Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Dr. Winifred Chambers received a master's degree in religion and art in 1957, a second master's degree in 1968 in philosophy with a specialization in ethics and social philosophy and a Ph.D. (with honors) in 1975 in the philosophy of science, all from the University of Chicago. While working on her dissertation, she studied at the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis. After working around hospitals and conducting classes and workshops on medical ethics for medical personnel, Petitioner decided to attend medical school. Because her educational training did not include extensive background in certain scientific areas, Petitioner was concerned with her ability to score well on the MCATS, which are the entrance examinations required by all medical schools in the United States. In addition, Petitioner's age (she was in her mid 40's at the time) was considered a negative factor by many medical schools in the United States. As a result, she inquired about attending certain foreign medical schools. She was limited in the schools that she could consider because she did not speak Spanish. Medical Education In 1979, Petitioner applied to the American University of the Caribbean (AUC). AUC taught its medical courses in English and Petitioner was only required to make up a few undergraduate science courses (including physics) in order to enroll in the medical school. Petitioner enrolled in classes at AUC in May of 1980. She actually started classes a few days after the semester began. She completed the first two semesters from May to December 1980 and then went home during the Christmas break. During the break, Petitioner learned that she had received an F in her course in neurosciences. Petitioner met with the professor from that course to discuss the failing grade she received and also met with the President of AUC. As a result of these meetings, it was her understanding that the grade was changed to a passing grade. In January of 1981, Petitioner visited CETEC (another Caribbean medical school located in the Dominican Republic,) and met with officials of the school to discuss transferring from AUC to CETEC. Petitioner applied to CETEC during her visit and, prior to leaving, was informed of her acceptance into medical school at CETEC. Petitioner returned to AUC and completed her third semester at the school. In May of 1981, she officially enrolled at CETEC by initiating clinical rotations at Sharp Hospital in San Diego, California. Even though Petitioner had only completed three semesters at AUC, she was granted status as a fifth semester medical student. She contends that she was granted this status based upon CETEC'S evaluation of her transcript and the number of hours she took at AUC. Prior to her enrollment at CETEC, Petitioner provided CETEC with a transcript indicating she had passed neurosciences at AUC and CETEC gave her credit for the course. From May 4, 1981 to June 6, 1982, Petitioner participated in clinical rotations at Sharp Memorial Hospital in San Diego, California as part of her medical education at CETEC. During this time period, Petitioner also participated in a clinical rotation at Children's Hospital in San Diego, California (from 12/28/81 to 2/20/82). Beginning in 1983, the media and some state licensing agencies began challenging the validity and/or authenticity of the credentials and training of some CETEC medical graduates. CETEC medical school was ultimately closed in 1984. The Dominican Republic government formed an agency to verify and certify the transcripts of CETEC graduates. This agency was called the "Counsel For Superior Education" also referred to by the acronym of CONES. CONES verified and certified the legitimacy of higher education credentials from all Dominican schools submitted to other countries. As part of her pending Florida Application, Petitioner has submitted a certification from CONES dated October 15, 1987 attesting to Petitioner's graduation from medical school at CETEC on June 12, 1982. Petitioner has also submitted a second certification from CONES dated July 8, 1988 confirming her graduation on June 12, 1982. Included as part of the documents submitted by Petitioner from CONES is a Certification of Clinical Rotations dated July 14, 1987 (the "CONES Report") and an academic transcript dated July 14, 1987 (the "CONES Transcript.") The "Education Commission For Foreign Medical Graduates" ("ECFMG") provides a certification of the education of applicants from foreign medical schools who seek licensure in the various United States and offers an examination required by some state licensing boards for licensure of applicants graduating from foreign medical schools. Petitioner passed the ECFMG examination and was certified by the ECFMG in 1982. However, after the CETEC scandal began in 1983, the ECFMG started an investigation of graduates of CETEC (including Petitioner) for the purpose of reverifying their medical training. The ECFMG required clearance from CONES of Petitioner's CETEC education before reverifying her ECFMG certificate. The ECFMG reinstated Petitioner's ECFMG certification on June 26, 1987. The earliest certification from CONES that has been submitted by Petitioner is dated July 14, 1987, approximately two and a half weeks after the ECMFG certification. It is not clear what the ECFMG relied upon in reissuing a certification to Petitioner. While Petitioner contends that CONES had originally certified her CETEC transcript shortly after her graduation in June of 1982, no competent evidence was presented to establish when or if an earlier CONES certification was issued. In any event, Petitioner currently holds a valid ECFMG certificate. In certifying Petitioner's medical degree from CETEC, CONES gave Petitioner credit for courses taken and work done at non-medical schools (i.e., the University of Chicago) prior to entering medical school. These credits are discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 17. Although the ECFMG has apparently accepted CONES' certification of Petitioner's medical education at CETEC, there are several inconsistencies on the face of the CONES Report. The CONES Report states that during the period from May 4, 1981 to June 6, 1982, Petitioner completed fifty six (56) weeks of clinical rotations. However, in reaching this total the CONES Report provides one week of credit for a rotation (from 5/24/82 to 5/28/82) in obstetrics and gynecology which overlapped with another rotation (from 5/10/82 to 6/5/82) in obstetrics and gynecology. It it also provides double credit for a single two week clinical rotation (from 5/4/81 to 5/16/81) in obstetrics and gynecology. In addition, there are two periods of time (from 2/21/82 to 3/14/82 and from 4/25/82 to 5/9/82, which total approximately five (5) weeks), during which no clinical rotations were taken. Since the period between May 4, 1981 and June 6, 1982 consisted of approximately fifty seven (57) weeks, it does not appear that Petitioner actually completed fifty six (56) weeks of rotations as listed. Deleting the double credit received for the 5/4/81 to 5/16/81 clinical rotation, the CONES Report only appears to certify completion of fifty four (54 weeks) of clinical rotations. Moreover, those fifty four (54) weeks of rotations include one week of credit for five (5) days in obstetrics and gynecology (from 5/24/82 to 5/28/82) which directly overlapped a separately listed clinical rotation in obstetrics and gynecology, and one (1) week of credit for six (6) days in obstetrics and gynecology from 6/1/82 to 6/6/82. Thus, on the face of the CONES Report it appears that Petitioner actually completed only fifty three (53) weeks of rotations at most. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, according to the CONES Report, there were approximately five (5) weeks of the fifty-seven (57) week period during which no clinical rotations were taken. Petitioner contends that the CONES Report fails to take into account a five (5) week clerkship in family medicine which she completed at Sharp Hospital and which was accepted by the ECFMG when Petitioner applied for licensure in California. This clerkship is reflected in the CETEC Transcript even though it is not reflected in the CONES Report. It is not clear why this rotation was not included in the CONES Report However, the evidence did establish that Petitioner completed the rotation. One of the five weeks of this family medicine rotation overlaps with an OB/GYN rotation (from 5/4/82 -5/8/82). The time frame of the family medicine rotation roughly coincides with the period of time during which no rotations are reflected in the CONES Report. Thus, this rotation would only add four more weeks to the clerkship total listed on the CONES Report. Even if this four week rotation is added to the fifty three (53) weeks certified in the CONES Report, the Report would still only indicate that Petitioner completed a total of fifty seven (57) weeks of clinical rotations. According to the boiler-plate language on the CONES Report, sixty (60) to seventy-two (72) total weeks of clinical rotations had to be completed by CETEC students who took their clinical rotations outside of the Dominican Republic. Thus, the CONES Report does not reflect completion of the required weeks of clinical rotations even though CONES has issued a certification that purports to certify successful completion of the degree requirements. This discrepancy has not been adequately explained. The CONES Report does not reflect any clinical rotations by Petitioner in psychiatry. However, the CETEC Transcript does indicate that Petitioner was granted eight hours credit for her graduate studies at the University of Chicago from 1971-1973. Petitioner contends she is entitled to at least four hours of clerkship in psychiatry for those studies. However, it appears from the CONES Transcript that the credit she received was applied towards classes in Human Conduct which were a part of the curriculum during the first two years of medical school. There is no evidence to indicate that CETEC or CONES granted or should have granted Petitioner credit for clinical rotations in psychiatry based upon her graduate studies at the University of Chicago. During a three week period (between her second and third semesters at AUC) from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981, Petitioner participated in an OB/GYN clinical rotation at Sharp Memorial Hospital in San Diego, California (hereinafter this rotation will be referred to as the "Unsanctioned Rotation.") This rotation is usually not done until after a student completes the third semester of medical school. Petitioner's participation in this Unsanctioned Rotation was not authorized by any medical school and was not a part of any medical school program. Petitioner contends that she satisfied the required sixty (60) clerkship weeks if the Unsanctioned Rotation at Sharp Hospital from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981 is added to the undisputed clinical rotations and the family medicine rotation discussed in Findings of Fact 15. However, the Unsanctioned Clerkship was not accepted by CONES and Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that it should be counted towards her required clinical rotations. Although CETEC had previously granted Petitioner credit for the neurosciences course at AUC, CONES was not able to verify that Petitioner passed the course and CONES required Petitioner to retake the course in order to obtain the 1987 certification from CONES. Petitioner attended Northwestern University during the spring quarter of 1987 and completed a four credit hour course (based on a quarter system) in neurosciences. This neurosciences course was apparently given five hours ex post facto credit by CONES to fulfill the neurosciences requirement for Petitioner's 1982 CETEC medical diploma. From December, 1987 to March, 1988, Petitioner attended Xochicalco Medical School in Ensenada, Mexico in order to take additional coursework in partial fulfillment of a requirement by the California licensing board in a stipulated agreement for additional medical training before licensure. (Petitioner's stipulation with the State of California is discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 47-50.) The courses taken at Xochicalco were approved by the California licensing agency and included clinical pathology, pharmacology (two courses) and physiology (two courses). Petitioner successfully passed all of the courses. However, no evidence was presented as to the accreditation status of this school. Petitioner completed a five week rotation in emergency medicine at Cruze Roja Hospital in Mexico in 1988 while she was completing the remedial science classes required by the California Licensing Board. Post-Graduate Training Petitioner completed one year of post graduate training from July 1, 1982 to June 30, 1983 in the family medicine residency program at Holston Valley Community Hospital through East Tennessee State University's Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine. Petitioner has presented a certificate verifying succcessful completion of her first post graduate year of training in this program. Petitioner performed her residency at two hospitals which are part of the East Tennessee State University Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine: Kingsport Family Practice Center and Holston Valley Community Hospital. She saw patients at the Kingsport Family Practice Center for 7 months, one afternoon each week under the supervision of various physicians. The rest of Petitioner's residency was performed at the Holston Valley Community Hospital. Dr. Lee S. Hyde was the program director of the Kingsport Family Medicine Center. Petitioner's contact with Dr. Hyde was limited, but she did have several consultations with him about patients. In an evaluation submitted to the Florida Board of Medicine in connection with Petitioner's application for licensure, Dr. Hyde evaluated Petitioner's diagnostic ability and relationships with patients as poor. He also stated that Petitioner came to the program with a "poor fund of knowledge, clinical habits, and basic medical education". Although he felt Petitioner made progress during the residency program, he did not think it was sufficient. However, his overall evaluation was to recommend with reservations. Dr. Hyde's evaluation of Petitioner to the Board was received by the Board on July 18, 1983. Dr. Hyde noted on the back of the evaluation form that Petitioner was not ready to begin a second year of unsupervised practice. Petitioner was not and would not have been offered a contract for a second year in the residency program. Dr. Hyde also commented that Petitioner demonstrated poor judgment by once going "AWOL" from the program. While Petitioner did take a three (3) day leave over a weekend while assigned to a particular rotation with another physician contrary to the rules of the program, she did so with the permission of her supervisor at the time. Prior to the negative evaluation submitted by Dr. Hyde in July of 1983, Dr. Hyde had previously written a letter dated March 24, 1983 to the Florida Board of Medicine recommending Dr. Chambers for licensure stating that she was in good standing with the program and of reasonable professional competence and excellent moral character. Leslie P. Reynolds, Jr., M.D., was a professor of Family Medicine, assistant Dean, and Director of Medical Education at the Holston Valley Hospital during Petitioner's year of residency. In a June 29, 1983 evaluation form submitted to the Florida Board, Dr. Reynolds, gave an evaluation of Petitioner's performance during the family medicine residency and recommended her as an outstanding applicant. Dr. Reynolds subsequently submitted an affidavit to the Florida Board of Medicine dated October 21, 1987 attesting that Petitioner earned the respect of both her instructors and fellow residents and that the hospital's records suggest that she performed well on all her services and that she was very helpful to other residents. Several other physicians who served as clinical supervisors during Petitioner's residency at Holston Valley have submitted letters of recommendation and virtually all other evaluations of her work were positive. Aside from the letter from Dr. Hyde, (Dr. Hyde did not testify and his letter is hearsay,) no other evidence was presented to demonstrate that Petitioner is incapable of practicing medicine with reasonable skill and safety. The weight of the evidence established that Petitioner is capable of practicing with reasonable skill and safety. Numerous letters from the physicians who have worked with Petitioner over the last several years corroborate to her ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. Petitioner was employed as a house physician at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami from July 11, 1983 to October 31, 1983. Her position was under the supervision of the Department of Family Medicine in the Ambulatory Care Unit of the Emergency Room Department and the Family Medicine Clinical Faculty from the University of Miami. However, the position was not an advanced residency program and the nature of the supervision and training that Petitioner received has not been fully explained. Furthermore, the evidence did not establish the exact nature of her duties and functions. From October 1984 to March 1985, Petitioner participated in a series of clinical rotations at the Wesley Medical Center which is affiliated with the University of Kansas. The exact nature of Petitioner's position is not clear. The position at the Wesley Medical Center was a non-paying position during which Petitioner completed an eight week rotation in Internal Medicine, twelve weeks in General Surgery and four weeks in psychiatry functioning in each rotation at the level of a first-year resident. Petitioner was not officially enrolled as a resident in this program. However, she did receive evaluations from the attending physicians and her evaluations by the supervising physicians in that program were acceptable. In 1988, Petitioner completed an eight month internship at Universal Medical Center in Plantation, Florida Universal Medical Center is an osteopathic teaching institution. This internship was undertaken to satisfy a requirement of the California licensing authority for eight months of "remedial" clinical work. See, Findings of Fact 50. Petitioner was evaluated as performing in a competent and professional manner in this program. At the Universal Medical Center, Petitioner completed thirty three (33) weeks of clinical rotations. The program extended from March 21, 1988 through November 3, 1988. Her duties and responsibilities were similar to other interns in the program. In sum, Petitioner has successfully completed several additional science courses and completed at least thirty eight (38) additional weeks of clinical training beyond her medical school rotations and first post-graduate year residency. Those weeks of training include thirty three (33) weeks at Universal Medical Center which is an approved osteopathic medical training program that was accepted by the California Licensing Agency for purposes of Petitioner's remedial clinical work. Licensure Applications Petitioner passed the FLEX exam in June, 1982 with a score of 78. She also passed the ECFMG exam in January, of 1982 with a score of 76. In addition, she passed an oral examination administered by the California State Licensing Board in 1988. After graduating from CETEC in June 1982, Petitioner initiated efforts to obtain licensure in several states. In her initial attempts at licensure, Petitioner submitted several misleading applications which have backfired into a morass of complications and confusion. In 1982, Petitioner knowingly submitted a fraudulent application to the State of Oregon. Petitioner filed the application with the Oregon licensing authority in order to take the Federal Licensing Examination known as the FLEX. Oregon was one of the few states which allowed applicants to take the FLEX examination prior to graduation and also granted applicants some choice in the location of the exam. Petitioner took the FLEX in the Virgin Islands in June of 1982. This was the nearest location to the Dominican Republic where she was attending graduation ceremonies at CETEC around the same time. On the application to take the FLEX exam filed with Oregon, Petitioner falsely stated that she attended AUC from May, 1979 to April, 1981. She actually attended AUC from May, 1980 through April, 1981. In the early part of 1983, Petitioner submitted applications for licensure to South Carolina, California, Georgia, New Mexico, and Florida. South Carolina determined that Petitioner was not eligible for licensure in that state because she had not completed the required post-graduate training. Her application for licensure in that state was returned without action. In her applications to Georgia, California and Florida in 1983, Petitioner misrepresented her attendance at CETEC as having commenced in May, 1979 rather than reporting attendance at AUC starting in May, 1980 and ending in May, 1981 when she transferred to CETEC. Petitioner admits that she falsely stated that she began her medical education in May, 1979 on the Oregon FLEX application, as well as the California, Georgia and 1983 Florida applications. In an attempt to justify these false statements, Petitioner points out that the Dean from CETEC had issued a letter to these licensing agencies stating that Petitioner had completed eight (8) semesters at CETEC from 1979 to 1982. Petitioner claims she completed the misleading applications because she wanted her statements to be consistent with the CETEC Dean's certification of attendance. It would appear that an additional motivation for falsifying the applications was to avoid having to explain that she had received medical education credit for some of her non-medical course work at the University of Chicago approximately ten years earlier. It is unclear why the Dean's certification letters were not accurate. While no evidence was presented to directly link Petitioner to the issuance of these incorrect Dean's letters, the shady circumstances surrounding her involvement with Pedro de Mesones around this same time period (discussed in Findings of Fact 87-95 below) leads to an inference that Petitioner was at least indirectly responsible for these misleading letters. In her February 1983 application to New Mexico, Petitioner accurately stated the dates and locations of her medical school education. No adequate explanation was given as to why the correct dates were listed on this 1983 application but not the other applications filed around the same time in Georgia, Florida and California. Petitioner listed the correct dates of attendance at AUC and CETEC on her 1984 Florida application and the 1988 filing which are discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 69-72 below. Georgia and New Mexico granted Petitioner licensure based upon the 1983 applications. California initially denied her licensure. However, as described in Findings of Fact 47-51 below, Petitioner challenged that decision. Florida permitted Petitioner to withdraw her 1983 Application rather than go to hearing on the Board's intent to deny licensure. See Findings of Fact 67-68. Petitioner's application for licensure in California was filed in the Spring of 1983. Petitioner received a letter in April of 1983 returning her application without action. Petitioner requested reconsideration of her application which, eventually, resulted in a proposed order of denial dated June 9, 1986. Petitioner requested a hearing on that proposed denial. The proposed denial was resolved without hearing by a stipulation between Petitioner and the California licensing agency in an order dated November 5, 1987 (the "California Stipulation"). The stipulated findings of fact in the November 5, 1987 California Stipulation recognize that the application filed by Petitioner in March, 1983 remained pending without action until the 1987 California Stipulation was entered. The California Stipulation notes that the proposed denial of her application in 1986 was based on the grounds that: (a) Petitioner had not listed on her application her attendance at AUC; (b) she had falsely stated under oath that she began her medical education at CETEC beginning in May, 1979; and (c) her medical education did not conform to California requirements. The California Stipulation provides that it supersedes the reasons set forth in the 1986 proposed denial so long as Dr. Chambers abides by the terms of the Stipulation. The California Stipulation makes no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding wrongdoing on the part of the Petitioner. The California Stipulation provides that Petitioner would be issued a license to practice medicine in California upon completion of remedial medical education specified in the Stipulation, completion of an additional academic year of clinical training before September, 1990, satisfactory proof of certification by CONES, and passage of an oral examination. The California Stipulation also provides that Petitioner shall take forty (40) hours of continuing medical education within the first two (2) years of licensure in addition to the continuing education classes statutorily required for licensure in California. Petitioner was issued her license to practice medicine in California on November 11, 1988 demonstrating that she satisfied the requirements of the November 1987 California Stipulation. In her application to the State of Georgia in June of 1983, the Petitioner specifically represented that she attended CETEC from May of 1979 to April 1980, attended AUC from April, 1980 to May, 1981 and CETEC again from April 1981 through June, 1982. The Dean of CETEC certified to the Georgia licensing agency that Petitioner enrolled in the school of medicine in May, 1979 and attended eight semesters of 4.2 months each. As discussed in Findings of Fact 43, the basis for this certification by the Dean is unclear. Petitioner obtained a license to practice medicine in Georgia based on her 1983 application and did in fact practice medicine in that state from January, 1984 to August, 1984. On August 17, 1984 the Georgia State Board of Medical Examiners issued a Notice of Hearing to Petitioner setting forth charges against her including failure to meet the standards for licensure and/or intentionally making false statements in obtaining a license to practice medicine. The charges also included an allegation that Petitioner "was denied a license by the Board of Medical Quality Assurance of the State of California based on evidence of making false statements on a sworn application and submitting false and/or inaccurate certificates of education to obtain a license to practice in that state." In fact, in 1984 the California licensing authority had not formally denied Petitioner's application for licensure. The proposed denial of Petitioner's California application was pending, but not acted upon. Indeed, a formal denial of her California application was never finalized. Instead, the issues were resolved by the California Stipulation in November, 1987. On September 22, 1984, Petitioner executed a "Voluntary Surrender" which was approved by the Georgia State Board of Medical Examiners and served as the final order of that agency with respect to the Notice of Hearing discussed in Findings of Fact 54. By voluntarily surrendering her license to practice medicine in Georgia, Petitioner waived her right to a hearing on the charges contained in the Notice of Hearing. The first paragraph of the "Voluntary Surrender" states: "I hereby acknowledge that this surrender shall have the same effect as revocation of my license, and I knowingly forfeit and relinquish all right, title and privilege of practicing medicine in the State of Georgia, unless and until such time as my license may be reinstated, in the sole discretion of the Board." Notwithstanding this language, Petitioner contends the "Voluntary Surrender" should be distinguished from a revocation because she did not admit to any wrongdoing and because she was allowed to seek reinstatement upon application and demonstration of the ability to safely practice medicine. The Voluntary Surrender of the Georgia license contains no specific findings of fact or conclusions of law that establish any wrongdoing on the part of the Petitioner. The "Voluntary Surrender" states that Petitioner did not admit to any wrongdoing and it allows Petitioner to seek reinstatement. The Executive Director of the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners of Georgia certified to the Florida Board of Medicine on August 2, 1988, that Petitioner's Georgia license had been issued in 8/83, surrendered in 9/84 and that license had not been "suspended or revoked." Thus, while disciplinary action was clearly initiated against Respondent in Georgia, her license was not revoked. Petitioner was licensed to practice medicine in the State of New Mexico in November, 1983. On January 10, 1985, the New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners served on Petitioner a Notice of Contemplated Action notifying her of charges including having made misrepresentations in applying for and procuring a license to practice medicine in New Mexico and having her license in Georgia revoked. The New Mexico case was referred to a hearing officer who considered argument and briefs by the parties regarding the nature and effect of Petitioner's surrender of her Georgia license. By an order of the New Mexico State Board of Medical Examiners, Petitioner's New Mexico medical license was revoked in January, 1986. The New Mexico order of revocation treated Petitioner's voluntary surrender of her Georgia medical license as the functional equivalent of a revocation for purposes of the New Mexico licensing statute. In reaching this determination, the New Mexico Board relied upon the wording of the Voluntary Surrender and the Georgia Statutes which both indicate that a voluntary surrender shall have the same effect as revocation. No other specific grounds were cited by the New Mexico Board in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order. As indicated above, Petitioner's initial application to the Florida Board of Medicine (the "Board") for licensure was filed March, 1983. When the Board proposed denial, Petitioner requested a formal hearing. Prior to hearing, the Board obtained leave from the hearing officer to amend the basis for denial to include grounds relating to information presented to the Board by U.S. Postal Service investigators regarding Petitioner's truthfulness on her application form and the validity of certain documents she utilized in her attempt to obtain a Florida medical license. The Board was granted leave to amend as requested by order dated February 20, 1984. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed with the hearing officer a motion to withdraw her application because of the new information presented from the "federal investigation." The Board granted the request to withdraw the 1983 Application in an order rendered May 29, 1984. The Board's proposed denial of Petitioner's 1983 Application was on the basis that the Board had reason to believe that Petitioner, "as a graduate of CETEC, was not capable of safely engaging in the practice of medicine as a result of a report of the California Board of Medical Quality Assurance which indicated gross irregularities in the degree granting process of CETEC University and which raised serious doubts about the adequacy of medical education certified by CETEC." Petitioner filed with the Board a second application for licensure in Florida in December of 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the 1984 Application.) In response to a request for additional information from the Board regarding this second application, Petitioner executed a waiver of the requirement that the Board act upon the application within 90 days. As a result, the 1984 Application was left pending. The 1984 Application was for licensure by endorsement based upon Petitioner's license in New Mexico. As discussed in Findings of Fact 62-66, action was initiated against that New Mexico license in January, 1985 ultimately leading to the revocation of the license in January, 1986. After her New Mexico license was revoked, Petitioner did not hold a valid license to practice medicine in any other state until California issued her a license in November, 1988. On August 1, 1988, Petitioner filed another application with the Board as an update to the 1984 Application. (This August 1988 application is referred to as the "1988 Filing.") In her 1988 Filing, Petitioner included a recertification from ECFMG. At the time she filed her 1984 Florida application, Petitioner's original ECFMG certification had been placed on hold because of the CETEC scandal. Petitioner was required to provide a revalidation of her medical education by ECFMG in order to obtain consideration of her application in Florida. This revalidation was not provided until the 1988 Filing. On September 12, 1988, Petitioner filed a supplement to the 1988 Filing. On November 2, 1988 the Board requested additional information relating to the application. On December 12, 1988 Petitioner filed a response to this request. The Board issued an Order of Intent to Deny on March 3, 1989 stating as grounds for denial in Paragraph 2: You have had licenses in Georgia, New Mexico and California acted against by the licensing bodies of those states. See, Subsections 458.331(1)(b) and 458.311(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1988). The only year of training you received was in 1982-1983 at Holston Valley Community Hospital and the Kingsport Family Practice Center through the auspices of East Tennessee State University Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine. You were recommended less than favorably by both hospitals and you were not permitted to return for a second year of residency training by the College of Medicine. Your poor performance in your only year of medical training evidences your inability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. See, Sections 458.301 and 458.331(4), Florida Statutes (1988). There are material discrepancies between answers and information provided in your 3 different applications and supporting documents submitted to the Board; and you have provided fraudulent information and misrepresented or concealed information regarding your medical education. See Subsections 458.311(1)(c) and 458.331(1)(a) and (hh), Florida Statutes (1988). Inconsistencies in the Application There are several discrepancies between Petitioner's 1983 Florida Application, her 1984 Application, and her 1988 Filing. On the 1984 Application, Petitioner reported her participation in the Unsanctioned Rotation at Sharp Memorial Hospital from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981 as part of her clinical clerkships. The Unsanctioned Rotation is not listed on the 1988 Filing. Petitioner contends that it was not until after submission of the 1984 Application that she found out that CONES refused to recognize the clerkships taken in 1980 because Petitioner was not enrolled as a student at CETEC at the time. Therefore, Petitioner deleted those unapproved clerkship weeks from the 1988 Filing. However, while specific reference to the clerkship was deleted in 1988, Petitioner admitted at the hearing that she counted the Unsanctioned Rotation as part of sixty (60) weeks of clerkships claimed in the 1988 Filing. The 1988 Filing states Petitioner completed sixty (60) weeks of clinical clerkships as part of her medical education at CETEC. However, as discussed in Findings of Fact 13 through 18, Petitioner's submitted a CONES verification of clinical rotations that only details fifty six (56) weeks (including duplicate and overlapping credit) of clinical clerkships. In the 1988 Filing, Petitioner did report the actions taken against her medical licenses in Georgia and New Mexico and mentioned her problems obtaining licensure in California. On the 1984 Application, Petitioner responded to the question "Have you ever been notified to appear before any licensing agency for a hearing on a complaint of any nature, including, but not limited to, a charge or violation of the medical practice act, unprofessional or unethical conduct?" by stating "after my voluntary surrender, notice of hearing in Georgia, [sic] charging denial and Flafalse documents re licensure (both false)." Both the Notice of Hearing and the Voluntary Surrender in Georgia were issued prior to the completion of Petitioner's 1984 Florida Application. Thus, while Petitioner did disclose the voluntary surrender, she only provided a brief and somewhat misleading explaination. The 1984 Application does not mention Petitioner's application in South Carolina (which was returned without action) nor does it discuss Petitioner's licensure difficulties in California other than to say she had been denied a license because of "informal deficiencies." The 1984 Application also omits Petitioner's licensure problems in New Mexico which is understandable since the Notice of Contemplated Action in that case was not filed until January, 1985. The application form requires the applicant to list all universities or colleges where the applicant "took classes/received training." Petitioner listed her training at the University of Kansas, Wesley Medical Center under the medical education section of her 1984 Application. In the 1984 application, she refers to it as a "externship". That position is also listed in the medical education section of the 1988 Filing with an explanation indicating that she was not actually a resident. As discussed in Findings of Fact 30, her position at the Wesley Medical Center is not easily described due to the unusual circumstances that led to her participating in the program. She was repeating clerkships in certain areas in accordance with the stipulation reached with the California licensing agency. Although Petitioner was not officially enrolled in classes or a residency program in that position, she considers it as part of her medical education and training and, therefore, listed it as such. In her 1984 Application, Petitioner listed time spent at Jackson Memorial Hospital (University of Miami) and Wesley Medical Center (Unversity of Kansas) on a sheet entitled graduate and post-graduate education. On her 1988 Filing, she listed both positions as post-graduate training. Both of these positions were actually house staff positions rather than part of the training programs of the affiliated medical schools. In the 1984 Application, Petitioner listed her dates of training at the Wesley Medical Center as October, 1984 to April 1985 (which was her projected completion date.) The 1984 Application was filled out and filed with the Board in December 1984, four months prior to the projected completion date of the Wesley position. In the 1988 Filing, Petitioner listed her actual completion date of March, 1985, which was approximately two weeks earlier than the projected completion date referred to in the 1984 Application. From January 1984 to August 1984, Petitioner worked for Spectrum Emergency Care in emergency rooms and free-standing clinics in Georgia. Petitioner listed different dates of service with Spectrum on the 1984 Application and the 1988 Filing. Petitioner contends the differences are due in part because the 1988 Filing included employment at Spectrum in New Mexico in December 1984 and January 1985 after submission of the 1984 Application. However, the 1988 Filing states that Petitioner was continuously employed by Spectrum from January 1984 - January 1985. In fact, she was not employed during the months of August, September, October and November, 1984. Moreover, her employment with Spectrum in New Mexico in December, 1984 and January, 1985 overlaps with her "externship" at the Wesley Medical Center/University of Kansas which took place from October, 1984 through March, 1985. Apparently, this overlap was possible because her work for Spectrum in December, 1984 consisted of one weekend and a holiday and in January, 1985 consisted of one weekend. In sum, the 1988 Filing significantly overstates her actual experience with Spectrum. The 1988 Filing contains several inconsistent statements regarding Petitioner's employment as a ship's physician. Under the practice/employment section of that Filing, she states she was a ship's physician for SeaEscape from April, 1985 to September, 1985 and a ship's physician for Commodore Cruise Lines from February, 1986 to September, 1986. Later in the application, under postgraduate medical training and work experience, she states she was a Chief Medical Officer for cruise ships from April, 1985, through September, 1986. However, according to the previously cited information, for at least a four month period during that time frame, she was not employed. In another portion of her application, Petitioner lists under clinical medicine that she worked on the two ships from April, 1985 through September, 1987. Even assuming that there is a typographical error and Petitioner meant September, 1986 as indicated in the other listings, by deleting any reference to the four months that she was not employed, an impression is created that Petitioner has more clinical experience than was actually true. There is a conflict between the AUC transcript that Petitioner submitted with the 1988 Filing and earlier versions of the transcript that appear in her records. The course titles are consistent in the transcripts, but the numbers of some of the courses are different. Only the last digit of the course numbers are different. Whether a course is listed in the 100 series, 200 series and 300 series is consistent in all of the transcripts. The series numbers reflect first semester, second semester and third semester courses respectively. The AUC transcript submitted with the 1988 Filing was the most recent one obtained by Petitioner from AUC. That transcript was prepared in June, 1986 and reflects a failing grade in the neurosciences course. However, as discussed in Finding of Fact 4, that grade was changed to a passing grade as reflected in a 1981 transcript from AUC which was submitted to CETEC when Petitioner transferred to that school. No adequate explanation has been given to explain why the 1986 AUC transcript is not consistent with the earlier one. Postal Investigation The confusing circumstances surrounding Petitioner's medical education are further complicated by her involvement with Pedro de Mesones. The circumstances surrounding her involvement with Pedro de Mesones have not been fully explained. While Pedro de Mesones' exact status or position is unclear, Petitioner believed him to be a representative of CETEC. He has subsequently been convicted of mail fraud in connection with selling medical diplomas and has been sentenced to a federal prison term. Between July, 1981 and January, 1982, while Petitioner was conducting her clinical rotations in San Diego, she attempted to get information and documentation from CETEC, but she had trouble getting responses to her repeated telephone calls, letters and telegrams. Petitioner sought the help of Pedro de Mesones in getting cooperation and/or responses from CETEC regarding transcripts and other documents necessary for the loan applications and residency applications which she had to file prior to her anticipated medical school graduation date of June, 1982. Another reason Petitioner hired Pedro de Mesones was to get confirmation that CETEC would give her credit towards her medical degree for her prior work on her Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. These credits were necessary for Petitioner to graduate in June of 1982 as she anticiapted. Petitioner was advised by others familiar with the school that Pedro de Mesones could help her in her dealings with CETEC. She first contacted Pedro de Mesones by telephone in February, 1982. She agreed to pay him a total of more than $8,000 for his services. Petitioner explains her payments to Pedro de Mesones as a $3000 fee, plus the next two (2) semester's tuition payments totaling an additional $5000.00 plus a $100.00 graduation fee. Pedro de Mesones advised Petitioner that she had to pay CETEC's tuition totalling $5,000 for two (2) additional semesters even though she did not have to take any classes at CETEC because she was given credit for her work at the University of Chicago. At one point during her dealings with Pedro de Mesones, Petitioner signed a false transcript from a Mexican medical school at Pedro de Mesones' request. This transcript reflected work which Petitioner never completed. No adequate explanation was given as to why these false transcripts were ever prepared. While Petitioner contends that she asked Pedro de Mesones not to use the false Mexican transcript for any purpose, it appears that these transcripts were prepared in the event that Petitioner could not secure two semesters credit from CETEC for her Ph.D. work at the University of Chicago. Ultimately, CETEC decided to give her credit for some of the Ph.D. course work she completed at the University of Chicago. As a result, Petitioner was able to graduate in June of 1982 from CETEC without having to use the false Mexican transcripts. It does not appear that the fraudulent Mexican transcript were ever used by Petitioner in any of her applications. Petitioner provided Pedro de Mesones with two false transcripts regarding her AUC medical education. It is clear that she intended for him to use those transcripts, if necessary, to get a dean's certification from CETEC. One of the false AUC transcripts she prepared made its way into the records of CETEC. It is not clear how CETEC obtained that transcript. Because Petitioner was given credit for her graduate work at the University of Chicago, she did not need the extra credits reflected on the false AUC transcripts. Petitioner subsequently wrote the Dean of CETEC requesting removal of the false AUC transcript after she saw it in her CETEC records during a visit to CETEC to obtain a letter from the Dean showing her to be in good standing. Petitioner asked Pedro de Mesones to provide her with letters signed by the CETEC Dean showing her to be in good standing and on track for graduation in June, 1982. She intended to use these letters in applying for licensure for residency programs. Petitioner felt that she was on track to graduate and indicated to Pedro de Mesones that because of time pressures, she felt it would be acceptable for him to forge the signature of the Dean on the letters required by the various state licensing agencies. However, there is no indication that he did so. While none of the false transcripts prepared by Petitioner were directly submitted by her in any of the applications for licensure filed with any state licensing authorities, it is clear the Dean's certification letters included in Petitioner's 1983 Applications in some of the states were false. See Findings of Fact 39-44. No direct connection has been drawn between the false Dean's certification letters submitted with Petitioner's applications in Georgia and California and Pedro de Mesones. However, the circumstances surrounding Petitioner's dealings with Pedro de Mesones raise a question as to how the certifications were obtained. More importantly, it is clear that Petitioner was aware that the representations contained in the Dean's certifications and the dates of attendance at medical school listed on her 1983 Applications were false. Nevertheless, she still submitted the applications. Petitioner's dealings with Pedro de Mesones ended on June 14, 1982, two days after her graduation ceremonies at CETEC. Practice Experience Petitioner has at various times practiced medicine in Georgia and New Mexico prior to surrendering or losing her license in those states. She has also worked on cruise ships as a ship's doctor for several months. She is currently licensed and practicing in California. She has been licensed in that state since November, 1988. She has practiced emergency medicine at various hospitals and has been practicing as a primary care physician for Castle Air Force Base in California since December 1988. There is no indication that she has been deficient in carrying our her professional duties in any of these positions.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medical Examiners enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a physician in the State of Florida subject to a probationary period of two years upon such terms and conditions as the Board deems appropriate. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of July, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. To the extent that the proposed findings of fact can be isolated, they are addressed below. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37, 46-50 and 67. 2. Aubored in substance in Findings of Fact 67 and 68. 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 69. 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 70. 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 71. 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 72. Adopted in substance in the preliminary statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2-4 and 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. Suborindate to Findings of Fact 6 and 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 96. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11 and 33. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87 and 88. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 88. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 89. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 90-94. The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The second sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 94. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 95. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 36 and 39- 42. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 45. The first sentence is adopted in Findings of Fact 87. The remainder is rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-66. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 47. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 50. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 51. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 54. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 55. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 57, 59-60. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 58. Suborindate to Findings of Fact 61. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 59. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 62-66. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 66. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 66. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20-30. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22 and 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25-26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24 and 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 74. See proposed findings 26-30 above. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 79-80. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 81. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 82-83. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 38. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 83. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 77. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 84. Addressed in Findings of Fact 12-18. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12-19. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 3. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9 and 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13 and 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 18. Subordinate to indings of Fact 35. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 39. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44. Subordinate to Fndings of Fact 46-52 and 67- 68. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 69. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78. Subordinate to Findings of 78. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 70. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76, 77 and 78. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 71. Adopted in substance in Findings of 72. 26. Adopted in substance in the preliminary statement. 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. 28. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. 29. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 54. 30. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 56. 31. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 78. 32. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 63. 33. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 65. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-51. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24-26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 25. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 31 and 79- 81. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 29. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12 and 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87-95. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 97. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87-95. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-68. Rejected as constituting argument. Rejected as constituting argument. Copies furnished: Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire Attorney at Law 1355 Mahan Drive P. O. Box 31 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 1602 - The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner's certificate of registration as a pain management clinic should be revoked pursuant to section 458.3265, Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact By stipulation the parties agreed to the following: Unique is a Florida for-profit corporation; Unique is not a pain management clinic. However, Unique is registered as a pain management clinic with the Department; and Ronald and Grace Van Der Juijl are not physicians licensed under chapters 458 or 459, Florida Statutes. Unique is, therefore, not fully owned by a physician licensed under chapters 458 or 459, or a group of physicians, each of whom is licensed under chapter 458 or 459. Section 458.309(4), Florida Statutes (2009), reads, in part, as follows: All privately owned pain-management clinics, facilities, or offices, hereinafter referred to as "clinics," which advertise in any medium for any type of pain-management services, or employ a physician who is primarily engaged in the treatment of pain by prescribing or dispensing controlled substance medications, must register with the department by January 4, 2010, unless that clinic is licensed as a facility pursuant to chapter 395. On January 5, 2010, Unique, pursuant to section 458.309(4), submitted to the Department an application for pain clinic registration. On March 10, 2010, the Department issued to Unique, pain management clinic license no. PMC 681.4/ On October 1, 2010, approximately nine months after becoming effective, section 458.309(4) was repealed. Also on October 1, 2010, section 458.3265 became effective. Section 458.3265(1) provides, in part, as follows: (d) The department shall deny registration to any clinic that is not fully owned by a physician licensed under this chapter or chapter 459 or a group of physicians, each of whom is licensed under this chapter or chapter 459; or that is not a health care clinic licensed under part X of chapter 400. * * * (f) If the department finds that a pain- management clinic does not meet the requirement of paragraph (d), . . . the department shall revoke the certificate of registration previously issued by the department. As determined by rule, the department may grant an exemption to denying a registration or revoking a previously issued registration if more than 10 years have elapsed since adjudication. As used in this subsection, the term "convicted" includes an adjudication of guilt following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the forfeiture of a bond when charged with a crime. (Emphasis supplied.) Unique is not a health care clinic licensed under part X of chapter 400.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Health, enter a final order revoking Petitioner, Unique Health Care Orlando's, license to operate as a pain management clinic. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2011.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent, a licensed physician, committed violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, sufficient to justify the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against his license.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Ernesto C. Jaranilla, M.D., a licensed physician at all times pertinent to these proceedings, holding medical license number ME 0065787. Respondent's last known address is 633 Baker Street, Rochester Hills, Michigan 48307. Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. The State of Michigan Department of Commerce, Board of Medicine, is the licensing authority for the State of Michigan. On or about May 9, 1994, the State of Michigan Board of Medicine issued a final order requiring Respondent to pay a fine of $1,000.00 within 60 days, placed Respondent's license on probation and required him to complete 100 hours of approved continuing education credits. As a result of the action of the Michigan Board of Medicine, Respondent is guilty of having action taken against his license to practice medicine by the licensing authority of the State of Michigan. Respondent did not notify the Florida Board of Medicine within 30 days of the action taken by the State of Michigan against his license to practice medicine. Instead, Petitioner's personnel learned of Respondent's transgression by way of a report from the Federation of State Medical Boards dated April 19, 1996. The report indicated that the Michigan disciplinary action had been terminated by order dated January 26, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered imposing discipline upon Respondent's license in this cases as follows: An administrative fine of $750 for each Count of the Administrative Complaint for a total of $1500. Suspension of Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida with such suspension to be terminated upon Respondent's payment of the administrative fine, and successful compliance with such other terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Florida Board of Medicine, inclusive of Respondent's personal appearance before the Florida Board of medicine for presentment of proof of his reinstatement to practice medicine in the State of Michigan and to certify his completion of any Board prescribed course for practitioners who have failed to comply with reporting or other obligations to the Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Kevin w. Crews, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, FL 32317-4229 E. Jaranillia, M.D. 301 State Street Harbor Beach, MI 48441 Marm Harris, Executive Director Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0770 Jerome Hoffman, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, FL 32309 Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's challenge to the licensure examination should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a candidate for optometry licensure. He took the examination for licensure in August 1999. The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering license examinations. In September 1999, the results of the August 1999 examination were provided to Petitioner. The examination grade report advised Petitioner that he had failed two portions of the licensure examination. A candidate must pass all portions of the exam to become licensed. As to the clinical portion of the examination, the Petitioner challenged the results due to what he maintained were "discrepancies" in the grading system. As to each question challenged in the clinical portion, the Petitioner cited the differing grades from the two examiners as the basis for his dispute. When the Petitioner received credit for the question from one examiner, he believed he should have received credit from the second as well. The clinical portion of the exam was scored by two examiners who independently reviewed the candidate's work. Typically, the candidate for licensure indicates when the examiner is to evaluate the work by stating "grade me now." As to each task, the candidate receives two scores. The scores are added together and divided by two to reach the overall clinical score. Based upon when the candidate directs the examiner to grade, it is possible to receive conflicting results in the scoring process. It is the overall score that determines whether a candidate receives a passing grade on the clinical portion. According to Dr. Liebetreu, a marginal candidate may well be able to correctly perform the task for one examiner yet do so incorrectly for the second reviewer. The method of scoring therefore gives the marginal candidate some credit. As to the questions challenged in the pharmacological portion of the exam, the Petitioner argued that the questions were misleading or had multiple correct answers. Each question challenged offered one most correct answer that the Petitioner should have selected in order to receive full credit. The Petitioner has failed to established that the answers he provided were "more correct" than the ones used by the Respondent to grant credit. The photographs used in the examination were of sufficient quality to provide the candidate with appropriate views to answer questions. The questions challenged were not ambiguous or misleading. The candidates were provided adequate time to complete all portions of the examination. Persons scoring the Petitioner's work during the clinical portion of the exam were not permitted to confer. Their scores were to be based solely on the work they observed. The overall scores issued by persons scoring the Petitioner's work were within acceptable statistical standards.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Optometry, enter a final order denying the Petitioner's challenge to the August 1999 examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Navin Singh, O.D., pro se 103 Knights Court Royal Palm Beach, Florida 33411 Amy M. Jones, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle Southeast, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Eric G. Walker, Executive Director Board of Optometry Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle Southeast, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to a license by endorsement to practice medicine pursuant to Section 458.313(1) F.S.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner William D. Plummer is an applicant for licensure as a physician by endorsement in Florida. On May 2, 1991, Petitioner filed a licensure application with the Department of Professional Regulation. On page one of the application is the question: Are you now or have you ever been licensed in any State, Canada, Guam, Puerto Rico or U.S. Virgin Islands? Yes No . Petitioner marked the "No" answer to this question on his application. On page four of the application is the question: Have you ever been denied an application for licensure to practice medicine by any state board or other governmental agency of any state or country? Yes No . Petitioner marked the "No" answer to this question on his application. On June 11, 1991, Petitioner was sent a notice that his application was incomplete. In that notice, he was asked: Are you now, or have you ever been licensed to practice medicine in any State? In response, Petitioner sent a letter stating only that he had received a Pennsylvania medical license on July 3, 1991. This date was subsequent to his making the initial Florida application on May 2, 1991. As part of the application process in Florida, Petitioner was asked to appear before the Credentials Committee of the Board of Medicine on January 25, 1992, in Tampa, to discuss various matters regarding his application. In the course of discussing various issues with the Credentials Committee Petitioner was asked: Were you ever denied a license to practice medicine in another state? In response, Petitioner stated, No. I have my Pennsylvania license. In my training initially--my medical training license took some time, and I think that was in 1985 and it was because we didn't have a program in Pennsylvania to work with the State Board. Later, Petitioner told the Committee, I thought there was a difference between a medical training license and a medical license. A medical training license is under supervision at a hospital. In point of fact, in 1985, Petitioner had applied for a graduate medical license in Pennsylvania in order to enter the residency program at Misercordia, Mercy Hospital where he had already been accepted. The Pennsylvania graduate medical license allows the licensee to work as a physician under supervision only as a resident in the institution named on the license. Petitioner's application for this license was rejected because the Pennsylvania Board found that Petitioner had "knowingly falsified" an answer regarding his addiction to alcohol. The Pennsylvania Board further prohibited Petitioner from reapplying for a graduate medical license until June 6, 1986. After formal hearing, the Pennsylvania Board entered its order as follows: ... an Applicant with a proclivity toward engaging in word ploys in these important matters runs the risk, as here, of being in error and thus committing an active concealment and misrepresentation. A more prudent course perhaps for such an Applicant would be to err on the side of giving excess (voluntary) information in responding to such a formal and serious written questionnaire. Medical residents in training programs "practice medicine." In Pennsylvania, residents are prohibited from practicing medicine unless they receive a graduate medical license from the State of Pennsylvania. Because of the Pennsylvania Board's denial of Petitioner's application for a graduate medical license, he was unable to accept the position at Mercy Catholic Hospital. However, in 1986, Petitioner reapplied for a graduate medical training license in Pennsylvania and the application was granted. This graduate medical training license was renewed annually thereafter while Petitioner continued to train in Pennsylvania. Petitioner still held the latest renewed graduate medical training license when he applied for Florida licensure in May 1991. Petitioner was granted his permanent unrestricted medical license in Pennsylvania in July 1991. (See Findings of Fact 2 and 5 supra.) At formal hearing, Petitioner explained that because Pennsylvania's graduate medical training license only allows participation in a residency training program at an approved institution named on the face of the license, he did not consider it to be a "license to practice medicine," and accordingly he did not disclose to Florida the Pennsylvania Board's 1985 denial of such license. He represented that he believed that because the Pennsylvania graduate medical training license was institution-specific, limited to one year in scope, and only a prerequisite to supervised additional medical education, it did not constitute what Florida's inquiries were all about. By common English usage, Pennsylvania law, and Florida law, the authority that Dr. Plummer was denied in 1985 and granted in 1986 by the Pennsylvania Board constitutes a "license to practice medicine," contrary to his interpretation of that term when he filled out his Florida application and responded to inquiries during the course of Florida's licensure investigation. He should have identified it in response to each relevant question or inquiry. However, Petitioner's interpretation of Florida's questions and his answers thereto do not constitute attempting to obtain a license to practice medicine by fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact for the following reasons: Petitioner's formal hearing testimony was credible and unrefuted. Petitioner was consistent in his interpretation of the questions on this subject in that he also did not disclose to Florida the "good" facts that the Pennsylvania Board had subsequently granted him the graduate medical license in 1986 and had renewed it annually and that he still held such a license at the time of filling out his Florida application. Also, in the Florida application, he readily and fully disclosed to Florida the "bad" facts of his detrimental past history of alcoholism. Dr. Lee testified as a medical physician licensed to practice in New York, Pennsylvania, and Iowa, that he considered Petitioner's interpretation of the Florida application questions concerning prior medical licensing reasonable and that he also considered Petitioner's answers to those questions reasonable. No contrary testimony was presented. The American Medical Association profile does not list Petitioner's Pennsylvania graduate medical training license as a "license to practice medicine." Various qualified credible witnesses acknowledged that Petitioner's failure to disclose his alcoholism to the Pennsylvania Board in 1985 was a denial symptom of his alcoholism at that time and was not symptomatic of his character makeup now that his alcoholism is in remission or at any time he responded during the Florida licensing process. Respondent presented no direct evidence to prove that Petitioner had a fraudulent intent in answering as he did. Although fraudulent intent may sometimes be inferred from the circumstances, the circumstances herein do not permit such an inference. On his initial Florida application, Petitioner could not correctly recall the dates of his medical training because he had not kept accurate records himself and because of his alcoholic condition in prior years. One representative error he made is that he listed a full year in one program which he attended for only four months. However, he approximated the dates as best he could and revealed all training programs, even those in which he was unsuccessful, and he consistently responded to the Board that he would defer to whatever the training institutions' records showed. He also concealed no rehabilitation programs he had been in. No intent to defraud or conceal can be inferred from these circumstances. Petitioner is an alcoholic. Petitioner's alcoholism had its inception sometime during his childhood, possibly as early as the age of eight years. Petitioner graduated from Pennsylvania State University summa cum laude, in 1976. He matriculated from the Uniformed Services University in 1980. Toward the end of his time in medical school, approximately 1980, Petitioner began to realize that he had a problem with alcohol. In 1980, Petitioner entered a surgical training program at Balboa Hospital in San Diego, California. As a direct result of his problems with alcohol, Petitioner left that surgical training program in 1981 without completing his training. Between 1981 and 1983, Petitioner was partially supported by his parents, performed odd jobs as a handyman and searched for a new training program. In July, 1983, Petitioner entered an internal medicine training program at St. Raphael Hospital in New Haven, Connecticut. After approximately five months and prior to completion of training in New Haven, Petitioner's problems with alcohol forced him to terminate participation in the internal medicine training program. In December 1983, Petitioner entered a rehabilitation program at Marworth in Waverly, Pennsylvania. He remained as an inpatient at Marworth until February 1984 when he was discharged to Little Hill--Alina Lodge, a continuing care facility in Blairstown, New Jersey, where he remained as an inpatient until May 1984. Petitioner left Little Hill--Alina Lodge with staff approval. Between May 1984 and November 1986, Petitioner worked at various odd jobs as a handyman and helped his parents relocate and build in Florida. He also waited for his graduate medical training license in Pennsylvania. (See Finding of Fact 7, supra) Petitioner described both the periods of 1981-1983 (See Finding of Fact 18 supra.) and 1984-1986 as periods of "self-employment" whereas "unemployment" might have been more accurate. This discrepancy was neither "fraud" nor "concealment," as those terms are generally understood. In November, 1986, Petitioner entered an internal medicine training program at Misercordia, Mercy Catholic Medical Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Petitioner's problem with alcohol caused him to behave in a manner which indicated the presence of an active physical impairment of alcoholism and resulted in Petitioner's suspension and later resignation from that program after approximately three and a half months and prior to completion of training. In June 1987, Petitioner returned to Marworth as an inpatient. He remained under treatment for approximately one month and then stayed on at Marworth as an inpatient for approximately a month. Thereafter, he worked as a janitor and groundskeeper for nearly two years while concentrating on his life problems that had contributed to his alcoholism. Many professionals reviewing his case have been favorably impressed with Petitioner's dedication and sacrifice during this period of time. In 1989, Petitioner entered an internal medicine training program at Robert Packer Hospital in Sayre, Pennsylvania. This hospital is part of the Guthrie Healthcare System where Petitioner is currently employed. (See Findings of Fact 28, 43, 49 infra.). In June 1990, Petitioner took a vacation to the Florida keys and while on vacation went on a four day drinking binge. Petitioner voluntarily reported himself for further treatment and returned to Pennsylvania. While awaiting placement in another rehabilitation program, he suffered an alcohol withdrawal induced seizure. In July 1990, Petitioner entered his fourth inpatient treatment program for alcoholism at Bethany Center in Homesdale, Pennsylvania, where he remained for one month. His absence was counted as vacation and sick time while he was able to complete his internal medicine training program at Robert Packer Hospital on schedule in April 1992. The Guthrie Health Care System immediately offered him his current position, with full knowledge of his excellent academic record and clinical references and his alcohol recovery history. (See, Findings of Fact 43 and 49 infra). Currently, Petitioner participates in the Physician's Health Program of the Pennsylvania Medical Society and since January 1991 has been participating, through counseling, in a program of recovery from alcoholism with the Bradford Sullivan Drug and Alcohol Program. Both the Florida Physician Resource Network and the Pennsylvania Physician's Health Program impaired physicians programs have opined that Petitioner's history of alcoholism should not bar his licensure in Florida at the current time. (See, Findings of Fact 31-39 infra.) Dr. Roger Goetz is the Director of Florida's PRN and is the Department of Professional Regulation's consultant charged with implementing Florida's Impaired Practitioner Program. The Physician Resource Network includes the Physician Recovery Network (PRN). In the past five years, the PRN has evaluated approximately 350 physicians with impairments at the request of the Board of Medicine. Over this period, Dr. Goetz cannot recall a single instance where an applicant endorsed by PRN has failed to maintain sobriety. PRN statistics show that at least 97 per cent of the practitioners on contract have not reverted to alcohol or chemical use. Petitioner is willing to enter such a contract with PRN if he is licensed. Dr. Goetz believes Petitioner will be able to practice medicine with skill and safety to patients in Florida, provided he enters into a contract with the PRN. Dr. Goetz opined that Petitioner's relapse in 1990 does not indicate the likelihood of future relapses because Petitioner has continued with a more effective treatment program and support system geared to his needs as a physician. Dr. Goetz, on behalf of PRN, recommended a five-year contract for Petitioner designed to identify pre-relapse behavior and entail that he remain chemically abstinent, be subjected to random body fluid analysis, establish a doctor/patient relationship and receive care from another physician for his personal health, obtain a monitoring physician, attend group therapy, attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, have significant family members involved in his recovery, notify the PRN of any problems in his life, including changes in his physical health, be willing to withdraw immediately should there be any problems surrounding his practice, and participate and cooperate with the PRN at all times. Such a contract would provide Petitioner with an environment in Florida which is similar to his current recovery environment in Pennsylvania. Dr. Goetz testified that to the extent of his knowledge Petitioner has a good reputation for truth and veracity. At the request of PRN, Petitioner was evaluated for chemical dependency by Leah H. Williams, M.D. in July 1991. Dr. Williams reported to PRN that she was in favor of Florida licensure for Petitioner. In September 1991, Petitioner received a thorough outpatient evaluation from Dr. Lynn Hankes, PRN's approved evaluator. Dr. Hankes also endorsed Florida licensure for Petitioner, contingent upon Petitioner entering the PRN program and participating in ongoing psychotherapy. Penny Ziegler, M.D., Medical Director of the Pennsylvania Physician's Health Program, supports Petitioner's application for licensure in Florida. Nicholas F. Colangelo, Ph.D., a psychologist, supports Petitioner's application for licensure in Florida. Dr. Colangelo may be considered as a past and currently treating psychologist for Petitioner. They have known each other since Petitioner was at Marworth. Dr. Colangelo is a nationally certified alcohol and drug counselor who is Vice-President of Clearbrook, Inc., an alcohol and drug addiction treatment facility. He is a recovering alcoholic who has been sober for over seventeen years. Twenty-five to thirty-five per cent of his addiction counseling focuses on professionals. According to Dr. Colangelo, professionals and other high-achieving individuals like Petitioner often have difficulty accepting that they must submit to the whole program for recovery from alcoholism but once they do, they recover at a higher than average rate. In Dr. Colangelo's opinion, Petitioner has demonstrated conduct which gives him a better than average prospect for continued sobriety. Dr. Colangelo opined that Petitioner's current employment in a tertiary care facility, the Guthrie Clinic, coupled with the management of the ongoing licensure proceedings in Florida, provide Petitioner with as much environmental stress as he has ever experienced, but the existence of environmental stress does not play a significant role in Petitioner's continued sobriety. Dr. Colangelo perceived Petitioner as a person of truth and veracity. Petitioner is currently employed by the Guthrie Healthcare System, a multi-specialty private medical practice clinic employing approximately 110 physicians in non-surgical areas of medicine. Petitioner is responsible for the initial evaluation of nonsurgical patients. It is within his job duties to determine the type of medical care to be provided to each nonsurgical patient entering the clinic. In that position, he sometimes provides all primary care to the patient or directs the patient to the appropriate subspecialist. Apart from the four days in 1990, Petitioner has been continuously sober for five and one-half years. That 1990 four day relapse did not detrimentally affect his patient care. At that time, Petitioner contacted Florida's PRN. He has maintained contact with Dr. Goetz ever since. According to Dr. Colangelo and Dr. Goetz, two years of continuous sobriety is a benchmark most professional associations accept for granting a license or privilege. The American Board of Internal Medicine uses such a two year benchmark. Petitioner has met all credentialing requirements to obtain certification by the American Board of Internal Medicine. Dr. Ferrol Lee currently is responsible for the nonsurgical quality of medicine at Guthrie, with overall supervision of the 110 physicians employed there, including Petitioner. He has worked with Petitioner both during Petitioner's residency at Robert Packer and during his current employment. He views Petitioner as a hard worker whose personal struggle with alcoholism gives him valuable insight into the care of patients who struggle with similar problems. He ranks Petitioner within the top 5-10 residents of the 100 he has worked with over the past nine years. Dr. Lee testified that Petitioner has continually demonstrated good moral character and has a flawless reputation for truth and veracity. Dr. Lee endorses Petitioner's licensure in Florida. The State of Pennsylvania has never taken disciplinary action against Respondent's license to practice medicine in that state.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a final order be entered certifying Petitioner for licensure with placement of Petitioner on probation for five years subject to his entering into and abiding by a contract acceptable to the Physicians Recovery Network. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of April, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1993.
Findings Of Fact Dora F. Villanueva is a licensed pharmacist in the State of Florida, holding license number PS 0014957. Ms. Villanueva is an elderly woman who owns the Century Pharmacy, a community pharmacy located at 3017 S.W. 107th Avenue in Dade County, which holds permit number PH 0006839. She depends on the pharmacy for her livelihood and is manager of its prescription department. An investigator for the Department of Professional Regulation, Thomas Daniels, entered the Century Pharmacy in the early afternoon on January 7, 1988. He was there to follow up on a previous inspection of the Century Pharmacy. When Mr. Daniels arrived at the pharmacy, Ms. Villanueva, the registered pharmacist, was not there. It is Ms. Villanueva's practice to open the prescription department from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. She returns to her home for lunch from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. While there, Mr. Daniels, observed a person in the pharmacy department, who was visible through a pass-through window which connects the prescription department with the over- the-counter drug section of the pharmacy. That person was Mary Washington, a pharmacy technician who works at the Century Pharmacy. Ms. Washington is not, and never has been a licensed pharmacist. No other licensed pharmacist was present and on duty at the pharmacy. Ms. Villanueva is the only pharmacist employed at the Century Pharmacy. While Ms. Villanueva was absent, there was no sign indicating the pharmacy prescription department was closed due to the absence of a pharmacist. The records of the Board of Pharmacy admitted into evidence indicate that Ms. Villanueva was placed on probation on November 5, 1984, for one year. The reason for the probation cannot be determined from the records offered in evidence.
Recommendation It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Dora F. Villanueva and Century Pharmacy receive a reprimand and a fine of $400 for violations of Rule 21S-1.014, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of August, 1988. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9765 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX Rulings on the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law of the petitioner. Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 4. Covered in finding of fact 4. Covered in finding of fact 4. Covered in finding of fact 5. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law of the respondent. Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in findings of fact 2 and 3. Generally covered in findings of fact 2 and 3. Rejected because I accepted the testimony of Mr. Daniels on this point, that there was no closed sign at all. Whether Dr. Villanueva places a sign in the dispensing window on most days cannot be determined from the evidence, but she did not do so on January 7, 1988. Rejected because I have accepted the testimony of Mr. Daniels that he saw Mary Washington in the pharmacy department. Rejected for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Mone', Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Regla M. Sibila-Zaidner, Esquire 2260 S.W. 8th Street Suite 204 Miami, Florida 33135 Rod Presnell, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue As to Case 93-6927, whether Respondent, a licensed physician, violated the provisions of Section 458.331(1)(m), (t), (v), and (dd), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed. As to Case 93-6928, whether Respondent violated the provisions of Section 458.319(5), 458.327(1)(a), and 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed. As to Case 93-6929, whether Respondent violated the provisions of Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida that regulates the practice of medicine. Respondent is a licensed physician in the State of Florida and has been issued license number ME 0028412 by the Petitioner. CASE NO. 93-6927 On December 12, 1990, Susan D. Bernhardt conducted an inspection for the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) of an abortion clinic named Miami International Esthetics Center (MIEC). Ms. Bernhardt was hired as a consultant by DHRS to conduct random inspections of MIEC pursuant to a stipulation between DHRS and MIEC. Ms. Bernhardt is a registered nurse and is experienced in surgical procedures. Ms. Bernhardt observed Respondent perform an abortion on a patient at MIEC on December 12, 1990. Also present in the operating room was a nurse anesthetist, to whom Respondent referred as Mr. Martin. Respondent, Mr. Martin, and Ms. Bernhardt were present in the operating room at all times during the procedure. Mr. Martin administered anesthesia and the patient lost consciousness. Shortly after losing consciousness, the patient began making sounds which Ms. Bernhardt described as "crowing noises" and to which Dr. Van Eldik referred to as "stridors". These sounds indicate that the patient's air passages are blocked, a condition that requires prompt action from the physician or from the person administering anesthesia since the condition can be life threatening. Ms. Bernhardt testified that she went to the patient and used her stethoscope to confirm that the patient was having breathing difficulties. She thereafter tilted the patient's head and restored her breathing. The amount of time that lapsed between the time the patient first experienced difficulties breathing and the time Ms. Bernhardt acted was not established. While it is clear that neither Respondent or Mr. Martin 1/ acted to provide the patient with any relief or to assure that her air passages were open so that she could receive adequate oxygen, it is not clear whether the action of Ms. Bernhardt obviated the necessity for either the physician or the nurse anesthetist to act. Consequently, it is found that Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to properly supervise Mr. Martin by failing to order him to assist the patient when Ms. Bernhardt acted promptly to relieve the patient. Emergency equipment was maintained on a crash cart that was in the operating room during the procedure Ms. Bernhardt observed. As the operating surgeon, Respondent was responsible for making sure that appropriate emergency equipment was readily available. Appropriate emergency equipment would include emergency drugs on the crash cart. Throughout the procedure there were no emergency drugs present on the crash cart. Respondent failed to adequately supervise Mr. Martin to ensure that appropriate emergency equipment was readily available. As part of her inspection of MIEC, Ms. Bernhardt reviewed medical records at the clinic pertaining to patients of the Respondent. Some of the records that were reviewed by her are contained in Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Respondent's records reviewed by Ms. Bernhardt were of overall poor quality. Documentation concerning physical examination was scanty and often failed to include the size of the patient's uterine and a description of the presumptive signs of pregnancy. Anesthesia records were not filled out. Documentation concerning the recovery room period was virtually nonexistent. No vital signs or progress notes were charted. There was no follow-up documentation evidencing a pelvic examination and no notation of patient complaints or symptoms. The records reviewed by Ms. Bernhardt during her inspection did not justify or adequately document the course of treatment for the respective patients. A subpoena was served on Respondent by one of Petitioner's investigators that required him to turn over all medical records pertaining to certain named patients. A similar subpoena was served on Mr. Angel Caso, the owner of MIEC. In response to the subpoena that was served on his client, Respondent's attorney informed the investigator that Respondent did not have any medical records other than those that would have been maintained at the MIEC. In response to the subpoena that was served on him, Mr. Caso turned over medical records pertaining to 45 patients. These records reflect that the Respondent was their attending physician. Mr. Caso could not be subpoenaed by Petitioner to compel his attendance at the formal hearing because he could not be located. The medical records that were turned over to Petitioner pursuant to subpoena were admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5 as records received by Petitioner during the course of an official investigation. There was no evidence that any other medical records pertaining to these patients exist. The medical records that constitute Petitioner's Exhibit 5 do not justify or adequately document the course of treatment of the respective patients. CASE NO. 93-6928 Section 458.319(5), Florida Statutes, provides, as follows: (5) The licensee must have on file with the department the address of his primary place of practice within the state prior to engaging in that practice. Prior to changing the address of his primary place of practice, whether or not within this state, the licensee shall notify the department of the address of his new primary place of practice. The Petitioner maintains the addresses of physicians by computer. There is no statute or rule that requires a physician to notify the Department in writing as to a change of address, but the Department's policy is to require that address changes be in writing and that the request for a change of address come from the physician. There was no written notification from Respondent to the Petitioner that his business address had changed prior to September 1992. At the time of the formal hearing, Respondent's business address was 102 East 49th Street, Hialeah. His former business address was 4821 West 4th Avenue, Hialeah, Florida. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent's home address was 14710 Day Pine Avenue, Miami, Florida. As of December 17, 1990, Petitioner had been informed of that address. Petitioner's investigator, Diane Robie, interviewed Respondent at his business address on East 49th Street on August 22, 1991. Respondent had been at this address for approximately eight months as of August 22, 1991. This new business address was reflected by Ms. Robie's report, which was filed with Petitioner on October 8, 1991, but that report did not trigger a change of the business address Petitioner maintained for Respondent in its computers. Respondent's license to practice medicine was scheduled to expire on December 31, 1991. In mid October 1991, the Department of Professional Regulation (Department) mailed a renewal notice to Respondent's former business address on West 4th Avenue. As required by Section 458.319(4), Florida Statutes, the Department routinely mails to the physician a renewal form that the physician must use to renew his license. This mailing takes place 60 days before the physician's license is scheduled to expire. This renewal form is generated by computer and is sent to the mailing address that is on record with the Department and maintained by computer. It was the Department's policy to try to notify a physician at his home address if a renewal notice is returned from a stale office address. There was no evidence that the renewal notice and the renewal form that was mailed to Respondent at his former address in October 1991 was returned to the Department as being an incorrect address. The evidence failed to establish what happened to the renewal notice that was mailed to Respondent in mid-October 1991. There was no further attempt by the Department following the mid-October 1991 mailing to notify the Respondent at his home address or business address that his license was about to expire. Respondent's license expired on December 31, 1991, and his licensure automatically reverted to inactive status pursuant to Section 458.319(3), Florida Statutes. Respondent made no effort to contact the Department until June 1992 at which time his secretary/office manager contacted the Department by telephone and advised that Respondent had not received the renewal documentation. On August 10, 1992, the Petitioner wrote to Respondent at his home address. This was the first written communication between the parties since the mid-October 1991 mailing. Respondent mailed a check in the amount of $500.00 for the renewal of his license to the Department in September 1992. On October 6, 1992, the Department wrote Respondent at his former address on West 4th Avenue and advised that prior to the renewal of his license, Respondent had to pay an additional fee in the amount of $350.00 for the processing of his renewal application and that he would also have to submit proof that he had earned required continuing medical education credits. On February 15, 1993, the Department sent to Respondent a letter at his East 49th Street address that provided as follows: This letter is in response to your (sic) to your submission to renew your Florida medical license which was received in the Board office on 9-15-92. Unfortunately the Board of Medicine cannot comply with your request until the follow- ing is received: $350.00 renewal fee. (in addition to the $500 already submitted) You did not fill out the Financial Respon- sibility portion of the renewal application, therefore, you will need to fill out a new form, and have it properly notarized. Please submit an affidavit for your active practice activities between January 1, 1992, and the present date. Any person applying for reactivation of a license must show either that such licensee main- tained tail insurance coverage which provided liability coverage for incidents that occurred on or after January 1, 1987, or the initial date of licensure in this state, whichever is later, and incidents that occurred before the date on which the license became inactive; OR that such licensee MUST SUBMIT A NOTARIZED AFFIDAVIT STATING THAT SUCH LICENSEE HAS NO UNSATISFIED MEDICAL MALPRACTICE JUDGMENTS OR SETTLEMENTS AT THE TIME OF APPLICATION FOR REACTIVATION. After July 1, 1992, you will need to submit copies of at least 40 hours of Category I CME earned between January 1, 1990, and the present date. Five of these hours must be in Risk Management. Also one hour of HIV/AIDS Category I CME needs to be submitted. Once the above items are received, we will proceed with the issuance of an active Florida medical license. (Emphasis is in the original.) Respondent met all requirements for the renewal of his medical license on March 16, 1993, the date on which his license was reactivated. Between January 1, 1992, and March 15, 1993, Respondent engaged in the practice of medicine in the State of Florida without an active license. Case 93-6929 Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent on April 27, 1988, which was subsequently referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case No. 88-5546. On February 28, 1989, the parties to that proceeding executed a "Stipulation" which settled the dispute. On April 19, 1989, the Board of Medicine entered a Final Order that accepted the Stipulation and ordered the parties to abide by its terms. Pertinent to this proceeding, Paragraph 4 of the Stipulation required the following: 4. Within one (1) year of the date of filing of the Final Order incorporating the terms of this stipulation, Respondent shall complete twenty-five (25) hours of Category I Continuing Medical Education in the areas of Risk Management and/or Medical Records Keeping. Such continuing education shall be in addition to that amount required for renewal of licensure. Category I Continuing Medical Education is a course approved by the American Medical Association as a top level course. In March 1990, Respondent completed a 25 hour course sponsored by Jackson Memorial Hospital in the area of "Medical Records Keeping". Respondent notified Petitioner on March 21, 1990, that he had completed this course. This was the only course that Respondent claimed to have taken in satisfaction of the Final Order entered in DOAH Case 88-5546. This course has not been designated as a Category I Continuing Medical Education course by Jackson Memorial Hospital. The Petitioner advised the Respondent that the course he had taken did not satisfy its order. Respondent thereafter requested that the matter be reviewed by Petitioner's Probation Committee. This request was granted, but the Probation Committee determined that the course was not acceptable. Respondent did not comply with the order until March 16, 1993.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein and which incorporates the following: Find Respondent not guilty of practicing beyond the scope of his competence in violation of Section 458.331(1)(v), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count One of Case 93-6927. Find Respondent not guilty of practicing below the standard of care in violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Two of Case 93-6927. Find Respondent guilty of failing to keep proper medical records in violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Three of Case 93-6927. For this violation, Respondent should be reprimanded, assessed an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00, and placed on probation for a period of two years, to run concurrently with any other period of probation imposed on Respondent. Find Respondent not guilty of failing to properly supervise the nurse anesthetist when the patient experienced breathing difficulties in violation of Section 458.331(1)(dd), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Four of Case 93- 6927. Find Respondent guilty of failing to ensure that the crash cart was appropriately equipped, thereby failing to properly supervise the nurse anesthetist in violation of Section 458.331(1)(dd), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Four of Case 93-6927. For this violation, Respondent should be reprimanded and assessed an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00. Find Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of Section 458.319(5), Florida Statutes, and thereby violating Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes, by failing to timely notify Petitioner of his change of business address as alleged in Count One of Case 93-6928. For this violation, Respondent should be reprimanded and assessed an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00. Find Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of Section 458.327(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and thereby violating Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes, by practicing medicine in the State of Florida after his license expired as alleged in Count Two of Case 93-6928. For this violation, Respondent should be reprimanded and assessed an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00, and placed on probation for a period of two years, to run concurrently with any other period of probation imposed on Respondent. Find Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes, by failing to timely comply with an order of the Board of Medicine alleged in Case 93-6929. For this violation, Respondent should be reprimanded and assessed an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1995.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Michael A. Fuentes, M.D., a licensed physician at all times pertinent to these proceedings, holding medical license number ME 0044461. Respondent's last known address is 311 Akron Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15216. Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. The Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine is the licensing authority for the State of Pennsylvania. The Connecticut Board of Medicine is the disciplining body for the State of Connecticut. On or about July 27, 1994, the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine indefinitely suspended Respondent’s license to practice medicine and then stayed that suspension while placing Respondent on five year's probation. The Board found Respondent to be an impaired physician who had been non-compliant with treatment recommendations. On or about August 26, 1996, the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine, reviewed its earlier decision and shortened the probationary period to three years. Respondent did not report the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine’s action in either instance to Petitioner’s representatives in the State of Florida. On October 19, 1993, the Connecticut Board of Medicine summarily suspended Respondent’s license to practice medicine due to his mental impairment and failure to undergo a complete psychiatric evaluation. Subsequently, on or about June 20, 1995, the Board revoked Respondent’s license to practice medicine in Connecticut. Respondent did not report the Connecticut State Board of Medicine's action in either instance to Petitioner's representatives in the State of Florida. Respondent is guilty of having action taken against his license to practice medicine by the licensing authorities of the State of Pennsylvania and the State of Connecticut, violations of Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Additionally, Respondent did not notify the Florida Board of Medicine within 30 days of the license disciplinary actions taken by either the State of Pennsylvania or the State of Connecticut against his license, notifications required by Section 458.331(1)(kk), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the charges set forth in the Administrative Complaint and revoking his license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Carol Lanfri, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Stephen M. Chizmadia, Esquire 125 Sun Dance Road Stamford, Connecticut 06905 Michael A. Fuentes 32 Lake Drive Darien, Connecticut 06820 Michael A. Fuentes c/o The Royal Inn Route 219, Boot Jack Summit Ridgway, Pennsylvania 15853 Marm Harris, Executive Director Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Health Building 6, Room 102-E 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 James Howell, Secretary Department of Health Building 6, Room 306 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues in this case are whether and how the Education Practices Commission (EPC) should discipline the Respondent on charges that she submitted another teacher’s work to earn an endorsement to her teacher certificate for English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Kimberly Bank, holds Florida educator certificate 993098, which expires on June 30, 2018. She is certified in English and reading. During the 2012-2013 school year, she was employed by the OCPS as a reading teacher at Oakridge High School. In January 2013, the Respondent and a fellow Oakridge reading teacher named Charnetta Starr enrolled in an online course through CaseNEX to earn credit towards an ESOL endorsement to their teaching credentials. ESOL endorsements were required for their jobs. Ms. Starr completed all required course work, including participation in online discussions, journal entries, and workbook submissions, and earned credit for the course. The Respondent began the CaseNEX class, but stopped participating after a few weeks and was told by the course facilitator that she was being withdrawn from the class. The course ended on April 24, 2013. On May 2, 2013, the Respondent emailed Ms. Starr to ask her to provide the Respondent with Ms. Starr’s course work, which Ms. Starr emailed to her. The Respondent enrolled to take the CaseNEX class again during the summer of 2013. She copied Ms. Starr’s journal entries and workbook submissions from the January course and submitted them verbatim as her own work for course credit during the summer course. The submissions struck the course facilitator as being very familiar, and her investigation revealed that they were exact copies of Ms. Starr’s submissions. The facilitator reported this to her supervisor. The Respondent was again withdrawn from the class, this time for violating course prohibitions against plagiarism. The Respondent and Ms. Starr were reported to OCPS, which reprimanded them and suspended them for three days. The Petitioner initiated separate, but virtually identical administrative cases to discipline the educator certificates of both the Respondent and Ms. Starr. The Petitioner agreed to settle Ms. Starr’s case for a reprimand and $750 fine, and the EPC accepted the settlement, because Ms. Starr was not perceived to have used the Respondent’s work product, but only to have allowed her work product to be used by the Respondent. Ms. Starr testified that she agreed to the settlement but actually does not believe her actions were wrong or violations because she did not know the Respondent was going to plagiarize her work and submit it for credit. Because the Respondent was perceived to have used Ms. Starr’s work product and submitted it as her own for CaseNEX course credit, the Respondent’s administrative case proceeded, with the Petitioner seeking to fine her, suspend her educator certificate, and place her on probation. The Respondent contends that she and Ms. Starr collaborated on all of Ms. Starr’s journal entry and workbook submissions with the intention that each would submit the identical work as their own. Initially, the Respondent contended that this was permissible “collaboration” under the CaseNEX honor code and course requirements. Later in the hearing, the Respondent seemed to concede that it was against the honor code and the course’s requirement that each teacher taking the course had to submit his or her own original work. At that point in the proceeding, she seemed to be taking the position that her conduct mirrored Ms. Starr’s and that her discipline should be the same (i.e., that she should not be suspended). In her proposed recommended order, the Respondent again took the position that her conduct was permissible collaboration under the CaseNEX honor code and the course’s requirements and that no discipline should be imposed. The evidence was clear and convincing that the work submitted by the Respondent for credit in the summer 2013 CaseNEX course was not the product of collaboration between her and Ms. Starr. The Respondent testified that she and Ms. Starr collaborated by jointly doing work for the course from the very beginning of the January 2013 course with the intention of each submitting their joint work product for credit. Yet, it is obvious that the Respondent’s work submissions prior to her withdrawal from the January 2013 course were not the same as Ms. Starr’s. The Respondent testified that she collaborated with Ms. Starr throughout the January 2013 CaseNEX course. She testified that they produced joint work for them both to submit for credit in the course. She testified that after she was withdrawn from the January course, she continued to collaborate and produce joint work product with Ms. Starr, and that it was understood that the Respondent would submit the work as her own when she retook the course. The Respondent testified that she misplaced and lost her thumb-drive with a digital copy of the joint work product and asked Ms. Starr to send her a copy as an attachment to an email, which Ms. Starr did on May 2, 2013. Ms. Starr testified that the Respondent emailed her to ask for a copy of Ms. Starr’s work product from the January CaseNEX course and that Ms. Starr complied on May 2, 2013. Ms. Starr testified that this was her own personal work product, not joint work product. She denied knowing that the Respondent intended to plagiarize and submit it as her own. She testified persuasively that there were other legitimate uses the Respondent could have made of the work besides plagiarizing it. Where there is conflict between the Respondent’s testimony and Ms. Starr’s testimony, the Respondent’s is rejected as being false, and Ms. Starr’s is credited as being the truth. The evidence was clear and convincing that Ms. Starr did her own work throughout the January 2013 course. None of the work submitted by Ms. Starr for credit in the January 2013 course was produced jointly with the Respondent. If the Respondent were telling the truth, and she and Ms. Starr collaborated on their work submissions, her early submissions for the January CaseNEX course would have been identical to Ms. Starr’s. They were not. On the other hand, some of her submissions during the course she took during the summer of 2013 were identical to Ms. Starr’s submissions. For this and other reasons, Ms. Starr’s testimony was more credible than the Respondent’s when their testimony was in conflict. The Respondent attempted to attack Ms. Starr’s credibility by use of a screen shot of an incomplete and out-of- context cell phone text message exchange between them on June 13, 2013. At 11:25 a.m. on that date, Ms. Starr texted the Respondent: “OK. Did you sign up for the online modules for the $1000? Let’s start working on them so we can get paid on 7/31.” The Respondent answered: “Girl I have started. The kids do 2 hrs in the computer lab and I do the modules. They are easy but looooooong!” Ms. Starr replied: “OK. Send me any info you have for it please.” The Respondent texted: “You just watch a video and answer 2 multiple choice questions. Skip through the video and go to the questions. You can try as much as you want. There”. There was no evidence as to what preceded or followed the exchange. When Ms. Starr was confronted with the text exchange on cross-examination, she understood that it was being presented to impeach her testimony that the Respondent contacted her about providing the Respondent with their supposedly joint work product from the January CaseNEX course. In her haste to vehemently defend herself, Ms. Starr failed to realize that the text message exchange actually had nothing to do with her providing the Respondent with her work product from the January course, but was about a different course they were taking to earn bonus pay, and she testified incorrectly that it was the Respondent who initiated the text message exchange that was in evidence. The cross-examination failed to impeach the essence of Ms. Starr’s testimony. The evidence was that the Respondent is a good teacher. She performed satisfactorily both at Oakridge before the CaseNEX cheating incident and at Conway Middle School after it. Nonetheless, it is clear that her effectiveness as an employee of the school district was seriously impaired by her plagiarism and cheating on the June 2013 CaseNEX course. For one thing, she was reprimanded and suspended for three days. For another, she did not get the ESOL endorsement that was required for the job she held at Oakridge. Since the Respondent was guilty of plagiarism, and Ms. Starr was less culpable, it is reasonable for the Respondent’s discipline to be harsher than Ms. Starr’s. A period of suspension is reasonable. Based on the EPC records of discipline imposed in similar cases that were officially recognized in this case, it appears that it has been the practice of the EPC to impose a one-year suspension, in addition to a fine, probation, and a requirement to take a college-level course in ethics, for a teacher who admits to plagiarism and cheating in a CaseNEX ESOL endorsement course. In the Respondent’s case, a longer period of suspension is warranted due to the Respondent’s dispute of the charges and her false testimony.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the EPC enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty as charged, suspending her educator certificate for 18 months, placing her on probation for two years with conditions to be determined by the EPC, requiring her to take a college-level course in ethics under terms and conditions determined by the EPC, and imposing a fine in the amount of $750. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2016.
