuates. As a result, there are periods during which water depths in parts of the Lake are extremely shallow. Rickman testified that the Dock was designed to extend far enough out into Crooked Lake to reach sufficient water depth to enable Howard to maximize the use of the Dock for boating throughout the year. The Dock is designed to extend out to the point at which the bottom elevation of the Lake is approximately 109.9 feet NGVD. Based on the Atlas' ten-year water level graph for Crooked Lake referenced above, Rickman projected that at this point, the water depth typically would be sufficient to allow Howard to operate her largest vessel, the 23-foot ski boat. The ski boat has a 25-inch draft.14/ The boat will be stored out of the water on a boat lift on the Dock, attached by cables to a sub-roof immediately beneath the platform roof. When being lowered into or hoisted from the water, the boat will be placed in a boat cradle consisting of two containment railings approximately 18 inches high each on either side, and a "V" shaped aluminum bottom with bunks on which the boat is cradled. The aluminum bottom of the cradle was estimated to be two to three inches thick. Although the boat cradle is approximately 18 to 21 inches in "total height,"15/ the cradle does not have to be completely lowered its entire 18- to 21-inch height into the water when used. Steven Howard explained, credibly, that the cradle needs to be lowered into the water only a few inches lower than the ski boat's 25-inch draft to enable the boat to float into or out of the cradle. To that point, Rickman testified that taking into account the 25-inch draft of the ski boat and the "total height" of the boat cradle, between 40 and 44 inches of water depth would be required when the cradle is used in order to avoid coming into contact with the Lake bottom. Based on the Atlas graph showing the lowest water levels for the previous ten-year period at approximately 114 feet NGVD, Rickman designed the Dock to extend out to the 109.9-foot NGVD bottom elevation point. At this point, the projected water depth would be slightly more than four feet during periods of the lowest projected water levels for Crooked Lake. For the Dock to be able to wharf out to 109.9 feet NGVD bottom elevation, it must extend a total of approximately 204 feet waterward into the Lake. The credible evidence establishes that while Howard's ski boat is one of the largest, it is not the largest boat operated on Crooked Lake. Impacts Assessment for Environmental Resource Permit Water Quality Impacts As noted above, Crooked Lake is a Class III waterbody. Accordingly, the surface water quality standards and criteria applicable to Class III waters in Florida codified in rule 62-302.300 apply to Crooked Lake. The Dock, as proposed to be constructed and operated, is not anticipated to adversely affect or degrade water quality in Crooked Lake. Specifically, as required by the Consolidated Authorization, a floating turbidity curtain will be installed around the boundary of the construction area before construction commences, and it must be left in place until construction is complete and turbidity levels in the work area have returned to background levels. Additionally, as noted, the pilings supporting the Dock must be wrapped in an impervious material to prevent leaching of metals and other pollutants into the water over the life of the structure. The Consolidated Authorization also prohibits the installation and use of fueling equipment at the Dock; prohibits the discharge of sewage or other waste into the water; prohibits liveaboards; prohibits fish cleaning or the installation of fish cleaning stations unless sufficient measures such as sink screens and waste receptacles are in place; and prohibits repair and maintenance activities involving scraping, sanding, painting, stripping, recoating, and other activities that may degrade water quality or release pollutants into the water. Although the Consolidated Authorization imposes a specific condition requiring, for all vessels using the Dock, a minimum 12-inch clearance between the deepest draft of the vessel (with motor in the down position) and the top of submerged resources, it does not specifically address circumstances where the use of the boat cradle, rather than the vessel itself, may come into contact with the Lake bottom. DEP's witness acknowledged that if the boat cradle were to come into contact with the Lake bottom, water quality standards may be violated. Given the information presented at the final hearing regarding the operation of the boat lift and the need for sufficient clearance between the bottom of the boat cradle and the lake bottom, the undersigned recommends that a specific condition be included in the Consolidated Authorization prohibiting contact of the Lake bottom by the boat cradle. This recommended condition is set forth in paragraph 73.A., below. Upon consideration of the conditions imposed by the Consolidated Authorization discussed above, including imposing a specific condition that prohibits contact of the boat cradle with the Lake bottom, the undersigned finds that the Dock will not adversely affect or degrade the water quality of Crooked Lake. Water Quantity Impacts The Dock, as proposed, is a piling-supported structure that will not impound, store, or impede the flow of surface waters. As such, the Dock will not cause adverse flooding to on-site or offsite property, will not result in adverse impacts to surface water storage and conveyance capabilities, and will not result in adverse impacts to the maintenance of surface or ground water levels. Impacts to Fish, Wildlife, and Listed Species and Habitat The Application states, in section 5, question 6, that there is no vegetation on Howard's riparian shoreline. However, the Survey depicts an area of emergent grasses approximately 60 feet wide and extending diagonally approximately 70 feet waterward into the Lake. The Survey depicts this grassed area as straddling the riparian line between Howard's property and the adjacent parcel to the south. The Survey shows the Dock as being located a significant distance waterward of the grassed area, such that no portion of the Dock will be located on or near this grassed area. Additionally, an aerial photograph of Howard's property and the Lake waterward of Howard's property shows a smaller patch of what appears to be emergent grasses further offshore. This grassed area is not shown on the Survey, and it cannot definitively be determined, by examining the Survey and the aerial photograph, whether this grassed area is growing in an area that will be impacted by the Dock. Steven Howard acknowledged that this smaller grassed area may be located at or near the jet ski slip on the southeastern side of the Dock. An environmental assessment of this smaller grassed area was not performed or submitted as part of the Application. Thus, any value that this area may have as fish and wildlife habitat was not assessed as part of DEP's determination that the Dock will not adversely impact the value of functions provided to fish, wildlife, and to listed species and their habitat. In order to provide reasonable assurance that the Dock will not adversely impact the value of functions provided to fish, wildlife, and to listed species and their habitat, the undersigned recommends including a specific condition in the Consolidated Authorization requiring this smaller grassed area to be completely avoided during construction and operation of the Dock, or, if avoidance is not feasible, that an environmental assessment be performed prior to construction so that the value of this grassed area, if any, to fish, wildlife, and listed species can be evaluated to determine whether minimization and compensatory mitigation should be required. This recommended condition is set forth in paragraph 73.B., below. As previously noted, the Consolidated Authorization contains a specific condition requiring a minimum 12-inch clearance between the deepest draft of the vessel (with the motor in the down position) and the top of submerged resources for all vessels that will use the docking facility. Compliance with this condition will help ensure that the value of functions provided to fish and wildlife and to listed species and their habitat of any such submerged resources is not adversely impacted by vessels using the Dock. The Consolidated Authorization also contains a specific condition requiring handrails to be installed on the Dock to prevent mooring access to portions of the Dock other than the wetslips. This will help protect submerged resources in shallower areas in the vicinity of the Dock. Fish populations in the immediate area of the Dock site may temporarily be affected during construction of the Dock; however, those impacts are not anticipated to be permanent. Additionally, as previously discussed, the Dock pilings must be wrapped with an impervious material to prevent leaching of pollutants into the water, and once installed, the pilings may provide habitat for fish and a substrate for benthic organisms. Provided that the conditions set forth in the draft Consolidated Authorization, as well as the recommendation regarding the smaller grassed area, are included in the final version of the Consolidated Authorization, it is determined that the construction and operation of the Dock will not adversely impact the value of functions provided to fish, wildlife, or to listed species or their habitat.16/ Impact on Navigation Petitioners assert that the Dock will constitute a hazard to navigation in the northeast portion of Crooked Lake. Specifically, they assert that because the Dock will extend out approximately 204 feet into the Lake, it necessarily will create a navigational hazard to boaters in the vicinity. As support, Petitioners presented evidence consisting of Steven Howard's testimony that an inner tube on which his nephew was riding, that was being pulled behind a motor boat, collided with the Gerards' 84-foot-long floating dock adjacent to Howard's riparian area. Petitioners argue that if an 84-foot-long dock creates a navigational hazard, a 204-foot-long dock would create an even greater navigational hazard. The undersigned does not find this argument persuasive. The portion of Crooked Lake on which the Dock is proposed to be located is approximately a mile and a half to two miles long and one-half to three-quarters of a mile wide. Although this portion of Crooked Lake experiences substantial boat traffic, the evidence shows that the Lake is sufficiently large in this area, even with the Dock in place, to allow safe navigation. To this point, it is noted that there are two other longer docks in the northeastern portion of Crooked Lake, extending 220 and 244 feet into the Lake from the shoreline. There was no evidence presented showing that either of these docks constitutes a navigational hazard.17/ Petitioners also assert that during periods of high water in this portion of Crooked Lake, the Dock will be underwater and thus will present a navigational hazard. In support, they presented photographs taken on October 30, 2017—— approximately six weeks after Hurricane Irma struck central Florida——showing ten docks, out of the 109 docks on Crooked Lake, that were partially or completely submerged.18/ When the photographs were taken, the approximate water elevation was 119.2 feet NGVD. All or a portion of the submerged docks had been constructed at or below the 119.2-foot NGVD elevation. The docks without roofs were mostly or completely invisible under the water. However, for the roofed docks, the roofs remained visible above the water even when their docking platforms were submerged. Here, although the walkway and lower platform of Howard's Dock is proposed to be constructed at an elevation of 121 feet NGVD, the roof will be constructed at an elevation of 129 feet NGVD. Thus, even during the relatively infrequent periods19/ during which the water level in Crooked Lake may exceed 121 feet NGVD, the platform roof will still be visible to vessels navigating in this portion of the Lake. Additionally, the Consolidated Authorization contains a specific condition requiring the waterward end of the Dock to be marked with a sufficient number of reflectors to be visible from the water at night by reflected light. This condition provides additional assurance that the Dock will not present a navigational hazard. For these reasons, it is determined that the Dock will not adversely affect navigation. Other ERP-Related Issues The evidence did not show that the Dock is proposed to be located in or proximate to a "work of the District," as defined in section 373.019(28). The only "work of the District" about which evidence was presented is the weir located south of Crooked Lake. This structure is many thousands of feet south of the Dock. There was no evidence presented showing that the Dock would have any impact on this weir. The Dock, as proposed, was designed by an experienced professional contractor who has designed and installed many docks on Crooked Lake, and, as such, is anticipated to function as proposed. The Dock must be built according to engineering diagrams to the Consolidated Authorization, and as-built drawings must be submitted when Dock construction is complete so that DEP can confirm that the Dock is constructed in accordance with the approved design. The evidence establishes that Howard, as the applicant, and Rickman, as the professional contractor in charge of construction, are financially, legally, and administratively capable of ensuring that the activity will be undertaken in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Consolidated Authorization. No evidence to the contrary was presented. The Dock will be located in the waters of Crooked Lake and will be affixed to the submerged bottom. The Department of State, Division of Historical Resources ("DHR"), did not provide any comments indicating that historical or archaeological resources are anticipated to be impacted by the project. Additionally, the Consolidated Authorization contains a general condition requiring subsurface activity associated with construction of the Dock to immediately cease, and DHR to be contacted, if any prehistoric or historic artifacts, such as pottery or ceramics, stone tools or implements, dugout canoes, or other physical remains that could be associated with Native American cultures or early colonial or American settlements are encountered at any time within the project site area. Additional Recommended Conditions Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the following specific conditions be included in the Consolidated Authorization, Permit No. 53-0351424-001-EI: A minimum six-inch clearance shall be maintained between the top of all submerged resources and the deepest draft of the cradle of the boat lift while in use. For purposes of this condition, submerged resources consist of the bottom sediment and/or any submerged grasses or other aquatic organisms. Any emergent grasses in the permittee's riparian area shall be avoided during the construction and operation of the Dock. If it is not feasible to avoid these grasses, an environmental assessment of the grassed area shall be performed and submitted to the Department prior to commencing construction, so that the value of this grassed area, if any, to fish, wildlife, and listed species can be evaluated and the extent to which minimization and/or compensatory mitigation is appropriate can be determined. Clearly in the Public Interest Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-4.070, Standards for Issuing or Denying Permits, states in pertinent part: A permit shall be issued to the applicant upon such conditions as the Department may direct, only if the applicant affirmatively provides the Department with reasonable assurance based on plans, test results, installation of pollution control equipment, or other information, that the construction, expansion, modification, operation, or activity of the installation will not discharge, emit, or cause pollution in contravention of Department standards or rules. In addition to the foregoing permitting requirements, because the Dock is proposed to be located in an OFW, Howard also must provide reasonable assurance that the Dock meets the "clearly in the public interest" standard. The "clearly in the public interest" standard does not require the applicant to demonstrate need for the project or a net public benefit from the project. Rather, this standard requires the applicant to provide greater assurances, under the circumstances specific to the project, that the project will comply with the applicable permitting requirements.20/ For the reasons discussed above, and with the inclusion of the additional recommended conditions in paragraphs 73.A. and 73.B., it is determined that the proposed Dock meets the applicable permitting requirements and the "clearly in the public interest" standard for issuance of the ERP. Impacts Assessment for Sovereignty Submerged Lands Lease Water-Dependency of the Proposed Dock A water-dependent activity is one which can only be conducted in, on, over, or adjacent to water areas because the activity requires direct access to the water body or sovereignty submerged lands for specified activities, including recreation, and where the use of water or sovereignty submerged lands is an integral part of the activity. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.003(71). Petitioners argue that the Dock will not constitute a water-dependent activity because the depth of water in the slips may, at times, be insufficient to allow operation of Howard's vessels while complying with the requirement that a minimum 12- inch clearance be maintained between the lowest draft of the vessel and submerged resources. The undersigned finds this argument unpersuasive. The Dock is being constructed specifically for the purpose of enabling Howard to use her vessels for boating——a recreational activity for which use of the water indisputably is an integral part. The Dock's primary purpose is to moor vessels that will be used for the water-dependent recreational activities of boating and fishing, and other water-dependent recreational uses of the Dock include fishing, swimming and sunbathing. Case law interpreting the Florida Administrative Code Chapter 18-21 makes clear that because docks are used for mooring vessels or conducting other in-water recreational uses, they are "water-dependent" activities for purposes of the rules.21/ Thus, even if water depths in the Dock's slips are at times insufficient for vessel mooring or launching,22/ this does not render the Dock not a "water-dependent activity." Resource Management Requirements The preempted area of the Lease is proposed to be used for a Dock that will be used for boating, fishing, and swimming. These traditional in-water recreational uses are consistent with the management purposes of sovereignty submerged lands as described in rule 18-21.004(2)(a). With the inclusion of the conditions currently proposed in the draft Consolidated Approval, as well as the recommended conditions in paragraphs 73.A. and 73.B., the undersigned determines that the Dock will not result in adverse impacts to sovereignty submerged lands and associated resources. With the inclusion of the conditions currently proposed in the draft Consolidated Approval, as well as the recommended conditions in paragraphs 73.A. and 73.B., the undersigned determines that the Dock is designed to minimize or eliminate impacts to fish and wildlife habitat and submerged resources. With the inclusion of the currently proposed conditions in the draft Consolidated Authorization, as well as the recommended conditions set forth in paragraphs 73.A. and 73.B., it is determined that the Dock, as designed and constructed, will minimize or eliminate cutting, removal, or destruction of wetland vegetation. Additionally, as discussed above, the proposed Consolidated Approval requires the avoidance of adverse impacts to historic and cultural resources. Riparian Rights Consistent with rule 18-21.004(3)(d), the Dock is proposed to be constructed in Howard's riparian area and will be set back more than 25 feet from the northerly and southerly riparian lines shown on the Survey. Rule 18-21.004(3)(a) prohibits activities authorized under chapter 18-21 from being implemented in a manner that would unreasonably infringe on traditional common law riparian rights, as defined in section 253.141, of upland owners adjacent to sovereignty submerged lands. Similarly, rule 18-21.004(3)(c) requires all structures and activities to be designed and conducted in a manner that will not unreasonably restrict or infringe upon the riparian rights of adjacent riparian owners. Collectively, these provisions prohibit an activity that will occur on sovereignty submerged lands from unreasonably infringing on or unreasonably restricting the riparian rights of upland riparian owners. Riparian rights are rights appurtenant to, and inseparable from, riparian land that borders on navigable waters. § 253.141, Fla. Stat.; Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 830 (Fla. 1909). At common law, riparian rights include the rights of navigation, fishing, boating, and commerce. Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1957). The right of navigation necessarily includes the right to construct and operate a dock to access navigable waters. Belvedere Dev. Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 476 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1985); Shore Vill. Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 824 So. 2d 208, 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Common law riparian rights also include the right to an obstructed view. Lee Cnty v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Many of these common law riparian rights have been statutorily codified in section 253.141. Statutory riparian rights include the "rights of ingress, egress, boating, bathing, and fishing and such others as may be or have been defined by law." § 253.141(1), Fla. Stat. At issue in this case are the competing riparian rights of next-door neighbors——i.e., Howard's right to wharf out to navigable waters for purposes of boating and other water- dependent recreational activities, and the Gerards' right to an unobstructed view. The question is whether Howard's proposed construction and operation of a dock of sufficient length to enable her to use her boats would unreasonably infringe on or unreasonably restrict the Gerards' right to an unobstructed view of the Lake. By virtue of the riparian rights appurtenant to Howard's riparian property, she is entitled to wharf out to water deep enough to enable her to navigate. She owns two boats, one of which pulls a draft of 25 inches, and the other, a draft of 20 inches, which she uses to navigate the Lake. Thus, an essential aspect of Howard's riparian right of navigation is her ability to construct and operate a dock long enough to enable her to reach water depths sufficient to use these boats. However, as noted above, this right is not unfettered. Howard's exercise of her riparian navigation right cannot unreasonably infringe on Gerard's right to an unobstructed view. Florida case law holds that the right to an "unobstructed" view does not entail a view free of any infringement or restriction whatsoever by neighboring structures or activities. In Hayes, the court defined the right as "a direct, unobstructed view of the [c]hannel and as well a direct, unobstructed means of ingress and egress . . . to the [c]hannel." Id. at 801 (emphasis added). The court then prescribed the rule that "in any given case, the riparian rights of an upland owner must be preserved over an area 'as near as practicable' in the direction of the [c]hannel so as to distribute equitably the submerged lands between the upland and the [c]hannel." Id. (emphasis added). To the extent there is no channel in this portion of the Lake, Hayes dictates that riparian rights must be apportioned equitably, so that a riparian owner's right to an unobstructed view can extend only from the owner's property in the direction of the center of the Lake. Kling v. Dep't of Envtl. Reg., Case No. 77-1224 (Fla. DOAH Oct. 6, 1977; Fla. DER Nov. 18, 1977) at ¶¶ 11-12 (emphasis added). Here, no evidence was presented showing that the Dock——which will be located immediately south and east of the Gerards' riparian property and attendant riparian area——will present an obstruction to the Gerards' view of the Lake channel. Additionally, the evidence did not establish that Howard's Dock would obstruct the Gerards' view of the center of the northeast portion of Crooked Lake, which is located west and slightly south of their property.23/ Administrative precedent in Florida provides additional support for the determination that the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the Gerards' right to an unobstructed view. In O'Donnell v. Atlantic Dry Dock Corporation, Case No. 04-2240 (Fla. DOAH May 23, 2005; Fla. DEP Sept. 6, 2005), riparian owners challenged the proposed approval of expansions of sovereignty submerged lands leases authorizing Atlantic Dry Dock, a neighboring commercial shipyard, to expand its shipyard facilities and install new docking facilities. The administrative law judge noted that although the expanded shipyard would further encroach on the riparian owners' already somewhat-restricted view from their property, it would not substantially and materially obstruct the Petitioners' view to the channel. He commented: "it [their view] may be further obstructed to the west in the direction of the Atlantic Marine yard, but not in the direction of the channel." To that point, he found that although "any lateral encroachment on the Petitioners' line-of-sight to the channel by the large eastern dry dock proposed will be an annoyance, . . . [it] will not rise to the level of a substantial and material interference or obstruction of the Petitioners' view to the channel." Id. at ¶ 119. He found that "there is no 'special riparian right' to a view of the sunset, just as there was no right to a particular object of view . . . by the riparian owners complaining in the Hayes case." Id. at ¶ 120. Castoro v. Palmer, Case Nos. 96-0736, 96-5879 (Fla. DOAH Sept. 1, 1998; Fla. DEP Oct. 19, 1998), also is instructive. In Castoro, neighboring riparian owners challenged the proposed issuance of an environmental approval and sovereignty submerged lands lease for a 227-foot-long dock having a terminal platform with boat lift. The owners contended that due to the dock's length, it would impermissibly obstruct their views of the water. The administrative law judge rejected that contention, distinguishing the circumstances from those in Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), in which the construction of a bridge that blocked 80 percent of the riparian owners' view of the channel was held to constitute a "substantial and material" obstruction to the riparian right of view. The ALJ noted that although the dock would have "some impact on the neighbors' views" and their use of the waterbody, it did not unreasonably impact their riparian rights to an unobstructed view or to use of the waterbody. Id. at ¶¶ 73-74. In Trump Plaza of the Palm Beaches Condominium v. Palm Beach County, Case No. 08-4752 (Fla. DOAH Sept. 24, 2009; Fla. DEP Oct. 8, 2009), a condominium association challenged the proposed issuance of a sovereignty submerged lands use approval to fill in a dredged area and create mangrove islands in the Lake Worth Lagoon, alleging, among other things, that the creation of the mangrove islands would unreasonably infringe on their riparian right to an unobstructed view. In rejecting this position and recommending issuance of the submerged lands use approval, the ALJ noted that the area obstructed by the mangrove islands would be negligible compared to the remaining expanse of the view, and further noted that the owners' real concern was directed at the aesthetics of the project——specifically, they did not want to view mangrove islands. The ALJ stated: "[t]he evidence supports a finding that while the project will undoubtedly alter the view of the water from [the riparian owners' property], the impact on view is not so significant as to constitute an unreasonable infringement of their riparian rights." Id. at ¶ 86. Applying these case law principles, it is determined that the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on or unreasonably restrict the Gerards' riparian right to an unobstructed view. To that point, the cases make clear that the right to an "unobstructed" view is not an unfettered right to a view of the water completely free of any lateral encroachment, but, instead is the right of a view toward the channel or the center of a lake without unreasonable infringement or restriction. Here, although the Dock will laterally encroach on the Gerards' full panoramic view of the Lake——and, as such, may even constitute an annoyance, the evidence did not show that the Dock will obstruct or otherwise restrict their view to the channel or the center of the Lake. Moreover, to the extent the Gerards have expressed concern about the Dock interfering with their view of the south shore of the Lake, O'Donnell makes clear the desire to have a particular object of view——here, the south shore of the Lake——is not a legally protected riparian right. It is also found that the Dock will not unreasonably interfere with the Gerards' riparian rights of ingress, egress, boating, or navigation. As previously noted, the Dock will be located at least 25 feet inside the riparian lines established for Howard's upland property, and, it will not be constructed in a location or operated in a manner that will obstruct, interfere with, or restrict the Gerards' access to the Lake or to sufficient water depths to enable navigation.24/ The evidence also did not establish that the Dock will restrict or otherwise interfere with the Gerards' use of their riparian area for ingress and egress, boating, fishing, bathing, or other riparian uses. In sum, it is concluded that the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on or restrict the riparian rights of adjacent upland riparian owners. Accordingly, it is determined that the Dock will meet the requirements and standards in rule 18-21.004(3) regarding riparian rights. Navigational Hazard For the reasons discussed in paragraphs 63 through 67, it is determined that the Dock will not constitute a navigational hazard in violation of rule 18-21.004(7)(g). Not Contrary to the Public Interest Rule 18-21.004(1)(a) requires an applicant to demonstrate that an activity proposed to be conducted on sovereignty submerged lands will not be contrary to the public interest. To meet this standard, it is not necessary that the applicant show that the activity is affirmatively in the "public interest," as that term is defined in rule 18-21.003(51). Rather, it is sufficient that the applicant show that there are few, if any, "demonstrable environmental, social, and economic costs" of the proposed activity. Castoro, at ¶ 69. For the reasons discussed above, and with the inclusion of the additional recommended conditions in paragraphs 73.A. and 73.B., it is determined that the proposed Dock meets the "not contrary to the public interest" standard required for issuance of the Lease. Demonstration of Entitlement to ERP Howard met her burden under section 120.569(2)(p) to present a prima facie case of entitlement to the ERP by entering into evidence the Application, the Notice of Intent, and supporting information regarding the proposed Dock. She also presented credible, competent, and substantial evidence beyond that required to meet her burden under section 120.569(2)(p) to demonstrate prima facie entitlement to the ERP. The burden then shifted to Petitioners to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the competent substantial evidence, that the Dock does not comply with section 373.414 and applicable ERP rules. For the reasons discussed above, it is determined that Petitioners did not meet their burden of persuasion under section 120.569(2)(p) in this proceeding. Accordingly, for the reasons addressed above, it is determined that Howard is entitled to issuance of the ERP for the Dock. Demonstration of Entitlement to Lease As previously discussed, Howard bore the burden of proof in this proceeding to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Dock meets all applicable statutory and rule requirements for issuance of the Lease for the Dock. For the reasons discussed above, it is determined that Howard met this burden, and, therefore, is entitled to issuance of the sovereignty submerged lands lease for the Dock. Petitioners' Standing Defenders' Standing As stipulated by the parties and noted above, Defenders is an incorporated non-profit entity created for the primary purpose of protecting and preserving Crooked Lake so that it may remain an OFW for all members of the public to enjoy. Defenders has been in existence since at least the mid- 1980s. Robert Luther, the president of Defenders, testified that the organization's purpose also entails providing education and promoting public awareness in order to preserve the natural beauty, water quality, ecological value, and quality of life around Crooked Lake. As stipulated by the parties and noted above, Defenders has more than 25 members. Luther testified that Defenders has approximately 100 family members, most of whom live on or around Crooked Lake. He noted that many of Defenders' members own boats, which they park at a local boat landing on the Lake. Based on this testimony, it is inferred that these members operate their boats on Crooked Lake. After receiving the public notice of the project, Defenders' board of directors voted to oppose issuance of the Consolidated Authorization for the Dock. Luther testified that the board's decision was based on the determination that "it was clearly within the public interest" to oppose the Dock. Gerards' Standing The Gerards reside at 1055 Scenic Highway, Babson Park, Florida. Their riparian property is immediately adjacent to, and northwest of, Howard's property. The Gerards own a floating dock that is located within their riparian area.25/ The dock consists of two 4-foot- wide by 30-foot-long ramps attached to a 24-foot-long by 8-foot- wide pontoon boat. Priscilla Gerard testified that she enjoys spending time sitting and reading books on the beach in front of her property, and that having that area to sit and read is a significant aspect of her enjoyment of her lakefront property. Ms. Gerard observed that extensive boating activities in the northeast portion of the Lake on weekends is disruptive, and interferes with her use of her beach for relaxing and reading. She particularly noted that boats operating very close to the shore cause waves to splash up on her beach, interfering with her ability to sit and read close to the shore. She did not contend that Howard's use of the Dock for boating would contribute to the disruptive nature of existing boat traffic in the vicinity. Ms. Gerard has viewed the plans for the proposed Dock and is very concerned that due to its size, her view of the south side of the Lake will be completely blocked. She acknowledged, and other competent, credible evidence showed, that there are other docks on the Lake in the vicinity of her riparian property. The evidence shows that existing docks having lengths of 145 feet and 170 feet are located in the vicinity of, and are visible from, the Gerards' property. She testified that an existing dock and tiki hut block her view of the Lake to the north. She acknowledged that although Howard's Dock, if constructed as proposed, may somewhat obstruct her view to the left (south) of her property, it would not block her view straight out into the Lake. Phillip Gerard testified that he has boated extensively on Crooked Lake in a variety of vessel types. He further testified that he has observed a range of boating practices on Crooked Lake, including seeing water skiers and persons being towed behind motorized vessels on inner tubes and other types of "towables." He testified that, based on his personal observations, persons being towed do not have independent control of the speed or direction of the "towable"; thus, depending on the direction in which the towing vessel turns, the towable may be slung to the left or the right. Gerard commented that such lack of control could result in a person riding on a towable colliding with a dock, and he noted that Howard's nephew, who was riding on an inner tube being towed by a boat, was involved in such a collection with his (Mr. Gerard's) own dock. Mr. Gerard did not testify that the Dock would present a navigational hazard to, or otherwise interfere with, the Gerards' riparian right of ingress and egress. Neither of the Gerards testified that the Dock would impact their ability to access navigable waters in the Lake. Mr. Gerard acknowledged that if Howard's Dock were constructed, boats that currently travel very close to the shoreline of his property would be forced to swing further out in the Lake, away from his riparian shoreline, in order to avoid the Dock.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order approving the issuance of Consolidated Environmental Resource Permit and Recommended Intent to Grant Sovereignty Submerged Lands Authorization, Permit No. 53-0351424-001-EI, on the terms and conditions set forth in the Consolidated Notice of Intent and attached draft of Permit No. 53-0351424-001-EI, as modified to include the Additional Recommended Conditions set forth in paragraphs 73.A. and 73B. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 2018.
