Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses, their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact: The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (??"HRS") is the regulatory agency charged with the administration of Chapter 499, Florida Statutes, which includes the issuance of permits to operate a drug wholesale facility. Sometime prior to December, 1986, Petitioner, Vetco International, Inc. d/b/a Pompano Vet Supply ("Vetco") was issued Wholesale Drug Permit Number 03:00375 by the Pharmacy Program of HRS. On December 15, 1986, HRS received an application from Thomas Karpinski, owner of Vetco, to renew Vetco's drug wholesale permit for 1987. On December 17, 1986, HRS denied Vetco's application for renewal of its wholesale drug permit for the year 1987. Vetco requested a formal administrative hearing on the denial and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings where it was assigned Case No. 87-0832. A hearing was held in that case on August 18, 1987 by Hearing Officer, James Bradwell of the Division of Administrative Hearings. On March 28, 1988, Hearing Officer Bradwell entered a Recommended Order recommending that Vetco's renewal application for the year 1987 be denied. The basis for that recommendation was that the applicable statutes and rules required that facilities where drugs are held be made available for inspection; that on several occasions Vetco's facility was not made available to authorized agents of HRS for inspection; and that Vetco's denial of inspections to HRS constituted a substantial violation of Chapter 499, Florida Statutes and Rule 10D-45, Florida Administrative Code. Hearing Officer Bradwell's Recommended Order was approved and incorporated in a Final Order by HRS dated April 20, 1988. On May 16, 1988, Vetco filed a Notice of Administrative Appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal regarding the Final Order issued by HRS on April 20, 1988. The case number assigned by the District Court of Appeal was Case No. 88-1342. On June 23, 1988, Vetco filed a Motion for Imposition of Automatic Stay with the Fourth District Court of Appeal seeking to stay the effect of HRS' April 20, 1988 Final Order. The Motion to Stay was granted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal on July 15, 1988. On December 28, 1988, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, per curiam, affirmed HRS' April 20, 1988 Final Order. The Mandate from the Fourth District Court of Appeal was issued on January 13, 1989. During the time period between the conclusion of the formal administrative hearing in August, 1987 and the issuance of the Recommended Order by Hearing Officer Bradwell in March, 1988, counsel for Vetco initiated efforts to obtain a renewal of the drug wholesale permit for the year 1988. Vetco contends that it did not receive the standard 1988 renewal application form typically sent by HRS prior to the beginning of the new year. By letter dated January 21, 1988, counsel for Vetco advised HRS that Vetco intended to keep its license in effect. In that letter, counsel for Vetco submitted a check for the amount of the renewal fee and provided certain other information required as part of the renewal process. During the period from January, 1988 through May, 1988, there were several exchanges between counsel for Vetco and the representatives of HRS regarding the renewal for the year 1988. HRS took the position that the January 21, 1988 letter from counsel for Vetco could not serve as a renewal application because it was not signed by the owner of the company and was not submitted on the appropriate HRS form. Vetco contends that the January 21, 1988 letter included all of the information legally required to process the renewal application and should have been treated as a renewal application. After exchanging correspondence and phone calls with counsel for Vetco and obtaining a signed form from Vetco, HRS acknowledged on May 24, 1988, that the renewal application was complete. On June 6, 1988, HRS denied Vetco's application for license renewal for the year 1988 citing the Final Order filed on April 20, 1988 and the Findings of Fact set forth in the Recommended Order entered by Hearing Officer Bradwell on March 28, 1988 in connection with the 1987 renewal application. By petition filed June 30, 1988, Vetco sought a formal hearing on the denial of its 1988 renewal application. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned Case No. 88-3596. It is one of the two cases consolidated in the current proceeding. As noted above, by order dated July 13, 1988, the Fourth District Court of Appeal stayed the effect of the Final Order regarding the 1987 renewal application and, by agreement of the parties, Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 88-3596 was abated pending the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal on the 1987 renewal. Thus, Vetco was able to continue business operations uninterrupted throughout 1987 and 1988. On January 6, 1989, Vetco applied for renewal of its drug wholesale permit for the year 1989. By letter dated January 17, 1989, HRS refused to renew Vetco's permit for 1989 citing the Fourth District Court Of Appeal's decision on the 1987 application. On February 2, 1989, Vetco filed a Petition for Formal Hearing challenging this denial. The Petition for Formal Hearing was transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned Case No. 89-717. It is the second case involved in this current proceeding. By order dated April 19, 1989, Division of Administrative Hearings' Case Nos. 88-3596 and 89-717 were consolidated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED: Petitioner's application for renewal of its wholesale drug permit No. 03:00375 for the year 1988 be dismissed as moot and the application for renewal for the year 1989 be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of August, 1989. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOs. 88-3596 AND 89-0717 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number Findings of Fact where accepted or reason for rejection 1 2-7 2-12 Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 13-16, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 13 Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 17, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 14 Rejected as irrelevant. 15 Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 18-19, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 16 Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 9-12 and 20, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 17-21 Rejected as irrelevant. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The proposed findings of fact in Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are not numbered. The individual paragraphs are treated as though separately numbered. Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Paragraph Findings of Fact where accepted Number reason for rejection 1 3 2 Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 4, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 3 Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 5, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 4 6 5 6-7 6 8-12 COPIES FURNISHED: Karen Coolman Amlong, Esquire Amlong & Amlong, P.A. 101 N.E. 3rd Avenue 2nd Fl. Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 John Rodriguez, Esquire Technical Health Services, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 304 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-070 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent's permit to operate a pharmacy should be suspended or revoked for alleged violations of Sections 465.22(1)(c), 465.18(1)(b), 465.18(2)(b) F.S., and Rule 21S-1.14 F.A.C. At the hearing, Petitioner withdrew Count-I of the Complaint. Respondent's Motion To Dismiss Counts II and III of the Complaint at the conclusion of Petitioner's case in chief was denied.
Findings Of Fact Respondent presently holds and did so hold at the time of the events alleged in the Complaint a permit to operate a pharmacy issued by Petitioner (Stipulation.) Prior to the events alleged in the Complaint, Petitioner's agent, Vernon K. Bell, an inspector, obtained an authentic prescription from another pharmacy that had not been picked up by a customer, for use in investigations of other pharmacies. The prescription was issued by Dr. George A. Fernandez, Miami, Florida, Number 012194, dated December 11, 1975, to Fela Rivias and was for twenty-one tablets of Erythrocin, 250 miligrams. Erythrocin is an antibiotic prescription drug used for various infections (Testimony of Bell, Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) On December 19, 1975, Bell visited Respondent's pharmacy and observed that the door to the prescription area was unlocked. On December 22, 1975, at approximately 3:30 P.M., Reynaldo Santiago, another agent of the Board of Pharmacy, entered Respondent's pharmacy with the prescription referred to in paragraph 2 above that had been given to him by Bell. Santiago gave it to the cashier to be filled. He observed her go to the prescription department, open a door, and place the prescription on a counter. He then observed Hildelisa Hernandez go to the prescription department and start filling the prescription. Thereafter, Ms. Hernandez, accompanied by Mr. Jose E. Valdez, came out of the prescription area and Hernandez gave a pill bottle to the cashier. The cashier in turn gave it to Santiago for the price of $3.95 or $4.00. The bottle contained 21 tablets and a label affixed thereon contained pertinent information as set forth in the prescription that Santiago had given to that cashier, including the name of the drug, doctor, prescription number and name of patient (Testimony of Santiago, Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) Santiago took the bottle of pills outside and then he and Bell re- entered the Pharmacy. Bell identified himself to Mr. Valdez and asked him who was his registered pharmacist and if he had a pharmacist on duty. Mr. Valdez stated that Hal Glass was his pharmacist, but that he had left the store at 2:00 P.M. Bell then asked Valdez if he had filled the prescription which Santiago had taken into the store and, after some hesitation, Bell asked Hernandez if she had filled it. She replied in the affirmative. She stated that she was not a licensed pharmacist in Florida, but had been a pharmacist in Cuba. Bell then wrote a violation and left the store. Neither he nor Santiago recalled seeing a sign indicating that the prescription department was closed on December 22 (Testimony of Bell, Santiago.) Jose E. Valdez testified that although he formerly had two pharmacists at his previous pharmacy, in August or September of 1975 he was forced to cut back to one part-time pharmacist because of the bad economic situation. He conceded that Ms. Hernandez was not a registered Florida pharmacist. He also stated that he was not aware of the rules requiring that the prescription department be locked when no pharmacist was present until this incident occurred and that, in fact, the door to the prescription area had not been locked although a sign indicating that the prescription department was closed had always been used. He further testified that on February 1, 1976, he hired a full-time pharmacist who is present at all times when the pharmacy is open and that the prescription department is now always locked when she is not present.
Recommendation That a civil penalty in the sum of $250.00 be imposed against Respondent in lieu of suspension or revocation of its permit, for violation of Section 465.18(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rule 21S-1.14, Florida Administrative Code DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Stanley Kaplan, Esquire 404 Biscayne Building Miami, Florida Seymour M. Litman, Esquire 10 Northwest 14 Avenue Miami, Florida 33125
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Petitioner is the state agency that administers the Florida Medicaid program, which includes pharmacies that participate in the program. The Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity is responsible for insuring that the goods and services billed to the Medicaid program are those that are actually provided to Medicaid recipients. Medicaid is a joint program, funded by the federal government and by the State of Florida, and is administered pursuant to both state and federal statutes and rules. All services or goods billed to the program must be necessary, Medicaid compensable, and must also have actually been provided to eligible recipients by providers prior to submitting claims. Any payment made by the Medicaid program for goods or services not actually provided to an eligible recipient is subject to recoupment by the Petitioner, and the provider is also subject to the imposition of administrative fines and exclusion from the program for a specified period of time. The Respondent is a community pharmacy located in a hispanic section of Miami, Florida, which has been owned and operated for the past six years by Frances Larin, a licensed pharmacist, who makes all drug purchases and does all Medicaid billings at the pharmacy herself. Most of Respondent's customers have limited financial resources and are Medicaid recipients. The Respondent has participated in the Medicaid program for approximately eight years, and has not previously been charged with overbilling the Medicaid program. The Respondent has cooperated fully with the Petitioner throughout these proceedings. Prior Review From February to April 1988, the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity had a review performed of the Respondent's billings to Medicaid from March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. This review was conducted for the Petitioner by the Foundation for Health Care, Inc. (Foundation), contract auditors, and resulted in the determination that the Respondent had overbilled the Medicaid program for prescription drugs dispensed to program recipients during the review period. In performing this review, the Foundation used an across-the-board Medicaid percentage of 54% in determining the available units of the various drugs on hand for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. Based upon the Foundation's review, the Petitioner sought recoupment for overpayments in the amount of $28,649.99 by letter to the Respondent dated July 20, 1988, as well as an administrative fine of $7,162.49, and a three month suspension from the program. The Respondent timely sought a formal administrative hearing in which it disputed the results of the Foundation review. However, after the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Petitioner withdrew its notice of overpayment and imposition of administrative sanctions, and thus, without a determination on the merits, the Division of Administrative Hearings file was closed and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Petitioner. Subsequently, the Petitioner entered a Final Order which provided that the Respondent would be re-audited. The Respondent timely sought judicial review of this Final Order in which it challenged that Petitioner's right to conduct a further review of the period March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. However, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, dismissed the Respondent's appeal, and the Petitioner proceeded with a further review. The KPMG Review (a) For purposes of its further review, the Petitioner employed the public accounting and management consulting firm of KPMG Peat Marwick which designed a statistically valid sampling methodology to determine the Respondent's Medicaid percentage for each drug, and also to perform a management review of the Respondent. It was established by competent substantial evidence in the record, and in particular by the expert testimony in statistics from Dr. Robert Ladner and Robert Peirce, that the KPMG methodology was statistically valid. The KPMG review was conducted during the latter half of 1989, and included developing a Medicaid percentage for individual drugs based upon an analysis of prescriptions for all drugs in question to determine the portion of each drug's total sales that went to Medicaid recipients, calculating the total units claimed for each drug for which the Respondent sought reimbursement during the audit period, and calculating the total units purchased by the Respondent for each drug claimed for reimbursement during the audit period. The Medicaid percentage of each drug was then applied to total purchases for each specific drug to determine the amount of each drug that was on hand at the Respondent's pharmacy for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. This number of available units was then compared with the total units claimed for reimbursement. Where the units claimed exceeded the units available for dispensing, a positive variance was noted, and this number of excess units claimed was then multiplied by the per unit reimbursement amount for that particular drug in order to obtain the amount of the apparent overbilling for that particular drug. Where the total units available for dispensing exceeded the total units claimed for a particular drug, a negative variance was noted. It was stipulated by the parties that negative variances did not indicate underpayments, and the evidence, including specifically the testimony and report of Dr. Victor Pestien, an expert in statistics, does not establish that such negative variances should be offset against the positive variances or that they in any way reduce the positive variances. This is the first instance in which this methodology has been utilized by the Petitioner in seeking a recoupment of an alleged Medicaid overpayment from a pharmacy, and this methodology was not set forth in any rule or regulation of the Petitioner that had been adopted at any time material hereto. Previous audits used an overall Medicaid percentage to calculate the portion of a pharmacy's business that was comprised of Medicaid recipients, and the quantity of drugs that were available to them. Using a drug specific Medicaid percentage, however, is a more accurate and conservative approach to determining overpayments than using a fixed percentage. Based upon the consideration of all evidence in the record, it is specifically found that the greater weight of evidence establishes that the methodology used by KPMG in this review for calculating Medicaid percentages was sound and reasonable, and in no way precluded the Respondent from presenting additional competent substantial evidence to the Petitioner, or at hearing, which would have established different Medicaid percentages for particular drugs. (a) The type of review conducted by KPMG is known as an aggregate analysis, a generally accepted type of statistical analysis, in which drugs that have been billed to and paid for by the Medicaid program are reviewed to determine whether the pharmacy under review purchased or otherwise acquired a sufficient quantity of drugs to justify its billings to Medicaid. Interchangeable brand-name drugs and generic equivalents were grouped together so that in conducting this review, whole equivalent groups of drugs were considered as one type of drug, regardless of differences in individual product names. To obtain a statistically random sample, prescriptions were put in numerical order and every fourth prescription for the review period was examined, and since prescriptions may be refilled for up to a year after they are originally filled, reviewers also examined every prescription for the year prior to the review period. Competent substantial evidence establishes that KPMG performed an appropriate and valid statistical analysis, and that they used an acceptable sampling methodology which produced a truly random result. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that before a drug can be claimed to have been dispensed and billed to Medicaid, the pharmacy under review must have that drug in its possession. (b) The approach taken by KPMG and the Petitioner was to be as conservative as possible in resolving all uncertainties and questions which arose during the course of this review in favor of the Respondent. KPMG did not conduct a financial audit of the Respondent, but did prepare a management report based upon its review of Respondent's operations during the audit period. Data used by KPMG in its methodology in calculating the amount paid by Medicaid to the Respondent, the unit price of drugs dispensed, and the quantity claimed by Respondent for payment by Medicaid, was derived from computer based information provided by the Petitioner's fiscal agent. During the period of time being reviewed in this case, Electronic Data Systems (EDS) was the Petitioner's fiscal agent, while Consultec was the Petitioner's fiscal agent during the period when the KPMG review was actually being performed. When Consultec was selected as the Petitioner's fiscal agent and replaced EDS on January 1, 1989, EDS turned over its computer records to the new agent by copying all of its magnetic, computer files, along with supporting microfiche documentation, which it then provided to Consultec under the supervision of the Petitioner. Upon receipt of these magnetic tapes, Consultec placed them in a controlled environment vault, and then later converted the information on these tapes to a new format used by Consultec. It was established by competent substantial evidence that in this process, no data was added, deleted or changed in any manner. The "units claimed" data was subsequently provided by computer download from the Consultec claims data base directly to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity. It was established by competent substantial evidence that data regarding claims which originated with EDS passed through Consultec to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity unchanged. Specific information regarding Respondent, including the claimed quantity of drugs dispensed and amounts paid, was accessed by staff in the Office of Program Integrity, randomly verified, and then made available to KPMG. Both Consultec and EDS are nationally recognized data processing and management companies. Competent substantial evidence established that the claims processing function utilized by the Petitioner in the Medicaid program during the period at issue was subject to several quality control checks to insure that claims were properly processed and appropriate payments were made. On occasion claim adjustments were made, but these were reasonable and for good cause, such as a substantiated underpayment. The computer hardware utilized in this process was reliable and properly maintained. In order to verify the data used by KPMG concerning the dollar amount of claims paid and the quantity of units of medication claimed, an "audit trail" was performed using 140 randomly selected sample claims by tracing each claim from its claim reference number to its associated remittance voucher and cancelled checks, where available. This audit trail verified that the data used as the basis for quantity claimed and total dollars paid was valid and reliable. The KPMG review was not limited to the top 100 drugs, by volume claimed, during the audit period, but included each drug dispensed by the Respondent to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. In its report dated November 20, 1989, KPMG calculated a total Medicaid overpayment to Respondent of $30,452.59, and based thereon, the Petitioner notified the Respondent that it was seeking recoupment of this amount, as well as an administrative fine of $2,000 and termination from the Medicaid program for at least two years. Subsequently, however, the Petitioner and KPMG reviewed and considered additional invoices documenting additional purchases of drugs in question by the Respondent during the audit period, and prepared a revised report dated August 30, 1990. Based upon this revised report, the Petitioner sought recoupment of a revised, reduced overpayment calculated to be $21,939.93, as well as a $2,000 administrative fine and a minimum two year termination from the program, and it was on this basis that this matter proceeded to final hearing. The Top 100 Drugs Subsequent to the final hearing, the Petitioner issued an amended recoupment letter dated October 17, 1990, which limited the recoupment it is seeking in this matter to the top 100 drugs, by dollar volume of claims, plus their generic equivalents. This resulted in the elimination of many individual drugs with relatively small overpayments from the list of overpayments, and left only five instances among these top 100 drugs where the difference between the quantity available, adjusted for standard error, and the quantity claimed is less than 100 units. In many instances the difference is well in excess of 1,000 units. The sanctions being sought in this amended recoupment letter further reduced the recoupment being sought to $12,643.11, reduced the administrative fine to $1,400, and reduced the period of exclusion from the program that is being sought to 16 months. However, due to an error in calculating the top 100 drugs and equivalents, the Petitioner issued a second amended recoupment letter dated October 26, 1990, further reducing the administrative fine sought to $1,200 and reducing the period of exclusion to 14 months. Inventory Analysis In performing its review, KPMG obtained information concerning the quantities of drugs purchased during the review period by the Respondent directly from the pharmacy's wholesalers and from a review of invoices retained by the Respondent for a period that included one month prior to the review period through one month after the review period (February 1, 1987, to January 31, 1988). The effect of seasonal variations in pharmacy sales and ordering patterns was also taken into account, and balanced, by extending this period to a full twelve months. All documentation concerning drug acquisitions was requested from Respondent, and the information received and considered by KPMG and the Petitioner was checked for reasonableness by a consultant pharmacist and cross validated by two reviewers. It was stipulated by the parties that the Respondent's main wholesaler, Gulf Distribution, Inc., had and maintained accurate information and records regarding its sales to the Respondent, and that it properly transferred that information to computer disks which were provided to KPMG. Subsequent thereto, additional invoices were discovered and were also made available to KPMG. The Petitioner stipulated that these additional invoices from Gulf did not reduce the number of drug units purchased by, and invoiced to, Respondent. Pharmacies in Florida which choose to participate in the Medicaid program are required to maintain complete and accurate patient and fiscal records which fully substantiate the extent of services rendered and billings made for a period of five years from the date of billing or service, and are also required to retain all invoices from wholesalers, or from the transfer or receipt of drugs through barter or exchange, for a period of five years. (a) Actual beginning and ending inventories of the top 100 drugs reviewed by KPMG for which the Petitioner now seeks recoupment in the amount of $12,643.11 were not determined. Rather, an estimate of inventory on hand was derived by counting invoices of all drug acquisitions through purchase, transfer or exchange made by the Respondent during the review period, as well as invoices of acquisitions made one month prior to and one month after the review period. Additionally, all documentation provided by the Respondent of bulk, or large, acquisitions made during or prior to the review period was also considered and included in the Petitioner's estimate of inventory. It was established by competent substantial evidence that pharmacies generally keep a drug inventory consisting of a two to two-and-a-half week supply on hand, and acquire drugs in anticipation of future sales rather than as a replacement of inventory depletion from past sales. Therefore, a basic assumption of the KPMG methodology, relied upon and accepted by the Petitioner, that Respondent had only those drugs available for dispensing which were obtained by invoiced purchase from wholesalers, or through transfer or exchange, between February 1, 1987 and January 31, 1988, as well as documented invoiced bulk purchases prior to this time period, is reasonable. At hearing, the Respondent established that a significant quantity of nine specific drugs were purchased during the review period from suppliers other than Gulf that were not considered by KPMG. These drugs include Xanax (.5 mg.), Inderal (10 mg.), Tagamet (300 mg.), Nitrostat (.4 mg.), Trental (400 mg.), Motrin (400 mg.), Motrin (600 mg.), Quinamm (260 mg.), and Quinidine Sulfate (200 mg.). It is, therefore, found that the overpayment of $2,902.19 calculated by KPMG and relied upon by the Petitioner for these particular drugs has not been supported by competent substantial evidence. Frances Larin, Respondent's owner and operator, testified that she did not follow the generally accepted practice of retaining only a two to two-and-a- half week supply of drugs on hand. Rather, she testified that for a significant number of the top 100 drugs at issue in this proceeding, she would purchase large quantites in bulk, and was thus able to draw down on these inventories without making additional purchases of particular drugs for over a year. The Respondent sought to establish that due to very large beginning inventories of particular drugs at issue, it was able to legitimately dispense more units during the review period than it purchased during the same time. However, the Respondent did not produce evidence in support of its position, such as invoices for bulk purchases which KPMG or the Petitioner did not consider, or complete records of bartering or transfers which had not been considered, and which would have supported its claim of a significantly larger beginning inventory for these particular drugs than would be the generally accepted practice. To the contrary, competent substantial evidence in the record, as well as the demeanor of Larin while testifying, establishes that Respondent's claim is unreasonable and lacks credibility. The deposition testimony of JoAnn Padell is outweighed by the testimony of Deborah Launer, Susan McCleod, and Robert Peirce. A review of the Respondent's purchasing patterns clearly shows that Respondent generally and routinely kept low inventories of drugs on hand, placing daily orders with Gulf to obtain drugs on an as-needed basis. Recoupment Based upon the foregoing, it is found that competent substantial evidence establishes that the Respondent overbilled the Medicaid program during the review period at issue in this case in the amount of $9,740.92 ($12,643.11 claimed in the second amended recoupment letter minus the $2,902.19 claim associated with the nine specific drugs for which significant purchases were omitted from the KPMG review, as found above at Finding 13). Petitioner is authorized to recoup the established overpayment of $9,740.92 from the Respondent. Sanctions (a) In determining the sanctions stated in the second amended recoupment letter which Petitioner seeks to impose upon the Respondent, the Petitioner considered the provisions of Section 409.266(13), Florida Statutes, as well as the impact which sanctioning this Medicaid provider would have upon Medicaid recipients. Competent substantial evidence establishes that there are eight pharmacies which accept Medicaid within a one mile radius from the Respondent's location, and twenty-six such pharmacies within a two mile radius. Medicaid recipients are issued new cards each month and may transfer pharmacies at the beginning of each month. Therefore, it is found that Medicaid recipients would not be substantially affected by the imposition of sanctions upon the Respondent. The parties stipulated that the sanction matrix set forth in Rule10C- 7.063, Florida Administrative Code, was not applied by the Petitioner against the Respondent in this case because it was not in effect at the time of this review. The sanctions which the Petitioner seeks to impose against the Respondent, therefore, are based upon non-rule policy which must be explicated in this proceeding. In seeking to explicate its non-rule policy upon which the sanctions set forth in the second amended recoupment letter are based, the Petitioner established that it was concerned that sanctions imposed in prior cases, as well as in the original recoupment letter which had been sent to the Respondent in this case, had been too lenient in view of the seriousness of Medicaid violations. The Petitioner developed its non-rule sanctions policy after the KPMG review had been completed, and based its proposal upon the maximum sanctions set forth in state and federal statutes and rules. Specifically, Section 409.266(12), Florida Statutes, provides for a maximum fine of $10,000; the maximum exclusion period applied in previous cases by the Office of Program Integrity is ten years, and the minimum exclusionary period imposed by the federal government has been five years for the failure to supply payment information. At hearing, the Petitioner explained that it first determined the percent of Respondent's total Medicaid payments that the overpayment represented, and then applied that percentage to these maximum sanctions allowed under law and existing policy. The overpayment of $12,643.11 claimed by the Petitioner in its second amended letter of recoupment is 12% of the total payment of $100,397.88 made by the Petitioner to Respondent for the review period, and 12% of the maximum fine and exclusion period is $1,200 and 14 months, respectively. While the Petitioner explained the manner by which this exclusionary period and fine were calculated, it did not explicate its non-rule policy by establishing a reasonable, rational basis for applying the percentage of Medicaid overbillings to the maximum fine and exclusionary period. Certainly, the arithmetic calculation used to arrive at these proposed sanctions is clear, but there was no explication through competent substantial evidence which would establish that there is a basis in fact or logic for this calculation. Therefore, it is found that the Petitioner's non-rule policy used to propose these sanctions is arbitrary and capricious. Due to the lack of any evidentiary basis in the record which would support the imposition of the sanctions of an administrative fine or a period of exclusion from the Medicaid program, the Petitioner is not authorized to impose sanctions on the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order which requires that Respondent to repay the Petitioner for Medicaid overbillings in the amount of $9,704.92, but which does not impose sanctions consisting of either an administrative fine or period of exclusion. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1991 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Findings 4 and 5. 7-10. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 11-17. Rejected as unnecessary. 18-20. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7. 21-24. Adopted in Finding 12. 25. Adopted in Finding 2. 26-28. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 29-30. Adopted in Finding 8. 31-32. Adopted in Findings 7 and 10. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as unnecessary. 35-39. Adopted in Finding 7. 40-47. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 48. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 49-51. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary. 54-63. Adopted in Finding 12, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 8. Adopted in Finding 9. 66-67. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 68-69. Adopted in Finding 9. 70-78. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 79-82. Adopted in Finding 8. 83-85. Rejected as unnecessary. 86-93. Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 94-97. Adopted in Finding 14, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 98-103. Adopted in Finding 14. 104-105 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 106-107 Adopted in Finding 12. 108. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 109-112 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 113-115 Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. Adopted in Finding 11. 118-119 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 120-122 Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. 125-128 Rejected as unnecessary. 129. Adopted in Finding 6. 130-132 Adopted in Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 11. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 135-147 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 148. Adopted in Finding 11. 149-150 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 151-152 Rejected as unnecessary. 153. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding 4. 2-3. Adopted in Finding 5, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence. 4-5. Adopted in Findings 3, 6 and 7. 6-7. Adopted in Finding 10, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 8-9. Adopted in Finding 11. 10-11. Adopted in Finding 3, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 14-15. Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as immaterial. Adopted in Finding 13, but Rejected in Finding 14 and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding and as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Finding 14, as immaterial, speculative, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 20-21. Rejected in Finding 6, as immaterial, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 22-23. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14. 26-30. Rejected as a statement of the Respondent's position and not a proposed finding, as speculative and contrary to competent substantial evidence, and as totally without citation to authority in the record as required by Rule 22I-6.031(3), Florida Administrative Code. 31-35. Rejected in Finding 6, and as not based on competent substantial evidence and as unnecessary. 36-38. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 39-41. Adopted in Finding 8. 42. Rejected as immaterial. 43-44. Rejected in Finding 9. 45. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and not a proposed finding. 46-48. Rejected in Finding 9, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. 49-50. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 51. Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 16. 56-57. Adopted in Finding 16. 58-61. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. 62. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 15. COPIES FURNISHED: David G. Pius, Esquire Building Six, Room 233 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 James J. Breen, Esquire Michael P. Scian, Esquire 900 Sun Bank Building 777 Brickell Avenue Miami, FL 33131 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, Acting General Counsel 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Robert B. Williams, Acting Secretary 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue Whether or not on or about May 24, 1978, the Respondent was arrested by officers of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, and found to be in illegal possession of the controlled substance, to- wit, Pentothal (Sodium Thiopental), injectable, and, therefore, in violation of Subsections 464.21(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes. Whether or not on or about May 24, 1978, the Respondent was found to be in possession of several prescription drugs without having obtained a prescription for those drugs, in violation of Subsection 464.21(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation It is recommended that the license of the Respondent, Gloria Nesmith Moore Callender, R.N., No. 48527-2, be REVOKED. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of November, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire Geraldine B. Johnson, R.N. 1005 Blackstone Building Department of Professional and Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Occupational Regulation Board of Nursing Ms. Gloria N. M. Callender 6501 Arlington Expressway, 8030 Almar Place Bldg. "B" Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Jacksonville, Florida 32211
Findings Of Fact The Home is licensed as an assisted living facility. It is also licensed to provide extended congregate care, limited nursing services, and limited mental health services. The Home accepted Respondent as a resident. In July 1998, Petitioner had to transport Respondent to the hospital due to an overdose of medication. Upon his return from the hospital, Respondent told Petitioner's staff that he had taken the overdose intentionally. Thereafter, the Home required Respondent to sign a mental health contract dated September 9, 1998. This contract states as follows in relevant part: Qualifications for the Home requires [sic] that a member or applicant must not be mentally ill, habitually inebriated, or addicted to the use of a controlled substance. With these requirements, I understand that to be eligible and maintain my membership in the Home, I must agree to the terms of this contract. * * * If I use alcohol or any non-prescribed drugs I understand I may be dismissed from the Home. I understand that I will allow the Veterans' Domiciliary Home of Florida to supervise the self-administering of my medications. I will take my medication as it is prescribed by the primary physician. I will only be given my full prescription at the time of my discharge. I understand upon reasonable suspicion of being under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, I consent to testing. The Domiciliary Home staff may take a blood, saliva, or supervised urine sample to test for illegal drugs or alcohol. I authorize members of the Domiciliary staff to perform random searches of my person, vehicle, living quarters, or belongings to determine if I am using drugs or alcohol. If I refuse to allow a blood, saliva, or urine test, or search, or if I interfere in any way with the staff's performance of these duties, I may be dismissed. The Home also required Respondent to sign a Dual Diagnosis/Substance Abuse/Psychiatric (dual diagnosis) contract dated September 14, 1998. In addition to terms and conditions similar to the ones set forth above, the dual diagnosis contract provides as follows in relevant part: 10. In order to assist me in gaining freedom from alcohol and drugs, I will not use alcohol, tranquilizers, sleeping medication, over the counter medications, or any other chemical escapes which have not been prescribed by a physician. If I use alcohol or non-prescribed drugs, I understand I will be dismissed from the Home. In November 1998, one of Respondent's doctors wrote him a prescription for Ritalin. Respondent became very upset when a nurse would not administer the Ritalin to him without first checking with Petitioner's staff physician. Eventually, Respondent's primary care physician approved the administration of Ritalin together with Respondent's other medications. In January 1999, Respondent worked for Petitioner as a receptionist. After working overtime on one occasion, Respondent's speech was slurred, his eyes were dull, and his voice was horse. Petitioner's staff became suspicious that Respondent was taking medication in violation of his contracts. Respondent subsequently tested negatively for all substances except his prescribed medicines. In March 1999, Respondent violated his contracts by having a prescription for methadone filled at a drugstore and removing twenty-four of the pills from the bottle before turning the medicine over to Petitioner's staff as required by his contract. Petitioner's staff advised Respondent that he would be dismissed from the Home by letter dated March 23, 1999. Respondent subsequently requested Petitioner's Executive Director to review the decision to discharge him from the Home. By letter dated August 16, 1999, Petitioner rescinded its decision to dismiss Respondent from the Home but warned him that any further infraction would result in his immediate expulsion. On April 14, 2000, Petitioner conducted a routine facility-wide room inspection at the Home. During the course of the inspection, Petitioner found a bottle of Ephedra 250 in Respondent's room. According to the label on the bottle, Ephedra 250 is a dietary supplement that General Nutrition Corporation (GNC) markets. During the hearing, Respondent admitted that he heard about Ephedra 250 on a television show that discussed its benefits as a diet aid as well as its dangerous side effects. The label states as follows in pertinent part: WARNING: Seek advice from a health care practitioner prior to use if you are pregnant or nursing, or if you have high blood pressure, heart or thyroid disease, diabetes, difficulty in urination due to prostate enlargement, or if taking MAO inhibitor or any other prescription drug. Reduce or discontinue use if nervousness, tremor, sleeplessness, loss of appetite or nausea occur. Not intended for use by person under the age of 18. The maximum recommended dosage of Ephedrine for a healthy adult is no more than 100 mg in a 24 hour period for not more than 12 weeks. Improper use of this product may be hazardous to a person's health. Each capsule of Ephedra 250 contains 250 mg of MA Huang Extract (Ephedra sinica) or ( 15 mg of 6 percent Ephedrine). The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Ephedra 250 is an over-the-counter medication despite being labeled as a diet supplement. Ephedrine is a prescription drug in Florida unless an individual dose is less than a specified quantity. Petitioner's staff properly became concerned about Respondent's possession of Ephedra 250 because he takes numerous prescribed medications, which can have serious side effects, if taken with certain other medications. Ephedrine is one of those drugs. For instance, Respondent takes Cozaar for high blood pressure, Methadose to reduce his dependency on Percoset, and Ritalin. Persuasive evidence indicates that large doses of Ephedra can be used as a recreational drug. Respondent knew or should have known that Ephedra 250 was prohibited by his contracts with the Home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order dismissing Respondent as a resident of the Robert H. Jenkins Veterans' Domiciliary Home of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James W. Sloan, Esquire Department of Veterans' Affairs Post Office Box 21003 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-8903 William T. Fisher 1300 Sycamore Lane, Suite 148 Lake City, Florida 32025 Lt. Col. Robin L. Higgins, Executive Director Department of Veterans' Affairs Post Office Box 31003 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-8903
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed dentist authorized to practice dentistry under the laws of the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Respondent was engaged in the practice of dentistry, specifically oral and maxillofacial surgery, in his office located in Hialeah, Florida. [This finding is determined from stipulation of the parties.] On or about October 2, 1979, Vernon K. Bell, an investigative supervisor employed by the Department of Professional Regulation, was conducting a routine pharmacy audit of the prescriptions of two drugstores in Miami, Florida. The audit was not based upon any complaint regarding the Respondent or any of the Respondent's patients, but was rather conducted in the routine course of the Department's business. During the course of such audits, Mr. Bess pays particular attention to prescriptions for "Schedule II" substances because the substances are regarded as having a high abuse potential. He located approximately thirty-seven prescriptions for "Quaalude," a Schedule II substance, which were issued by the Respondent to three persons: Wade Laremore, Patti Laremore, and Linda McKenzie. Bell considered the number of Quaalude prescriptions to be unusual for issuance by a dentist, and he confronted the Respondent with them on that same day. [This finding is determined from the testimony of the witness Bell.] The testimony of the witness Bell and the Respondent regarding their initial confrontation differs in material respects. Bell testified that the Respondent admitted issuing the prescriptions. Bell testified that the Respondent admitted issuing the prescriptions. Bell testified that the Respondent admitted issuing the prescriptions. Bell related that the Respondent told him he issued the prescriptions to the Laremores to aid them in sleeping, and not for dental work. He testified that the Respondent showed him the Laremores' records and that the records reflected no dental work since 1973. As to the prescriptions for Linda McKenzie, Bell testified that the Respondent admitted issuing the prescriptions, and that they were to assist her in overcoming nervousness and lack of sleep resulting from marital problems. Bell testified that the Respondent said he had no medical records for Linda McKenzie and that he had no treated her in his capacity as a dentist. The Respondent agreed that he admitted issuing the prescriptions. He testified, however, that he did not tell Bell that the prescriptions for the Laremores and McKenzie were issued for problems other than dental work. He testified that he did not show Bell the Laremores' complete records, but only their charts. He testified that he did not discuss his treatment of any of the patients with Bell. In resolving this conflict, the testimony of the Respondent has been found more credible as to his statements regarding the Laremores, but the testimony of the witness Bell has been found more credible regarding Linda McKenzie. As to the Laremores, Bell did not testify how long he was able to examine the records. The Respondent indicated that he waved the charts at Bell, and this testimony is consistent with what both witnesses agreed was the Respondent's angry reaction to the confrontation. Bell's notes regarding what the Respondent told him are considerably less definite than was his testimony at the hearing. Given the number of investigations that Bell conducts, it is likely that his memory regarding specific details of any particular confrontation would be unclear. The very sketchy notes that he kept would do little to refresh his memory, especially when he is trying to recall precise words that were uttered. As to McKenzie, however, Bell's testimony is directly corroborated by her testimony. This resolution of the conflicting testimony is reflected in the findings of fact which follow. [This finding is determined from the testimony of the Respondent, and the witnesses Bell and McKenzie, and from Petitioner's Exhibits 3 and 4, and Respondent's Exhibit 2.] Quaalude is classified as a Schedule II controlled substance. Such substances possess a significant risk of abuse and physical or psychological dependency. Quaalude works as a central nervous system depressant, and is classified as a hypnotic. The prescribing of Quaalude is not beyond the scope of the practice of oral and maxillofacial surgeons such as the Respondent. Oral and maxillofacial surgeons are fully trained in uses and potential for abuse of such substances. Numerous oral and maxillofacial surgeons testified at the hearing. Their opinions respecting the prescribing of Quaalude varied. Some of them do not prescribe the drug at all because of its reputation as a "street drug," and because of its potential for abuse. Others testified that Quaalude is among the most effective of the hypnotic drugs, that it has no more potential for abuse than other drugs which serve the same or similar beneficent purposes, and that its side effects are less profound then with similar drugs. Witnesses who testified to this effect expressed dismay at the bad reputation the drug has received due to its nontherapeutic abuse. Synthesizing the testimony of the various oral and maxillofacial surgeons, it becomes apparent that Quaalude is properly utilized in the practice for at least two purposes: First, it is used as a sedative or anesthetic prior to surgery. A onetime dosage of approximately three hundred milligrams would be appropriate in this context. Several of the oral and maxillofacial surgeons who testified have used Quaalude in this manner in the past. Several have discontinued its use due to the drug's bad reputation. One of the surgeons called as a witness by the Department of Professional Regulation continues to use the drug in this manner. The Respondent does not, however, because he feels, as do several of his peers, that patients might choose a surgeon who utilizes Quaalude in that manner because of the Quaalude rather than the competency of the surgeon. The second appropriate usage is for relieving anxiety associated with pain subsequent to surgery or pain and anxiety that result from very dramatic conditions. Temporomandibular joint problems are an example. Pain and anxiety of long duration can result from such conditions, and in some circumstances long-term usage of a hypnotic drug such as Quaalude can serve as a more conservative, less drastic approach to treatment than surgery. If such long-term use of the drug were prescribed, close observation of the patient would be important to assure that psychological and/or physical addiction was not occurring. Prescriptions in such instances should be given for a relatively short period of time to assure that proper supervision would occur. [This finding is determined from the testimony of the witnesses Farmer, Davis, Treadwell, Wruble, Laboda, Richman, Goodhart, and the Respondent; and from Petitioner's Exhibit 5 and Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 3.] Between August 9, 1978, and September 22, 1979, the Respondent issued forty-eight separate Quaalude prescriptions for Wade Laremore. The prescriptions were for three-hundred milligram tablets with the number of tablets prescribed each time varying from five to fifteen. Between October 2, 1978, and August 31, 1979, the Respondent issued twenty-three separate Quaalude prescriptions for Patti Laremore. These prescriptions were also for three- hundred milligram tablets. No testimony was presented to establish the purpose for these prescriptions. The testimony of the witness Bell to the effect that the Respondent told him the prescriptions were not for a proper dental purpose has not been credited. In order to conclude that the prescriptions were inappropriate, therefore, it would be necessary to find that prescriptions in these amounts would be in appropriate under any circumstances. No such conclusion can be made without knowing the medical history of the patient. Prescriptions in these quantities would be an appropriate manner for treating pain and anxiety resulting from severe temporomandibular joint problems, in order to obviate the need for drastic and potentially damaging surgery. The sequence of prescriptions issued for the Laremores is consistent with this sort of treatment. [This finding is determined from the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits listed at the conclusion of paragraphs 4 of these Findings of Fact, and from Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2.] The Respondent prescribed Quaalude to Linda McKenzie on two occasions. The first of these was for five three-hundred milligram tablets issued on April 27, 1979; and the second was for four three-hundred milligram tablets issued on May 7, 1979. The purpose of these prescriptions was to assist Linda McKenzie in overcoming nervousness and sleeplessness connected with the breakup of her marriage, and not for any proper dental or oral and maxillofacial surgical purpose. The Respondent is not qualified by reason of his training as an oral and maxillofacial surgeon to treat anxiety resulting from marital discord. [This finding is determined from the testimony of the witnesses Bell and McKenzie, and from Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4.] The Respondent is an able oral and maxillofacial surgeon. He enjoys a high regard among his peers. Numerous general practice dentists refer cases to him on a continuing basis with confidence. [This finding is determined from the testimony of the witnesses Mas, Wruble, Sootin, Wolf, Cornbluth, Danziger, and Hoffner.]
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of the allegations set out in Count III of the Administrative Complaint, suspending the Respondent's license to practice as a dentist in the State of Florida for a period of thirty days, and imposing an administrative fine against the Respondent in the amount of one thousand dollars. That the Administrative Complaint be dismissed in all other respects. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February 1981 in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah J. Miller, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard G. Cushing, Esquire One Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10020 Ms. Nancy Kelley Wittenberg, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
