STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
)
WINIFRED CHAMBERS, M.D., )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 89-1712
) DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL ) REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICINE, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was held in this case in Tallahassee, Florida on August 26, 1989, before J. Stephen Menton, duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire
Attorney at Law 1355 Mahan Drive
P. O. Box 31
Tallahassee, Florida 32308
For Respondent: Allen R. Grossman, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General Suite 1602 - The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to a license to practice medicine in the state of Florida.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On February 2, 1989, the Credentials Committee of the Florida Board of Medicine considered Dr. Chamber's application for licensure in the State of Florida and voted to recommend denial of her application to the full Board. The Board considered the Committee's report on February 4, 1989 and voted to adopt the report. The Board's Order of Intent to Deny was filed March 3, 1989. In the Order of Intent to Deny, the Respondent cited three grounds for denying Petitioner's application. First, the Board stated Petitioner's license to practice medicine in Georgia, New Mexico and California was "acted against by the licensing bodies of those states" thereby serving as a basis for denial under Sections 458.331(1)(b) and 458.331(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1988).
Second, the Board said the Petitioner's poor performance in her medical training program at Holston Valley Community Hospital and Kingsport Family Practice
Center in 1982-1983 evidenced her inability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety as required by Sections 458.301 and 458.331(4), Florida Statutes (1988). Finally, the Board stated Petitioner provided fraudulent information and misrepresented or concealed information regarding her medical education contrary to Sections 458.311(1)(c) and 458.331(1)(a) and (h), Florida Statutes (1988).
A formal hearing was timely requested by Petitioner. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings which noticed and conducted the hearing.
At the hearing, Petitioner testified on her behalf and offered thirteen exhibits into evidence, all of which were accepted. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is a copy of the transcript of the Board's consideration of the report of the Credentials Committee. The parties have stipulated that the transcript is mistakenly designated on its cover as a transcript of the Committee meeting.
The parties also stipulated that several of the speakers were misidentified in the transcript. While the parties were granted leave to file a corrected exhibit, no correction of that transcript has been filed.
Respondent did not present any testimony, but identified three exhibits, all of which were accepted into evidence except Respondent's Exhibit 1 which was not moved into evidence. At the request of the Respondent, official recognition has been taken of the calendar for the years 1981 and 1982.
A transcript of the hearing has been filed. By stipulation of the parties and Order of the Hearing Officer, the time for submitting proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law was extended until December 15, 1989. Respondent timely filed its proposed findings. However, Petitioner's proposed findings were not filed until the following Monday, December 18, 1989. On January 5, 1990, Respondent filed Respondent's Motion to Strike Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order on the grounds that it was untimely filed. On January 8, 1990, Petitioner filed Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Motion To Strike Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order which states that, due to a printer problem, Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order was not completed until approximately 6:00 p.m. on Friday, December 15, at which time it was filed.
However, the Division of Administrative Hearing's Clerk's Office was closed at that time and the Proposed Recommended Order was not actually filed until the following Monday. After reviewing the Motion and the Response thereto, Petitioner's Motion is denied and the proposals submitted by both parties have been reviewed and considered in the preparation on this Recommended Order. A specific ruling on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties is included in the Appendix attached to this Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner, Dr. Winifred Chambers received a master's degree in religion and art in 1957, a second master's degree in 1968 in philosophy with a specialization in ethics and social philosophy and a Ph.D. (with honors) in 1975 in the philosophy of science, all from the University of Chicago. While working on her dissertation, she studied at the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis.
After working around hospitals and conducting classes and workshops on medical ethics for medical personnel, Petitioner decided to attend medical school. Because her educational training did not include extensive background in certain scientific areas, Petitioner was concerned with her ability to score well on the MCATS, which are the entrance examinations required by all medical
schools in the United States. In addition, Petitioner's age (she was in her mid 40's at the time) was considered a negative factor by many medical schools in the United States. As a result, she inquired about attending certain foreign medical schools. She was limited in the schools that she could consider because she did not speak Spanish.
Medical Education
In 1979, Petitioner applied to the American University of the Caribbean (AUC). AUC taught its medical courses in English and Petitioner was only required to make up a few undergraduate science courses (including physics) in order to enroll in the medical school.
Petitioner enrolled in classes at AUC in May of 1980. She actually started classes a few days after the semester began. She completed the first two semesters from May to December 1980 and then went home during the Christmas break. During the break, Petitioner learned that she had received an F in her course in neurosciences. Petitioner met with the professor from that course to discuss the failing grade she received and also met with the President of AUC. As a result of these meetings, it was her understanding that the grade was changed to a passing grade.
In January of 1981, Petitioner visited CETEC (another Caribbean medical school located in the Dominican Republic,) and met with officials of the school to discuss transferring from AUC to CETEC. Petitioner applied to CETEC during her visit and, prior to leaving, was informed of her acceptance into medical school at CETEC.
Petitioner returned to AUC and completed her third semester at the school. In May of 1981, she officially enrolled at CETEC by initiating clinical rotations at Sharp Hospital in San Diego, California. Even though Petitioner had only completed three semesters at AUC, she was granted status as a fifth semester medical student. She contends that she was granted this status based upon CETEC'S evaluation of her transcript and the number of hours she took at AUC.
Prior to her enrollment at CETEC, Petitioner provided CETEC with a transcript indicating she had passed neurosciences at AUC and CETEC gave her credit for the course.
From May 4, 1981 to June 6, 1982, Petitioner participated in clinical rotations at Sharp Memorial Hospital in San Diego, California as part of her medical education at CETEC. During this time period, Petitioner also participated in a clinical rotation at Children's Hospital in San Diego, California (from 12/28/81 to 2/20/82).
Beginning in 1983, the media and some state licensing agencies began challenging the validity and/or authenticity of the credentials and training of some CETEC medical graduates. CETEC medical school was ultimately closed in 1984. The Dominican Republic government formed an agency to verify and certify the transcripts of CETEC graduates. This agency was called the "Counsel For Superior Education" also referred to by the acronym of CONES. CONES verified and certified the legitimacy of higher education credentials from all Dominican schools submitted to other countries. As part of her pending Florida Application, Petitioner has submitted a certification from CONES dated October 15, 1987 attesting to Petitioner's graduation from medical school at CETEC on June 12, 1982. Petitioner has also submitted a second certification from CONES
dated July 8, 1988 confirming her graduation on June 12, 1982. Included as part of the documents submitted by Petitioner from CONES is a Certification of Clinical Rotations dated July 14, 1987 (the "CONES Report") and an academic transcript dated July 14, 1987 (the "CONES Transcript.")
The "Education Commission For Foreign Medical Graduates" ("ECFMG") provides a certification of the education of applicants from foreign medical schools who seek licensure in the various United States and offers an examination required by some state licensing boards for licensure of applicants graduating from foreign medical schools.
Petitioner passed the ECFMG examination and was certified by the ECFMG in 1982. However, after the CETEC scandal began in 1983, the ECFMG started an investigation of graduates of CETEC (including Petitioner) for the purpose of reverifying their medical training. The ECFMG required clearance from CONES of Petitioner's CETEC education before reverifying her ECFMG certificate. The ECFMG reinstated Petitioner's ECFMG certification on June 26, 1987. The earliest certification from CONES that has been submitted by Petitioner is dated July 14, 1987, approximately two and a half weeks after the ECMFG certification. It is not clear what the ECFMG relied upon in reissuing a certification to Petitioner. While Petitioner contends that CONES had originally certified her CETEC transcript shortly after her graduation in June of 1982, no competent evidence was presented to establish when or if an earlier CONES certification was issued. In any event, Petitioner currently holds a valid ECFMG certificate.
In certifying Petitioner's medical degree from CETEC, CONES gave Petitioner credit for courses taken and work done at non-medical schools (i.e., the University of Chicago) prior to entering medical school. These credits are discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 17.
Although the ECFMG has apparently accepted CONES' certification of Petitioner's medical education at CETEC, there are several inconsistencies on the face of the CONES Report. The CONES Report states that during the period from May 4, 1981 to June 6, 1982, Petitioner completed fifty six (56) weeks of clinical rotations. However, in reaching this total the CONES Report provides one week of credit for a rotation (from 5/24/82 to 5/28/82) in obstetrics and gynecology which overlapped with another rotation (from 5/10/82 to 6/5/82) in obstetrics and gynecology. It it also provides double credit for a single two week clinical rotation (from 5/4/81 to 5/16/81) in obstetrics and gynecology. In addition, there are two periods of time (from 2/21/82 to 3/14/82 and from 4/25/82 to 5/9/82, which total approximately five (5) weeks), during which no
clinical rotations were taken. Since the period between May 4, 1981 and June 6, 1982 consisted of approximately fifty seven (57) weeks, it does not appear that Petitioner actually completed fifty six (56) weeks of rotations as listed.
Deleting the double credit received for the 5/4/81 to 5/16/81 clinical rotation, the CONES Report only appears to certify completion of fifty four (54 weeks) of clinical rotations. Moreover, those fifty four (54) weeks of rotations include one week of credit for five (5) days in obstetrics and gynecology (from 5/24/82 to 5/28/82) which directly overlapped a separately listed clinical rotation in obstetrics and gynecology, and one (1) week of credit for six (6) days in obstetrics and gynecology from 6/1/82 to 6/6/82. Thus, on the face of the CONES Report it appears that Petitioner actually completed only fifty three (53) weeks of rotations at most. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, according to the CONES Report, there were approximately five (5) weeks of the fifty-seven (57) week period during which no clinical rotations were taken.
Petitioner contends that the CONES Report fails to take into account a five (5) week clerkship in family medicine which she completed at Sharp Hospital and which was accepted by the ECFMG when Petitioner applied for licensure in California. This clerkship is reflected in the CETEC Transcript even though it is not reflected in the CONES Report. It is not clear why this rotation was not included in the CONES Report However, the evidence did establish that Petitioner completed the rotation. One of the five weeks of this family medicine rotation overlaps with an OB/GYN rotation (from 5/4/82 -5/8/82). The time frame of the family medicine rotation roughly coincides with the period of time during which no rotations are reflected in the CONES Report. Thus, this rotation would only add four more weeks to the clerkship total listed on the CONES Report. Even if this four week rotation is added to the fifty three (53) weeks certified in the CONES Report, the Report would still only indicate that Petitioner completed a total of fifty seven (57) weeks of clinical rotations.
According to the boiler-plate language on the CONES Report, sixty
(60) to seventy-two (72) total weeks of clinical rotations had to be completed by CETEC students who took their clinical rotations outside of the Dominican Republic. Thus, the CONES Report does not reflect completion of the required weeks of clinical rotations even though CONES has issued a certification that purports to certify successful completion of the degree requirements. This discrepancy has not been adequately explained.
The CONES Report does not reflect any clinical rotations by Petitioner in psychiatry. However, the CETEC Transcript does indicate that Petitioner was granted eight hours credit for her graduate studies at the University of Chicago from 1971-1973. Petitioner contends she is entitled to at least four hours of clerkship in psychiatry for those studies. However, it appears from the CONES Transcript that the credit she received was applied towards classes in Human Conduct which were a part of the curriculum during the first two years of medical school. There is no evidence to indicate that CETEC or CONES granted or should have granted Petitioner credit for clinical rotations in psychiatry based upon her graduate studies at the University of Chicago.
During a three week period (between her second and third semesters at AUC) from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981, Petitioner participated in an OB/GYN clinical rotation at Sharp Memorial Hospital in San Diego, California (hereinafter this rotation will be referred to as the "Unsanctioned Rotation.") This rotation is usually not done until after a student completes the third semester of medical school. Petitioner's participation in this Unsanctioned Rotation was not authorized by any medical school and was not a part of any medical school program. Petitioner contends that she satisfied the required sixty (60) clerkship weeks if the Unsanctioned Rotation at Sharp Hospital from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981 is added to the undisputed clinical rotations and the family medicine rotation discussed in Findings of Fact 15. However, the Unsanctioned Clerkship was not accepted by CONES and Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that it should be counted towards her required clinical rotations.
Although CETEC had previously granted Petitioner credit for the neurosciences course at AUC, CONES was not able to verify that Petitioner passed the course and CONES required Petitioner to retake the course in order to obtain the 1987 certification from CONES. Petitioner attended Northwestern University during the spring quarter of 1987 and completed a four credit hour course (based
on a quarter system) in neurosciences. This neurosciences course was apparently given five hours ex post facto credit by CONES to fulfill the neurosciences requirement for Petitioner's 1982 CETEC medical diploma.
From December, 1987 to March, 1988, Petitioner attended Xochicalco Medical School in Ensenada, Mexico in order to take additional coursework in partial fulfillment of a requirement by the California licensing board in a stipulated agreement for additional medical training before licensure. (Petitioner's stipulation with the State of California is discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 47-50.) The courses taken at Xochicalco were approved by the California licensing agency and included clinical pathology, pharmacology (two courses) and physiology (two courses). Petitioner successfully passed all of the courses. However, no evidence was presented as to the accreditation status of this school.
Petitioner completed a five week rotation in emergency medicine at Cruze Roja Hospital in Mexico in 1988 while she was completing the remedial science classes required by the California Licensing Board.
Post-Graduate Training
Petitioner completed one year of post graduate training from July 1, 1982 to June 30, 1983 in the family medicine residency program at Holston Valley Community Hospital through East Tennessee State University's Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine. Petitioner has presented a certificate verifying succcessful completion of her first post graduate year of training in this program.
Petitioner performed her residency at two hospitals which are part of the East Tennessee State University Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine: Kingsport Family Practice Center and Holston Valley Community Hospital. She saw patients at the Kingsport Family Practice Center for 7 months, one afternoon each week under the supervision of various physicians. The rest of Petitioner's residency was performed at the Holston Valley Community Hospital.
Dr. Lee S. Hyde was the program director of the Kingsport Family Medicine Center. Petitioner's contact with Dr. Hyde was limited, but she did have several consultations with him about patients. In an evaluation submitted to the Florida Board of Medicine in connection with Petitioner's application for licensure, Dr. Hyde evaluated Petitioner's diagnostic ability and relationships with patients as poor. He also stated that Petitioner came to the program with a "poor fund of knowledge, clinical habits, and basic medical education". Although he felt Petitioner made progress during the residency program, he did not think it was sufficient. However, his overall evaluation was to recommend with reservations.
Dr. Hyde's evaluation of Petitioner to the Board was received by the Board on July 18, 1983. Dr. Hyde noted on the back of the evaluation form that Petitioner was not ready to begin a second year of unsupervised practice. Petitioner was not and would not have been offered a contract for a second year in the residency program. Dr. Hyde also commented that Petitioner demonstrated poor judgment by once going "AWOL" from the program. While Petitioner did take a three (3) day leave over a weekend while assigned to a particular rotation with another physician contrary to the rules of the program, she did so with the permission of her supervisor at the time.
Prior to the negative evaluation submitted by Dr. Hyde in July of 1983, Dr. Hyde had previously written a letter dated March 24, 1983 to the Florida Board of Medicine recommending Dr. Chambers for licensure stating that she was in good standing with the program and of reasonable professional competence and excellent moral character.
Leslie P. Reynolds, Jr., M.D., was a professor of Family Medicine, assistant Dean, and Director of Medical Education at the Holston Valley Hospital during Petitioner's year of residency. In a June 29, 1983 evaluation form submitted to the Florida Board, Dr. Reynolds, gave an evaluation of Petitioner's performance during the family medicine residency and recommended her as an outstanding applicant. Dr. Reynolds subsequently submitted an affidavit to the Florida Board of Medicine dated October 21, 1987 attesting that Petitioner earned the respect of both her instructors and fellow residents and that the hospital's records suggest that she performed well on all her services and that she was very helpful to other residents. Several other physicians who served as clinical supervisors during Petitioner's residency at Holston Valley have submitted letters of recommendation and virtually all other evaluations of her work were positive.
Aside from the letter from Dr. Hyde, (Dr. Hyde did not testify and his letter is hearsay,) no other evidence was presented to demonstrate that Petitioner is incapable of practicing medicine with reasonable skill and safety. The weight of the evidence established that Petitioner is capable of practicing with reasonable skill and safety. Numerous letters from the physicians who have worked with Petitioner over the last several years corroborate to her ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety.
Petitioner was employed as a house physician at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami from July 11, 1983 to October 31, 1983. Her position was under the supervision of the Department of Family Medicine in the Ambulatory Care Unit of the Emergency Room Department and the Family Medicine Clinical Faculty from the University of Miami. However, the position was not an advanced residency program and the nature of the supervision and training that Petitioner received has not been fully explained. Furthermore, the evidence did not establish the exact nature of her duties and functions.
From October 1984 to March 1985, Petitioner participated in a series of clinical rotations at the Wesley Medical Center which is affiliated with the University of Kansas. The exact nature of Petitioner's position is not clear. The position at the Wesley Medical Center was a non-paying position during which Petitioner completed an eight week rotation in Internal Medicine, twelve weeks in General Surgery and four weeks in psychiatry functioning in each rotation at the level of a first-year resident. Petitioner was not officially enrolled as a resident in this program. However, she did receive evaluations from the attending physicians and her evaluations by the supervising physicians in that program were acceptable.
In 1988, Petitioner completed an eight month internship at Universal Medical Center in Plantation, Florida Universal Medical Center is an osteopathic teaching institution. This internship was undertaken to satisfy a requirement of the California licensing authority for eight months of "remedial" clinical work. See, Findings of Fact 50. Petitioner was evaluated as performing in a competent and professional manner in this program. At the Universal Medical Center, Petitioner completed thirty three (33) weeks of clinical rotations. The program extended from March 21, 1988 through November 3, 1988. Her duties and responsibilities were similar to other interns in the program.
In sum, Petitioner has successfully completed several additional science courses and completed at least thirty eight (38) additional weeks of clinical training beyond her medical school rotations and first post-graduate year residency. Those weeks of training include thirty three (33) weeks at Universal Medical Center which is an approved osteopathic medical training program that was accepted by the California Licensing Agency for purposes of Petitioner's remedial clinical work.
Licensure Applications
Petitioner passed the FLEX exam in June, 1982 with a score of 78. She also passed the ECFMG exam in January, of 1982 with a score of 76. In addition, she passed an oral examination administered by the California State Licensing Board in 1988.
After graduating from CETEC in June 1982, Petitioner initiated efforts to obtain licensure in several states. In her initial attempts at licensure, Petitioner submitted several misleading applications which have backfired into a morass of complications and confusion.
In 1982, Petitioner knowingly submitted a fraudulent application to the State of Oregon. Petitioner filed the application with the Oregon licensing authority in order to take the Federal Licensing Examination known as the FLEX. Oregon was one of the few states which allowed applicants to take the FLEX examination prior to graduation and also granted applicants some choice in the location of the exam. Petitioner took the FLEX in the Virgin Islands in June of 1982. This was the nearest location to the Dominican Republic where she was attending graduation ceremonies at CETEC around the same time.
On the application to take the FLEX exam filed with Oregon, Petitioner falsely stated that she attended AUC from May, 1979 to April, 1981. She actually attended AUC from May, 1980 through April, 1981.
In the early part of 1983, Petitioner submitted applications for licensure to South Carolina, California, Georgia, New Mexico, and Florida.
South Carolina determined that Petitioner was not eligible for licensure in that state because she had not completed the required post-graduate training. Her application for licensure in that state was returned without action.
In her applications to Georgia, California and Florida in 1983, Petitioner misrepresented her attendance at CETEC as having commenced in May, 1979 rather than reporting attendance at AUC starting in May, 1980 and ending in May, 1981 when she transferred to CETEC.
Petitioner admits that she falsely stated that she began her medical education in May, 1979 on the Oregon FLEX application, as well as the California, Georgia and 1983 Florida applications.
In an attempt to justify these false statements, Petitioner points out that the Dean from CETEC had issued a letter to these licensing agencies stating that Petitioner had completed eight (8) semesters at CETEC from 1979 to 1982.
Petitioner claims she completed the misleading applications because she wanted her statements to be consistent with the CETEC Dean's certification
of attendance. It would appear that an additional motivation for falsifying the applications was to avoid having to explain that she had received medical education credit for some of her non-medical course work at the University of Chicago approximately ten years earlier.
It is unclear why the Dean's certification letters were not accurate. While no evidence was presented to directly link Petitioner to the issuance of these incorrect Dean's letters, the shady circumstances surrounding her involvement with Pedro de Mesones around this same time period (discussed in Findings of Fact 87-95 below) leads to an inference that Petitioner was at least indirectly responsible for these misleading letters.
In her February 1983 application to New Mexico, Petitioner accurately stated the dates and locations of her medical school education. No adequate explanation was given as to why the correct dates were listed on this 1983 application but not the other applications filed around the same time in Georgia, Florida and California.
Petitioner listed the correct dates of attendance at AUC and CETEC on her 1984 Florida application and the 1988 filing which are discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 69-72 below.
Georgia and New Mexico granted Petitioner licensure based upon the 1983 applications. California initially denied her licensure. However, as described in Findings of Fact 47-51 below, Petitioner challenged that decision. Florida permitted Petitioner to withdraw her 1983 Application rather than go to hearing on the Board's intent to deny licensure. See Findings of Fact 67-68.
Petitioner's application for licensure in California was filed in the Spring of 1983. Petitioner received a letter in April of 1983 returning her application without action. Petitioner requested reconsideration of her application which, eventually, resulted in a proposed order of denial dated June 9, 1986. Petitioner requested a hearing on that proposed denial. The proposed denial was resolved without hearing by a stipulation between Petitioner and the California licensing agency in an order dated November 5, 1987 (the "California Stipulation").
The stipulated findings of fact in the November 5, 1987 California Stipulation recognize that the application filed by Petitioner in March, 1983 remained pending without action until the 1987 California Stipulation was entered. The California Stipulation notes that the proposed denial of her application in 1986 was based on the grounds that: (a) Petitioner had not listed on her application her attendance at AUC; (b) she had falsely stated under oath that she began her medical education at CETEC beginning in May, 1979; and (c) her medical education did not conform to California requirements. The California Stipulation provides that it supersedes the reasons set forth in the 1986 proposed denial so long as Dr. Chambers abides by the terms of the Stipulation.
The California Stipulation makes no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding wrongdoing on the part of the Petitioner.
The California Stipulation provides that Petitioner would be issued a license to practice medicine in California upon completion of remedial medical education specified in the Stipulation, completion of an additional academic year of clinical training before September, 1990, satisfactory proof of certification by CONES, and passage of an oral examination. The California
Stipulation also provides that Petitioner shall take forty (40) hours of continuing medical education within the first two (2) years of licensure in addition to the continuing education classes statutorily required for licensure in California.
Petitioner was issued her license to practice medicine in California on November 11, 1988 demonstrating that she satisfied the requirements of the November 1987 California Stipulation.
In her application to the State of Georgia in June of 1983, the Petitioner specifically represented that she attended CETEC from May of 1979 to April 1980, attended AUC from April, 1980 to May, 1981 and CETEC again from April 1981 through June, 1982. The Dean of CETEC certified to the Georgia licensing agency that Petitioner enrolled in the school of medicine in May, 1979 and attended eight semesters of 4.2 months each. As discussed in Findings of Fact 43, the basis for this certification by the Dean is unclear.
Petitioner obtained a license to practice medicine in Georgia based on her 1983 application and did in fact practice medicine in that state from January, 1984 to August, 1984.
On August 17, 1984 the Georgia State Board of Medical Examiners issued a Notice of Hearing to Petitioner setting forth charges against her including failure to meet the standards for licensure and/or intentionally making false statements in obtaining a license to practice medicine. The charges also included an allegation that Petitioner "was denied a license by the Board of Medical Quality Assurance of the State of California based on evidence of making false statements on a sworn application and submitting false and/or inaccurate certificates of education to obtain a license to practice in that state."
In fact, in 1984 the California licensing authority had not formally denied Petitioner's application for licensure. The proposed denial of Petitioner's California application was pending, but not acted upon. Indeed, a formal denial of her California application was never finalized. Instead, the issues were resolved by the California Stipulation in November, 1987.
On September 22, 1984, Petitioner executed a "Voluntary Surrender" which was approved by the Georgia State Board of Medical Examiners and served as the final order of that agency with respect to the Notice of Hearing discussed in Findings of Fact 54.
By voluntarily surrendering her license to practice medicine in Georgia, Petitioner waived her right to a hearing on the charges contained in the Notice of Hearing.
The first paragraph of the "Voluntary Surrender" states: "I hereby acknowledge that this surrender shall have the same effect as revocation of my license, and I knowingly forfeit and relinquish all right, title and privilege of practicing medicine in the State of Georgia, unless and until such time as my license may be reinstated, in the sole discretion of the Board."
Notwithstanding this language, Petitioner contends the "Voluntary Surrender" should be distinguished from a revocation because she did not admit to any wrongdoing and because she was allowed to seek reinstatement upon application and demonstration of the ability to safely practice medicine.
The Voluntary Surrender of the Georgia license contains no specific findings of fact or conclusions of law that establish any wrongdoing on the part of the Petitioner.
The "Voluntary Surrender" states that Petitioner did not admit to any wrongdoing and it allows Petitioner to seek reinstatement.
The Executive Director of the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners of Georgia certified to the Florida Board of Medicine on August 2, 1988, that Petitioner's Georgia license had been issued in 8/83, surrendered in 9/84 and that license had not been "suspended or revoked." Thus, while disciplinary action was clearly initiated against Respondent in Georgia, her license was not revoked.
Petitioner was licensed to practice medicine in the State of New Mexico in November, 1983.
On January 10, 1985, the New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners served on Petitioner a Notice of Contemplated Action notifying her of charges including having made misrepresentations in applying for and procuring a license to practice medicine in New Mexico and having her license in Georgia revoked.
The New Mexico case was referred to a hearing officer who considered argument and briefs by the parties regarding the nature and effect of Petitioner's surrender of her Georgia license.
By an order of the New Mexico State Board of Medical Examiners, Petitioner's New Mexico medical license was revoked in January, 1986.
The New Mexico order of revocation treated Petitioner's voluntary surrender of her Georgia medical license as the functional equivalent of a revocation for purposes of the New Mexico licensing statute. In reaching this determination, the New Mexico Board relied upon the wording of the Voluntary Surrender and the Georgia Statutes which both indicate that a voluntary surrender shall have the same effect as revocation. No other specific grounds were cited by the New Mexico Board in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order.
As indicated above, Petitioner's initial application to the Florida Board of Medicine (the "Board") for licensure was filed March, 1983. When the Board proposed denial, Petitioner requested a formal hearing. Prior to hearing, the Board obtained leave from the hearing officer to amend the basis for denial to include grounds relating to information presented to the Board by U.S. Postal Service investigators regarding Petitioner's truthfulness on her application form and the validity of certain documents she utilized in her attempt to obtain a Florida medical license. The Board was granted leave to amend as requested by order dated February 20, 1984. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed with the hearing officer a motion to withdraw her application because of the new information presented from the "federal investigation." The Board granted the request to withdraw the 1983 Application in an order rendered May 29, 1984.
The Board's proposed denial of Petitioner's 1983 Application was on the basis that the Board had reason to believe that Petitioner, "as a graduate of CETEC, was not capable of safely engaging in the practice of medicine as a result of a report of the California Board of Medical Quality Assurance which
indicated gross irregularities in the degree granting process of CETEC University and which raised serious doubts about the adequacy of medical education certified by CETEC."
Petitioner filed with the Board a second application for licensure in Florida in December of 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the 1984 Application.) In response to a request for additional information from the Board regarding this second application, Petitioner executed a waiver of the requirement that the Board act upon the application within 90 days. As a result, the 1984 Application was left pending. The 1984 Application was for licensure by endorsement based upon Petitioner's license in New Mexico. As discussed in Findings of Fact 62-66, action was initiated against that New Mexico license in January, 1985 ultimately leading to the revocation of the license in January, 1986. After her New Mexico license was revoked, Petitioner did not hold a valid license to practice medicine in any other state until California issued her a license in November, 1988.
On August 1, 1988, Petitioner filed another application with the Board as an update to the 1984 Application. (This August 1988 application is referred to as the "1988 Filing.") In her 1988 Filing, Petitioner included a recertification from ECFMG. At the time she filed her 1984 Florida application, Petitioner's original ECFMG certification had been placed on hold because of the CETEC scandal. Petitioner was required to provide a revalidation of her medical education by ECFMG in order to obtain consideration of her application in Florida. This revalidation was not provided until the 1988 Filing.
On September 12, 1988, Petitioner filed a supplement to the 1988 Filing.
On November 2, 1988 the Board requested additional information relating to the application. On December 12, 1988 Petitioner filed a response to this request.
The Board issued an Order of Intent to Deny on March 3, 1989 stating as grounds for denial in Paragraph 2:
You have had licenses in Georgia, New Mexico and California acted against by the licensing bodies of those states. See, Subsections 458.331(1)(b) and 458.311(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1988).
The only year of training you received was in 1982-1983 at Holston Valley Community Hospital and the Kingsport Family Practice Center through the auspices of East Tennessee State University Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine. You were recommended less than favorably by both hospitals and you were not permitted to return for a second year of residency training by the College of Medicine.
Your poor performance in your only year of medical training evidences your inability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. See, Sections 458.301 and 458.331(4), Florida Statutes
(1988).
There are material discrepancies between answers and information provided in your 3 different applications and supporting documents submitted to the Board; and you have provided fraudulent information and misrepresented or concealed information regarding your medical education. See Subsections 458.311(1)(c) and 458.331(1)(a) and (hh), Florida Statutes (1988).
Inconsistencies in the Application
There are several discrepancies between Petitioner's 1983 Florida Application, her 1984 Application, and her 1988 Filing.
On the 1984 Application, Petitioner reported her participation in the Unsanctioned Rotation at Sharp Memorial Hospital from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981 as part of her clinical clerkships.
The Unsanctioned Rotation is not listed on the 1988 Filing. Petitioner contends that it was not until after submission of the 1984 Application that she found out that CONES refused to recognize the clerkships taken in 1980 because Petitioner was not enrolled as a student at CETEC at the time. Therefore, Petitioner deleted those unapproved clerkship weeks from the 1988 Filing. However, while specific reference to the clerkship was deleted in 1988, Petitioner admitted at the hearing that she counted the Unsanctioned Rotation as part of sixty (60) weeks of clerkships claimed in the 1988 Filing.
The 1988 Filing states Petitioner completed sixty (60) weeks of clinical clerkships as part of her medical education at CETEC. However, as discussed in Findings of Fact 13 through 18, Petitioner's submitted a CONES verification of clinical rotations that only details fifty six (56) weeks (including duplicate and overlapping credit) of clinical clerkships.
In the 1988 Filing, Petitioner did report the actions taken against her medical licenses in Georgia and New Mexico and mentioned her problems obtaining licensure in California. On the 1984 Application, Petitioner responded to the question "Have you ever been notified to appear before any licensing agency for a hearing on a complaint of any nature, including, but not limited to, a charge or violation of the medical practice act, unprofessional or unethical conduct?" by stating "after my voluntary surrender, notice of hearing in Georgia, [sic] charging denial and Flafalse documents re licensure (both false)." Both the Notice of Hearing and the Voluntary Surrender in Georgia were issued prior to the completion of Petitioner's 1984 Florida Application. Thus, while Petitioner did disclose the voluntary surrender, she only provided a brief and somewhat misleading explaination. The 1984 Application does not mention Petitioner's application in South Carolina (which was returned without action) nor does it discuss Petitioner's licensure difficulties in California other than to say she had been denied a license because of "informal deficiencies." The 1984 Application also omits Petitioner's licensure problems in New Mexico which is understandable since the Notice of Contemplated Action in that case was not filed until January, 1985.
The application form requires the applicant to list all universities or colleges where the applicant "took classes/received training." Petitioner listed her training at the University of Kansas, Wesley Medical Center under the medical education section of her 1984 Application. In the 1984 application, she refers to it as a "externship". That position is also listed in the medical
education section of the 1988 Filing with an explanation indicating that she was not actually a resident. As discussed in Findings of Fact 30, her position at the Wesley Medical Center is not easily described due to the unusual circumstances that led to her participating in the program. She was repeating clerkships in certain areas in accordance with the stipulation reached with the California licensing agency. Although Petitioner was not officially enrolled in classes or a residency program in that position, she considers it as part of her medical education and training and, therefore, listed it as such.
In her 1984 Application, Petitioner listed time spent at Jackson Memorial Hospital (University of Miami) and Wesley Medical Center (Unversity of Kansas) on a sheet entitled graduate and post-graduate education. On her 1988 Filing, she listed both positions as post-graduate training. Both of these positions were actually house staff positions rather than part of the training programs of the affiliated medical schools.
In the 1984 Application, Petitioner listed her dates of training at the Wesley Medical Center as October, 1984 to April 1985 (which was her projected completion date.) The 1984 Application was filled out and filed with the Board in December 1984, four months prior to the projected completion date of the Wesley position. In the 1988 Filing, Petitioner listed her actual completion date of March, 1985, which was approximately two weeks earlier than the projected completion date referred to in the 1984 Application.
From January 1984 to August 1984, Petitioner worked for Spectrum Emergency Care in emergency rooms and free-standing clinics in Georgia.
Petitioner listed different dates of service with Spectrum on the 1984 Application and the 1988 Filing. Petitioner contends the differences are due in part because the 1988 Filing included employment at Spectrum in New Mexico in December 1984 and January 1985 after submission of the 1984 Application. However, the 1988 Filing states that Petitioner was continuously employed by Spectrum from January 1984 - January 1985. In fact, she was not employed during the months of August, September, October and November, 1984. Moreover, her employment with Spectrum in New Mexico in December, 1984 and January, 1985 overlaps with her "externship" at the Wesley Medical Center/University of Kansas which took place from October, 1984 through March, 1985. Apparently, this overlap was possible because her work for Spectrum in December, 1984 consisted of one weekend and a holiday and in January, 1985 consisted of one weekend. In sum, the 1988 Filing significantly overstates her actual experience with Spectrum.
The 1988 Filing contains several inconsistent statements regarding Petitioner's employment as a ship's physician. Under the practice/employment section of that Filing, she states she was a ship's physician for SeaEscape from April, 1985 to September, 1985 and a ship's physician for Commodore Cruise Lines from February, 1986 to September, 1986. Later in the application, under postgraduate medical training and work experience, she states she was a Chief Medical Officer for cruise ships from April, 1985, through September, 1986. However, according to the previously cited information, for at least a four month period during that time frame, she was not employed. In another portion of her application, Petitioner lists under clinical medicine that she worked on the two ships from April, 1985 through September, 1987. Even assuming that there is a typographical error and Petitioner meant September, 1986 as indicated in the other listings, by deleting any reference to the four months that she was not employed, an impression is created that Petitioner has more clinical experience than was actually true.
There is a conflict between the AUC transcript that Petitioner submitted with the 1988 Filing and earlier versions of the transcript that appear in her records. The course titles are consistent in the transcripts, but the numbers of some of the courses are different. Only the last digit of the course numbers are different. Whether a course is listed in the 100 series, 200 series and 300 series is consistent in all of the transcripts. The series numbers reflect first semester, second semester and third semester courses respectively.
The AUC transcript submitted with the 1988 Filing was the most recent one obtained by Petitioner from AUC. That transcript was prepared in June, 1986 and reflects a failing grade in the neurosciences course. However, as discussed in Finding of Fact 4, that grade was changed to a passing grade as reflected in a 1981 transcript from AUC which was submitted to CETEC when Petitioner transferred to that school. No adequate explanation has been given to explain why the 1986 AUC transcript is not consistent with the earlier one.
Postal Investigation
The confusing circumstances surrounding Petitioner's medical education are further complicated by her involvement with Pedro de Mesones. The circumstances surrounding her involvement with Pedro de Mesones have not been fully explained. While Pedro de Mesones' exact status or position is unclear, Petitioner believed him to be a representative of CETEC. He has subsequently been convicted of mail fraud in connection with selling medical diplomas and has been sentenced to a federal prison term.
Between July, 1981 and January, 1982, while Petitioner was conducting her clinical rotations in San Diego, she attempted to get information and documentation from CETEC, but she had trouble getting responses to her repeated telephone calls, letters and telegrams. Petitioner sought the help of Pedro de Mesones in getting cooperation and/or responses from CETEC regarding transcripts and other documents necessary for the loan applications and residency applications which she had to file prior to her anticipated medical school graduation date of June, 1982. Another reason Petitioner hired Pedro de Mesones was to get confirmation that CETEC would give her credit towards her medical degree for her prior work on her Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. These credits were necessary for Petitioner to graduate in June of 1982 as she anticiapted.
Petitioner was advised by others familiar with the school that Pedro de Mesones could help her in her dealings with CETEC. She first contacted Pedro de Mesones by telephone in February, 1982. She agreed to pay him a total of more than $8,000 for his services. Petitioner explains her payments to Pedro de Mesones as a $3000 fee, plus the next two (2) semester's tuition payments totaling an additional $5000.00 plus a $100.00 graduation fee. Pedro de Mesones advised Petitioner that she had to pay CETEC's tuition totalling $5,000 for two
(2) additional semesters even though she did not have to take any classes at CETEC because she was given credit for her work at the University of Chicago.
At one point during her dealings with Pedro de Mesones, Petitioner signed a false transcript from a Mexican medical school at Pedro de Mesones' request. This transcript reflected work which Petitioner never completed. No adequate explanation was given as to why these false transcripts were ever prepared. While Petitioner contends that she asked Pedro de Mesones not to use the false Mexican transcript for any purpose, it appears that these transcripts
were prepared in the event that Petitioner could not secure two semesters credit from CETEC for her Ph.D. work at the University of Chicago. Ultimately, CETEC decided to give her credit for some of the Ph.D. course work she completed at the University of Chicago. As a result, Petitioner was able to graduate in June of 1982 from CETEC without having to use the false Mexican transcripts.
It does not appear that the fraudulent Mexican transcript were ever used by Petitioner in any of her applications.
Petitioner provided Pedro de Mesones with two false transcripts regarding her AUC medical education. It is clear that she intended for him to use those transcripts, if necessary, to get a dean's certification from CETEC. One of the false AUC transcripts she prepared made its way into the records of CETEC. It is not clear how CETEC obtained that transcript. Because Petitioner was given credit for her graduate work at the University of Chicago, she did not need the extra credits reflected on the false AUC transcripts. Petitioner subsequently wrote the Dean of CETEC requesting removal of the false AUC transcript after she saw it in her CETEC records during a visit to CETEC to obtain a letter from the Dean showing her to be in good standing.
Petitioner asked Pedro de Mesones to provide her with letters signed by the CETEC Dean showing her to be in good standing and on track for graduation in June, 1982. She intended to use these letters in applying for licensure for residency programs. Petitioner felt that she was on track to graduate and indicated to Pedro de Mesones that because of time pressures, she felt it would be acceptable for him to forge the signature of the Dean on the letters required by the various state licensing agencies. However, there is no indication that he did so.
While none of the false transcripts prepared by Petitioner were directly submitted by her in any of the applications for licensure filed with any state licensing authorities, it is clear the Dean's certification letters included in Petitioner's 1983 Applications in some of the states were false. See Findings of Fact 39-44. No direct connection has been drawn between the false Dean's certification letters submitted with Petitioner's applications in Georgia and California and Pedro de Mesones. However, the circumstances surrounding Petitioner's dealings with Pedro de Mesones raise a question as to how the certifications were obtained. More importantly, it is clear that Petitioner was aware that the representations contained in the Dean's certifications and the dates of attendance at medical school listed on her 1983 Applications were false. Nevertheless, she still submitted the applications.
Petitioner's dealings with Pedro de Mesones ended on June 14, 1982, two days after her graduation ceremonies at CETEC.
Practice Experience
Petitioner has at various times practiced medicine in Georgia and New Mexico prior to surrendering or losing her license in those states. She has also worked on cruise ships as a ship's doctor for several months. She is currently licensed and practicing in California. She has been licensed in that state since November, 1988. She has practiced emergency medicine at various hospitals and has been practicing as a primary care physician for Castle Air Force Base in California since December 1988. There is no indication that she has been deficient in carrying our her professional duties in any of these positions.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner has the burden of proof in this proceeding to establish her entitlement to licensure. See Rule 28-6.08(3), Florida Administrative Code, and
J. W. C. Company, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Petitioner seeks licensure in this state as a physician.
The licensure of physicians in Florida is governed by the Medical Practice Act Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. The statement of purpose in Section 458.301, Florida Statutes (1988) provides:
... The primary legislative purpose in enacting this chapter is to ensure that every physician practicing in this state meets minimum requirements for safe practice. It is the legislative intent that physicians who fall below minimum competency or who otherwise present a danger to the public shall be prohibited from practicing in this state.
Pertinent to this case are Sections 458.311, 458.313 and 458.331, Florida Statutes. However, the parties disagree as to what version of the Florida Statutes apply.
Petitioner filed her second application in December 1984. She "supplemented" her application in August, 1988 by submitting a new application form with updated information. The Board did not rule on her 1984 Application or the 1988 Filing until February, 1989. Petitioner contends that the statute extant upon the filing of the 1984 Application applies. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the statute extant at the time the Board considered the application in February, 1989 applies. Because there have been changes in the applicable statutes since the filing of the 1984 Application, it is necessary to resolve this issue at the outset.
Both parties cite to Bruner vs. Board of Real Estate, Department of Professional Regulation, 399 So.2d 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services vs. Petty-Eifert, 443 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). In Bruner, the court, in an alternate holding, applied the statute in existence at the time the Board considered the application in question. In Petty-Eifert, the court held that, based on the facts and circumstances of that case, the law in effect at the time the application was filed should apply. The facts and circumstances of that case were not fully set forth in the decision.
The facts and circumstances in this case indicate that the law to be applied by the Board should be Chapter 458 as it existed in February, 1989. At the time she submitted her 1984 Application, Petitioner could not provide a valid ECFMG certification. This certification was not provided until the 1988 "supplemental" application was filed. While the Board never issued a final order on the 1984 Application, there is no evidence that the Board in any way agreed not to apply changes to the law from the date of the initial application or that the Board caused any unconscionable delay in order to achieve a strategic advantage. In fact, the major reason for the delay between 1984 and
1988 was Petitioner's difficulty in obtaining the ECFMG certification and her problems with licensure in other states. Since Petitioner did not have a complete application of record in 1984, she is not entitled to have the law in place at that time applied to the supplemental information she did not submit as part of her application until 1988.
Petitioner's 1984 Appliocation sought licensure by endorsement under Section 458.313. Petitioner's 1988 Filing indicates that she is applying for licensure by examination under Section 458.311, Florida Statutes. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent treats Petitioner's application as a petition for licensure by endorsement under Section 458.313, Florida Statutes. Since Section 458.313(1), Florida Statutes (1988), requires an applicant for licensure by endorsement to meet the qualifications for licensure set forth in Section 458.311(1)(b)-(f), Florida Statutes, the result in this case does not change regardless of whether Petitioner is viewed as seeking licensure by endorsement or by examination.
Under Section 458.313, an applicant for licensure by endorsement must have obtained a passing score on the FLEX exam and demonstrate evidence of active practice of medicine within the previous four years. There is no dispute that Petitioner meets these initial criteria. The key issue in this case is whether Petitioner meets the criteria of Section 458.311.
The 1988 version of Section 458.311(1)(b)-(f), Florida Statutes requires that an applicant:
Is of good moral character.
Has not committed any act or offense in any jurisdiction which would constitute the basis for disciplining a physician pursuant to Section 458.331.
(f) Meets one of the following medical education and postgraduate training requirements:...
3(a) Is a graduate of a foreign medical school which has not been certified pursuant to Section 458.314:
Has had his medical credentials evaluated by the Education Commission on Foreign Medical Graduates, holds an active, valid certificate, issued by that commission, and has passed the Foreign Medical Graduate Examination in the Medical Sciences or the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates Examination, and
Has completed an approved residency of at least 1 year.
The evidence in this case established that Petitioner has graduated from a foreign medical school, holds a certificate from the ECFMG, has passed the FLEX Exam, and has completed a one year residency. Therefore, Petitioner has met the criteria of Section 458.311(1)(f)3. The more troublesome issues arise with respect to whether Petitioner is "of good moral character" as required by subsection (c) and/or has committed any actions that would constitute a violation of Section 458.331.
Making false and misleading statements in the application process is relevant to whether the applicant is of good moral character and can safely engage in the practice of medicine. Intentional falsification and lies to the Board are valid grounds for denial of a license. Gentile v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, 448 So.2d 1087, 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In Gentile, the court recognized that an applicant should be provided with an opportunity to provide evidence of explanation or mitigating circumstances regarding misrepresentations in the application. The mitigating factors in this case are discussed below.
Section 458.331, Florida Statutes (1988), provides in pertinent part:
The following acts shall constitute grounds for which the disciplinary actions specified in subsection (2) may be taken:
Attempting to obtain, obtaining, or renewing a license to practice medicine by bribery, by fraudulent misrepresentations, or through an error of the department or the board.
Having a license or the authority to practice medicine revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against, including the denial of licensure, by
the licensing authority of any jurisdiction, including its agencies or subdivisions. The licensing authority's acceptance of a physician's relinquishment of a license, stipulation, consent order, or other settlement, offered in response
to or in anticipation of the filing of administrative charges against the physician's license, shall
be construed as action against the physician's license....
(hh) Misrepresenting or concealing a material fact at any time during any phase of a licensing or disciplinary process or procedure.
When the board finds any person guilty of any of the grounds set forth in subsection (1), it may enter an order imposing one or more of the following penalties;
Refusal to certify, or certification with restrictions, to the department an application for licensure, certification, or registration.
(4) The board shall not ... cause a license to be issued to a person it deems or has deemed
unqualified, until such time as it is satisfied...
that such person is capable of safely engaging in the practice of medicine.
The evidence in this case established that Petitioner violated Sections 458.331(1)(a) and (hh) in her efforts to obtain a license to practice medicine in Georgia by filing an application that included fraudulent misrepresentations regarding her educational background. Those misrepresentations were also included in the application which she filed in
Oregon which enabled her to sit for FLEX Exam. She also submitted applications for licensure containing false information in California and Florida in 1983.
The evidence also established that Petitioner has had her license revoked in New Mexico and has had action taken against her license in Georgia. The underlying facts surrounding those disciplinary proceedings should be considered in determining the effect those actions should be given in Florida. See, Castleman v. Office of the Comptroller, 538 So.2d 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In this case, the actions taken by the other states were premised upon the actions taken against Petitioner's license in Georgia, her licensure problems in California, as well as the Petitioner's educational background and misrepresentations that she has made in connection therewith. It appears that all the matters raised in those other states have been addressed in this proceeding.
The ultimate issue in this case is whether Petitioner should be issued a license to practice medicine in Florida despite the established violations.
Even though violations have been established, the Board has discretion to issue a license under such conditions, limitations or restrictions which it deems appropriate so long as it is satisfied tht Petitioner can safely engage in the practice of medicine. See, Section 458.311(8) and 458.331(4), Florida Statutes.
The mitigating factors which weigh in favor of issuing a license to Petitioner in this case include the length of time that has passed since she filed the misleading applications, her efforts to "come clean" and openly discuss the misleading applications, the extensive remedial course work and clerkships which she undertook in order to obtain licensure in California and the years of experience she has obtained as a ship's physician and in private practice in various locations. On the other hand, there are lingering questions regarding the CONES certification of her clinical clerkships and the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the Dean's certification letters provided to the various states in her 1983 Applications. In addition, while Respondent has clearly undertaken considerable effort to bolster her medical credentials by completing additional course work and clerkships, much of that work was not completed in an established, certified program and was not undertaken with the prior approval of the Board. The evidence regarding the exact nature and scope of this additional work is somewhat sketchy. There is no evidence as to the extent of supervision by the schools or their faculty or the evaluation process, if any, of Petitioner's performance in the programs. While there are letters of recommendations from a number of the physicians with whom Petitioner allegedly worked, none of these physicians testified and these letters are hearsay.
The certification submitted by Petitioner from CONES purports to verify that Petitioner completed the requirements for a medical degree from CETEC. From the records submitted, there are some questions regarding the calculation of the actual weeks of clinical rotations actually completed by Petitioner. Moreover, CONES apparently accepted the ex post facto neurosciences class as well as the graduate classes taken by Petitioner ten years earlier as part of the required medical education. Nonetheless, both CONES and the ECFMG have certified Petitioner's medical education.
Pursuant to Section 458.331(4), the Board has not only the authority but also the duty to look at the quality of the educational experience behind
Petitioner's diploma. However, while there is some question regarding the exact number of clinical rotations completed by Petitioner at Sharp Hospital, there is no doubt that she completed over fifty five (55) weeks of clinical rotations in that program. Likewise, the evidence clearly established that she successfully completed her first year in the residency program at East Tennessee University. In addition, she has completed numerous additional weeks of clinical rotations at Wesley Medical Center and Universal Medical Center, in Plantation Florida.
Without question, Petitioner's medical education is an unusual one. While a better understanding of her position and function at Jackson Memorial Hospital, Wesley Medical Center, Cruiz Roja Hospital and Universal Medical Center would be helpful, the numerous letters of recommendation from the attending physician in these programs demonstrate that her medical education has prepared her to meet minimum requirements for safe practice.
In sum, the Petitioner's considerable efforts to overcome the perceived deficiencies in her medical education and the extensive remedial training she has been forced to undertake due to the licensure problems she inflicted on herself justify providing her an opportunity to practice in this state despite the misleading statements she made on her applications seven years ago.
Petitioner is obviously a very intelligent woman. Unfortunately, her overwhelming desire to become a physician has, at times, impaired her judgement and led her to some ill-advised decisions regarding her medical education and the medical license application process. In her zeal to become a physician, she has sought shortcuts in her medical education and her efforts to disguise or downplay the deficiencies in her medical education have resulted in an avalanche of problems in the licensure process. She has suffered a great deal as a result.
While Petitioner was clearly frustrated with the difficulties and delays in obtaining appropriate documentation from the foreign medical schools which she was attending, her impatience does not justify her actions in misrepresenting her education. Nonetheless, it would seem unduly harsh to permanently ban her from licensure in this state. See, The Florida Bar v. Davis, So.2d 159 (Fla. 1978) (dealing with revocation of a professional license).
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medical Examiners enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a physician in the State of Florida subject to a probationary period of two years upon such terms and conditions as the Board deems appropriate.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of July, 1990.
J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 1990.
APPENDIX
Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. To the extent that the proposed findings of fact can be isolated, they are addressed below.
The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact
Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or
Reason for Rejection.
1. Adopted in substance | in | Findings | of | Fact | 37, |
46-50 and 67. | |||||
2. Aubored in substance | in | Findings | of | Fact | |
67 and 68. | |||||
3. Adopted in substance | in | Findings | of | Fact | 69. |
4. Adopted in substance | in | Findings | of | Fact | 70. |
5. Adopted in substance | in | Findings | of | Fact | 71. |
6. Adopted in substance | in | Findings | of | Fact | 72. |
Adopted in substance in the preliminary statement.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2-4 and 6.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6.
Suborindate to Findings of Fact 6 and 8.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 96.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11 and 33.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87 and 88.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 88.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 89.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 90-94.
The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The second sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 94.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 95.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 36 and 39- 42.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 45.
The first sentence is adopted in Findings of Fact 87. The remainder is rejected as irrelevant.
Rejected as irrelevant.
Rejected as irrelevant.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-66.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 47.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 50.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 51.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 54.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 55.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 57, 59-60.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 58.
Suborindate to Findings of Fact 61.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 59.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 62-66.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 66.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 66.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20-30.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact
22 and 27.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25-26.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 27.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24 and 25.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 74.
See proposed findings 26-30 above.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 79-80.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 81.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 82-83.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 38.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 83.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 77.
Rejected as irrelevant.
Rejected as irrelevant.
Rejected as irrelevant.
Rejected as irrelevant.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 84.
Addressed in Findings of Fact 12-18.
Rejected as irrelevant.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12-19.
The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact
Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or
Reason for Rejection.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 3.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9 and 13.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13 and 14.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 18.
Subordinate to indings of Fact 35.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 39.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44.
Subordinate to Fndings of Fact 46-52 and 67- 68.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 69.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78.
Subordinate to Findings of 78.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 70.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76, 77 and 78.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 71.
Adopted in substance in Findings of 72.
26. | Adopted in | substance | in | the preliminary | |
statement. | |||||
27. | Adopted in | substance | in | Findings of Fact | 73. |
28. | Adopted in | substance | in | Findings of Fact | 73. |
29. | Adopted in | substance | in | Findings of Fact | 54. |
30. | Adopted in | substance | in | Findings of Fact | 56. |
31. | Adopted in | substance | in | Findings of Fact | 78. |
32. | Adopted in | substance | in | Findings of Fact | 63. |
33. | Adopted in | substance | in | Findings of Fact | 65. |
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-51.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24-26.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 27.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 25.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 31 and 79- 81.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 29.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12 and 17.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87-95.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 97.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87-95.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence.
Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence.
Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-68.
Rejected as constituting argument.
Rejected as constituting argument.
Copies furnished:
Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire Attorney at Law
1355 Mahan Drive
P. O. Box 31
Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 1602 - The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional
Regulation
1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel
Department of Professional Regulation
1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Jul. 02, 1990 | Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Jul. 02, 1990 | Recommended Order | Petitione's application for license should be granted despite prior misrepresentations regarding foreign medical training; she completed addtional rotations and passed FLEX |
