The Issue Whether the finger pier portion of Respondent Raab's dock creates a navigational hazard. The resolution of that issue will determine whether the dock qualifies for an exemption from an environmental resource permit under Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 403.813, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact DEP has the authority to regulate the construction of docks in jurisdictional wetlands and other waters of the State of Florida and on state submerged lands under Chapters 253, 373, and 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 62-330 (which adopts Chapter 40E-4) and 18-21, Florida Administrative Code. The Association is a residential community located in Sewall's Point, Martin County, Florida. All lots within the community abut navigable channels which provide ingress and egress to the ICW. These channels converge so that there is only one channel that connects to the ICW. Most of the residents of the community have large vessels that routinely navigate the channels within the community. At the time of the formal hearing, many of the vessels owned by residents of the community had drafts of four feet and at least two had drafts of five feet. In 1997, Mr. Raab purchased a residence in the Association that is located very close to where the channel meets the ICW. Because of that location, practically all residents of the Association have to pass in front of Mr. Raab's property when going into or returning from the ICW. The property at issue is located at 22 Simara Street, Sewalls Point, Martin County, Florida. The dock at issue in this proceeding is subject to DEP's regulatory authority. When Mr. Raab purchased this property in 1997, there was an existing marginal dock parallel to the bulk-head. Mr. Raab subsequently sought and received approval from DEP to demolish the existing marginal dock and replace it with a virtually identical structure. The existence and configuration of the marginal dock is not at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Raab thereafter sought to modify his approved marginal dock by adding a finger pier which extended into the channel 36 feet so he could dock his vessel perpendicular to the bulkhead. Mr. Raab's plan also called for the construction of two pilings 12 feet from the end of the finger pier. Mr. Raab had, as of the time of the formal hearing, re-constructed the marginal dock and had constructed the finger pier. 3/ The two additional pilings had not been constructed at the time of the formal hearing. After reviewing the modified project, DEP determined that the project was exempt from the need for an environmental resource permit under Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 403.813, Florida Statutes. DEP also authorized Mr. Raab to use state-owned submerged lands if necessary. The Association thereafter timely challenged DEP's determination that the finger pier portion of the project (and the two additional pilings) did not require an environmental resource permit. There was a conflict in the evidence as to the functional width of the channel in front of Mr. Raab's property. 4/ Mr. Holly testified on behalf of the Association that the functional width of the channel was 83 feet. Mr. Lidberg, testifying on behalf of Mr. Raab, testified that the functional width was 101 feet. This conflict is resolved by finding that the functional width of the channel in front of the Raab property is 101 feet. 5/ The prevailing winds in the area in front of Mr. Raabb's dock blow into the dock. The depth of the water in the channels is influenced by tides. The principal reason Mr. Raab wants the finger pier is so that he can moor his boat with the bow to the prevailing winds in times of high winds. At the time of the formal hearing, Mr. Raab owned a vessel with an overall length of 44 feet. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Raab's finger pier and the two pilings that have been authorized, but not constructed, constitute a hazard to navigation. 6/ Based on the totality of the evidence, it is found that these structures do not create a navigational hazard. 7/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order dismissing the Association's challenge to the determination that Mr. Raab's project qualifies for an exemption from an environmental resource permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2000.
The Issue The issue is whether appellant's application for a conditional use permit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Appellant, Nostimo, Inc. (appellant, applicant or Nostimo), is the owner of Lots 8, 9, 10 and 11, Block 8, Revised Plat of Clearwater Beach Subdivision, located at 32 Bay Esplanade, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property is subject to the land use requirements codified in the City of Clearwater Code of Ordinances (code or city code). By application filed on April 25, 1989 appellant sought the issuance of a conditional use permit from appellee, City of Clearwater (City or appellee). If approved, the permit would authorize the sale of beer and wine for off-premises consumption by a Pick Kwik Food Store to be constructed on the property under a lease agreement between appellant and Pick Kwik, Inc. Appellant's property is properly zoned for a retail establishment (CB or Beach Commerical), and it needs no further zoning permits from the City in order to convert the existing structures on the property to a convenience store. Indeed, appellant has already received approval for the construction and operation of the store. However, under subsection 137.024(b) of the city code, appellant is required to obtain a conditional use permit because it intends to engage in the sale of packaged beer and wine for off-premises consumption. In order to obtain such a permit the applicant must satisfy a number of criteria embodied in the code. The parties have stipulated that, with the exception of one standard, all other relevant criteria have been met. The disputed standard requires that "the use shall be compatible with the surrounding area and not impose an excessive burden or have a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities or services." It is noted that appellant must secure the necessary land use permit from the City before it can obtain the alcoholic beverage license from the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The application was considered by the Clearwater Planning and Zoning Board (Board) on June 13, 1989 and denied by a 5-0 vote with one member abstaining. As a basis for the denial, the Board adopted a staff report that concluded that "due to the beach area being saturated with this use (sale of alcoholic beverages), public nuisances requiring police action are taxing community services." It further concluded that the proliferation of this activity "has a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities and services, specifically police services in handling nuisances related to alcoholic beverage establishments." Members of the public who testified in opposition to the application expressed concern over increased traffic in the area, the glare of lights from a 24 hours per day establishment, and potential problems arising from customers who will consume the beer and wine during the evening hours. In addition, two letters in opposition to the application were considered by the Board. Finally, besides a presentation by applicant's attorney, two witnesses appeared on behalf of the applicant and established that Pick Wick, Inc. provides security services at its stores, if needed, and training for employees to prevent the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors. The subject property is located on the western side of the intersection of Bay Esplanade and Mandalay Avenue in Clearwater Beach, an elongated strip of land to the west of the mainland portion of the City and separated from the mainland by Clearwater Harbor. Mandalay Avenue runs north and south through the heart of Clearwater Beach and is a principal traffic artery in that part of the community. The avenue narrows from four to two lanes just south of where the store is to be located. Bay Esplanade is a much shorter street and runs in an east-west direction between the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater Harbor. In general terms, the property is surrounded by mixed uses and include a 7-11 convenience store immediately across the street to the east, motels and rental apartments, a restaurant, retail businesses and resort facilities, residences, public areas and a city fire station. Maps received in evidence more definitively depict the nature of the uses surrounding Nostimo's property. In addition to a number of commercial establishments within the immediate area, there are also tennis courts, a parking area, community boat ramp, soccer field, playground and public park. Finally, the area is replete with apartments, rental units and condominiums, including some directly behind the proposed establishment. Although there are presently no active businesses located on the subject property, the premises were once occupied by a hotel, apartments, hot dog shop and a small lounge that offered both on and off premises consumption of alcohol. The applicant contends that the proposed use is compatible with both the property's former use and the present surrounding area, particularly since a 7-11 convenience store directly across the street has been in business selling beer and wine for the last twenty-five years, and there are several restaurants or motels within a block that sell alcoholic beverages. The applicant added that, in all, there are approximately fifty-three active alcoholic beverage licenses within two miles of the proposed convenience store. At both the Board hearing and final hearing in this cause, the City Police Department offered testimony in opposition to the issuance of the requested permit. According to the uncontradicted testimony of Lt. Frank Palumbo, who is the Clearwater Beach police department district commander, additional noise, vandalism, traffic congestion and congregation of younger people are expected if the permit is issued. This opinion was based upon his law enforcement experience with other convenience stores on the Beach side that sell beer and wine, including another Pick Wick convenience store. Further, Mandalay Avenue is an important north-south traffic artery in Clearwater Beach, and there are no alternative streets for residents and visitors to use to avoid the traffic build-up that will occur around the store. Lieutenant Palumbo disputed the assertion that the lounge that once occupied a portion of the subject property generated substantial numbers of customers and associated traffic and that the new enterprise is actually a downgrade in use. He pointed out that the former lounge was very small, and a congregation of four or five customers at any one time was a "large crowd." In contrast, the police officer distinguished that situation from the proposed store where the sale of beer and wine around the clock is expected to generate larger volumes of traffic and customers, particularly during the evening hours. Finally, it has been Lt. Palumbo's experience that convenience stores that sell beer and wine attract the younger crowd, including minors, during the late hours of the night, and they create noise and sanitation problems for the adjacent property owners. The witness concluded that all of these factors collectively would have a negative impact on "community services" by placing a greater demand on police resources. This testimony was echoed by a city planner who gave deposition testimony in this cause. The nexus between the sale of alcoholic beverages and increased traffic and noise was corroborated by Daniel Baker, the manager of another Pick Wick store and a former employee of the 7-11 store across the street, who recalled that when beer sales stopped at that store at midnight, the noise and traffic also came to a halt. In this regard, it is noted the proposed store will operate twenty-four hours per day. To the above extent, then, the proposed use is incompatible with the requirements of section 137.011(d)(6). Two other witnesses testified at final hearing in opposition to the application. One, who is a member of a church that lies a block from the proposed store, pointed out without contradiction that a playground sits next to the church and is used by area young people, many of whom use bicycles as their means of transportation. She was concerned that if more traffic is generated by the store, it would make access to the playground more hazardous and discourage the children from using the facility. The second member of the public is concerned that the store will be incompatible with the surrounding area. This is because much of the neighboring area is made up of public areas, apartments, rental units or condominiums, and he contended an establishment selling alcoholic beverages would be inconsistent with those uses.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On or about March 6, 1984, petitioner applied for a DER permit to construct a marina on state owned submerged land located in Punta Rassa, Lee County, Florida. The original design requested approval to build slips for 54 boats. This design was later modified to conform to suggested modifications made by DER staff. The modification reduced the size of the marina to 30 boat slips. By an Intent to Issue dated April 24, 1985, petitioner was advised that the DER intended to issue the permit with 17 special conditions. Special Condition Number 1 advised petitioner of the Florida law which states that construction on state sovereignty lands may not be commenced prior to receiving from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund the required lease, license, easement, or other form of consent authorizing the proposed use. In none of the 17 special conditions, nor in any other portion of the Intent to Issue, was it stated when the permit time would begin to run, or when it would expire. The expiration date of the proposed permit simply was not mentioned. The Intent to Issue did contain a standard "point of entry" notice, advising that a petition for a hearing could be filed and stating that the hearing process was designed to formulate agency action. Having no objection to the DER's Intent to Issue and the conditions thereof, the petitioner determined not to request an administrative hearing with regard to said Intent. On May 17, 1985, the DER issued to petitioner Permit Number 360836415. This permit included 15 general conditions and the same 17 special conditions that were contained in the Intent to Issue. In addition, the permit stated that it would expire on June 1, 1987. The permit was accompanied by a letter. Neither the letter, nor the permit, bore the stamp of the agency clerk or contained language advising petitioner of its right to petition for an administrative hearing or other "point of entry" language. DER never notified petitioner by any document that contained "point of entry" language that the permit time would begin running immediately and would expire on June 1, 1987. In order to obtain a sovereignty land lease from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, petitioner was required to modify its proposed marina design by reducing the number of boat slips to 14. The Trustees approved the lease on or about July 29, 1986, although the Certification of Board Action attesting the Board's approval of the lease, as well as the sovereignty submerged land lease itself, was not forwarded to the petitioner until March 12, 1987. Due to the modifications required by the Trustees, the petitioner requested DER to modify its permit to reflect the reduction of the project scope. The request represented a minor modification to the permit and was granted by DER by letter dated September 30, 1986. The letter of modification does not suggest that the original expiration date of the permit had been changed. As of June 1, 1987, construction work on the proposed marina had not yet begun. The petitioner's agent relied upon a promulgated rule of the DER and assumed that the permit time would not begin to run on this project until petitioner had obtained consent to use state owned submerged land. DER's Dredge and Fill Application is encompassed in a form which is adopted by reference in Rule 17-1.203(1), Florida Administrative Code. This rule was adopted in 1982 and is still in effect today. A portion of that form, Appendix E, paragraph 3(g), on page 30, states that Where the proposed activity involves the use of state-owned submerged lands, DER shall not issue a permit before approval or consent of use is obtained from DNR, although DER will continue to process the application to the extent possible. (Emphasis supplied.) Except for this rule, DER has no other published instructions to applicants as to when permit times begin to run. Since the effective date of the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act (Sections 403.91 - .929, Florida Statutes) in October of 1984, DER has not followed its policy outlined in Form 17-1.203(1), as adopted by rule. This contrary practice is based on DER's interpretation of the Henderson Act's failure to include language which was previously included in Section 253.124, Florida Statutes, to the effect that DER permits do not become effective until all other local, state and federal permits are issued. DER's internal practice that calculates the running of the permit time prior to receiving approval to use state owned submerged land is not the subject of any public notice, memorandum or instructions generally available to the public or permit applicants. DER does not require permittees to provide proof of submerged land consent subsequent to the issuance of the DER permit. Also, DER has no internal mechanism for regularly apprising itself of permits which are soon to expire. DER does process and grant time extensions of permits. Requests for time extensions are made through a simple written request, and DER will generally grant such requests if the subject permit is still valid. If the DER permit has already expired at the time that the request for an extension is made, DER requires a new permit application. In this case, petitioner did not request an extension at any time before June 1, 1987. As noted above, it was the belief of petitioner's agent that the two-year permit term would not begin to run until the required Trustee's consent was secured. It was not until June 23 or 24, 1987, that he learned that DER considered the permit to have expired on June 1, 1987. In July of 1987, petitioner did re-apply for a new permit, but DER had environmental objections to the issuance of a new permit. The petition initiating these proceedings was subsequently filed.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order holding that Permit Number 360836415 does not expire until two years from March 12, 1987, and that appropriate recognition be given to the time which has elapsed due to the pendency of the instant proceeding. Respectfully Submitted and entered this 13th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 1989. APPENDIX The Proposed findings of fact Submitted by the parties have been carefully considered and are accepted, incorporated and/or Summarized in this Recommended Order, with the following exceptions: Petitioner 7. Rejected as an improper factual finding. Respondent 19. Last three Sentences rejected as contrary to the evidence. 21. Partially rejected due to the existence of Rule 17-1.203(1), Florida Administrative Code. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Richard Grosso, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Application for consumptive use permit No. 75-00225 is a request for an existing use to be withdrawn from the Floridan Aquifer from two different wells. These two wells are located in the Hillsborough Basin and in Polk County. The property contiguous to the wells encompasses approximately 80.9 acres. The water is to be used for citrus processing and disposed of off site. The permit seeks, for average daily withdrawal, 2.98 million gallons per day for one well and 1.566 million gallons per day for the other well for a total average daily withdrawal of 3.864 million gallons per day. For maximum daily withdrawal the permit seeks 4.096 million gallons per day for one well and 2.792 million gallons per day for the other well for a total maximum daily withdrawal of 6.888 million gallons per day. The amount of water sought to be consumptively used by this application greatly exceeds the water crop of the subject lands owned by applicant. Mr. John C. Jennings and Mr. William Sunderland, owners of property adjacent to the Kraft property, appeared in their own behalf and stated that they felt that their wells were being hurt because of the large quantities of water pumped by Kraft. They did not attempt to offer expert testimony nor did they claim to be hydrologists. They did note that each had substantial problems with their wells running out of water.
Recommendation It does not appear that the district has had a reasonable opportunity to examine the objections and comments of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland with regard to the effect of the applied for consumptive use on their property. These objections were apparently raised for the first time at the hearing. As noted in paragraph 6, if the wells of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland are substantially affected in an adverse manner by applicant's use of such large quantities of water, such a use would not seem to be a reasonable, beneficial use as is required for permit unless further conditions were placed upon the permit. Therefore, it is recommended that the Southwest Florida Water Management District staff further investigate the effect of the applied for consumptive use on the wells located on the property of John C. Jennings and William Sunderland prior to the Board taking formal action on this application. ENTERED this 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Staff Attorney Southwest Florida Water Management District P. 0. Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Douglas T. Moring, Esquire Kraftco Corporation Kraftco Court Glenview, Illinois 60025
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents committed an act of discrimination based upon disability against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner claimed to be living in his grandfather’s condominium at Respondent, Oceana II North Oceanfront Condominium Association, Inc. (“Oceana II”), 9900 South Ocean Drive, Apartment 4, Jensen Beach, Florida 34957, pursuant to a month-to-month lease under which he paid $1,000.00 monthly. Petitioner neither produced a written lease nor provided testimony from his grandfather, the putative owner of the condominium, of the existence of such lease. Petitioner also offered no competent evidence (e.g., cancelled checks, receipts, etc.) that he had made any payments under the alleged lease, whether written or oral. At the time of hearing, Petitioner was living in Texas and had no immediate plans to return to Florida or his grandfather’s condominium. Oceana II is a condominium homeowners’ association created and authorized under chapter 718, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Tiffany Ferguson, is the community association manager for Oceana II and the corporate representative for Oceana II for purposes of this hearing. Petitioner testified that his claim of discrimination came about because his car was parked in a disabled space with an expired disability placard. He was informed by Respondents or their agents that his vehicle must be moved to a parking lot away from the entrance to the building in which he was staying. He claims to have told Respondents’ agents that he could not park that far away from “his” unit due to a disability. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that any fine or suspension was ever levied by Respondents on him. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that any of Petitioner’s vehicles were ever towed by Respondents. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Respondents treated any other person outside of the protected class any more favorably than Petitioner was treated with respect to the rule requiring a current license plate. Petitioner brought several different vehicles, one of which had an expired Maryland tag, onto Oceana II’s premises. Despite the fact that he worked on many of these disabled vehicles, Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Respondents in any way caused Petitioner to purchase such vehicles, which may have needed repair or had issues obtaining a license plate. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner attempted to purchase or lease a unit in the condominium and was denied by Respondents due to a disability. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner had any lease at any time for his grandfather’s unit which Petitioner testified was a family vacation unit. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner provided any information in response to Respondents’ request for information as to an alleged disability, the disability-related need for an accommodation, and how any accommodation was necessary to ameliorate any alleged disability. Petitioner admitted he received Respondents’ email which said no fines would be imposed. Petitioner admitted he received Respondents’ request for additional information to make a meaningful review from Respondents’ counsel. Petitioner admitted he refused to provide the additional information requested by Respondents (through counsel) to make a meaningful review of an accommodation request on October 20, 2020. Petitioner admitted he voluntarily removed the original vehicle (a Pontiac Sunbird) while it had a valid license plate. Petitioner admitted at hearing that he brought in other vehicles at a later time--a green van, a white Saturn, and a gray van--onto the property without plates on purpose to provoke a response and engineer a hearing under section 718.303(3)(b), which pertains to the rights and obligations of condominium associations in levying fines against owners or occupants. He was attempting to set up a claim by intentionally not showing license plates because he wanted a hearing. Petitioner admitted he never tried to register the green van or the gray van with the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). Petitioner admitted the white Saturn has a current plate, not a Florida plate, and it is currently located in Texas. The white Saturn did not display a plate while on the condominium property. Petitioner admitted he refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds whether he ever displayed a plate on any of the vehicles. Petitioner admitted he left Florida in early February and lives in Texas, in San Marco near San Antonio. Petitioner could not renew the Maryland tag on the Sunbird because the VIN (vehicle identification number) on the registration was missing a digit, yet he admitted he has no evidence of any efforts to fix the VIN on the Sunbird with the Maryland DMV.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s claim for relief, finding both that he has failed to make a prima facie case of housing discrimination and that, because he resides in Texas and has no ownership or legal claim to the condominium in Florida, his claim is moot. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 J. Henry Cartwright, Esquire Fox McCluskey Bush Robison, PLLC 3461 Southeast Willoughby Boulevard Post Office Drawer 6 Stuart, Florida 34995 John Sebastian Quick Apartment 4 9900 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's property is zoned CTF-28 which contemplates high density residential, motels and marinas. Riprap at existing seawall along Petitioner's property extends four to six feet from the seawall, which makes it hazardous for boats to moor to the seawall. By constructing a dock 122 feet long extending nine feet into the water Petitioner is, in effect, extending the beneficial use of its property nine feet into and over navigable waters. Marina facilities are permitted in CTF-28 zoning as a special exception (Section 131.099, Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations). Other commercial properties in the vicinity have been granted special exceptions to construct the same type dock. The proposed dock will be the same level as the finger piers extending therefrom to eliminate any step that could create a safety hazard. No evidence was presented that the proposed project would be injurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare other than the conclusion by the board that granting the special exception would allow this riparian owner to use public property, thereby creating a precedent which would be followed by others.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
The Issue The issues remaining in this case are: (1) whether New River Solid Waste Association (NRSWA) requested that its permitted bioreactor landfill system be included as part of its application for renewal of its operating permit for the New River Regional Landfill in Union County, Florida; (2) whether Petitioner participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose under Section 120.595(1); and (3) whether the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under Section 403.412(2)(f). (Citations to sections are to the 2000 codification of Florida Statutes. Rule citations are to the current Florida Administrative Code.)
Findings Of Fact NRSWA is comprised of Union, Baker, and Bradford Counties and was formed to share the costs associated with solid waste disposal. NRSWA owns and operates the New River Regional Landfill in Union County. The landfill was initially permitted in 1990 and was expanded and the original permit renewed in 1995 for an additional five years, expiring on November 6, 2000. The landfill now has a permit for disposal of Class I waste in three cells, with a fourth under design; it also has a permit for disposal of Class III waste and a permit for a waste tire collection center. Cells 1 and 2 were retired, and in July 1999 NRSWA applied to modify its operating permit (Permit No. SC63-271982) to allow construction and operation of a bioreactor landfill system on retired cells 1 and 2. On June 26, 2000, DEP gave notice of its intent to issue NRSWA a permit modification to construct and operate the bioreactor system. On July 11, 2000, Petitioner, Paul Still, timely filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing to challenge DEP's proposed agency action. On August 15, 2000, DEP referred the matter to DOAH, which gave it DOAH Case No. 00-3448 and assigned an ALJ. On August 28, 2000, NRSWA filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Administrative Hearing for lack of standing. On September 8, 2000, NRSWA applied to DEP for renewal of Permit No. SC63-271982 for continued operation of its landfill. The renewal application requested that all landfill permits be consolidated into the renewal permit as a single operating permit. However, at the time Case No. 00-3448 on the bioreactor modification application remained pending, and the renewal application did not specify the bioreactor modification as part of the renewal application. Frank Darabi, NRSWA's professional engineer, signed a transmittal letter on September 7, 2000; arranged for delivery of the application to DEP's Northeast District office in Jacksonville, Florida; and thought it was delivered and left there after-hours on September 7, 2000. But NRSWA did not prove that the renewal application was submitted to DEP before September 8, 2000, when it was filed-stamped. The renewal application was submitted on DEP FORM 62- 701.900(1). The application was signed on the behalf of NRSWA by Darrell O'Neal, its Executive Director. By this signature on the form, O'Neal swore that all statements in the application were true, correct, and complete and agreed on behalf of NRSWA to comply with applicable statutes and DEP rules. The application was also signed, sealed and dated by Frank Darabi, as professional engineer. Darabi's signature certified that all engineering features in the application were "designed/examined by me and found to conform to engineering principals [sic] applicable to such facilities." On September 18, 2000, the ALJ in Case No. 00-3448 entered an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend. The ALJ held that the allegations in the Petition for Administrative Hearing failed to demonstrate that the Petitioner "ha[d] sustained, or [wa]s in the immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the proposed agency action." The ALJ granted Petitioner leave to amend as to standing. On September 26, 2000, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing in Case No. 00-3448, which included new allegations in an attempt to address the question of Petitioner's standing. On October 5, 2000, NRSWA filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing. NRSWA asserted that the Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing failed to sufficiently allege Petitioner's standing. On October 6, 2000, DEP issued a Request for Additional Information (RAI) as to the renewal application. The RAI did not ask for any information concerning the pending bioreactor modification application. On October 20, 2000, the ALJ in Case No. 00-3448 granted NRSWA's motion to dismiss Petitioner's amended petition in that case, finding that the amended petition "ha[d] set forth no new allegations sufficient for a presumption of standing to initiate and sustain these proceedings." On November 3, 2000, NRSWA submitted its response to DEP's RAI, which included the statement: Please note the permit modification application for the bioreactor construction and operation, DEP File Number 0013500-004-SC, is currently under review by Department. It is understood that the previously submitted bioreactor information is to be incorporated in the renewed permit. This statement was included after Darabi asked DEP and was told that it would be appropriate to include information about the pending bioreactor modification application in the response to RAI although not asked for in the RAI. NRSWA's response to RAI was signed by Darabi, with a copy to O'Neal. Darabi's signature did not make representations or certifications like those provided for in DEP FORM 62- 701.900(1). However, Darabi had been NRSWA's professional engineer since its inception, had signed numerous application submissions on behalf of NRSWA over the years, and clearly had authorization to submit the response to RAI. DEP entered its Final Order dismissing Case No. 00-3448 on December 4, 2000. On December 12, 2000, DEP issued Permit Number 001-3500004-SC to NRSWA for the bioreactor modification. This permit provided in pertinent part: This modification shall remain in effect as long as the underlying permit, SC63-271982, is in effect. The underlying permit will remain in effect until final agency action is taken on the renewal application of that permit . . . . Petitioner did not appeal the Final Order in Case No. 00-3448. Following review of the additional information submitted by NRSWA on its renewal application, DEP deemed the permit application complete as of November 3, 2000. Additional information was submitted in January 2001, including a request submitted on January 11 that the bioreactor modification part of the renewal permit address specific conditions omitted from the modification permit issued on December 12, 2000. On February 15, 2001, DEP gave notice of intent to renew NRSWA's permit for continued operation of its landfill. DEP's draft permit incorporated specific conditions addressing the construction and operation of the bioreactor system, as well as all other permitted landfill activities. The evidence is clear that, since November 3, 2000, NRSWA consistently has taken the position that the bioreactor system modification was included in its renewal application. Alleged Improper Purpose The evidence did not prove that Petitioner participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose--i.e., primarily to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for frivolous purpose or to needlessly increase the cost of licensing or securing the approval of NRSWA's permit renewal applications. To the contrary, the evidence was that Petitioner participated in this proceeding in an attempt to raise justifiable issues as to why NRSWA's permit renewal application, with bioreactor landfill system in cells 1 and 2, should not be granted. Petitioner failed in his attempts in large part because several issues he wanted to litigate were outside the scope of a permit renewal application and because he had no expert testimony on issues he was allowed to raise. At that point, Petitioner announced he was dropping all issues but one. The sole remaining issue after Petitioner's announcement might be viewed as a procedural technicality bordering on being frivolous. But it arose out of the complex (as DEP described it, "muddled") procedural history. Under these circumstances, it is not found that Petitioner's continued litigation of his sole remaining issue was frivolous.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order: (1) dismissing the verified Petition for Administrative Hearing; (2) granting NRSWA's application to renew Permit No. SC63-271982, as set forth in the draft permit--i.e., for merger and continued operation of all existing landfill operations, including NRSWA's Class III waste disposal permit, its permit for a waste tire collection center, and its permit for the bioreactor landfill system on cells 1 and 2; and (3) denying NRSWA's request for attorney fees and costs from Petitioner under Section 120.595(1) and Section 403.312(2)(f). Jurisdiction is reserved to enter a final order on NRSWA's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs under Section 120.569(2)(e), to the extent that it has been preserved. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Paul Still Route 4 Box 1297H Starke, Florida 32091 Jonathan F. Wershow, Esquire Post Office Box 1260 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Office of General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David B. Struhs, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether the Respondent, Roy Palmer, is entitled to a Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit, under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-341, and a Consent of Use under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 18-21.
Findings Of Fact Procedural History On or about February 13, 1995, the Respondent, Roy Palmer (Palmer), applied for a wetland resource permit to construct a 395-foot boat dock for use at his single-family residence at property he owned on Sarasota Bay, an Outstanding Florida Water. As proposed, this dock was to originate from the northern part of Palmer's property and have a terminal platform with two boat moorings and two boat lifts. On September 1, 1995, the Department of Environmental Protection (the Department or DEP) gave notice of intent to issue a permit for a shorter (370-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging the intended action. DEP referred the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 95-5311. On or about December 11, 1995, Palmer applied for a noticed general environmental resource permit (ERP) permit for his dock under new DEP rules went into effect on October 3, 1995. This proposal was for the 370-foot dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. On or about January 10, 1996, DEP acknowledged receipt of the noticed general ERP (No. 582819483) and informed Palmer that it appeared to meet the requirements of the new rule. DEP also gave notice of intent to grant Palmer's application for consent of use of sovereign submerged lands necessary to construct the dock. (The record is not clear when the application for consent of use was filed.) The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging agency action regarding both the noticed general ERP and the consent of use. DEP also referred this petition to DOAH, where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 96-0736. Palmer withdrew the original permit application and moved to dismiss DOAH Case No. 95-5311. In July, 1996, Palmer applied for a noticed general ERP to build a still shorter (232-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property (Permit No. 292583). Apparently, no notice of the application was published or required to be published. It is not clear whether the Petitioners "filed a written request for notification of any pending applications affecting the particular area in which the proposed activity is to occur." Palmer's second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) was amended on or about August 19, 1996, to eliminate one boat mooring and one boat lift. DEP took no action on Palmer's second application for a noticed general ERP No. 292583. On September 23, 1996, Palmer filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Administrative Proceeding in DOAH Case No. 96-0736 because he had withdrawn the previous application for a noticed general ERP for a 370-foot dock (No. 582819483) and was proceeding only on the second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) for the 232foot dock. Palmer's intent was to dismiss only the portion of his prior application regarding the noticed general permit, but not the consent of use. On October 28, 1996, the Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging noticed general ERP No. 292583 for the 232-foot dock. This petition alleged that the Petitioners filed a written objection to noticed general ERP No. on September 16, 1996, which requested a written response, and that no response of any kind was received until the Petitioners inquired and were told that DEP did not intend to respond to either the noticed general ERP (No. 292583) or the Petitioners' objection. Proposed Dock at Issue The proposal at issue is for a 227-foot access pier and 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform with only one boat mooring and one boat lift. The length, location, and design of Palmer's proposed dock was changed in an attempt to satisfy the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP or the Department) and Palmer's neighbors. Palmer's task in this regard was difficult in part because a longer dock with a terminus in deeper water could have less impact on seagrasses (the major environmental concern) but would have a greater impact on the neighbors' views of Sarasota Bay (the major infringement of riparian rights concern.) In the final version, Palmer tried to balance these conflicting concerns. As proposed, neither the terminal platform, boat lift, nor mooring location occurs over submerged grassbeds, coral communities or wetlands. Starting at the mean high water line, the first 75 feet of the access pier for the proposed dock will traverse essentially no sea grasses. In the next 75 feet to 150 feet of the access pier, there will be approximately 80% vegetative cover consisting primarily of the seagrass halodule wrightii. Between 150 feet and 200 feet, there will be approximately 20% vegetative cover consisting of the seagrasses halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. Between 200 feet and 232 feet, seagrasses consisted primarily of thalassia testudinum, except that the terminal platform is located in an area of essentially bare sand. Starting at 80 feet from the mean high water line, the access pier for the proposed dock will ramp up to 5 feet above mean high water for the next 20 linear feet and continue at that elevation for the next 112 feet to reduce shading of the seagrasses. Then it will descend stairs for the next 5 linear feet, until it is 3.5 feet above mean high water, and will continue at that elevation for 10 more feet to where it joins the 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform. In this way, wherever it traverses seagrasses, the access walkway portion of the pier will be elevated 5 feet above mean high water. The access walkway will be only 4 feet wide and will have half-inch wide gaps between its deck boards to allow sunlight through and further reduce shading of the seagrasses. The access walkway also will have handrails that are maintained in such a manner as to prevent use of the access walkways for boat mooring or access. As proposed, the terminal platform and boat lift occurs in a location with minimum depth of 2.2 feet below the mean low water level. There is some water 1.7 feet deep in the vicinity of the terminal platform, but the structure can be used without traversing the shallow water. The structure is designed so that boat mooring and navigational access will be in water at least 2 feet deep. Including access pier and terminal platform, the total area of Palmer's proposed dock over sovereign, submerged land would be 1,008 square feet. There will be no wet bars or living quarters over wetlands or surface waters or on the pier, and there will be no structures enclosed by walls or doors. There will be no fish cleaning facilities, boat repair facilities or equipment, or fueling facilities on the proposed dock. No overboard discharges of trash, human, or animal waste, or fuel will occur from the dock. The only dredging or filling associated with construction of Palmer's proposed dock will be the minimum dredge and fill required for installation of the actual pilings for the pier, terminal platform, and boat lift. Altogether, less than 30 square feet of bay bottom will be disturbed during construction and displaced to accommodate the pilings. Palmer's noticed general ERP is subject to the general conditions set out in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 341.427. Among those conditions is the requirement that Palmer implement best management practices for erosion, turbidity, and other pollution control to prevent violation of state water quality standards. The pilings will be jetted, not driven, into place to minimize disturbance of the bay bottom and temporary increases in turbidity. Turbidity barriers will be installed and maintained in a functional condition at each piling until construction is completed and soils are stabilized and vegetation has been established. Used properly, turbidity barriers have proved effective in containing temporary turbidity from dock construction. Based on the expert testimony, it is found that the construction of Palmer's proposed dock will not significantly impact seagrasses. The Petitioners presented expert testimony on seagrasses, but their expert testified only generally based on studies showing that shading negatively impacts seagrasses. He had no prior knowledge of the Palmer dock design, seagrass coverage, or the depth of the water. When apprised of some information concerning Palmer's proposed dock, he admitted that the studies involved far more severe shading conditions than would be caused by the proposed dock. He could not testify that the Palmer dock design would harm seagrasses, with the exception of those actually removed by the installation of the pilings. Accidental boat propeller dredging in using a dock can be a secondary impact on seagrasses from dock construction. But while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of damage to seagrasses from accidental prop dredging. Petitioners Dr. Franklin Pfeiffenberger, James Castoro, and Winifred Castoro jointly own a dock to the south of the Palmer property. This dock, which was built in the 1930's, projects 190 feet into Sarasota Bay and traverses seagrasses. Unlike the proposed Palmer dock, the Pfeiffenberger dock is not elevated, and it terminates in seagrasses. The seagrasses under the Pfeiffenberger dock are the same types as those located in the Palmer dock alignment--a combination of halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. The dock has been rebuilt a number of times over the years. Upon physical inspection, apparently healthy and growing seagrasses were found underneath the Pfeiffenberger dock. The proposed dock will not harm wildlife, including manatees (the only endangered species in the area, animal or plant). Manatees use Sarasota Bay in general, but the east side of the bay, where the Palmer property is located, is not a high use area. It is shallow and would not be considered "select" habitat for manatees. The proposed dock would not have any detrimental effect on manatee travel patterns; they could easily swim around the dock. Manatees eat seagrasses and other aquatic vegetation, but the proposed dock will not have significant adverse impact on those resources. Finally, while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of injury to manatees in the area from boat collisions and prop scarring. Except for temporary turbidity during construction, no other water quality parameters will be violated as a result of the construction of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock and its use will not significantly impede navigability in Sarasota Bay. The bay is approximately 18,000 feet wide at that point, and it is approximately 4,800 feet from Palmer's property to the Intracoastal Waterway. Since the water is shallow near shore in the vicinity of the Palmer property, relatively few boats frequent the area. Those that do are generally smaller boats. These boats easily could navigate so as to avoid the dock; very small boats, such as canoes and kayaks, might even be able to carefully pass under the elevated portion of the dock. Palmer's proposed dock also would not be a serious impediment to other recreational uses of Sarasota Bay in the area. The water is too shallow for swimming. Fishing could improve because the dock could attract baitfish. People could continue to wade-fish by walking around or even under the proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock is aesthetically consistent with the area in which it is located. All the Petitioners have some sort of man-made structure projecting out into Sarasota Bay from their property. As already mentioned, Dr. Pfeiffenberger and the Castoros have a 190-foot dock projecting straight out into Sarasota Bay. Within the past five years, Dr. Pfeiffenberger has installed a bench to sit on at the end of the dock. To the north of the Palmer property, property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Cabaniss has a yacht basin formed by a sea wall that projects roughly perpendicular to the shoreline out into the bay. Immediately north of the Cabaniss property, there is a boat house on the Goldman property where it abuts the yacht basin. The Goldmans' boat house is approximately 20 feet in length and 10 feet in height from ground level. Immediately south of the Palmer property, Ms. Stenhouse has a small dock (which appears to be located over seagrasses.) As a result, the viewsheds of Palmer and the Petitioners already contain many docks and man- made structures. In addition, the Ringling Causeway and bridge can be seen from all of these properties. Palmer's proposed dock will appear in some views from the Petitioners' properties. Generally, the closer the neighbor, the more will be seen of Palmer's proposed dock. Some of the Petitioners will only be able to see the proposed dock if they go out to the westerly edge of their properties on the bay. While the proposed dock will appear in and alter these views, it will not eliminate any Petitioner's view of Sarasota Bay. Even the closest neighbors will have some unobstructed views around the proposed dock. It also will be possible to see over and under the proposed dock, similar to the way in which many of the Petitioners now enjoy their views. There are tall pine and palm trees on the Cabaniss property between their house and their view of the bay. Most of the other properties in the vicinity appear to have similar viewsheds. Ms. Stenhouse has a large stand of mangroves of the western edge of her property; they cover approximately 60 percent of the panorama from her house, but they are trimmed up so she can see through them. While some people would prefer not to have the Palmer dock there, other people might view the availability of single- family residential docks to be an asset to the properties in the neighborhood. Based on expert testimony, it cannot be found that property values in the area would go down as a result of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock does little if anything to further the idealistic goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan to restore and expand seagrasses in Sarasota Bay in that the proposed dock will eliminate some seagrasses. However, only approximately 30 square feet of seagrasses will be lost. Otherwise, the proposed dock is consistent with other goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan in that the dock has been aligned and planned so as to minimize impacts on seagrasses while balancing the neighbors' desire to minimize the impact on their views of Sarasota Bay. Palmer's Riparian Rights Palmer and his wife received a Warranty Deed, dated August 27, 1993, from James Kirk, II, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Marie Ferguson. The deed describes Lots 27 and 28 of the Indian Beach subdivision in Sarasota, Florida, with a western boundary "along the shores of Sarasota Bay." Palmer attached this deed to his applications. Since at least November 1992, the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay has been west of a seawall on the Palmer property. The evidence was clear that the seawall has been there since at least 1944 and that Palmer has not filled the area to the west of the seawall or built any structure that influences its existence. The evidence was not clear as to the creation and history of upland to the west of the seawall. From aerial photographs, it appears that at least some upland has existed to the west of the seawall at least from time to time for at least the last 30 years. For reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers also received a Warranty Deed from Kirk, dated September 3, 1993, purporting to convey title only up to the seawall on the Palmer property. Likewise for reasons no witness could explain, a land surveyor named Lawrence R. Weber prepared a boundary survey based on the description in the September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed. Also for reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers received a Quit Claim Deed from Kirk, dated October 20, 1993. This instrument quitclaimed to the Palmers "all of the Grantor's property to the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay, including riparian rights." Except for the mysterious September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed from Kirk, all deeds in the chain of title back to at least 1944 reflect an intention to convey riparian rights. A deed given by Helen and Frederick Delaute to Cecilia and Harold Wilkins, dated April 19, 1944, described the westerly boundary of the property as running northerly along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced riparian rights. (This deed attached a survey showing the still-existing seawall.) The next deed in the chain of title was from the widowed Cecilia S. Wilkins to Edward and Laura Williams dated December 27, 1954. The metes and bounds description again referenced the westerly boundary as running along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Edward and Laura Williams to Aidan and Wilma E. Dewey dated June 30, 1958. This deed again defined the westerly boundaries of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Aidan and Wilma Dewey to Edward and Marie Ferguson dated August 23, 1967. This deed again defined the westerly boundary of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order issuing Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit (No. 292583) and Consent of Use (No. 582819483) to Roy Palmer. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Filson, Esquire Filson and Penge, P.A. 2727 South Tamiami Trail, Suite 2 Sarasota, Florida 34239 Thomas I. Mayton, Esquire T. Andrew Zodrow, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David M. Levin, Esquire Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg Post Office Box 4195 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Alexandra St. Paul, Esquire The Riverview Center 1111 3rd Avenue, West Suite 350 Bradenton, Florida 34205 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue is whether to approve an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) modification for the construction of a surface water management system, to be issued to Respondent, Miromar Lakes, LLC (Miromar), which will serve a 29.08-acre single- family residential development known as The Peninsula Phase IV (Phase IV) located in Lee County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Miromar is a Florida limited liability corporation that owns property in the Miromar Lakes community in Lee County on which a development known as Phase IV will be constructed. Miromar is the applicant for the Phase IV permit. The District is a government entity with the power and duty to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over the proposed project pursuant to part IV, chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and title 40E, Florida Administrative Code. In implementing this power and duty, the District has adopted the Applicant's Handbook (AH) to provide standards and guidance to applicants. Alico is a Florida limited liability corporation with its principal place of business in Fort Myers, Florida. It is the owner of property immediately adjacent to and north of Miromar's property. Respondents have stipulated to the facts necessary to establish Alico's standing. The Conceptual Permit This case concerns Miromar's application to modify a conceptual permit issued by the District more than 15 years ago. On June 10, 1999, the District issued ERP Permit No. 36-03568-P, a conceptual approval permit for the development of a large, mixed-use residential development with a golf course, known as Miromar Lakes, that lies east of Interstate 75 (I-75), south of Alico Road, and north of Florida Gulf Coast University. The permit also approved a surface water management system designed to serve a 1481.1-acre mixed-use development within Miromar Lakes. Alico asserts that the permit is so vague in future development details that it is impossible to determine whether Phase IV is consistent with its terms and conditions. However, the 1999 permit was not contested, and any attempt in this proceeding to challenge that permit, or subsequent modifications to the permit that are now final, is untimely. A conceptual permit is available to applicants who wish to have their design concept approved for a master plan or future plan. So long as the future phases are consistent with the conceptual permit and there are no changes to applicable state water quality standards or special basin criteria, the applicant does not need to reapply under the current rules for subsequent phases. Instead, it allows an applicant to take advantage of the rules in effect at the time of the original permit issuance. A conceptual permit typically leaves construction details to future development decisions. As District witness Waterhouse explained, this is "the nature of a conceptual permit." Because the landowner does not know the precise manner in which the property will be developed years down the road, "it doesn't make sense to force the landowner to pretend that they do because it's a pretty good bet that those things are going to change to some extent in the future." By way of example, Waterhouse noted that "[a]s long as it's single family proposed then and it's proposed now, I would characterize that as sufficient detail." It is not surprising, then, that the 1999 permit contains very little detail regarding the existence, location, or development of roads, lots, a stormwater management system, or grading, and that the construction permit for Phase IV has far more detail than the conceptual permit. Even Alico's expert agreed that there is no requirement that a conceptual permit include the details of each subsequent construction phase. A fair inference to draw is that the District intended for the developer to have considerable latitude in developing the large tract of undeveloped land, phase by phase, over the life of the conceptual permit. The 1999 permit has been modified over 60 times since its issuance, and to date, significant portions of Miromar Lakes have been constructed. Except for the current, on-going feud between Miromar and Alico over several recent or pending applications (see Case Nos. 15-1050, 15-3937, and 15-5621), none of these modifications were contested. The Property at Issue Phase IV is a 29.08-acre subdivision within an area of the Miromar Lakes community known as the Peninsula. Located within Basin 6, Phase IV is the last phase of development approved by the conceptual permit for residential development in the Peninsula. All prior Peninsula phases have been permitted and developed, or are in the process of development. Prior phases were permitted based on their consistency with the conceptual permit, and none were challenged by third parties. The area under Miromar's requested permit in the instant case was conceptually authorized for single-family residential development. This is confirmed by language in the 1999 permit, which describes the conceptual proposal for Basin 6 as "includ[ing] 639.7 acres of residential, golf course, and mixed-used [sic] development." Jt. Ex. 3, p. 275. The permit also provides that each of the four sub-basins in Basin 6 should "have a water quality structure that provides treatment for the first one inch of stormwater runoff from the sub-basin . . . and that attenuation for Basin 6 is achieved onsite via the proposed sub-basin lakes and also by an existing 244.2-acre borrow lake." Id. While the 1999 permit establishes standards for flood control elevations, minimum lot elevations, and discharge rates, more specific development guidance is not provided. When the conceptual permit was issued, Basin 6 contained one former mining pit dredged from uplands to be used as a man-made lake for recreational purposes. A second mining pit, later converted to a lake, continued mining operations until 2006. The following year, the District authorized the two borrow lakes to be connected by a series of channels and canals, forming a privately-owned, 660-acre waterbody now known as Lake 5/6. Alico's property includes Lake 5, which makes up the northern portion of Lake 5/6, while Lake 6 to the south, owned by the Miromar Lakes Community Development District, is surrounded by Miromar's development. Alico has an easement over portions of Lake 6 for recreational uses under a Lake Use Agreement. Because the two connected lakes are to be used only for recreation and attenuation purposes, Lake 5/6 is designated as Class III waters and cannot be used for stormwater treatment. It is not classified as an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW) or an Impaired Florida Waterbody. Lake 5/6 discharges over a control weir into an un- channeled slough system known as the Stewart Cypress Slough. The water travels several miles through the slough system, passes several intervening properties that also discharge waters into the slough, and then runs underneath I-75. It eventually reaches the Estero River, an OFW and Impaired Florida Waterbody, which flows into the Estero Bay, an OFW. There is no direct discharge of waters from Lake 5/6 to the Estero River. The evidence shows that the project will not increase the overall discharge rate from the control weir for Lake 5/6. In February 2013, the District approved another Miromar application, known as Phase III, which authorized the third phase of development within the same peninsula where the Phase IV project will be located. That development contains two wet detention structures (Lakes 1 and 3) that will also service the Phase IV project. The Phase III permit was issued using the 1999 rules and regulations and was not contested. The Application The Original Application On November 25, 2014, the District issued its notice of intent to issue Miromar a permit authorizing the construction and operation of a stormwater system serving 29.08 acres of residential development that included multi-family residences, single-family residences, 49 boat slips, and road construction. Phase IV is a very small portion of the 1,481-acre development approved in the conceptual permit. The project is located on Via Salerno Way and Via Cassina Court within Basin 6. Construction was originally proposed in Sub-Basins 1 and 3. There is an approved Master Plan for stormwater management facilities within the project area. The site was previously cleared and filled and no wetlands are located on the site. The original construction in Sub-Basin 1 consisted of a roadway, 22 single-family residential lots, and stormwater conveyance facilities. Also included were shoreline contour shaping, placement of rip-rap on portions of the Lake 5/6 shoreline to enhance stability, enhanced littoral zones, and boat docks. Stormwater within that Sub-Basin flows via sheet flow and interconnected inlets to the existing wet detention area (Lake 1) located in Phase III north of the site. The wet detention area provides the required water quality treatment volume for the project prior to discharge to Lake 5/6. The original proposed construction in Sub-Basin 3 consisted of a roadway, 11 single-family residential lots, and 16 multi-family buildings with associated internal roadway, parking areas, and stormwater treatment, storage, and conveyance facilities. Also included within the original plans were shoreline contour shaping, placement of rip-rap on portions of Lake 5/6 shoreline to enhance stability, enhanced littoral zones, and boat docks. Stormwater runoff within Sub-Basin 3 flows via sheet flow and interconnected inlets to the existing wet detention area (Lake 3) located in Phase III north of the site. The original application included a request to increase the surface area of Lake 3 by approximately 0.1 acre and to construct three dry detention areas within the multi-family development area. The wet and dry detention areas provide the required water quality treatment for the project prior to discharge to Lake 5/6. The Revised Project After the case was referred to DOAH, by letter dated June 8, 2015, Miromar's project engineer provided the District with proposed changes to the site plan, to be used at the final hearing then scheduled to begin on June 24, 2015, which include the replacement of 16 multi-family buildings and driveways on Via Cassina Court with 23 single-family residential lots; removal of the 16 multi-family boat docks located at the southern end of Via Cassina Court; reducing the number of boat docks to 45 single-family docks; relocation of the three dry detention areas shown on the proposed site plan; and clarification of the lot grading cross-section to ensure that stormwater runoff from the development will be directed to the stormwater management system and not Lake 5/6. Updated plans, drawings, and specifications, and new water quality calculations accompanied the letter and were intended to replace original Exhibits 2.0 and 2.3 of the permit. See Jt. Ex. JA-1, pp. 244- 257. The changes resulted in a continuance of the final hearing and Alico's filing of an Amended Petition. By amendment at final hearing, Miromar removed the 45 single-family docks. The June 8 letter states that the changes will not increase pollution or reduce the efficiency of the stormwater management system. Miromar acknowledges that some of these changes were to resolve concerns raised by Alico. Miromar now seeks approval of the Phase IV permit, incorporating the changes proposed by the June 8 letter and those agreed to at the final hearing. Because there was no requirement to provide a site- specific nutrient loading analysis when the 1999 permit was issued -- this analysis was not yet formally developed -- the District did not require, and Miromar did not submit, such an analysis with its application. Under the conceptual permit, Miromar was required to provide treatment for one inch of stormwater runoff in Basin 6. Relying on this condition, Miromar applied that treatment to the Phase IV permit. This results in the treatment of 7.09 acre- feet of stormwater for the basin. After the construction shown in the permit, the stormwater management system will treat 9.21 acre-feet, or more than is required under the 1999 permit. The District established that new flood routing calculations for the project were not necessary because Miromar has set elevations for the water control structures in Lakes 1 and 3 at the same level as the road elevations, and the project connects to an existing surface water treatment system. This provides reasonable assurance that the project will not cause flooding despite having no calculations from the applicant. Alico's Objections Although couched in different terms, Alico's concerns can be generally summarized as follows. First, it contends the application should be treated as a major modification of the conceptual permit and that Miromar must satisfy current rules and regulations, and not those in effect in 1999. Second, it contends both the original and revised applications are inconsistent with the conceptual permit and must be treated as a new design, subject to all current rules and regulations. Third, even though Miromar agreed at hearing to revise its permit to address certain errors/deficiencies identified by Alico's experts, Alico contends no revisions can be made at this stage of the proceeding, and that a new application must be filed with the District and the review process started anew. Is the Application a Major or Minor Modification? If the modification is minor, Miromar is required only to satisfy applicable rules for issuance of a permit when the conceptual permit was issued. Rule 62-330.315 and AH section 6.2.1 provide guidance in resolving this issue. Rule 62-330.315(2)(g) defines a minor modification as one "that do[es] not substantially alter the permit authorization, increase permitted off-site discharge, increase the environmental impact of the project, decrease required retention, decrease required detention, decrease required flood control elevations, or decrease pollution removal efficiency." The rule also provides that the "factors that will be considered in determining whether a change is minor are described in section 6.2.1 of Volume I [of the Applicant's Handbook]." Section 6.2.1(d) lists a series of 14 factors to be considered in determining whether a modification will cause more than minor changes under rule 62-330.315(2). None of the factors is dispositive alone, and the presence of any single one of the factors does not necessarily mean that a modification is major. All 14 factors are considered together in determining whether a modification is major. Using the factors set forth in rule 62-330.315(2), in conjunction with section 6.2.1, the District reviewed the application to determine whether it was a minor modification. Based on these criteria, the District determined that the application qualified as a minor modification of a conceptual permit and that it satisfied applicable rules for issuance of a permit for this subsequent phase of the project. Alico contends that the initial review by a District staffer was only cursory and was in no way a meaningful assessment. Even if this is true, subsequent reviews by District staff, including witness Waterhouse, who supervises the ERP Bureau, was a signatory on the 1999 permit, and has reviewed thousands of ERP applications, confirmed that the application, as revised on June 8 and at final hearing, meets the criteria for a minor modification. The testimony of District witnesses Waterhouse and Waters has been accepted as being the most credible on this issue. In its review of the original application, the District considered the inclusion of boat docks as the only aspect of the application that made the project a major modification. In all other respects, the District determined that the modification would not cause more than minor changes. With the removal of the boat docks, the District concluded that the application did not substantially alter the design of the activities or the conditions of the conceptual approval permit. Alico's expert, who has never performed a similar consistency analysis on any project, testified that several of the 14 factors in section 6.2.1(d) might be affected. But he opined with certitude that factor 2 is implicated by the Phase IV permit. Factor 2 comes into play when there is an "[i]ncrease in proposed impervious and semi-impervious surfaces more than 10 percent or 0.5 acres, whichever is less, unless the activities were permitted with stormwater treatment and flood attenuation capability sufficient to meet the permitting requirements for the proposed modification." By citing only one factor, the expert implicitly conceded that the other 13 factors are not present, thus weighing towards a finding of consistency. Alico's expert focused only on the first part of factor 2 by calculating the impervious area of the project, as he did not believe the conceptual permit approved a master stormwater management system capable of sufficiently meeting the treatment and attenuation requirements for the Phase IV project. However, the more persuasive evidence is that the Master Plan in the 1999 permit is capable of meeting the treatment and attenuation requirements for the project. Therefore, factor 2 is not implicated by the Phase IV permit. Even if the factor were present, it would be insufficient to outweigh the other 13 factors and render the project a major modification of the 1999 permit. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the District may consider as minor the revised application. Consistency with the Conceptual Permit A consistency analysis is conducted under two related rules. First, rule 62-330.315 identifies when a subsequent permit is either a major or minor modification of a prior conceptual permit. As found in the previous section of this Recommended Order, the modification is minor. Second, rule 62- 330.056 provides a rebuttable presumption that subsequent consistent development phases are likely to meet the applicable rules and regulations if the factors listed in subsections (7)(a) through (7)(d) are met. The primary factors for consistency comparison are identified in subsection (7)(a) as "the size, location and extent of the activities proposed, the type and nature of the activities, percent imperviousness, allowable discharge and points of discharge, location and extent of wetland and other surface water impacts, mitigation plans implemented or proposed, control elevations, extent of stormwater reuse, detention and retention volumes, and the extent of flood elevations." Subsections (7)(b) and (c) provide that in order to have consistency, there can be no changes to state water quality standards, in this case the standards for Lake 5/6, or special basin criteria. There is no evidence that applicable state water quality standards or special basin criteria have changed. Finally, subsection (7)(d) requires that there can be no substantive changes to the site characteristics. Except for the conceptual permit, there is no requirement that the District compare the Phase IV permit with any other permit. The District views the location and the land use type of the project as the two most important criteria for determining consistency. As required by the rule, the District also compares the environmental impacts of the modification to the conceptual permit, control elevations, and discharge rates. The District credibly determined there is no inconsistency. While some site characteristics in Basin 6 have obviously changed over the last 16 years, the District's review found no substantive changes that would affect whether the design concepts approved in the conceptual approval permit can continue to be reasonably expected to meet the conditions for authorizing construction of future phases. The District credibly determined that the activities in Phase IV, as revised, were similar to or less intensive than those authorized in the conceptual approval permit and may actually provide a net benefit to Lake 5/6. Alico contends that a meaningful consistency analysis was not conducted by the District staffer who reviewed the original application. But subsequent reviews by witnesses Waterhouse and Waters confirmed that Phase IV, as revised, is consistent with the conceptual permit based upon the rule and AH criteria. Besides the District's review, Miromar's expert testified that Phase IV is consistent in land use as a single- family residential development. He also testified that the Phase IV permit was consistent with the 1999 permit in size and location; it maintained the same allowable rate of stormwater discharge; and it maintained required flood control elevations. He further testified that the Phase IV permit did not change the mitigation plans, permitted stormwater reuse, flood routings, or storm stages provided by the 1999 permit. This testimony has been credited in resolving the issue. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the Phase IV land uses are the same as contemplated in the conceptual permit and the already-approved prior phases of Miromar Lakes, and the new permit is consistent with the conceptual permit. Therefore, Miromar is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that it meets the applicable rules and standards in place when the 1999 permit was issued. Alico failed to rebut this presumption. Revisions and Amendments at the Final Hearing During the final hearing, Alico's experts identified several errors and/or deficiencies in the design of Miromar's project, described below, that should be addressed before a permit can be issued. Miromar agrees with some of these concerns and asks that they be addressed through revisions incorporated into its permit. The District also concurs with these changes. The record shows that they are appropriate, minor in nature, and do not change the character of the permit. There is no evidence that Alico is prejudiced by allowing these revisions. Alico's expert testified that the Phase IV permit does not provide sufficient information regarding the soils on the Phase IV site. At hearing, Miromar agreed that any unsuitable soils discovered during construction would be excavated and removed and correctly disposed of in a landfill or other uplands. This is the common method of dealing with soils in Lee County, where it is not unusual to find unsuitable soils during construction. A special condition to this effect should be included in the final permit to ensure clarity. Through a series of treatment ponds, Miromar proposes to treat nearly all stormwater that falls on-site prior to its discharge to off-site properties. Alico's expert testified that the lot grading detail drawings inaccurately reflect the elevations of certain portions of the lots and can result in runoff from some lots being routed to Lake 5/6, instead of Lakes 1 and 3. Miromar agrees with this concern and represented that the intent of the June 8 letter is that drainage for all lots, except for the portion of lots within the 20-foot Lake Maintenance Easement (LME), which surrounds the project on three sides, be directed to the front of the lots toward the street, and then to the treatment ponds. Water that falls naturally within the LME will be treated by attenuation in Lake 5/6 prior to off-site discharge. Miromar also agrees to submit new Tabular Lot Grading Revisions and a new Typical Lot Grading Detail and to update its June 8 plans to reflect proposed lot grading elevations consistent with the lot detail. Alico's expert acknowledged that roof gutters are an additional solution, and they should be installed on all roofs in order to direct runoff to the front yards and then to the stormwater system. Finally, to ensure proper lot drainage, Miromar agrees that the secondary drainage pipes to convey runoff from roofs, gutters, and grassed areas will have a minimum size of six inches. The District agrees that these changes will improve water quality and ensure that all stormwater is properly captured and directed into the stormwater system. A special condition requiring these revisions should be included in the final permit to ensure clarity. Alico's expert also testified that the plans should include a requirement that Miromar follow best management practices (BMPs) for the replacement of a control structure in Lake 3, which serves as a stormwater treatment pond. General Condition 3 already addresses this issue by requiring Miromar to use BMPs that prevent adverse impacts to the water resources and adjacent lands. In addition, the June 8 letter provides plans for BMPs for work at the site, including Lake 3. Although the District found that reasonable assurances were provided by General Condition 3 and the June 8 letter, to ensure clarity, a special condition should be included in the final permit that requires the use of BMPs for all construction, including the replacement of an old boat ramp and the control structure in Lake 3. Miromar and the District agree that this revision is appropriate. Alico's expert opined that control structures CS-1 (Lake 1) and WQS-1.3 (Lake 3), which have a circular bleeder orifice with a four-inch diameter, should be limited to a bleeder orifice of 3.7 inches in diameter. Although the District found reasonable assurances existed with four-inch bleeder orifices, Special Condition 3 should be modified to reflect a 3.7-inch bleeder for these control structures. This will ensure that before being discharged, the water leaving the two control structures receives the appropriate amount of water quality treatment. Both Miromar and the District agree that this revision is appropriate. With the removal of all docks and an old boat ramp, Special Conditions 2, 10, 11, and 13 through 17 require modification, or deletion if necessary, to eliminate obsolete language relating to the docks and ramp and to add language to provide that construction and operation of the docks shown on the plans, specifications, and drawings are not authorized. Miromar and the District agree to these revisions. Other Concerns Alico's expert contended that under current District rules, Miromar is required to provide stormwater treatment equal to the greater of (a) one inch multiplied by the total project acreage, and (b) 2.5 inches multiplied by the project's impervious area. However, Alico did not pursue this issue in its PRO, probably because its expert agrees that the current design of the project meets District rule criteria for one inch of water quality treatment. Alico's expert also contends that Miromar is required to provide an additional 50 percent of stormwater treatment above the one-inch requirement. This is contrary to the conceptual permit, which does not require additional stormwater treatment. Also, the requirement does not apply when there is no direct discharge of stormwater into an OFW. Even so, Miromar voluntarily agreed to increase the stormwater treatment capacity for Phase IV, which results in excess treatment in Basin 6 greater than 50 percent above the treatment required for the Phase IV area. Alico argues that the additional treatment is illusory, as it relies on additional treatment from an adjoining phase, and not Phase IV. Even if this is true, Alico's expert admits that the current one inch treatment meets the requirements of the rule for issuance of a permit. Alico's expert contended that the Phase IV permit allows the bulkhead to be developed on more than 40 percent of total shorelines, in contravention of AH section 5.4.2, Volume II, which restricts a bulkhead to no more than 40 percent of the lake perimeter. However, Miromar's expert established that the Phase IV hardened shorelines would comprise less than 40 percent of the total shoreline in the Phase IV area and therefore comply with this requirement. His testimony was not credibly refuted. Even though there is no direct discharge from the project into the Estero River or Estero Bay, and the project will not result in higher discharge rates from the overall system outfall from Lake 5/6, based on water samples taken in August 2015, Alico's expert opined that the project will cause a discharge of excess nutrients into an OFW. The evidence shows, however, that these water samples were taken after heavy rains when the expert observed water flowing upstream from the slough into Lake 5/6, rather than downstream. The expert also admitted he had done no testing, analysis, or modeling demonstrating that any pollutant would even reach the Estero River. He failed to take a baseline sample of water quality for any nutrients for which the slough, Estero River, or Estero Bay may be impaired, and he conceded that it was possible that there was no net discharge from Lake 5/6 into the slough during the time of his testing. There is insufficient evidence to sustain this allegation. Other alleged deficiencies or errors in the application, as revised, that are not addressed in this Recommended Order have been considered and found to be without merit. ERP and Public Interest Criteria The criteria the District uses when reviewing an ERP application are contained in the AH and rules 62-330.301 and 62-330.302. In addition, an applicant must provide reasonable assurance that a proposed project is not contrary to the public interest. § 373.414, Fla. Stat.; AH § 10.2.3. Alico failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Miromar has not provided reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the ERP comply with all applicable ERP permitting criteria. Alico failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Miromar has not provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project is not contrary to the public interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order approving Miromar's application, as revised, for a permit modification, subject to the following additional conditions: That the plans, drawings, and specifications submitted with the June 8 letter that appear in Joint Exhibit JA-1, pages 244-53, be used as Exhibit 2.0 of the permit. That the water quality calculations submitted with the June 8 letter that appear in Joint Exhibit JA-1, pages 254-57, be used as Exhibit 2.3 of the permit. That Special Conditions 2, 10, 11, and 13 through 17 be revised or eliminated to remove obsolete language relating to the removal of the boat docks and boat ramp. That Special Condition 10 be revised to require that all construction, including the removal of the boat ramp and replacement of Control Structure No. 3, be conducted using BMPs. That a new special condition be added to reflect that the construction and operation of docks will not be authorized by the permit. That a new special condition be added with new Tabular Lot Grading Revisions and a revised Typical Lot Grading Detail and address the following: the project shall be constructed to ensure that stormwater from the project, except stormwater from within the LME, is routed to the stormwater treatment system prior to discharge to Lake 5/6; the lot grading on all lots shall be in accordance with the revised lot grading to reflect the high point of the lots located adjacent to the LME to ensure that runoff from the lots is directed to Lakes 1 and 3; that the revised lot grading require the installation of six-inch secondary drainage pipes; and that roof gutters be installed on all roofs to ensure that runoff from the residential lots is directed to the stormwater treatment system. That a new special condition be added to address unsuitable soils encountered during construction and to ensure that they are removed and disposed of in an appropriate manner. That Special Condition 3, relating to discharge facilities, be revised to reflect that a 3.7-inch circular orifice will be installed in Sub-Basins 1 and 3, rather than a four-inch orifice shown in the existing plans. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Antonacci, Executive Director South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-3007 (eServed) Kevin S. Hennessy, Esquire Lewis Longman & Walker, P.A. Suite 620 101 Riverfront Boulevard Bradenton, Florida 34205-8841 (eServed) Brian J. Accardo, General Counsel South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-3007 (eServed) Keith L. Williams, Esquire South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-3007 (eServed) Martin L. Steinberg, Esquire Hogan Lovells US, LLP Suite 2700 600 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131-3085 (eServed) Timothy J. Perry, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed)
