The Issue Whether the decision by Respondent, Bay County, Florida, Board of County Commissioners (the “County” or the “Board”), to approve the bid proposal submitted by Intervenor, Williams Communication, Inc. (“Williams”), should be reversed in favor of granting the proposal by Petitioner, Motorola Solutions, Inc. (“Motorola”).
Findings Of Fact (Findings of fact 1 through 24 were stipulated to by the parties and were included in their Prehearing Stipulation.) Motorola is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located at 1303 East Algonquin Road, Schaumburg, Illinois. The County is the legislative and governing body of Bay County, Florida, pursuant to Article VIII, Section (1)(e) of the Florida Constitution, and chapter 125, Florida Statutes, and has its principal business address at 840 West 11th Street, Panama City, Florida. The County contracted with Tusa Consulting Services, II, LLC (“Tusa”) to support its request for proposal (“RFP”) process. On July 31, 2015, the Board issued RFP #15-32, entitled “P25 Public Safety Radio System.” Subsequently, the County issued six addenda to the RFP. RFP section 1.2.2.18, entitled “Evaluation Process and Criteria,” described the process that the County planned to follow in evaluating responses. Motorola, Williams and one other entity timely submitted proposals for consideration. On October 15, 2015, the County ultimately disqualified one proposer, and considered only Motorola and Williams for award. Tusa employees Nick Tusa and Dean Hart performed the technical evaluation of the proposals. On December 21, 2015, the County announced its intent to award the contract to Williams, indicating total scores of 85.21 for Williams and 84.07 for Motorola. On December 22, 2015, Motorola filed a notice of intent to protest. Upon review of Motorola’s protest, the County concluded that the relative weights assigned to evaluation criteria during the scoring process did not match the relative weights indicated in RFP section 1.2.2.18. Applying the correct weights changed the total scores to 84.18 for Motorola and 83.95 for Williams. Upon recommendation of Tusa, the County rounded the total scores to 84 and deemed the proposals a tie. County staff proposed to reject all proposals and re- advertise the RFP. On January 5, 2016, the Board of County Commissioners considered the staff recommendation. By a 3-2 vote, the Commission accepted Tusa’s recommendation to round the scores and to commence contract negotiations with Williams. Motorola filed another written challenge to the County’s January 5 action, which it characterized as an award of the contract to Williams. On January 19, 2016, the Board of County Commissioners again considered the RFP process. County staff again recommended rejecting all proposals and re-advertising the procurement. After a motion to continue negotiations with Williams failed by a vote of 3-2, the Commission passed a motion to hire an outside attorney with experience and expertise in the area of procurement law to advise the County. On March 15, 2016, the Commission voted to continue negotiations with Williams. On March 17, 2016, Motorola filed an intent to protest the Commissioners’ vote of March 15, 2016. On March 21, 2016, the County responded to Motorola’s various pending protests, concluding that the protests were premature because the County had not yet made an award decision. On March 31, 2016, Motorola filed an Amended and Supplemental Formal Written Protest Petition. On April 19, 2016, the Board of County Commissioners voted to authorize County staff to post a Notice of Award to Williams and to accept protests to the decision prior to entering into any contract with Williams. On April 21, 2016, Motorola filed another intent to protest the notice of award. On May 4, 2016, Motorola filed its Consolidated Formal Protest Petition. On May 10, 2016, the County procurement director, Wendi Sellers, issued the County’s written decision denying Motorola’s protest. The P25 Public Safety Radio System in the RFP was intended to be a turnkey system that met or exceeded all requirements. The RFP contained a number of important and necessary elements, including but not limited to: 1) Portable units must have a one quarter (1/4) wavelength antenna; 2) Portable and mobile radio devices must meet minimum electrical specifications; 3) Portable and mobile radio units must include separate volume and channel select knobs; 4) Microwave link segments must have a 40 dB flat fade margin and be designed with a microwave loop that excludes any single point of failure; and 5) The proposed network must be able to migrate to P25 Phase II in the future without adding new hardware. The County had some concerns about Motorola’s response relating to some of the required items. Clearly, the portable radio units did not have 1/4 wavelength antennas; the radios Motorola proposed had 1/2 wavelength antennas which are much longer and bulkier, and less easy to use. Motorola indicated that it could address that problem “during negotiations” with the County, but its response to the RFP was definitely deficient. There is some question whether Motorola’s proposed radios met the minimum electrical specifications for portable radios. While the datasheet for the radios included by Motorola in its bid proposal was out of date, Motorola maintains that the radios it specifically meant to include would meet the standards. The hand-held radios proposed by Motorola did not come equipped with individual knobs for volume control and channel selection. Instead, the radio proposed by Motorola contained a knob for volume and a switch for channel selection. Again, Motorola said it would address the discrepancy with the County during negotiations, if necessary. Motorola’s proposal for meeting the 40 dB flat fade margin was suspect. The applicant suggested that if there was a “fix” needed, it would do so without cost to the County. As to the loop/ring design without a single point of failure, again Motorola’s proposal appeared somewhat deficient. One of the proposed sites on the system, in Mexico Beach, spurs off from the rest of the system, leaving only one link to and from the site. That could result in a single point of failure. It appears that Motorola would need to add hardware in order to do the complete upgrade to Phase II, and no costs were included in its proposal to cover that need. This resulted in a cost estimate lower than Williams, but the lower cost was not justified. Tusa assigned two experienced employees to evaluate the technical portions of the bid proposals. They assigned points to literally hundreds of line items on their scoresheets, totaled scores for each section, and weighted the section scores in accordance with section 1.2.2.18 of the RFP. The section scores were then totaled and multiplied by .70 (i.e., 70 percent) to obtain a final technical score for consideration. That figure was added to the final cost score figure and combined for an “Overall Project Score” for each proposal. Tusa incorrectly weighted some of the scores, resulting in a complaint from Motorola. Those errors were corrected and revised Overall Project Scores were assigned. Upon completion of its error corrections, Tusa found the Overall Project Scores to be “mathematically identical,” i.e., 84.175 for Motorola and 83.950 for Williams, a difference of about two tenths of a point. Never before had Tusa seen scores so close in an RFP situation. The scores were close enough that the County considered rejecting all the bids and starting over with the RFP process. However, so much time and work had gone into the project that another resolution was sought. So, instead of rejecting both bids, Tusa recommended rounding the scores to the nearest whole number, resulting in a tie score of 84. Inasmuch as Williams’ technical score was higher than Motorola’s, and the Motorola cost projection was suspect due to possible omissions of costs, the County decided to negotiate with Williams. Motorola timely filed a protest to challenge that decision. Motorola had numerous concerns about the scoring process used by Tusa and the County during the proposal evaluation conducted by Tusa. First, Motorola objected to the rounding of scores. However, both Tusa and the County justified the concept as a means of effectuating a faster and final resolution, which was preferable to starting over. The rationale for rounding the scores was explained credibly by Tusa and accepted as reasonable by the County. Motorola complained that while the RFP did not specifically allow an applicant to get more points by showing it “exceeded” the criteria, Williams received scores higher than the maximum for some sections. However, it is evident from Motorola’s own submission that it also designated areas of its proposal as exceeding the requirements. In fact, Motorola had prior experience in bids evaluated by Tusa as to the ability to exceed a criterion. Motorola did not receive as many “exceeds” as Williams during the review, but that was based on the quality of the proposals, not favoritism to one applicant versus the other. Motorola pointed out some scoring errors made by Tusa in the evaluation of the proposals. For example, points were awarded by one evaluator for a section that did not even exist, i.e., section 3.2.5. The other evaluator did not make that mistake. When the mistake was pointed out, the evaluator inexplicably corrected it by giving both applicants a score of 1 on that non-existent section. On section 6.1, which should result in a score of 0 or 1, Tusa awarded Williams a 2. Both of the errors were corrected when pointed out, but show some level of sloppiness by Tusa in its evaluation. However, neither of the errors was significant enough to warrant rejection of the final decision. There were, for example, other errors made by the evaluators that benefitted Motorola instead of Williams. A primary complaint by Motorola had to do with how the cost portions of the proposals were weighted. RFP section provides, in pertinent part: The County plans to use a two-step process when evaluating Proposals. Technical and Pricing Proposals shall be evaluated separately using a weighted point system. Out of a maximum 100% Overall Project Score, 70% shall be allocated to Technical Proposal evaluation scores with 30% being allocated to system cost over the life of the system (initial cost + one year warranty plus additional 14 years of maintenance and operational costs (15 year warranty support). * * * Proposals that are determined responsive and complete will be evaluated by an Evaluation Committee comprised of three (3) Tusa Consulting Services personnel. The Proposal scoring the highest will be submitted to the County with recommendations to begin negotiations with the corresponding Vendor. Technical Proposals will be graded in the following areas, listed in relative order of importance, with respect to the requirements as outlined in this RFP: Performance, coverage, capability, and versatility (30%). Reliability, redundancy, and warranty (20%). Proposer qualifications, history of product support, RFP deviations (20%). Quality of maintenance, response time, availability of service parts (10%). Interoperability, and proposed timeframe for project completion (5%). Proposed Training (5%). System installation, and implementation planning (5%). Organization, scope, and detail of proposal (5%). The scored results of this Technical Evaluation will be multiplied by 0.70, thereby yielding a weighted technical project-total score. The results of this portion of the Evaluation shall be submitted to the Bay County Purchasing Department. The cost Proposals will comprise of 30% of the total Proposal score. * * * The Total Cost will be calculated by comparing the relative cost differences between responsive Cost Proposals and evaluating the Proposal costs by simple percentage on the total cost of procurement and annual operation. The combination will be determined at the sole discretion of the County. The Proposer Submittal receiving the highest Overall Project Score shall be considered for the Contract Award, by the Evaluation Committee, subject to Bay County’s Total Cost Analysis set forth below. Further, the County retains the right to reject all bids for any and all reasons, in the exercise of its sole discretion. In the case of a tied Overall Project Score, the Consultant shall recommend the Proposal Submittal having the highest Technical Proposal evaluation score. Motorola contends that Tusa improperly assigned the cost scores under this section. Tusa took both applicants’ cost projections ($17,569,299 by Motorola; $20,335,354 by Williams), totaled them, and divided each projection by the total. This resulted in a figure of 46.35 for Motorola, 53.65 for Williams. Those numbers were divided by .30 (i.e., 30 percent) for a final cost score of 16.10 for Motorola and 13.91 for Williams. Those scores were added to their technical scores for their Overall Project Scores (which were ultimately deemed mathematically identical). Motorola contends that at least one of the parties’ cost proposals should have had a score of 30 under the terms of RFP section 1.2.2.18, but that contention is not persuasive. Tusa credibly explained how the cost score calculation worked. An expert witness, Dr. Roberts, supported the Tusa method, although he agreed it was but one way of approaching the issue. Another expert, Dr. Amidon, constructed a totally different method which, though reasonable, was not sufficiently proven to be more reasonable than the method Tusa used. Motorola also took exception to the fact that only two evaluators reviewed the projects even though the RFP notes that a “committee comprised of three” would review the proposals. At the beginning, there were three Tusa employees involved, but one of them had to recuse himself due to a relationship with one of the vendors. While he remained involved in a clerical capacity, he did not evaluate the proposals directly. His removal from the evaluation process and resulting two-man evaluation was completely understandable. All in all, the review process and the final decision were consistent with the spirit of the RFP, even if mistakes were made. The County’s decision to negotiate with Williams was justified.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by Respondent because of his race.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, Tredit Tire & Wheel Co., Inc., operated a specialty tire and wheel assembly facility in Plant City, Florida. Petitioner was employed by Tredit at that facility. On October 10, 1995, Ronald Pike, Tredit’s vice- president for operations, paid a routine visit to Tredit’s Plant City facility. Somewhat concerned over the apparent inadequate level of production and higher costs being experienced there, Mr. Pike called a meeting of the entire 15-member staff. During the course of the meeting, in an attempt to determine, if possible, the reason for the deficiency, Mr. Pike asked questions of each member of the staff. Mr. Lee, who recalls he had nothing to say at the time, claims Pike’s insistence on his participation in the discussion constituted "picking on him." Mr. Pike denies picking on Petitioner. He contends he was trying to get some input from the hourly employees, and insists he questioned all of them even-handedly. He asked each for input, indicating their jobs would not be jeopardized by their answers. During the meeting Pike advised the associates that both their attitudes and their production must improve. Though Petitioner denies it, Mr. Pike indicated that Petitioner claimed at that time there was not enough work to give him a 40-hour week, and he was stretching out his jobs in order to make them take long enough to ensure he could work a 40-hour work week. Mr. Bauer, also a Tredit executive, is of the opinion this manipulation is neither necessary nor possible, considering the facility’s work practices. Tredit creates wheel assemblies for specialty vehicles, utilizing tires and wheels manufactured by others. Though its Florida business is high volume, due to the nature of the product and the intense competition, the profit margin is low, and the company has to react to order cycles which require immediate response. However, Mr. Bauer opined there was always enough to do to make sure the hourly employees were always productively employed. No independent evidence was presented in support of the position taken by either party on this point, however. Once the meeting was completed, Mr. Pike and Mr. Bauer left. The facility was being managed at the time by Carol Suggs. At the end of the day after Mr. Pike held his meeting with the staff, Ms. Suggs called for Petitioner to meet with her. The request was communicated through Mr. Longo. According to Ms. Suggs, Petitioner was admonished about his working habits and warned regarding his attitude on the job. She claims he then became disrespectful and quit. A short while later, a payroll accounting document was prepared reflecting Petitioner had been discharged on the day of the conference with Ms. Suggs. Petitioner categorically denies having quit the job as Ms. Suggs indicates in her sworn affidavit of August 22, 1996. He claims to have taken pride in his work and to have been so upset by his termination that he actually cried as a result. Ms. Suggs, on the other hand, contends that Petitioner did not put forth appropriate effort on the job. She claims that not only were the hourly employees getting a full 40-hour week, but also performing overtime, and yet the required amount of material was not being produced. Petitioner rebuts this contention, claiming adequate inventory was prepared. Nonetheless, as a result of what she perceived as Petitioner’s attitude and performance shortcomings, on October 11, 1995, at her meeting with Petitioner the day after Mr. Pike’s visit, Ms. Suggs gave him a written employee warning notice. Petitioner admits to having signed this notice as indication he received it, but denies he agreed with its contents. No other notice of dismissal action was executed by Ms. Suggs except the payroll change notice reflecting Petitioner’s dismissal on October 13, 1995, two days following the meeting she had with Petitioner. Because this earlier action, the warning, does not reflect Petitioner was terminated, but within two days thereof he was taken off the payroll, and because Ms. Suggs’ testimony was credible, it is found that Petitioner’s reaction to the warning was as described by her and was the basis for his dismissal. Tredit had 15 employees at the Plant City facility when Petitioner was employed there. Of this number, four were female and eleven were male. Two of the males were black. After Petitioner was terminated, the employee census was the same except for one fewer black employee. At the time of the hearing, Tredit employed four individuals in the Plant City facility’s office, all of whom were white; and nine warehouse employees, of whom four were white, one black, and two Hispanic. No evidence was presented to establish that Petitioner’s termination from employment with Respondent was the result of his race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Raymond T. Lee’s Petition for Relief filed against Tredit Tire & Wheel Co., Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Ramon T. Lee, pro se 832 Augusta Street Lakeland, Florida 33805 Antonio Faga, Esquire 375 Twelfth Avenue South Naples, Florida 34102 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact The Respondent entered into a contract with Anthony Cocco and his wife in August of 1977, to construct a single-family residence. By June of 1978, work on the project had virtually ceased, although Respondent caused some landscaping work to be done after that date. In October, 1978, Respondent gave notice to Cocco of a default on the contract. This led to civil litigation on the contract between the parties which was unresolved at the time of the subject hearing. Respondent was licensed as a residential contractor in 1970. See Petitioner's Exhibit #1. The Respondent was also licensed at the time of the hearing. See Petitioner's Exhibit #2. No evidence was received that the Respondent was licensed at any time between the date he entered into the contract with Cocco and the date that Respondent gave notice of default. Regarding the Respondent's licensure between August of 1977, and October, 1978, the only evidence received was the Petitioner's Exhibit #2, which states in pertinent part: ... Said licensee was licensed September 1970 and has been current for all years licensed.
Recommendation Therefore, based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Respondent's Motion for Directed Verdict is granted, and it is recommended that this cause be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael E. Egan, Esquire 217 South Adams Street Post Office Box 1386 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jane E. Heerema, Esquire 217 South Adams Street Post Office Box 1386 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 George E. Tragos, Esquire 487 Mandalay Avenue Clearwater Beach, Florida 33515 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation is the state agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting complaints involving violations of the requirements of Chapter 489, Part I, Florida Statutes. Sections 489.131(7)(e) and 455.225, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 489.129(1), the Construction Industry Licensing Board ("Board") is the entity responsible for imposing discipline for any of the violations set out in that section. At all times material to this case, Mr. Vega was a certified general contractor operating under a license issued by the Construction Industry Licensing Board, numbered CG C046448. Mr. Vega has been a licensed general contractor in Florida since 1989, and since 1994, he has been the licensed qualifying agent for Group Construction South Florida, Inc. The residence of David M. Hudson, located at 19801 Southwest 84th Avenue, Miami, Dade County, Florida, was severely damaged in August, 1992, by Hurricane Andrew. In a letter dated October 13, 1992, Mr. Hudson, who holds a doctorate in biology and is the laboratory manager for the University of Miami Chemistry Department, proposed to Mr. Vega that he prepare plans for reconstructing the Hudson residence. On December 23, 1992, Mr. Hudson and Mr. Vega executed a contract for construction work to be performed on the Hudson residence. The parties contemplated that Mr. Vega would complete the work in accordance with the drawings and original blueprints prepared by Jose A. Sanchez, a structural engineer, at Mr. Vega's direction and based on preliminary plans approved by Mr. Hudson. Specifically, Mr. Hudson understood that the major elements of construction included in the December 23 contract were elevation of the house from one story to two stories, construction of a new living area on the second floor, and construction of a basement on the first floor to serve as a "bare bones storage area." The contract price specified in the December 23 contract was $146,338.33, with ten percent due upon acceptance of the proposal, ten percent due at completion of each of eight items of construction specified in the contract, and ten percent due upon completion of the project. The eight items of construction specified in the contract were "demolition work, rising work, tie beams, roof, doors & windows, plaster & tile, pool & fence, finish work and paint." On February 1, 1993, Metropolitan Dade County Building and Zoning Information Department issued Permit Number 93119957 to Mr. Vega for the Hudson project. The building permit was based on the original plans for the project submitted by Mr. Vega on January 19, 1993, together with some items that were added to the plans at the county's request. Mr. Vega began work on the project on February 1, 1993, the day the permit was issued. Mr. Vega hired Ruben Armas to act as foreman for the project, and his duties included hiring and supervising day laborers and procuring materials needed for construction. At the time, Mr. Armas was not licensed, registered, or certified by either Dade County or the State of Florida. Mr. Vega had an arrangement with Mr. Armas whereby he paid Mr. Armas periodic advances on a lump sum payment that Mr. Armas was to receive when the Hudson project was complete. Mr. Vega did not deduct FICA or withholding tax from the payments made to Mr. Armas under this arrangement. Mr. Vega dealt directly with Mr. and/or Mrs. Hudson regarding the project, although they would occasionally leave messages for him with Mr. Armas. Mr. Vega directly supervised Mr. Armas and gave him instructions on the work that was to be performed and the way it was to be done. Mr. Vega was routinely at the job site at least two or three times a day to inspect the work that had been done. Mr. Vega was present at the site during the entire time that cement was poured for footings or other structural elements. Mr. Vega arranged for various subcontractors to work on the project, including electricians, plumbers, air conditioning workers, roofers, carpenters, and drywall hangers. On April 14, 1993, a Department investigator conducted an inspection of the Hudson project during a "hurricane task force sweep." When she and the other members of the task force arrived on the job site, she observed Mr. Armas and two other men "inside working," but she did not observe them working or see the type of work they were doing. Mr. Armas walked out to meet the inspector and gave her a card that contained his name and phone numbers and the words "General construction & roof repair." Mr. Armas told the Department investigator that, when she arrived, he was "working on the footing for the elevation of the house." On April 21, 1993, Mr. Vega signed a Cease and Desist Agreement in which he acknowledged that the Department was investigating allegations that he had "engaged in the practice of aiding and abetting unlicensed contractor Ruben Armas." By signing the agreement, Mr. Vega agreed to cease "engaging in this activity," but he did not admit that the Department's allegations were true. The Department investigator was at the Hudson job site on April 14, 1993, for thirty minutes to an hour, during which time Mr. Vega did not appear at the site. This was the only time she was at the job site while work was being done. As the work progressed on the project, everything appeared to be going well, and Mr. Vega felt that he enjoyed a very good working relationship with Mr. and Mrs. Hudson. Mr. Hudson paid Mr. Vega a total of $116,400.00, or eighty percent, of the original contract price of $146,338.33, in ten percent increments as provided in the contract. By check dated December 23, 1992, Mr. Hudson paid the down payment of $14,633.38. By check dated February 5, 1993, Mr. Hudson paid $14,600.00 upon completion of the demolition work. By check dated March 5, 1993, Mr. Hudson paid $14,633.00 upon completion of raising the structure to two stories. By check dated March 24, 1993, Mr. Hudson paid $14,633.00 upon completion of the tie beams. By check dated April 19, 1997, Mr. Hudson paid $14,633.00 upon completion of the roof. By check dated May 13, 1993, Mr. Hudson paid $14,633.00 which should have been paid upon completion of the doors and windows but which he paid even though the installation of the doors and windows was not complete. By check dated June 23,1993, Mr. Hudson paid $12,000.00 of the $14,633.00 draw because, in his opinion, the project was not being completed on schedule. Finally, by check dated July 2, 1993, Mr. Hudson paid $17,000.00 to bring the payments up to the amount consistent with the contract schedule for completion of the pool and fence. In a letter to Mr. Vega dated June 7, 1993, Mr. Hudson stated that he wanted to make "a major change" in the plans. Specifically, Mr. Hudson wanted to eliminate the swimming pool, which he estimated would save $20,000.00 of the $146,633.00 contract price, and use the money saved "to completely finish the downstairs to be a nice guest area," to "install the better quality carpet we want, complete wooden fence, air conditioning in 1st floor, plumbing ~ electric in 1st floor, [and] indoor wooden shutters for all windows." Mr. Hudson went on to state that he wanted certain enumerated appliances, which would cost $4,108.00, and new furniture, which he estimated would cost $6,000.00, for a total of $10,108.00. According to Mr. Hudson's proposal, Mr. Vega should be able to "finish off the 1st floor the way we want it, install the nice carpet and tile, and do all the other jobs previously listed (fence, plumbing, etc., for 1st floor) for about $10,000.00." The basement area which Mr. Hudson wanted to finish as a "nice" living area consisted of approximately 2,000 square feet and had originally been designed as a storage area, with concrete floor and walls. Mr. Vega and Mr. Hudson discussed the proposal and the costs of the changes, but they did not reach an agreement on the cost of the additional work. 3/ Mr. Hudson asked Mr. Vega to leave the job site and cease work on the project on or about July 3, 1993, and Mr. Vega did not perform any work on the Hudson residence after this time. Mr. Hudson terminated Mr. Vega from the project solely because of the dispute with Mr. Vega over the cost of the changes he had requested in his June 7 letter. Mr. Hudson did not complain to Mr. Vega about the quality of the work that had been completed, and, although he thought that the project was getting behind schedule, Mr. Hudson issued a check dated July 2, 1993, which brought the total payments to eighty percent of the original contract price. When Mr. Vega stopped work on the project, the structure contained deviations from the original plans. 4/ Some of the deviations were items shown in the original blueprints which had not been incorporated into the structure; some were items that were not shown in the original blueprints but were incorporated into the structure at the request of, or with the approval of, Mr. and/or Mrs. Hudson; some were deviations in the size of openings to accommodate doors and in the location and size of windows; most were minor deviations in the placement of electrical switches and receptacles or other similar deviations. The construction was, however, generally consistent with the original plans. 5/ There were three items that were significant deviations from the original plans. The most serious deviation concerned the changes made in the dimensions of the structural slab that formed the floor of the second floor balcony off the family room, kitchen, and dining room and the roof of the first floor terrace. The original plans included a second floor balcony with a width of six feet. The Hudsons asked Mr. Vega to increase the width of the balcony, and Mr. Vega called Mr. Sanchez, the structural engineer who had prepared the original plans, and asked if the width of the slab could be increased. Mr. Sanchez approved an extension from the original six feet to eight feet, eight inches, and he advised Mr. Vega of the additional reinforcement that would be needed to accommodate the increased width. On the basis of Mr. Sanchez's approval, Mr. Vega incorporated the additional reinforcement specified by Mr. Sanchez and poured the slab to the requested width of eight feet, eight inches. Even though Mr. Vega consulted a structural engineer, he did not submit revised blueprints to the building department and obtain approval for the structural change before doing the alteration. He was aware that the building code required approval before such a change could be incorporated into a structure and that his actions violated the code. 6/ The second significant deviation from the original plans was Mr. Vega's failure to construct the fireplace shown in the original plans. According to the plans, a fireplace was to be constructed in the living room, on the second floor. Although the roof was completed and the drywall installed, no accommodation had been made for the fireplace in either the wall or the roof. Mr. Vega intended to construct the fireplace and would have done so had he not been told to cease work on the project. The third significant deviation from the original plans concerns the windows installed in the structure. No window permits or product approvals were contained in the permit file for the Hudson project. In addition, some of the windows were not the size specified in the original plans, some were too deep, and some were placed lower than the thirty inch sill height specified in the original plans. Many of the items identified as "deviations" were actually items not shown on the original plans but incorporated into the structure at the request of, or with the approval of, Mr. and/or Mrs. Hudson. Neither the requests for the additional items nor the costs of the items were reduced to writing by Mr. Hudson or Mr. Vega. At the time Mr. Hudson directed him to cease work on the project, Mr. Vega had contracts with subcontractors to provide the labor and materials specified in the original contract. He was prepared to complete the project in accordance with the original plans and for the original contract amount, with adjustments for the extras that had already been incorporated into the project at the request of, or with the approval of, Mr. and/or Mrs. Hudson. He was also prepared to correct all deficiencies and code violations in the structure. After he was terminated from the project, Mr. Vega continued to negotiate with Mr. Hudson's attorney to arrive at an agreement for completion of the project that would be satisfactory to Mr. Hudson. In a proposal submitted to Mr. Hudson's attorney in the fall of 1993, Mr. Vega offered to complete the project in seven weeks in accordance with the original plans, as modified to incorporate the changes and upgrades Mr. Hudson had requested in the June 7 letter and the changes and upgrades that had already been incorporated into the project at the request of, or with the approval of, Mr. and/or Mrs. Hudson. The total price for completion proposed by Mr. Vega was $56,750.00, which included the cost of the upgrades and extras and the $29,572.00 balance owing under the original contract. Mr. Hudson did not accept this proposal. Instead, he eventually hired a contractor named Robert Krieff, who did some work on the project. In February, 1994, Mr. Hudson took over the building permit himself and hired various subcontractors to work on the project. According to Mr. Hudson, in addition to the $116,400.00 he paid Mr. Vega, he has paid approximately $50,000.00 for work done after he terminated Mr. Vega, and he anticipates spending another $35,000.00 before a Certificate of Occupancy is issued. Mr. Hudson paid off a lien on his property for work done pursuant to his contract with Mr. Vega. A Claim of Lien in the amount of $4,712.00 was filed by Luis A. Roman on October 5, 1993, for drywall hung and finished at the Hudson residence under an arrangement with Mr. Vega. Summary of the evidence. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that Mr. Vega willfully violated the building code with respect to the alteration of the width of the second floor balcony. Mr. Vega admitted that he knew he was violating the building code when he extended the width of the second floor balcony beyond the width specified in the original blueprints before submitting revised engineering plans to the county and receiving approval to make the alteration. This violation is one of procedure only, however, and there was no competent evidence presented to establish that Mr. Vega failed to include adequate reinforcement to compensate for the additional width prior to pouring the slab or that there were structural problems with the slab. 7/ The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that Mr. Vega violated the building code because the work completed by Mr. Vega on the Hudson project contained deviations from the original approved plans. 8/ On the other hand, the evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that this violation is a minor one. The Department's experts testified that the construction done on the Hudson residence by Mr. Vega was generally consistent with the approved plans and that it was commonplace for contractors in Dade County to deviate from the approved plans and later submit revised plans for approval. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that Mr. Vega did not file product approvals or obtain window permits prior to windows being installed in the Hudson project. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient, however, to establish that these omissions on Mr. Vega's part constituted a violation of section 204.2 of the South Florida Building Code, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Although there was some testimony that the building code requires that product approvals be filed and window permits obtained before windows are installed, the applicable code and section were not identified by the Department's witnesses or otherwise made a part of the record. Thus, there is no evidence of the precise obligations imposed on Mr. Vega by the code that was applicable at the time of the Hudson project. As a result, it is not possible to determine whether Mr. Vega fulfilled his obligations under the code. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Mr. Vega assisted Mr. Armas in engaging in the unregistered or uncertified practice of contracting. There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Armas performed any work on the Hudson project that could be performed only by a licensed contractor. 9/ Notwithstanding the opinions stated by the Department's experts, the evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Mr. Vega is guilty of incompetence or misconduct in the practice of contracting as a result of the work done on the Hudson project. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that Mr. Hudson suffered financial loss in the amount of $4,712.00, which is the amount Mr. Hudson paid to clear the lien placed on his property by Luis A. Roman. Although this loss is attributable to Mr. Vega's failure to pay Mr. Roman for hanging and finishing drywall in the Hudson residence, the evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Mr. Hudson suffered financial loss as a result of the violation with which Mr. Vega was charged and of which he was proven guilty.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board issue a Final Order dismissing Counts I and III of its Administrative Complaint, finding that Gonzalo Vega is guilty of violating section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1993), and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1997.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a Florida licensed professional engineer, holding license number PE 39759. In 2002, the Petitioner undertook an evaluation of the Respondent's design for construction of the Hunter's Creek Community Association Town Hall. The design was completed in 2001. The Respondent submitted the plans at the Petitioner's request and pursuant to a Final Order filed January 10, 2000, by the Florida Board of Professional Engineers. The Final Order required the Respondent to periodically submit a list of completed project designs to the Petitioner. The Petitioner selected project designs at random for review. The Final Order also directed the Respondent to comply with various statutory requirements. Following its review of the submitted plans and additional dialogue with the Respondent, the Petitioner brought the instant disciplinary proceeding against the Respondent. Section 1601.2.1 of the 1997 Standard Building Code requires that structures "be of sufficient strength to support the loads and forces encountered, or combinations thereof, without exceeding in any of its structural elements the stresses prescribed elsewhere in this code." Design of a structure must accommodate the various loads to a proposed structure. The "gravity load" is the weight of the structure itself. The "live load" is the transient weight of the objects (persons, furnishings, vehicles, etc.) within the structure. "Lateral loads" are horizontal forces generated against a structure by such natural forces as earthquakes or hurricanes. "Vertical loads" consist of uplift- type wind forces. Acceptable standards of engineering practice require that a professional engineer design the structure to accommodate the various loads without exceeding the allowable load values of the components. Essentially the allegations against the Respondent are that according to the plans submitted, allowable load capacities for certain materials specified in the plan were exceeded and that some materials were improperly specified. Insofar as is relevant to this proceeding, the plans specified use of Simpson H-3 framing anchors ("Simpson H-3 anchor") at three locations, a 49'-4" wall and two 20'-0" walls. The plans also specified use of Simpson MGT anchors at a number of locations. The Simpson H-3 anchor was an 18 gauge metal plate, commonly referred to as a "hurricane tiedown." The Simpson H-3 anchor was used to connect a wooden truss to a wooden sill plate or to the top part of a wall. The manufacturer identified the lateral load design capacity of each Simpson H-3 anchor as 125 pounds-per-linear- foot. The Simpson MGT anchor was a "medium girder tiedown" anchor. The Simpson MGT anchor consisted of a heavy-gauge metal plate and metal straps used to connect a masonry wall to a girder. At the hearing, the Petitioner presented the testimony of Joseph Berryman, P.E. Mr. Berryman testified that according to the project plans, 54 H-3 anchors were specified for the 49'-4" wall. Mr. Berryman testified that dividing the load calculation identified in the Respondent's plans by the specified number of anchors resulted in a load of approximately 245 pounds-per-linear-foot. Mr. Berryman testified that application of the same calculation to the load identified in the project plans for the two 20'-0" walls resulted in a load of approximately 380 pounds-per-connector. Mr. Berryman further testified, after additional review of the Respondent's documentation, that his original identification of the load to be accommodated at the two 20"-0" walls was incorrect and that the actual load per connector was in excess of his initial calculation. The Respondent provided testimony and evidence indicating that Mr. Berryman's analysis was overly conservative and failed to consider the load-carrying capacities of other structural elements. Such elements included the Simpson MGT anchors and portions of the building, such as walls and floors, that reduce the load being transferred to the Simpson H-3 anchors. The Respondent testified that the Simpson MGT anchor was capable of resisting a lateral load of 2,462 pounds. The Respondent offered the testimony of Wilbur Yaxley, P.E., who stated that the Simpson MGT anchor was capable of resisting a lateral load of 4,541 pounds. The manufacturer of the Simpson MGT anchor has not rated the device for lateral load resistance. There was no credible evidence that the Respondent accurately calculated the lateral load being applied to the H-3 anchors at the time of design. There was no credible evidence that any lateral load resistance calculation or testing was performed on the Simpson MGT anchor prior to construction of the structure at issue in this case. The Respondent further asserted that substantial load resistance was achieved through the "continuity" of the structure, but acknowledged that no calculations related to continuity were performed prior to construction of the project. Absent any credible evidence of reliable pre- construction calculation of the relevant load-bearing capacities of the Simpson MGT anchor or of the structural continuity of the design, Mr. Berryman's testimony regarding the plans submitted and the loads identified is accepted. Based on the plans submitted by the Respondent to the Petitioner, the evidence establishes that the actual design loads for the Simpson H-3 anchors at the 49'-4" wall and the two 20'-0" walls exceeded the allowable design loads of the anchors. The Petitioner further alleges that the Simpson MGT anchors were not "listed" at the time of permitting and construction and, therefore, could not have been installed in accordance with such listing. There is no credible evidence that any witness actually reviewed a "list" to determine whether or not the Simpson MGT anchors were listed. Notwithstanding building code references to "listed" materials, the evidence fails to establish the existence of such a list.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Professional Engineers enter a final order finding Robert L. Plowfield, P.E., guilty of violating Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2004), and imposing a penalty of reprimand, $5,000 fine, two-year suspension, and a six-year probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Florida Engineers Management Corporation 2507 Callaway Road, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 David P. Rankin, Esquire Law Office of David P. Rankin, P.A. 18540 North Dale Mabry Highway Lutz, Florida 33548 Paul J. Martin, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Florida Engineers Management Corporation 2507 Callaway Road, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-5267 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the facts stipulated to in the Prehearing Stipulations, the following relevant facts are found: Babcock, a Weyerhauser Company, is the agent for Centennial Homes, Inc., another Weyerhauser Company, and is the current owner and/or seller of real property located on Rocky Point Island, an island Situated along the eastern shore of Tampa Bay. The Island is bisected by the Courtney Campbell Causeway (State Road 60), a major regional roadway which runs across Tampa Bay and links Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties. (Prehearing Statements of Fact) The City of Tampa (City) is a municipal corporation and is the local government having jurisdiction to render development orders for DRIs located within its municipal boundaries. The TBRPC is the regional planning council within whose jurisdiction the Rocky Point Office and Commercial Park is located. The Department of Community Affairs (DCA) is the state land planning agency having jurisdiction over the proposed Babcock project. (Prehearing Statements of Fact) The New York Yankees is a New York limited Partnership which owns and operates the Bay Harbour Inn, located on the south portion of Rocky Point Island directly across the Courtney Campbell Causeway from the proposed Rocky Point Office and Commercial Park. The Bay Harbour Inn is a 260-room motel, with a banquet room, meeting rooms, a restaurant and a cocktail lounge, and is Situated on the only true beachfront property in Tampa. (Prehearing Statements of Fact; testimony of Frederick Matthews, Tr. 1524-1547) Shriners Hospitals is a Colorado charitable corporation authorized to do business in Florida. Its international headquarters is located on the south portion of Rocky Point Island directly across the Courtney Campbell Causeway from the proposed Rocky Point Office and Commercial Park. Purchased in 1980, the six and a half acre site was selected by the Shriners for its high visibility and its convenient access. The Shriners headquarters average approximately fifty (50) visitors per day. The Shriners operate 22 hospitals which treat crippled and burned children without charge to the patients. It depends upon its members and visitors to assist in funding efforts. If the visibility and/or accessibility of its headquarters were impaired, its ability to raise funds to operate its childrens' hospitals would be adversely affected. (Prehearing Statements of Fact; testimony of Louis Molnar, Tr. 2424-2429) In 1973-74, Centennial purchased approximately 62 acres of land located on the north side of Rocky Point Island. Between 1977 and 1980, Centennial constructed road, water, sewer and drainage improvements and platted a subdivision of the property known as the Rocky Point Office and Commercial Park. Between December 1981 and November 1983, Babcock sold, at a substantial profit, four parcels within the Rocky Point Office and Commercial Park to separate individual developers. (Prehearing Statements of Fact; testimony of William Lopez, Tr. 101-104) In the spring of 1984, a dispute arose between Babcock and the Department of Community Affairs as to whether the Rocky Point Office and Commercial Park was required to undergo Development of Regional Impact (DRI) review pursuant to Section 380.06, Florida Statutes. In order to resolve this dispute, Babcock and the DCA entered into a Preliminary Development Agreement (PDA) pursuant to Section 380.032(3), Florida Statutes. Under that Agreement, the entire Rocky Point Office and Commercial Park was required to undergo DRI review. However, the four previously sold parcels were permitted to be developed and occupied prior to receipt of a final Development Order with, respectively, a 70,000 square foot office building, a 183,393 square foot office building with an associated 5,000 square foot restaurant, a 202 suite hotel and a 176 room hotel. The Agreement also required Babcock to pay to the DCA $50,000 to fund a study of growth management issues on Rocky Point Island. (Prehearing Statements of Fact; Babcock's Exhibit 8) Pursuant to the Preliminary Development Agreement, a DRI pre- application conference was held on April 7, 1984, and Babcock's Application for Development Approval (ADA) was filed on October 19, 1984. In its ADA, Babcock proposed a total of 1,375,393 square feet of office uses, 378 rooms of hotel or motel use and 17,000 square feet of restaurant development in two phases. Phase I consisted of the 253,393 square feet of office uses, the 378-rooms of hotel use and 5,000 square feet of restaurant use permitted by the ADA to proceed prior to receipt of a final Development Order for the overall DRI. Phase II consisted of the balance of the proposed DRI: 1,122,000 square feet of office space and 12,000 square feet of restaurant uses. (Prehearing Statements of Fact; Babcock's Exhibits 1-3) Babcock furnished additional information to the TBRPC in November and December of 1984. From December 1984 to March 1985, the TBRPC, in conjunction with the DCA and the City, proceeded with plans to conduct a short-term traffic study of the immediate Rocky Point Drive/Courtney Campbell Causeway Intersection. Also, the Preliminary Development Agreement with the DCA was amended to require payment of the $50,000 to TBRPC instead of the DCA. These funds were subsequently paid to TBRPC by Babcock. (Prehearing Statement of Facts; Babcock's Exhibit 9) On or about March 12, 1985, the TBRPC determined the ADA was sufficient and so notified the City of Tampa. The City Council set a public hearing for May 23, 1985 to consider Babcock's ADA. In April, 1985, the short-term study was completed. The purpose of that study was to (1) determine the maximum at-grade roadway improvements which could be made to the Intersection and (2) determine the level of development which could be accommodated thereby. The conclusion of the short-term study was that, with the maximum amount of at-grade improvements (three through lanes in each direction), the intersection would operate at Level of Service (LOS) "E" in the morning peak hour in the year 1990 with existing and approved development. The afternoon peak hour would operate at LOS "D". Therefore, it was concluded that there was no capacity for any additional development on Rocky Point Island north or south of Courtney Campbell Causeway using the Rocky Point Drive intersection. (Prehearing Statements of Fact; Babcock's Exhibit 37) On May 13, 1985, the TBRPC submitted its regional report and recommendation. The TBRPC recommended denial, but set forth conditions which, if satisfied, would result in a recommendation of approval. The Council's prime concern was the adverse impact of the proposed project upon the transportation network and regional facilities in the area, and mitigation of those impacts. The Council determined that "The addition of a project of this magnitude to an already overburdened infrastructure raises serious questions regarding land use and public facility decisions for this area of the region." The TBRPC concluded that the Babcock DRI would have a substantial negative impact upon several regionally significant highway facilities. While the council did identify some positive impacts from the proposed project (such as increased employment opportunities and increased ad valorem tax yields), the positive impacts were not site-specific to Rocky Point Island. (Babcock's Exhibit 13, TBRPC's Exhibit 52B, page 8) The TBRPC also proceeded with a longer term traffic study of the Courtney Campbell Causeway corridor area. The long-term study's stated purpose was to determine whether the traffic to be generated by the overall proposed development on Rocky Point Island, including Babcock's DRI, could be accommodated on the Causeway corridor given reasonable levels of road improvements. (Prehearing Statements of Fact) Except as to conditions relating to transportation, levels of development, and development phasing, Babcock and City Staff were in substantial agreement by May 23, 1985, on the terms and conditions of a recommended development order approving with conditions Babcock's ADA. At the public hearing on May 23, 1985, the City Council voted to defer consideration of the ADA in order to allow additional time to address and resolve various traffic related issues and to formulate conditions relating to mitigation of the project's transportation impacts. From that point forward, proceedings before the City were protracted, and public hearings were continued on numerous occasions. (Prehearing Statements of Fact) The long-term study was completed in December of 1985, and was formally released on February 20, 1986. The study concluded that a reduced amount of development on Rocky Point Island could be accommodated with a reasonable level of improvements, including an overpass at the intersection of Rocky Point Drive and Courtney Campbell Causeway. The study further concluded that an alternative development scenario would allow over twice the existing and approved development. (Prehearing Statements of Fact) Review and comment regarding the long-term study as well as negotiations regarding Development Order conditions resulted in further continuances of the public hearing on the Babcock ADA. On September 25, 1986, City Council approved on first reading a proposed ordinance issuing a Development Order approving Babcock's ADA. (Babcock's Exhibit 6) The City Council also directed that a further traffic study be conducted regarding Rocky Point Island. On October 23, 1986, the City Council heard objections to the issuance of the Development Order from surrounding property owners, including the New York Yankees and the Shriners. The matter was then continued until December 18, 1986, over Babcock's objections to further continuances. On December 18, 1986, the City Council again continued the matter to April 9, 1987, despite Babcock's objection to further continuances. (Prehearing Statements of Fact) On December 31, 1986, Babcock filed a Complaint for Mandamus seeking to compel the City of Tampa to render a Development Order. The Circuit Court issued a Final Peremptory Writ of Mandamus on February 16, 1987, commanding the City Council to adopt an ordinance issuing a Development Order. (Prehearing Statements of Fact) On February 26, 1987, the City Council adopted emergency Ordinance No. 9544-A constituting a DRI Development Order which approved with conditions Phase I, and denied with conditions Phase II of the Rocky Point Office and Commercial Park DRI. The approval of Phase I (consisting of the development previously approved by the Preliminary Development Agreement) was conditioned upon payment to the City of $582,566.09, based on the City's transportation impact fee then in effect. Denial of Phase II was based upon the City's finding that the development would cause the intersection of Rocky Point Drive and Courtney Campbell Causeway to operate below a level of service (LOS) "D" peak, and that the feasibility of traffic improvements and Babcock's fair share of the costs thereof' to mitigate traffic impacts and maintain LOS "D" peak hour had not been fully determined. Before Phase II could be approved, the Development Order required Babcock to institute worker flex time conditions and to show the feasibility of, and funding commitments for, the roadway improvements necessary to maintain LOS "D" peak hour on the Causeway for project build-out. Further, Babcock would be required to pay, in advance of further building permits, a proportionate share contribution calculated under Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code, or City of Tampa Transportation Impact Fees, whichever was greater. Needed improvements caused by both the approved Phase I development and the denied Phase II development were listed. (Babcock's Exhibit 7) Babcock's proposed development is consistent with the zoning which existed on the property prior to Centennial's acquisition of the property and at the time the ADA was filed. It is also consistent with existing development on the Island. However, on December 17, 1987, during the pendency of these proceedings, the City Council rezoned the undeveloped portions of Babcock's property from C-1 and C-2 (general commercial) to RM-24 and RS-60 (residential, multi- and single-family). (TBRPC's Exhibit 51 and 51-A) The new zoning would not allow the development proposed by Babcock. Courtney Campbell Causeway is a regionally significant roadway because it serves as one of only four links between Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties and is the only direct link between the Cities of Tampa and Clearwater. There is no reason to believe that the Causeway will not remain a significant regional roadway in the future. (Tipton, Tr. 2475) The traffic impacts of the proposed Babcock DRI take place in a unique setting. The entire development will be served by a single intersection located at Rocky Point Drive, which runs north and south, and Courtney Campbell Causeway, which runs east and west. There is no alternative route for people who would work on or visit the Island, other than the Causeway. Thus, Rocky Point Island is unique from a traffic planning perspective because of its location on a major regional link and its single point limited access onto said link. (Chapman, Tr. 2090 and 2185; Tipton, Tr. 2473) DRI review is site-specific and location is a critical factor. In reviewing the traffic impacts of a proposed DRI, the applicant identifies the regionally significant roadways which it projects will operate below Level of Service (LOS) "D" peak hour upon buildout of its project and upon which its project contributes a certain percentage or more of the LOS "D" peak hour capacity. The DCA requires an applicant to identify those regional roadways on which its traffic contributes ten percent (10%) or more of the LOS "D" peak hour capacity, while the TBRPC's requirement is five percent (5%). The applicant then identifies the roadway improvements needed to return the roadway to LOS "D" peak hour. (Beck, Tr. 1495; Benz, Tr. 2356) Developers need not identify roadways `which will operate at LOS "D" or better at the time of buildout, nor are they required to mitigate for the capacity which they are absorbing at locations which will be functioning at acceptable levels. (Benz, Tr. 2375) In other words, no commitment for roadway improvements is required so long as the LOS would not deteriorate below "D" during the peak hour. The DCA has three options for mitigation of traffic impacts which, if included in a Development Order, will preclude DCA appeal. The DCA's Transportation Rule, Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code, contains the three mitigation options. The first option is staging, the second is pipelining and the third is a creative option which provides for flexibility in situations such as an areawide DRI with mass transit. (Beck, Tr. 1498) These options are considered minimum criteria, and the local government and regional planning council may require more stringent measures than those found in the DCA's Rule in order to address traffic impacts. According to the DCA's interpretation of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, payment of a local impact fee by a DRI developer would not necessarily make adequate provision for the transportation impacts of a DRI. (Beck, Tr. 1406-07) It is the position of the DCA that the Legislature intended to hold DRI developers to more stringent standards than non-DRI developers. (Beck, Tr. 1432) The TBRPC would offer three options, plus a creative option, to local government for mitigation of traffic impacts. The first option requires funding commitments from either the developer, the Department of Transportation, or any other source, for all roadway improvements identified. Such commitments must be in place prior to each phase of the development's approval. The second option is a phasing or staging approach whereby the developer proceeds on a piecemeal basis, obtaining funding commitments for smaller segments of the project. The funding commitments must be viable at the time of approval. The third option is known as the "pipelining" option which does not require that funding commitments for all roadway improvements be in place prior to development. Under this option, the developer is permitted to construct or fund the construction of one or more of the necessary improvements needed to maintain LOS "D." The developer's fair share contribution of the cost of all improvements is calculated, and that contribution is directed to one or more of the necessary improvements. The pipelining option is a tradeoff approach whereby the developer contributes his proportionate share and actually constructs or funds one or more regionally significant projects, and his impacts at other locations identified during the regional review are forgiven in exchange for construction of the pipeline improvement. The pipelining policy is to encourage early construction of immediate major improvement to a regional roadway in exchange for forgiveness of impacts at other locations. The pipelining option was not available at the time the TBRPC issued its report on the Babcock ADA, but was available at the time the City of Tampa issued its Development Order. (Benz, Tr. 2355- 2375; TBRPC's Exhibits 23 and 24) The Florida Department of Transportation has jurisdiction over improvements to be constructed on the Courtney Campbell Causeway. The City of Tampa has an urban area Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) long-range transportation plan which analyses the transportation demand estimates for the horizon year 2010. It is the policy of the TBRPC to encourage local governments to approve the pipelining option for roadway improvements which are consistent with the MPO and the Department of Transportation's long-range plans. (TBRPC's Exhibit 24, Policy 19.8.14) A grade separated interchange at Rocky Point Drive and Courtney Campbell Causeway does not appear on the MPO long-range plan or the work plan of the Florida Department of Transportation. (Adair, Tr. 2274) The notion of concurrency is a common ingredient in each of the options for mitigation of transportation or traffic impacts. Concurrency means that the developer cannot build until the public improvements are either physically in place or there is a funding commitment from some source (not necessarily the developer) to put them in place. (Benz, Tr. 2388) A DRI developer does not have to pay money for its impacts. It may phase its development so that it is accommodated by the infrastructure in place, those improvements which are programmed to be put in place over time, or until the improvements are committed to by some other development. It is only when the DRI's impacts exceed existing capacity that the developer must identify and provide for the improvement. (Benz, Tr. 2355-57; Beck, Tr. 1492) One of the purposes of the Land Use Element of the Tampa Comprehensive Plan 2000 is to coordinate the orderly provision of public facilities (which include transportation facilities) with public and private development activities in a manner that is compatible with the City's fiscal resources. (City's Exhibit 17, page 3, paragraph 3.3) New development or increased intensity is to be permitted only in areas where adequate public facilities exist or can be adequately provided. (City's Exhibit 17, page 18, paragraph 1.2.3) Likewise, commercial and office development is to be permitted at an intensity and a location which complements existing and planned land use and existing and programmed public facilities. (City's Exhibit 17, page 24, paragraph 1.4.1.2; Mikalik, Tr. 1976, 1981, 1982) Prior to September 12, 1986, the City of Tampa had no transportation impact fee. The City's first impact fee was adopted on September 12, 1986, and it imposed upon all developers a non-site specific flat fee per square foot or per hotel/motel room. The fees imposed were conservative and were not sufficient to pay for the costs of transportation improvements necessary to accommodate new development paying the fee. (Tindale, Tr. 660-667) The impact fee ordinance was amended in 1988. The City was divided into transportation districts, and a different level of fees for each district was established. The transportation impact fees for the Westshore District, which encompassess Babcock's property, were increased. (Babcock's Exhibit 129) Transportation impact fees generally attempt to measure the value of the entire system consumed by a particular development. An impact fee calculation does not deal with existing conditions. In contrast, the requirement that a DRI developer make "adequate provision" has a different focus. This requirement focuses on the geographic location of the DRI, and measures the effect of the DRI on the public facilities at that location, both present and projected into the future. If certain regulatory levels are exceeded, the developer has several mitigation options to make "adequate provision" concurrently with the impact. Thus, while impact fees look at development in terms of the average value or capacity available to be consumed, the DRI regulatory process views impacts in terms of a performance standard not to be exceeded at a specific geographic location. (Tindale, Tr. 2233-43, 2253- 62) According to transportation experts, the transportation impacts of a proposed new development can be estimated through the use of the Highway Capacity Manual and the Institute of Traffic Engineers (ITE) Manual, the latter of which predicts the number of "trips" that a certain amount and type of development will generate. Through further calculations, these trips form the basis for conclusions as to the Level of Service (LOS) at which a roadway will operate. The LOS range from "A" (the best) through "F" (the worst). As noted above, the TBRPC considers LOS "D" peak hour the lowest acceptable level of service. (Chapman, Tr. 322-41; Wright, Tr. 457-74; Tipton, Tr. 2456-60) Several studies have shown that trip generation rates in the City of Tampa and throughout Florida are typically higher than the national average rates projected by the ITE Manuals. (Tindale, Tr. 646, 704, 820; Adair, Tr. 2275-76; Chapman, Tr. 2120). This may be due to factors such as climate, suburban characteristics and lack of mass transit. (Adair, Tr. 2275-79) Thus, trip rate projections for new developments within Tampa based upon the ITE Manuals would be on the conservative side. At the time Babcock filed its Application for Development Approval in 1984, the intersection of Rocky Point Drive and Courtney Campbell Causeway was operating at LOS "B" in both the a.m. and p.m. peak hours. (Babcock's Exhibit 3, page 31-16) The short-term study completed in April of 1985 concluded that, assuming maximum at-grade improvements, the intersection at Rocky Point Drive and the Causeway would operate at LOS "E" in the morning peak hours in the year 1990 with existing and approved development. Therefore, the study concluded there was no further capacity for additional development on Rocky Point Island north or south of the Causeway. (Babcock's Exhibit 37) Without additional development above the Preliminary Development Approval (or Phase I), the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual projects that with the current Department of Transportation improvements, the at-grade intersection will operate at LOS "D" or better in both the a.m. and p.m. peak hours in 1992. With full buildout of the Babcock proposal and current Department of Transportation improvements, the 1992 LOS at the intersection would be at or below LOS "E" in both the a.m. and p.m. peak hours. (Wright, Tr. 1729-30) As noted above, the long-term study issued in February of 1986 concluded that over twice the amount of existing and approved development could be accommodated by an overpass at the intersection of Rocky Point Drive and the Causeway. The congested conditions which currently exist on the Courtney Campbell Causeway in the vicinity of the Rocky Point Drive intersection occur primarily one-way in the peak hours. In the morning peak hours, the Causeway is congested in the direction moving from the west to the east -- from Pinellas to Hillsborough County. Conversely, in the afternoon peak hours, the heaviest traffic flows from east to west. Thus, there is some excess capacity in the a.m. and p.m. peak hour direction opposite the prevailing flow of traffic and little or no excess capacity in the direction of the prevailing flow of traffic. (Wright, Tr. 522-23; Patterson, Tr. 1383) While the greatest negative impact on the intersection in the a.m. peak hours is westbound traffic from Tampa turning left to reach South Rocky Point Island, it is the conflicting through traffic movement which creates the total congested condition. In other words, there is no one critical movement. It takes two directional movements in conflict to create the negative impact. (Padmanabahn, Tr. 849-50; Hall, Tr. 864, 909) With additional development on the Babcock parcel, the intersection at Rocky Point Drive and Courtney Campbell Causeway will degrade to a LOS below "D" in the a.m. peak hours sometime between the years 1990 and 1992. In order to accommodate the traffic impacts of its proposed additional development, Babcock proposes a grade separated interchange which would separate the conflicting turning movements from through traffic and improve the movement of traffic on the Causeway. Babcock's experts testified that with full buildout of the proposed development, the overall operating condition of such an interchange would be LOS "C" during the a.m. and p.m. peak hours in 1992. (Wright, Tr. 528) While it is technically feasible from an engineering standpoint to design an interchange for the Rocky Point Drive intersection, Babcock failed to demonstrate that the preliminary conceptual design it proposes is feasible. Babcock's witness on the subject was unfamiliar with certain aspects of the design and drawing of the proposed interchange. (Chinery, Tr. 934-40, 945-48) The vehicle mix was not considered in designing the overpass. It is important to know the mix of heavy vehicles because it affects the length of the ramps. (Chinery, Tr. 1011-14) While Babcock's engineers utilized a "weave analysis" in designing the overpass, there was credible evidence presented that the proper analysis for this particular design is a "ramp analysis." If a ramp analysis is performed, the ramp would operate at a LOS "E," as would the Causeway itself. (Chapman, Tr 2156, 2676-79) Although the Department of Transportation requires a 20-year design life for an interchange, Babcock's proposed interchange was not designed for any particular design life. (Chinery, Tr. 1042-43) Also, it was not established whether the proposed interchange would fit within the Department of Transportation's right-of-way on Rocky Point Drive. (Chinery, Tr. 1010-11) Babcock estimated the cost of the proposed interchange to be $9.5 million, plus or minus 25%. However, Babcock's cost witness did not prepare the estimate himself, did not verify the quantities of materials to be utilized in construction and did not include many costs that would be associated with the proposed interchange. For example, the estimated costs do not include right-of- way costs, design or engineering costs, costs associated with the environmental effects of additional dredging, filling and bulkheading activities, or possible business damages for any existing property owners in the Rocky Point area who might lose access to the Causeway. (Tocknell, Tr. 1832-67) It also appears that the cost estimate of $9.5 million was based upon a conceptual drawing different than the drawing submitted at the hearing. (Tocknell, Tr. 1859) Babcock's Exhibit 128, prepared in May of 1986, indicates that the recommended standard value for interchanges is $7 million. The Ulmerton-U.S. 19 urban interchange located in Pinellas County, which is similar to the proposed interchange, cost $19 million-plus in construction costs, which figure did not include right-of-way costs. (Tocknell, Tr. 1912-13) Babcock has not offered to fund or construct the proposed interchange at Rocky Point Drive. There was no evidence offered to determine whether a proportionate share contribution by Babcock would fund the proposed grade separated interchange. There was no competent evidence presented that a grade separation is currently scheduled for construction. It was generally agreed that the existence of a properly designed overpass or interchange at the Rocky Point Drive/Courtney Campbell Causeway intersection would accommodate additional development on Rocky Point Island. However, the extent or amount of such additional development was not established. Babcock's expert presented evidence that the overall operating condition of the intersection with its proposed interchange would be LOS "C" during the a.m. and p.m. peak hours in 1992 with full buildout of its proposed DRI, plus an additional 300,000 square feet of office development. (Wright, Tr. 528) LOS "C" is characterized as the absence of congestion. However, the analysis performed and assumptions made in reaching this conclusion were faulty in many respects. Babcock utilized the ITE Manual, 4th Edition, for its trip generation projections. The 4th Edition projects less traffic per square foot of commercial office development than had been projected under the 3rd Edition that was in use until December of 1987. As indicated above, in Florida, and specifically in Tampa, actual trip generation figures from established developments demonstrate that even the 3rd Edition ITE Manual under-projects traffic impacts. (Tindale, Tr. 646; Adair, Tr. 2275-77; Chapman, Tr. 2120) Babcock's use of a zero percent background growth rate is incorrect based upon the historic growth rate for Courtney Campbell Causeway (Wright, Tr. 461), other studies of the Causeway and Rocky Point Island, and the likelihood that, with further development on the Island, cars will travel back and forth between North and South Rocky Point Islands. (Patterson, Tr. 270; Chapman, Tr. 2116; Wright, Tr. 1707) A fifteen and twenty percent flex time reduction of trips for all office uses is erroneous because the ITE trip generation rates already account for any flex time which may be occurring (Tipton, Tr. 2465-66) and the ITE Manual does not authorize reduction of trips for flex time. (Wright, Tr. 1743) The internal capture rates and directional traffic split utilized by Babcock were not supported by competent substantial evidence. Babcock's failure to take into account heavy vehicles on Rocky Point Drive is inappropriate since the Island is served by public transportation, and City bus stops are located on the Island. (City's Exhibit 2A; Hale, Tr. 1597) Babcock's analysis which concluded that with current Department of Transportation improvements, the at-grade intersection could accommodate an additional 300,000 square feet of office use (Wright, Tr. 1808) utilized many of the same faulty assumptions as discussed above. Accordingly, it too, is not supported by competent substantial evidence. If Babcock were to buildout with the at-grade intersection, the automobile carbon monoxide emissions would exceed the Department of Environmental Regulation's (DER) guidelines and standards for air quality. (Hale, Tr. 1625) Babcock presented evidence that if the proposed grade separation (the interchange) were in place, carbon monoxide concentrations would not exceed ambient air quality standards for this pollutant. This conclusion is suspect for several reasons. The air quality analysis conducted on Babcock's behalf deviated from the DER's guidelines in several respects. (Kenney, Tr. 1082-83; Hale, 1556) Although parking garages are located in the vicinity, they were not considered in the analysis. (Kenney, Tr. 1136; Hale, Tr. 1593-94, 1630) Use of the intersection by heavy duty vehicles, which emit far more particulate matter than most motor vehicles, was not considered. (Kenney, Tr. 1062-63, 1140) The assumption of traffic traveling unimpeded through the intersection at 35 miles per hour was not substantiated. (Kenney, Tr. 1118-27) Some receptors were not located in accordance with the DER guidelines. (Kenney, Tr. 1195-96; Hale, Tr. 1582, 1627- 29) All these factors affect Babcock's air quality analysis. Thus, while there is little doubt that a grade-separated interchange which permits the free flow of traffic would improve air quality at the subject intersection, it cannot be concluded that full buildout of the proposed DRI would comply with Florida's ambient air quality standards. Traffic congestion causes user delay costs to the motoring public. If Babcock were to buildout at-grade, the increased delay costs to motorists would be $1,525 per hour or $1,549,400 per year. (City's Exhibit 12; Garity, Tr. 2056-57; Chapman, Tr. 2083) If an interchange were substituted for the existing at-grade condition, and assuming the interchange functioned properly, there would be a savings to the motoring public of approximately one million dollars per year. (Wright, Tr. 2574) The grade-separated interchange proposed by Babcock will affect the property rights of nearby landowners. The interchange would allow entrance to the Bay Harbour Inn from the Causeway only from the west, and would allow no means for exiting the facility at all. A similar situation would exist for the Rocky Point Beach Resort Hotel. Since the Bay Harbour Inn has no access to Rocky Point Drive, the only means of providing that access would be through property owned by the Shriners. This would require condemnation of the Shriners' property and the construction of a driveway from Rocky Point Drive to the Bay Harbour Inn either over a large retention pond or through the existing Shriners parking lot. This, of course, would create a substantial hardship upon any further development of the Shriners' 6-acre parcel. Even if Bay Harbour Inn were permitted a driveway onto Courtney Campbell Causeway after construction of the overpass, it would not be a commercially viable access. (Tipton, Tr. 2468- 70; Chapman, Tr. 2110-13; Matthews, Tr. 1540-42; Molnar, Tr. 2427) Not only would the proposed interchange require use of the Shriners' property in order to provide access to the Bay Harbour Inn, the interchange would diminish the ability of the Shriners to continue performing its charitable activities at its international headquarters. Reduced visibility would adversely affect the Shriners' ability to raise funds to operate its children's hospitals. The overpass would require the construction of a retaining wall which, at its highest point, is about 25 feet high. (Chinery, Tr. 1033) This would virtually obliterate the visibility of the Shriners' property from Courtney Campbell Causeway. (Chinery, Tr. 1041; Molnar, Tr. 2424-27) As noted above, DRI review is site-specific and location is a critical factor in reviewing a DRI's potential impacts, both positive and negative. (Beck, Tr. 1414) For this reason, other Development Orders entered by the City of Tampa which may contain different conditions for approval do not establish that the City or the TBRPC has acted arbitrarily with regard to the Babcock DRI. For example, the Areawide Westshore DRI does not include Rocky Point Island. As an areawide DRI, it is regulated by Section 380.06(25), Florida Statutes, and the two developments are not comparable. (Babcock's Exhibits 85 and 95) Point Properties, Ltd. is a non-DRI development which is located on North Rocky Point Island on an out-parcel which has direct access to Courtney Campbell Causeway and Rocky Point Drive. (Hall, Tr. 2669) The City's action upon Point Properties' application for a zoning change (while perhaps relevant to the City's action in rezoning Babcock's undeveloped property) cannot be compared with the City's action concerning Babcock's DRI application. The City of Tampa denied the Lifsey DRI for North and South Rocky Point Islands with essentially the same conditions and language as contained in the Babcock Development Order. (Stipulation, Tr. 1523-24) While not included in the City's Development Order as a change which would make Babcock's proposal eligible to receive approval, evidence was presented at the hearing that City staff would recommend approval of a multi- family residential proposal for the Babcock property on Rocky Point Island. (Mihalik, Tr. 1994) Other developments in Tampa have mixed office uses with residential and retail uses. (Mihalik, Tr. 1992-93) The opinion was offered by City staff that multi-family use would reduce overall trip generation and change the direction and timing of peak hour trips. (Hall, Tr. 878, 896, 905-910; Mihalik, Tr. 1992-94) While it would seem logical that the p.m. peak hour traffic would be less with residential as opposed to office development, the opinion as to a.m. peak hour traffic was not substantiated by sufficient evidence. Indeed, there was evidence indicating that traffic exiting a multi- family development on North Rocky Point Island in the morning hours could aggravate the a.m. peak hour conditions due to conflicts with eastbound through traffic. (Hall, Tr. 877-82) In any event, Babcock did not request development approval for a residential development and sufficient analyses and studies were not presented to enable a conclusion that residential development on Babcock's property would comport with all applicable review standards and criteria.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission DENY Phase II of Babcock's application for development approval, and otherwise approve the Development Order entered by the City of Tampa. Respectfully submitted and entered this 2nd day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1989. APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted by the Parties have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order except as noted below: Babcock 50. Rejected - contrary to the evidence. 59. Accepted as supported by some evidence, but not included as irrelevant to the issues in dispute. 64. Rejected as to grade-separated interchanges - not supported by competent substantial evidence. 66. Not totally accepted - unsupported by competent substantial evidence. 67 - 68. Accepted only if identical locations are assumed. 71. Second and third sentences rejected. See Finding of Fact 32. 75 - 76. Accepted as factually correct, but the materiality of other developments is - discussed in Conclusions of Law. 78 - 79. Partially rejected. It was determined that the issue of traffic impacts sufficiently embraces the issue of air pollution from carbon monoxide emissions. Last sentence rejected - not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected - irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in dispute. 85. First sentence rejected - not supported by competent substantial evidence and irrelevant. 89. Rejected - not supported by competent substantial evidence. 102. Rejected - not supported by competent substantial evidence. 104, 105 & 107. Rejected - not supported by competent substantial evidence. 108. Second and third sentences rejected - not supported by competent substantial evidence. 109 - 110. Rejected - contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and not supported by competent substantial evidence. 112. Rejected - improper factual finding, contrary to the burden of proof in this proceeding and not supported by competent substantial evidence. 113 & 115. Rejected - not supported by competent substantial evidence. 116. Third sentence rejected - not supported by competent substantial evidence. City of Tampa 26. All but first sentence rejected - irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in dispute. 29. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 42. First part of first sentence rejected as overbroad. 53. The words "no weight" rejected and replaced with "deduced weight." 68. Degree of weight to be accorded rejected. 80. The words "any evidence" should be replaced with "competent substantial" evidence. 100. Last sentence rejected - speculative and not supported by competent substantial evidence. TBRPC 39. Rejected - irrelevant and immaterial. 80. Rejected - irrelevant and immaterial. 107 & 110. The words "intentionally" rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. New York Yankees 18. Last sentence rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Third from last and last sentence rejected - not supported by competent substantial evidence. Last sentence rejected - legal conclusions as opposed to factual finding. 25. Second sentence rejected as an overstatement. Shriners 19. Second sentence rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Eugene D. Sterns, Esquire David Smolker, Esquire Mark D. Solov, Esquire Sterns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A. One Tampa City Center Suite 3300 Tampa, FL 33602 Douglas M. Wyckoff, Esquire de la Parte, Gilbert & Gramovot, P.A. 705 East Kennedy Blvd. Tampa, FL 33602 Linda M. Hallas, Esquire Law Offices of Roger S. Tucker 9455 Koger Blvd., Suite 209 St. Petersburg, FL 33702 Jeffrey N. Steinsnyder, Esq. Office of General Counsel State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 G. Steven Pfeiffer, Esquire Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street Suite 1040 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Jann Johnson, Esquire Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, FL 32302 The Honorable Bob Martinez Governor, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 The Honorable Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 The Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 The Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 The Honorable Tom Gallagher Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 The Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Patty Woodworth, Director Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol - PL-05 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
