The Issue Whether the Respondent Carlyn R. Kulick, d/b/a Carlyn's, failed to pay amounts owing to the Petitioner for the shipment of citrus fruit, as set forth in the Complaint dated April 30, 2001, and, if so, the amount the Petitioner is entitled to recover.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Spyke's Grove and Carlyn's were "citrus fruit dealers" licensed by the Department. As part of its business, Carlyn's sells to its retail customers "gift fruit" consisting of oranges and grapefruit for shipment to third persons identified by the customers. Carlyn R. Kulick is the owner of Carlyn's and acted on its behalf with respect to the transactions that are the subject of this proceeding. Spyke's Grove is in the business of packaging and shipping "gift fruit" consisting of oranges and grapefruit pursuant to orders placed by other citrus fruit dealers. Barbara Spiece is the president of Spyke's Grove and acted on its behalf with respect to the transactions that are the subject of this proceeding. In November and December 1999, Spyke's Grove received a number of orders for "gift fruit" from Carlyn's. Most of the orders were for single shipments of fruit. One order was for six monthly shipments of fruit. This was the first year Carlyn's had done business with Spyke's Grove, and Carlyn's and Spyke's Grove did not execute a written contract governing their business relationship. On the night of Sunday, December 12, 1999, the Spyke's Grove's packinghouse was destroyed by fire, and its offices were substantially damaged. The fire could not have happened at a worse time because it was at the peak of the holiday fruit- shipping season. Spyke's Grove was able to move into temporary offices and to obtain the use of another packinghouse very quickly. It had telephone service at approximately noon on Tuesday, December 14, 1999, and it began shipping "gift fruit" packages on Friday, December 17, 1999, to fill the orders it had received. Carlyn R. Kulick, the owner of Carlyn's, learned of the fire at Spyke's Grove and attempted to contact the Spyke's Grove offices for an update on the orders Carlyn's had placed for shipment during the holidays. Mr. Kulick was unable to contact anyone at Spyke's Grove for three or four days after the fire, and he was worried that his customers' orders for "gift fruit" would not be shipped on time. Mr. Kulick called another packinghouse and placed orders duplicating some of the orders Carlyn's had placed with Spyke's Grove. Meanwhile, Spyke's Grove was giving priority to its smaller wholesale customers such as Carlyn's, and it shipped all of the orders it had received from Carlyn's. Carlyn's did not cancel its orders with Spyke's Grove or otherwise notify Spyke's Grove that it should not ship the fruit; Mr. Kulick assumed that Spyke's Grove would contact him if it intended to ship the fruit ordered by Carlyn's. Spyke's Grove sent numerous invoices and statements of account to Carlyn's Regarding the gift fruit at issue here. According to the statement of account dated June 1, 2001, as of that date Carlyn's owed Spyke's Grove $1,069.78 for the gift fruit at issue here. Most of the invoices to Carlyn's that were submitted by Spyke's Grove contain the following: "Terms: Net 14 days prompt payment is expected and appreciated. A 1½% monthly service charge (A.P.R. 18% per annum) may be charged on all past due accounts. . . ." Relying on this language, Spyke's Grove also seeks to recover a monthly service charge for each month that Carlyn's account was past due. Carlyn's does not dispute Spyke's Grove's claim that $1,069.78 worth of "gift fruit" was shipped by Spyke's Grove pursuant to orders Carlyn's placed in November and December 1999. Carlyn's' basic position is that it need not pay Spyke's Grove for the fruit because Spyke's Grove did not notify it after the December 12, 1999, fire that it would ship the orders and because Carlyn's had to make sure that its customers' orders were filled. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Carlyn's was, at the times material to this proceeding, a Florida- licensed and bonded citrus fruit dealer; that, in November and December 1999, Carlyn's submitted orders to Spyke's Grove for the shipment of "gift fruit" consisting of oranges and grapefruit; that Spyke's Grove shipped all of the "gift fruit" ordered by Carlyn's in November and December 1999; that the price of the "gift fruit" shipped by Spyke's Grove pursuant to Carlyn's' orders totaled $1,069.78; and that Spyke's Grove timely filed its complaint alleging that Carlyn's failed to promptly pay its indebtedness to Spyke's Grove for citrus products shipped pursuant to orders placed by Carlyn's. Spyke's Grove is, therefore, entitled to payment of the principal amount of $1,069.78, plus pre-judgment interest. Based on the date of the last invoice which contained a charge for any of the gift fruit at issue here, the prehearing interest would run from May 1, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order ordering Carlyn R. Kulick, d/b/a Carlyn's, to pay $1,069.78 to Spyke's Grove, Inc., d/b/a Fresh Fruit Express, Emerald Estate, Nature's Classic, together with pre-judgment interest calculated at the rate specified in Section 55.03, Florida Statutes, on the amounts owing. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Carlyn R. Kulick, Owner Carlyn's 1601 Fifth Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 Barbara Spiece, President Spyke's Grove, Inc. 7250 Griffin Road Davie, Florida 33314 Western Surety Company Post Office Box 5077 Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57117 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 541 East Tennessee Street India Building Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issues concern the complaint by Petitioner against Respondents for the alleged failure to pay for $125.00 worth of medium zucchini squash also referred to as medium green squash. See Sections 604.15 through 604.30, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner sells produce. East Coast purchases produce and resells that produce at wholesale. The transaction which is in dispute here concerns an April 25, 1990 sale of medium zucchini squash. On that date Jerry B. Portnoy, Vice President for East Coast who runs the day to day operations of the company and buys produce spoke with Petitioner. In that conversation, which took place early in the morning, Petitioner stated that he had the squash to sell. Portnoy told Petitioner that he had plenty of that form of produce on hand. Petitioner stated that this was the last picking and that he would give Portnoy a good price. The price that Petitioner mentioned was $2.50 a crate. Mr. Portnoy said that he could use about 100 crates and he reiterated that he had plenty of that type of produce on hand. That comment by Mr. Portnoy met with the remark by Petitioner which was to the effect, that there might be a few additional crates above the 100 discussed. Portnoy said that he did not need any more than 100 crates in that he had plenty of that produce on hand. As Portnoy described at hearing, he felt that he really did not even need 100 crates; however, based upon the past working relationship between the Petitioner and Portnoy he agreed to take 100 crates. Contrary to the agreement between Portnoy and the Petitioner, sometime on the evening of April 25, 1990, Petitioner delivered 236 crates of the squash. No one was at East Coast at its Jacksonville, Florida business location to receive the squash and inspect them. East Coast would not have accepted 236 crates that were delivered if it had known of that number of crates. No one was available to inspect the squash until the following morning. On April 26, 1990, Mr. Portnoy examined the squash and found that some of the product was inferior and was in a state of decay. As a consequence, Mr. Portnoy called the Petitioner on the telephone on that morning and told the Petitioner that the Petitioner had sent too many crates and some of the squash were bad. Nonetheless, Mr. Portnoy told Petitioner that he would work it out as best he could, meaning that he would sell as much of the product as possible. During contact with the Petitioner on the part of East Coast, Petitioner did not ask for a federal inspection. East Coast was able to sell all but 50 crates of the squash as delivered. It submitted payment in the amount of $465 as reflected on the face of the invoice which Petitioner sent to East Coast. That exhibit is Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. It reflects that 50 crates were dumped which had they been sold would have been worth $125.00. It is that $125.00 which is in dispute. Mr. Portnoy called the Petitioner after the squash had been sold. That call took place a couple of weeks later. In the course of this conversation the Petitioner said that he did not want to hear about problems anymore and that he wanted to be paid for the full amount of all crates delivered. Mr. Portnoy said that 50 crates had been lost and that the amount being remitted through a check would relate only to those crates that had been sold. This describes the amount remitted on June 15, 1990 set out in Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Petitioner replied that he did not know if he would cash the check or not. Mr. Portnoy said that the check in the amount of $465.00 was for payment in full. This concluded their business until the time of the complaint filed by the Petitioner. On that facts as reported, there was no agreement to sell more than 100 crates. The additional crates that were sold by East Coast was a gratuitous gesture on the part of East Coast for which Petitioner was paid the full amount. The 50 crates that were not paid for contained inferior products for which Petitioner was not entitled to payment. This speaks to the 50 crates that were dumped which had they been sold would have been worth $125.00.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which dismisses the complaint of the Petitioner and relieves the Respondents of any financial obligation to pay the contested $125.00 claim. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: David Browning c/o David Browning Wholesale Produce 234 Church Street Starke, FL 32091 East Coast Fruit Company Jerry Portnoy, Vice President Post Office Box 2547 Jacksonville, FL 32203 James W. Sears, Esquire 511 North Ferncreek Avenue Orlando, FL 32803 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
The Issue The issue presented for decision is whether Proposed Rules 20-15.001, 20-15.002, and 20-15.003 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(a)-(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Florida Citrus Commission was established in 1935 to organize and promote the growing and sale of various citrus products, fresh and processed, in the State of Florida. The purpose of the Citrus Commission is today reflected in Section 601.02, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Florida Citrus Commission ("the Commission") and the Department, are set forth in full in Section 601.10, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Department include the power to tax and raise other revenue to achieve the purposes of the Department. In particular, Section 601.10(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, state: The Department of Citrus shall have and shall exercise such general and specific powers as are delegated to it by this chapter and other statutes of the state, which powers shall include, but shall not be confined to, the following: To adopt and, from time to time, alter, rescind, modify, or amend all proper and necessary rules, regulations, and orders for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties under this chapter and other statutes of the state, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of law when not inconsistent therewith. To act as the general supervisory authority over the administration and enforcement of this chapter and to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be imposed upon it by other laws of the state. The Department is authorized to set standards by Section 601.11, Florida Statutes, as follows: The Department of Citrus shall have full and plenary power to, and may, establish state grades and minimum maturity and quality standards not inconsistent with existing laws for citrus fruits and food products thereof containing 20 percent or more citrus or citrus juice, whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, including standards for frozen concentrate for manufacturing purposes, and for containers therefor, and shall prescribe rules or regulations governing the marking, branding, labeling, tagging, or stamping of citrus fruit, or products thereof whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, and upon containers therefor for the purpose of showing the name and address of the person marketing such citrus fruit or products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed; the grade, quality, variety, type, or size of citrus fruit, the grade, quality, variety, type, and amount of the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, and the quality, type, size, dimensions, and shape of containers therefor, and to regulate or prohibit the use of containers which have been previously used for the sale, transportation, or shipment of citrus fruit or the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or any other commodity; provided, however, that the use of secondhand containers for sale and delivery of citrus fruit for retail consumption within the state shall not be prohibited; provided, however, that no standard, regulation, rule, or order under this section which is repugnant to any requirement made mandatory under federal law or regulations shall apply to citrus fruit, or the products thereof, whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or to containers therefor, which are being shipped from this state in interstate commerce. All citrus fruit and the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed sold, or offered for sale, or offered for shipment within or without the state shall be graded and marked as required by this section and the regulations, rules, and orders adopted and made under authority of this section, which regulations, rules, and orders shall, when not inconsistent with state or federal law, have the force and effect of law. The Department is authorized to conduct citrus research by Section 601.13, Florida Statutes. To help pay for these duties of the Department, the Legislature first enacted the "box tax" in 1949. The box tax is now codified as Section 601.15(3), Florida Statutes. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part: There is hereby levied and imposed upon each standard-packed box of citrus fruit grown and placed into the primary channel of trade in this state an excise tax at annual rates for each citrus season as determined from the tables in this paragraph and based upon the previous season's actual statewide production as reported in the United States Department of Agriculture Citrus Crop Production Forecast as of June 1. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, goes on to set forth specific rates for fresh grapefruit, processed grapefruit, fresh oranges, processed oranges, and fresh or processed tangerines and citrus hybrids. Section 601.15(1), Florida Statutes, sets forth the Department's authority to administer the box tax, as follows: The administration of this section shall be vested in the Department of Citrus, which shall prescribe suitable and reasonable rules and regulations for the enforcement hereof, and the Department of Citrus shall administer the taxes levied and imposed hereby. All funds collected under this section and the interest accrued on such funds are consideration for a social contract between the state and the citrus growers of the state whereby the state must hold such funds in trust and inviolate and use them only for the purposes prescribed in this chapter. The Department of Citrus shall have power to cause its duly authorized agent or representative to enter upon the premises of any handler of citrus fruits and to examine or cause to be examined any books, papers, records, or memoranda bearing on the amount of taxes payable and to secure other information directly or indirectly concerned in the enforcement hereof. Any person who is required to pay the taxes levied and imposed and who by any practice or evasion makes it difficult to enforce the provisions hereof by inspection, or any person who, after demand by the Department of Citrus or any agent or representative designated by it for that purpose, refuses to allow full inspection of the premises or any part thereof or any books, records, documents, or other instruments in any manner relating to the liability of the taxpayer for the tax imposed or hinders or in anywise delays or prevents such inspection, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. The box tax was challenged in 1936 under various provisions of the Florida Constitution as well as the Export Clause, Article 1, s. 9, cl. 5, of the United States Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion in 1937 upholding the validity of the box tax. C.V. Floyd Fruit Company v. Florida Citrus Commission, 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248 (1937). In 1970, the Legislature enacted the "equalization tax," codified as Section 601.155, Florida Statutes. The statute mirrored Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, but added certain processors who were mixing foreign citrus products with Florida products. The purpose of the equalization tax was to have all Florida processors of citrus products help pay for the costs of the Department, rather than have the burden fall entirely on the Florida growers subject to the box tax. Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: The first person who exercises in this state the privilege of processing, reprocessing, blending, or mixing processed orange products or processed grapefruit products or the privilege of packaging or repackaging processed orange products or processed grapefruit products into retail or institutional size containers or, except as provided in subsection (9) or except if a tax is levied and collected on the exercise of one of the foregoing privileges, the first person having title to or possession of any processed orange product or any processed grapefruit product who exercises the privilege in this state of storing such product or removing any portion of such product from the original container in which it arrived in this state for purposes other than official inspection or direct consumption by the consumer and not for resale shall be assessed and shall pay an excise tax upon the exercise of such privilege at the rate described in subsection (2). Upon the exercise of any privilege described in subsection (1), the excise tax levied by this section shall be at the same rate per box of oranges or grapefruit utilized in the initial production of the processed citrus products so handled as that imposed, at the time of exercise of the taxable privilege, by s. 601.15 per box of oranges. In order to administer the tax, the Legislature provided the following relevant provisions in Section 601.155, Florida Statutes: Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall keep a complete and accurate record of the receipt, storage, handling, exercise of any taxable privilege under this section, and shipment of all products subject to the tax imposed by this section. Such record shall be preserved for a period of 1 year and shall be offered for inspection upon oral or written request by the Department of Citrus or its duly authorized agent. Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall, at such times and in such manner as the Department of Citrus may by rule require, file with the Department of Citrus a return, certified as true and correct, on forms to be prescribed and furnished by the Department of Citrus, stating, in addition to other information reasonably required by the Department of Citrus, the number of units of processed orange or grapefruit products subject to this section upon which any taxable privilege under this section was exercised during the period of time covered by the return. Full payment of excise taxes due for the period reported shall accompany each return. All taxes levied and imposed by this section shall be due and payable within 61 days after the first of the taxable privileges is exercised in this state. Periodic payment of the excise taxes imposed by this section by the person first exercising the taxable privileges and liable for such payment shall be permitted only in accordance with Department of Citrus rules, and the payment thereof shall be guaranteed by the posting of an appropriate certificate of deposit, approved surety bond, or cash deposit in an amount and manner as prescribed by the Department of Citrus. * * * (11) This section shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes set forth and as additional and supplemental powers vested in the Department of Citrus under the police power of this state. In March 2000, certain citrus businesses challenged Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, as being unconstitutional. At the time of the suit, Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, read as follows: All products subject to the taxable privileges under this section, which products are produced in whole or in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, are exempt from the tax imposed by this section to the extent that the products are derived from oranges or grapefruit grown within the United States. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. The citrus businesses claimed the exemption in Section 601.155(5) rendered the tax unconstitutionally discriminatory, in that processors who imported juice from foreign countries to be blended with Florida juice were subject to the equalization tax, whereas processors who imported juice from places such as California, Arizona and Texas enjoyed an exemption from the tax. The case, Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al. v. Department of Citrus, Case No. GCG-00-3718 (Consolidated) ("Tampa Juice"), was brought in the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Polk County. Judge Dennis P. Maloney of that court continues to preside over that case. In a partial final declaratory judgment effective March 15, 2002, Judge Maloney found Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution due to its discriminatory effect in favor of non-Florida United States juice. In an order dated April 15, 2002, Judge Maloney severed the exemption in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, from the remainder of the statute. The court's decision necessitated the formulation of a remedy for the injured plaintiffs. While the parties were briefing the issue before the court, the Florida Legislature met and passed Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, which amended Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, to read as follows: Products made in whole or in part from citrus fruit on which an equivalent tax is levied pursuant to s. 601.15 are exempt from the tax imposed by this section. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit exempt from the tax imposed by this section, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, was given an effective date of July 1, 2002. By order dated August 8, 2002, Judge Maloney set forth his decision as to the remedy for the plaintiffs injured by the discriminatory effect of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. Judge Maloney expressly relied on the rationale set forth in Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 574 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1991)("McKesson II"). In its initial McKesson decision, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988), the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment ruling that Florida's alcoholic beverage tax scheme, which gave tax preferences and exemptions to certain alcoholic beverages made from Florida crops, unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. The Florida Supreme Court also affirmed that portion of the summary judgment giving the ruling prospective effect, thus denying the plaintiff a refund of taxes paid pursuant to the unconstitutional scheme. The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In McKesson Corporation v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's decision as to the prospective effect of its decision. The United States Supreme Court held that: The question before us is whether prospective relief, by itself, exhausts the requirements of federal law. The answer is no: If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation. 496 U.S. at 31 (footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court set forth the following options by which the state could meet its obligation to provide "meaningful backward-looking relief": [T]he State may cure the invalidity of the Liquor Tax by refunding to petitioner the difference between the tax it paid and the tax it would have been assessed were it extended the same rate reductions that its competitors actually received. . . . Alternatively, to the extent consistent with other constitutional restrictions, the State may assess and collect back taxes from petitioner's competitors who benefited from the rate reductions during the contested tax period, calibrating the retroactive assessment to create in hindsight a nondiscriminatory scheme. . . . Finally, a combination of a partial refund to petitioner and a partial retroactive assessment of tax increases on favored competitors, so long as the resultant tax actually assessed during the contested tax period reflects a scheme that does not discriminate against interstate commerce, would render Petitioner's resultant deprivation lawful and therefore satisfy the Due Process Clause's requirement of a fully adequate postdeprivation procedure. 496 U.S. at 40-41 (citations and footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court expressly provided that the state has the option of choosing the form of relief it will grant. In keeping with the United States Supreme Court opinion, the Florida Supreme Court granted the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (the "Division") leave to advise the Court as to the form of relief the state wished to provide. The Division proposed to retroactively assess and collect taxes from those of McKesson's competitors who had benefited from the discriminatory tax scheme. McKesson contended that a refund of the taxes it had paid was the only clear and certain remedy, because retroactive taxation of its competitors would violate their due process rights. McKesson II, 574 So. 2d at 116. The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on McKesson's refund claim, with the following instructions: While McKesson may not necessarily be entitled to a refund, it is entitled to a "clear and certain remedy," as outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion. Because nonparties, such as amici, will be directly affected by the retroactive tax scheme proposed by the state, all affected by the proposed emergency rule must be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in this action. Therefore, on remand, the trial court not only must determine whether the state's proposal meets "the minimum federal requirements" outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion, it also must determine whether the proposal comports with federal and state protections afforded those against whom the proposed tax will be assessed. We emphasize that the state has the option of choosing the manner in which it will reformulate the alcoholic beverage tax during the contested period so that the resultant tax actually assessed during that period reflects a scheme which does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Therefore, if the trial court should rule that the state's proposal to retroactively assess and collect taxes from McKesson's competitors does not meet constitutional muster and such ruling is upheld on appeal, the state may offer an alternative remedy for the trial court's review. However, any such proposal likewise must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court as well as be consistent with other constitutional restrictions. 574 So. 2d at 116. In the Tampa Juice case, Judge Maloney assessed the options prescribed by the series of McKesson cases and concluded that the only fair remedy was to assess and collect back assessments from those who benefited from the unconstitutional equalization tax exemption. His August 8, 2002, order directed the Department to "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." On September 18, 2002, the Department promulgated the Emergency Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-3648RE. The Emergency Rules were filed with the Department of State on September 24, 2002, and took effect on that date. Those emergency rules were held invalid in Peace River, and are not at issue in the instant case. In the November 15, 2002 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 28, no. 46, pp. 4996-4998), the Department published the Proposed Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-4607RP. In the March 7, 2003, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 29, no. 10, p. 1036), the Department published amendments to the Proposed Rule. The Proposed Rules, as amended, read as follows: EQUALIZATION TAX ON NON-FLORIDA UNITED STATES JUICE 20-15.001 Intent. The Court in Tampa Juice Service, et al v. Florida Department of Citrus in Consolidated Case Number GCG-003718 (Circuit Court in and for Polk County, Florida) severed the exemption contained in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, that provided an exemption for persons who exercised one of the enumerated Equalization Tax privileges on non-Florida, United States juice. The Court had previously determined that the stricken provisions operated in a manner that violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. On August 8, 2002, the Court ordered that the Florida Department of Citrus "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." It is the Florida Department of Citrus' intent by promulgating the following remedial rule to implement a non- discriminatory tax scheme, which does not impose a significant tax burden that is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress constitutional limitations. These rules shall be applicable to those previously favored persons who received favorable tax treatment under the statutory sections cited above. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.002 Definitions. "Previously favored persons" shall be defined as any person who exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege as defined by Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, but who was exempt from payment of the Equalization Tax due to the exemption for non-Florida, United States juice set forth in the statutory provision, which was ultimately determined to be unconstitutional and severed from Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. The "tax period" during which the severed provisions of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, were in effect shall be defined as commencing on October 6, 1997, and ending on March 14, 2002. "Tax liability" shall be defined as the total amount of taxes due to the Florida Department of Citrus during the "tax period," at the following rates per box for each respective fiscal year: Fiscal Year Processed Rate Orange Grapefruit 1997-1998 .175 .30 1998-1999 .17 .30 1999-2000 .18 .325 2000-2001 .175 .30 2001-2002 .165 .18 Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.003 Collection. The Florida Department of Citrus shall calculate the tax liability for each person or entity that exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege outlined in section 601.155, Florida Statutes, upon non-Florida, United States juice based upon inspection records maintained by Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the United States Department of Agriculture. Subsequent to adoption of this rule, the Florida Department of Citrus will provide to the previously favored persons by certified mail a Notice of Tax Liability which shall contain a demand for payment consistent with the above-referenced itemized statement. The Department will deem late payment of Equalization Taxes owed by previously favored persons to constitute good cause, and shall waive the 5 percent penalty authorized by Section 601.155(10), F.S., as compliance with either of the following is established by Department [sic]: Lump sum payment of the tax liability remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20-100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability; or Equal installment payments remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20- 100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection subsection [sic] 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., over a 60-month period, the first payment being due within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability pursuant to subsection 20- 15.003(2), F.A.C.; or The Good Cause provisions of 601.155(10), F.S., shall not apply to persons who do not comply with paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(a), F.A.C., or paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(b), F.A.C. Failure to pay the taxes or penalties due under 601.155, F.S. and Chapter 20-15, F.A.C., shall constitute grounds for revocation or suspension of a previously favored person's citrus fruit dealer's license pursuant to 601.56(4), F.S., 601.64(6), F.S., 601.64(7), F.S., and/or 601.67(1), F.S. The Florida Department of Citrus will not oppose the timely intervention of persons who previously enjoyed the subject exemption that wish to present a claim to the Court in the Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al v. Florida Department of Citrus. However, the Florida Department of Citrus does not waive any argument regarding the validity of the calculation of the tax liability or that imposition of this tax is constitutional. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New . The Final Order in Peace River held that the Proposed Rules were not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, for reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law below. Judge Maloney has yet to rule on the backward-looking remedy proposed by the Department. On March 26, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an order extending until May 1, 2003, the time for interested parties to file motions to intervene with regard to the Department's proposed backward-looking relief. The order noted that the parties have stipulated to the suspension of the back tax as to plaintiffs and objecting non-parties until further order of the court. On February 19, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-- Import-Export." The sole issue before Judge Maloney was "whether Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, (the 'Equalization Tax'), as it existed in 1997, violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the 'Import- Export Clause')." (Emphasis in original) After setting forth the standard for analysis of whether a taxing scheme violates the Import-Export Clause under Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976), Judge Maloney ruled as follows: It is precisely [the exemption for United States products found in 601.155(5), Florida Statutes] that causes the 1997 Equalization Tax to contravene the Import-Export Clause. Specifically, the court finds that because the statute exempts "citrus fruit grown within the United States," but does not exempt citrus fruit grown in foreign countries, the exemption causes the tax to "fall on imports as such simply because of their place of origin." Michelin, 423 U.S. at 286. Additionally, because the tax falls on foreign-grown citrus as such simply because of its origin but does not fall on domestic-grown citrus, the Equalization Tax, with the exemption, creates a "special tariff or particular preference for certain domestic goods." Id. (i.e. California, Arizona, and Texas citrus products). * * * In conclusion, because the court finds the exemption contained within the 1997 Equalization Tax violates both the first and third elements of the Michelin test,1 the court finds the 1997 Equalization Tax violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the "Import-Export Clause"). On March 31, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." In this order, Judge Maloney found that the box tax itself, Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petitioners and Intervenor in the instant case are licensed citrus fruit dealers regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, they are subject to the rules of the Department. Petitioners and Intervenor buy, sell, and manufacture citrus juices. They shipped products made with non- Florida U.S. juice during the tax period without paying equalization taxes. Petitioners and Intervenor have been notified by the Department that they are liable to pay back taxes pursuant to the Proposed Rules, as well as the invalid Emergency Rules.
The Issue This case arises out of the denial of a beer and wine license application by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The Petitioner, Mr. Rory Lee Clark, doing business as The Friendly Spot, applied for a beer and wine license and was denied on the basis that he had previously held a beverage license in the State of Florida which was revoked. The Petitioner, Mr. Clark, testified on his own behalf and also called as a witness Mr. Carl Valletto. The only evidence offered by the Respondent, the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, was Respondent's Exhibit 1, a stipulation dated June 20, 1975, entered into by Mr. Rory Lee Clark and the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Rory Lee Clark applied for a beer and wine license and his application was denied because a previous license held by Mr. Clark had been revoked by the Division. The application for license and letter of denial were not offered into evidence by Petitioner. Therefore, the specific information contained in the application and the letter of denial were not in evidence. Mr. Rory Lee Clark first held a beverage license in Florida at the age of 18 or 19. The license previously held by Mr. Rory Lee Clark was License No. 27-34 Series 2-COP and was utilized in connection with a business named Garden of Earthly Delights located in Pensacola, Florida. On June 16, 1975, Mr. Rory Lee Clark entered into a stipulation with the Division of Alcoholic Severages and Tobacco whereby he stipulated to the revocation of his License No. 27-34. That stipulation stated in part: "He [Rory Lee Clark] understands that revocation of a license would keep him from getting another beverage license in the future." (See Respondent's Exhibit 1). The stipulation was signed by Mr. Clark, his attorney, and the Director, Division of Beverage. The stipulation did not state the reasons for the revocation. The revocation action arose out of allegations that he and other persons were gambling on the licensed premises by shooting pool for between one and three dollars per game. Prior to the date of the voluntary revocation of his license, Mr. Clark had also been involved in an incident somewhere other than Garden of Earthly Delights. He was arrested and charged with use and sale of amphetamines and was placed on probation; he was not adjudicated guilty by the Circuit Court. Other than an arrest for a pawn shop violation, Mr. Clark has had no other arrest or problems involving violations of the law since the revocation of his previous license. The arrest for pawn shop violation occurred when he was 23 years old and was for failing to write a serial number of a gun on a required form. The charge was ultimately dismissed and no further action taken. Since the revocation of his previous license, Mr. Rory Lee Clark has been gainfully employed and conducted himself as a responsible adult. He is presently 28 years old and working as a metal stud mechanic doing work primarily as a subcontractor for Carl Valletto, the owner of Key Insulation. For the last eight (8) years, Mr. Clark has been a good, dependable worker and has enjoyed a reputation in the community for good moral character.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 22 day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Hatch, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Gary Rutledge Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Howard M. Rasmussen Executive Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Thomas N. Tucker, Esquire 8445 Pensacola Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32504
The Issue Has Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. (Respondent) paid Petitioner, Chastain- Bishop Farms (Petitioner) in full for watermelons represented by Respondent's load numbers 3002 and 3004 purchased from Petitioner during the 1995 watermelon season?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a "producer" of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. Watermelons come within the definition of "agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent was issued license number 8887 by the Department which is supported by Bond Number 137743741 in the amount of $75,000 written by Respondent Continental Casualty Company (Continental), as surety, with an inception date of January 1, 1995, and an expiration date of December 31, 1995. The Complaint was timely filed by Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. Sometime during the week prior to Monday, May 8, 1995, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a verbal agreement which contained the following terms: (a) Petitioner would sell Respondent a semi-trailer load of medium size melons of good quality to be harvested and loaded by Petitioner onto a semi-trailer furnished by Respondent; (b) Respondent would have the right and opportunity to inspect the melons before or during loading; (c) Respondent would pay Petitioner fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound for the melons loaded onto the trailer; (d) upon delivery at Petitioner's farm, the melons became Respondent's property and Petitioner had no further obligation to Respondent concerning the melons; and (e) settlement was to be made by Respondent within a reasonable time. Subsequent to the above agreement, Petitioner sold and Respondent bought, a second semi-trailer load of melons to be delivered under the same terms and conditions as agreed in the above verbal agreement. On Friday, May 5, 1995, Respondent's agent, Robert Allen and T. J. Chastain, a partner in Chastain-Bishop Farms, had a disagreement concerning Eddie Idlette, Respondent's inspector, being on the Petitioner's farm. Because of an incident in the past involving Idlette and Petitioner, Chastain did not want Idlette on Petitioner's farm and made this known to Allen. As result of this disagreement, Idlette left the Petitioner's farm and was not present on Monday or Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, to inspect the two loads of melons. Allen testified that Chastain also excluded him from Petitioner's farm at this time, and that Chastain told him that neither he nor Idlette needed to be present during the loading of the melons because Chastain "would stand behind the loads". However, the more credible evidence shows that Chastain did not prevent Allen from inspecting the melons on Monday or Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, or tell Allen that he "would stand behind the loads". Furthermore, there is credible evidence to show that Allen was present at Petitioner's farm on Monday and Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, and he either inspected, or had the opportunity to inspect, the two loads of melons, notwithstanding Allen's testimony or Respondent's exhibit 6 to the contrary. Petitioner did not advise Respondent, at any time pertinent to the sale of the melons, that Petitioner would give Respondent "full market protection" on the melons. Furthermore, Petitioner did not agree, at any time pertinent to the sale of the melons, for Respondent to handle the melons "on account" for Petitioner. The more credible evidence supports Petitioner's contention that the melons were purchased by Respondent with title to the melons passing to Respondent upon delivery at Petitioner's farm, subject to inspection or the opportunity to inspect before loading and delivery. On Monday, May 8, 1995, Petitioner loaded Respondent's first semi- trailer with a State of Georgia tag number CX9379, with 2,280 medium size Sangria melons of good quality weighing 46,800 pounds and identified as Respondent's load number 3002. Respondent accepted load 3002 for shipment to its customer. Using the agreed upon price of fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound times 46,800 pounds, the Respondent owed Petitioner $7,020.00 for load number 3002. On Tuesday, May 9, 1995, Petitioner loaded Respondent's second semi- trailer with a State of New Jersey tag number TAB4020, with 2,331 medium size Sangria melons of good quality weighing 46,620 pounds and identified as Respondent's load number 3004. Respondent accepted load 3004 for shipment to its customer. Using the agreed upon price of fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound times 46,620 pounds, the Respondent owed Petitioner $6,9993.00 for load number 3004. The combined total amount owed to Petitioner by Respondent for load numbers 3002 and 3004 was $14,013.00. Respondent shipped load 3002 to E. W. Kean Co, Inc. (Kean). Upon receiving load 3002, Kean allegedly found problems with the melons. Respondent allowed Kean to handled the melons on account for Respondent. Kean sold the melons for $6,804.05 or 14.5 cents per pound. After Kean's deduction for handling, Kean paid Respondent $6,112.05 or 13.02 cents per pound. In accounting to Petitioner, Respondent made further deductions for handling and freight, and offered Petitioner $3,641.24 or 7.8 cents per pound for the melons on load 3002. Respondent shipped load 3004 to Mada Fruit Sales (Mada). Upon receiving load 3004, Mada allegedly found problems with the melons. By letter dated June 8, 1995 (Respondent's exhibit 4), Mada grudgingly agreed to pay the freight plus 10 cents per pound for the melons. Mada paid Respondent $4,662.00 for load 3004, and after Respondent deducted its commission of $466.20, offered Petitioner $4,195.80 or nine cents per pound for the melons on load 3004. By check number 18922 dated May 28, 1995, Respondent paid Petitioner $7,760.08. Respondent contends that this amount was offered to Kye Bishop in full settlement for loads 3002 and 3004, and that after Bishop consulted with Chastain, Bishop on behalf of Petitioner, accepted this amount in full settlement for loads 3002 and 3004. Bishop contends that he turned down the $7,760.08 as settlement in full but took the $7,760.08 as partial payment and proceeded to file a complaint with the Department against Respondent's bond for the difference. There is nothing written on the check to indicate that by accepting and cashing the check Petitioner acknowledged that it was payment in full for load numbers 3002 and 3004. The more credible evidence shows that Bishop did not accept the check in the amount of $7,760.08 as payment in full for loads 3002 and 3004 but only as partial payment, notwithstanding the testimony of Allen to the contrary. There was an assessment charge of $62.72 which Petitioner agrees that it owes and should be deducted from any monies owed to Petitioner by Respondent. Initially, Respondent owed Petitioner $14,013.00. However, substracting the partial payment of $7,760.08 and the assessment of $62.72 from the $14,013.00 leaves a balance owed Petitioner by Respondent of $6,190.20
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order granting the Petitioner relief by ordering Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. to pay Petitioner the sum of $6,190.20. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of May, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4226A The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed findings of fact 1(a) through 1(i) are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 16. Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed finding of fact 1 is covered in the Conclusion of Law. Proposed finding of fact 2 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 16. Proposed finding of fact 3, 6, 7 and 8 10, are not supported by evidence in the record. As to proposed finding of fact 4, Petitioner and Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. agreed that Petitioner would sell and Respondent would pay $0.15 per pound for medium size melons. Otherwise proposed finding of fact is not supported by evidence in the record. See Findings of Fact 4, 7 and 8. As to proposed finding of fact 5, Respondent sold the loads. Otherwise proposed finding of fact 5 is not supported by evidence in the record. Respondent Continental elected not to file any proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Lakeland, Florida 32399-0800 David K. Oaks, Esquire David Oaks, P.A. 252 W. Marion Avenue Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Mark A. Sessums, Esquire Frost, O'Toole & Saunders, P.A. Post Office Box 2188 Bartow, Florida 33831-2188
The Issue Does Respondent, William. G. Roe & Sons, Inc. (Roe & Sons) owe Five Star Packing (Five Star) monies as alleged in the Complaint for citrus contracted for under various written contracts entered into by the parties? Case No. 01-2496A Does Respondent Five Star owe Roe & Sons monies as alleged in the Complaint for damages sustained by Roe & Sons as a result of the breach of alleged oral contracts between the parties by Five Star?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Five Star was a citrus fruit dealer as that term is defined in Subsection 601.03(8), Florida Statutes, and was licensed and bonded in accordance with Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Roe & Sons was a citrus fruit dealer as that term is defined in Subsection 601.03(8), Florida Statutes, and was licensed and bonded in accordance with Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, both Five Star and Roe & Sons were subject to the provisions of Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. Five Star bought, sold, and delivered citrus fruit to various citrus processing facilities and packing houses in Central Florida during the 1999-2000 citrus fruit season. During the 1999-2000 citrus fruit season, Roe & Sons operated a packing house in Winter Haven, Florida, and regularly purchased citrus fruit for the fresh fruit market, and sold citrus fruit that it had purchased to other citrus fruit dealers such as Five Star. The Complaint in Case No. 01-2495A was filed with the Department by Five Star on September 12, 2000, and was timely filed in accordance with Subsection 601.66(1), Florida Statutes. On January 5, 2001, before the Department referred this matter to the Division, Five Star filed its First Amended Complaint with the Department. The Complaint in Case No. 01-2496A was filed with the Department by Roe & Sons on November 10, 2000, and was timely filed in accordance with Subsection 601.66(1), Florida Statutes. On December 6, 1999, Roe & Sons and Five Star entered into a Participation Marketing Agreement, Contract No. B233Q, for tangerines wherein Roe & Sons was to purchase Sunburst Tangerines from Five Star. Roe & Sons purchased 2,124 boxes of Sunburst Tangerines from Five Star for which Roe & Sons paid Five Star $23,534.84. There is no disagreement as to these tangerines. However, Five Star contends that the tangerines supported by Trip Ticket Nos. 225488, 225489, 225490, 225491, and 225492 were delivered to Roe & Sons but that Five Star did not receive payment. Roe & Sons has no Trip Ticket receipts or any other record indicating that these tangerines were delivered to Roe & Sons. However, Larry Thompson of Five Star testified that Trip Ticket Nos. 225488, 225489, and 225490 were filled out by the harvester and that he was present when the tangerines represented by those Trip Tickets were delivered to Roe & Sons. Thompson also testified that he filled out Trip Ticket Nos. 225491 and 225492 and was present when the tangerines represented by those Trip Tickets were delivered to Roe & Sons. The Trip Tickets indicate that the tangerines were being delivered to Roe & Sons under Contract No. B233Q. Copies of the Trip Tickets along with the testimony of Larry Thompson, which is credible, is sufficient to show that the tangerines represented by Trip Tickets Nos. 225488, 225489, 225490, 225491, and 225492 were delivered to Roe & Sons, notwithstanding that Roe & Sons has no records of these tangerines being delivered to Roe & Sons by Five Star. Therefore, Roe & Sons owes Five Star $8,645.67 for the tangerines represented by Trip Ticket Nos. 225488, 225489, 225490, 225491, and 225492. However, Five Star stipulated that it owed Roe & Sons $2,667.60 for 684 boxes of tangerines delivered to Five Star by Roe & Sons on January 13, 2000. The adjusted amount owed Five Star by Roe & Sons for tangerines is $5,978.07. On February 11, 2000, Roe & Sons and Five Star entered into a Fresh Cash Purchase Agreement, Contract No. B333S, wherein Roe & Sons agreed to purchase an estimated 25,000 boxes of Marsh white grapefruit from Five Star for an agreed price of $1.35 Per Pound Solids (PPS) Gross. Contract No. B333S contained the following Special Clauses: "FRUIT MUST BE A MINIMUM 10.00 BRIX AND 9.00 RATIO. PRICE FOR FRUIT NOT MEETING THIS MINIMUM SCORE WILL BE NEGOTIATED AS THE LOADS ARE RECEIVED." The "Movement Date" under Contract No. B333S was to be "SEASONAL," which the parties stipulated meant that there was no specified date for delivery, only that the grapefruit was to be delivered during the 1999/2000 season. Contract No. B333S also contained the following clause: "Fruit not meeting contract ratio or brix requirements but otherwise suitable to BUYER will be discounted by .10 per unit measure P/S or returned to SELLER at BUYER's sole discretion." On March 31, 2000, Roe & Sons entered into a second Agreement, Contract No. B376B, wherein Roe & Sons agreed to purchase an estimated 7,000 boxes of Marsh white grapefruit from Five Star for an agreed price of $1.50 PPS Gross. Contract No. B376B contained the following special clause: "Must be 10 Brix and 9 Ratio minimum or $0.15 PPS Penalty." Although Contract No. B376B contained no Movement Date, the parties agreed that the grapefruit was to be delivered during the 1999/2000 season. Morgan Roe testified that when Roe & Sons entered into multiple contracts with the same party to furnish citrus fruit during same season, Roe & Sons had an unwritten internal policy, which required the other party to the multiple contracts with Roe & Sons to fulfill the requirements of the first contract before Roe & Sons would accept citrus fruit under any subsequent contract. Roe & Sons did not make Five Star aware of this unwritten internal policy at the time that either the first or second contract was executed by Five Star. Likewise, neither the first nor the second contract contained any language which would require Five Star to fulfill the first contract before Roe & Sons would be required to accept grapefruit under the second contract. Between March 28, 2000 and May 9, 2000, Five Star delivered 7,649 boxes of white grapefruit to Roe & Sons. Five Star contends that Roe & Sons owes Five Star $43,614.77 after adjustments for unloading charges and research and advertising taxes for the grapefruit delivered. Roe & Sons contends that it owes Five Star $40,106.96 after adjustments for unloading charges and research and advertising taxes for the grapefruit Five Star delivered. Five Star contends that the majority of the grapefruit was delivered under Contract No. B376B and that Five Star should have been paid $1.50 PPS for the grapefruit delivered under Contract No. B376B. However, only Trip Ticket Nos. 48433, 48434, 77569, 77570, 77571, 77572, and 77573 were specifically marked as being delivered under Contract No. B376B, which Five Star contends it should have been paid $1.50 per pound solids since this grapefruit met all the specifications of the contract. However, Roe & Sons contends that since Five Star's commitment under Contract No. B333S had not been totally fulfilled, Roe & Sons was only required to pay Five Star $1.35 per pound solids for all of the grapefruit delivered between March 28, 2000 and May 9, 2000, notwithstanding that some of the Trip Tickets indicated that the grapefruit was being delivered under Contract B376B. Roe & Sons' contention was based on its internal policy that the first contract, Contract No. B333S, had to be fulfilled before Roe & Sons was required to honor the second contract, Contract No. B376B. There is insufficient evidence to support Roe & Sons' contention that its internal policy is an industry standard, notwithstanding the testimony of W. A. Alford to the contrary, which lacks credibility. Roe & Sons has failed to show that Five Star was required to fulfill Contract No. B333S before Roe & Sons was required to accept fruit under Contract No. B376B. Roe & Sons should have allowed Five Star $1.50 PPS for the grapefruit delivered under Contract No. B376B. Five Star conceded that none of the other Trip Tickets indicated that the grapefruit was being delivered under Contract No. B376B. Therefore, Roe & Sons' Net Return amount should be adjusted upwards to account for the difference ($0.15) in the price PPS for the above listed Trip Tickets. After adjustment (13,497.78 PS x $0.15 PPS = $2,024.67), Roe & Sons owes Five Star the sum of $42,131.63 ($40,106.96 + $2,024.67) for the grapefruit delivered under Contract Nos. B333S and B376B. Other than the adjustment for the difference in PPS, Roe & Sons Net Return amount is correct. Five Star's Net Return amount incorrectly takes credit for grapefruit at $1.50 PPS that was not delivered under Contract B376B and fails to take credit for grapefruit delivered to Roe & Sons on May 9, 2000, under Trip Ticket Nos. 4134 and 212720. Five Star contends that Roe & Sons' cull adjustment was excessive and that Roe & Sons owed Five Star $1,688.52 for excessive cull adjustment. Five Star's contracts with Roe & Sons provides that Roe & Sons has the right to reject unsuitable fruit. Although Five Star presented testimony as to what might constitute "excessive cull adjustment," it failed to present sufficient evidence to show that the "culled fruit" was suitable and that Roe & Sons' "cull adjustment" was excessive. Therefore, Five Star is not entitled to any adjustment for cull adjustment. Roe & Sons contends that sometime around April 11, 2000, Larry Thompson for Five Star and William Roe for Roe & Sons entered into an oral contract wherein Five Star was to purchase 30,000 boxes of field run ruby red grapefruit with a 9.00 ratio at a price of $1.20 PPS. Roe & Sons reduced these terms to writing and designated it as Contract S2057. Roe & Sons also contends that sometime around April 14, 2000, Larry Thompson for Five Star and William Roe for Roe & Sons entered into an oral contract wherein Five Star was to purchase 15,000 boxes of elimination red grapefruit at a price of $1.10 PPS. Roe & Sons reduced these terms to writing and designated it as Contract S2060. Larry Thompson testified that he refused to agree to, or to sign, either of these alleged contracts on the basis that he did not agree to handle any specific quantity (number of boxes) of red grapefruit for Roe & Sons. Larry Thompson testified that he agreed to handle some (no specific quantity) of red grapefruit for Roe & Sons at the price and specifications stated. Based on Larry Thompson's testimony, which is credible, there was never any valid contract, oral or otherwise, wherein Five Star agreed to purchase a specific quantity (boxes) of red grapefruit from Roe & Sons, notwithstanding William Roe's testimony to the contrary, which lacks credibility in this regard, or the fact that Five Star did purchase a number of boxes of red grapefruit from Roe & Sons, for which Five Star agrees that it owes Roe & Sons. Between April 12, 2000 and April 20, 2000, Five Star purchased some 2,760 boxes of red grapefruit at a price of $1.10 PPS, represented by ticket nos. 71146, 71149, 64019, 64024, and 64585. The total PPS of the boxes was 13,094.44 for a gross price of $14,403.88 (13,094.44 PS x $1.10 PPS = $14,403.88). After adjusting the gross price for hauling and unloading charges and advertising tax, the total amount owed Roe & Sons by Five Star was $10,972.86. Between April 12, 2000 and April 20, 2000, Five Star purchased some 4,355 boxes of red grapefruit at a price of $1.20 PPS, represented by ticket nos. 214720, 214721, 71147, 71148, 71150, 214722, 214723, 214724, and 214725. The total PPS of the boxes was 21,387.92 for a gross price of $25,665.50 (21,387.92 PS x $1.20 PPS = $25,665.50). After adjusting the gross price for hauling and unloading charges and research and advertising tax, the total amount owed Roe & Sons by Five Star was $21,621.11. Five Star alleged that it owed Roe & Sons the sum of $32,593.97. However, Five Star stipulated that Roe & Sons should be given credit for $4,336.37 in hauling charges paid by Roe & Sons, which brings the total owed to Roe & Sons for red grapefruit by Five Star to $36,930.34. Subsequent to the purchase of the above red grapefruit by Five Star from Roe & Sons, Five Star advised Roe & Sons that Five Star would not be purchasing any more red grapefruit from Roe & Sons. As a result of this decision by Five Star, Roe & Sons advised Five Star that Five Star could continue to deliver white grapefruit under Contract Nos. B333S and B376B, but that any monies due Five Star for grapefruit delivered on theses contracts would be applied against any damages suffered by Roe & Sons for Five Star's failure to honor the alleged oral contracts to purchase red grapefruit from Roe & Sons. As a result of Roe & Sons' position concerning the alleged oral contracts, Five Star made no further deliveries of white grapefruit to Roe & Sons under Contract Nos. B333S and B376B. Instead, Five Star sold the white grapefruit that was to be delivered to Roe & Sons under Contract Nos. B333S and B376B to Silver Springs Citrus at a much reduced rate PPS due to the decline in the grapefruit market in what Five Star described as an attempt to mitigate damages under Contract Nos. B333S and B376B. Five Star alleged that Roe & Sons owed Five Star $4,822.31 for 840 boxes of temple oranges purchased by Roe & Sons. However, Five Star stipulated that Roe & Sons was entitled to a credit of $355.58 due to an accounting error by Five Star. The adjusted amount owed to Five Star for temple oranges by Roe & Sons is $4,466,73. Roe & Sons alleged in its First Affirmative Defense to Five Star's Complaint that the parties had reached a settlement of their respective claims. However, based on the testimony of Larry Thompson denying that a settlement had been reached, which is credible in this regard, and the fact that the check for the amount of the alleged settlement was never received or negotiated by Five Star, supports Five Star's position that the parties had not reached a settlement. In its Second Affirmative Defense, Roe & Sons alleged that Five Star breached Contract No. B333S by failing to deliver white grapefruit in accordance with the specifications set forth in the contract. Roe & Sons failed to present sufficient evidence to support this affirmative defense. Roe & Sons' Third Affirmative Defense, Setoff, and Counterclaim to Five Star's Complaint is based on Five Star's breach of the alleged oral red grapefruit contracts. Roe & Sons failed to present sufficient evidence to show that the alleged oral red grapefruit contracts were in fact valid contracts. Roe & Sons alleges in its Complaint filed in Case No. 01-2496A that Five Star breached the alleged oral contracts for red grapefruit. Roe & Sons failed to present sufficient evidence to show that the alleged oral red grapefruit contracts were in fact valid contracts.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order requiring Roe & Sons to pay Five Star the sum of $15,646.09 and denying Five Star any damages in regard to Contract Nos. B333S and B376B. It is further recommended that Roe & Sons be denied any relief in regards to the alleged red grapefruit contracts. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Hank B. Campbell, Esquire Gray, Harris, Robinson, Lane, Trohn Post Office Box 3 Lakeland, Florida 33802 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company 4311 West Waters Avenue, Suite 401 Tampa, Florida 33614 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 541 East Tennessee Street India Building Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Douglas A. Lockwood, III, Esquire Peterson & Myers, P.A. 141 5th Street, Northwest Post Office Drawer 7608 Winter Haven, Florida 33883 H. Christopher Thompkins, II, Esquire 1706 South Kings Avenue Brandon, Florida 33509-6216 Jack P. James, Esquire Post Office Box 3 Lakeland, Florida 33802 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents Harbor Island Citrus, Inc., and Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland are indebted to Petitioner Rio Indio Fruit Company in the amount of $80,684.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Rio Indio Fruit Company operates a citrus packinghouse located in St. Lucie County, Florida. Respondent Harbor Island Citrus, Inc., operates a citrus packinghouse in Indian River County, Florida. On approximately November 20, 1999, Albert Valdes from Harbor Island contacted Ralph Viamontes from Rio Indio to ascertain if Rio Indio might have a source that Harbor Island could use to obtain colored grapefruit for Harbor Island's annual fund-raising program. It was the industry practice, and Harbor Island's practice, for the fund-raising program to run from late-November through mid-December. During that time period, students in the north sell the fruit to raise money for their projects. The fruit used in such a fund-raising program can be a quality inferior to the quality demanded by the Japanese market, the primary market for Harbor's Island's citrus. Viamontes told Valdes he would see if he could find a grower with colored grapefruit suitable for Harbor Island's fund-raising program. Viamontes telephoned Valdes the following day and said he had located a grower. On that day or possibly the following day Valdes and two other Harbor Island employees, Dennis Downs and James Morris, met Viamontes at the Rio Indio facility. The four men drove in Viamontes' vehicle to the Sorge VII grove in Martin County to look at the grove's colored grapefruit. The amount of fruit in the grove was much larger than Harbor Island needed to fulfill its fund-raising program commitment. Viamontes estimated that the grove contained the equivalent of 30,000 boxes of colored grapefruit. Valdes told Viamontes that Harbor Island might need 18,000 to 20,000 boxes of the grapefruit for its fund-raising program. Viamontes told the Harbor Island employees that they could still make a deal for the grapefruit in the grove because since he had his own packing house, he would take the fruit that Harbor Island did not need. The men discussed that Harbor Island could take 2/3 of the colored grapefruit in the grove, and Rio Indio could take 1/3. They further discussed that the manager of Sorge VII wanted $5.50 a box for the fruit, that Viamontes would contract to take all the fruit in the grove, that Harbor Island would pay Viamontes $5.50 a box for the fruit Harbor Island took, and that Viamontes would pay the grower. James Morris from Harbor Island specifically asked Viamontes what would happen if Harbor Island wanted less than 18,000 to 20,000 boxes. Viamontes told the Harbor Island employees that there would be no problem if Harbor Island took less fruit because Viamontes would take whatever was left after Harbor Island took what it wanted. Valdes consulted with Donald Groves, Jr., the owner of Harbor Island to verify that Harbor Island would make the arrangement suggested by Viamontes, and Groves approved the arrangement. Thereafter, Viamontes entered into a written contact with the manager of Sorge VII to purchase all of the fruit for $5.50 a box, and that written contract included deadlines for 20,000 boxes of fruit to be picked by December 31, 1999, and the remainder to be picked by the end of February 2000. Rather than the 30,000 field boxes that Viamontes had estimated the grove contained, the grove contained substantially more grapefruit than Viamontes estimated. The record in this cause suggests that the grove may have contained as many as 43,762 boxes of colored grapefruit. In accordance with its understanding of the arrangement with Viamontes, Harbor Island began harvesting colored grapefruit from the Sorge VII grove on November 26, 1999, and completed all picking at the grove on December 8, 1999. During that time Harbor Island picked 9,000 boxes of colored grapefruit for which it was obligated to pay Viamontes $5.50 per box. Harbor Island paid Viamontes in full for the fruit it took. During the time Harbor Island was at the Sorge VII grove picking colored grapefruit, Rio Indio's crews were there picking grapefruit. Rio Indio's crews also picked fruit at the grove during the months after Harbor Island completed its picking. In addition to Rio Indio's crews knowing that Harbor Island had completed its picking, James Morris specifically told Viamontes that Harbor Island had taken all the fruit it wanted from the Sorge VII grove as of December 8, 1999. During the months of December 1999, January 2000, February 2000, and the first half of March 2000, Viamontes spoke with Valdes of Harbor Island several times a day to check on the status of other unrelated fruit being packed and sold by Harbor Island for Viamontes. In addition, Viamontes was present at the Harbor Island packinghouse on a weekly basis to pick up checks due to him or Rio Indio for the unrelated fruit being sold by Harbor Island for Viamontes. Yet, at no time between December 8, 1999, and the middle of March 2000 did Viamontes tell anyone that he believed Harbor Island had an obligation to harvest additional fruit from the Sorge VII grove. Rather, in late January 2000 Viamontes asked Valdes if Harbor Island were going to take any more fruit from Sorge VII. When Valdes said the fund-raising program was over, Viamontes told Valdes not to worry because Rio Indio would take the rest. Further, on or about March 1, 2000, during one of Viamontes' visits to the Harbor Island packinghouse, Dennis Downs of Harbor Island asked Viamontes how the harvesting in Sorge VII was proceeding. Viamontes responded that Rio Indio was harvesting the remaining colored grapefruit and that Harbor Island need not be concerned about any further harvesting at the Sorge VII grove. On or about March 15, 2000, the price and demand for colored grapefruit suddenly and dramatically dropped due to an oversupply of fruit for which the industry was not prepared. After the dramatic decline, Viamontes contacted Valdes from Harbor Island and inquired whether Harbor Island was going to pick any additional fruit at the Sorge VII grove. Valdes responded that Harbor Island had no obligation to pick any additional colored grapefruit from the Sorge VII grove based upon the agreements between Harbor Island and Rio Indio, specifically, Viamontes' continued representations that Harbor Island should not be concerned about picking any additional colored grapefruit from the grove because Rio Indio would take the remainder. In July 2000 Viamontes appeared at Harbor Island and advised Donald Groves, for the first time, that Harbor Island owed Rio Indio the amount of $80,684 for an additional 20,171 boxes of colored grapefruit from the Sorge VII grove, which Viamontes now contends Harbor Island should have harvested. Rio Indio claims that it suffered a loss of $4 per box for that additional fruit. The documentation presented by Rio Indio to support its demand is questionable and does not substantiate Rio Indio's claimed damages. First, the majority of the documents submitted by Rio Indio indicate that the fruit described therein was from a grove in St. Lucie County, and Sorge VII is in Martin County. Second, the majority of the documents indicate that the fruit described therein was from packinghouse eliminations although Viamontes alleges that the fruit went directly from the field to the cannery without going through a packinghouse. Third, the cannery records reflect that the "pound solids per box" are significantly less than what would be expected from fruit coming from the Sorge VII grove based upon the grove's historical production.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Harbor Island Citrus, Inc., is not indebted to Rio Indio Fruit Company and dismissing the Complaint filed by Rio Indio Fruit Company in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore W. Herzog, Esquire 1101 Simonton Street Key West, Florida 33040 Fred L. Kretschmer, Jr., Esquire Moss, Henderson, Blanton, Lanier, Kretschmer & Murphy, P.A. 817 Beachland Boulevard Post Office Box 3406 Vero Beach, Florida 32964-3406 Kathy Elves The Fidelity and Deposit Companies 300 Saint Paul Place Post Office Box 87 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 500 Third Street, Northwest Post Office Box 1072 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1072 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 541 East Tennessee Street India Building Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The primary issue in this hearing was the existence of a contract between M. Stembridge and Jack's Fruit Company under which monies were owed Stembridge.
Findings Of Fact Prior to August 5, 1974, Mrs. Barbara Stembridge, who was in the grove caretaking business, called Mr. Jack Goldtrap by telephone relative to the sale of citrus fruit on properties managed by her for her mother-in-law and herself. Their discussion regarding the sale of the fruit and the terms was incorporated with the contract, Exhibit 1, which Mr. Goldtrap sent to Mrs. Stembridge together with a check for $7500. Mrs. Stembridge executed the contract, accepted the check, and returned the executed contract to Mr. Goldtrap. This contract recites that Mr. Goldtrap had purchased " all fruit on the following groves at market price at time of picking less 50 cents plus picking cost". Thereafter the contract lists the groves subject to the contract: "Home Bloc, Poor Prospect and R. F. Stembridge grove." The testimony was uncontroverted that the fruit which is the subject of the instant controversy was located within the groves enumerated in the contract, however, Mrs. Barbara Stembridge stated that it had not been her intent to sell the fruit in controversy, but she was uncertain whether this was communicated to Mr. Goldtrap prior to the execution of the contract. Mr. Goldtrap testified that he felt he had purchased all the fruit on the groves as stated in the contract. The Hearing Officer finds that the contract, Exhibit 1, takes precedent over any prior verbal agreement between the parties to the contract and that Mr. Goldtrap purchased all fruit in the grove identified therein. Mrs. Barbara Stembridge and R. M. Stembridge testified that subsequent to the written contract with Mr. Goldtrap that R. M. Stembridge entered into an oral agreement to purchase the fruit in controversy from Mrs. Stembridge (the mother of R. M. Stembridge and mother-in-law of Mrs. Barbara Stembridge, who is the sister-in-law of R. M. Stembridge). R. M. Stembridge desired the fruit for sale in his roadside stand at his service station, and planned to pick the fruit in controversy himself on a piecemeal basis over several months. Pursuant to her mother-in-law's Instructions, Mrs. Barbara Stembridge contacted T. G. Mixon, a field superintendent with 31 years experience to estimate the value of the fruit in controversy. T. G. Mixon looked at the trees and crop in controversy late in 1974 and estimated in value to R. M. Stembridge as $3/box; however, he qualified his estimate stating that this was only a valid estimate of its value to R. M. Stembridge based on his particular intended use and that its market value was no where near that figure. R. M. Stembridge paid the agreed upon price of $900 to his mother-in-law for the fruit in controversy. Prior to picking the fruit he had purchased, Mr. Goldtrap visited the groves and was shown the groves, their boundaries, and the fruit in controversy by Mrs. Barbara Stembridge's foreman. This fruit was red grapefruit which is generally unsuitable for juice production. Such fruit cannot be economically picked for juice because there is no market for the unacceptable fruit. Mr. Goldtrap was advised by Mrs. Stembridge's foreman that Mr. Stembridge was interested in the fruit. Mrs. Barbara Stembridge testified that she thought that her foreman had told an unknown person that the red grapefruit had been promised to her brother-in-law. Mr. Goldtrap decided not to pick the red grapefruit, but to leave the fruit on the trees, and instructed his picking crew supervisors to check with R. M. Stembridge to determine which of the fruit be desired. In addition to the red grapefruit in controversy, R. M. Stembridge also had agreed to purchase white grapefruit from approximately 10 trees adjoining his service station, a fact unknown to Mr. Goldtrap or his supervisors. When the supervisors called on Mr. Stembridge to find out which trees should be spared, Stembridge thinking that they were referring to the white grapefruit trees near his station and that they had been shown the red grapefruit trees by his sister-in-law's foreman told them to begin their picking and when they got down to the station he would show them the trees to spare. Mrs. Barbara Stembridge's foreman did not instruct the picking supervisors and the picking crew picked the red grapefruit in controversy. When Mr. Stembridge became aware of the reds having been picked, he contacted Mr. Goldtrap. Mr. Stembridge was very irate and Mr. Goldtrap was very apologetic not fully realizing how the fruit had been picked when it had been his intent to spare the fruit. At this point, Stembridge demanded $3/box for the fruit, and Mr. Goldtrap stated that was a high price. Thereafter, in either this conversation or a subsequent one, Stembridge stated perhaps he knew a man who would buy them, however, when contacted this individual was not interested. When Goldtrap was advised of this, Goldtrap said he would send another truck and collect the red grapefruit. The issue presented in this controversy, therefore, becomes a question of whether there was a transaction between Mr. Goldtrap and Mr. R. M. Stembridge. It is clear from the contract, Exhibit 1, that Mr. Goldtrap owned the fruit in question at the time Mr. Stembridge "purchased" the fruit from his mother. Goldtrap intended to leave the fruit because of it low value and instructed his supervisors to contact Stembridge so that Stembridge could identify the trees in which be was interested. However, these trees were not identified by Stembridge because Stembridge thinking the supervisors were referring to the white grapefruit trees, did not indicate the trees he desired. Therefore, Goldtrap's intent to relinquish his right to the fruit was never effectively communicated to Mrs. Barbara Stembridge or to R. M. Stembridge. Mr. Stembridge's demand for $3/box for the grapefruit was in essence a demand for damages and not an offer for sale. Even if it were viewed as an offer (overlooking Stembridge's lack of ownership), there is no evidence that Goldtrap accepted the offer. His response was to advise Stembridge that he would send another truck to pick up the fruit. This action was consistent with his prior contract with Barbara Stembridge to purchase all the fruit in the groves and his legal obligation. See Section 601.64(3), Florida Statutes. The testimony was clear that Mr. Goldtrap had not paid out the moneys received from the sale of the red grapefruit because of the questions raised by R. M. Stembridge. However, Barbara Stembridge has filed no complaint in this matter, and based upon the foregoing findings that there is no transaction or contract between R. M. Stembridge and Goldtrap, R. M. Stembridge is not entitled to an accounting or to payment for the fruit in controversy.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, a licensed citrus fruit dealer, violated the Florida Citrus Code by failing to pay Petitioner the full purchase price for grapefruit that the dealer had harvested from Petitioner's grove and sold in the ordinary course of business to its (the dealer's) customers; and, if so, the amount of the indebtedness owed by the dealer.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Frontier Fresh of Indian River, LLC ("Seller"), is in the business of growing citrus fruit and hence is a "producer" as that term is defined in the Florida Citrus Code. § 601.03(33), Fla. Stat. Respondent United Indian River Packers, LLC ("Buyer"), is a "citrus fruit dealer" operating within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (the "Department"). See § 601.03(8), Fla. Stat. On September 6, 2013, Seller and Buyer entered into a Production Contract Agreement (the "Contract") under which Buyer agreed to purchase and harvest red and flame grapefruit (both generally called "colored grapefruit") then growing in Seller's "Emerald Grove" in St. Lucie County. Buyer promised to pay Seller $7.75 per box plus "rise" for all colored grapefruit harvested from the Emerald Grove during the 2013/2014 season. ("Rise" is an additional payment due Seller if Buyer's net revenue from marketing the fruit exceeds the Contract price or "floor payment.") The Contract gave Buyer and its "agents, employees and vehicles" the right to "enter upon SELLER'S premises . . . from time to time for the purpose of inspecting, testing and picking fruit, and for the purpose of removing said fruit." Buyer was obligated to make scheduled payments to Seller totaling $250,000 between September and December 2013, with the balance of the floor payment "to be made within 45 days from week of harvest." The deadline for making the final rise payment was June 30, 2014. The Contract described the Seller's duties as follows: SELLER agrees to maintain the crop merchantable and free from Citrus Canker, Mediterranean fruit fly, Caribbean fruit fly, and any and all impairments which would alter the ability to market the crop. It is further agreed that in the event of such happening BUYER has the option to renegotiate with SELLER within 10 days of such find, or terminate contract and receive any monies that may be remaining from deposit. It is understood and agreed that the word "merchantable" as herein used, shall mean fruit that has not become damaged by cold, hail, fire, windstorm, insects, drought, disease or any other hazards to the extent it cannot meet all applicable requirements of the laws of the State of Florida and the Federal Government, including without limitation those relating to pesticides, and the regulations of the Florida Department of Citrus relating to grade and quality. With regard to default, the Contract provided: It is further agreed that in case of default by either the BUYER or SELLER the opposite party may, at his option, take legal action to enforce this contract or may enter into negotiations to carry out the terms and provisions thereof, in which event the party found to be in default shall pay reasonable costs in connection with either negotiation or litigation, such cost to include a reasonable attorney's fee to party prevailing in such controversy. The Contract acknowledged the existence of a "Citrus Fruit Dealers Bond" posted with the Department but cautioned that the bond "is not insurance against total 1iabilities that may be incurred if a citrus fruit dealer should default" and "does not necessarily insure full payment of claims for any nonperformance under this contract." Buyer began picking colored grapefruit from the Emerald Grove on October 17, 2013, and initially things went well. For the first month, Buyer achieved encouraging packout percentages of between 60% and 90%. (The packout percentage expresses the ratio of fruit deemed acceptable for the fresh market to the total fruit in the run. A higher packout percentage means fewer "eliminations" for the juice processing plant and thus a more valuable run.) On November 13, 2013, however, the packout rate plunged to around 38%. Although there were some good runs after that date, for the rest of the season the packout percentages of grapefruit picked from the Emerald Grove mostly remained mired in the 30% to 50% range, which is considered undesirably low. Everyone agrees that the 2013/2014 grapefruit crop in the Emerald Grove was disappointing. Representatives of Buyer and Seller met at the Emerald Grove in mid-November to discuss the reduced packout percentages. Mild disagreement about the exact reason or reasons for the drop-off in quality arose, but some combination of damage by rust mites and a citrus disease known as greasy spot is the likeliest culprit.1/ The problems were not unique to Emerald Grove, as the 2013/2014 citrus season was generally poor in the state of Florida. Seller's grapefruit crop was consistent with the statewide crop for that year. Despite the low packout percentages, and being fully aware of the crop's condition, Buyer continued to harvest colored grapefruit from the Emerald Grove, which it packed and exported for sale to its customers in Europe, Japan, and Southeast Asia. After picking fruit on February 3, 2014, however, Buyer repudiated the Contract and left the colored grapefruit remaining in the Emerald Grove to Seller. As a result, Seller sold the rest of the crop to another purchaser.2/ At no time did Buyer notify Seller that it was rejecting any of the grapefruit which Buyer had picked and removed from the Emerald Grove pursuant to the Contract. For months after Buyer stopped performing under the Contract, Seller endeavored to collect the amounts due for all the fruit that Buyer had harvested. By mid-April, however, Buyer still owed several hundred thousand dollars. At a meeting between the parties on April 22, 2014, Buyer proposed that Seller discount the purchase price given the disappointing nature of the crop, which Buyer claimed had caused it to lose some $200,000 in all. Buyer requested that Seller forgive around $100,000 of the debt owed to Buyer, so that Seller, in effect, would absorb half of Seller's losses. Buyer expected that Seller would agree to the proposed reduction in price and maintains that the parties did, in fact, come to a meeting of the minds in this regard, but the greater weight of the evidence shows otherwise. Seller politely but firmly——and unequivocally——rejected Buyer's proposal, although Seller agreed to accept installment payments under a schedule that would extinguish the full debt by August 31, 2014. This response disappointed Buyer, but Buyer continued to make payments to Seller on the agreed upon payment schedule. By email dated June 4, 2014, Buyer's accountant asked Seller if Seller agreed that the final balance due to Seller was $108,670.50. Seller agreed that this was the amount owing. After that, Buyer tried again to persuade Seller to lower the price, but Seller refused. Buyer made no further payments. At no time did Buyer notify Seller that it was revoking its acceptance of any of the fruit harvested from the Emerald Grove during the 2013/2014 season. Having taken physical possession of the fruit, Buyer never attempted to return the goods or demanded that Seller retrieve the fruit. Rather, exercising ownership of the goods, Buyer sold all the colored grapefruit obtained under the Contract to its customers for its own account. On October 14, 2014, Seller brought suit against Buyer in the Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Indian River County, Florida, initiating Case Number 31-2014-CA-001046. Buyer filed a counterclaim against Seller for breach of contract. On February 4, 2015, Seller filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of its judicial complaint, opting to take advantage of available administrative remedies instead, which it is pursuing in this proceeding. As of the final hearing, Buyer's counterclaim remained pending in the circuit court.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order awarding Frontier Fresh of Indian River, LLC, the sum of $108,670.50, together with pre-award interest at the statutory rate from June 4, 2014, to the date of the final order, and establishing a reasonable time within which said indebtedness shall be paid by United Indian River Packers, LLC. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 2015.
