The Issue The ultimate issue in this case is whether Janna Preissig is eligible for vocational rehabilitation benefits for which she has applied on three separate occasions. 1/ Ms. Preissig contends that she is eligible. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter "the Department" or "DHRS") contends that Ms. Preissig is ineligible on the grounds that vocational rehabilitation services may not reasonably be expected to render Ms. Preissig fit to engage in a gainful occupation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following finds of fact: The Petitioner, Ms. Janna Preissig, most recently applied for vocational rehabilitation services on January 17, 1984. Ms. Preissig applied for such benefits twice before, once in 1982 and once in 1983. Both of her prior applications were denied. Ms. Preissig is a 32-year-old, single, white, female with a long history of unsuccessful efforts at employment corresponding to a long history of mental problems. Her only period of regular employment was a three and one-half year period during which she was in the U.S. Army working as a supply clerk. She has obtained numerous other jobs from time to time, but is always fired after a short period of time due to her mental condition. Since childhood Ms. Preissig has suffered from severe mental problems. As early as age thirteen she was hospitalized for psychiatric problems for approximately one year. During the hospitalization she was subjected to at least 20 electrical shock treatments. She believes that some of her current problems are the result of the electrical shock treatments. Ms. Preissig has a long history of both inpatient and outpatient treatment for psychiatric disorders since her initial hospitalization at age thirteen. In addition to her difficulties in retaining employment, Ms. Preissig also has difficulties with social adjustment. She has a long history of vagrancy. Ms. Preissig has a long history of being uncooperative with treatment plans. She has been discharged from inpatient treatment because of disruptive conduct which interfered with the treatment of other patients. She has been suspended from outpatient treatment programs for breaking rules. She has a poor attendance record at outpatient treatment programs. She also has a negative attitude towards the treatment programs she has been exposed to and does not believe she is likely to receive any benefit from the treatment programs which have been recommended for her. Due to the nature of Ms. Preissig's mental condition and her uncooperative attitude towards the treatment which has been recommended for her and made available to her, the prognosis for significant improvement in her present condition is poor. Her present condition was summarized as follows by Dr. Michael C. Berg: She is at present, and previously, quite unable to hold gainful employment because of the presence of severe mental impairment, paranoia, which is long-standing and with a poor prognosis. Not only is she unemployable, but she lacks the basic living and social skills necessary for an independent life without some supervision, structure, and assistance with accommodation. This condition will not, in my opinion, significantly improve over the next 12 months. As a result of Ms. Preissig's current mental condition, which is not expected to improve over the next twelve months (and which may last much longer if she fails to cooperate with the treatment program), she is not fit to engage in a gainful occupation. Further, because of Ms. Preissig's current mental condition, vocational rehabilitation services would not render her fit to engage in a gainful occupation. The sine qua non to her ability to engage in a gainful occupation is some significant improvement in her current mental condition.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order denying Ms. Janna Preissig's application for vocational rehabilitation services. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of October, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1984.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent holds a teaching certificate from the State of Florida and has been employed as a full-time teacher by the School Board of Dade County ("School Board") since the 1985/1986 school year. Respondent is certified in the areas of Mental Retardation and Special Learning Disabilities. During the 1990/1991 school year, Respondent was assigned as a special education teacher for autistic children at Thomas Jefferson Middle School (the "School"). Respondent was employed pursuant to a professional services contract. Respondent was previously employed by the Dade County Public Schools from March 1979 to April 1980. There is no evidence of any prior discipline taken against Respondent by the School Board. In April and May of 1991, Respondent was the classroom teacher for six autistic students at the School. D.H. was a seventeen year old ninth grade student enrolled in Respondent's class in April/May of 1991. D.H. is autistic and profoundly mentally retarded. He has extremely limited communication skills. D.H. suffers from a seizure disorder and often defecated in his pants during the school day. On these occasions, Respondent and/or her aides would be required to clean up the student and change his clothes. During the school day on May 1, 1991, D.H. defecated in his pants. While Respondent was cleaning him up, she became angry and began scolding him very loudly. After cleaning him and putting his pants back on, Respondent struck the student with a piece of wood (approximately 2" by 4") on his buttocks. Respondent returned to her desk for a few minutes then got up and struck the student twice more with the piece of wood. The classroom aides and students in the classroom witnessed the events. During the School Board's investigation into this incident, Respondent denied striking the student. At the hearing in this cause, Respondent admitted hitting the student on the buttocks with a ruler as an "attention getter." She claims that her actions were appropriate in view of the student's deficiencies in communication skills and she denies using any significant amount of force. The more persuasive evidence established that Respondent struck the child in a forceful manner in anger and/or frustration. After Respondent struck him, the student became very upset. He developed significant bruises and swelling as a result of Respondent striking him. Respondent contends that the student had bruises on his knees, legs and buttocks two days prior to the incident and the bruises observed by the student's parents and school officials were not related to her actions. This contention is rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. While the student may have had some minor bruises prior to the incident, the more persuasive evidence established that he suffered significant bruises as a result of the blows administered by Respondent. The School Board has adopted Rule 6Gx13-5D-1.07, Florida Administrative Code, entitled "CORPORAL PUNISHMENT - PROHIBITED". This rule provides, in part, as follows: The administration of corporal punishment in the Dade County Public Schools is strictly prohibited.... Respondent was aware of the School Board policy against administering corporal punishment to students. Respondent's acts constituted a violation of the School Board's corporal punishment policy and its rules on employee conduct. In addition, Respondent's excessive corporal punishment of the student created a condition harmful to learning, health or safety in the school. Because of the events of May 1, 1991, Respondent was transferred out of the classroom by the School Board pending review of her case by School Board Administrators. Respondent's effectiveness as a teacher in the school system has been impaired as a result of this incident. The Miami Herald, a newspaper circulated in the area, published an article on June 6, 1991 that described the incident and identified both the school and Respondent by name. Several parents of students at the school have voiced concern over the incident. Parents in the Autistic Society had a special meeting to discuss the incident and the safety of their children in the school system. Respondent was arrested and charged with aggravated child abuse, a second degree felony. Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge. The Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, accepted Respondent's plea of nolo contendere, withheld adjudication of guilt, and sentenced her to five years of probation. A special condition of her probation is that Respondent is not to teach retarded persons or children for five years.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which upholds the suspension of Respondent's employment without pay and which terminates her professional services contract on the grounds that she engaged in misconduct in office. RECOMMENDED this 17th day of July, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-6338 Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 5 and 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4, 12 and 13. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a Finding of Fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 9 and 11 and in the Conclusions of Law. The Respondents's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. 6-7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4, 5 and 6. 8. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14 and addressed in the Conclusions of Law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Sydney H. McKenzie, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Octavio J. Visiedo, Superintendent Dade County School Board 1450 N.E. Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Jerry Moore, Administrator Professional Practices Services 352 Florida Education Center 325 W. Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 William Du Fresne, Esquire Du Fresne and Bradley, P.A. 2992 S.W. Third Avenue Suite One Miami, Florida 33129 Copies furnished continued: Jaime Claudio Bovell, Esquire 75 Valencia Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33134
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent, the Orange County Convention Center, discriminated against Petitioner, Norman H. Siales, on the basis of a handicap within the meaning of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first employed by Respondent in October 2000 as a set-up worker on an on-call basis. In June 2001, Respondent hired Petitioner in a regular full-time position as a set-up worker. Throughout his employment with Respondent, Petitioner's supervisors considered him a good employee who always performed his job properly and did assigned tasks to the best of his ability. Petitioner was incarcerated on or about July 8, 2004. Shortly after his incarceration, Petitioner called Steve Miller, one of the assistant supervisors in the Event Set-Up Department, and informed him that he was in the county jail. Petitioner was then told that he should keep Respondent updated on his situation. On or about July 9, 2004, Mr. Miller advised Mr. Schildgen, his supervisor, that Petitioner had called and reported that he was incarcerated. After first learning that Petitioner was incarcerated, Mr. Schildgen never heard from Petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Schildgen asked the two shift supervisors if they had heard from Petitioner, and they indicated they had not. Mr. Schildgen considered Petitioner a good employee and wanted him to return to work. However, in late July or early August 2004, after not hearing from Petitioner for about three weeks, Mr. Schildgen, in consultation with the manager of the Event Set-Up Department, determined that Petitioner's continued absence from the workplace, without notice, was a violation of the Orange County policy. According to the policy, employees could be terminated from employment if they were absent from the workplace for three consecutive days without notice to the employer. At or near the time Petitioner was employed by Respondent, he received a copy of the Orange County Government Employee Handbook (on June 11, 2001). He also received training on the Orange County Policy Manual. Petitioner signed an Employee Acknowledgement (March 30, 2004) form stating that he had received the training. The Employee Acknowledgement form, signed by Petitioner, further stated "I understand that I am responsible for complying with all Policies, Operational Regulations, Departmental Operating Procedures, and Departmental Guidelines, and that the failure to do so may be grounds for corrective action, up to and including termination." As a result of the training described in paragraph 6, Petitioner was aware of the Orange County policy that authorized employees to be terminated if they were absent from work three consecutive days and did not notify Respondent. Based on Petitioner's extended absence from the workplace and his failure to communicate with his supervisors regarding the absences, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment. By letter dated August 26, 2004, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment with the Event Set-Up Department. The reason for Petitioner's termination was that he had not communicated with Respondent since July 8, 2004. The letter also stated, "while we understand there were some extenuating circumstances involving the Orange County Sheriff's Office, we can no longer wait to address this violation of . . . policy." According to the termination letter, the applicable policy provides the following: "Failure to work for three (3) or more consecutive working days without proper authorization shall be considered job abandonment and result in immediate termination, unless the employee presents written proof that he/she was unable to make appropriate notifications through no fault of his/her own." When he was first incarcerated, Petitioner thought he would be held for 24 to 48 hours. However, he was not released until December 3, 2004. After Petitioner was released from jail, he went to his employer and asked if he could return to work, but was told that he could not return due to his excessive and consecutive absences without notifying his employer. Petitioner had a psychological evaluation when he was incarcerated, and a psychological report dated October 11, 2004, was generated as a result of that evaluation. Petitioner did not offer the evaluation into evidence, but testified that the evaluation indicated he had a mental illness. However, this report and the findings and conclusions therein have no bearing on this case as the report was prepared after Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment. Respondent was unaware of the psychological evaluation or report until the final hearing. During his employment with Respondent, Petitioner never advised his supervisor that he had a disability. Petitioner testified that in 2002 or 2003, he asked his three supervisors to help him "with the grievances." At hearing, Petitioner explained that when he used the term "grievances" he meant the mental, psyche, and physiological abuses he was suffering. In early 2002, while employed with Respondent, Petitioner sent a letter to Mr. Schildgen. According to Petitioner, the letter was about "psychological and physiological experimentations of science and technology." Mr. Schildgen found the letter described in paragraph 17 to be somewhat "strange," but nothing in the letter stated that Petitioner had a handicap or disability. After receiving the letter, Mr. Schildgen and two other supervisors met with Petitioner and asked him about the letter. During the meeting with his supervisors, Petitioner broke out in a cold sweat and rather than talking about the letter, started talking about subjects such as "Sigmund Freud and other stuff [Mr. Schildger and the other two supervisors] and we didn't quite understand where it was going." At no time during the meeting did Petitioner state or indicate that he had a disability. Moreover, there was nothing in Petitioner's personnel file that indicated he had a disability. At no time during his employment with Respondent did Petitioner advise anyone there that he had a handicap or disability. Also, Respondent never knew or considered Petitioner to be handicapped or disabled. The sole basis for Petitioner's termination was his violation of Orange County's "absentee policy."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Norman H. Siales', Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Norman H. Siales Post Office Box 1772 Orlando, Florida 32802 P. Andrea DeLoach, Esquire Orange County Attorney's Office 435 North Orange Avenue, Suite 300 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue This is a rule challenge proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, in which Petitioner claims to be substantially affected by an agency statement that allegedly violates Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The subject matter at issue here concerns two sentences at page 11 of a pamphlet generated by Respondent, which is entitled "Florida's Educational Opportunities for Students with Sensory Impairments (2000)(the DOE Pamphlet)." The two sentences state that the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind (FSDB) is an available educational option for sensory-impaired children in Florida.
Findings Of Fact Background Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. Section 1400 (d)(1)(A). As a condition to IDEA funding, each state must have a policy in effect that executes the principal goal of the Act, which is to assure "all children with disabilities [have] the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. Section 1412(1). In 1997, Congress substantially amended IDEA. On March 12, 1999, regulations were published at Part B of Part 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), implementing the 1997 IDEA amendments. The IDEA, as amended, is implemented in Florida at Section 230.23(4)(m), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 6A-6, Florida Administrative Code. IDEA’s centerpiece is the "individualized education program" (IEP), which is a detailed statement "summarizing the child’s abilities, outlining the goals for the child’s education and specifying the services the child will receive." Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit, 853 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1988). The IEP provides special education and related services tailored to the child’s unique needs and designed to provide the child with a "free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. Sections 1401(8), 1414(d); 34 CFR Sections 300.13, 300.15, 300.344-300.347; Section 230.23(4)(m)5, Florida Statutes; Rule 6A-6.03028, Florida Administrative Code. A team including the child’s teachers, local education agency representatives and the child’s parents creates the IEP; 20 U.S.C. Section 1414(d)(1)(B); 34 CFR Section 300.344; Rule 6A-6.03028, Florida Administrative Code. Both IDEA and the parallel Florida Statute state that special education students should be educated with non-disabled peers "to the maximum extent appropriate," and that separate classes or schooling should be used if "the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." See 34 CFR Section 300.550 and Section 230.23(4)(m)6, Florida Statutes. Placement must be determined on a child-by-child basis. Section 230.23(4)(m), Florida Statutes, generally identifies the educational options available for sensory- impaired children in Florida, including FSDB. That statute is implemented in pertinent part by Respondent at Rules 6A-6.03014, and 6A-6.03022, Florida Administrative Code, which set school district admissions criteria for visually impaired and dual- sensory impaired children, respectively. One of the options listed in the statute is FSDB. Section 230.23(4)(m)3, Florida Statutes. Section 242.3305, Florida Statutes, states the "responsibilities and mission" for FSDB. In pertinent part, it provides that FSDB educates "hearing-impaired and visually impaired students in the state who meet enrollment criteria." Rule 6D-3.002, Florida Administrative Code, implements that statute by setting forth the "Admission and Enrollment Requirements" for FSDB. The DOE Pamphlet was generated in 1997, and amended in 2000, to explain the special education options available to parents of sensory-impaired school-age children in Florida. The Parties Petitioner is a nine-year-old student who is legally blind and otherwise developmentally impaired. He resides in St. Johns County, Florida, and attends classes for the sensory- impaired offered by the St. Johns County School District. His parents moved from Belize in September, 1999, for the express purpose of enrolling Petitioner at FSDB. Respondent is the head of the state agency that published the DOE Pamphlet. FSDB is a state school that, pursuant to Section 242.3305, Florida Statutes, maintains a residential program for educating sensory-impaired children in Florida. The Factual Background The Petition asserts that Petitioner’s parents moved to St. Johns County in 1999, where they "chose to enroll the Petitioner in the . . . FSDB . . . as described in the DOE Pamphlet." The Petition notes that FSDB declined to accept Petitioner. The Petition further states Petitioner then filed multiple due process petitions pursuant to Section 232.23(4)(m), Florida Statutes, which "yielded an offer by FSDB that the Petitioner be evaluated over an extended period in a temporary assignment at FSDB." Thereafter, "As the parents’ choice of enrollment was denied by FSDB, Petitioner’s parents enrolled the Petitioner in the local St. Johns County School District." The Petitioner further states that he later sought County support for placement at FSDB, which was rejected because the County believed it could adequately educate Petitioner. The records of DOAH adequately set forth the factual background. Petitioner was denied admission to FSDB when he applied in 1999. Thereafter, his parents filed a due process petition to contest the FSDB denial (DOAH Case No. 99-493OE). Petitioner and FSDB entered into a Settlement Agreement, which allowed Petitioner to enroll at FSDB on a "temporary assignment basis for extended evaluation [in] accordance with Rule 6D- 3.002(4) . . ., for a period of 90 school days within which time [Petitioner] will participate in the educational program as established by the IEP team." The Petitioner dismissed his case, however, for reasons not apparent in this record, the child’s parents opted not to enroll their son in the school. On January 19, 2000, Petitioner’s parents again filed a request for a due process hearing, alleging that they made a "unilateral mistake" in entering into the first Settlement Agreement. (DOAH Case No. 00-0348E). On March 1, 2000, Petitioner and FSDB entered into another Settlement Agreement (the Second Settlement Agreement). The Second Settlement Agreement provided for the same 90-day temporary assignment, which would commence on the first day of the 2000-2001 school year. That agreement also provided that Petitioner could contest any decision made by FSDB after the temporary assignment. The Petitioner then dismissed his petition. On July 9, 2000, Petitioner filed a third request for due process hearing against FSDB (DOAH Case No. 00-2871E). It alleged that both settlement agreements denied rights under the IDEA, violated FSDB’s admissions rules, and the Second Settlement Agreement was an attempt by FSDB to "circumvent the requirements of law." Petitioner requested a hearing to determine "their conformity to both IDEA and FSDB Rule 6D." On August 8, 2000, DOAH dismissed the case on two grounds. First, Petitioner failed to allege a dispute subject to DOAH review, because Petitioner "clearly stated his intent to continue his enrollment in the public schools of St. Johns County . . .," and further stated his satisfaction with that school system. Final Order in N.H. v. F.S.D.B., Case No. 00- 2871E at p. 3. Second, it was dismissed because the Second Settlement Agreement barred the action. Id. at p.3, et seq. That order was not appealed, and became final. Petitioner filed a fourth due process petition on August 1, 2000 (DOAH Case No. 00-3129E), opposing FSDB’s IEP meeting set for August 8, 2000, which was set by FSDB to implement the Second Settlement Agreement. Petitioner later withdrew that request. FSDB has repeatedly stated, and continues to maintain, that it will excuse the terms of the Second Settlement Agreement to allow Petitioner to remain in the St. Johns County School District. Alternatively, FSDB continues to state Petitioner may temporarily enroll at FSDB pursuant to the Second Settlement Agreement. The Current Case Petitioner filed the instant rule challenge on January 21, 2001. His father received a copy of the predecessor 1997 version of the DOE Pamphlet in August 2000, from a representative of the Dade County School District. He asserts the following two sentences constitute an unpromulgated rule in violation of Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes: Parents in Florida have the right to choose the educational setting they consider most appropriate for their child who has a hearing or visual impairment. FSDB is an option in the continuum of placement for the education of students with sensory impairments. The Petition claims Petitioner is adversely affected by the two sentences due to the following three injuries: (1) his "parents were denied the right to choose the educational setting they feel most appropriate for their child"; (2) his sensory-impaired peers attend FSDB; and (3) the St. Johns County School District loses funding for special education of sensory- impaired children because most local parents of sensory-impaired children choose FSDB over the District. At the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of two employees of the Respondent, Shan Goff and Margot Palazesi. Both testified that the Respondent promulgated the DOE Pamphlet as an informational document for parents and others dealing with sensory-impaired children in Florida. Ms. Goff testified that DOE generates a multitude of similar brochures and pamphlets. She further stated that there is no relation between funding of FSDB and funding of local school districts’ special education programs. The DOE Pamphlet is clear. At page 3, the DOE Pamphlet distinguishes between mandatory education of sensory- impaired children in school districts and discretionary admissions at FSDB: School districts must provide educational programs to each eligible student who has a sensory impairment, beginning on the student’s third birthday and continuing until the student’s 22nd birthday or until the student graduates with a standard diploma, whichever comes first. * * * For students between the ages of 5 and 22 who have sensory impairments and who meet enrollment requirements, the FSDB provides educational and co-curricular programs, support services, day school and residential programs. Immediately following the two challenged sentences, the DOE Pamphlet advises: Interested parents may contact the School’s Parent Information Office for information regarding admission . . . There is no evidence that the DOE Pamphlet, read in pari materia, is inconsistent with the laws, regulations, or policies of the federal government.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is eligible to enroll in the Developmental Disabilities Program administered by the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with administering and determining eligibility for services to developmentally disabled individuals pursuant to Florida's Developmental Disabilities Prevention and Community Services Act, Chapter 393, Florida Statutes. Section 393.065, Florida Statutes (2001). The program developed by the Department is known as the Developmental Disabilities Program. Mr. Fernandez is 31 years of age and a resident of Miami, Florida. Mr. Fernandez submitted an application to the Department requesting that it enroll him in its Developmental Disabilities Program and provide him services as a developmentally disabled individual under the categories of retardation and autism. The Department evaluated Mr. Fernandez's application and determined that he was not eligible to receive services through the Developmental Disabilities Program under either category. In making this determination, the Department considered a Psychological Evaluation Report dated June 26, 2001, that was prepared by Hilda M. Lopez, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist to whom Mr. Fernandez was referred by the Department.2 To assess Mr. Fernandez's intellectual functioning and cognitive abilities, Dr. Lopez administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition ("WAIS"). According to her report, Mr. Fernandez attained a Verbal I.Q. score of 80 points, a Performance I.Q. score of 80 points, and a Full Scale I.Q. score of 78 points. These scores place Mr. Fernandez in the Borderline range of intellectual functioning. The Department considers persons who score 70 points or less on the WAIS to be mentally retarded. The mean score on the WAIS is 100 points, and the standard deviation is 15 points. To assess Mr. Fernandez's adaptive behavior, Dr. Lopez administered the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales ("Vineland"). Mr. Fernandez attained an Adaptive Behavior Composite score of 66, which indicates that his adaptive behavior is in the low range. His scores reveal deficits in the domains of Living Skills, Communication, and Socialization. Dr. Lopez also tested Mr. Fernandez for autism using the Childhood Autism Rating Scale. In the report, Dr. Lopez noted that Mr. Fernandez was rated by his father and by Dr. Lopez after observing, interacting, and interviewing Mr. Fernandez. Dr. Lopez reported that Mr. Fernandez's score was 26.5 points, which places him within the non-autistic range. Dr. Lopez observed in the report, however, that Mr. Fernandez "showed the following behavior problems: inappropriate emotional reactions, mildly abnormal fear and nervousness, resistance with [sic] changes in routine, mildly abnormal adaptation to change, and restlessness." A score of 30 points or more on the Childhood Autism Rating Scale is indicative of autism disorder. When Mr. Fernandez was a child of four or five years old, he was apparently diagnosed with autism, and he and his family took part in a behavior modification program in Boston, Massachusetts. As a result of the work done by Mr. Fernandez and his parents in this program, Mr. Fernandez learned to talk, although long after his peers, and improved his social skills. Based on her psychological evaluation of Mr. Fernandez, Dr. Lopez recommended the following: Mr. Fernandez will greatly benefit from a program geared at providing him with help to enhance his functional skills. Facilitation of social services to provide needed support and monitoring. Stimulation program oriented to develop his cognitive skills, to improve attention, memory, verbal communication and problem solving in order to achieve optimal capability. He will benefit from supported employment and referral to Vocational Rehabilitation Services for proper counseling and training. Mr. Fernandez was unable to produce any documents relating to his early diagnoses and treatment or his special education placements because these documents were destroyed in a fire that destroyed the Fernandez home. According to his father, Mr. Fernandez makes friends easily and communicates verbally very effectively. He worked for a while in a family business where his limitations were tolerated, and he flourished in this job. On the other hand, Mr. Fernandez is easily frustrated and confused, and he has difficulty following directions in simple matters. His father is seeking services on Mr. Fernandez's behalf that will teach him to live on his own and to become a productive citizen. The uncontroverted evidence presented by Mr. Fernandez establishes that he is in need of several of the services available through the Department's Developmental Disabilities Program. The evidence presented by Mr. Fernandez is not, however, sufficient to establish that he is eligible to participate in the Developmental Disabilities Program under the eligibility criteria established by the legislature for developmental disabilities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying the application of Mikael Fernandez for enrollment in the Developmental Disabilities Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2002.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has, pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes, demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that she should not be disqualified from employment in a position involving direct contact with children or developmentally disabled persons and, thus, whether the intended action to deny an exemption from disqualification from employment is an abuse of the agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact By letter dated October 13, 2016, Respondent issued its notice of proposed agency action by which it informed Petitioner that her request for exemption from disqualification was denied. A timely Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing involving disputed issues of material fact was filed on behalf of Petitioner. After filing the hearing request, Petitioner responded to the Initial Order, and the final hearing was scheduled on a date provided by Petitioner. Thereafter, Petitioner failed to comply with the Order of Pre-hearing Instructions and failed to appear at the final hearing. Based on Petitioner’s failure to appear and offer evidence, there is no evidentiary basis on which findings can be made regarding whether Petitioner proved her rehabilitation from the disqualifying offense such that Petitioner would not present a danger to children or developmentally disabled people served in programs regulated by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Petitioner, Kyanna Raquel Dixon’s, request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Kyanna R. Dixon Post Office Box 454 Quincy, Florida 37353 Kyanna Dixon 1720 Bordeaux Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities Suite 422 200 North Kentucky Avenue Lakeland, Florida 33801 (eServed) Michele Lucas, Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner properly denied Respondent's request to amend or expunge FPSS Report Number 97-025819.
Findings Of Fact Liberty Intermediate Care Facility ("LICF" or "Liberty ICF") is a residential facility which provides care, shelter, and sustenance to developmentally disabled adults. From time to time, certain residents at Liberty ICF require "one-on-one" supervision. In that circumstance, one staff member is assigned to look after only one resident. The staff member must maintain eye contact with the resident and must keep the resident within arm's reach at all times. During March 1997, Respondent provided direct care to developmentally disabled adult residents at Liberty ICF in her capacity as a Direct Care Instructor. On March 6, 1997, Respondent was assigned one-on-one supervision of M.H., a developmentally disabled adult resident of the LICF. M.H. was known to leave the facility and to commit acts of physical self-abuse, such as head banging, if he was not carefully monitored. M.H. suffers from mental limitations which substantially restrict his ability to perform the normal activities of daily living. At the time of this assignment, Respondent was aware of M.H.'s propensities. At around 3:00 p.m. on the afternoon of March 6, 1997, as Respondent was performing this supervision, M.H. was asleep on his bed, while Respondent was sitting on the chair next to the bed. When M.H. awoke, Respondent gave him some gummy bears. M.H. then accepted the gummy bears, went to the window, and stared outside. Respondent then sat down in the chair beside the bed and went to sleep. While Respondent was sleeping M.H. left the room and exited the building. Another staff member observed M.H.'s departure. Behavioral Program Specialist Cathy Buchanon entered M.H.'s room, woke Respondent, and asked her where M.H. was. Respondent stated that she did not know where he was. Respondent and Ms. Buchanan left the building and found M.H. in the parking lot.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order retaining as confirmed the report of adult neglect naming Respondent as perpetrator. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 252-A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 T. R. (address of record) Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in the practice of discrimination against Petitioner when terminating him from employment as a firefighter due to a medical condition.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jonathan Race, was employed by Respondent, Orange County Fire Rescue Department, since January 1989, and worked in the Operations Division as a Lieutenant/EMS Supervisor. In this role, he managed, coordinated, and performed firefighting and emergency rescue services. In the mid-1990s, Petitioner was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation which ultimately resulted, in July 2001, in his undergoing an open heart surgical procedure known as the "MAZE" procedure. Following the open heart surgery, Petitioner had a pacemaker installed in August 2001. Petitioner's cardiologist from 1997 to January, 2005, was Arnold Einhorn, M.D. Barry Portnoy, M.D., is a physician under contract with Orange County to perform annual physical examinations for members of the Orange County Fire Rescue Department. While Dr. Einhorn served as Petitioner's cardiologist, he had periodic conversations with Dr. Portnoy concerning Petitioner's cardiac condition. On May 20, 2003, Dr. Einhorn wrote a letter to Dr. Portnoy in which he stated that Petitioner, "continues to be on medical therapy with beta blockers and Digoxin and his underlying heart rate is in the 30s and this making him dependent on the pacemaker approximately 80% of the time." Dr. Einhorn concluded at that time that Petitioner needed to continue with his medications and use of the pacemaker. Petitioner, concluded, Dr. Einhorn, "is dependent on the pacemaker." On January 16, 2004, Dr. Portnoy conducted an annual physical for Petitioner. On February 6, 2004, Dr. Portnoy stated in his evaluation of Petitioner: "Classification deferred pending additional information. . . . Employee may continue in his/her present duties for no more than 30 days while awaiting further evaluation." On June 4, 2004, Dr. Portnoy completed his evaluation of Petitioner, imposing a restriction of "No functioning as a member of a team or independently where sudden incapacitation could result in harm to himself, risk to others, or mission failure." Dr. Portnoy placed Petitioner on light duty, which resulted in his assignment to an office job at fire headquarters. Respondent's policy dictates that, when an employee is placed on light duty, a medical review is conducted. After being placed on restricted or light duty, a medical review of Petitioner was commenced in June 2004. Respondent's medical review committee requested that Petitioner obtain from his cardiologist, Dr. Einhorn, information concerning Petitioner's cardiac condition. On January 5, 2005, Dr. Einhorn, at Petitioner's request, sent a letter to Dr. Portnoy in which he stated, in part, "We have been trying to wean the patient off beta blockers and Digoxin to see if the patient is still pacemaker dependent. He is now not on any Digoxin and Toprol and interrogation of his pacemaker revealed 30% atrial paced with 16 runs of atrial fibrillation." Based upon the information received from Dr. Einhorn by Dr. Portnoy, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter dated February 17, 2005, which stated that Respondent had determined there was a preponderance of evidence that restrictions placed on Petitioner by Dr. Portnoy would continue indefinitely and that Petitioner would not be able to return to his position in the Operations Division as Lieutenant/EMS Supervisor. Respondent concluded that under Article 34.11 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Petitioner would be medically separated from his employment with the County, effective March 26, 2005, at 19:30 hours. While on light office duty, Petitioner was given additional time to pursue other jobs with Orange County. Petitioner did not find another job with Orange County. On March 10, 2005, after Petitioner had received the February 17 letter from Respondent, Amish Parikh, M.D., wrote a letter "To Whom It May Concern", in which he stated that Petitioner "is now pacing only 0.8% of the time and it is not considered pacemaker-dependent. I believe the pacemaker is not a limiting factor in his ability to perform his job and he should be permitted to return to full duty without restrictions." Nothing in this letter makes reference to any medications Petitioner would be required to take in the future. On April 15, 2005, after Petitioner had been terminated from his employment with Respondent, Petitioner was examined by another cardiologist, Sunil M. Kakkar, M.D., who concluded that Petitioner was not pacemaker dependent and could return to full duties with Respondent. Neither Dr. Parikh nor Dr. Kakkar testified at the hearing. Their written reports appear to be based upon one visit by Petitioner with each of them. On March 23, 2005, Dr. Portnoy reviewed the March 10 letter from Dr. Parikh. Dr. Portnoy did not change his determination that Petitioner was pacemaker dependent after his review of Dr. Parikh's letter. Dr. Portnoy did not lift the restrictions he had imposed on Petitioner. At the time of hearing, Petitioner continued to take medications, both aspirin and Toprol, for his cardiac condition. David Hart worked as a firefighter with Respondent from March 16, 1981, through his voluntary retirement, with the rank of Engineer, on February 10, 2005. Mr. Hart was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation in 1992 and was treated for the condition with medications for the ensuing six years. Mr. Hart had a pacemaker implanted in October of 1998, and had the pacemaker in place through his retirement. While still employed by Respondent, Mr. Hart's private cardiologist, Dr. Filart, provided Respondent and Dr. Portnoy with information concerning the pacemaker, and determined that Mr. Hart was not pacemaker dependent. Based upon Dr. Filart's determination that Mr. Hart was not pacemaker dependent, Mr. Hart was not removed from duty or placed on restricted duty due to his pacemaker. Mr. Hart agreed that the decision with respect to pacemaker dependency should be made by the patient's cardiologist. Petitioner claims that he was discriminated against by Respondent due to disparate treatment between himself and David Hart. He alleges he is not pacemaker dependent, is similar to Mr. Hart, and, therefore, should not have been medically separated from his employment with Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that the Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jonathan A. Race 1081 Dean Street St. Cloud, Florida 34771 Gary M. Glassman, Esquire Orange County Attorney's Office Litigation Section 435 North Orange Avenue, 3rd Floor Orlando, Florida 32801 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Robert F. Cameron, was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Osceola County, based on his disability, race, or national origin in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act. 1 All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (2020), unless otherwise noted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner brings this action alleging that the County discriminated against him based on his disability, race (white), and national origin (Canadian). Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the County failed to provide him a reasonable accommodation to allow him to participate in the application and selection process for a County job. The County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and under the governance of the Osceola County Board of County Commissioners. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that he is a disabled individual with at least seven disabilities. Pertinent to this matter, Petitioner stated that he is partially deaf in one ear which limits his ability to hear.4 In addition, Petitioner relayed that his disability(ies) affect his normal life in that he has frequent medical appointments and requires an increased number of restroom breaks. On October 15, 2019, Petitioner, who is from Canada, applied for the position of Budget Analyst II (the "Analyst Position") with the County. The Analyst Position falls within the County's Office of Management and Budget Department ("OMB"). The OMB is responsible for preparing the County's 2 By requesting a deadline for filing a post-hearing submission beyond ten days after the filing of the hearing transcript, the 30-day time period for filing the Recommended Order was waived. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.216(2). 3 Petitioner filed a revised version of his post-hearing submittal on October 9, 2020, which the undersigned considered as Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order in writing this Recommended Order. 4 At the final hearing, Petitioner initially strenuously objected to identifying his specific disability, asserting that his right to privacy protects him from having to disclose personal medical information, except as requested by a medical professional. annual budget, as well as analyzing and evaluating budget transfers for the County Commissioners. The County initiated the recruitment process for the Analyst Position by posting the opening on the website www.governmentjobs.com on October 14, 2019. Petitioner found the posting on the website and submitted his application through the same. At total of 15 individuals applied for the position, including Petitioner. The application window for the Analyst Position closed on October 21, 2019. Thereafter, the County's Human Resources Department screened the 15 applications to ensure the interested persons met the minimum qualifications for the job. Eleven applicants, including Petitioner, possessed the required qualifications. The Human Resources Department forwarded those 11 applications to the OMB for consideration. The OMB reviewed the 11 applications and selected three individuals to interview. These applicants included Petitioner (a white male), Lizette Rivera (a Hispanic female), and Sean Lower (a white male). Thereafter, the Human Resources Department set up a panel of five County employees to interview the candidates. Petitioner learned that he was being considered for the job on Thursday, October 24, 2019. That morning, the County called Petitioner at his home in Canada to inquire whether he was available for an interview the next day, Friday, October 25, 2019. Damaris Morales, an administrative assistant in the OMB, made the call. This case centers around what was said during that morning phone call. Petitioner and Ms. Morales left the conversation with vastly different impressions of what transpired. The Phone Call According to Petitioner Petitioner testified that Ms. Morales called him at a most inopportune time. His home phone rang at 8:44 a.m. At that moment, Petitioner was rushing out of his apartment to reach a 9:00 a.m. doctor's appointment. In fact, Petitioner had already started his car with an automatic starter, and it was running in his driveway. After he heard his phone ring, however, he turned back to answer the call. Petitioner answered the phone and greeted the caller. The caller identified herself as "Tamaris" from Osceola County.5 Ms. Morales then informed Petitioner that she was calling to set up an interview for the Analyst Position. Petitioner initially expressed to Ms. Morales that her call was "great" news. He then explained that he was running out the door to a medical appointment. Therefore, he asked if she would email him details about the interview, and he would respond to her as soon as he returned home. Ms. Morales informed Petitioner that the interviews would take place the next day (Friday). Petitioner was alarmed at the short notice. He explained to Ms. Morales that he was currently at home in New York state and could not travel to Florida for an in person interview the next day. Ms. Morales replied that she could arrange a telephone interview. Petitioner then asked Ms. Morales when the interview on Friday was scheduled. Ms. Morales relayed that she would email him the specific information when she obtained the time from her manager. Petitioner stated that he would "clear my schedule tomorrow for that interview." Petitioner then signed off saying, "Thank you. I do have to run. Sorry." Ms. Morales hung up the phone first. The conversation lasted 1 minute and 30 seconds. As Petitioner left for his doctor's appointment, he was under the impression that Ms. Morales would email him imminently regarding available times for the Friday telephone interview. The Phone Call According to Ms. Morales At the final hearing, Ms. Morales described a vastly different conversation with Petitioner. As further discussed below, Ms. Morales's 5 At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that he heard Damaris Morales state her name as "Tamaris." initial impressions of Petitioner from that phone call ultimately led the OMB to decide not to interview Petitioner for the Analyst Position. When Petitioner answered the phone, Ms. Morales testified that Petitioner's "aggressive" tone quite startled her. In a "loud" voice, Petitioner declared, "Yeah. What do you want? I don't have time to talk right now. I've got to be somewhere." Ms. Morales was not expecting such an abrupt and jarring reception. After a few seconds of stunned silence, Ms. Morales explained to Petitioner that she was calling about his application for the Analyst Position. Continuing in his harsh tone, Petitioner replied, "I have somewhere I need to be right now. Send me all the information via email. I am in Niagara Falls, New York." Petitioner then hung up the phone first without providing Ms. Morales his availability for a Friday interview. The whole conversation took less than 30 seconds. At the final hearing, in response to Ms. Morales's testimony, Petitioner suggested that she may have overheard an exchange between him and his son, Stewart, with whom he lives. Petitioner explained that, as he was leaving his apartment, his son called out from his bedroom asking whether the bathroom was free. Petitioner yelled back, "What do you want, Stewart? I am leaving." Petitioner explained that his phone may have malfunctioned and engaged Ms. Morales' call without him actually picking up the receiver. Petitioner strongly denied that he directed the comment "what do you want?" at Ms. Morales. Petitioner also theorized that if he spoke in a loud tone with Ms. Morales, it may have been due to his disability. As indicated above, Petitioner testified that he is deaf in one ear. Petitioner explained that Ms. Morales was talking very fast during their phone call. In responding to her questions, Petitioner was not trying to be abrupt or argumentative. However, he was in a rush to reach his appointment and was frustrated at the delay. Continuing with Petitioner's story, after the phone call, as Thursday morning progressed into Thursday afternoon, Petitioner did not receive an email back from Ms. Morales. Therefore, around 2:15 p.m., Petitioner called the County to speak with her. He was forwarded to her office phone, where he left a voicemail. In his message, Petitioner expressed that he was available for an interview any time the next day (Friday). He also left his Skype contact information. Time continued to pass on Thursday. With no response over the next two hours, at 4:14 p.m., Petitioner again called for Ms. Morales. This time, he was able to reach her. Petitioner inquired about his interview time for Friday. Ms. Morales momentarily demurred, telling Petitioner that she had to check with her manager. After several minutes, Ms. Morales came back on the line. She then told Petitioner that the Friday interviews were "full up." When Petitioner asked about an interview on another day, Petitioner claims that Ms. Morales promptly "slammed the phone down in my ear." Ms. Morales, on the other hand, testified that after she informed Petitioner that no interview times were available on Friday, Petitioner got angry and threatened her with a "legal matter." Petitioner then hung up on her. Petitioner was not content to let the matter drop. Therefore, on Friday morning at 9:47 a.m., he emailed the County Manager, Don Fisher, to complain about the County's Human Resources Department and the OMB. In his email, Petitioner summarized the events from the previous day. Petitioner focused on the fact that Ms. Morales told him that she would provide him an interview time. Then, when he contacted her Thursday afternoon, Ms. Morales informed him that the interviews were "full up," and he would not be offered an opportunity to interview for the Analyst Position. Petitioner sent Mr. Fisher follow-up emails at 10:01 a.m. and 10:03 a.m. In the first follow-up email, Petitioner stated: I am disabled and covered under the ADA Act. I make this request for accommodation under the ADA Act. At 10:10 a.m., Petitioner sent an email to another County employee, Maria Colon, the Director of the Human Resources Department and the County's Americans with Disability Act ("ADA") coordinator. In this email, Petitioner stated: You are the designated ADA Act Coordinator, but you are discriminating against me and denying my ADA rights to accommodation under the ACT and Title VII. I formally ask for this interview to be rescheduled and Oscola [sic] County to stop this discrimination. Attached to this email, Petitioner included a copy of his Ontario Disability Support Program Certificate of Disability ("ODSP Certificate"). At the final hearing, Petitioner explained that the ODSP Certificate, which was determined in 2013, is proof of his disability. Petitioner's certificate states: Your file with the Disability Adjudication Unit has been adjudicated and you have been found to be a person with a disability as defined in the Ontario Disability Support Program Act. 1997. At the final hearing, Petitioner expounded on the reasons for his request, explaining that he sought an accommodation to enable him to conduct a telephonic interview because his disability prevented him from driving from Canada to Florida to interview in person. Furthermore, as a disabled person, he needed more time to prepare and participate in the recruitment process. The specific accommodation he desired was to be allowed to interview by telephone on Monday, October 28, 2019. Not hearing a response from Ms. Colon by Friday afternoon, at 3:03 p.m., Petitioner dispatched another email to her. He again attached his ODSP Certificate. In this email, Petitioner wrote that "your staff member Tamaris" refused to schedule an interview and then "hung up the phone on me." Petitioner also repeated that he was "requesting reasonable accommodation for the Budget Analyst II position." Ms. Colon called Petitioner shortly after his second email. During this call, Petitioner informed Ms. Colon that he was disabled, and he needed a telephone interview for the County job opening. Petitioner added that he was located out of state, and he could not travel to Florida in time for an in-person interview. Petitioner further declared that the County was discriminating against him because of his disability and his national origin. Ms. Colon advised Petitioner that she would look into his concerns and get back to him. Petitioner claims that Ms. Colon ended this conversation by slamming the phone in his ear. During this call, despite Ms. Colon's request, Petitioner refused to identify his specific disability. At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that the law protects those with disabilities from having to disclose their actual medical conditions. He said that, to safeguard their privacy, the disabled do not have to reveal their disability, except to the limited extent necessary to relate the disability to the requested accommodation. At 6:01 p.m. on Friday evening, Ms. Colon emailed Petitioner stating, "Per our phone conversation, I will look into your concerns and get back with you on Monday." By late Monday morning, October 28, 2019, however, Petitioner had not heard from Ms. Colon. Therefore, he sent her two emails. At 11:43 a.m., Petitioner wrote, "When is my interview? I am not available tomorrow." With no response to this first email, at 3:48 p.m., Petitioner wrote, "As per your reply above, you indicated my accommodation request under the ADA and interview time would be dealt with today. It is 4 pm EST. Please respond." Petitioner then signed off, "I am available for an interview 10am to 11 am tomorrow and then on Wednesday, Thursday or Friday." Petitioner received a response from Ms. Colon at 6:10 p.m., Monday evening. In her email, Ms. Colon wrote: I had the opportunity to look into your concerns. To be honest, customer service is very important in the Budget Analyst II role, and we're assessing those skills in every contact with candidates. The OMB Department had concerns about the way you handled the call and treated the employee that contacted you on October 24th for the purpose of scheduling an interview. Therefore, the Department has moved forward with other candidates. Petitioner was most displeased at Ms. Colon's email, and at 6:54 p.m., he responded: I did nothing except indicate I was available for an interview. Regardless none of this over-rides the ADA and my rights to employment and accommodation. I will be discussing your actions, the "OMB" in denying my constitutional and ADA rights, my Title VII rights with [a County attorney] tomorrow. If they fail to resolve this, then I will be suing you personally, Tamaris, the OMB and the County on a substantial indemnity basis for well in excess of $500g. Petitioner ended the email with "See you soon in court." Six minutes later, at 7:01 p.m., Petitioner sent another email to Ms. Colon. In this message, Petitioner stated: I must commend you for trying to deflect the egregious violation of my rights through trying to claim my rights to an interview are somehow superceded [sic] by this department withdrawing an interview based on race, geography, nationality and disability … in a call in which this Tamaris said and I quote – "we are full up" … . I asked her to leave my interview time through an email. If that qualifies as "poor customer service" then you have a very BIG legal problem using that as a diversion for blantant [sic] discrimination based on race, color, nationality, and disability. Petitioner ended this email with, "I will be happy to take you to Federal Court not the Courthouse right across the street. See you soon in court." Petitioner wrote Ms. Colon once more at 7:03 p.m. In this email, Petitioner accused Ms. Colon of "a blatant discrimination of interest in applying the ACT. Your superiors told you to deny me my rights under the ADA and you did so." Petitioner then declared that he was going to "sue you personally. … Trust me on that." After Monday, October 28, 2019, Petitioner never heard back from Ms. Morales or Ms. Colon regarding his application for the Analyst Position. Consequently, Petitioner claims that the County, by refusing to respond to his request for a telephone interview, denied him his rights under the FCRA and the ADA. At the final hearing, Petitioner vehemently denied that he was rude to Ms. Morales or during his call with Ms. Colon. Petitioner professed that he was perfectly polite to Ms. Morales. In addition, he asserted that Ms. Morales's testimony that he hung up the phone on her is totally false. Petitioner also contended that he did not threaten Ms. Colon with legal action as a means of intimidation. He was just exercising his rights as a disabled person. Petitioner further charged that the County's excuse for removing him from consideration was based on a misconstrued comment overheard during a brief phone call. Petitioner insists that his single utterance, "What do you want (Stewart)," cannot and should not justify the County's discriminatory action. The County ultimately hired Lizette Rivera for the Analyst Position. Petitioner alleges that the decision to hire Ms. Rivera is evidence of the County's female employees working together to eliminate white, male candidates. Petitioner maintains that Ms. Morales, a Hispanic female, favored another Hispanic (nondisabled) female (Ms. Rivera) for the Analyst Position. Consequently, Petitioner claims that Ms. Morales rigged the process and discriminated against Petitioner. At the final hearing, the County did not dispute that, while the OMB initially considered Petitioner for the Analyst Position, it quickly decided not to interview him for the job. The County also confirmed that the OMB did interview, and ultimately hire, Ms. Rivera to fill the Analyst Position. Regarding the County's decision not to interview Petitioner, after the initial phone call, Ms. Morales testified that she was quite startled by Petitioner's rude and unprofessional conduct. She immediately reported the conversation to her supervisor, Sharon Chauharjasingh, who is the Director of the OMB. Ms. Morales expressed to Ms. Chauharjasingh how shocked she was by Petitioner's behavior. Ms. Morales further relayed that because Petitioner was "in a rush," he did not provide her his availability for a telephone interview. Consequently, she had no information which would allow her to schedule him for an interview on Friday. Ms. Morales's testimony describing the telephone interaction with Petitioner was credible and is credited. Petitioner admitted to parts of Ms. Morales's versions, including that fact that he was in a rush and that he yelled, "what do you want?" Other than the two phone calls with Petitioner on Thursday, October 24, 2019, Ms. Morales was not involved in the OMB's decision not to interview Petitioner or to hire Ms. Rivera. (Those decisions belonged to Ms. Chauharjasingh.) Ms. Morales did not participate on the interview panel for either Ms. Rivera or Mr. Lower. Ms. Morales further testified that at no time during her phone calls with Petitioner did he inform her that he had a disability, or that he needed an accommodation to participate in the interview process. Ms. Chauharjasingh also testified at the final hearing. Ms. Chauharjasingh initially explained that the OMB is tasked with preparing the County's annual budget of approximately $1 billion. The person who fills the Analyst Position will work in the OMB. The duties of the Analyst Position include reviewing the budgets of the different County departments, as well as assisting those departments with budget questions and preparation related tasks. The Analyst Position will also review budgetary impacts and projections, and be prepared to personally discuss these issues with County representatives. In addition, the Analyst Position will interact daily with other staff members and occasionally contact outside companies and the public. Regarding the hiring of Ms. Rivera, Ms. Chauharjasingh disclosed that, because she oversees the OMB, she was responsible for selecting the person to fill the Analyst Position. For this opening, Ms. Chauharjasingh was the individual who narrowed down the applicants to the shortlist of three individuals including Petitioner, Ms. Rivera, and Mr. Lower. In selecting these candidates, Ms. Chauharjasingh looked at each applicant's past experience as a budget analyst, as well as their aptitude to efficiently assume the job duties. Based on their resumes, Ms. Chauharjasingh believed that each finalist was qualified for the Analyst Position. After selecting the three candidates, Ms. Chauharjasingh asked her assistant, Ms. Morales, to call each applicant and set up an interview. Ms. Chauharjasingh asked Ms. Morales to schedule the interviews for either Friday, October 25, 2019, or Monday, October 28, 2019. At the final hearing, Ms. Chauharjasingh represented that the County routinely interviews job applicants by telephone. Ms. Chauharjasingh further testified that the decision not to continue the interview process with Petitioner was hers. Ms. Chauharjasingh recounted that on Thursday morning, October 24, 2019, Ms. Morales came into her office looking "shaken up." Ms. Morales reported that she had just spoken to Petitioner, and he yelled at her and was rude and unprofessional. Ms. Chauharjasingh had never heard of a job candidate reacting the way Ms. Morales described. Ms. Morales has never complained to her about any other applicant. Based on Ms. Morales's interaction with Petitioner, Ms. Chauharjasingh immediately decided to remove Petitioner from consideration for the Analyst Position. She therefore directed Ms. Morales to "move on" from Petitioner and not to communicate with him any further. Instead, Ms. Morales was to only schedule interviews with the other two candidates (Ms. Rivera and Mr. Lower). The County's panel of five interviewers, which included Ms. Chauharjasingh, conducted an in-person interview of Ms. Rivera on Friday, October 25, 2019, at 11:30 a.m. Mr. Lower was interviewed, in person, on Monday morning, October 28, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. Following the interviews, the panel ranked the candidates, and then sent the list to Ms. Chauharjasingh. Ms. Chauharjasingh extended the offer of employment to Ms. Rivera, who was the top-ranked candidate. Ms. Chauharjasingh concluded her testimony by asserting that Petitioner's disability played no role in her decision not to interview him. Ms. Chauharjasingh explained that, at the time she decided to terminate the interview process with him, neither she nor Ms. Morales had any knowledge or information regarding Petitioner's disability. Instead, the sole basis for removing Petitioner from the shortlist was Ms. Morales' interaction with him during her initial phone call. Ms. Chauharjasingh testified that, based on the specific responsibilities of the Analyst Position, personal traits such as good communication skills, decorum, and telephone etiquette are very important. For example, the Detailed Job Posting for the Analyst Position includes a Physical Demand Requirement of "Expressing or exchanging ideas by spoken word or perceiving sound by ear." Consequently, upon hearing Ms. Morales's description of Petitioner's attitude and behavior during the telephone call, Ms. Chauharjasingh decided that the County did not need to consider Petitioner's application any further. In her testimony, Ms. Colon expressed that she had no part in the OMB's decision not to interview Petitioner. She became involved in this matter only after she received Petitioner's email, addressed to her as the County's ADA coordinator, on Friday morning, October 25, 2019. Ms. Colon stated that after she read Petitioner's email, she did not immediately respond because she first wanted to determine what exactly had transpired between Petitioner and Ms. Morales the previous day. Ms. Colon spoke with both Ms. Morales and Ms. Chauharjasingh on Friday. From these conversations, Ms. Colon heard that Petitioner was "rude" during Ms. Morales's first telephone call. Further, Petitioner was so "abrupt" that Ms. Morales was not able to offer him an interview time. Ms. Morales also informed Ms. Colon that Petitioner did not mention a disability or request an accommodation during either of their calls. Regarding her own phone call with Petitioner on Friday afternoon, Ms. Colon described an experience very similar to Ms. Morales's. Ms. Colon testified that the conversation was "not pleasant." As with Ms. Morales, Ms. Colon recounted that Petitioner was "agitated," loud," and "extremely unprofessional." During the exchange, Petitioner also threatened to sue her and the County. Regarding her email to Petitioner on Monday evening, October 28, 2019, in which she wrote that, "The OMB Department had concerns about the way you handled the call and treated the employee that contacted you on October 24th," Ms. Colon stated that the decision not to schedule Petitioner for an interview was made on October 24, 2019. Specifically, after talking with Ms. Morales and Ms. Chauharjasingh, Ms. Colon learned that Ms. Chauharjasingh had decided not to interview Petitioner immediately after Ms. Morales reported to her regarding Petitioner's rude and unprofessional interaction with her during their first phone call. As a final witness, Ms. Fatima Lozano testified regarding her participation on the interview panel for the Analyst Position. Ms. Lozano described herself as a Human Resources "generalist" with the County. Ms. Lozano has taken part in a number of interviews of applicants for County employment. She relayed that the County routinely conducts telephonic interviews. Ms. Lozano repeated that, when hiring employees, the department responsible for the position sets up the interviews and selects the winner. For the Analyst Position, the OMB selected the applicants who would interview for the job. Regarding scheduling the interviews for the Analyst Position, Ms. Lozano testified that, on October 21, 2019, she received a calendar invite requesting her availability. The interviews then took place on Friday, October 25, 2019, at 11:30 a.m. and Monday, October 28, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. While the above findings chronical the key aspects of Petitioner's discrimination claim, Petitioner also raised several other complaints against the County. Petitioner was exceedingly frustrated by the County's failure to schedule his interview through the www.governmentjobs.com website. At the final hearing, Petitioner elicited testimony from several County employees that, although the County pays a hefty annual fee to recruit employees through governmentjobs.com, the County only uses the website to solicit applications. Petitioner was "shocked" to learn that the County did not take advantage of the website's functions to schedule interviews with candidates. Petitioner was also "stunned" at the County's attempt to schedule his interview with less than one day's notice. Petitioner found the practice unprofessional and unacceptable. Petitioner represented that the standard process used by governmentjobs.com is to email a notification to the job applicant at least four to seven days prior to the agreed interview time. Based on the competent substantial evidence in the record, the preponderance of the evidence does not establish that the County discriminated against Petitioner based on his disability (handicap), race, or national origin. Instead, the credible evidence establishes that the decision not to interview Petitioner was made without knowledge of his disability prior to his request for an accommodation, and without regard to his race or national origin. The decision to not interview Petitioner was based solely on his own behavior, considered rude and unprofessional, effectively disqualifying him from the job. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that the County committed an unlawful employment practice against him in violation of the FCRA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Robert F. Cameron, did not prove that Respondent, Osceola County, committed an unlawful employment practice against him, and dismissing his Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Robert Finley Cameron 1 Churchill Street, Apartment 10 St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada L25 2-P3 C (eServed) Frank M. Townsend, Esquire Osceola County Attorney's Office 1 Courthouse Square, Suite 4700 Kissimmee, Florida 34741 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for a license to operate a child care facility should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing child care facilities. On June 17, 2016, Ms. Gaines filed an application for a license to operate a child care facility in Babson Park, Polk County (County). She previously worked as a caregiver for two child care facilities in the County and desires to operate a new facility known as Brighter Beginnings Learning Center. To qualify for licensure, an applicant must meet the licensing standards in section 402.305(1), Florida Statutes. Also, section 402.305(2) requires that child care personnel meet minimum requirements as to good moral character based upon a level 2 screening as provided for in chapter 435. That screening includes a check to determine if the applicant has a report on the Central Abuse Hotline. The background screening revealed that Ms. Gaines has three reports on the Central Abuse Hotline. The incidents occurred in 2010, 2014, and 2015. Based on this information, and the underlying facts surrounding those reports, the Department informed Petitioner by letter dated June 30, 2016, that her application was denied. Petitioner timely requested a hearing. On July 12, 2010, the Department received a report that Ms. Gaines (then known as Ms. Hamilton) had grabbed and pinched several children at Hope Child Development Center in Frostproof, where she was working as a caregiver. The incident was investigated by Deanna McCain, then a child protective investigator (CPI), who testified at hearing. However, the report was not verified because there were no visible injuries on the children. The facility terminated Petitioner as an employee after the incident. Ms. Gaines began working as a caregiver at Our Children's Academy in Lake Wales around October 2013. On October 12, 2014, the Department received a report that a 13- year-old child under Ms. Gaines' supervision was left unattended in a sandbox in the playground while Ms. Gaines was on a personal cell phone call in a classroom. The child suffers from autism and epilepsy and is prone to having seizures. The child suffered a seizure during Petitioner's absence. Brandy Queen, a CPI who testified at hearing, was assigned the task of investigating the incident. Her investigation revealed the child suffered a severe seizure that lasted four minutes and caused her to vomit and defecate on herself. Based on interviews with Petitioner, a teacher who witnessed the incident, and the school principal, Ms. Queen classified the incident as verified. The child was found face down in the sandbox by a teacher, Mr. Swindell, who immediately contacted the school nurse to check the child. Mr. Swindell, who testified at hearing, established that the child was alone outside for around ten to 15 minutes and that Petitioner did not go back outside to check on the child until after she had awoken from the seizure. Throughout the episode, Ms. Gaines was making a personal call on her cell phone. The facility has a policy of no cell phone usage during student contact time. Prior to the incident, the principal had spoken to Petitioner around nine or ten times about inappropriate cell phone usage. After the incident, a Letter of Concern regarding cell phone usage was placed in Petitioner's file. The mother of the student testified at hearing and stated she had no concerns about the incident and described it as "overblown." She said her daughter suffers seizures two or three times a week without warning, but they are not life- threatening. She does not blame Petitioner for the incident. The mother was under the impression, however, that her child was left alone for only a very short period of time and Petitioner immediately went back to the playground to retrieve her. The mother admitted she would be concerned had she known that her daughter had been allowed to remain alone for ten to 15 minutes and that asphyxiation could be a potential result if the child was face down in the sand. On February 25, 2015, the Department received another report of possible abuse by Petitioner, who was still employed as a caregiver at Our Children's Academy. The report indicated that Petitioner had inappropriately dragged a non-verbal child with Down Syndrome from the classroom to the playground. Two school therapists were present during the incident and testified at hearing. They confirmed that Petitioner was working with the child in an effort to get him from the classroom to the playground swings. The child was frightened by the swings and resisted her efforts. Petitioner first grabbed the child by one arm, and when he dropped to the floor, she grabbed both arms and dragged the child on his stomach out of the classroom and into the hallway. She then dragged him down a set of wooden stairs and to the playground where she forced him to sit in the swings against his will. One of the therapists observed that the child was very upset and urged Petitioner to let him calm down, but Petitioner continued dragging the child to the playground. The frightened child urinated on himself. The incident was investigated by CPI Queen, who interviewed the Petitioner, principal, and two therapists. She observed minor bruising on the child's arms but could not say definitively that the bruising was caused during the incident. She also could not establish that the child would suffer long- term emotional trauma due to the incident. Because of this, she classified the report as unsubstantiated. This meant that something happened to the child, but she could not verify that the bruising was caused by Petitioner's actions. The facility terminated Petitioner as an employee after the incident. Petitioner downplayed her conduct and generally contended that she never harmed or failed to supervise the children assigned to her care. Petitioner has five children of her own, she has a passion for children, and she wants to put that passion to good use by operating a child care center. The Department based its decision to deny the application on the facts that underlie the reports, and not the reports themselves. This includes consideration of who was interviewed by the CPI, what the statements were, whether there were any inconsistencies, how the cases were closed, the applicant's employment history, and whether there appears to be a pattern of concerning behavior. Based on this information, a Department licensing official observed a pattern of concerning behavior on the part of Petitioner as well as inconsistencies between Petitioner's statements and those of persons who witnessed the incidents. The Department considers Petitioner to be a potential risk to children unless she is supervised.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a license to operate a child care facility. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Trina Gaines Post Office Box 4024 Lake Wales, Florida 33859-4024 Cheryl D. Westmoreland, Esquire Department of Children and Families 1055 U.S. Highway 17 North Bartow, Florida 33830-7646 (eServed) Rebecca F. Kapusta, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Mike Carroll, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed)
