The Issue The issues are whether the Respondents committed unlawful employment practices against Petitioner, and if so, to what relief is she entitled.
Findings Of Fact In the spring of 1994, Respondent CSD began operating a residential detention program for juvenile offenders pursuant to a contract with the Department of Juvenile Justice. The purpose of the program, commonly known as Hamilton House, was to provide redirection to the lives of its youthful residents/clients. Hamilton House had 48 beds divided between two dormitories. Respondent CSD assigned each resident to the appropriate dormitory, level six or level eight, depending on the type of security and rehabilitative services required. The program included an educational program as well as facilities for vocational and recreational activities. Respondent CSD employed Petitioner, a 51 year-old white female, as a resident advisor at Hamilton House from March 24, 1994 through June 30, 1996. Petitioner initially worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift in the level six dormitory. At times she served as the acting shift supervisor though she was not paid a supervisor's wages. When Petitioner began working for Respondent CSD, she lived with her elderly mother, Lotus Musgrove, whose colon cancer was in remission. At that time, Mrs. Musgrove was able to live independently and did not need a caretaker. On April 24, 1994, some of the clients managed to gain access to a bottle containing an alcoholic beverage. Petitioner and other employees received a verbal warning for failing to adequately monitor the behavior and movement of the clients. A training letter was placed in each employee's personnel file. In May of 1995, Respondent CSD hired Bobby Williams, Sr., as a resident advisor in the level eight dormitory. Mr. Williams is a black male. He eventually assumed the position of shift supervisor for the entire facility. There is no evidence that Petitioner sought this full-time position or a similar supervisory position at any time during her employment with Respondent CSD. In October of 1995, some of the clients accused Petitioner and another staff member of inappropriate conduct including, but not limited to, furnishing them with prohibited magazines and movies. As a result of the allegations, Respondent CSD suspended Petitioner and her co-worker without pay on October 18, 1995. By letter dated October 20, 1995, Respondent CSD advised Petitioner in writing that there was insufficient evidence of misconduct to warrant termination of her employment. However, the letter stated that Petitioner had violated company policy and procedure by allowing a youth to leave his room for extended periods after curfew. Respondent CSD paid Petitioner and her co- worker for the time they were suspended during the internal investigation. Respondent CSD subsequently reassigned Petitioner and her co-worker to work in a different dormitory and on a different shift. The change in time and location of their work shift was necessary to ensure there was no contact between them and the clients who had accused them of improper conduct. Petitioner was assigned to work the 3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. shift in the level eight dormitory. In a written statement dated October 23, 1995, Petitioner objected to the change in her shift. She preferred to continue working the 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. shift. She asserted that, during the day, she took care of her 78 year-old mother who had cancer. Respondent CSD did not immediately honor Petitioner's request. On or about November 24, 1995, Petitioner voluntarily purchased some supplies in the amount of $20.98 from a retail store. The supplies included the following: hand sprayers, cotton swabs, hydrogen peroxide, rubbing alcohol, highlighters, marker, Sharpies, and other miscellaneous items. Petitioner requested reimbursement from Respondent CSD because she intended to use the supplies at work. Respondent CSD declined to reimburse Petitioner for the supplies. There is no evidence that Respondent CSD ever authorized the purchase of the supplies. On December 11, 1995, a resident in the level eight dormitory attempted to discard a container of contraband tobacco. Petitioner detected his effort and responded appropriately. She received a letter of commendation for exemplary action which was placed in her personnel file. On January 23, 1996, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Juvenile Justice made a formal and final determination that "[i]t is inconclusive that staff members Julie Toughton and Alice Musgrove engaged in improper conduct with clients." On or about February 1, 1996, Petitioner took a box of pens and pencils from a client's desk. The client became upset and exhibited inappropriate behavior toward Petitioner. As a result of the client's tantrum, Petitioner took token-economy points from the client. Petitioner filed a written complaint dated February 4, 1996, with Respondent CSD after learning that one of her supervisors, Mike Myers, changed the client's point sheet. Petitioner's February 4, 1996, statement also asserted that Supervisor Myers was mishandling clients' mail. She complained that he was logging clients' mail and making the clients read their personnel mail to him. According to Petitioner, handling client mail was the responsibility of "line staff." On one occasion in February 1996, Petitioner was 30 minutes late reporting to her assigned duty station in the dormitory. She spent that time in the administration building because she refused to work with one of her co-workers. Supervisor Myers was responsible for changing Petitioner's time sheet to reflect a 30-minute deduction in regular time. On another occasion in February 1996, Petitioner and other employees worked two hours of overtime due to a crisis situation with one of the clients. Petitioner elected to "bank" the overtime rather than receive time-and-one-half of overtime pay. The other employees chose to receive overtime pay. Petitioner was off from work on February 22-23, 1996. When Petitioner arrived at work on February 24, 1996, her time sheet was not with the time sheets of other employees. Petitioner's time sheet was locked in a supervisor's office until February 26, 1996, because the supervisor was not at work. There is no indication in the record whether Petitioner's time sheet was locked up inadvertently or due to a dispute over Petitioner's wages. On March 1, 1996, Petitioner filed a written grievance with Respondent CSD regarding her pay. She claimed that Supervisor Myers was harassing her and discriminating against her by changing her time sheet without her knowledge. Specifically, Petitioner complained that Mr. Myers cheated her out of 30 minutes of regular time on one occasion and two hours of overtime on another occasion. She complained that her time sheet was locked in a supervisor's office for four days. On March 4, 1996, the Program Director, Dale Edwards, agreed that Petitioner should not be penalized for one-half hour of regular pay because she was in the administration building during the disputed time. Additionally, Mr. Edwards directed Supervisor Myers not to change an employee's time sheet without prior approval. He also requested that Petitioner furnish documentation that the company owed her for the two hours of overtime. Mr. Edwards was under the mistaken impression that the dispute over Petitioner's time sheet had been resolved. In March of 1996, Petitioner was working the midnight shift in dormitory eight consistent with her written request dated October 23, 1995. On March 18, 1996 and March 27, 1996, Petitioner made written requests for a change to the 7:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m. shift. Petitioner specifically wanted to replace a Ms. Aikens on the morning shift. Respondent CSD did not honor Petitioner's request. However, there is no evidence showing that Ms. Aiken's position was ever filled, and if so, whether Respondent CSD selected a person of a different race or a younger to file the position. Petitioner was absent from work between April 8, 1996, and April 16, 1996, on April 22, 1996, and on April 29, 1996, due to illness and/or medical appointments. While she was absent, her inner-office mail box became so full that the mail had to be removed. The administrative manager gave Petitioner's mail to her supervisor. On April 23, 1996, Supervisor Myers completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal for the period March 14, 1995 through March 14, 1996. Petitioner disagreed with the determination that she had difficulty communicating with others. Petitioner's mental health counselor, Christine Clark, sent Mr. Edwards an unsolicited letter dated April 23, 1996. According to the letter, Ms. Clark was treating Petitioner for family/employment related stress reduction. The letter states as follows in pertinent part: Due to the demands of her home environment, caretaking of her elderly mother who is dying from colon cancer, I am recommending that Ms. Musgrove be reassigned new working hours, namely a day schedule of approximately 8:00 AM until 5:00 PM in order to effectively and efficiently facilitate the evening and night care of her mother. In addition, Ms. Musgrove appears to have unresolved issues regarding her personnel file and salary still due to her for 30 minutes or .5 hour pay as well as two hours uncompensated work from several weeks ago. I personally read your approval for this compensation but apparently this has still not yet been indicated on her pay check. There also remain the allegations of her misconduct charges that appears not to be fully resolved. As an employee she does have the legal right to have these fully addressed and challenged. From my understanding that although the misconduct charges have been dropped, there are still areas that compromise Ms. Musgrove's reputation as a resident advisor. Mr. Edwards did not disclose the contents of Ms. Clark's letter to any employee of Respondent CSD other than his superiors, who advised him to get a release from Petitioner before responding to the letter. After receiving Ms. Clark's letter, Mr. Edwards had a telephone conversation with Petitioner's mother because Petitioner was not at work or at home. During the conversation, Mr. Edwards inquired about the mother's health. Mr. Edwards learned that Mrs. Musgrove's cancer had been in remission since 1993 and that she no longer required assistance with daily living activities. Mr. Edwards did not disclose any information regarding Petitioner's employment status, medical condition, or personal business to Mrs. Musgrove. Petitioner's sister placed an unsolicited telephone call to Mr. Edwards several days after he talked to Mrs. Musgrove. The purpose of the call was to thank Mr. Edwards for his concern over Mrs. Musgrove's health. During the telephone call, Mr. Edwards and Petitioner's sister did not exchange any information relating to Petitioner's employment, medical condition, or personal business. On April 29, 1996, all staff at Hamilton House received a memorandum advising them as follows, in pertinent part: As a result of the recent competitive bid conducted by District 3, Department of Juvenile Justice, Gator Human Services has been awarded the contract to operate the Hamilton County Youth Treatment Complex starting July 1, 1996. The memorandum also included information regarding the transfer of operations to the new service provider. Respondent CSD advised employees that, if requested, it would supply Gator Human Services the name, position title, hire date, and current salary of each employee of record. Respondent CSD stated that no other information would be given to the new organization without the consent of the employee. On May 1, 1996, Mr. Edwards wrote two memoranda regarding Petitioner's pay. First, Mr. Edwards directed the administrative manager to pay Petitioner for .5 hours of regular wages out of the company's petty cash fund and to get a receipt for the payment. Second, he directed the resident life manager to allow Petitioner to leave work two hours early (with pay) at a time of her choosing within the next work week. Petitioner could not "bank" the time indefinitely because Respondent CSD's contract was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1996. Mr. Edwards phoned Petitioner at home on May 2, 1996, to request a written release so that he could respond to Ms. Clark's letter. Petitioner wrote that release on May 3, 1996. The release gave Mr. Edwards permission to disclose confidential information to Ms. Clark. On May 3, 1996, Petitioner signed a written acknowledgment that receipt of $4.06 in payment for .5 regular hours would end the issue of the .5 regular hours owed to her. On May 10, 1996, Respondent Gator informed the staff at Hamilton House of the procedure for handling applications for employment with Respondent Gator's new program, Tiger Success Center. Applications were due on or before May 28, 1996. Interviews were to be scheduled between May 28, 1996, and June 7, 1996. Applicants would be advised of the final selections and employment offers by June 14, 1996. Respondent Gator requested that each applicant take a copy of their most recent performance appraisal to their employment interview. By letter dated May 13, 1996, Mr. Edwards responded to Ms. Clark's inquiry. First, he explained that questions regarding Petitioner's compensation had been resolved. Second, he stated that letters from the Department of Juvenile Justice and from the Office of the Inspector General had been added to Petitioner's personnel file, clearing her of all misconduct allegations. Third, he explained that the day shift would be the least desirable shift in terms of stress reduction because the activity level of the residents is highest during the day. Mr. Edwards also revealed that Petitioner's mother was treated successfully for cancer in 1993 and that her current health failed to support the need for a change in Petitioner's shift. Finally, Mr. Edwards noted that he had to consider the needs of the residents and other staff. A copy of Ms. Clark's inquiry and Mr. Edwards' response were placed in Petitioner's personnel file. Neither of the documents were disclosed to unauthorized persons. On May 22, 1996, the employees at Hamilton House received another memorandum advising them that after June 30, 1996, Respondent CSD would no longer operate the facility. The employees were encouraged to apply for employment with the new organization. Petitioner was scheduled for an employment interview on May 30, 1996. However, the interview was rescheduled because she was unable to keep the appointment. Petitioner's application for employment with Respondent Gator is dated May 31, 1996. She also furnished Respondent Gator with copies of three performance appraisals. Petitioner's signature on the application authorized Respondent Gator to make inquiries of references and former employers regarding her general character and past performance. There is no evidence that Respondent Gator ever made any such inquiries about Petitioner. A panel of three people representing Respondent Gator interviewed Petitioner. The panel asked her the same questions that they asked other applicants. Petitioner was very negative and critical of the existing program and Respondent CSD during her interview. After the interview, each member of the interview panel tallied their score sheets independently. All three agreed that Petitioner should not be given further consideration for employment with Respondent Gator because of her negative attitude and low interview scores. On June 13, 1996, Petitioner received a memorandum from Respondent Gator stating that the company was unable to offer her a position of employment. That same day, Respondent Gator offered employment to every other Hamilton House staff applicant except one black male, Mr. Humphrey. Respondent Gator hired a black female, Latasha Bristol, who worked in the level eight dormitory with Petitioner. Ms. Bristol is younger than Petitioner. However, she was not hired to replace Petitioner. Respondent Gator hired Ms. Bristol to work in the level six dormitory. Respondent Gator offered an employment position to a white female, Lucy Oxendine. Ms. Oxendine was over 60 years old at the time. She declined to accept a job with Respondent Gator for personal reasons. Mr. Edwards was hired by Respondent Gator to continue as program director after July 1, 1996. However, neither he nor any other employee of Respondent CSD shared any information about Petitioner with Respondent Gator or had any input into Respondent Gator's decision not to hire Petitioner. Respondent Gator based its decision not to employ Petitioner solely on the results of her interview which was very negative. On June 14, 1996, the staff at Hamilton House received a memorandum stating that anyone interested in accepting employment with Respondent Gator must sign up on June 19, 1996. On June 14, 1996, Petitioner's doctor faxed a medical excuse to Respondent CSD stating that Petitioner could not return to work for an undetermined period of time. The document indicates that Petitioner's diagnosis involved anxiety, depression, and work-related stress. The doctor commented that Petitioner was the primary caretaker of her mother who was terminally ill with cancer. The doctor's June 14, 1996, fax was received by Respondent CSD in the administrative manager's office. It was on her desk for a brief period of time before it was delivered to Mr. Edwards. There is no credible evidence that any employee of Respondent CSD disclosed the contents of the fax to unauthorized persons. Petitioner's doctor did not give her permission to return to work until after July 1, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that FCHR enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Charges of Discrimination against both Respondent CSD and Respondent Gator. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: H. B. Stivers, Esquire Levine and Stivers 245 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Faye Musgrove Post Office Box 657 Live Oak, Florida 32064 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Olin Corporation has an explosives manufacturing plant at St. Marks, Florida, known as Olin St. Marks Operations, employing 425-500 employees and is an "employer" as that term is defined in Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. Production and maintenance employees are represented by the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC Local 8018 (Union). At all times material to this case there was in effect a collective bargaining agreement (Agreement) between Respondent and the Union. The Agreement contains provisions which: - reserves to management the right "to make reasonable rules for the maintenance of discipline and protection of life and property and to suspend, discharge, or otherwise discipline employees for cause" (Article 4, Section 4.2, page 3); contain special procedures regarding discharge of employees (Sections 8.5 and 8.6, page 8); set forth hours of work and rates of pay, including overtime pay (Article 14, pp. 19-20; Article 15, pp. 20-22; Article 16, pp. 22-23); provides for a one-half hour unpaid lunch period (Article 14, Section 14.2, p. 19). a. The Petitioner, John W. Lockhart, Jr., a Warehouse Helper, was initially employed by Olin on April 8, 1976 and discharged by Respondent August 15, 1989. His hourly rate of pay at the time of his discharge was $8.94. During times material to this case, Petitioner was regularly assigned to work the day shift - 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. The warehouse normally operates on day shift only. A production supervisor is present on all shifts and is responsible for the warehouse on shifts other than the day shift. At all times material to this case, Lynn E. Black was Personnel Supervisor for Olin's St. Marks plant. She held the position for 10 to 12 years. Black conducted the hearing and investigation which resulted in Petitioner's discharge, and prepared the letter notifying him of his discharge. Bruce C. Longman was, at all times material to this case, Manager of Administration at Olin's St. Marks plant. He has 19 years' experience with Olin and 24 years' experience in total in the field of human resources and labor relations. Longman participated in Petitioner's pre-discharge hearing and prepared the answer to the grievance filed on Petitioner's behalf. a. At all times material to this matter, Respondent had in effect Plant Rules which are divided into three categories, with Category 1 being the most serious in that violations of Category 1 rules subject an employee to termination for a single offense. Sleeping is a Category 1 offense. The rules are widely publicized. The sleeping rule has been in effect since 1969. Company guidelines are utilized in administration of the sleeping rule. Factors considered, inter alia, include whether the employee is in his work area, if he made a bed, if he had a pillow, if he was difficult to awaken, if the area was lighted, whether the employee is sitting up or lying down, and his or her intent. Mitigating factors considered include proven illness and excessive recent overtime. On Wednesday July 26, 1989, Petitioner's supervisor advised him that certain work had to be completed prior to the beginning of the day shift on July 27,1989 and further advised that Petitioner could perform the work on overtime at his discretion. The work was expected to take two hours to complete. Petitioner returned to the plant at midnight and performed the work. Petitioner received pay at 1.5 times his base rate or $13.41 per hour for the hours in the plant after midnight. At approximately 3:30 a.m. on July 27, 1989 Petitioner proceeded to a secluded area of the warehouse and slept until about 5:40 a.m., when he was awakened by two supervisors and a Fire/Security Technician. Petitioner slept on a pile of flattened cardboard boxes, with a pillow made of foam rubber wrapped in rags. His feet were propped on two fiber packs. His shoes were off and his safety clothing removed from his upper body. His eyes were shut and he was snoring. Petitioner was suspended pending a hearing in accordance with the Agreement which was held on July 28, 1989. Petitioner was aware (a) of the rules against sleeping, Rule I-4; (b) that the maximum penalty for deliberate sleeping was termination, absent mitigating circumstances; and, (c) the company's enforcement of the rule as a result of his participation three months earlier in the investigation of two "sleeping cases" which culminated in the employees being discharged. Petitioner intentionally slept on the job and stated that he would do so again under the same circumstances. Petitioner believes that any employee should be allowed to sleep on the job when that employee's work is finished. Petitioner consulted a sleep disorder center in early June 1990, approximately ten months after his discharge, that issued a report on June 15, 1990 diagnosing his condition as "severe obstructive sleep apnea" that resulted in "profound excessive daytime sleepiness". However, there was no evidence of Petitioner having a problem with sleepiness at any time while on the job other than this occasion. When Petitioner became sleepy he did not seek any medical assistance, which was available to him at the time, or any other assistance, nor did he "clock-out" and go home. Instead, he "made a bed" and intentionally went to sleep and continued to draw pay at the overtime rate. There was insufficient evidence to show that there were any mitigating factors to lessen the penalty of termination in this case. Since there were no mitigating circumstance to lessen the penalty for violation of Rule I-4, sleeping on the job, in this case, Petitioner's employment with Olin was terminated on August 15, 1989 Although sleeping is allowed on break periods and during lunch, Olin does not condone sleeping on the job. There was insufficient evidence to show that employees were confused in regard to when and where sleeping was allowed. The rule against sleeping on the job has been uniformly applied in that employees who violate the rule are terminated unless there are mitigating circumstances such as in the Annie Norton case. There was insufficient evidence to show that employees were confused in regard to the application of the sleeping rule. Petitioner filed a previous charge of discrimination against Olin with the Commission (Charge No. 89-4102) which was resolved by settlement agreement and dismissed by the Commission. Petitioner alleged that he had filed one other previous charge of discrimination against Olin with the Commission but no evidence was adduced regarding this charge. There was insufficient evidence to show that Petitioner or any other employee of Olin suffered any retaliation for filing discrimination charges against Olin with the Commission. There was insufficient evidence to show that Petitioner's discharge was in retaliation for filing previous discrimination charges against Olin with the Commission or that there was any causal connection between the Petitioner's filing of previous charges of discrimination against Olin with the Commission and his discharge or for any of his union activities in investigating grievances or complaints. Petitioner received no discipline between the filing of the previous charge (Charge No. 89-4102) with the Commission and his discharge on August 15, 1989. Olin's no sleeping rule is reasonably related to the operation of its business, is common to all Olin plants, and is common throughout the industry.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Conclusion of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying relief to the Petitioner, John Lockhart, and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMEDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1. - 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1, 3, and 4 respectively. 4. - 7. Restatement of testimony and not a finding of fact but see Findings of Fact 13, 14 and 20. Restatement of testimony and not a finding of fact, however, not material. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13 and 17. Restatement of testimony and not a finding of fact but see Finding of Fact 19. - 12. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Restatement of testimony and not a finding of fact see Findings of Fact 22 and 23. Not material. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Not material. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8. Restatement of testimony and not a finding of fact but see Finding of Fact 7. Specific Rulings of Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent 1. - 13. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-13 respectively. 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 15. - 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. 18. Restatement of testimony and not a finding of but see Finding of Fact 14. 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. 20. Adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. 21. - 22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 18 and 16. 23. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 11. 24. Adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. 25. Not material. 26. - 27. Covered in preliminary statement. 28. Adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. 29. Not material. 30. Adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. 31. - 39. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15, 20, 19, 19, 20, 13, 13 and 20, respectively. Not material. - 42. Adopted in Findings of Fact 24 and 25, respectively. COPIES FURNISHED: Curley R. Doltie, Esquire 118 North Gadsden Street Post Office Box 1325 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Dorothy J. Kelley, Esquire Labor and Employment law Olin Corporation 427 N. Shamrock East Alton, IL 62024 Dana Baird, Acting Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
The Issue Whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of race or handicap in discharging him from employment on February 25, 1992; and whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner and other black employees in pay for similar jobs.
Findings Of Fact During the summer of 1988, Larry Jelks, a black male, approached Jerry Sikes, the Director of Public Works of Suwannee Country, seeking employment. Petitioner, Jelks, explained and Sikes was aware that Petitioner had significant experience as a welder. Several weeks later, Sikes contacted Jelks and offered him a job as a laborer. The Petitioner began work of August 16, 1988 with a starting pay of $5.00/hour in the position of laborer, an entry level, unskilled job classification. The Petitioner received a copy of the employer's regulations. On August 24, 1988, the Petitioner was promoted to Serviceman, and his pay increased to $6.00/hour. On October 12, 1988, Sikes hired Mr. Praley, a white male, as a welder, although his expertise was as a mechanic and Praley was subsequently assigned duties as a mechanic by Sikes. Praley was paid a starting salary of $6.50/hour. The welder/mechanic position was open when Jelks was hired. On November 24, 1988, Petitioner completed his 100 day probation and given his annual 5 percent raise, increasing his pay to $6.30/hour. Other black employees also had their pay raises delayed until after their probation was completed. White employees, including Praley, received their annual raises in the year of their initial employment, notwithstanding their probationary status. This discrepancy in treatment of employees was not explained by the County. On September 30, 1989, the Petitioner laterally transferred to the position of truck driver for the refuse collection service because he did not enjoy the work of a serviceman. One October 1, 1989, Petitioner received an annual raise of 4 percent, to $6.56/hour. Subsequently, the axle in Petitioner's truck broke, and when he was questioned about it, he asked for a transfer. On March 3, 1990, the Petitioner was transferred to a shop position in which he repaired rusted or damaged garbage bins (dumpsters), by welding new sides and bottoms on them. The sheets of steel which Petitioner welded on the bins were 6 feet by 12 feet in size and 1/16" thick, and weighed approximately 180 pounds. These sheets were generally cut into smaller pieces prior to being moved from the stack in which they were stored. These pieces of material had to be moved into position to be cut and welded. The bins were moved using backhoes and forklifts. The Petitioner was responsible for moving the pieces of sheet steel and using the equipment to move the bins. On March 17, 1990, the Petitioner received a 5 percent pay increase to $6.89/hour. On April 28, 1990, the Petitioner received a 5 percent raise to $7.24/hour. On October 1, 1990, the Petitioner was given a 5 percent raise to $7.61/hour. In early 1991, the Petitioner's child became critically ill, and the Petitioner obtained leave to be with the child. In addition, Jerry Sikes approved flexibility in the Petitioner's scheduling to permit him be with the child conditioned upon Petitioner letting his supervisors know what he was doing and when he was going to be away from his job. Problems were encountered with Petitioner's attendance, and he was counseled about this and given a copy of the Country's leave policy. Generally, however, the Petitioner's performance was satisfactory, and he was considered a good and valued employee. On September 23, 1991, the Petitioner suffered a job- related injury, and was placed upon workers' compensation leave. The Petitioner received workers' compensation and disability benefits during his leave. During his absence the other employees performed his welding duties. While on leave, the Petitioner received a 3 percent pay increase to $7.84/hour. On November 25, 1991, Sikes wrote Petitioner a letter advising that he was required to submit doctor's notes concerning his absences while on workers compensation leave. On December 20, 1991, John B. Roberts, the County's workers' compensation (rehabilitation) consultant contacted Sikes and asked Sikes to identify an alternative position the duties of which the Petitioner could perform. Sikes advised Roberts that the County had no light duty jobs, but that driving a truck was one of the least physically demanding jobs in the County's maintenance department. He advised Roberts that he would assign the Petitioner to drive one of the light dump trucks if he returned to work. These trucks have an especially rough ride when operated off road, as these were. Roberts looked at the duties of the job, and determined that the Petitioner ought to be able to perform these duties. Roberts discussed returning to work and performing the duties of a truck driver with the Petitioner; however, the Petitioner advised Roberts that he wanted to talk with his attorney prior to returning to work. The Petitioner did not return and assume the duties of driving a truck in December as Roberts had arranged. On January 2, 1992, the Petitioner was sent a copy of a letter which was to Mr. Larry Sikes from Dr. Cason who had been treating Petitioner. The letter stated that the Petitioner was released from treatment to return to regular work activities as of January 2, 1992. On January 3, 1992, the Petitioner returned to work. He had a 4 percent permanent impairment, but his employer was not advised of this. His doctor advised the rehabilitation counselor that the Petitioner be placed on light duty because he would have to toughen up after returning to work. Sikes did not afford the Petitioner the opportunity to work back into the job. The Petitioner's work area was outside, behind the regular shop, exposed to the elements. It was very cold at the time the Petitioner returned to work. The Petitioner's production was low because he could not physically manhandle the large sheets of steel as he could prior to his injury. He asked that an inmate be assigned to work with him all the time, but assistance was denied to the Petitioner. The Petitioner asked for a backhoe, which he had previously modified, to move the bins and sheets around; however, this piece of equipment had been sent to the landfill. He was told to use a front end loader to do this work; however, he went to the landfill and retrieved the backhoe because he had difficulties climbing into the cab of the front end loader. His demands and getting the backhoe without permission created additional conflicts between the Petitioner and his supervisors. On January 8, 1992, Sikes issued the Petitioner a memo concerning his poor productivity and failure to follow the instructions of his supervisor. Prior to his injury, the Petitioner repaired approximately one bin per day. During the period after his return to work, he did approximately one bin every two to three days. When presented with the memorandum, the Petitioner advised that he was unable to do that which he had formerly done. The Petitioner was told that he was expected to do all his regular work. This motivated the Petitioner to return to the doctor and seek a clarification of what he could and could not do. In addition, Petitioner was also seeing a chiropractor regularly for treatment. Petitioner left work almost daily to see the doctor, and frequently did not return. He did not provide his employer with documentation of these visits. The Petitioner asked that an overhead chain hoist, similar to the one which was inside the shop area, be installed in his work area to move the sheets of steel to assist him. His direct supervisor, Mr. Horton, denied the request because it was expensive and required additional construction to support the mechanism. On January 13, 1992, the Petitioner received a second warning for being absent from work without notifying his supervisor. Sikes advised the Petitioner that he would have to comply with the County's personnel regulations which required prior notification and a note from the doctor. Although the Petitioner testified he was absent attending doctor's visits, he presented no other substantiation of these visits at the hearing. On January 22, 1992, the Petitioner submitted, as requested earlier, a report from Dr. James B. Slatery of Gainesville Orthopedic Group, advising that the Petitioner could return to work, but should avoid climbing and limit his lifting over 50 pounds to an occasional basis. A similar report was submitted by Dr. A. C. Bass. The metal sheets the Petitioner was lifting weighed over fifty pounds. The County failed to make accommodations for the Petitioner's physical problems upon his return to work in a manner it had for white employees. The county had placed recovering white employees in positions where they were flagmen, directed traffic, and in similar positions. The county placed the Petitioner back at his regular duties, stated it had no "light duty" positions, and demanded Petitioner perform all his duties to pre-injury standards of productivity. When the Petitioner asked for assistance in lifting the sheets of steel which were in excess of the weight allowance set by his doctor, the County told him to seek assistance from his coworkers, who were instructed to assist him. He had to wait until they finished with their immediate task, and they were less than happy about these interruptions, and going outside where the Petitioner worked. This slowed his production for which he received criticism from his supervisors. The conditions imposed by the employer were not so bad as to constitute a constructive discharge. However, had Petitioner filed an action at that time, he would have proven that he was treated differently than white employees who were accommodated for their physical problems when returning from workman's compensation leave. There was a verbal exchange between the Petitioner and one of his coworkers, Earnest Johns, arising out of their interactions in the shop. The Petitioner told Johns that he "would pass up a bus load of white girls, to make him (Johns) his bitch." Johns complained to Sikes about the Petitioner, and told Sikes, "he needed to do something about that Nigger." Sikes told Johns that he would take care of it and to calm down. Johns, who was very upset, subsequently apologized to Sikes for his confrontational manner in raising the matter with him. On January 25, 1992, Sikes sent the Petitioner another memo confirming a verbal warning about his poor work habits, wasting time, and absenteeism. On January 30, 1992, Sikes sent the Petitioner another memo regarding his poor work habits. In February, the Petitioner's wife, from whom he was separated, died, and he was granted three days bereavement leave for February 11-13, 1992. On February 18, 1992, the Petitioner called the shop and left word with a secretary that he would not be at work for the rest of that week. He did not submit a leave request for this period of time. Subsequently, the Petitioner was absent without permission from February 14 until February 24, 1992. The Petitioner did not obtain permission from his supervisors prior to taking this leave, did not request leave without pay, and did to explain his absence. Neither did his doctor, the rehabilitation counselor, his chiropractor, his attorney, or a member of his family or a friend report his absence and give any explanation. During this period, he appeared once at work to pick up his pay check on February 21, 1992. On this occasion the Petitioner did not address the matter of his absence with Sikes or Horton, although Horton advised he Petitioner that Sikes wanted to speak with him. The Petitioner had exhausted all of his sick and vacation leave prior to February 14, 1992. Under the County's rules, an employee had to request leave without pay after exhausting sick and annual leave, and the request had to be approved by the County Commission. The Petitioner did not make a request for leave without pay. Although the Petitioner asserts that he had not exhausted his sick leave because he was visiting the doctor during his absences which was covered by workers' compensation leave, he did not provide medical substantiation for the alleged treatments and doctors' visits as required by the employer's rules in order to obtain workers' compensation leave. On February 25, 1992, the Petitioner returned to work at starting time wearing work clothes. Horton stopped him on his way to his work area, and advised him that Sikes wanted to talk with him. Horton accompanied the Petitioner to Sikes office. Sikes asked the Petitioner were he had been, and the Petitioner answered that he had been attending to personal business. Sikes asked him for a more detailed explanation of his absence, and the Petitioner again told him that he had been tending to business and that Sikes should either fire him or get off his back. Sikes warned the Petitioner that unless he provided some explanation for his unauthorized absence, he would have to terminate him. The Petitioner refused to provide any additional explanation, but asked that his firing be put in writing. The Petitioner left the work place after the meeting, and did not return to work or attempt to explain his absences. Sikes viewed the Petitioner's absences and refusal to obey the personnel regulations as undermining his credibility as a supervisor. Several days after the confrontation on February 25, 1992, Sikes wrote a letter terminating the Petitioner for (1) continued or gross neglect of duty; (2) absence without leave; incompetence or unwillingness to render satisfactory service; insubordination; and (5) habitual absences, as provided in Parts X and XI of the County personnel regulations. Sikes extended special consideration to all employees of the department, who were permitted to take leave or be absent without applying for leave. The Petitioner was permitted to take leave without applying for it, and that considerable latitude was extended to the Petitioner regarding his absences prior to his being discharged. A white male, who was not handicapped, was hired on May 28, 1992 to file the position from which the Petitioner was discharged. The Petitioner appealed his discharge under the County's rules, and after an evidentiary hearing in which the Petitioner was represented by counsel, the county's hearing officer found that the dismissal was for cause in a Final Order dated September 24, 1992. Discrimination in Promotion and Pay among Blacks. The population and labor market statistics offered by the Petitioner in support of his contention that Blacks were discriminated against in promotion fail to support the proposition for which they were offered. For example, the Petitioner limits the labor pool to those persons who are over 16 and worked in 1989. However, there are those persons who are over 16 and would like to work, but who have not been hired. If the Petitioner's contention is correct, one would expect that for every white employee hired, there was a black applicant who was not hired. Therefore, comparisons based upon persons actually hired understate the percentage of Blacks in the labor pool. The relevant labor market for this dispute is Suwannee County, Florida, and the relevant labor pool are those people over 16 years of age who are now seeking, or who have in the past sought employment. According to the 1990 census, 14.7 percent of the population of the County is black. Blacks constitute 13.8 percent of the County's employees. The work environment was not overtly racist, and while, as stated above, racially charged verbal barbs were occasionally exchanged, there is no evidence that this was common or tolerated by the employer. The best evidence of discrimination by the employer were the actual practices engaged in by the County. During the 12 years prior to the termination of the Petitioner, the County had never had a Black supervisor. From 1989 to September 23, 1992, the County hired one black employee of 30 employees who it hired. Its top 10 highest paid employees were all white. The highest paid black was the forty-first highest paid employee of the County. Kevin Praley was placed in a welder's position despite the fact he was a mechanic at $6.50/hour; and Petitioner, who was a professional welder, was hired as a laborer at $5.00/hour in 1988. At the time Praley was hired, the Petitioner was making $6.00/hour, so that the differential between their pay was $.50/hour in 1988. After four years, Praley, who was hired after the Petitioner, was paid $2.01/hour more than the Petitioner for work which Sikes and others said was similar. This reflects continuing discrimination in hiring and paying Blacks. Blacks were hired in the lowest paying, menial jobs within the county, and this was not on the basis of education. All of the county's custodial employees are black. Only one of the county's secretaries is black. Until very recently, there were no black supervisors in the county's maintenance department. Most of the County's increases in Black employment and promotions occurred after institution of this case. The Clerk of the Circuit Court/Clerk of the Board of County Commissioners has not published a salary discrimination review required by Section 28.34, Florida Statutes. Further, the County's Equal Opportunity Program of 1992 provided for annual assessment of its progress in equal opportunity. As of May 9,1994, the County and not compile an annual report pursuant to its plan. The County did not train Black employees to assume greater responsibility, and did not utilize them as heavy equipment operators until after the institution of this action. The county did not pay Jelks and other Black employees annual pay raises while they were on probation; however, it did pay white employees Praley, Hardin, Simmons, Mobley, Luanne Mixon, Tervola, and Brother annual pay raises while they were on probation. These white employees were all hired prior to or during the year the Petitioner was hired. Jelks received the raise at the end of his probation period on November 24, 1988. Helen Stoudermire, Mattie L. Weatherspoon, Tyrone Tillman, and Marvette Gwinn, all black employees of the Respondent, did not receive annual raises while in probationary status, contrary to the treatment afforded white employees. The amounts of their collective salary losses were not presented as a finding of fact. The county did discriminate against the Petitioner and other black employees in pay and promotion during the period 1989 until February 25, 1992.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission of Human Relations enter a Final Order directing that: The Petitioner's Petition for Relief relating to his discharge be dismissed; Black employees of the County be certified as a class for the period beginning August 1988 until the present; The County be ordered to cease and desist its discriminatory practices in pay and promotion against the class of black employees; The County's Clerk be ordered to file reports on salary differentials are required by statute; and Reasonable attorney's fees and costs be awarded to Petitioner's counsel. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1994. APPENDIX CASE NO. 93-5330 Both of the parties submitted proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 2 Rejected as contrary to more credible facts. See Paragraph 41. Paragraph 3 True, but part of statement of case. Paragraph 4 Paragraph 11. Paragraph 5 Paragraph 1. Paragraph 6 Subsumed in Paragraph 11. Paragraph 7 Subsumed in Paragraphs 11 and 17. Paragraphs 8,9,10 Paragraph 44. Paragraph 11 Conclusion of Law Paragraph 12 Paragraph 57. Paragraph 13 Contrary to facts. The Petitioner returned to duty. Paragraph 14 Irrelevant. Paragraph 15 Paragraph 48 Paragraphs 16,17,18 Paragraph 51 Paragraph 19,20 Contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 21 Subsumed in paragraph 54. Paragraph 22 Paragraph 56. Paragraphs 23,24,25 Paragraphs 2,3,4,58,60 Paragraph 26 Paragraph 26. Paragraphs 27,28 Paragraph 42. Paragraphs 29,30 Subsumed in 2,3,52,53. Paragraph 31 Rejected because Jelks received the raise at the end of his probation period on November 24, 1988. His reduction in pay was $.30/hour for October and November, or 8 weeks X 40 hours X .30 = $96.00. Paragraph 32 County's claims were rejected on this point. Paragraph 33 Paragraph 18 Paragraph 34 The statistical record is rejected for lack of credibility because it considers averages of both groups compared when there are findings which show whites held higher paying jobs. Paragraph 35 Subsumed in paragraph 32. Paragraph 36 Subsumed in paragraph 54. Paragraph 37 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 38 Subsumed in Paragraphs 26,27. Paragraph 39 Paragraphs 29,30. Paragraph 40 Is not addressed specifically because it violated the HO's directions that findings be kept short, and address specific factual matters, and is mostly argument. Paragraph 41 Subsumed in Paragraph 17. Paragraph 42 Paragraph 20. Paragraph 43 The County did accommodate some whites. Paragraph 44 Rejected as contrary to best evidence. Paragraph 45 Paragraph 50. Paragraph 46 Subsumed in Paragraph 55. Paragraph 47 Rejected. Welder and mechanic were the same job description. Paragraph 48 Irrelevant. Paragraph 49 Rejected because "handicap" relates to permanent conditions, and his permanent handicap was only 4 percent. It was his temporary condition which impacted his ability to perform the work. Paragraph 50 Irrelevant. Paragraph 51,52 The name calling by employees, to include Johns, occurred in the context of an angry exchange with Sikes, who cautioned Johns to calm down. Johns subsequently apologized to Sikes, and neither were aware that his comments had been overheard by Jelks. Paragraph 53 Paragraph 51. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-5 Paragraphs 1-6 Paragraph 6 Subsumed in part in 1-6, and rejected in part as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraphs 7,8 Paragraph 6 & rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 9 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 10,11 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 12,13,14 Paragraph 9,10 Paragraph 15 Paragraph 29 Paragraph 16 Paragraph 49 Paragraphs 17-23 Paragraphs 11-17 Paragraph 24 Paragraph 21 Paragraph 25 Paragraph 19. Paragraphs 26,27 Irrelevant. Paragraph 28 Paragraph 25 Paragraph 29 Paragraph 17 Paragraph 30 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 31 Paragraph 28. Paragraph 32 Irrelevant. Paragraph 33 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 34 Paragraph 20. Paragraphs 35,36 Paragraph 19 & rejected as contrary to best evidence. Paragraph 37 Paragraph 23. Paragraph 38 Paragraph 24. Paragraph 39 Paragraph 25. Paragraph 40 Paragraph 31. Paragraph 41 Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 42 Paragraph 33. Paragraphs 43,44 Paragraph 32. Paragraph 45 Paragraph 35. Paragraph 46 Paragraph 36. Paragraph 47 Irrelevant. Paragraph 48 Subsumed in paragraphs above. Paragraph 49 Subsumed in Paragraph 33. Paragraph 50 Paragraph 35, best evidence. Paragraph 51 Paragraph 32. Paragraph 52 True, but part of law. Paragraph 53 Paragraph 34. Paragraphs 54-58 Paragraphs 37,38,40,41 Paragraph 59 Irrelevant. Paragraph 60 Duplicative. Paragraphs 61,62 Irrelevant. Paragraph 63 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 64 Paragraph 48. Paragraph 65 Subsumed in Paragraph 41. Paragraph 66 Subsumed in Paragraph 48. Paragraph 67 Irrelevant. Paragraph 68 The wage disparity was the result of hiring Blacks in the lowest paying jobs. Paragraph 69 Subsumed in Paragraph 54. Paragraph 70 Paragraph 50. Paragraph 71 See comments to Paragraph 68. Paragraphs 72-83 Subsumed in Paragraphs 54, 55. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Mattimore, Esquire Kimberly L. King, Esquire Suite 305 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Toby Buel, Esquire Three Rivers Legal Services 817 West Duval Street Lake City, FL 32055 C. Dean Lewis, Esquire Post Office Box 8 Live Oak, FL 32060 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent due to Petitioner's race in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner on October 13, 1997, as a maintenance operator. Six months later he was promoted to the position of Maintenance Technician I. During his employment, Petitioner was one of six technicians. He was the only black technician. Petitioner was initially paid at a rate of $6.00 per hour. He received no pay increase with his first promotion. His yearly evaluation was delayed, but finally received by him on December 7, 1998. His evaluation for 1999 was received by December 23, 1999. His wages had climbed by this time to $8.40 per hour. His evaluations were satisfactory or above. Although Petitioner had been told he would be provided training on the job, he was relegated to the night shift, working by himself. As a consequence, he educated himself on maintenance of Respondent’s facility. In 1999, all technicians were to receive formal training. Another technician, who was white and lower in seniority than Petitioner, was selected for training before Petitioner. When Petitioner brought this to the attention of a supervisor, Petitioner was sent to other training provided by Siemen’s Corporation in Atlanta, Georgia. Petitioner stated he was treated unfairly because he was required to absorb the cost of lodging for the first night in Atlanta, prior to commencement of training. The five other technicians employed by Respondent were being paid a minimum of $11.00 per hour when Petitioner, on or about May 5, 2000, requested an increase from his current $8.40 per hour rate to $10.00 per hour. His supervisor responded that he could not grant the increase. An argument ensued and Petitioner left the office and returned to work. Later that day, Respondent’s human resource officer contacted Petitioner. He informed Petitioner that Petitioner’s employment was terminated due to “insubordination.” On Respondent’s termination form, the reason listed for Petitioner’s termination was insubordination and using “slanders to his senior manager.” The form also listed Petitioner’s absence from work on Saturday, April 29, 2000, as a reason for employment termination. In rebuttal, Petitioner produced a copy of an annual leave slip at final hearing requesting approval of his absence on the date in question. Petitioner had accumulated ample leave to cover the requested time. Respondent’s approving authority failed to approve Petitioner’s absence, but no notification was given to Petitioner. Respondent’s claim of unauthorized absence is effectively rebutted. According to a copy of a letter dated June 19, 2003, and received by DOAH on June 24, 2003, bearing the purported signature of David Anderson, registered agent for Respondent on June 20, 2002, Respondent was reputed to have ceased operation. According to statements contained in the letter, the Bank of America sold Respondent on March 10, 2002, in the “form of rights in collateral.” The letter additionally stated “unliquidated assets” in the bankruptcy were “sold in a Section 363 auction” on May 23, 2002. No direct evidence was presented on behalf of Respondent corroborating the contents of the letter and consequently the letter is not credited. Petitioner produced documentation at the final hearing, specifically a corporation reinstatement form issued by the Florida Department of State, documenting Respondent’s continued existence as of April 22, 2002.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered directing that Respondent to cease the discriminatory employment practice evidenced in this case and awarding Petitioner back pay at the rate of $10.00 per hour for each normal 40-hour work week between May 5, 2000, and the present. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael F. Coppins, Esquire Coppins & Monroe Post Office Box 14447 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4447 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dwight E. Mazion 1713 Calgary Drive Desoto, Texas 75115 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Born in Rio de Janeiro, petitioner Paul Sergio Inacio emigrated to the United States from Brazil in 1961, when he was still a teenager. He first worked for respondent for a brief time in 1976. On June 6, 1980, he returned to respondent's employ as a journeyman welder mechanic at Crist Electric Generating Plant, a position he still held at the time of hearing. A "mile square with seven generating units" (T.187), the plant is in Florida, as are respondent's headquarters. Several hundred people work for respondent at Crist Electric Generating Plant alone. In "late June, 1980" (T.235) somebody began calling Mr. Inacio "Julio," nicknaming him after a Hispanic character in a television series (Sanford & Son). The actor portraying Julio "used to drag a goat through the living room . . . and acted . . . stupid." T.236; T.64. Despite (or perhaps because of) petitioner's telling people he did not like being called "Julio," the sobriquet caught on. Even during his initial eight-month probationary period, he made his objections known. T.115, 180. He felt freer to press the point, once the probationary period ended, although at least one friend advised him to do so might be counterproductive T.235-6. Mr. Inacio never referred to himself as Julio. T.28, 99-100, 115, 146-7, 180, 194, 198. Once "he almost got in a fight with [a co-worker] because the guy called him my little Puerto Rican buddy Julio." T.28. Before he retired from his employment as a supervisor with respondent, on July 30, 1987, Murdock P. Walley repeatedly addressed, or referred to petitioner in his presence, as "Julio," "wop," "spic," and "greaser." Mr. Walley's last day at work was "in April or along about then." T.472. Behind petitioner's back, Mr. Carnley heard Mr. Walley refer to petitioner as "wetback," "wop" or "the greaser." T. 27. Co-workers have called him "spic," "wetback," and "greaser" to his face, (T.30) as well as behind his back. Mr. Peakman, another maintenance supervisor, testified that he was guilty of a single lapse: I didn't see him and I asked, "Where's Julio?" And then I caught myself, I said, "Excuse me, where's Mr. Inacio?" I corrected myself right then. T.455. In or about January of 1989, (T.271), Jimmy Lavon Sherouse, maintenance superintendent since May of 1987, referred to petitioner as "Julio" at least once, in the break room. Willard A. Douglas, a supervisor of maintenance at the plant since December of 1981, referred to petitioner as "Julio" frequently. Described as abrasive, Mr. Douglas, also known as "Bubba," has "single[d] Paul out." T.46. But it appeared at hearing at least as likely that Mr. Douglas singled petitioner out because of a run-in which had nothing to do with Mr. Inacio's background, as that he discriminated against him on account of national origin. Prior to June of 1989, continuously since 1981 (T.29), Howard Keels, Calvin Harris, Mike Taylor, Ronnie Yates, and Bill Sabata, Control Center supervisors, C. B. Hartley, supervisor over the coal docks, John Spence and David Hansford, both maintenance supervisors at the time, Mike Snuggs, Joe Patterson, Ed Lepley, Tommy Stanley and Dennis Cowan, supervisors of the laboratory department, Dennis Berg and Joe Kight, schedulers, Tom Talty, the assistant plant manager, Joe Lalas and Larry Swindell, both operations supervisors, all called petitioner "Julio" "[t]o his face in [the] presence" (T.27) of Ricky Carnley, a fellow welder mechanic who testified at hearing. T.21-26. Others also heard supervisors call petitioner "Julio." T.79-80, 110, 144-6, 178-9, 195-6, 237-9, 537-8. Not without reason, petitioner came to feel that "(a)nything associated with Hispanic heritage that could come up, I was called at some point or other by practically anybody." T.267. Angelo Grellia, a fellow mechanic who testified "I'm a wop, you know" (T.79) (emphasis added) remembered co-workers calling petitioner a "wop." A newspaper cartoon posted on a bulletin board in the employee break room (not the bulletin board reserved exclusively for management's use) depicted a man using a two-by-four. Petitioner "is known for using two-by-fours a lot to move stuff, pry stuff for leverage." T.34. The cartoon was labelled "Julio." Another time somebody posted a newspaper clipping, a report of a parricide, complete with picture; the killer's name had been lined through and Mr. Inacio's had been substituted. T.112, 158, 179. After two days, a fellow employee took it down (T.158), apparently without Mr. Inacio's ever seeing it. Still another time somebody posted "a National Geographic picture" (T.181) that resembled petitioner "and the caption said, can you guess who this is." T.181. Somebody had guessed and written in "Julio." T.243. According to uncontroverted testimony, white Anglo-Saxon men "were not selected to be the butt of these sorts of jokes." T.159. Over the plant's public address system, in Mr. Talty's presence, Charles Brown referred to petitioner as "Paul Inasshole," a play on his surname. T.25. No other employee was ridiculed in such a fashion, as far as the evidence showed, (T.49) but broadcasts in a similarly offensive vein ("An asshole" "A nasty hole") took place repeatedly over respondent's public address system. T. 24-25, 48-49, 71, 144-146, 163, 240. At all pertinent times, respondent had widely disseminated written equal opportunity and affirmative action policies with the stated "intent . . . to provide all employees with a wholesome work environment." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. "Company policy prohibits intimidation or harassment of its employees by any employee or supervisor." Id. But, as Barbara Louise Mallory, an "Equal Employment Opportunity representative" (T.477) in respondent's employ, conceded, the "conduct that went on was against [Gulf Power's] policies and against the law." T.484. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 stated that employees "subjected to conduct which violates this policy should report such incidences to their immediate supervisor, a higher level of supervision, or the Company's Equal Employment Opportunity Representative in the Corporate Office." Id. In the present case, both respondent's immediate supervisors and "a higher level of supervision," were well aware of the harassment to which petitioner was subjected, before he officially reported it. Supervisors were themselves guilty of harassment. On February 8, 1988, Mr. Sherouse, the maintenance superintendent, addressed "a routine shift meeting with employees [and] discussed with them the need to refrain from destruction of employees' or company property." Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. Mr. Sherouse "essentially said . . . some employees . . . were being singled out . . . . " T.295. He told employees at the meeting that "such an incident . . . could result in an action up to termination." Id. At the same meeting he "also discussed cartoons and calendars that could be considered . . . racial or sexual harassment . . . [directing that] they must be removed now." Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. These matters were also discussed at an employee information meeting in January of 1989. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. But harassment of petitioner continued. "[Q]uite frequently . . . thick heavy grease would get smeared on his toolbox, underneath the drawers of his toolbox." T.34. The lock on his locker was glued or "zip-gripped" shut several times, and had to be cut to open the locker. Respondent's Exhibit No. He is the only employee (T.39) who had to change clothes because some sort of itching powder was put in his clothes. Somebody put "Persian Blue," a particularly persistent dye, in his glove. At respondent's counsel's behest a list was prepared of "employees who have experienced problems with someone tampering with their tools or person[a]l lockers," Respondent's Exhibit No. 10, during the two years next preceding the list's preparation on August 4, 1989. Of the nine employees listed, seven were white Caucasians whose tools or books had been lost or stolen. 1/ Unlike the native-born men on the list, petitioner and Debbie Mitchell, the only other person listed, were subjected to repeated instances of vandalism and other harassment, including unflattering references in cartoons posted on the bulletin board in the break room. Although petitioner did not request it, management assigned him a new locker, something they did for no other employee. According to a co-worker, petitioner, who once taught welding at Pensacola Junior College, "likes to do a good, clean, responsible job" (T.185) of welding. But, on October 22 and 23, 1988, when petitioner and Millard Hilburn worked on "the #7 bottom ash discharge piping," Respondent's Exhibit No. 21, at Willard Douglas' behest, they failed to stop seepage from the pressurized pipe (which was in use while they worked) by welding, and resorted to epoxy which, in Mr. Douglas' "opinion[,] . . . [was] bad judgement and very poor workmanship." Id. Of 30 or 40 welders respondent employed at Crist, only one or two "still have a clean record. Eventually somebody is going to get a leak." T.202. Petitioner's work record is basically a very good one, although not perfect. Nevertheless Mr. Sherouse, after putting petitioner's name on a list of three "employees who for different reasons are not performing their jobs," Respondent's Exhibit No. 7, summoned petitioner to a conference about his job performance, on January 20, 1989. The other two employees were Scott Allen, whose problem was "attitude . . . distrust, dislike . . . just unbelievable" (T.443; 420) and Ed Lathan who "hadn't been there since June of '87" (T.420) except sporadically "working light duty." T.420. Mr. Sherouse also prepared various memoranda concerning petitioner; and caused other managers to prepare still other memoranda. Only after the January conference was petitioner involved in the repair of a boiler tube that failed. (He welded one end of a replacement piece that may have been improperly sized and had already been welded in place by others.) In contrast to petitioner's involvement in two incidents (only one of which occurred before the filing of the complaint), at least one other welder mechanic working for respondent had made five welds that failed in short order. On April 11, 1989, petitioner was assigned the job of cleaning plugged nozzles on intake screens for units four and five (although ordinarily operators themselves did such routine maintenance.) He first went to the control room for units four and five and asked directions to the intake screens, which are part of the cooling system. Misunderstanding directions, he went to the wrong cooling system intakes, those for units six and seven, instead of those for four and five, and started work without finding a red tag (used to indicate that somebody from operations had "isolated" the equipment) and without placing his own tag on an electrical switch that equipment operators use. He did, however, place tags on valves that had to be opened in order for the system to operate. When Mr. Sherouse heard what had happened he sent Mr. Inacio home from work. Although Mr. Sherouse did not at that time "announce termination or non- termination, pay or no pay" (T.436), petitioner was eventually paid for the time off, which lasted two days during the purported pendency of an investigation, which consisted of "going back and looking at his files." T.437. Without credible contradiction, several people testified that mistaking one piece of equipment for another occurred not infrequently (T.85) at the Crist plant. The evidence showed that much more serious safety lapses had, in general, elicited much milder responses from management. Petitioner was criticized more harshly than non-minority employees for the same or comparable performance. T.31-33, 73-74, 112-120, 130-131, 148-9, 150-4, 186-7, 197, 257- 263. Petitioner's safety record was "better than most." T.424. An Indian who works at the Crist steam plant, Ron Taylor is known as "Indian" or "Chief." T.52. Supervisors referred to Nicholas Peterson as "a damned Greek" (T.111) when he worked at respondent's Crist plant. "From January 1982 until March 1990," just about every supervisor at Crist "refer[red] to some . . . blacks as being niggers." T.135. Objection was sustained to admission of colored Beetle Bailey comic strips crudely altered to depict cartoon characters engaged in oral sex. But Ms. Mitchell testified without objection to other "extremely vulgar cartoons" (T.157) she saw posted on the bulletin boards including one with her name on it. T.159. (When she complained to Mr. Sherouse, he eventually reported back to her that the reference was to a different Debbie.) At Crist Electric "they use the good ole boy theory . . . [i]f you fit into their select group, you're taken in, you're trained . . . you get better selection of jobs. If you're not, you're an outcast." T.136. Petitioner "definitely" got more than his share of "dirty jobs," specifically precipitator work and condenser work. T.183; 85-86, 147-8. Petitioner's "pride was hurt." T.265. He felt humiliated. Unfair criticism affected his morale. T.36. At least one co-worker "could sense . . . that he felt like he was not wanted there." T.37. He considered leaving his employment and even told at least one Gulf Power official that he was doing so. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. Discriminatory treatment affected his ability to concentrate, and so his job performance. T.36, 37.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the FCHR order respondent to refrain from harassing or otherwise discriminating against petitioner on account of his national origin. That the FCHR award petitioner reasonable attorney's fees and costs. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mose Howard, Jr., was hired by the Respondent, K-Mart Corporation, as a night maintenance man at its store number 7339 located at 2620 N. Hiawassee Road in Orlando, Florida on July 10, 1984. According to Mr. Howard, his job was to help clean up after the store closed for the evening and to -notify the store authorities if and when the alarm went off during that period. His duty hours were from 9:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., Monday through Friday. He worked at the store for approximately six weeks during which time, according to him, he was never told by anyone in authority that his work was unsatisfactory. On August 16, 1984, Mr. Howard was called in by Mr. King who advised him that his work was not satisfactory. Mr. Howard contends that at the time in question, Mr. Ring gave him two pieces of paper to sign and advised him that if he didn't perform better, he'd be laid off. At the time, Mr. Howard looked at the papers and determined that his name was on them, but nothing else. The form in question was a Personal Interview Record consisting of two pages and Mr. Howard contends that that portion of the record dealing with the summary of discussion held between the parties at the interview was left blank. According to Mr. Howard, he signed the form in blank because he thought it was merely a notice that he was being placed on probation. In fact, though he may not have known it, he was on a probationary period from the time he was hired. During the course of the discussion, Mr. King advised him that the store had been receiving complaints about his work from undisclosed sources and also information that he had been sleeping on the job. Mr. Howard categorically denies having slept on the job at any time during the period of his employment and Respondent produced no evidence that he had. He admits, however, that his cleaning duties may have been, from time to time, accomplished in a less than satisfactory fashion. From time to time, when he was cleaning up paper and other debris from under the counters, crews of the contractor hired to maintain the floors in the store, whose job it was to strip and re-wax the floors periodically, were working on other aisles of the store. He contends that when this crew would go from one aisle to another, they would turn off and on the lights. Because he could not turn the lights on where he was working if the crew had previously turned them off, it was too dark for him to see and clean up well. He believes that it was this inability to clean up properly because of lack of lighting that formed the basis of the complaints against him. In addition, he states, the burglar alarms would periodically sound and when this happened, it would be necessary for him to call someone to come in and turn them off. This caused him to lose work time because when the alarm sounded, he felt he had to stop working and leave-the store because, had he stayed in there, the police might think he was breaking in. While denying, unequivocally, that he ever slept on the job, Mr. Howard admitted he would sit down from time to time in the break room but only on his two 15 minute breaks or during his 30 minute meal period. There were other times, he admits, that because of the lighting situation, he was unable to work in the store while the floor crew was there. In that case, he would sit down and wait until the crew would finish where it was working and he could go back to work. Sometimes this would be for an hour or even a couple of hours and during the period of enforced break from sweeping, he would try to find something else to do like cleaning the restrooms. In this regard, according to Mr. King, the cleaning of the restrooms was an integral part of Petitioner's responsibilities and his accomplishment of these duties was also periodically and repeatedly unsatisfactory. After the personnel interview conducted on August 16, 1984, Mr. Howard finished work for the evening and left. When he returned the following evening, a Friday, he was called in by another supervisor and advised that he was discharged. He says that at this point he was not given any reason for his discharge. However, he waited around outside the store until the closing time of 9:30 p.m. (approximately a half-hour after he came to work and was fired), went into the office, and picked up his paycheck from Payroll. The check he received that night was for all that was owed him up to the end of the pay period. A few days later, (the following Monday), he went back and was given another check for the day and a half wages owed him for the new pay period up until he was discharged. Mr. Howard denies having received a call in advance to advise him his work was unsatisfactory nor was he given a reason for being fired. Nonetheless, he did not question the basis for his firing either on August 17, or the following Monday, but merely accepted the pay due him and left. Even though Mr. Howard says he was not given a reason for his discharge and does not know why he was fired, he is convinced the discharge action was taken on the basis of his race because he always did his duty to the best of his ability and worked extra hours without pay on many occasions. It is because of his own satisfaction with his duty performance that he contends his discharge must have been racially motivated. However, he admits that no one from K-Mart Corporation or the store in which he worked ever gave him any indication of a desire to get rid of him or other black employees. Further, during the period of time he worked there, he never heard any racial comments or slurs from any employees, either upper management or low level, except from one young stockboy who used the term "nigger" frequently. He admits to being told on one occasion by an employee of the contractor that he had missed an area in his sweeping and had to go back and do it again and, on several occasions, he observed areas he missed and went back and cleaned them on his own, but aside from those instances, he contends no one from the corporation ever complained to him about the way he was performing his duties until the night of August 16, 1985, when he was interviewed by Mr. King about his performance. Even on that occasion, according to Petitioner, there were few specifics in Mr. King's comments. As he remembers it, Mr. King merely stated that he was deficient in keeping the floors, the walls, the restrooms, etc. clean but Mr. Howard states that these allegations are all lies. Mr. King, on the other hand, indicates that when Mr. Howard was hired, he was fully briefed on the nature and scope of his duties and was taken around the store and shown where and how things were to be done. At that time, the routine janitorial. duties such as wet mopping the floors, cleaning the restrooms and the cafeteria, and the other items of a similar nature were clearly made known to him. In the interim, Mr. King has personally discussed his performance, which was not up to par with Mr. Howard on at least three or four separate occasions, including in his comments such things as the stools not being kept clean, the floors not being mopped, spots being left on the mirrors. These duties and others of a similar nature were solely the responsibility of the Petitioner on the nights he worked. On each occasion, Mr. King found Petitioner's attitude to be negative. Mr. Howard gives the impression he feels he is performing satisfactorily and if management doesn't like the way he's doing his job, that's too bad. Though Mr. Howard contends that the problems he faced in accomplishing his duties were caused by the low availability of light in the store after closing hours due to the actions of the contractor's crew, he never complained to anyone about this. He didn't feel he had to say anything to the contractor's employees because he did not work for them and he felt that they could see the problem because it was obvious. He also contends that he cleaned the ladies' room as he was required to do and that any unsatisfactory condition may well have been caused by two white contractor's employees who would sleep in there from time to time. Again, he did not say anything to the contractor or anyone else about this because he thought what was happening was obvious. Petitioner's deficiencies and the counselings he received for them ultimately culminated in the personal interview reduced with a written memorandum on August 16, 1985. At that time, Petitioner was told that if he didn't improve, it would be necessary to get someone else to do the job. The personal interview on August 16, 1984 was the last effort on the part of K-Mart management to get Petitioner to do a better job. The description of his deficiencies, according to Mr. King, was placed on the interview form before the interview and was given to Petitioner to read at the time. Mr. King is quite certain that Petitioner looked at the form containing these comments and signed it. The personnel manager for the store was present at the time. When the work was not done properly that August 17, 1984 when he came to work, he recommended Petitioner's termination to the store manager. The other assistant manager, Mr. Avera, concurred in this recommendation on the basis that Petitioner was simply not getting the job done. Mr. King unequivocally denies that his recommendation for termination was racially motivated. He has, in the past, recommended only one other termination of an employee. This employee was white. The list of all employees terminated by this K-Mart store from August , 1983 through November, 1984, with reasons therefor, reflects that of the three other night maintenance personnel terminated during that period, two were white and one was black. The reasons for termination include sleeping on the job, unsatisfactory performance and drug possession. Of the fifteen total employees discharged during the period, at least ten were white, four were black, and one is not identified by race. On balance it is clear that Mr. Howard was terminated not as a result of any racial motivation but simply because he was a probationary employee and management was dissatisfied with his performance during the period of probation. Mr. Howard rejects Mr. King's evaluation of him on the basis that Mr. King did not personally supervise his work and that his analysis is based on matters outside his personal knowledge. He contends that his work was always done to the best of his ability and he does not accept the possibility that his performance could have resulted in his termination. Nonetheless, he does not know if any other black maintenance employees were discriminated against or, for that matter, if any other black employees in any job were discriminated against at this facility. Mr. Howard denies signing the separation report that was prepared on the night of his discharge even though, admittedly, it bears his signature. It is for this reason as well as because of his denial that any detail was included on the interview report when he signed it that a question is raised as to the accuracy of his analysis of the situation. In substance, there is ample evidence with specifics to establish the legitimate ground of inappropriate performance as the basis for his discharge and very little evidence other than his allegation to support a claim of racial prejudice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petition of Mose Howard, Jr. be denied. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of September, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED Mose Howard, Jr. 67 West Michael Gladden Blvd. Apopka, Florida 32703 Janice Paulsen, Esq. International Headquarters K-Mart Corporation 3100 West Big Beaver Road Troy, Michigan 48084 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F - Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Aurelio Durana General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F - Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to discrimination in the work environment by Respondent due to Petitioner's gender in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a payload operator by Respondent, a fertilizer manufacturer, at the time of her employment termination in August of 1996. Petitioner’s job duties included scooping fertilizer onto the pay loader, or front-end loader, and dropping the fertilizer into a “hopper” for subsequent loading into rail cars. Petitioner was expected, along with other payload operators, to perform other duties, including the cleaning of work areas when she ceased her loading function. During Petitioner's employment, a union contract existed between Respondent and the International Chemical Workers Union of which Petitioner was a member. The union contract governed overtime assignments, pay structure, shift structure, disciplinary/termination procedures and lay-offs, among other things. Respondent paid Petitioner and gave her breaks, contrary to her allegations, in the same manner as other employees. Governed by the union contract during the busy 1995-96 period, Respondent assigned work to employees on many different shifts. The plant operated 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Overtime requirements were based on business necessity. All employees worked the same number of hours regardless of the shift to which they were assigned. Petitioner never formally complained to anyone regarding displeasure with shift assignments. Neither salary nor number of work hours were affected by Petitioner’s assignments to different work shifts. Petitioner and other employees worked the same number of hours. Petitioner took breaks just like other employees. Changes from shift to shift experienced by Petitioner had nothing to do with her gender. The union contract governed how Respondent assigned overtime to its employees. The contract established a procedure that distributed overtime hours evenly and fairly among all of Respondent's employees. Those procedures were adhered to by Respondent and all employees were given overtime opportunities in an equal manner without regard to gender. On one occasion, Petitioner complained about her overtime assignment. She felt that she should have been called into work on a day when another operator (male) was called to come in and work. Respondent had attempted to contact Petitioner at contact numbers provided by Petitioner, without success. Safety equipment was distributed to all employees. Petitioner signed a check list indicating that she had received or knew how to request safety equipment. A pair of boots requested by Petitioner on one occasion had not yet arrived, but did arrive before the conclusion of the business day. The delay in delivery of Petitioner's requested boots to her was not related to her gender. Petitioner complained that adverse comments were made to her on the job by male workers. The alleged comments ranged from women should only do "clean up work" to "if you don't smoke or drink, we don't need you in this department." All of the alleged comments were roundly denied by Petitioner's co-workers at the final hearing. The credibility and candor of the testifying co-workers establishes that the adverse comments were not made. One incident in which Petitioner complained about her work assignment resulted in the general foreman's immediately contacting Respondent's human resource department. A meeting was then held with Petitioner to address the situation. The foreman felt confident that Petitioner would voice any additional concerns if the situation did not change. Petitioner never voiced further concerns to the foreman. Petitioner alleged that she was denied the right of free speech at a meeting attended by her, Respondent representatives, and union representatives. As established at the final hearing, she was told by the union representative to remain quiet and let him do the talking if Respondent representatives made Petitioner angry. However, the union representative did not instruct Petitioner to otherwise remain silent. Under the union contract, Respondent could terminate employees who received three reprimands within a 12-month period. Petitioner was aware of this procedure. Petitioner had numerous instances of work-related misconduct and received more than three reprimands in a 12-month period. Counseled on June 4, 1995, for damaging a payloader, Petitioner received a reprimand on July 18, 1995, for again damaging a payloader. Petitioner was counseled again on August 14, 1995, for failure to communicate with the shipping operator. On October 16, 1995, Petitioner received a second reprimand for poor work performance for mixing discarded product with good product, a violation of Respondent policy. Petitioner received her third reprimand on February 28, 1996, for loading hot fertilizer, a violation of Respondent's policy. The difficulty of loading fertilizer before it cooled was the later removal of the hot product which would harden upon cooling into a concrete-like substance. Petitioner was given a second chance and not fired upon receiving her third reprimand in a 12-month period. Management hoped that Petitioner would seek to improve her work performance. Petitioner refused to help clean the plant on July 10, 1996, and was counseled by her supervisor. On July 25, 1996, she received a verbal warning for failure to report an accident. In August of 1996, Petitioner received her final reprimand for failure to attend a company meeting at the proper time and for again loading hot product. Petitioner's employment was terminated. The various reprimands imposed on Petitioner were from different supervisors at different times. None of the reprimands were based on Petitioner's gender. After a complete review of Petitioner's case, the union representative determined that Respondent had properly terminated her employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Artie Johnson 2672 Northwest 6th Drive Jennings, Florida 32053 Mary L. Wakeman, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod, Pope, and Weaver, P.A. Post Office Drawer 229 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0229 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact On October 18, 1971, the Respondent through ordinance Number 201 (Respondent's Exhibit 1) established a civil service system. The ordinance in pertinent part provided that the civil service board shall "adopt, enact and amend a code of rules and regulations for each department covering, among other things, duties, hours of work, discipline and control, rules and regulations for appointment, employment, suspension and discharge of employees based on merit, efficiency, character and industry." Evidence reveals that the Civil Service Board took no action to "adopt, enact or amend a code" pursuant to Section 5 of ordinance Number 201 and, until the unilateral acts here complained of, Respondent had little in the way of written rules and regulations. However, within the Police Department there were "general rules of conduct" which had been promulgated by the Police Chief. (See G C Exhibit 8). Thereafter, the City Attorney drafted an ordinance amending ordinance Number 201 (see Respondent's Exhibit 8). Police Department representatives attended a meeting with the Mayor on June 15, 1975, for the purpose of discussing the proposed amendment to ordinance Number 201. After the meeting, George Slinkman, then President of the FOP, learned of its purpose and was given a rough draft of the proposed amendment. He was informed that the departmental representative had voiced objections to the Mayor concerning the amendment and on July 31, 1975, the proposed amendment came before the City Council at a workshop meeting. Present at that meeting was the President of the FOP who informed the council that the FOP was in favor of implementation of the original ordinance Number 201 rather than the proposed amendment to which the FOP objected. President Slinkman indicated that if the Respondent was proceeding with the new amendment as proposed, the FOP would like to provide some input into the proposal. No further action on the proposed amendment was taken by the City Council at that meeting nor did it appear on subsequent council agendas. On December 15, 1975, PERC certified the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative of Lauderhill Police Department Employees in the following unit. INCLUDED: Police Detectives, Officers and Sergeants. EXCLUDED: Police Lieutenants, Captains and the Chief. (See G.C. Ex. 7). Approximately two weeks later, the City Service Rules and Regulations, first part, through implementing resolution Number 511 (G.C. Ex.2) was presented to the City Council by the Mayor as an implementation of Civil Service Ordinance Number 201. The rules contained therein governed personnel recruitment and examinations for positions within the City. The Mayor informed the Council that there had been no employee input on such rules. While members of the Council received their copies approximately five days prior to the December 30th Council meeting, they were informed at the meeting that copies had not otherwise been distributed. City resolution no. 511 was passed by the City Council at the December 30, 1975, meeting and became effective immediately. Apart from the fact that witnesses George Slinkman, the former President of the FOP and President Elect Ralph Dean testified that Respondent failed to request input from the FOP on the rules as adopted, they also testified that no agent of the Fraternal Order of Police was made aware of the existence of the newly passed resolution until several days thereafter. (TR.401-402, 420-422). On or about April 22, 1976, Richard Witt, FOP State President, wrote to Mayor Cipolloni advising that he had been asked to represent the Charging Party in collective bargaining negotiations with the Respondent. Witt requested a meeting with the Mayor for the purpose of discussing negotiations. In response, the Mayor suggested the parties meet during the morning of April 28, in the Mayor's office. On Tuesday night, April 27, the Mayor introduced the City Service Rules and Regulations, second part, along with implementing resolution Number 571 to the City Council. This document contained numerous proposed changes in terms and conditions of bargaining unit employees including changes in appointments, lay-offs re-employment, evaluations, physical and mental exams, weight regulations, hours of work, vacations, holidays, sick leave, suspensions, demotions and grievance procedures. The Council was informed that employees had not provided input on the rules although the Mayor expressed his understanding gained from a recently attended labor relations seminar that Respondent needed a base for forthcoming negotiations with the Charging Party. When it was learned that the Civil Service Board had not been consulted with regard to the document, the resolution was tabled and Civil Service Board members were invited to be present the following evening when it would be brought up again, Richard Witt, the Mayor, and Police Chief Ramsdell met as scheduled on the morning of April 28, 1976. Witt requested that prior to collective bargaining the City furnish him with budget documents and other materials pertaining to police officers' health program, welfare and other employment working conditions. The Mayor responded, according to Witt, that it would take some time for him to assemble such but that the information would be forthcoming. That night, the City Council passed resolution no. 571, which adopted the City Service Rules and 7Regulations, save the sick leave policies which became effective January 1, 1977. (See G.C. Ex. 6). Ralph Dean, the President of the Charging Party testified that Respondent was not requesting input from the FOP on the rules and regulations, second part, nor had FOP representatives been furnished copies of the documents prior to their adoption. Additionally, he testified that the Charging Party was not notified of the pending adoption of the document and did not obtain a copy of such until after passage on April 28, 1976. Corroborative testimony on this point was given by Councilwoman Hatcher and employees Dean and Slinkman. The parties' first negotiation session was held on May 22, 1976 and at that time the Charging Party advised the Mayor and the City Attorney that in their opinion, some of their proposals were in violation of existing City ordinances, including the rules and regulations first and second parts. Two days thereafter, on May 24, 1976, the Charging Party filed with the Commission the instant unfair labor practice charges. The parties were again scheduled to meet on May 28, 1976. Upon receipt of the unfair labor charges, the City Council met with the Mayor in "executive session" and it was then decided that Respondent would "suspend bargaining" until the charges were disposed of. The Mayor arrived at the May 28th session and informed the Charging Party that Respondent would not return to the bargaining table until the pending charges had been resolved. A second charge was filed against the Respondent alleging essentially that the Respondent's suspension of bargaining constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith within the meaning of Section 447.501(a)(c) of the Act. The evidence also reveals that on approximately March 30, 1976, the Respondent adopted a pay plan for its police department employees who are in the bargaining unit in which the Charging Party was certified to represent. The pay plan, as adopted, represented a reduction in the existing pay plan. In adopting this plan, Frank C. Brown Associates, a management consulting firm, was commissioned to conduct a study to devise a pay plan for all city employees. The evidence reveals that the wage and job classification plan prepared by Frank C. Brown and Associates was not compiled based on any joint efforts by the Charging Party who had been certified to exclusively represent the police unit employees. Specifically, Ralph Dean objected to the new pay plan and in fact, Mayor Cipolloni testified that he gave no direction to Frank C. Brown and Associates to seek any input from the Charging Party and/or its agents. Based on the Charging Party's objections to the pay plan as submitted by Frank C. Brown on February 9, 1976, one pay grade was added to each of the ranks. The plan was submitted to the City Council on March 30, 1976 and was made effective immediately for all employees. Representatives of the Charging Party were present at this meeting and objected to the implementation thereof to no avail. Thereafter, and during the second negotiation session on May 28, 1976, the Respondent suspended negotiations with the Charging Party based on the fact that the Charging Party had filed unfair labor practice charges with the Commission.
Conclusions The essence of the collective bargaining relationship between public employers and its employees in the State of Florida is outlined in Chapter 447.309(1), Florida Statutes (1975). The dictates there mandates a bilateral decision making process which becomes effective after an employee organization has been certified by the Commission. At that juncture, the public employer is no longer free to make unilateral determinations with respect to items which are considered "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment". See for example District School Board of Hillsborough County and Hillsborough C.T.A., PERC order no. 76U-1181 (October 4, 1976). The Charging Party and/or its agents objected to the City Service Rules and Regulations first and second parts each time they were brought up before the Council. Respondent at no time requested any input from the Charging Party's agents respecting its position in fulfilling its obligation to represent the unit employees it was certified to represent. The Respondent's affirmative defense that the Charging Party's members were advised and participated in the enactment of the City Service Rules and Regulations and the pay scale as it relates to unit employees was considered. However, when an examination of the positive duty placed on the Respondent as it relates to its duty to bargain with the certified representative, such a position fails to withstand scrutiny and amounts to conduct representing an abrogation of its duty to meet with and confer with the designated certified representative. Absent an impasse, necessity or an express or implied waiver (all of which are absent here), the employer was expressly obligated to refrain from taking the unilateral action which it took on December 30, 1975, on March 30, 1976 and on May 28, 1976. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any evidence which would permit the employer to unilaterally act as stated above, the conclusion is inescapable that the Respondent consciously abrogated its duty as set forth in Chapter 447.309(1), F.S., and engaged in conduct violative of the Act.
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it be ordered to post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, on forms to be provided by the Commission, a notice substantially providing: that it will bargain collectively, upon request, with the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative of the unit employees as stated above; that it will not make unilateral changes in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of said employees and that it will not suspend bargaining or fail to meet and bargain collectively with the exclusive bargaining representative unless directed to do so by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Irving Weinsoff, Esquire Suite 804, Roberts Building 28 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Bruce A. Leinback, Staff Attorney for William E. Powers, Jr., General Counsel 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Anthony J. Titone, Esquire 6299 West Sunrise Boulevard Suite 205 Sunrise, Florida 33313
The Issue Petitioner has alleged that Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and its predecessor statute by discriminating against him based on his age and national origin in the following: denial of promotion to liftstation mechanic; disparate treatment with regard to training opportunities, transfers, overtime opportunities and disciplinary actions; ridicule and other demeaning actions, such as being escorted to the restroom; and other harassment in retaliation for his complaints. Both parties have requested attorney's fees and costs and it is necessary to determine if such award is appropriate. The primary issue for disposition is whether the alleged violations occurred, and, if so, what relief is appropriate. Although other actions, including termination, have occurred since the complaint was filed, the parties have concurred that those actions are not the subject of this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Emiliano Santos was born in Puerto Rico in 1944 and came to the United States in 1964. Spanish is his first language, and, in his words, he has been struggling with English since 1964. Mr. Santos was employed by the City of Melbourne on January 8, 1990. His first job was as a custodian helper in the auditorium. Approximately six months later he applied for positions as Maintenance Worker I and Maintenance II in the city sewer department; he was given the Maintenance II position, the higher level, because of his employment with the city. Robert Klaproth is the Melbourne water and sewer administrator in charge of the day-to-day operations of the water and sewer division. Tom Hogeland is the water and sewer operations superintendent for the City of Melbourne and has been in that position for approximately five years. Under his supervision is Greg Williams, supervisor of the sewer collection division, who in turn directly supervises Doug Hammond, the liftstation maintenance foreman, and Bob Lyons, the maintenance and construction crewleader. Under those two latter individuals are technical workers such as liftstation mechanics, the liftstation electrician, equipment operators, and other crew leaders. At the entry-level or laborer level are the maintenance workers I and II and utility system service workers. As of January 1992, that entry level in the sewer collection division included, among others, Mr. Santos, William Spann, Joseph Concepcion, and Martin Koehler. The Liftstation Mechanic Promotion Some time in the summer of 1992, an opening came up in a liftstation mechanic position; and Tom Hogeland was directly involved in the recruitment and hiring process. Five applicants sought the position: Mr. Santos, William Spann, Elmer Cross, Oscar Vega and Cecil Smith. The position was advertised in-house as a promotional opportunity. It called for five years mechanical experience in the repair and maintenance of pumps, motors and other associated mechanical equipment. Each applicant was given a copy of the job description in advance of the interview. At the individual interviews Tom Hogeland described the physical condition of the job and asked the individual whether he was familiar with the position description. He also asked four questions to determine the applicant's basic familiarity with pumps and equipment used in liftstations, and he asked each about his background and experience. Of the five applicants, Tom Hogeland found only two had the minimum five years' experience: William Spann and Elmer Cross. Hogeland verified the experience of each applicant. William Spann had claimed experience in the Marine Corps and Hogeland called and spoke with someone in the Corps who was familiar with Spann's experience. Hogeland verified Elmer Cross' experience with his city supervisor, as Cross was working in the Melbourne wastewater treatment plant. Emeliano Santos claimed on his application that he had the requisite experience in a prior job with the John Deere company. When Hogeland called the company he was told that Mr. Santos had not worked as a mechanic, but was a machinist, assembling and operating machines. He had no pump mechanic experience at John Deere. Because of his seniority with the city, Hogeland recommended Elmer Cross for the opening. However, it was not a promotion for Cross and he told Hogeland that he decided to turn down the transfer. The position was then offered to William Spann, who accepted it. At hearing, Mr. Santos admitted that he did not have the requisite five years' experience. He claimed, however, that William Spann did not have the experience either. William Spann is a white male in his 20's who was hired as a maintenance worker I in 1990 in the sewer division. His prior experience was as a maintenance sergeant at Camp LeJeune, including the responsibility for maintaining and servicing the wells and pumps at the facility. This military experience and his experience with the city, when he was assigned to assist the liftstation mechanic, combined to provide him the requisite minimum five years. Contrary to Mr. Santo's claim that he was the only one who was quizzed on his knowledge, both William Spann and Oscar Vega (an Hispanic) testified that their interviews included the questions described by Tom Hogeland. Training Opportunities The city sponsors or pays for its employees' attendance at various training sessions and tries to insure that everyone has an opportunity for such training each year. Tom Hogeland generally makes the final decisions where there is a dispute about who can participate. As required by union contract, the educational opportunities are posted on the bulletin board, and commonly there is no dispute because selections for attendees are made on the basis of seniority and rotation. Selections are also made based on whether the opportunity relates to an individual's job. Mr. Santos alleges that he and other minorities were passed over in favor of white employees who were given training opportunities. He was selected, and attended, a pump school in Orlando, but he contends that the city denied any employee's attendance at another pump school when a number of minorities signed up for the school. Robert Klaproth has cancelled training opportunities twice, both in the wastewater treatment division. On one occasion the opportunity was posted and employees applied, but the school could not be approved because there was no money for it in the budget. On another occasion twenty people signed up, and when the union could not resolve who should go, the opportunity was cancelled. In neither case was race or ethnicity of the employees an issue. There is no evidence that race, age or ethnicity has been an issue in any decision by the city in providing training opportunities. Over-time Opportunities There are three types of overtime for employees in the sewer division. The first is a voluntary on-call overtime for which employees sign up and take one week at a time. During that week the employee forfeits his free time and must be available for emergency response. The second type of overtime is the scheduled emergency overtime which occurs when repairs need to be scheduled after hours when there is reduced demand on the system, or when an emergency occurs which cannot be handled by the on-call person, alone. The third type of overtime occurs when a job is not finished by quitting time and the crew needs to stay over to get the system back together. Generally the crew who starts the job has the opportunity to stay and finish it. Overtime is voluntary and is granted on rotation. The list is posted, by seniority, and when the individual's name comes up, the opportunity is offered, and if it is declined, the individual's name goes back to the bottom of the list. Overtime is compensated at time and a half, either in pay or compensatory time off, at the employee's option. There was a period during 1991 or 1992 when Mr. Santos declined overtime. He claims he declined because it was not being handled fairly, that the rotation was not being followed and that he was being passed over. Aside from some evidence that the overtime postings were removed from the employees' bulletin board for a brief period by some unknown person, there is no evidence that the union-prescribed rotation system was not followed. The 1992 records maintained by Greg Williams reflect a substantial amount of overtime available to Mr. Santos and no evidence that he or the other minorities in the division were being passed over. In 1993, Mr. Santos was provided more than the average amount of overtime hours provided to other employees in the sewer division. Disciplinary Incidents Mr. Santos has been disciplined on several occasions. On one occasion, he, Joseph Concepcion (an Hispanic) and Perry McThenney (Black) were disciplined for leaving the city limits in the city truck to buy some work shoes for Mr. Concepcion. Neither Mr. Concepcion nor Mr. McThenney considered the discipline unwarranted; they understood they violated city policy and did not consider the discipline as discriminatory. On another occasion, incentive points which were used to obtain a raise in pay were removed by the city after it learned that Mr. Santos forged the signatures of his supervisor and other employees on documents related to those incentive points. Mr. Santos freely admits the forgery but dismisses its significance, as he claims he was attending the classes on his own time, and received academic credit for the classes. These were classes taken in coordination with an on-job training program which required the periodic certification by the city that Mr. Santos was working as an electrical apprentice. In October 1992, Mr. Santos was given a written reprimand and leave without pay for taking a full day off for a medical appointment that was approved for a half-day. That discipline was rescinded after Mr. Santos explained to Robert Klaproth that he needed the day to go to the doctor, go to the bank to get money for his prescription and to buy the prescription. Other Hispanic employees have been disciplined from time to time. There is a union grievance procedure in place and it has been used by Mr. Santos and others. In some instances the grievance has been upheld and the discipline rescinded; in other cases the discipline has been upheld. No evidence was presented that the disciplinary process or grievance process have been used by the city to discriminate against Hispanics or other minorities; that is, no competent evidence was presented that white employees received less or no discipline for similar infractions. Ridicule, Harassment or Retaliation Claims Sewer collection division supervisor, Greg Williams, received complaints from other workers, including Joseph Concepcion, that Mr. Santos was taking the truck to make telephone calls or to go to the bathroom and the crew was left at the field site without a vehicle or tools. He also heard complaints that Mr. Santos was leaving to go to the bathroom right after the crew left the breakroom. Greg Williams spoke with crew leader, Bobby Lyons, about telling everyone, and not just Mr. Santos, that the crew members should check with the others before leaving to see if anyone else needed to go; and to be sure that tools and equipment were left at the job site. Greg Williams did not instruct Bobby Lyons to "escort" Mr. Santos to the bathroom. Bobby Lyons did go with Mr. Santos to the bathroom on two occasions after that. The record does not reflect whether Mr. Lyons also went to the bathroom or had other errands to run at the same time. The crews in the city water and sewer division are a diverse group, comprised of whites, blacks and Hispanics. The work can be rough and difficult, and there is ample opportunity for banter and joking to get out of hand. Mr. Santos was involved on several occasions in such verbal spats and was orally chastised, along with the other employee. In the course of one verbal exchange, he called Martin Koehler a "prick" and Koehler called him an "asshole." These are not racial or ethnic epithets. Mr. Santos also complained that Joseph Concepcion was calling him names. Mr. Concepcion, a Hispanic, was not harassing Mr. Santos because of his ethnicity. Two employees in particular in the water and sewer division were commonly heard to say "nigger," or to call Mr. Santos "Puerto Rican": Mike Carouso and Martin Koehler. When this language was brought to the attention of the supervisors, the men were reprimanded, either in writing (in Carouso's case) or verbally. When the union steward, Robert Bray, complained to Robert Klaproth that ethnic remarks were being made, Mr. Klaproth immediately convened a general meeting of the employees in the division and made it clear that such language would not be tolerated. Although it is obvious that the meeting did not cure the problem entirely, the name-calling and epithets did not take place in front of the supervisors. The city's policy is to discipline employees who engage in language that is derogatory to minorities and the city has taken severe action against two high-ranking employees, a police sergeant and a fire battalion chief, for single incidents of such language. Mr. Santos' claims of retaliation are not substantiated. The incidents of disciplinary action which he described were justified, or in the case of the medical leave, was properly rescinded after he explained the circumstances to his supervisors. None of the grievance proceedings described in Mr. Santos' testimony and in copious documents received in evidence, including transcripts of the proceedings, support his claims of retaliation or harassment. The Experience Of Other Minorities Carlos Colon is a sixty-two year old Hispanic employee in the city's park department. He was hired nine years ago, when he was fifty-three. He was disciplined once for accidently damaging a city tractor that he was driving, and he failed to receive a promotion for which he considered himself qualified, but he does not believe that the city or his supervisor discriminated against him. The top manager in the parks department is Felix Rodriquez, a Puerto Rican. Joseph Concepcion, also Puerto Rican, considers his ethnic background an asset because of his bi-lingual ability. He has been regularly promoted in his seven years with the city. He has not observed discrimination in the choice of employees for training, for promotions or for overtime. He has heard Martin Koehler use derogatory language regarding blacks and Hispanics, but not directly toward Mr. Santos and not when any supervisors were around. When he heard Mr. Koehler, a co-worker talking like that, Mr. Concepcion walked into the breakroom at lunch and invited anyone who did not like Puerto Ricans and blacks to come outside and "talk" to him. No one came out; and as far as he was concerned, that was the end of the issue. Perry McThenney is a black employee who has worked for the city for eight years and has been promoted three times. He has not experienced nor observed discrimination in promotions, overtime and training opportunities. Robert Bray, the union steward, is a black city employee. Mr. Santos complained frequently to him about racial slurs against his Hispanic origin but never complained about age discrimination. The one time that Mr. Bray went to Mr. Klaproth with the racial slur complaint, a meeting was held the next day to inform the entire division staff that such language would not be tolerated. Mr. Bray believes that the city should come up with some kind of sensitivity program, but he has not actually suggested that remedy to anyone yet. The employees whom Mr. Brag was aware had used derogatory language were the same two mentioned by Mr. Santos and others: Martin Koehler and Michael Carouso. Pedro Diaz, an Hispanic, was passed over for promotion in favor of a sixty year old white employee. At the time, Mr. Diaz felt he should have gotten the promotion because of his longer seniority with the city; however, he conceded that the successful employee could have had better experience. Mr. Diaz has been promoted by the city since then. Mr. Diaz encountered a series of problems with a supervisor who is no longer employed by the city. Since that supervisor left, no other management employee has given him a hard time or discriminated against him because of his ethnic background. Oscar Vega was born in Cuba and has worked for the city approximately 6-1/2 years. He has been promoted during that period. He has also applied for positions which he did not get; in one case, he was not qualified and agrees that the best person got the job; in another case, he filed a grievance with the help of Robert Bray and received the job. He feels the city has treated him fairly and has not discriminated against him based on his Hispanic origin. Summary of Findings The City of Melbourne has not discriminated against Emiliano Santos based on his age or ethnic origin. The demeanor and credibility of the witness have, in part, contributed to this finding. Specifically, the hearing officer has considered, and rejected, the suggestion that the presence of Robert Klaproth, as Respondent's representative, throughout the proceeding, influenced the testimony of the several black and Hispanic employees called as witnesses by Mr. Santos. There is no doubt that Mr. Santos is bitter and frustrated with his employment experience with the city. He has been subjected to other discipline or personnel action which, by stipulation, was not at issue in this proceeding. He has engaged in crude and disruptive verbal exchanges with co-workers. Whether he was the instigator of those exchanges or not, there is no evidence that they were racially or ethnically motivated. He has been disciplined for good cause, or when he explained the circumstances (as with the medical leave), the discipline was rescinded. He was passed over for a promotion, but did not have the requisite experience, and, as best as the city could determine, the successful applicant did have the experience. There was uncontroverted evidence that at least two non-supervisory employees have used racially derogatory or abusive language in the work place. They were disciplined, and the supervisors attempted to address the problem with a general meeting. Although the language continued, it was not because such was tolerated by the supervisors, and it was not so pervasive as to create an abusive or offensive work environment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief dated February 28, 1994, be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: James L. Reinman, Esquire 1825 S. Riverview Drive Melbourne, FL 32901 Susan K. W. Erlenbach, Esquire ERLENBACH AND ERLENBACH, P.A. 400 Julia Street Titusville, Florida 32796 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice and, if so, determination of the relief to which the Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Allison M. Huth, is an adult female person. At all times material to this proceeding the Petitioner has been a resident of the State of Florida. The Respondent, National Admark Corporation, is an advertising agency and publishing company. At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was doing business from offices located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On the morning of June 12, 1998, a Mr. William Rufrano, who was at that time a boyfriend of the Petitioner, took the Petitioner with him to the Fort Lauderdale offices of the Respondent. At that time, Mr. Rufrano had some type of arrangement with the Respondent pursuant to which he worked in the field making sales calls in an effort to sell the Respondent's products.1 The Petitioner's reason for going with her boyfriend to the Respondent's offices on June 12, 1998, was to find out more about the company in order to decide whether she wanted to work for the company. Upon arriving at the Respondent's offices on June 12, 1998, Mr. Rufrano introduced the Petitioner to his "boss" and to several of the other people who worked in the Respondent's offices. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Rufrano left the Respondent's offices and spent most of the rest of the day meeting prospective customers and making sales presentations outside of the Respondent's offices. The Petitioner remained at the Respondent's offices for most of the day. The Petitioner spent the day making calls to prospective customers. She attempted to have each of the prospective customers make an appointment for a salesperson to visit and make a sales presentation for the Respondent's products.2 The Petitioner never signed any paper work with the Respondent regarding any business relationship between herself and the Respondent. Specifically, she did not sign or submit an application for employment with the Respondent, she did not sign or enter into an employment contract with the Respondent, and she did not sign or enter into an independent contractor agreement with the Respondent. The Petitioner did not have an understanding with the Respondent as to what her hours of work would be or as to how many hours she would work each day, each week, or each month. The Petitioner did not have an understanding with the Respondent as to what her compensation would be for making telephone calls.3 In sum: The Petitioner and the Respondent never entered into any agreement by means of which the Petitioner became either an employee or an independent contractor of the Respondent. During the course of her day at the Respondent's offices, the Petitioner had occasion to seek assistance from Mr. Anthony Tundo, who was the Respondent's Sales Manager, and was the person the Petitioner had been told to contact if she had any questions. Following the Petitioner's request for assistance, Mr. Tundo engaged in a number of inappropriate, unwanted, and ungentlemanly acts that caused the Petitioner to become very upset and uncomfortable. The worst of Mr. Tundo's acts that day are described as follows in the Petitioner's Exhibit 8, a letter signed by the Petitioner and her boyfriend a few days after the events on June 12, 1998: Mr. Tundo began stroking Allison's [Petitioner's] head very softly and used the excuse that he was trying to pick something out of her hair. Mr. Tundo trapped Allison against the coffee counter in the hallway. He then pressed himself, including his erection [,] against her body which was against the counter. He then proceeded to kiss her on her forehead and cheeks. When Allison was in Mr. Tundo's office, he told her to take a look at something he was doing. Not wanting to go behind the desk, Allison leaned over the front of the desk to look. As she did so, Mr. Tundo stared directly down Allison's blouse and commented[,] "what a nice pair of tits you have." Allison quickly stood up, and proceeded to walk around behind Mr. Tundo's desk figuring he couldn't look down her blouse. As she was leaning on his desk watching what he was doing, he began to stroke her fingers and hands. He then told her to turn around. Allison did so thinking there was a flaw or something wrong with her outfit. He then grabbed her firmly by the backs of her arms and positioned her[,] which made her feel extremely uncomfortable. After doing so, he uttered the word[,] "there." He then told Allison[,] "You have very, very nice legs," and "You have a very beautiful ass[,]" and proceeded to pat Allison on her rear end. When Allison was sitting on the couch in Mr. Tundo's office, she got up to go to the ladies' room. Mr. Tundo told her to sit back down. Presuming Mr. Tundo wanted to tell her some more things related to business, she sat back down. Mr. Tundo told her to "do that again." When Allison questioned what he meant, Mr. Tundo told her that he wanted her to uncross her legs (like she would have to do in order to stand up) again so he could see what it looks like inside her legs and up her skirt. Mr. Tundo was also moving his hands in an outward motion as he was telling her these things. After Allison left Mr. Tundo's office, he continued to follow her around the office building. As he was following her, he continually told her that she has "such a sexy walk," and "such a nice ass." He followed her into the conference room next to the coffee maker. He then proceeded to rub her shoulders, moaning softly and breathing heavy as he did so. He then told her that she seemed "tense." There is no competent substantial evidence that Mr. Tundo had ever previously engaged in conduct such as that to which he subjected the Petitioner. There is no competent substantial evidence that Mr. Tundo had ever previously engaged in any type of conduct that would create a sexually hostile or abusive work environment. There is no competent substantial evidence that the Respondent's management had ever been advised that Mr. Tundo had previously engaged in any conduct that would create a sexually hostile or abusive work environment. There is no competent substantial evidence that the Respondent's management had ever received any prior complaints that Mr. Tundo had engaged in conduct such as that to which he subjected the Petitioner, or that he had engaged in any other type of conduct that would create a sexually hostile or abusive work environment.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order in this case dismissing the Petition for Relief and denying all relief sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2001.
