The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments, and, if so, what is the aggregate amount of the overpayments.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent, the Agency for Health Care Administration, is the single state agency charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida under Section 409.907, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, The Doctor's Office, was a Florida corporation approved by the Agency to provide group Medicaid services. At all times relevant to this matter, Petitioner was owned entirely by non-physicians who employed salaried physicians to provide Medicaid services. Petitioner, at all times relevant to this matter, offered physician services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to a contract with the Agency under provider number 371236P-00. Petitioner, pursuant to the specific terms in the contract with the Agency, agreed to abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program, and Federal laws and regulations. Petitioner, pursuant to its contract with the Agency, agreed to only seek reimbursement from the Medicaid program for services that were "medically necessary" and "Medicaid compensable." The Audit In mid-1996, the Agency, pursuant to its statutory responsibility, advised Petitioner that it intended to audit Petitioner's paid Medicaid claims for the alleged medical services it provided between July 1, 1994 and June 30, 1996. In September 1996, the Agency conducted an initial audit site visit, and randomly selected 61 patient files for review. The complete patient files, provided by Petitioner, were reviewed by Sharon Dewey, a registered nurse consultant and Agency employee, as well as Dr. Solenberger, a physician consultant and Agency employee. In accordance with its procedure, the Agency determined that Petitioner had submitted a total of 580 claims for reimbursement relating to the 61 patient files and had received full payment from the Medicaid program for each claim. On March 3, 1997, the Agency issued a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR), and advised Petitioner that it had over-billed Medicaid and received an overpayment from the program. Shortly thereafter, the Agency auditors, Dr. Solenberger and Ms. Dewey, met with Frank Colavecchio, Petitioner's Corporate Representative, and discussed the Medicaid violations alleged in the review. During the meeting, the Agency requested Mr. Colavecchio to instruct Petitioner's staff physicians to review their records and provide a written rebuttal to the Agency's initial determinations. Within days, and prior to any further action, the Agency placed the audit on indefinite hold. The Agency decided to delay the audit until certain proposed legislation relating to peer review and the integrity of the Medicaid reimbursement program was enacted. Two years later, Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes, was enacted during the 1999 legislative session and became law. Shortly thereafter, in 1999, the Agency hired Dr. Larry Deeb, a board-certified, practicing pediatrician, to perform a peer review of Petitioner's practices and procedures. Dr. Deeb has performed similar medical records reviews for the Medicaid program since 1981 and possesses a thorough understanding of CPT coding and the EPSDT requirements. Dr. Deeb received the medical files provided by Petitioner, and reviewed each patient file in the random sample, including the medical services and Medicaid-related claim records. On November 11, 1999, Dr. Deeb completed his peer review of 564 of the 580 claims provided in the random sample and forwarded his findings to the Agency. Dr. Deeb advised the Agency that 16 reimbursement claims involved adult patients and he therefore did not review them. Utilizing Dr. Deebs findings, the Agency employed appropriate and valid auditing and statistical methods, and calculated the total Medicaid overpayment that Petitioner received during the two year audit period. On July 17, 2000, approximately four years after the original audit notification, the Agency issued its Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR). The Agency advised Petitioner that, based upon its review of the random sample of 61 patients for whom Petitioner submitted 580 claims for payment between 1994 and 1996, Petitioner received $875,261.03 in total overpayment from the Medicaid program during the audit period. Petitioner denied the overpayment and requested a formal administrative hearing. Following the initial commencement of the final hearing in this matter in December 2001, Dr. Deeb, again, reviewed the disputed claims and modified his opinion relating to 6 claims. Thereafter, the Agency recalculated the alleged overpayment and demanded Petitioner to pay $870,748.31. The Allegations The Agency alleges that specific claims submitted by Petitioner, which were paid by the Medicaid program, fail to comply with specific Medicaid requirements and therefore must be reimbursed. Since its inception, the Medicaid program has required providers to meet the Medicaid program's policies and procedures as set forth in federal, state, and local law. To qualify for payment, it is the provider's duty to ensure that all claims "[a]re provided in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with . . . state . . . law." Section 409.913(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1993). Medicaid manuals are available to all Providers. Petitioner, as a condition of providing Medicaid services pursuant to the Medicaid program, is bound by the requirements and restrictions specified in the manuals, and under the contract, is required to reimburse the Medicaid program for any paid claims found to be in violation of Medicaid policies and procedures. The evidence presented at hearing established that Petitioner frequently violated various Medicaid policies and procedures. First, Petitioner repeatedly failed to comply with Section 10.9 of the Medicaid Physician's Provider Handbook, (MPPH), and Sections 409.905(9), 409.913(5)(e), 409.913(7)(e), and 409.913(7)(f), (1993, 1994 Supp. 1995, and 1996), Florida Statutes, which require all medical services to be rendered by, or supervised by a physician, and attested to by the physician's signature. Medical records reflecting services for paid claims must be physician signature certified and dated, or the services are not defined as physician's services. In addition, Petitioner routinely failed to correctly document the provision of certain physician's assistant (P.A.) Medicaid services that require the personal supervision of a physician or osteopath. See Chapter 1 of the Physician Assistant Coverage and Limitations Handbook, March 1995, and Appendix D (Glossary) in the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 (HCFA-1500). In addition, Petitioner failed to comply with Medicaid regulations that require an approved physician to be present in the facility when certain P.A. services are delivered and to attest to it by signature within twenty-four hours of service. See Section 11.1 of the MPPH, effective July 1994, and Sections 409.905, and 409.913 (1993, 1994 Supp., 1995, and 1996 Supp.), Florida Statutes. The evidence presented at hearing also demonstrates that Petitioner repeatedly violated specific record keeping requirements located in Section 10.9 of the MPPH, Sections 10.6 and 11.5 of the Medicaid EPSDT Provider Handbook (EPSDT), and Sections 409.913(5)(e), 409.913(7)(e), and 409.913(7)(f), (1993, 1994 Supp., 1995, and 1996), Florida Statutes. In addition, the Agency demonstrated that Petitioner occasionally failed to document support for the necessity of certain services or simply billed for services that were not medically necessary. As indicated, Medicaid policy limits a physician to bill only for services that are medically necessary and defines the circumstances and varying levels of care authorized. In fact, Section 11.1 of the MPPH, effective July 1994, provides in part: The physician services program pays for services performed by a licensed physician or osteopath within the scope of the practice of medicine or osteopathy as defined by state law . . . . The services in this program must be performed for medical necessity for diagnosis and treatment of an illness on an eligible Medicaid recipient. Delivery of all services in this handbook must be done by or under the personal supervision of a physician or osteopath . . . at any place of service . . . . Each service type listed has special policy requirements that apply specifically to it. These must be adhered to for payment. The manual further provides clear guidelines defining authorized services for reimbursement which Petitioner apparently overlooked. For example, the manual defines the four types of medical history exams that Medicaid providers may conduct, the nature of the problems presented, and the appropriate and authorized tests. The manual also identifies the varying degrees of medical decision-making complexity related to Medicaid services and provides instructions relating to the method of selecting the correct evaluation and management code for billing. Petitioner consistently violated coding restrictions. Moreover, the Medicaid policy manual also outlines the specific procedures and billing requirements necessary for seeking payment for medical services including the early periodic screening for diagnosis and treatment (EPSDT) services. Chapter 10 and 11 of the MPPH specifically state that services that do not include all listed components of the EPSDT are not defined as an EPSDT, and upon audit, the Agency re-calculated Petitioner's medical services at the appropriate procedure code. Stipulation Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that certain paid claims were correctly determined by the Agency to be overpayments. Specifically, the parties agreed that portions of samples 1, 3, 14, 21, 28, 41, 46, 47, 51, 53, and 56 could not be claimed for reimbursement since lab services which are part of an office visit reimbursement and/or lab service fees performed by an independent outside lab are not permitted. In addition, the parties agreed that specific portions of samples 1, 13, 14, 27, 28, 33, 35, 43, 46, 47, 52, 53, and 55 could not be claimed since Modifier 26 billing, the professional component, is only appropriate when the service is rendered in a hospital and Petitioner's services were rendered in an office. Pediatric Sample With regard to the random sample of pediatric files, upon careful review, the evidence presented at hearing sufficiently demonstrates that Petitioner was overpaid the following amounts on the following paid claims for the following reasons: The prolonged physician's services billed to Medicaid were not documented as having been provided or medically necessary. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 1 1/18/1996 99354 $ 36.64 1 5/14/1996 99354 $ 36.64 13 9/25/1995 99354 $ 36.64 19 9/28/1994 99354 $ 39.50 21 12/18/1995 99354 $ 36.64 28 3/06/1995 99354 $ 36.64 42 6/04/1996 99354 $ 36.64 43 12/19/1994 99354 $ 36.64 47 9/28/1994 99354 $ 39.50 47 10/17/1995 99354 $ 36.64 51 4/05/1995 99354 $ 36.64 53 11/02/1995 99354 $ 36.64 56 5/01/1996 99354 $ 36.64 The level of care billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care provided was at the 99213 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 1 9/14/1995 $ 34.14 1 1/18/1996 $ 34.14 1 5/14/1996 $ 34.14 33 9/28/1994 $ 20.00 47 10/17/1995 $ 34.14 The level of care billed and paid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99214 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 53 5/31/1995 $ 21.69 The level of care billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99204 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 25 7/27/1994 $ 2.00 The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99203 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 35 5/11/1995 $ 37.96 51 12/08/1994 $ 15.00 55 11/21/1995 $ 37.96 58 9/22/1995 $ 37.96 The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99204 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 43 12/11/1994 ($ 3.00) credit The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the medical services provided and documentation supported an EPSDT visit. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 53 2/06/1995 $ 16.53 The required components of the EPSDT were not documented as being performed at the office visit that had been claimed and paid as an EPSDT and therefore, the difference between the EPSDT payment received and the value of the procedure code for the documented level of office visit that occurred (i.e., 99214, 99213, 99212, 99211, or 99203), is deemed an overpayment. Cluster Number Date of Service Level of Visit Overpayment 1 7/28/1995 99213 $ 39.82 3 6/28/1995 99213 $ 39.82 5 3/03/1995 99203 $ 21.43 6 7/07/1994 99213 $ 5.00 10 8/17/1995 99212 $ 43.82 12 1/31/1996 99204 $ 0.00 14 5/31/1995 99213 $ 39.82 18 10/04/1994 99213 $ 5.00 18 1/29/1996 99214 $ 27.37 20 8/25/1994 99213 $ 5.00 21 12/11/1995 99214 $ 27.37 29 8/17/1994 99212 $ 9.00 Cluster Number Date of Service Level of Visit Overpayment 29 9/06/1995 99213 $ 39.82 40 7/25/1994 99203 $ 0.00 41 5/06/1996 99214 $ 27.37 46 9/19/1994 99213 $ 5.00 46 10/19/1995 99213 $ 39.82 47 11/02/1994 99213 $ 5.00 51 9/07/1995 99213 $ 39.82 53 7/10/1995 99213 $ 39.82 53 1/19/1995 99213 $ 39.82 59 5/02/1996 99203 $ 43.39 Adult Samples At hearing, Petitioner disputed all of the Agency's findings relating to patients over the age of 21 and objected to Dr. Deeb, a pediatrician, performing any review of their files. While Dr. Deeb is not the appropriate peer to review adult patient files, the following adult claims did not require substantive peer review and resulted in overpayment due to the stated reason: There were not any medical records in existence to indicate that any medical services were performed. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 2/20/1995 99215 $ 53.00 2 7/11/1995 99215 $ 59.14 2 8/09/1995 99215 $ 57.14 2 9/07/1995 99213 $ 23.00 2 10/11/1995 99213 $ 23.00 2 1/02/1996 99213 $ 23.00 2 3/22/1996 73560/Rad.Ex. $ 16.36 2 4/01/1996 99215 $ 57.14 2 4/05/1996 99213 $ 23.00 2 4/23/1996 99213 $ 23.00 15 2/16/1996 99213 $ 23.00 15 2/19/1996 99215 $ 57.14 16 5/14/1996 Blood Count $ 8.00 Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 16 5/14/1996 UA $ 3.00 16 5/14/1996 99215 $ 57.14 23 7/28/1994 99213 $ 23.00 23 5/09/1995 72069/26 Rad.Ex. $ 6.98 23 5/09/1995 72069/Rad.Ex. $ 17.45 23 10/20/1995 99213 $ 23.00 34 4/24/1996 99214 $ 35.45 57 11/17/1995 99215 $ 59.14 60 4/10/1996 99215 $ 57.14 61 5/22/1995 99213 $ 23.00 The medical records failed to contain the required physician's signature and date authenticating the fact that the services billed were performed by either P.A. Olsen or P.A. Avidon under physician supervision. The services provided by the non-physician employee were reviewed and down-coded by the Agency to the appropriate level physician's office visit code. Cluster Number Date of Service Proc. Code Pd./ P. Code Allowed Overpayment 2 6/30/1995 99215/99212 $ 36.14 2 7/20/1995 99215/99213 $ 34.14 2 7/28/1995 99215/99213 $ 34.14 2 9/05/1995 99215/99212 $ 36.14 8 4/17/1995 99205/99203 $ 35.96 17 3/27/1995 99205/99203 $ 35.96 23 5/09/1995 99215/99213 $ 32.14 23 6/09/1995 99215/99213 $ 32.14 34 4/23/1996 99205/99203 $ 35.96 The medical records failed to contain the required physician signature authenticating the fact that the services were provided by a physician. The services provided were reviewed and down-coded by the Agency to the appropriate level physician's office visit code. Procedure Code Cluster Number Date of Service Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 6/14/1995 99215/99211 $ 45.14 16 5/15/1996 99215/99211 $ 45.14 61 5/05/1995 99205/99204 $ 14.53 The provider improperly sought payment for lab services that were part of the office visit reimbursement and/or lab services performed by an independent outside lab. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 3/08/1996 UA $ 3.00 2 4/03/1996 UA $ 3.00 15 2/08/1996 UA $ 3.00 16 5/15/1996 Blood Count $ 8.50 16 5/15/1996 Blood Count $ 8.00 The provider improperly sought payment for Modifier 26 billings (professional component) which are only appropriate when the service is rendered in a hospital. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 2/17/1995 Radiologic exam $ 6.98 2 6/14/1995 Radiologic exam $ 7.20 8 4/17/1995 Tympanometry $ 9.00 16 5/13/1996 Radiologic exam $ 5.45 16 5/15/1996 Radiologic exam $ 6.98 In addition to the policy and procedural violations, Petitioner, in egregious violation of the Medicaid program, admittedly submitted Medicaid claims for the services of specialist physicians (such as an allergist, OB/GYN, podiatrist, psychologists, and ophthalmologists) not within its Provider group, collected Medicaid funds based on those claims, and reimbursed the respective specialist. While Petitioner's corporate representative, Mr. Colavecchio, was admittedly responsible for the coding and billing of the Medicaid services submitted for reimbursement, he was minimally aware of the Medicaid policy requirements and possessed limited working knowledge of CPT coding and EPSDT billing. In addition, Petitioner's employees, Dr. Keith Wintermeyer and Dr. Marcia Malcolm, were only moderately familiar with the CPT coding and EPSDT component requirements. They provided little input to Petitioner regarding CPT coding and the sufficiency of certain physician's services relating to EPSDT billing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency re-calculate the overpayment consistent with the Findings of Fact, and include only those identified violations in the cluster samples of the adult patient files, and issue a Final Order requiring Petitioner to reimburse, within 60 days, the Agency for the Medicaid overpayments plus any interest that may accrue after entry of the Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Felker-Little, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Charles D. Jamieson, Esquire Ward, Damon & Posner, P.A. 4420 Beacon Circle West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Respondent is liable for overpayment of Medicaid claims, for the period of January 1, 2004, through January 1, 2006, as stated in Petitioner’s Final Audit Report (FAR), dated July 19, 2006, due to Respondent’s failure to properly document for services billed and collected, in violation of Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2006),1 and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the single state agency under federal law, charged with administration of the Medicaid Program in Florida, and is charged with recovering overpayments to providers. Petitioner’s Bureau of Medicaid Integrity (MPI) has the primary responsibility to audit medical service providers who participate in the Medicaid program. MPI is a Bureau under the AHCA Inspector General. MPI conducts audits to review provider’s compliance with applicable statutes, rules, and policies regarding billing Medicaid for services rendered. An MPI audit is separate and distinct from an annual or other licensure survey or inspection conducted by Petitioner. The MPI audit is a compliance audit not a licensure one. MPI is mandated to review for provider fraud and abuse to ensure that the recipients are receiving the service for which Medicaid is paying. Respondent is a Florida licensed Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner (ARNP) and provided medical services, including psychological counseling to Medicaid recipients, pursuant to a contract with Petitioner under her Provider number 302123800. Respondent participated in the Medicaid program at least from July 1, 2001, and continuously through December 31, 2005 (end of the Audit Period). Petitioner was paid for the services rendered. The audit period for Respondent was determined to be from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2005. Claims for services were reviewed for a standard two-year audit period, and were audited for coding, records and visits. Thirty recipients were picked as a sample of recipients to examine during the two-year audit period. The selection was random and computer generated. Respondent was notified that Petitioner was conducting an audit. Respondent provided the charts on the 30 recipients to be examined and each of their claims during the audit period, which comprised all of her medical records. Gary Mosier is a Registered Nurse (RN), and holds a master’s degree in health care administration. Mosier is employed by the AHCA Inspector General, MPI, and is a nurse consultant and investigator. He was lead analyst and investigator in this matter. James Edgar, M.D., a psychiatrist with 35 years of experience, was retained by Petitioner as a peer review expert to review the charts and give a coding opinion. Billing codes are five-digit numbers. There are general guidelines for establishing the degree of difficulty which are set forth in documents such as Documentation Guidelines for Evaluation and Management Services, published by the American Medical Association. However, the correct coding can only be established through expert testimony, which is based upon established and identified criteria. With respect to each of the services reviewed, Petitioner relied upon the opinion of its expert, Dr. Edgar, as to whether or not Respondent billed Medicaid correctly. Dr. Edgar based his opinion on a review of documents regarding each service which were provided to him by Petitioner. In each instance where the Billing Code 90807, Individual Psychotherapy, Insight Orientation, appeared on Respondents charts for all 30 patients, Dr. Edgar down-coded the charts to Code 90862, medical management. He did not disallow payment, he adjusted each of them. His opinion was that, without the time spent with the patient being delineated on the medical chart, then the visit must be down-coded, or it could be denied completely. Dr. Edgar’s testimony was credible and persuasive. A Preliminary Audit Report (PAR) was sent to Respondent on September 12, 2006. The PAR informed Respondent of an alleged overpayment and explained her options prior to the completion of a FAR. It also put Respondent on notice of possible sanctions for lack of response to Petitioner. AHCA pays for mental health counseling when the face- to-face time spent with the recipient is documented. The medical records resulting from these services are required by law to be maintained for five years following the dates of service. These records must be made available when requested by Petitioner. Respondent was requested to produce office appointment sheets or calendars in order to document her face-to-face time with patients. Respondent sent non-contemporaneous time listings, rather than chart materials or office materials to verify and document time spent. There existed no charted or office records of the time spent with patients. Although Respondent testified that these time listings were implied because of the code that she submitted to Petitioner, this testimony is not persuasive in proving a material fact in dispute. The FAR was sent to Respondent on November 7, 2006, with the spreadsheet attachment. As with the PAR, it informed Respondent of the issues involved with the audit and the overpayment calculations and sought to levy a sanction, if one applied. There was no documentation in the charts of the time expended in the patient encounter, as required under the law. Although Petitioner agreed that the use of the Code 90807 implied that there was one hour of face-to-face contact with a patient, CPT policy requires both medication management and therapy, not just medication management. There was no time of service, time spent, and no start or stop times noted in the medical records. These notations are specifically required under Medicaid policy. A record must reflect the time spent face-to-face with a patient. The final overpayment calculation and final audit reports document that the overpayment to be recouped, and which Petitioner seeks, is $12,500.70, with an added sanction of $1,500.00. The preponderance of evidence has shown that Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $12,500.70, and that Petitioner is authorized to impose a penalty of $1,500.00.
Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order instructing Respondent to repay the sum of $12,500.70, and imposing a fine if appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2010.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was overpaid by the Florida Medicaid Program and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent has been the state agency charged with responsibility for overseeing the Florida Medicaid Program, including the recovery of overpayments to Medicaid providers pursuant to Section 409.913, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was an authorized Medicaid provider, having been issued provider number 377290000. Petitioner had valid Medicaid Provider Agreements with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) during the Audit Period, which began on January 1, 1996, and ended on May 10, 1999. Petitioner graduated from the University of Puerto Rico School of Medicine in 1987, did an internship at Tulane University, did a residency in internal medicine at Eastern Virginia Graduate Medical School, and did a fellowship in hematology at Washington Hospital Center. He served as Chief of Hematology for Kessler Medical Center in Biloxi, Mississippi, while serving in the United States Air Force (with the rank of major). At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was licensed to practice medicine in Florida, Virginia, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was employed by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) as a Medical Officer, Health Scientist Administrator. Petitioner served as an advisor to the director of the NIH on issues related to HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) and AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome). Petitioner’s specialty is internal medicine with a sub- specialty in hematology. Petitioner has extensive experience treating persons suffering with HIV and AIDS dating back to 1987. Pursuant to his Medicaid Provider Agreements, Petitioner agreed to: (1) retain for five years complete and accurate medical records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid program; (2) bill Medicaid only for services or goods that are medically necessary; and (3) abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations. Respondent audited Petitioner’s Medicaid claims during the Audit Period and conducted a peer review of Petitioner’s billings and medical records of 25 of Petitioner’s patients as part of that audit.2 Joseph W. Shands, M.D., conducted the peer review of the documentation provided by Petitioner for purposes of the audit conducted by AHCA. Dr. Shands first reviewed documentation provided by Petitioner in 1999. He had no further participation in the audit until he reviewed information in preparation for his deposition in this proceeding. Dr. Shands graduated from medical school in 1956, trained in internal medicine, and worked as a microbiologist for approximately 15 years. He served as Chief of Infectious Diseases at the University of Florida for 23 years and also treated patients through the Alachua County Public Health Department and Shands Hospital at the University of Florida. Dr. Shands' practice was devoted almost entirely to the treatment of patients diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. Dr. Shands retired from the practice of medicine in May 2002. For three years prior to his retirement, Dr. Shands practiced medicine part-time. Petitioner was sent a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) dated May 25, 1999, that found an overpayment in the amount of $862,576.72. In response to that PAAR, Petitioner had the attorney representing him at that time respond to AHCA in writing. The letter from the attorney, dated June 2, 1999, requested a copy of AHCA’s supporting materials and clarification of certain matters. AHCA did not respond. AHCA issued its FAAR on January 22, 2004, asserting that Petitioner was overpaid by the Florida Medicaid Program in the total amount of $261,336.14 for services that in whole or in part were not covered by Medicaid. There was no plausible explanation why the FAAR was not issued until 2004, whereas the audit period ended in 1999. The difference between the amount of the alleged overpayment reflected by the PAAR and the amount of the alleged overpayment reflected by the FAAR is attributable to the use of different methodologies in calculating the amounts overpaid. The FAAR used the correct methodology that was not challenged by Petitioner. The FAAR sets forth five categories of alleged overpayments. Each category accurately describes an overpayment based on applicable Medicaid billing criteria. The five categories are as follows: Medicaid policy specifies how medical records must be maintained. A review of your medical records revealed that some service for which you billed and received payment were not documented. Medicaid requires documentation of the services and considers payments made for services not appropriately documented an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category I.) Medicaid policy defines the varying levels of care and expertise required for the evaluation and management procedure codes for office visits. The documentation you provided supports a lower level of office visit than the one for which you billed and received payment. The difference between the amount you were paid and the correct payment for the appropriate level of service is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category II.) Medicaid policy addresses the type of pathology services covered by Medicaid. You billed and received payment for laboratory tests that were performed outside your facility by an independent laboratory. Payments made to you in these instances are considered overpayments. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category III.) Medicaid policy requires the Medicaid services be provided by or under the personal supervision of a physician. Personal supervision is defined as the physician being in the building when the services are rendered and signing and dating the medical records within twenty-four hours of service delivery. You billed and received payment for services which your medical records reflect you neither personally provided nor supervised. Payment made to you for all or a part of those services is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category IV.) Medicaid policy requires services performed be medically necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of an illness. You billed and received payments for services for which the medical records, when reviewed by a Medicaid physician consultant, indicated that the services provided did not meet the Medicaid criteria for medical necessity. The claims which were considered medically unnecessary were disallowed and the money you were paid for these procedures is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category V.) CATEGORY I CLAIMS The disputed Category I claims can be separated into two subcategories: services performed while an employee of a corporate employer and services performed while a recipient was hospitalized. As to both subcategories Petitioner argues that he has been prejudiced by Respondent’s delay in issuing the FAAR because Medicaid requires providers to retain medical records only for five years from the date of service.3 Although Respondent was dilatory in prosecuting this matter, Petitioner’s argument that Respondent should be barred (presumably on equitable grounds such as the doctrine of laches) should be rejected. Petitioner has cited no case law in support of his contention, and it is clear that any equitable relief to which Petitioner may be entitled should come from a court of competent jurisdiction, not from this forum or from an administrative agency. All billings for which there are no medical records justifying the services rendered should be denied. CATEGORY II CLAIMS The following findings as to the Category II claims are based on the testimony of the witnesses and on the information contained in the exhibits.4 Although nothing in the record prior to the final hearing reflects that position, Petitioner did not dispute most of the down-codings at the final hearing. Office visits, whether supported by a doctor’s note or a nurse’s note, for the sole purpose of administering IVIG treatment, will be discussed in the section of this Recommended Order dealing with Category V claims. The office visits, which were for the purpose of intravenous immunoglobulin (IVIG) treatment and for other reimbursable medical services, are set forth as part of the Category II disputes. The following findings resolve the Category II disputes. The date listed is the date the service was rendered. The billing code following the date is the billing code that is supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Recipient 1:5 01-20-98 99213 Recipient 2 09-27-96 99214 10-10-96 99213 11-13-96 99214 12-23-96 99212 02-24-97 99214 04-21-97 99213 04-28-97 99214 05-21-97 99213 06-02-97 99213 07-09-97 99213 07-23-97 99212 08-06-97 99213 08-11-97 99212 10-01-97 99213 10-10-97 99213 10-15-97 99214 10-21-97 99214 11-10-97 99213 12-08-97 99213 12-17-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-21-98 99213 Recipient 3 10-21-97 99213 11-04-97 99213 11-25-97 99213 12-16-97 99213 01-27-98 99214 02-26-98 99214 Recipient 4 01-03-98 99254 01-04-98 99261 01-05-98 99261 Recipient 5 09-29-97 99204 Recipient 6 11-11-97 99204 11-18-97 99213 Recipient 7 01-26-98 99204 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 8 09-26-96 99214 09-30-96 99213 10-03-96 99213 10-10-96 99212 10-25-96 99214 11-29-96 99213 12-04-96 99213 12-30-96 99213 01-22-97 99214 01-31-97 99211 02-14-97 99212 03-17-97 99214 04-04-97 99213 04-25-97 99212 05-30-97 99211 07-11-97 99213 08-08-97 99213 08-22-97 99213 09-05-97 99212 09-19-97 99214 10-31-97 99214 11-24-97 99214 12-03-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-09-98 99214 01-16-98 99213 01-30-98 99214 02-13-98 99214 Recipient 9 11-24-97 99203 Recipient 10 10-14-96 99205 11-04-96 99213 11-11-96 99213 11-25-96 99214 12-30-96 99213 01-27-97 99214 02-24-97 99214 03-10-97 99213 03-24-97 99212 04-07-97 99213 04-21-97 99214 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99213 05-21-97 Deny 06-09-97 99213 07-07-97 99212 08-04-97 99213 08-18-97 99213 09-24-97 992136 10-06-97 99213 10-10-97 99214 10-27-97 99213 11-10-97 99213 11-19-97 99214 11-24-97 99213 12-08-97 99213 02-02-98 99213 Recipient 11 06-30-97 99204 11-06-97 Recipient 12 Deny due to lack of documentation. 10-14-97 99213 11-06-97 99204 11-20-97 99213 12-16-97 99213 01-06-98 99213 Recipient 13 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 14 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 15 09-16-97 992157 Recipient 16 02-19-98 99212 Recipient 17 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 18 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 19 09-27-96 99212 10-01-96 99213 10-10-96 99213 10-23-96 99213 11-06-96 99213 11-20-96 99213 12-18-96 99211 12-30-96 Deny due to lack of 01-09-97 documentation. Deny due to lack of 01-22-97 documentation. 99211 02-05-97 99214 03-05-97 99214 03-19-97 99211 03-24-97 99214 03-26-97 04-02-97 Deny due to lack documentation. 99213 of 04-21-97 99213 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99213 06-02-97 99212 06-30-97 99213 07-07-97 99213 07-14-97 99213 07-28-97 99212 08-18-97 99213 08-25-97 99213 09-08-97 99213 09-15-97 99214 09-22-97 99213 10-28-97 99214 11-04-97 11-07-97 Deny due to lack documentation. 99213 of 11-24-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-12-98 99213 01-26-98 99213 02-19-98 99214 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 20 12-04-96 99204 12-13-96 99213 01-03-97 99213 01-17-97 99213 01-27-97 99213 02-07-97 99214 02-21-97 99213 03-07-97 99214 03-21-97 99212 04-04-97 99214 04-21-97 99212 05-06-97 99213 06-04-97 99213 06-13-97 99213 06-30-97 99213 07-14-97 99213 08-04-97 99213 01-19-98 99213 Recipient 21 04-29-97 99204 05-13-97 99214 05-16-97 99213 05-23-97 99212 06-09-97 99212 06-23-97 99212 07-11-97 99211 07-25-97 99213 08-11-97 99213 09-10-97 99213 11-05-97 99214 11-19-97 99213 12-22-97 99213 01-07-98 99214 01-21-98 99213 02-04-98 99213 Recipient 22 02-16-98 99205 02-20-98 99213 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 23 06-23-97 99215 10-02-97 992138 Recipient 24 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 25 01-24-97 99213 02-07-97 99213 02-24-97 99212 03-10-97 99213 03-24-97 99212 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99212 06-02-97 99212 06-16-97 99212 07-14-97 99213 07-23-97 99212 07-28-97 99213 08-18-97 99213 08-25-97 99213 09-15-97 99213 10-01-97 99213 10-13-97 99213 10-27-97 99214 12-08-97 99213 12-22-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-13-98 99212 01-19-98 99214 02-02-98 99212 CATEGORY III As set forth in the Physician Coverage and Limitation Handbook (Respondent’s Exhibit 6), Petitioner is not entitled to billings for laboratory tests that were performed outside his facility by an independent laboratory. The only billing arguably in Category III is the billing for Recipient 1 on February 19, 1998. That billing should have been approved because it was for a urinalysis by dip stick or tablet that was administered and analyzed by Petitioner. It was not analyzed by an independent laboratory. CATEGORY IV All Category IV billings pertained to Petitioner’s supervision of his staff while patients were receiving treatments of IVIG. Those billings will be subsumed in the Category V billings discussion. CATEGORY V The alleged Category V overpayments relate to Petitioner’s IVIG treatment of Patients 2, 8, 10, 19, 20, 21, and 25, each of whom was an adult diagnosed with AIDS. In many of these cases a nurse administered the IVIG treatment. A dispute as to whether Petitioner properly supervised the nurse while he or she administered the IVIG treatment is moot because of the findings pertaining to the IVIG treatments set forth in Paragraphs 20 and 21. The Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook requires that rendered services be medically necessary, as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary and do not duplicate another provider’s service. In addition, the services must meet the following criteria: the services must be individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the recipient’s needs; the services cannot be experimental or investigational; the services must reflect the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; and the services must be furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient’s caretaker, or the provider. The use of IVIG in adult AIDS patients is not approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA). The use of a drug for a purpose other than the uses approved by the FDA is referred to as an “off-label” use. The off-label use of IVIG in adult AIDS patients is not effective either from a medical standpoint or from an economic standpoint. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether any of the Recipients at issue in this proceeding had a medical condition or conditions other than AIDS that would justify the IVIG treatment administered by Petitioner. The following finding resolves that conflict. Utilizing applicable Medicaid billing criteria, the medical records produced by Petitioner fail to document that any of the Recipients at issue in this proceeding had a medical condition or conditions that warranted treatment with IVIG.9 All of Petitioner’s billings for IVIG treatments for Recipients 2, 8, 10, 19, 20, 21, and 25 were properly denied under the rationale of the FAAR’s Category V. Included in the billings that were properly denied were billings for office visits (whether documented by a doctor’s note or a nurse’s note) when the sole purpose of the office visit was the administration of an IVIG treatment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Final Order require that Petitioner repay the sum of the overpayment as determined by Respondent’s staff based on the Findings of Fact set forth in this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2005.
The Issue The issues are 1) whether Dr. Veloso's eligibility to participate in the Florida Medicaid program as a provider of physician services should be terminated, due to his guilty plea to a charge of Medicaid fraud in the Circuit Court for the 15th Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida and 2) whether a stay of the termination should be granted pending disposition of Dr. Veloso's appeal.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Dr. Veloso was a provider of medical services to persons who qualify for the Medicaid program and received reimbursement from Medicaid funds for his services. The Department is designated to administer the provision of Medicaid funds in Florida. Dr. Veloso is a licensed physician and a licensed pharmacist who practices in South Florida and whose patients are primarily Medicaid eligible. Dr. Veloso does not necessarily maintain a regular office practice. In addition to treating patients at his offices in West Palm Beach and Miami, he sees them at their homes, at the pharmacy or wherever is most convenient to the patients. As a provider of services to Medicaid eligible patients, Dr. Veloso is charged with the responsibility of being familiar with the rules and law relating to the Medicaid program. On November 4 1987, the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Office of the Auditor General received a call alleging that Dr. Veloso was making a copy of a Medicaid card when he filled a prescription. Dr. Veloso was employed at the caller's pharmacy as a part-time pharmacist. An investigation of Dr. Veloso's medicaid billing practice ensued. The investigation revealed that Dr. Veloso was billing for office visits on Miami Medicaid residents although his practice of record was located in West Palm Beach. The investigators interviewed sixteen households for whom Medicaid billings had been submitted by Dr. Veloso. The interviews resulted in the taking of sworn statements of six of the patients from the sample households who denied that they had received the treatment for which Dr. Veloso had filed reimbursement. None of the six patients was present or testified at the hearing. In his testimony, however, Dr. Veloso, countered the denials of each of the six patients. He described the treatment he had given each of the six and produced the patients' medical records to verify his statements. As to why the patients allegedly made the contradictory statements, Dr. Veloso asserted that they were quite possibly intimidated by the investigator since the patients did not have complete command of the English language and the investigator presented herself with an official badge for identification prior to the interview. Dr. Veloso also stated that if any mistakes had been made, they were only clerical. He explained that his wife prepared most of his billings at their home, and although he admitted that he was responsible for her actions, he represented that mistakes, if any, were inadvertently made. At the hearing, the investigator testified that it was her conclusion that Dr. Veloso did knowingly file false claims for services. Although the files for the six patients were received into evidence and each corroborates that he did in fact treat the patients, the actual disputed billings were not offered at the hearing. A comparison between the treatment given to the patients and the alleged fraudulent billings cannot be made. Given the demeanor of the witnesses, the competent substantial evidence received at the hearing and the lack of corroboration of the affidavits of the six patients, Dr. Veloso's testimony is deemed credible. Criminal proceedings were brought against Dr. Veloso. Dr. Veloso asserted that on the advice of his attorney, he entered his plea on October 2, 1989. The choice of plea on the judgment and sentencing form filed in this case is indicated by checking one of the three blocks on the form. The first block precedes the following statement, "Been tried and found guilty of the following crime(s)." The second block is followed by, "Entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s)," and the final choice is a block notated by "Entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following crime(s)." The block checked in Dr. Veloso's case is the second block. Above the "X" in the block is a handwritten statement, "Alford Plea." Dr. Veloso argued that it was not his intent to enter a plea which would be an admission of culpability. He entered his plea as merely a matter of convenience and on the representation of his counsel that the plea would result in punishment similar to a misdemeanor traffic offense. Dr. Veloso, further, testified that his plea was on appeal. Except for Dr. Veloso's statements and the official court documents, no additional competent substantial evidence was presented at the instant hearing concerning the circumstances present at the time of Dr. Veloso's plea. However, the judgment and sentencing form dated October 2, 1989 clearly indicates that he entered a plea of guilty to and was adjudicated guilty of a lesser included offense of medicaid fraud under Paragraph 409.325(5)(b), Florida Statutes. His sentence was stayed, and on October 6, 1989, an Order was issued in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County withholding adjudication for the offense and placing Dr. Veloso on probation for one year and requiring that restitution be paid to the Department of $492.00 plus costs. Although Dr. Veloso is a well intended physician, he was, in fact, found guilty of Medicaid fraud, based on a plea of guilty and is subject to termination from further participation in the Medicaid program under existent law, if the Department chooses to exercise its discretion to sanction him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order dismissing the charges against Dr. Veloso and not imposing the sanction permitted pursuant to Paragraph 409.236(11)(a), Florida Statutes, based on the exercise of its discretion. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 28 day of June, 1990. JANE C HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1990.
The Issue Whether Medicaid overpayments were made to Respondent and, if so, what is the total amount of those overpayments. Whether, as a "sanction," Respondent should be directed to submit to a "comprehensive follow-up review in six months."
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings s of fact are made to supplement and clarify the factual stipulations set forth in the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation and their January 26, 2007, pleading:4 Respondent and his Practice Respondent is a pediatric physician whose office is located in a poor neighborhood in Hialeah, Florida. He has a very busy practice, seeing approximately 50 to 60 patients each day the office is open. Respondent documents patient visits by making handwritten notations on printed "progress note" forms. Because of the fast-paced nature of his practice, he does not always "have time to write everything as [he] would like, because [there] is too much" for him to do. Respondent's Participation in the Medicaid Program During the Audit Period, Respondent was authorized to provide physician services to eligible Medicaid patients. Respondent provided such services pursuant to a valid Provider Agreement (Provider Agreement) with AHCA, which contained the following provisions, among others: The Provider agrees to participate in the Florida Medicaid program under the following terms and conditions: * * * Quality of Services. The provider agrees to provide medically necessary services or goods of not less than the scope and quality it provides to the general public. The provider agrees that services or goods billed to the Medicaid program must be medically necessary, of a quality comparable to those furnished by the provider's peers, and within the parameters permitted by the provider's license or certification. The provider further agrees to bill only for the services performed within the specialty or specialties designated in the provider application on file with the Agency. The services or goods must have been actually provided to eligible Medicaid recipients by the provider prior to submitting the claim. Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, manuals, handbooks and Statements of Policy as they may be amended from time to time. Term and signatures. The parties agree that this is a voluntary agreement between the Agency and the provider, in which the provider agrees to furnish services or goods to Medicaid recipients. . . . Provider Responsibilities. The Medicaid provider shall: * * * (b) Keep and maintain in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid related records as the Agency may require and as it determines necessary; make available for state and federal audits for five years, complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid. The provider agrees that only records made at the time the goods and services were provided will be admissible in evidence in any proceeding relating to the Medicaid program. * * * (d) Except as otherwise provided by law, the provider agrees to provide immediate access to authorized persons (including but not limited to state and federal employees, auditors and investigators) to all Medicaid- related information, which may be in the form of records, logs, documents, or computer files, and all other information pertaining to services or goods billed to the Medicaid program. This shall include access to all patient records and other provider information if the provider cannot easily separate records for Medicaid patients from other records. * * * (f) Within 90 days of receipt, refund any moneys received in error or in excess of the amount to which the provider is entitled from the Medicaid program. * * * (i) . . . . The provider shall be liable for all overpayments for any reason and pay to the Agency any fine or overpayment imposed by the Agency or a court of competent jurisdiction. Provider agrees to pay interest at 12% per annum on any fine or repayment amount that remains unpaid 30 days from the date of any final order requiring payment to the Agency. * * * Respondent's Medicaid provider number (under which he billed the Medicaid program for providing these services) was (and remains) 370947700. Handbook Provisions The handbooks with which Petitioner was required to comply in order to receive Medicaid payment for services rendered during the Audit Period included the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 (MPR Handbook); Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook (PCL Handbook); the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Coverage and Limitations Handbook (EPSDTCL Handbook); and the Child Health Check-up Coverage and Limitations Handbook (CHCUCL Handbook). Medical Necessity The PCL Handbook provided that the Medicaid program would reimburse physician providers for services "determined [to be] medically necessary" and not duplicative of another provider's service, and it went on to state as follows: In addition, the services must meet the following criteria: the services must be individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the recipient's needs; the services cannot be experimental or investigational; the services must reflect the level of services that can be safely furnished and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; and the services must be furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a covered services. Note See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 and EPSDT 224, for the definition of medically necessary.[5] The EPSDTCL and CHCUCL Handbooks had similar provisions. Documentation Requirements The MPR Handbook required the provider to keep "accessible, legible and comprehensible" medical records that "state[d] the necessity for and the extent of services" billed the Medicaid program and that were "signed and dated at the time of service." The handbook further required, among other things, that the provider retain such records for "at least five years from the date of service" and "send, at his or her expense, legible copies of all Medicaid-related information to the authorized state and federal agencies and their authorized representatives." The MPR Handbook warned that providers "not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies [described therein] may be subject to administrative sanctions and recoupment of Medicaid payments" and that "Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation or appropriate signatures will be recouped." EPSDT Screening/Child Health Check-Up The EPSDTCL Handbook provided: To be reimbursed by Medicaid, the provider must address and document in the recipient's medical record all the required components of an EPSDT screening. The following required components are listed in the order that they appear on the optional EPSDT screening form: Health and developmental history Nutritional assessment Developmental assessment Physical examination Dental screening Vision screening Hearing screening Laboratory tests Immunization Health education Diagnosis and treatment The CHCUCL Handbook, which replaced the EPSDTCL Handbook in or around May 2000, similarly provided as follows: To be reimbursed by Medicaid, the provider must assess and document in the child's medical record all the required components of a Child Health Check-Up. The required components are as follows: Comprehensive Health and Developmental History, including assessment of past medical history, developmental history and behavioral health status; Nutritional assessment; Developmental assessment; Comprehensive Unclothed Physical Examination Dental screening including dental referral, where required; Vision screening including objective testing, where required; Hearing screening including objective testing, where required; Laboratory tests including blood lead testing, where required; Appropriate immunizations; Health education, anticipatory guidance; Diagnosis and treatment; and Referral and follow-up, as appropriate. Coding Chapter 3 of the PCL Handbook "describe[d] the procedure codes for the services reimbursable by Medicaid that [had to be] used by physicians providing services to eligible recipients." As explained on the first page of this chapter of the handbook: The procedure codes listed in this chapter [were] Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) Levels 1, 2 and 3. These [were] based on the Physician[]s['] Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) book. The Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) book referred to in Chapter 3 of the PCL Handbook was a publication of the American Medical Association. It contained a listing of procedures and services performed by physicians in different settings, each identified by a "procedure code" consisting of five digits or a letter followed by four digits. For instance, there were various "procedure codes" for office visits. These "procedure codes" included the following, among others: New Patient * * * 99204 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 45 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. * * * Established Patient * * * 99213 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: an expanded problem focused history; an expanded problem focused examination; medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 15 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99214 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a detailed history; a detailed examination; medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 25 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. * * * Fee Schedules In Appendix J of the PCL Handbook, there was a "fee schedule," which established the amount physicians would be paid by the Medicaid program for each reimbursable procedure and service (identified by "procedure code"). For both "new patient" office visits (99201-99205 "procedure code" series) and "established patient" office visits (99211-99215 "procedure code" series), the higher numbered the "procedure code" in the series, the more a physician would be reimbursed under the "fee schedule." The Audit and Aftermath Commencing in or around August 2002, AHCA conducted an audit of Respondent's Medicaid claims for services rendered during the Audit Period (Audit Period Claims).6 Respondent had submitted 18,102 such Audit Period Claims, for which he had received payments totaling $596,623.15. These Audit Period Claims involved 1,372 different Medicaid patients. From this group, AHCA randomly selected a "cluster sample" of 40 patients. Of the 18,102 Audit Period Claims, 713 had been for services that, according to the claims, had been provided to the 40 patients in the "cluster sample" (Sample Claims). Respondent had received a total of $23,263.18 for these 713 Sample Claims. During an August 28, 2002, visit to Respondent's office, AHCA personnel "explain[ed] to [Respondent] what the audit was about [and] why [AHCA] was doing it" and requested Respondent to provide AHCA with copies of the medical records Respondent had on file for the 40 patients in the "cluster sample" documenting the services provided to them during the Audit Period. The originals of these records were not inspected by AHCA personnel or agents during, or any time after, this August 28, 2002, site visit. Sometime within approximately 30 to 45 days of the August 28, 2002, site visit, Respondent, through his office staff, made the requested copies (First Set of Copies) and provided them to AHCA. There is nothing on the face of these documents to suggest that they were not true, accurate, and complete copies of the originals in Respondent's possession, as they existed at the time of copying (Copied Originals). They do not appear, upon visual examination, to be the product of "bad photocopying." While the handwritten entries and writing are oftentimes difficult (at least for the undersigned) to decipher, this is because of the poor legibility of the handwriting, not because the copies are faint or otherwise of poor quality. Each of the Sample Claims was reviewed to determine whether it was supported by information contained in the First Set of Copies. An initial review was conducted by AHCA Program Analyst Theresa Mock and AHCA Registered Nurse Consultant Blanca Notman. AHCA then contracted with Larry Deeb, M.D., to conduct an independent "peer review" in accordance with the provisions of Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes. Since 1980, Dr. Deeb has been a Florida-licensed pediatric physician, certified by the American Board of Pediatrics, in active practice in Tallahassee. AHCA provided Dr. Deeb with the First Set of Copies, along with worksheets containing a "[l]isting of [a]ll claims in [the] sample" on which Ms. Notman had made handwritten notations indicating her preliminary determination as to each of the Sample Claims (Claims Worksheets). In conducting his "peer review," Dr. Deeb did not interview any of the 40 patients in the "cluster sample," nor did he take any other steps to supplement the information contained in the documents that he was provided. Dr. Deeb examined the First Set of Copies. He conveyed to AHCA his findings regarding the sufficiency of these documents to support the Sample Claims by making appropriate handwritten notations on the Claims Worksheets before returning them to AHCA. Based on Dr. Deeb's sufficiency findings, as well as Ms. Notman's "no documentation" determinations, AHCA "provisional[ly]" determined that Respondent had been overpaid a total $80,788.23 for the Audit Period Claims. By letter dated July 7, 2003 (Provisional Agency Audit Report), AHCA advised Petitioner of this "provisional" determination and invited Respondent to "submit further documentation in support of the claims identified as overpayment," adding that "[d]ocumentation that appear[ed] to be altered, or in any other way appear[ed] not to be authentic, [would] not serve to reduce the overpayment." Appended to the letter were "[t]he audit work papers [containing a] listing [of] the claims that [were] affected by this determination." In the Provisional Agency Audit Report, AHCA gave the following explanation as to how it arrived at its overpayment determination: REVIEW DETERMINATION(S) Medicaid policy defines the varying levels of care and expertise required for the evaluation and management procedure codes for office visits. The documentation you provided supports a lower level of office visit than the one for which you billed and received payment. The difference between the amount you were paid and the correct payment for the appropriate level of service is considered an overpayment. Medicaid policy specifies how medical records must be maintained. A review of your medical records revealed that some services for which you billed and received payment were not documented. Medicaid requires documentation of the services and considers payment made for services not appropriately documented an overpayment. Medicaid policy addresses specific billing requirements and procedures. You billed Medicaid for Child Health Check Up (CHCUP) services and office visits for the same child on the same day. Child Health Check- Up Providers may only bill for one visit, a Child Health Check-Up or a sick visit. The difference between the amount you were paid and the appropriate fee is considered an overpayment. The overpayment was calculated as follows: A random sample of 40 recipients respecting whom you submitted 713 claims was reviewed. For those claims in the sample which have dates of service from January 01, 2000 through December 31, 2001 an overpayment of $4,168.00 or $5.84667601 per claim was found, as indicated on the accompanying schedule. Since you were paid for a total (population) of 18,102 claims for that period, the point estimate of the total overpayment is 18,102 x $5.84667601= $105,836.33. There is a 50 percent probability that the overpayment to you is that amount or more. There was then an explanation of the "statistical formula for cluster sampling" that AHCA used and how it "calculated that the overpayment to [Respondent was] $80,788.23 with a ninety-five percent (95%) probability that it [was] that amount or more." After receiving the Provisional Agency Audit Report, Respondent requested to meet with Dr. Deeb to discuss Dr. Deeb's sufficiency findings. The meeting was held on September 25, 2003, approximately six months after Dr. Deeb had reviewed the First Set of Copies and a year after AHCA had received the First Set of Copies from Respondent. At the meeting, Respondent presented to Dr. Deeb what Respondent represented was a better set of copies of the Copied Originals than the First Set of Copies (on which Dr. Deeb had based the sufficiency findings AHCA relied on in making its "provisional" overpayment determination). According to Respondent, the First Set of Copies "had not been properly Xeroxed." He stated that his office staff "had not copied the back section of the documentation and that was one of the major factors in the documentation not supporting the [claimed] level of service." The copies that Respondent produced at this meeting (Second Set of Copies) had additional handwritten entries and writing (both on the backs and fronts of pages) not found in the First Set of Copies: the backs of "progress note" pages that were completely blank in the First Set of Copies contained handwritten narratives, and there were handwritten entries and writing in numerous places on the fronts of these pages where, on the fronts of the corresponding pages in the First Set of Copies, just blank, printed lines appeared (with no other discernible markings). The Second Set of Copies was not appreciably clearer than the First Set of Copies. In the two hours that he had set aside to meet with Respondent, Dr. Deeb only had time to conduct a "quick[]," partial review of the Second Set of Copies. Based on this review (which involved looking at documents concerning approximately half of the 40 patients in the "cluster sample"), Dr. Deeb preliminarily determined to "allow" many of the Sample Claims relating to these patients that he had previously determined (based on his review of the First Set of Copies) were not supported by sufficient documentation. Following this September 25, 2003, meeting, after comparing the Second Set of Copies with the First Set of Copies and noting the differences between the two, AHCA "made the decision that [it] would not accept the [S]econd [S]et [of Copies]" because these documents contained entries and writing that appeared to have been made, not contemporaneously with the provision of the goods or services they purported to document (as required), but rather after the post-Audit Period preparation of the First Set of Copies. Instead, AHCA, reasonably, based its finalized overpayment determination on the First Set of Copies. Thereafter, AHCA prepared and sent to Respondent a Final Agency Audit Report, which was in the form of a letter dated June 29, 2004, advising Respondent that AHCA had finalized the "provisional" determination announced in the Provisional Agency Audit that he had been overpaid $80,788.23 for the Audit Period Claims (a determination that the preponderance of the record evidence in this case establishes is a correct one).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order finding that Respondent received $80,788.23 in Medicaid overpayments for the Audit Period Claims, and requiring Respondent to repay this amount to AHCA. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2007.
Findings Of Fact The Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency) is the successor to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services as the single state agency responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida. The Agency is required to operate a program to oversee the activities of Medicaid providers and is authorized to seek recovery of Medicaid overpayments to providers pursuant to Section 409.913, Florida Statutes. The division of the Agency responsible for the oversight of Medicaid providers is referred to as Medicaid Program Integrity. On October 10, 1985, the Petitioner, Billy Beeks, M.D., (Provider) executed a Medicaid Provider Agreement which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The provider agrees to keep complete and accurate medical and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid program . . . . The provider agrees to submit Medicaid claims in accordance with program policies and that payment by the program for services rendered will be based on the payment methodology in the applicable Florida Administrative Rule. . 8. The provider and the Department agree to abide by the provisions of the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations. Among the "manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program" referenced in paragraph 8 of the provider agreement was the Medicaid Physician Provider Handbook (hereinafter referred to as the "MPP Handbook"). Chapter 10 of the MPP Handbook addressed the subject of "provider participation." At the times pertinent to this proceeding Section 9 of Chapter 10 included the following: RECORD KEEPING You must retain physician records on services provided to each Medicaid recipient. You must also keep financial records. Keep the records for five (5) years from the date of service. Examples of the types of Medicaid records that must be retained are: Medicaid claim forms and any documents that are attached, treatment plans, prior authorization information, any third party claim information, x-rays, fiscal records, and copies of sterilization and hysterectomy consents. Medical records must contain the extent of services provided. The following is a list of minimum requirements: history, physical examination, chief complaint on each visit, diagnostic tests and results, diagnosis, a dated, signed physician order for each service rendered, treatment plan, including prescriptions for medications, supplies, scheduling frequency for follow-up or other services, signature of physician on each visit, date of service, anesthesia records, surgery records, copies of hospital and/or emergency records that fully disclose services, and referrals to other services. If time is a part of the procedure code prescription being billed, then duration of visit shown by begin time and end time must be included in the record. . Medicaid payments are based on billing codes and levels of services provided. In setting the appropriate billing to Medicaid, the level of service is determined pursuant to the MPP Handbook. At all times pertinent to this proceeding Section 1 of Chapter 11 of the MPP Handbook included the following pertaining to "covered services and limitations": HCPCS CODES and ICD-9-CM CODES Procedure codes listed in Chapter 12 are HCPCS (Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure Coding System) codes. These are based on the Physician's Current Procedural Terminology, Fourth Edition. Determine which procedure describes the service rendered and enter that code and description on your claim form. HCPCS codes described as "unlisted" are used when there is no procedure among those listed that describes the service rendered. Physician's Current Procedural Terminology, Fourth Edition, Copyright . . . by the American Medical Association (CPT-4) is a listing of descriptive terms and numeric identifying codes and modifiers for reporting medical services and procedures performed by physicians. The Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) includes CPT-4 descriptive terms and numeric identifying codes and modifiers for reporting medical services and procedures and other materials contained in CPT-4 which are copyrighted by the American Medical Association. The Diagnosis Codes to be used are found in the International Classification of Diseases, 9th edition, Clinical Modifications (ICD-9- CM). A diagnosis code is required on all physician claims. Use the most specific code available. Fourth and fifth digits are required when available. All billings pertinent to this proceedings are for patient office visits. Prior to amendments effective January 1, 1992, the MPP also provided in Section 1, Chapter 11, for six levels of service associated with the office visit procedure code. These levels of service, in ascending order of complexity, are "Minimal, "Brief", "Limited", "Intermediate", "Extended", and "Comprehensive". The least amount paid by Medicaid to a provider was for a "Minimal" level office visit. The level of payment immediately above the "Minimal" level were the "Brief" and "Limited" levels, which entitled a provider to the same payment. Immediately above the "Brief" and "Limited" levels, in ascending order of payment, were "Intermediate", "Extended", and "Comprehensive". Section 1, Chapter 11 of the MPP contained the following discussion of the six levels of service: There are six levels of service associated with the visit procedure codes. They require varying skills, effort, responsibility, and medical knowledge to complete the examination, evaluation, diagnosis, treatment and conference with the recipient about his illness or promotion of optimal health. These levels are: Minimal is a level of service supervised by a physician. Brief is a level of service pertaining to the evaluation and treatment of a condition requiring only an abbreviated history and exam. Limited is a level of service used to evaluate a circumscribed acute illness or to periodically reevaluate a problem including a history and examination, review of effectiveness of past medical management, the ordering and evaluation of appropriate diagnostic tests, the adjustments of therapeutic management as indicated and discussion of findings. Intermediate level of service pertains to the evaluation of a new or existing condition complicated with a new diagnostic or management problem, not necessarily related to the primary diagnosis, that necessitates the obtaining of pertinent history and physical or mental status findings, diagnostic tests and procedures, and ordering appropriate therapeutic management; or a formal patient, family or a hospital staff conference regarding the patient's medical management and progress. Extended level of service requires an unusual amount of effort or judgment including a detailed history, review of medical records, examination, and a formal conference with the patient, family, or staff; or a comparable medical diagnostic and/or therapeutic service. Comprehensive level of service provides for an in-depth evaluation of a patient with a new or existing problem requiring the development or complete reevaluation of medical data. This service includes the recording of a chief complaint, present illness, family history, past medical history, personal review, system review, complete physical examination, and ordering appropriate tests and procedures. Chapter 11 of the MPP was amended, effective January 1, 1992. Instead of the six levels of service for office visits, five levels of service, referred to as "evaluation and management" (E/M) service codes were adopted. The E/M levels of service levels ranged from Level 1 to Level 5 in ascending order of complexity and payment. 1/ Section 1, Chapter 11 of the MPP, as amended January 1, 1992, provides the following discussion as to the development of the E/M service codes: The American Medical Association, in cooperation with many other groups, replaced the old "visit" codes with the new "evaluation and management" (E/M) service codes in the 1992 CPT. This is a result of the Physician Payment Reform which requires the standardization of policies and billing practices nationwide to ensure equitable payment for all services. The new E/M codes are a totally new concept for identifying services in comparison to the old visit codes. They are more detailed and specific to the amount of work involved. Section 1, Chapter 11 of the MPP, as amended January 1, 1992, provides that the level of E/M codes are defined by the following seven components: Extent of History, Extent of Examination, and Complexity of Medical Decision- Making, Counseling, Coordination of Care, Nature of Presenting Problem, and time. 2/ After determining whether the office visit is for a new or established patient, Section 1, Chapter 11 of the MPP, as amended January 1, 1992, instructs the provider to determine the level of E/M services by taking into consideration the following three key components: Extent of History, Extent of Examination, and Complexity of Medical Decision-making. Section 1, Chapter 11 of the MPP, as amended January 1, 1992, provides the following discussion under the subheading "Extent of History": There are four types of history which are recognized: Problem Focused - chief complaint; brief history of present illness or problem. Expanded Problem Focused - chief complaint; brief history of present illness; problem pertinent system review. Detailed - chief complaint; extended history of present illness; extended system review; pertinent past, family and/or social history. Comprehensive - chief complaint; extended history of present illness; complete system review; complete past, family and social history. Section 1, Chapter 11 of the MPP, as amended January 1, 1992, provides the following discussion under the subheading "Extent of Examination": There are four types of examinations which are recognized: Problem Focused - an examination that is limited to the affected body area or organ system. Expanded Problem Focused - an examination of the affected body area or organ system and other symptomatic or related organ systems. Detailed - an extended examination of the affected body area(s) and other symptomatic or related organ system(s) Comprehensive - a complete single system speciality examination or a complete multisystem examination. Section 1, Chapter 11 of the MPP, as amended January 1, 1992, provides the following discussion under the subheading "Complexity of Medical Decision- Making": Medical decision-making refers to the complexity of establishing a diagnosis and/or selecting a management option as measured by the following factors: The number of possible diagnoses and/or the number of management options that must be considered. The amount and/or complexity of medical records, diagnostic tests, and/or other information that must be obtained, reviewed and analyzed. The risk of significant complications morbidity and/or mortality, as well as co- morbidities, associated with the patient's presenting problem(s), the diagnostic procedure(s) and/or the possible management options. There are four types of medical decision- making which are recognized: straightforward, low complexity, moderate complexity, and high complexity. 3/ Rule 10C-7.047, Florida Administrative Code, 4/ pertains to the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Program (EPSDT), and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Purpose. EPSDT is a comprehensive, preventive health care program for Medicaid- eligible children under age 21 that is designed to identify and correct medical conditions before the conditions become serious and disabling. Medicaid provides payment for EPSDT which allows entry into a health care system, access to a medical home (sic) and preventive/well child care on a regular basis. This periodic medical screening includes a health and developmental history, an unclothed physical examination, nutritional assessment, developmental assessment, laboratory tests, immunizations, health education, dental, vision and hearing screens, and an automatic dental referral for children age 3 and over. A billing for an EPSDT screening is compensated by Medicaid at a rate that is higher than the rate for a Limited or Level 2 office visit. A provider must document all components of the EPSDT screening in order to be entitled to payment for the screening. If all components of the EPSDT screening are not documented by a provider's records, Medicaid compensates the provider for a Limited or Level 2 office visit since the provider would have made sufficient contact with the recipient to justify that billing level. When conducting an audit of a provider's billings to the Medicaid program, employees of Medicaid Program Integrity review the provider's medical records to determine whether the level of services billed are justified by the medical records. Medical records must contain sufficient documentation to substantiate that the recipient received necessary medical services at the level billed by the provider. A routine urinalysis performed during the course of an office visit should be billed as part of the office visit and not billed as a separate service. Vicki Divens, a registered nurse, is a consultant employed by the Agency and was administratively responsible for the audit of the Provider's medical records. She conducted this audit pursuant to the Agency's rules and policies. Ms. Divens obtained a report from Consultec, the Agency's fiscal agent, that provides identifying information as to all services that were billed to Medicaid by the Provider for the audit period of June 1, 1991, through May 30, 1993. This computer report reflects the date that each service was billed to Medicaid by the Provider, the name and Medicaid number of each recipient of the service, the codes which are used to describe the procedure of the service billed, the level of the service, the amount paid to the Provider, and the date of payment. For the audit period, there were a total of 1,712 Medicaid recipients who received services from the Provider, there were 9,054 separate billings for services to recipients, and there was a total of $259,305.01 paid by Medicaid to the Provider. The Agency is authorized 5/ to employ a statistical methodology to calculate the amount of overpayment due from a provider where there has been overstated billings. The methodology used by the Agency is a form of cluster sampling that is widely accepted and produces a result that is recognized as being statistically accurate. For the audit that is the subject of this proceeding, the Agency determined that 23 patient files would be the number of files necessary for the statistical analysis. The Agency established that sampling was adequate to perform the statistical analysis. The 23 recipients whose medical records would be analyzed were thereafter selected on a completely random basis. Ms. Divens obtained from the Provider the medical records for the 23 patients that had been randomly selected for analysis. A total of 141 separate billings had been made for these 23 recipients during the audit period and each of those billings had been paid to the Provider by the Medicaid program. The medical records for the 23 recipients were thereafter reviewed by Dr. John Sullenberger, the Florida Medicaid Program's Chief Medical Consultant, who made the determination as to whether the medical records in the sampling justified the level at which Medicaid had been billed for each of the services. Based on the overbillings found in the sampling, the Agency calculated an estimate of the overpayment for all Medicaid billings during the audit period by using a formula that is recognized as producing a statistically accurate result. When Dr. Sullenberger initially reviewed the Provider's medical records, several of the medical files for recipients in the sampling had not been located. Without these records to substantiate the billings for these patients, no credit was given for those services. The amount of the alleged overpayment for all recipients during the audit period was initially calculated to be $60,753.25, which is the amount claimed in the Agency's final audit report letter dated December 13, 1993. Thereafter additional records were furnished to the Agency by the Provider and the alleged overpayment was recalculated to be $50,852.86, which is the amount the Agency asserted as being the amount of the overpayment at the beginning of the formal hearing. 5/ The following findings are made as to the billings that were in dispute at the formal hearing. The date of birth is given for each recipient to help identify the recipient. For office visits before January 1, 1992, the level of services are described as being "Minimal," "Brief," "Limited," "Intermediate," "Extended," or "Comprehensive." For office visits after January 1, 1992, the level of services are described as being Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, Level 4, or Level 5. Patient 1 was born January 22, 1989. There were four billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On November 19, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On April 29, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On August 7, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 4. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On August 21, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 4. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 2 was born September 29, 1985. There were five billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On August 31, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Extended level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On September 3, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On October 25, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Extended level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On February 7, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On October 26, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 3 was born May 9, 1985. There were two billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On May 22, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On January 20, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 4 was born March 20, 1968. There was one billing for this patient at issue in this proceeding. A. On July 25, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 5 was born April 28, 1988. There were three billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On August 30, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On October 14, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Intermediate level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On April 3, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 6 was born February 7, 1987. There was one billing for this patient at issue in this proceeding. A. On August 30, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 7 was born February 25, 1987. There were two billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On August 30, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient and he also billed for a urinalysis. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level and that the billing for the urinalysis should be included as part of the Limited level office visit. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 8 was born July 11, 1988. There were three billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On September 10, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level and he billed separately for an urinalysis for this patient during this visit. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Intermediate and that the urinalysis should be included in this billing. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On March 23, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 9 was born January 9, 1989. There were four billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On August 23, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Extended level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On October 15, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On April 20, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level Four. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level Two. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On April 21, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 4. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level Two. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 10 was born August 30, 1988. There were three billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On September 4, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited Level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On October 14, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited Level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On July 21, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Level Two. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 11 was born September 17, 1989. There were fifteen billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On June 3, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Extended level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On June 14, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On July 6, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Intermediate level. Dr. Leterman was of the opinion that the medical records justified the Intermediate level billing (Leterman deposition, page 30), but Dr. Sullenberger testified the billing should be at the Limited level (Transcript, page 171). This conflict is resolved by finding that the medical records justify this billing at the Intermediate level so that no adjustment is necessary. On July 15, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On July 20, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On August 5, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On August 20, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Extended level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On October 30, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On November 25, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Intermediate level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On December 27, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. (See, Leterman deposition, page 34) On January 28, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 4. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On February 25, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On July 7, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 3. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On December 9, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On May 3, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 3. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 12 was born July 12, 1970. There were four billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On January 3, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On January 13, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On February 3, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On March 10, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 13 was born August 22, 1990. There was one billing for this patient that was initially at issue in this proceeding. On August 22, 1990, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. When Dr. Sullenberger, the Agency's expert, initially reviewed the Provider's medical records pertaining to this billing, he thought that the billing should be reduced to a Limited level office visit. The amount of overpayment claimed by the Agency at the beginning of the formal hearing was based on this billing being at a Limited level. At the formal hearing, Dr. Sullenberger testified that on further consideration, he believed that the medical records justified this billing as an EPSDT, so that no adjustment was necessary. Based on his testimony, it is found the medical records maintained by the Provider justify this billing and no adjustment is necessary. Patient 14 was born October 23, 1990. There were nine billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On September 27, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Intermediate level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On October 11, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Extended level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On October 21, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Intermediate level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On December 17, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Extended level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On January 31, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 4. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On May 19, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On June 4, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On July 7, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On May 7, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 15 was born November 9, 1990. There was one billing for this patient at issue in this proceeding. A. On September 24, 1991, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Comprehensive level. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Limited level. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 16 was born September 14, 1991. There were two billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On March 13, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 4. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On March 1, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 17 was born February 9, 1992. There were two billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On November 7, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On November 25, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. When Dr. Sullenberger, the Agency's expert, initially reviewed the Provider's medical records pertaining to this billing, he thought that the billing should be reduced to a Level 2 office visit. The amount of overpayment claimed by the Agency at the beginning of the formal hearing was based on this billing being at Level 2. At the formal hearing, Dr. Sullenberger testified that on further consideration, he believed that the medical records justified this billing at Level 3. Based on that testimony, it is found that this billing should have been at the Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 18 was born July 6, 1992. There were six billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On August 12, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On August 17, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and than this billing should have been at Level 4. 6/ The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On September 18, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On October 9, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and than this billing should have been at Level 3. 7/ The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On November 5, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On December 18, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Level 5. When Dr. Sullenberger, the Agency's expert, initially reviewed the Provider's medical records pertaining to this billing, he thought that the billing should be reduced to a Level 2 office visit. The amount of overpayment claimed by the Agency at the beginning of the formal hearing was based on this billing being at Level 2. At the formal hearing, Dr. Sullenberger testified that on further consideration, he believed that the medical records justified this billing at Level 3. Based on the testimony of Dr. Sullenberger and that of Dr. Leterman, it is found that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 19 was born June 12, 1989. There was one billing for this patient at issue in this proceeding. A. On February 9, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 20 was born May 18, 1987. There was one billing for this patient at issue in this proceeding. A. On July 27, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 21 was born April 27, 1988. There were four billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On January 12, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 4. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On February 17, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for an EPSDT for this patient. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. March 8, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at the Level 4. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On April 16, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 22 was born August 10, 1992. There were three billings for this patient at issue in this proceeding. On December 28, 1992, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On February 9, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 4. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at the Level 3. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. On February 22, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 4. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 2. The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing. Patient 23 was born May 23, 1993. There was one billing for this patient at issue in this proceeding. A. On May 26, 1993, the Provider billed Medicaid for services rendered to this patient at Level 5. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical records maintained by the Provider do not justify this billing and that this billing should have been at Level 3 The Provider received an overpayment from the Medicaid program as a result of this billing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein and that the Agency recalculate the total amount of the overpayment during the audit period based on the findings of fact contained herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1995.
The Issue Whether Petitioner failed to maintain required records to support and document Medicaid prescription claims paid by the Medicaid program for the audit period (June 24, 1998, to June 1, 2000). If so, whether Petitioner received overpayments from the Medicaid program. If so, whether extrapolation was appropriately used to determine the amount of that overpayment (alleged by Respondent to be $1,053,137.49).
Findings Of Fact PETITIONER At all times relevant to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was licensed pursuant to Chapter 465, Florida Statutes, to provide pharmacy services in Florida with pharmacy license number PH0012223. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was an authorized Medicaid provider with provider number 102126500. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Respondent. During the audit period, Petitioner provided pharmacy services to Medicaid recipients and billed those services to the Medicaid program under its Medicaid provider number. Specifically Petitioner sold or dispensed drugs to Medicaid recipients who resided in nursing homes. Petitioner operated solely to serve nursing home populations. Petitioner usually received pharmacy orders by telephone or facsimile transmission from a nursing home. Typically, the staff at Petitioner’s facility would take the call or receive the facsimile transmission, write down the pertinent information, enter the data into the pharmacy’s computer system, dispense the item, and route the drugs to the nursing home via courier. All drugs are dispensed in sealed containers and are delivered with a manifest listing all the medications by name and patient. Jerry Kelly, a pharmacist employed by Petitioner’s parent corporation, described how nursing home orders or prescriptions were obtained and taken, beginning on line 11, page 716, of Volume VI of the hearing transcript: The vast majority, probably 90, 95 percent, are faxed over from the nursing home by nurses. A few may be called in with the nurse acting under the regulatory authority to act as the agent of the physician. These orders are then reviewed by the pharmacist. An order issue technician will enter that information into the computer, creating the original prescription.[2] The pharmacist then checks that data that was entered into the prescription to make sure all elements are there and the order entry is correct. Labels are then printed, which go to the floor to be filled by technicians. The pharmacist then checks the final product. That product is sent to a staging area where delivery manifests are printed. Those orders are then checked off the delivery manifest to make sure that no orders have been missed. The tote is sealed and then delivered to a nursing home by courier service. At the nursing home, the nurse and the driver check these orders off together, both sign that delivery manifest, and a copy of that delivery manifest comes back to the pharmacy. Q. Can you explain to the Court the typical process at [Petitioner’s parent corporation] by which refills, so to speak, are received and handled. A. Back then refills were handled by pulling a label off of the prescription container, apply it to a refill order sheet or a piece of paper of any kind that would fax . . . those are faxed to the pharmacy, those labels are pulled and faxed to the pharmacy by a nurse acting again under the regulatory authority of a -- to act as the agent of the physician. That’s also verifying to us that those orders are continued for another month. The prescription number is put in by an order entry tech. Those labels are printed and filled. From there on, the process is exactly the same. Prior to the audit period, Petitioner was purchased by another corporation. Subsequent to the audit, Petitioner ceased to operate as a pharmacy. RESPONDENT Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility and authority to administer the Medicaid program in Florida. Respondent’s OMPI is responsible for overseeing the integrity of the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to this authority Respondent’s OMPI oversees audits to assure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. These integrity audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Medicaid program in Florida was governed by a “pay and chase” procedure. Under this procedure, Respondent paid Medicaid claims submitted by Medicaid providers and then, after- the-fact, OMPI audited such providers for accuracy and quality control. These integrity audits are to assure that the provider maintains records to support the paid claims. HERITAGE In 1999 OMPI contracted with Heritage through Consultec, L.L.C. (Medicaid’s fiscal agent), to perform and report pharmacy audits of pharmacy providers within the state. Auditors from Heritage were assigned Petitioner’s audit. The Heritage employees in charge of the subject audit were experienced and appropriately trained. THE AUDIT Respondent’s audit no 01-1017-00-3/H/JDJ reviewed Petitioner’s Medicaid claims paid by Respondent for the period June 24, 1998, through June 1, 2000. Ken Yon is the OMPI administrator who was responsible for managing the instant case and who worked with the Heritage auditors to assure the policies and practices of Respondent were met. In this case, the Heritage auditors presented at Petitioner’s facility unannounced on July 31, 2000 and sought 250 randomly selected claims for review. By limiting the number of claims, the auditors were not required to sift through the records of 139,036 claims (the total number of claims that the Petitioner submitted during the audit period). For the universe of 139,036 claims, 250 randomly selected claims is a reasonable sample to audit. The adequacy of the sample number as well as the manner in which it was generated is supported by the weight of credible evidence presented in this matter. Also, the results of extrapolating a sample of 250 claims to the universe of 139,036 claims would be statistically valid if the sampled claims were randomly chosen. The 250 sample claims selected for the subject audit were randomly chosen. Heritage asked the Petitioner to present prescription records it was required to retain to support the claims for the audit period. Petitioner offered the auditors its computerized records for many of the 250 samples in lieu of the hard copies the auditors requested. The auditors refused to accept the computerized records and, as reflected by the Audit Report, Petitioner was unable to produce acceptable evidence of prescriptions for a great many of the 250 samples.3 The auditors found that 171 of the 250 claims sampled were discrepant, in that they did not meet standards for payment. The auditors analyzed the number of discrepant claims and determined that the average overcharge per sampled claim was $36.3434 (sic). Multiplying the number of claims in the universe by that average yielded an initial estimate of the overcharge in the amount of $5,053,040.96. The 95% one-sided, lower-confidence limit4 for the initial estimate was determined to be $3,946.215.96, which is the amount of the overpayment alleged in the FAAR. THE FAAR AND SUBSEQUENT COMPUTATIONS After the auditors completed their review of the records at Petitioner’s facility, JoAnn Jackson, a licensed pharmacist with extensive experience in auditing pharmacies, was assigned by Respondent to review Heritage’s audit report and to prepare the Respondent’s FAAR. The vast majority of the discrepant claims (165 of the 171) were categorized as CF, which meant that the auditors could not find required documentation of the subject prescription or could not find required documentation for the refill of a prescription. These findings were reported to the Petitioner, who was given additional time to locate and produce documents to support the claims. Respondent was willing to accept documentation for claims up through the time of hearing.5 Based on additional documentation submitted by Petitioner after the auditors had completed their field work, Respondent’s staff recalculated the amount of the overpayment by the use of extrapolation (including the reduction of the initial estimate to the 95% one-sided, lower confidence limit) to be the amount of $1,053,137.49, which is the amount of the overpayment at issue at the formal hearing. Respondent established that each alleged discrepant claim that it used to recalculate the amount of the overpayment was, in fact, discrepant and did not meet Medicaid record-keeping standards. RECORD RETENTION REQUIREMENTS Although Petitioner’s manner of doing business was different from the conventional pharmacy (the so-called corner drugstore), it was subject to the same Medicaid records retention requirements as a conventional pharmacy that serves as a Medicaid provider. Pursuant to the applicable Medicaid Provider Agreement between Petitioner and Respondent, Petitioner was to comply with all Medicaid handbooks in effect during the audit period. Petitioner was also required to comply with all applicable state and federal Medicaid Program rules and laws in effect during the audit period. For each claim submitted during the audit period by Petitioner to Respondent for payment under the Medicaid Program, Petitioner was required to “keep, maintain, and make available in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid- related records as Respondent requires for a period of at least five (5) years.” Petitioner was also required to make these supporting records available to Respondent upon Respondent’s request. A Medicaid provider must retain all medical, fiscal, professional, and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. In addition to the foregoing, a Medicaid provider must maintain a patient record for each recipient for whom new or refill prescriptions are dispensed. Specific to the issues of this case, a Medicaid provider must retain prescription records for five years from the date the prescription was last filled or refilled. For the audit period in this case, the prescription that authorized the dispensing of each drug for which Petitioner claimed payment under the Medicaid program should have been maintained and made available for the auditors since each prescription would have been within the five-year period. The records may be kept on paper, magnetic material, film, or other media. However, in order to qualify for reimbursement, the records must be signed and dated at the time of service, or otherwise attested to as appropriate to the media. Rubber stamp signatures must be initialed. The records must be accessible, legible and comprehensive. Applicable records that must be kept for quality control so that an after-the-fact audit can verify the integrity of the Medicaid claims that were paid by Respondent. Each claim reviewed and at issue in this cause was a paid Medicaid claim subject to the Petitioner’s provider agreement and the pertinent regulations. In order to stand as a sufficient prescription form, a writing must be created contemporaneous to the order (phone requests that are transcribed are acceptable), must contain specific information (type of drug, strength, dose, patient, doctor, DEA number, refill, etc.), and it must be kept for the requisite time. It would be acceptable for the prescription to be computer generated so long as it was written contemporaneous to the order and preserved as required by law. At the times relevant to this proceeding, Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16-28.140(1)(d) and (e), provided, in part, as follows: Original prescriptions . . . shall be reduced to writing if not received in written form. All original prescriptions shall be retained for a period of not less than two years from date of last filling. To the extent authorized by 21 C.F.R. Section 1304.04, a pharmacy may, in lieu of retaining the actual original prescriptions, use an electronic imagining record keeping system, provided such system is capable of capturing, storing, and reproducing the exact image of the prescription, including the reverse side of the prescription if necessary, and that such image be retained for a period of no less than two years from the date of the last filling. Original prescriptions shall be maintained in a two or three file system as specified in 21 C.F.R. 1304.04(h). PETITIONER’S COMPUTERIZED RECORDS There was a dispute between the parties as to whether Petitioner’s computer records should have been accepted as evidence that valid prescriptions underlie each dispensed drug within the sample. That dispute is resolved by finding that the computer records maintained by the Petitioner did not retain prescriptions in the format dictated by rule. An electronic imaging recording system may be used when the system captures, stores, and can reproduce the exact image of the prescription, including the reverse side of the prescription if necessary. The Petitioner’s system did not do that. An electronic system must be able to produce a contemporaneous hard-copy printout of all original prescriptions dispensed and refilled. The original prescriptions must be maintained in a two or three file system as specified in 21 C.F.R. 1304.04(h). If the Petitioner’s system could do that, it did not. Fundamentally, a Medicaid claim for a drug that has been dispensed by a Medicaid provider must have as its basis a valid prescription. While Petitioner’s computer records established what drugs had been dispensed, those records did not meet the requirements for establishing that the drugs were dispensed pursuant to valid prescriptions. OVERPAYMENT Any Medicaid providers not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. As set forth in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order, the term “overpayment” is defined by Section 409.913(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2000). EXTRAPOLATION At hearing, Petitioner continued to dispute the procedure of applying the audit sample overpayment to the population of claims to mathematically compute the overpayment for the audit period. Extensive testimony was taken as to the extrapolation process used in this proceeding. Respondent has used a statistical extrapolation method to compute overpayments for years. The statistical concept and process of applying a sample to a universe to mathematically compute an overpayment is not novel to this case. All testimony, including the testimony of Dr. Intriligator, has been fully considered in the findings reached in this case. The testimony of Dr. Mark Johnson, an expert in statistical sampling and analysis, has been deemed credible and persuasive as to the issues of the appropriateness of the sample (as to size and how it was generated), the use of the sample overpayment to calculate an overall payment, and the statistical trustworthiness of the amounts claimed in this case. The only way to determine the amount of the actual overpayment is to examine each of the 139,036 claims that were made during the audit period. Dr. Johnson’s testimony established that the probability is overwhelming that the amount of the alleged overpayment is substantially less than the actual overpayment. Respondent established that Petitioner received an overpayment during the audit period as alleged in the FAAR and it established that the amount of the overpayment is at least $1,053,137.49.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order that finds that Petitioner has received an overpayment from the Medicaid program in the amount of $1,053,137.49. It is further recommended that the final order require Petitioner to repay that overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th of February, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner received a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $11,077.65 for claims filed between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. One of its duties is to recover Medicaid overpayments from physicians providing care to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner is a licensed chiropractor in the State of Florida. His Medicaid provider number is No. 3801578-00. At all times relevant here, Petitioner provided services to Medicaid patients pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement. Therefore, Respondent was subject to all statutes, rules, and policy guidelines that govern Medicaid providers. Specifically, Petitioner was required to follow the guidelines set forth in the Medicaid Coverage and Limitation Handbook and the Medicaid Reimbursement Handbook. Additionally, Petitioner was required to maintain all "Medicaid-related records" that supported his Medicaid invoices and claims and to furnish those records to Respondent upon request. In 1997 and until April 1998, Petitioner's advertisement in the yellow pages of the Panama City, Florida, telephone book invited the public to make an appointment for a "free spinal exam," which specifically included two X-rays, if medically necessary. The advertisement indicated that Petitioner's office accepted patients with major medical insurance, workers' compensation insurance, and Medicare and Medicaid coverage. The advertisement did not specifically exclude Medicare and Medicaid patients, but specifically stated that the free spinal exam did not include further examination, treatment, or workers' compensation and personal injury cases. However, Petitioner's subsequent advertisements in the telephone book specifically included Medicaid as a type of case that Petitioner excluded from the offer of free services. The original and subsequent advertisements further stated as follows: Our office policy: The patient and any other person responsible for payment has the right to cancel payment, or be reimbursed for payment for any other service, exam, or treatment which is performed as a result of and within 72 hours of responding to the ad for the free service, exam or treatment. ($99.00 value) Respondent's investigator, Julie Canfield-Buddin, saw the advertisement excluding Medicaid patients as recipients of the free services. After confirming that Petitioner was a Medicaid provider, Ms. Canfield-Buddin performed an audit of Petitioner's paid Medicaid claims between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001. The audit revealed that Petitioner had not provided the advertised free services to Medicaid patients. In other words, Petitioner had received Medicaid reimbursements for initial office visits and X-rays of new patients who were Medicaid eligible. Petitioner received reimbursements for these services even though Medicaid policy prohibits payments to providers for services that are given to non-Medicaid patients free of charge. In April 2002, Respondent sent Petitioner a preliminary audit report. The preliminary report indicated that for the period beginning April 15, 1998, up to and including December 31, 2001, Petitioner had received $13,522.02 for certain claims that were not covered by Medicaid. The report included a request for Petitioner to send Respondent that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. After receiving the preliminary report, Petitioner's office contacted Ms. Canfield-Buddin, stating that Petitioner had some issues with the denied claims. Ms. Canfield-Buddin responded that Petitioner should state his concerns in writing and furnish Respondent with any additional medical documentation that would serve to reduce the overpayment. Petitioner sent Ms. Canfield-Buddin a letter dated April 25, 2002. Petitioner did not send Respondent any additional medical documentation with the letter to substantiate his position regarding the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner did not provide Respondent with any written office policy that delineated any difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients. In a final audit report dated May 9, 2002, Respondent informed Petitioner that he had been overpaid $13,522.02 for Medicaid claims that, in whole or in part, were not covered by Medicaid. The final audit report included a request for Petitioner to pay that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. Ms. Canfield-Buddin subsequently received a telephone call from Petitioner's office on May 30, 2002. She received Petitioner's written request for a formal administrative hearing on June 3, 2002. After receiving Petitioner's request for a hearing, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reviewed Petitioner's account statements that related to the Medicaid overpayments. Based on that review, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reduced the amount of overpayment to $11,077.65. The revised overpayment reversed denied charges for X-rays of Medicaid patients in excess of the two X-rays that should have been provided free of charge pursuant to the offer for free services. For example, Petitioner was reimbursed for services provided to B.A. on August 10, 2001. These charges included an initial office visit under the Current Procedures Terminology (CPT) code 99203, two X-rays under the CPT code 7240, two X-rays under the CPT code 72072, and two or three X-rays under the CPT code 72100. The final audit denied reimbursement for all charges except the two or three X-rays under CPT code 72100. The revised overpayment reversed the denied charges for two X-rays under the CPT code 72070. The end result was that Respondent denied Petitioner reimbursement only for the initial office visit and two X-rays that ordinarily would have been provided free to non-Medicaid patients. Medicaid allows reimbursement for services equal to the lesser of the Medicaid fee or the provider's usual and customary charge. Petitioner's advertisement offered free services to the public at large with certain exceptions. Petitioner cannot exclude Medicaid patients from that offer by also excluding patients with personal injury or workers' compensation claims. All patients who are not Medicaid eligible are non-Medicaid patients regardless of their payment source. Just because Petitioner excludes free services to non-Medicaid patients with personal injury and workers' compensation claims, does not mean that he can deny those free services to Medicaid patients when his usual and customary practice is to provide the services free to non-Medicaid patients. Some of the denied charges at issue here allegedly involve spinal manipulations that Petitioner claims he performed on Medicaid patients during their initial office visits. Medicaid reimbursement policy requires a spinal manipulation performed during an initial office visit under a 99203 CPT code for a new patient visit to be included as part of the examination conducted during that visit. Medicaid does not allow Petitioner to be separately reimbursed for a spinal manipulation performed on the same day of service as an initial office visit. Petitioner did not include more than two X-rays or any spinal manipulations in his offer of free services for any patient. When a patient has an initial office visit in response to Petitioner's offer of free services, Petitioner first takes the patient's history, performs an examination, and reviews the first two free X-rays. Depending on the results of the evaluation, Petitioner may or may not advise the patient that additional X-rays and/or a spinal manipulation are medically necessary. Petitioner then allows the patient to arrange for payment of those services with his office staff. If the patient is non-Medicaid eligible and is able to pay for services, Petitioner proceeds to take the additional X-rays and/or to perform the spinal manipulation immediately or during a subsequent visit with payment due as arranged. If a non-Medicaid patient requires subsequent examinations during the course of treatment, Petitioner bills the patient or his or her insurance carrier for those services. If the patient is Medicaid eligible, Petitioner may either proceed with taking the X-rays and/or performing the spinal examination immediately, knowing that he will not be separately reimbursed for the spinal manipulation, or make an appointment for the Medicaid patient to return on another day so that he can be reimbursed for the spinal manipulation. In any event, Medicaid regulations do not allow reimbursement for further examinations within a three-year period. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that some of the denied charges for initial office visits under the CPT code 99203 included spinal manipulations that he never intended to be free and that he did not provide spinal manipulations as a free service to non-Medicaid patients. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not credited for two reasons. First, he did not produce any medical documentation to support his testimony as to any Medicaid patient receiving a spinal manipulation during an initial office visit. Second, he did not identify any such patient during his testimony. Respondent performs Medicaid audits after a provider renders services. Therefore, it is essential for providers like Petitioner, who contest denied claims, to be able to substantiate their billing with appropriate documentation. Such documentation must be created at the time of service, maintained pursuant to statutory and rule requirements, and furnished to Respondent upon request. Petitioner never responded to Ms. Canfield-Buddin's request for medical documentation to substantiate Petitioner's challenge to the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner testified that the services he performed for some Medicaid patients were not equivalent to the free services he performed for non-Medicaid patients because they often involved a higher level of service, including additional services, tests, or examinations. According to Petitioner, some of the Medicaid patients required more extensive screening and counseling that consumed more of Petitioner's time. Despite this testimony, Petitioner admitted that the histories he took of Medicaid patients and non-Medicaid patients were basically the same. Petitioner testified that the difference in the level of service provided to all patients varied based upon the individual patients and did not depend on whether they were or were not Medicaid patients. He had no written or unwritten guidelines or policies that limited the scope of screening or level of service in an initial office visit for either type of patient. Petitioner's testimony that the level of services provided to Medicaid patients differed from the level of services offered to non-Medicaid patients is not persuasive. Once again, Petitioner failed to provide the required medical documentation to support his testimony or to identify in his testimony Medicaid patients who required a higher level of service. Moreover, Petitioner knew, when he made his offer of free services, that he would not be able to claim reimbursement for services provided to Medicaid patients that were not separately reimbursable even if Petitioner was entitled to exclude Medicaid patients from the offer. This includes cases where a Medicaid patient may have required a high level of service in terms of the time expended during the screening or a spinal manipulation during the initial office visit. Petitioner provides free services to members of his family. The provision of free services to family does not establish that Petitioner had a usual and customary practice of providing free services. At times, Petitioner treats police officers and indigent persons free of charge. However, Petitioner does not publicly advertise that he treats these patients free of charge because he does not want to be overrun with people taking advantage of the offer. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner routinely treats police officers covered by private health insurance and indigent patients covered by Medicaid free of charge. Therefore, it cannot be said that Petitioner's usual and customary practice is to furnish services to these patients free of charge. A Medicaid provider is allowed to use the CPT code 99203 for a new patient visit once per recipient every three years. Petitioner's offer of free services for non-Medicaid patients allows them one free office visit and two free X-rays regardless of the passage of time. According to Petitioner, this means that Respondent's interpretation of Medicare regulations would entitle a Medicaid patient to the free services every three years whereas a non-Medicaid patient would not be so entitled, showing yet another difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients under the offer of free services. However, Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not persuasive because it is not based on medical documentation or testimony showing that Petitioner ever treated a Medicaid patient as a new patient more than once.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order determining that Petitioner owes $11,077.65 for Medicaid reimbursement overpayments. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony L. Conticello, Esquire Grant P. Dearborn, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Hal Cowen ChiroNetwork Health Care Centers 127 West 23rd Panama City, Florida 32405 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Respondent was overpaid for Medicaid claims submitted during the audit period January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2004, and, if so, what amount Respondent is obligated to reimburse Petitioner; and whether sanctions and costs should be assessed against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact This case involves a Medicaid audit of claims paid by AHCA to Respondent for dates of service from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2004. The audit in this case evaluated 2,631 paid claims on behalf of 17 Medicaid recipients. During the audit period, Respondent was an enrolled Medicaid waiver provider and had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with AHCA. Respondent was authorized to provide home and community-based services to Medicaid waiver recipients. Paragraph 3 of the Medicaid Provider Agreement states that "the provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, manuals, handbooks, and Statements of Policy as they may be amended from time to time."1/ Among other duties, Petitioner investigates and audits Medicaid providers in an effort to identify and recoup overpayments made to providers for services rendered to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner is also empowered to impose sanctions and fines against offending providers. Petitioner, when it identifies overpayment, fraud, or abuse, is charged with taking affirmative steps to recoup any overpayments and can, as appropriate, impose fines, sanctions, and corrective actions plans on the offending provider. Pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the "pay- and-chase" system, Petitioner pays Medicaid providers under an honor system for services rendered to Medicaid recipients. If Petitioner determines that the provider was paid for services rendered which were not in compliance with Medicaid requirements, then Petitioner seeks reimbursement from the provider. By correspondence dated December 8 and December 29, 2006, Petitioner contacted Respondent and requested records related to claims billed to Medicaid by Respondent. Respondent provided documents in response to Petitioner's requests. After considering the information provided by Respondent, Petitioner, on February 27, 2007, issued a Preliminary Audit Report and advised therein that it was believed that Petitioner had overpaid Respondent in the amount of $364,973.45. In response to the Preliminary Audit Report, Respondent submitted additional documentation that it desired for Petitioner to consider. On May 17, 2007, Petitioner, after having reviewed the additional documentation submitted by Respondent, issued a FAR and noted therein that Petitioner had determined that Respondent was overpaid by Medicaid in the amount of $259,033.49. In this same correspondence Petitioner notified Respondent that Petitioner was seeking to impose a $2,000.00 fine against Respondent; would be requiring Respondent to adhere to a corrective action plan in the form of a Provider Acknowledgment Statement; and would be assessing investigative, legal, and expert witness costs against Respondent. In response to Petitioner's correspondence of May 17, 2007, Respondent submitted to Petitioner additional documentation which resulted in the overpayment amount being adjusted downward to $212,683.06. The FAR is supported by Petitioner's staff files, testimonial evidence, spreadsheets related to overpayment determinations, and documentation submitted by Respondent. Collectively, this supporting documentation constitutes Petitioner's "work papers" within the meaning of section 409.913(22), Florida Statutes (2003).2/ Petitioner's work papers establish that Respondent was overpaid $212,683.06. Petitioner's work papers show the following with respect to the 17 Medicaid recipients whose paid claims were audited: For Medicaid recipient no. 1, Petitioner audited 9 claims. For each claim, Petitioner determined that Respondent billed and erroneously received payment for services provided to the recipient that were not authorized by Medicaid; For Medicaid recipient no. 2, Petitioner audited 388 claims. Of the claims reviewed, six were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. The remaining claims resulted in overpayment to Respondent because Respondent failed to produce sufficient supporting documentation related to staff eligibility to provide the services for which Medicaid was billed. For other claims, there were unexplained alterations made by Respondent to certain time entries contained in the Medicaid services log book; For Medicaid recipient no. 3, Petitioner audited 110 claims. Of the claims reviewed, only one claim resulted in overpayment due to Respondent's failure to provide sufficient supporting documentation to support the services for which Medicaid was billed; For Medicaid recipient no. 4, Petitioner audited 51 claims. Of the claims reviewed, 23 were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. The remaining claims resulted in overpayment to Respondent because there was insufficient documentation related to the eligibility of Respondent's staff to provide the services for which Medicaid was billed; For Medicaid recipient no. 5, Petitioner audited five claims. Of the claims reviewed, two were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. The remaining claims resulted in overpayment to Respondent because Respondent could not produce sufficient documentation to support the services for which Medicaid was billed; For Medicaid recipient no. 6, Petitioner audited 32 claims. Each of the 32 claims resulted in overpayment to Respondent because Respondent could not produce sufficient documentation to support the services for which Medicaid was billed; For Medicaid recipient no. 7, Petitioner audited 279 claims. Of the claims reviewed, 94 were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. The remaining claims resulted in overpayment to Respondent because Respondent could not produce sufficient documentation to support the services for which Medicaid was billed; For Medicaid recipient no. 8, Petitioner audited 155 claims. Of the claims reviewed, 95 were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. The remaining claims resulted in overpayment to Respondent because Respondent could not produce sufficient documentation to support the services for which Medicaid was billed; For Medicaid recipient no. 9, Petitioner audited 239 claims. Of the claims reviewed, 82 were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. The remaining claims resulted in overpayment to Respondent because Respondent could not produce sufficient documentation to support the services for which Medicaid was billed, and Respondent overbilled for certain services provided to this Medicaid recipient; For Medicaid recipient no. 10, Petitioner audited 82 claims. None of the claims reviewed were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. Respondent was overpaid for these claims because Respondent could not produce sufficient documentation to support the services for which Medicaid was billed, and Respondent overbilled for certain services provided to this Medicaid recipient; For Medicaid recipient no. 11, Petitioner audited five claims. None of the claims reviewed were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. This Medicaid recipient was authorized to receive services through December 31, 2003. For each claim, Respondent billed, and was paid for, services that were provided after December 31, 2003. This resulted in an overpayment to Respondent; For Medicaid recipient no. 12, Petitioner audited 113 claims. Of the claims reviewed, 79 were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. The remaining claims resulted in overpayment to Respondent because Respondent could not produce sufficient documentation to support the services for which Medicaid was billed, and Respondent overbilled for certain services provided to this Medicaid recipient; For Medicaid recipient no. 13, Petitioner audited 20 claims. Of the claims reviewed, 15 were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. The remaining claims resulted in overpayment to Respondent because Respondent failed to follow the recipient's support plan goals and double-billed Medicaid for services that were provided to the recipient; For Medicaid recipient no. 14, Petitioner audited 343 claims. Of the claims reviewed, 275 were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. The remaining claims resulted in overpayment to Respondent because Respondent failed to provide sufficient supporting documentation related to the services for which Medicaid was billed, and Respondent overbilled for certain services provided to this Medicaid recipient; For Medicaid recipient no. 15, Petitioner audited 258 claims. Each of the 258 claims was found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. For Medicaid recipient no. 16, Petitioner reviewed 222 claims. None of the claims reviewed were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. The reviewed claims showed overpayment to Respondent because Respondent failed to provide sufficient supporting documentation related to the services for which Medicaid was billed, the services were provided to the Medicaid recipient by an unqualified individual, and Respondent overbilled for certain services provided to this Medicaid recipient; and For Medicaid recipient no. 17, Petitioner reviewed 320 claims. None of the claims reviewed were found to be in compliance with Medicaid standards. Respondent was overpaid for these claims because Respondent failed to provide sufficient supporting documentation related to the services for which Medicaid was billed, and Respondent overbilled for certain services provided to this Medicaid recipient. On November 30, 2011, Petitioner rested its case-in- chief in the instant matter. At Respondent's request, a third day was authorized for the presentation of evidence so that Respondent could issue subpoenas and offer evidence to rebut Petitioner's claim as appropriate. So as to allow Respondent, who appeared in this matter pro-se, adequate time to prepare its defense, the third day of final hearing was noticed for 9:30 a.m., on February 20, 2012. At 9:51 a.m., on February 20, 2012, the final hearing was announced as being in session. Respondent did not attend the final hearing on February 20, 2012, and has offered no explanation for her absence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order finding that Respondent, ARC Consulting Home Health Agency, Inc., by and through Jasmine J. Allison, Administrator, owes $212,683.06 to Petitioner as an overpayment, plus interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Florida Hospital Orlando (Respondent or FHO), was overpaid by Medicaid for care provided to the patient, L.D., in the amount of $52,606.04, as alleged by Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner or AHCA); or, whether, as Respondent maintains, such care was medically necessary and supported by the record presented in this cause. Petitioner also maintains an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000.00 is warranted in this matter.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of monitoring the Medicaid Program in Florida. Petitioner, through MPI, audited FHO for the dates of service from January 1, 2007, through June 30, 2008 (the audit period). At all times material to the audit period, FHO was enrolled as a Medicaid provider, governed by a Medicaid provider agreement, and subject to all pertinent Medicaid rules and regulations related to the provision of Medicaid services to Medicaid recipients/patients. Respondent's Medicaid Provider No. was 0010129001. All services provided to Medicaid patients are billed and identified by patient name, date of service, and provider. For purposes of confidentiality, the names of patients are redacted in MPI proceedings. Although this case began with a number of patients being identified as part of the audit dispute, only one patient, L.D., and the services provided to her remain at issue. Before a Medicaid provider is authorized to bill Medicaid for medical services rendered to a patient, several checks are considered. First, the patient must be Medicaid-eligible. There is no dispute that L.D. was Medicaid-eligible. Second, before an inpatient stay is reimbursable, a Medicaid provider must seek prior authorization. To do so, at all times material to this case, AHCA enlisted the assistance of, and contracted with, KePro South (KePro) to perform utilization management for inpatient hospital services for Medicaid recipients. This meant the Medicaid provider contacted KePro by email through a system known as "I-Exchange." In this case, FHO followed the protocol and requested prior approval for patient L.D. KePro approved the inpatient stay for L.D. All patient records for L.D. have been revisited in the course of this case and have been thoroughly debated by doctors for both parties. In summary, AHCA's expert, Dr. Walter, opined that the records for L.D. do not support the "medical necessity" for the extended inpatient stay that was provided for her care. In contrast, Dr. Busowski, opined that L.D. required the inpatient stay based upon the medical conditions she and her babies presented. The events leading up to the instant dispute, set in chronological context, are as follows: FHO provided medical services to a patient, L.D.; those services were billed to and paid by Medicaid; AHCA conducted its audit of FHO for the audit period prior to August 12, 2008; on that date, AHCA issued its Preliminary Audit Report (PAR); the PAR claimed a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $359,107.65 (overpaid claims for the full audit period); in response, FHO set about to furnish additional documentation to support its Medicaid billings; such documentation was reviewed by Petitioner and its medical consultants before the Final Audit Report (FAR) was entered; then, the FAR reduced the amount claimed as overpayment, gave Respondent the opportunity to challenge the FAR, and forwarded the case to DOAH. Respondent continued to provide additional information to AHCA throughout the pre-hearing and post-hearing times. Subsequent to discovery in this case, AHCA considered information from FHO and, ultimately, the overpayment claim was reduced to $52,606.04 as noted above. Prior to entering the FAR, Petitioner did not have the benefit of testimony from Dr. Busowski or Dr. Fuentes. Additionally, Dr. Walter, AHCA's consultant, did not have the benefit of reviewing the records from Dr. Busowski's point of reference. It is undisputed that FHO billed Medicaid and was paid $52,606.04 for patient L.D. Dr. Busowski is a board-certified physician whose specialty is OB/GYN and whose subspecialty is Maternal Fetal Medicine, also described as "perinatologist" in this record. L.D. presented to a clinic staffed by Dr. Busowski and his former associate, Dr. Fuentes. Both doctors have privileges at FHO and took turns monitoring patients admitted to the hospital. In examining L.D., it was discovered that her cervix had shrunk from 2.6 to 1.2 centimeters. As L.D. was pregnant with twins, the patient was admitted to FHO as a "high risk" pregnancy. Simply stated, the medical concern for L.D. was that she would deliver her children prematurely and, thereby, cause additional medical issues for herself, as well as her babies. L.D. was only 26 weeks, two days along at the time, and it would be very difficult for the twins to be delivered at that time. Further, L.D. had had two prior deliveries by C-section, so it was anticipated that her twins would also be delivered in that fashion. Finally, the twins were locked with one in a breached position so that if the children had prematurely delivered vaginally, other complications would have been likely. L.D. remained at FHO until she was discharged at 35 weeks, six days. During her stay at FHO, doctors were able to monitor contractions, make sure her C-section scar did not dehisce, and chart the growth, well-being, and viability of the children. Some patients, such as L.D., may be monitored in a home setting with "take home" equipment. That device is not covered by Medicaid and was, therefore, not an option for L.D. It may have provided a less expensive treatment option had it been available to L.D. and had her home environment been suitable for its use. It is unknown whether L.D. and her home environment would have been conducive to the home monitoring some patients can use. Another consideration in keeping L.D. hospitalized was the well-being of the unborn twins. Medical costs for premature babies are higher than full-term children. Had L.D. delivered prematurely, there would have been three Medicaid patients with serious medical needs rather than one. Dr. Busowski candidly admitted that all considerations in keeping L.D. hospitalized were not listed in the patient's chart. As a specialist, Dr. Busowski did not think it was necessary to have certain facts documented. It is not Dr. Busowski's policy to keep any mother hospitalized unnecessarily. It was not Dr. Busowski's practice to write "a whole bunch because nothing has changed." L.D.'s chart contained daily notes from an attending OB/GYN or resident, but orders were not written for medication unless it changed or was new. For example, if an order for prenatal vitamins were written, it would naturally continue throughout the patient's stay without additional orders. In this case, L.D. was on the medication Procardia. It was used to stop pre-term contractions. When L.D. was discharged and the babies were not in danger, presumably, Procardia was not necessary. Until she was stabilized during her hospitalization, it was necessary. Thus, the length of stay ultimately is the issue of this proceeding. Not that L.D. was admitted inappropriately or without medical basis, but that she was kept as an inpatient longer than medically necessary. Since L.D. was admitted at 26 weeks, two days and discharged at 35 weeks, six days, the question then essentially is: When in the interim should she have been discharged because her continued inpatient care was not necessary? Arguably she could have taken the medication to stop contractions at home, monitored herself somehow, and rushed to the emergency room (ER) if delivery was imminent. Delivery of the twins short of a prescribed gestation period would have placed the children at risk. Who would have borne the medical responsibility for pre-term twins born under ER conditions when it was avoidable and was, in fact, avoided in this case? Medicaid has a "pay and chase" policy of paying Medicaid claims as submitted by providers. Audits performed by the Agency then, after-the-fact, reconcile the amounts paid to providers with the amounts that were payable under the Medicaid guidelines and pertinent rules. The Medicaid provider agreement executed between the parties governs the contractual relationship between FHO and AHCA. The parties do not dispute that the provider agreement, together with the pertinent laws or regulations, control the billing and reimbursement of the claim that remains at issue. The amount, if any, that was overpaid related solely to the period of inpatient treatment that L.D. received from week 27 of her pregnancy until her discharge. Dr. Walter conceded perhaps a week would be required to stabilize the patient under her presenting conditions. The provider agreement pertinent to this case was voluntarily entered into by the parties. Any Medicaid provider whose billing is not in compliance with the Medicaid billing policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. Petitioner administers the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to its authority, AHCA conducts audits to ensure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. The audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. Audits are to ensure that the provider bill and receive payment in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. Respondent does not dispute Petitioner's authority to perform audits. Respondent does, however, dispute that a recoupment is appropriate, because FHO sought and was given prior approval for the inpatient stay for L.D. through the KePro system. If the inpatient length of stay was medically necessary for L.D., Petitioner does not dispute the amount billed as accurately reflecting the services provided to L.D. during that stay. There is no question that L.D. stayed in the hospital for the length of stay noted in the record. Based upon the weight of the persuasive evidence in this case, it is determined that L.D.'s length of stay until week 35 of her pregnancy was medically appropriate and necessary to protect the medical health and well-being of L.D. and her unborn children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the case, with each party bearing its own costs and expenses of the litigation. Further, to the extent that Petitioner may have already sought recoupment against Respondent for the alleged overpayment, it is recommended that those funds be credited back to FHO. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Arnold, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Carter, P.A. Post Office Drawer 14079 Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Debora E. Fridie, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
