Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), is designated as the state agency responsible for the administration of federal and state Medicaid funds, and is authorized by statute to provide payments for medical services. Respondent, Marvin H. Ledbetter, is a doctor of osteopathy who is enrolled as a general practitioner provider in the Medicaid Program. His professional office is in Ormond Beach, Florida where he is engaged in family practice. Under the Program, Ledbetter is assigned a provider number (48220-0) which is used to bill Medicaid for services rendered to Medicaid recipients. During calendar year 1981, which is the only time period in question, Ledbetter received $42,809 in Medicaid reimbursements from HRS, of which $28,062 related to fees for Medicaid hospital patients. The latter category of fees is at issue. In order to qualify for federal matching Medicaid funds HRS must meet certain federally-imposed requirements, including the establishment of a program integrity section designed to insure that all Medicaid services are medically necessary. If they are not, HRS is obliged to seek recoupment of funds paid to the provider. This proceeding involves an attempt by HRS to recoup certain funds paid to Ledbetter for hospital services. After providing medical services to various hospital patients, Ledbetter completed and sent in the necessary forms to obtain payment. As noted earlier, these payments totaled $28,062 during 1981. Upon receipt of the forms, HRS input the information from the forms into a computer data base, along with similar information from other Medicaid providers throughout the State. This information included, among other things, the number of admissions, number of discharges, amount paid for hospital services and length of stay. The retention of such data is necessary so that possible overpayments may be detected by HRS through the statistical analysis of claims submitted by a group of providers of a given type. Because Ledbetter's total discharges exceeded the average of other family physicians throughout the State, the computer generated a report which flagged Ledbetter for further review and examination. An HRS analyst conducted such a review of Ledbetter's records, and found his average hospital length of stay for patients to be acceptable when compared to the average physician in the State. This report was forwarded to the HRS peer review coordinator who randomly selected thirty of Ledbetter's patients from the computer, and obtained their patient charts (numbering sixty-eight). Such a statistical calculation is authorized by Rule 10C-7.6(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code. A medical consultant employed by HRS then reviewed twelve of the sixty-eight charts and recommended the records be sent to a Peer Review Committee (PRC) for its review and recommendation. This committee is authorized by Rule 7C-7.61(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code serves under contract with HRS, and is composed of eight members of the Florida Osteopathic Medical Association. It is their responsibility to review the files of physicians whose Medicaid payments are questioned by HRS's program integrity section. When Ledbetter's records were forwarded to the PRC by HRS, the transmittal letter stated that a "study" of his records had been made, and that said study revealed "overutilization of inpatient hospital services" and "excessive lengths of stay." After a PRC review was conducted in early 1984, the records were returned to HRS with a notation that "mild overutilization" had occurred. According to informal guidelines used by the PRC, this meant that Ledbetter's overutilization fell within the range of 0 percent to 20 percent. HRS accepted these findings but for some reason initially determined that a 40 percent overutilization had occurred, and that Ledbetter was overpaid in 1981 by 40 percent for his hospital services. Finding this amount to be inconsistent with the mild overutilization guidelines, HRS arbitrarily added back two days to each patient's hospital stay, which decreased overutilization to 33.8 percent, or $9,505.06 in overpayments. By proposed agency action issued on May 18, 1984, it billed Ledbetter this amount, thereby precipitating the instant controversy. All of the patients in question were from the lower income category, and most were black. Their home conditions were generally less than desirable, and the ability of the parents to supply good nursing care to ill or sick children was in doubt. At the same time, in 1981 Ledbetter was working an average of 56 hours per week in the emergency room of a local hospital and devoted only minimal time to his family practice. Because of this Ledbetter's number of hospital admissions greatly exceeded the norm when compared to general practitioners who engaged in an office practice. Consequently, he received most of these patients through the emergency room rather than his office and was dealing with patients whose socioeconomic conditions were an important consideration. These factors must be taken into account in analyzing Ledbetter's patient records. HRS does not contend that Ledbetter failed to perform the services for which he was paid--rather, it questions only whether some of the admissions were medically necessary and whether some of the lengths of stay were too long. In this regard, conflicting expert testimony was offered by the parties concerning the amount of overutilization, if any. Expert testimony by two local doctors of osteopathy support a finding that only mild overutilization of admissions and lengths of stay occurred. This is corroborated by HRS's expert (Dr. Smith) and by the testimony of its "live" expert, Dr. Conn, who conceded that lengths of stay were only "a little bit too long." The more persuasive testimony also establishes that while mild overutilization falls within the range of 0 percent to 20 percent, 10 percent is an appropriate median in this proceeding. Using this yardstick, Ledbetter should reimburse HRS for 10 percent for his billings, or $2,806.20.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent repay petitioner $2,086.20 in excess Medicaid payments received for calendar year 1981 claims. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1985.
The Issue The issues raised by this case are those brought about through an amended administrative complaint filed by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation (Petitioner) against David D. Turner, M.D. (Respondent). The stated authority for this action is found in Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. The allegations against the Respondent concern his treatment of the patient Frank C. Pendleton. The allegations are more completely described in the conclusions of law associated with this recommended order.
Findings Of Fact Part A. Facts which are alleged in the Administrative Complaint, admitted by Respondent: Petitioner, the Department of Professional Regulation, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapter 455, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0010840. Respondent's last known address is Post Office Box 267, Orange Park, Florida 32073. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed by the Pureal Medical Center as a physician. On or about February 4, 1983, Respondent examined patient Frank C. Pendleton, at the Pureal Medical Center, for complaints of chest pain. Respondent made no contemporaneous written diagnosis of patient Pendleton's condition. Respondent admitted patient Pendleton to the Pureal Medical Center for observation, and testing was ordered. Patient Pendleton remained at the Pureal Medical Center until on or about February 8, 1983. On or about February 4 and 5, 1983, Respondent ordered the following procedures/tests for patient Pendleton: Chest x-ray Serum Glutamic Oxaloacetic Transaminase ("SGOT") Serum Glutamic Pyruvic Transaminase ("SGPT") AlphaHydroxybutyric Dehydrogenase ("HBD") Electrocardiogram The total cost for patient Pendleton's stay at the Pureal Medical Center was $871.00. This amount included the following charges: days at $115.00 75.00 c) Supplies 34 00 d) Cardiac monitor 42.00 e) X-ray 30.00 f) Two EKG's 55 00 g) Doctor's admission examination 75.00 h) Four (4) follow-up visits by Doctor at $25.00 per visit TOTAL 100.00 $871.00 General care, four (4) per day $460.00 Laboratory services On or about February 15, 1983, insurance claims were submitted by the Pureal Medical Center and Respondent for the treatment of patient Pendleton between on or about February 4, 1983, and on or about February 8, 1983. On the Insurance Claim Form submitted by Respondent to Blue Cross Blue Shield, the nature of patient Pendleton's illness was described to include hypertension, Tachycardia, shortness of breath and severe chest pain from unknown etiology. On or about February 8, 1983, Respondent transferred and admitted patient Pendleton to Baptist Medical Center for further evaluation. The admitting diagnosis included Hiatus Hernia with reflux, and a request to rule out coronary artery disease. Patient Pendleton remained in the Baptist Medical Center until on or about February 19, 1983. During the above-mentioned hospitalization at Baptist Medical Center, the following testing was performed on patient Pendleton: Electroencephalogram ("EEG") Echocardiogram EKG Esophageal mobility study and Burnstein test Right and left catheterization with coronary arteriography A second EKG Gall bladder study CAT scan of the head Thyroid profile A KUB following the heart catheterization Upon admission of patient Pendleton to Baptist Medical Center, Respondent obtained four (4) consultations from other physicians about patient Pendleton's condition. Respondent prepared a discharge summary for patient Pendleton, upon discharge of the patient, and listed the following diagnosis therein: Coronary artery spasm, nitroglycerin relieved Hyperventilation syndrome Anxiety neurosis with conversion and depression The total fee for Respondent's services for treatment of patient Pendleton during the above-mentioned hospitalization at Baptist Medical Center was $350.00. This amount included a charge of $275.00 for eleven hospital visits at $25.00 per visit and a $75.00 charge for a discharge summary. On or about February 24, 1983, patient Pendleton presented at the Pureal Medical Center. At the time, patient Pendleton's complaint was right-sided chest pain. On February 24, 1983, the admitting diagnosis for patient Pendleton included right pleural effusion, pneumonitis, and right pulmonary embolism, and a request to rule out congestive heart failure. On or about February 24, 1983, in the emergency room at Baptist Medical Center, a chest x-ray disclosed a right pleural effusion with some evidence of pneumonitis. A consultation was obtained by Respondent from John M. Moorehead, M.D., on or about February 24, 1983. Based upon Dr. Moorehead's examination of patient Pendleton and his evaluation of the chest x-ray taken February 24, 1983, Dr. Moorehead diagnosed patient Pendleton as suffering from a pulmonary embolus and instituted appropriate treatment. While patient Pendleton was in Baptist Medical Center between February 24, 1983, and March 15, 1983, Dr. Moorehead was not the attending physician but was the primary treating physician for patient Pendleton. Patient Pendleton was discharged from Baptist Medical Center, on or about March 16, 1983. The total fee requested for Respondent's services in reference to patient Pendleton's hospitalization at Baptist Medical Center between on or about February 24, 1983, and on or about March 16, 1983, was $1,100.00. This amount included a $125.00 charge for admitting the patient; a $900.00 charge for eighteen (18) hospital visits at $50.00 per visit; and a $75.00 charge for discharge and summary. 27. On the discharge summary prepared by Respondent for patient Pendleton for the hospitalization between on or about February 24, 1983, and on or about March 15, 1983, Respondent listed the following final diagnosis: Massive pulmonary infarct right lung with pleural effusion and atelectasis Underlying Pneumonitis Pulmonary emboli, origin unknown d) Right coronary stenosis, fifty (50) percent Part B. Facts found based upon an examination of the record established at hearing: Respondent is a graduate of Marietta College, from which he obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in 1947. He then received a Master of Medical Science from Ohio State University and his M.D. degree from the University of Cincinnati. The M.D. degree was earned in 1951. Dr. Turner is Board certified in family practice and surgery. He specializes in abdominal surgery. Dr. Turner, in addition to licensure within the state of Florida, is licensed to practice medicine in California and New York. Dr. Turner has not been the subject of disciplinary action prior to this occasion. Dr. Turner practices medicine at an office in Orange Park, Florida. That office is known as the Pureal Medical Center. He is an employee at that location. His employer is Dr. Marcus D. Bergh, a medical doctor. Dr. Bergh is a Board certified family practitioner licensed in Florida. In performing his function as a family practice physician, Respondent is involved in what he describes as general practice in the overall medical management of family health care. Examples of his involvement include surgical, obstetrical, and medical. Dr. Turner is on the active staff of the Baptist Medical Center which is located in Jacksonville, Florida. That staff activity is related to family practice. He also has courtesy staff privileges at Memorial Medical Center and St. Luke's Hospital in Jacksonville, Florida. His staff privileges existed at Baptist Medical Center at all times relevant to this inquiry. Dr. Turner limits his hospital practice to the admission of patients and the use of consultants to perform primary care. When the patient Pendleton presented himself at the Pureal Medical Center on February 24, 1983, in addition to his complaint of right-side chest pains, he was experiencing shortness of breath and had a flushed appearance. The patient was sweating and was unstable on his feet. The impression that Dr. Turner had of Pendleton's condition at the time was one of a form of severe pulmonary insult. Dr. Turner arranged for the admission of Pendleton to Baptist Medical Center through contact with the emergency room at that facility. It was Dr. Turner's expectation that Pendleton would be seen by contract physicians working for Baptist Medical Center who specialized in pulmonary problems. Those physicians were Dr. John M. Moorehead and one Dr. Reed. Mr. Pendleton's wife drove him to the emergency room on February 24, 1983. Dr. Turner had talked to someone at Baptist Medical Center before Pendleton's arrival at that facility and indicated that he wished to have Pendleton's chart pulled from the prior hospitalization described and to be seen by an emergency room physician as soon as possible. After arriving at the emergency room, Dr. Rodriguez, an emergency room physician, examined the patient Pendleton and conducted certain tests, which included chest x-ray, urinalysis and blood work. Dr. Rodriguez made a preliminary diagnosis of pleural effusion in the right lung. There was some possibility at that time of congestive heart failure. When Dr. Rodriguez explained his impression of the case to Respondent, Dr. Turner requested that Dr. Rodriguez contact one of the pulmonary specialists on the hospital staff, Dr. Reed or Moorehead. Dr. Moorehead responded to this request, and as described, from February 24, 1983, to March 15, 1983, served as the primary treating physician for the patient Pendleton. Dr. Moorehead's involvement with the case is summarized in Petitioner's Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence, which is a copy of the medical records of the patient Pendleton during the hospitalization from February 24, 1983, to the discharge date of March 16, 1983. On the evening of February 24, 1983, Respondent went to the Baptist Medical Center and while there reviewed information about the patient's admission, including examination of the authorization for treatment signatures and the emergency room physician's report. Dr. Turner also looked at Dr. Moorehead's remarks that were given as a consultant. Turner saw the patient Pendleton on the evening of February 24, 1983. He has no specific recollection of any conversation with the patient. Dr. Turner does recall that the patient offered no resistance to Respondent's attempt at making a physical examination. Following this examination, Respondent prepared the patient history and physical, and the details of that history and physical may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit 6. Notwithstanding the suggestion by Mr. Pendleton and his wife that they had dismissed Dr. Turner from any involvement with Mr. Pendleton's case during his hospitalization from February 24, 1983, to March 16, 1983, that testimony is not credited. Therefore, Dr. Turner is found to be the admitting physician and in attendance of the patient during the period February 24, 1983, to March 16, 1983, while Pendleton was being treated at Baptist Medical Center. Attendance, in this instance, principally means the technical involvement in Pendleton's case sufficient to maintain Pendleton as a patient at Baptist Medical Center. This is as distinguished from active case management, attending, other than to the limited extent which is described subsequently. This arrangement of continuing to be associated with the case was necessitated by the fact that Dr. Moorehead, the principal treating physician, as a contract doctor to the hospital did not have admitting privileges and the authority to act as independent contractor in the case during the patient's stay. In describing his involvement with the patient Pendleton during the February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983, stay at Baptist Medical Center, Respondent indicated deference to the role of the primary treating physician, Dr. Moorehead. Dr. Turner said that he was not in a position to second guess Dr. Moorehead; however, he stated that he felt that it was his responsibility to see that Dr. Moorehead maintained direction and that the patient was progressing safely and having his needs and wants attended on a day-to-day basis. To accomplish these outcomes, Dr. Turner made daily rounds. He would pull the chart related to Mr. Pendleton, read the nurses notes, and read the consulting physician's notes. In his role as physician, Dr. Turner felt he had to make certain that a progress note was entered every two or three days by some physician, but not necessarily by Dr. Turner. It was sufficient in Dr. Turner's mind that Dr. Moorehead met this requirement for progress notes. Dr. Moorehead made numerous notes in the patient's chart, and they indicated entries on a daily basis during the patient's stay until Dr. Moorehead had completed his relationship with the case. Some contact was made with Dr. Turner by hospital personnel through telephone calls while Mr. Pendleton was in his second stay at Baptist Medical Center in the year 1983. In these instances comments were made to the effect that Mr. Pendleton didn't look so good or his color was dark or that he was using four liters of oxygen, or concerning diagnostic matters. On these occasions, Dr. Turner would refer the inquiry back to Dr. Moorehead. Dr. Turner concedes that a limited number of chart entries were made related to his assessment of the patient Pendleton's condition during Pendleton's February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983, stay at Baptist Medical Center. At the hearing Dr. Turner expressed his regret at not making notations in the chart on a daily basis. On the other hand, he indicates his belief that the JCAH standards did not require such notation, to his knowledge. He points out that his observations would only be that of confirming the remarks of Dr. Moorehead. Finally, Dr. Turner did not believe that his remarks would have advanced the treatment of the patient. Pendleton was released from the hospital in the February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983, stay based upon Dr. Moorehead's suggestion that the patient could be discharged and instructions to have this confirmed with Dr. Turner. Dr. Turner did confirm the acceptability of releasing the patient. Actual face-to-face visits between Dr. Turner and the patient during the February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983, stay were three or four in number. Dr. Turner explained that he did not go in and bother the patient at times that he would be making rounds late at night, as he did not wish to disturb the patient. Moreover, Dr. Turner did not feel that there were any medically indicated reasons for seeing the patient personally other than compliance with by-laws of the hospital related to attending physicians. Respondent did not feel that he needed to give examinations to the patient as a physician, unless other problems unrelated to the primary diagnosis indicated the need to make those examinations. Limited problems did occur, to include one problem with constipation which was addressed by Dr. Turner and the Respondent's ordering of pain medication near the end of the patient's stay in the hospital. This pain medication was pursuant to telephone order from Dr. Turner. On the occasions in which the Respondent actually saw the patient Pendleton in the above-described hospitalization, he would confer with the patient and ask if there were problems that needed to be attended. This conversation would take place after examination of the patient's chart. In one of the visits, which took place on February 27, 1983, a progress note was made about the patient's involvement with asbestos. During his hospital stay, the patient voiced some concern to the Respondent about chest pains. Dr. Turner indicated that the nature of the visits that were taking place would be more of a social visit, were it not for the fact that he felt legally obligated as the attending physician. For that reason, Dr. Turner felt that he was involved with a circumstance other than a social visit. Dr. Turner caused the patient Pendleton to be charged $50 a day for the period of hospitalization February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983, related to eighteen different days. Dr. Turner describes these billing situations as "visits" to the patient. As described, of the eighteen billing instances, only three or four pertained to actual face-to-face contact with the patient. Dr. Turner asserts that the effort which he devoted to the care of the patient Pendleton which would entitle his employer, Pureal Medical Center, to charge $900 was not so much related to medical care as it was related to making sure that nothing else had developed pertaining to previous problems such as ulcers, cardiac, and things that might involve other possible problems with the patient's health. This effort was in the way of monitoring the patient's circumstance, according to Dr. Turner. Dr. Turner believes that a "visit" to the patient is synonymous with activity .involved with the physician who is making rounds and not necessarily face-to-face contact. According to Respondent, a "visit" as it related to the patient Pendleton could be seen as the mere examination of medical records about the patient on each day that the Respondent came to the hospital during Pendleton's stay. Dr. Turner had no contact with Dr. Moorehead, the principal treating physician, during the course of Pendleton's treatment in the period February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983. Dr. Bergh, who is responsible for the establishment of a physician's fees to be charged by Pureal Medical Center for hospital visits which were done by the Respondent in various hospitals where the Respondent had admitting privileges, indicated that those charges were $20 per visit per day prior to 1983. Beginning January 1983, the costs were elevated to $25 per visit per day until August of 1983, and then those fees went to $50 per visit per day. The basis for the billing was premised on the time of billing, not the time of visit. This explains the $50 charge per visit per day that was made based upon Respondent's involvement with the patient Pendleton during the period February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983. The billing took place after the fees were raised to $50 per visit per day. The fees, according to Dr. Bergh, were raised from $25 to $50 based upon the amount of time necessary for Dr. Turner to travel the fifteen miles from Orange Park to the Jacksonville area hospital and return and the amount of work involved with patients in those hospitals. Dr. Bergh did not feel that the $50 charge was exorbitant. Some of the items that Dr. Bergh indicates that his organization took into account in raising the fee to $50 include rate for hospital and doctor charges in Duval County, Workman's Compensation rates for doctors and hospital charges, and articles in a newspaper. Agnes Davis, an employee of Pureal Medical Center, was essentially responsible for increasing the per-visit-per-day charges of 1983 to $50. She had been involved with medical claims work with the Traveler's Insurance Company, and felt that the charges that were being made before the increase were not in keeping with comparable charges by other area doctors. In arriving at the computation of the $50 charge, she references Dr. Turner's Board certification as a family practitioner. Dr. Bergh was responsible for establishing the policy of Pureal Medical Center on the subject of hospital visitation by Dr. Turner. Dr. Bergh, as Respondent's employer, shares Dr. Turner's opinion of what constituted a "visit" at the time the patient Pendleton was hospitalized at Baptist Medical Center from February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983. Again, this concept was such that Dr. Turner need only examine medical records to conclude an event for which a $50 so-called "visit" fee could be imposed based upon the scale in place at the time the billing was done on the Pendleton account. It was not necessary, according to Dr. Bergh, for the Respondent to make any form of annotations in the patient's chart in order to count the activity by the Respondent as being a "visit." This idea of exemption from record keeping is consistent with the Respondent's beliefs as set forth already. Dr. Bergh identified the fact that the charges of Pureal Medical Center were eventually reconsidered, and sometime after September 1983, a month or so later within that calendar year, charges were reduced from $50 per visit per day to 535 per visit per day. He also describes the circumstance by which the amount of charge per visit per day of $50 came about. This occurred due to delays in billing the patient Pendleton for the hospitalization February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983, associated with personnel problems at Pureal Medical Center. In addition to the $900 charges for "visit," in the hospitalization of February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983, an admitting charge of $125 and an expense item of $75 for the discharge summary done by Dr. Turner were imposed against Mr. Pendleton, as described. These charges were reflections of increases in the amounts charged for these services in addition to the preparation of the history and physical, prepared the discharge summary related to the patient Pendleton, and that is found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 6. Other than those already discussed, Dr. Turner gave no other orders and made no other entries in the medical records pertaining to the patient Pendleton during his stay from February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983. At the instigation of Dr. Turner, the $1,100 in charges for Dr. Turner's services to the patient Pendleton during the period February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983, have been paid to Pureal Medical Center by Pendleton's insurance carrier. Respondent did not transmit the request for payment of fees related to his treatment of the patient Pendleton. This task was fulfilled by the administrative arm of the Pureal Medical Center. Dr. Marshall H. Burns, a physician who has been licensed in the state of Florida for a period of twenty-five years and who holds Board certification in internal medicine, offered testimony concerning Respondent's care of the patient Pendleton during the period February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983. Dr. Burns also spoke to the propriety of the charges for that treatment. Dr. Burns, in addition to his certification in internal medicine, has a cardiology practice in the Jacksonville area. He is familiar with prevailing medical standards for the admission and treatment of patients with internal disorders. He is also familiar with the fee structure for internist and family practitioners in the Duval County area in 1983. This familiarity includes the geographic area in which Dr. Turner practiced in 1983. Prior to 1983, Dr. Burns had been involved with the Duval County Medical Society insurance review committee. In 1983 his familiarity with fee charges related to discussions with colleagues and his coverage partners. In preparing himself to give testimony about the propriety of treatment and charges involved in the Respondent's care of the patient Pendleton during the period February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983, Dr. Burns reviewed the materials set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit 6. He looks upon the job of the admitting physician as being to follow the treatment, diagnosis, and progress of patients admitted, even where medical consultants have taken over case management. Dr. Burns believes a consultant takes over the intense management of the case, in a case such as Pendleton's wherein Dr. Moorehead was the principal physician. Dr. Burns does not feel that the admitting physician is necessarily attending the patient. Dr. Burns' expression of what it means to be in actual attendance of a patient such as Pendleton is accepted, and it is found that Dr. Turner, with the exception of the two instances of his providing orders, the preparation of the admitting history and physical and the discharge summary, and the total of three or four visits made to the patient Pendleton was not attending the care of that patient. Dr. Burns feels that a visit to a patient means the actual involvement with the patient through seeing the patient, assessing the patient, talking to the patient, looking at the patient and making at least a limited examination. This definition of a patient visit is accepted and the more liberal definition of a patient visit set forth by Drs. Turner and Bergh in describing involvement with the patient Pendleton is rejected. Dr. Burns believes, and his opinion is accepted, that if Turner were to be considered the attending physician, he, Turner, was responsible for seeing the patient on a daily basis or every other day at the minimum. Under the facts in this case, Dr. Turner's activity cannot be perceived as that of an attending physician, other than those instances as described. Other than those occasions, accepting Dr. Burns' definition, the chart review is not attendance and is not billable as a visit. Dr. Burns believes, and his opinion is accepted, that charting or record entries should have been made related to the three or four visits by the Respondent. Dr. Turner gave only one indication of the patient's progress in the physician's records for the patient Pendleton during the period between February 24, 1983, through March 16, 1983. His other recorded visit dealt with the initial patient history and physical. This left one or two visits unexplained in the patient record. If Dr. Turner intended to be considered the attending physician, reference notes should have been made related to the other visit(s) with the patient Pendleton, visit(s) on this occasion, meaning visits as defined by Dr. Burns. As Dr. Burns established, those progress notes needed to be written at least every other day if the visit(s) transpired on consecutive dates. The progress notes are also important to assist other medical doctors and nurses, directed to affording good care for the patient, this as shown by the testimony of Dr. Burns. Dr. Burns acknowledges that there were circumstances in which Dr. Turner, the admitting physician, might have desired to attend other needs of the patient Pendleton unrelated to the pulmonary condition; however, Dr. Turner did not set out to address any other areas of Pendleton's health and in fact did not address those other health related matters, with the limited exceptions as related above. As described by Dr. Burns, if Dr. Turner intended to bill the patient Pendleton $50 per day, he should have seen him on a daily basis or as close to that arrangement as possible. Dr. Turner only saw the patient three or four times, and yet he billed the patient for eighteen visits. Dr. Burns indicated on the topic of the amount of fee charged that he presently charges a standard fee of $30, and his fee in 1983 was in the range of $25. The $50 fee was double what he would have anticipated as a charge per visit in this category of care in 1983 in the Jacksonville area, at the least. The charges for the admission of the patient, in Dr. Burns' mind, should not exceed $100; therefore the $125 that Dr. Turner charged Pendleton for admission on February 24, 1983, was excessive, or, as Dr. Burns described it, "far out of line." Dr. Burns felt that the discharge summary for the patient Pendleton. Dr. Burns' opinion on the excessive amounts of the charges is accepted.
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(4) (Rule) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented.
Findings Of Fact The Parties VRBH is an existing hospital in Sarasota County. In the second batching cycle of 2016, VRBH applied to AHCA for a CON to establish a Class I Acute Care Replacement Hospital of up to 312 beds in AHCA District VIII, Subdistrict 8-6, Sarasota County. The CON application was preliminarily approved by AHCA on December 2, 2016. SMH is a public hospital system serving Sarasota County. In the second batching cycle of 2016, SMH applied for a CON to establish a new acute care hospital with 90 beds in AHCA District 8, Acute Care Subdistrict 8-6, Sarasota County. As with the VRBH application, the SMH application also received preliminary approval from AHCA on December 2, 2016. AHCA is designated as the single state agency responsible for administering the CON program under the Health Facility and Services Development Act, sections 408.031 through 408.045, Florida Statutes. The Challenged Rule In part, Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(4) requires that CON applications contain the audited financial statements of the applicant, or the applicant’s parent corporation. The Rule states as follows: Certificate of Need Application Contents. An application for a Certificate of Need shall contain the following items: All requirements set forth in Sections 408.037(1), (2) and (3), F.S. The correct application fee. An audited financial statement of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation if the applicant’s audited financial statements do not exist. The following provisions apply: The audited financial statement of the applicant, or the applicant’s parent corporation, must be for the most current fiscal year. If the most recent fiscal year ended within 120 days prior to the application filing deadline and the audited financial statements are not yet available, then the prior fiscal year will be considered the most recent. Existing health care facilities must provide audited financial statements for the two most recent consecutive fiscal years in accordance with subparagraph 1. above. Only audited financial statements of the applicant, or the applicant’s parent corporation, will be accepted. Audited financial statements of any part of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation, including but not limited to subsidiaries, divisions, specific facilities or cost centers, will not qualify as an audit of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation. To comply with Section 408.037(1)(b)1., F.S., which requires a listing of all capital projects, the applicant shall provide the total approximate amount of anticipated expenditures for capital projects which meet the definition in subsection 59C-1.002(7), F.A.C., at the time of initial application submission, or state that there are none. An itemized list or grouping of capital projects is not required, although an applicant may choose to itemize or group its capital projects. The applicant shall also indicate the actual or proposed financial commitment to those projects, and include an assessment of the impact of those projects on the applicant’s ability to provide the proposed project; and, Responses to applicable questions contained in the application forms. The 2008 CON Legislative Changes In 2008, the Florida Legislature made numerous changes to streamline the CON application process for general hospitals. It is these changes that VRBH asserts removed the requirement for general hospitals to submit audited financial statements with CON applications. Section 408.035 was amended to provide as follows: 408.035 Review criteria.— The agency shall determine the reviewability of applications and shall review applications for certificate-of-need determinations for health care facilities and health services in context with the following criteria, except for general hospitals as defined in s. 395.002: The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed. The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant. The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant’s record of providing quality of care. The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation. The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district. The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal. The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness. The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction. The applicant’s past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. The applicant’s designation as a Gold Seal Program nursing facility pursuant to s. 400.235, when the applicant is requesting additional nursing home beds at that facility. For a general hospital, the agency shall consider only the criteria specified in paragraph (1)(a), paragraph (1)(b), except for quality of care in paragraph (1)(b), and paragraphs (1)(e), (g), and (i). (Emphasis added). Section 408.035 has not been revised since 2008. Additionally, section 408.037 was amended to read as follows: 408.037 Application content.— Except as provided in subsection (2) for a general hospital, an application for a certificate of need must contain: A detailed description of the proposed project and statement of its purpose and need in relation to the district health plan. A statement of the financial resources needed by and available to the applicant to accomplish the proposed project. This statement must include: A complete listing of all capital projects, including new health facility development projects and health facility acquisitions applied for, pending, approved, or underway in any state at the time of application, regardless of whether or not that state has a certificate-of-need program or a capital expenditure review program pursuant to s. 1122 of the Social Security Act. The agency may, by rule, require less- detailed information from major health care providers. This listing must include the applicant’s actual or proposed financial commitment to those projects and an assessment of their impact on the applicant’s ability to provide the proposed project. A detailed listing of the needed capital expenditures, including sources of funds. A detailed financial projection, including a statement of the projected revenue and expenses for the first 2 years of operation after completion of the proposed project. This statement must include a detailed evaluation of the impact of the proposed project on the cost of other services provided by the applicant. An audited financial statement of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation if audited financial statements of the applicant do not exist. In an application submitted by an existing health care facility, health maintenance organization, or hospice, financial condition documentation must include, but need not be limited to, a balance sheet and a profit-and-loss statement of the 2 previous fiscal years’ operation. An application for a certificate of need for a general hospital must contain a detailed description of the proposed general hospital project and a statement of its purpose and the needs it will meet. The proposed project’s location, as well as its primary and secondary service areas, must be identified by zip code. Primary service area is defined as the zip codes from which the applicant projects that it will draw 75 percent of its discharges. Secondary service area is defined as the zip codes from which the applicant projects that it will draw its remaining discharges. If, subsequent to issuance of a final order approving the certificate of need, the proposed location of the general hospital changes or the primary service area materially changes, the agency shall revoke the certificate of need. However, if the agency determines that such changes are deemed to enhance access to hospital services in the service district, the agency may permit such changes to occur. A party participating in the administrative hearing regarding the issuance of the certificate of need for a general hospital has standing to participate in any subsequent proceeding regarding the revocation of the certificate of need for a hospital for which the location has changed or for which the primary service area has materially changed. In addition, the application for the certificate of need for a general hospital must include a statement of intent that, if approved by final order of the agency, the applicant shall within 120 days after issuance of the final order or, if there is an appeal of the final order, within 120 days after the issuance of the court’s mandate on appeal, furnish satisfactory proof of the applicant’s financial ability to operate. The agency shall establish documentation requirements, to be completed by each applicant, which show anticipated provider revenues and expenditures, the basis for financing the anticipated cash- flow requirements of the provider, and an applicant’s access to contingency financing. A party participating in the administrative hearing regarding the issuance of the certificate of need for a general hospital may provide written comments concerning the adequacy of the financial information provided, but such party does not have standing to participate in an administrative proceeding regarding proof of the applicant’s financial ability to operate. The agency may require a licensee to provide proof of financial ability to operate at any time if there is evidence of financial instability, including, but not limited to, unpaid expenses necessary for the basic operations of the provider. The applicant must certify that it will license and operate the health care facility. For an existing health care facility, the applicant must be the licenseholder of the facility. (Emphasis added). Section 408.037 has only been amended once since 2008. The revisions are not relevant to the issue presented in this Rule challenge.2/ The Parties’ Positions In support of its argument that the Rule contravenes the statutes, VRBH asserts that the Rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the laws implemented. Simply put, VRBH contends that the Rule is contrary to sections 408.035 and VRBH advances three reasons for its position that the Rule modifies the laws implemented; all three center on the assertion that in 2008, the Legislature removed the requirement for the submission of audited financial statements with general hospital CON applications: Requiring a general hospital to comply with the requirements of section 408.037(1), Florida Statutes, by submitting an audited financial statement with its CON application violates the express provision of the statute which specifically excludes general hospitals from the requirements of subsection (1); Requiring a general hospital to submit an audited financial statement with the CON application directly contradicts the submission requirements set forth in section 408.037(2), Florida Statutes, which only requires a general hospital to provide a statement of intent that it will “furnish satisfactory proof of the applicant’s financial ability to operate” if the CON application is approved by final order of the agency. Requiring a general hospital to submit an audited financial statement with the CON application contradicts the 2008 legislative changes to section 408.035, Florida Statutes, which streamlined the application process for general hospitals by removing the short and long term financial feasibility of the project as a review criteria. (VRBH Petition, ¶¶ 15-17). AHCA’s ultimate position is that the Rule should be interpreted as not requiring audited financial statements for general hospital CON applicants. To reach this conclusion, AHCA relies on 59C-1.008(4)(a), which provides that a CON application must contain “all requirements set forth in Sections 408.037(1), (2), and (3), Florida Statutes.” AHCA interprets the introductory phrase contained in section 408.037(1)--“except as provided in subsection (2) for a general hospital, an application for a certificate of need must contain”--to mean that only subsection (2) of section 408.037 applies to an application for general hospitals. Because section 408.037(2) does not mention audited financial statements, AHCA reasons that they are not required. Therefore, despite the plain language of the Rule, AHCA contends that the Rule does not require the submission of audited financial statements because: the Rule references sections 408.037(1), (2), and (3); AHCA interprets only section 408.037(2) as applying to general hospitals; and section 408.037(2) does not mention audited financial statements. SMH contends that the Rule does not enlarge, modify, or contravene the laws implemented and, therefore, is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Specifically, SMH contends that section 408.037 itself requires general hospital applicants to submit audited financial statements because subsection (2) does not wholesale replace subsection (1) for general hospitals. Subsection (1) applies to general hospitals, unless there is an exception to those requirements listed in subsection (2). Subsection (1) requires the submission of audited financial statements for all CON applicants; nothing in subsection (2) creates an exception to that requirement. SMH also argues that audited financial statements are reliable documents that AHCA can quickly access for relevant information, including an applicant’s provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent, both of which are prominent considerations during the review of a general hospital’s CON application. See § 408.035(1)(i), (2), Fla. Stat. Post 2008 Rule Challenged Rule 59C-1.008(4) does not expressly exclude or differentiate between general hospital CON applications and other CON applications. Instead the Rule cross-references to the statutory requirement. AHCA asserts that by doing so, the Rule incorporates the statutory scheme by reference and does not require a CON application for a general hospital to include audited financial statements. The above-cited statutory provisions clearly state that a general hospital CON application need not include an audited financial statement and that financial condition is not relevant to the CON application review process. Any rule that requires a general hospital CON applicant to provide an audited financial statement with the application would be contrary to the requirements of section 408.037. It follows, therefore, that a rule contrary to the requirements of a statute would be invalid as it would exceed AHCA’s delegated legislative authority. Requiring a general hospital applicant to comply with the requirements of section 408.037(1) would violate the provision of the statute, which expressly excludes general hospitals from the requirements of subsection (1). Further, requiring a general hospital applicant to submit an audited financial statement with its CON application directly contradicts the submission requirements set forth in section 408.037(2). AHCA’s interpretation of rule 59C-1.008 is that it must be read in conjunction with section 408.037, subsections (1), (2), and (3), and accordingly, AHCA does not require that a general hospital applicant submit an audited financial statement as part of its application. AHCA’s interpretation is consistent with the differences in the content of the CON application forms published by AHCA for general hospital applications when compared to non-general hospital applications, for instance, those seeking other beds and services such as comprehensive medical rehabilitation, psychiatric, hospice, and other CON- regulated beds in a hospital. The requirements of each application type correspond to the statutory requirements for each application type. Application forms for projects “except for general hospitals” correspond to the CON application content requirements of section 408.037(1), which requires a statement of financial resources that must include capital projects (Schedule 2 of the CON application); capital expenditures and source of funds (Schedules 1 and 3 of the CON application); and a detailed financial projection, including revenues and expenses for the first two years (Schedules 5 through 8 of the CON application). The general hospital CON application does not have these requirements. General hospitals are not required to submit proof of financial ability to operate at the time of the submission of the CON application. In accordance with rule 59C-1.010(2)(d), general hospitals are required to comply with the requirements of sections 408.035(2) and 408.037(2). Neither of those statutes requires that a general hospital applicant submit proof of financial ability to operate until 120 days after the issuance of the final CON to the applicant. AHCA’s representative, Marisol Fitch, testified that AHCA does not require applicants for general hospitals to submit audited financial statements in the CON application, and that proof of financial ability to operate is required within 120 days after the final approval of the CON application, consistent with the statutory provisions. She testified that the Rule being challenged, when read in conjunction with the AHCA CON application form (incorporated by reference into the Rule) and other AHCA rules, including 59C-1.010 and 59C-1.030, is consistent with the statute, and that no audited financial statements are required. SMH asserts that an audited financial statement for hospitals might contain useful information, such as information on a hospital’s current payor mix. However, the unrefuted testimony is that audited financial statements are not required to include payor mix information, and normally do not since they are typically used to look at an applicant’s financial feasibility to operate. Further, regardless of whether such information might be “useful,” the specific requirement of section 408.037(2) expressly “excepts” general hospitals from the requirement to include such statements in the CON application. Pursuant to rule 59C-1.010(2)(d), “an application for a general hospital must meet the requirements of Sections 408.035(2) and 408.037(2), F.S.,” neither of which require that a general hospital CON applicant provide audited financials or financial feasibility data with the CON application. However, the challenged language in rule 59C-1.008(4) does not contain the “exception” for general hospital applications. Rule 59C-1.008(4) provides, without qualification, that a CON application must contain audited financial statements. Therefore, rules 59C-1.008(4) and 59C-1.010(2)(d) are contradictory. The primary purpose of an audited financial statement in a CON application is to review the short-term and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal. Requiring this financial information is contrary to the clear language of the 2008 changes to section 408.035, which removed the short-term and long-term financial feasibility of the project as review criteria in order to streamline the general hospital CON application process. AHCA has stated that their interpretation of rule 59C-1.008(4) is that it must be read in pari materia with rule 59C-1.010(2)(d) and sections 408.037 and 408.035, therefore, general hospital CON applicants are not required to submit audited financials with the CON application. According to AHCA’s interpretation, rule 59C-1.008(4) does not require a general hospital CON applicant to submit an audited financial statement with the CON application. However, regardless of AHCA’s interpretation, rule 59C-1.008(4) expressly states that a CON application must contain audited financial statements, in contravention of sections 408.035 and 408.037.
The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Hunt is and has been at all times material, licensed by the Florida Board of Medicine. His license number is ME 001081. The Department of Health is charged with regulating the practice of medicine. The Department of Health may contract with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to provide investigative and prosecutorial services required by the Division of Medical Quality Assurance, councils, or boards, as appropriate. In this case, ACHA provided those services to the Department of Health. The Board of Medicine is an administrative body statutorily situated under the Division of Medical Quality Assurance. On the evening of June 28, 1999, Dr. Hunt was on duty in the emergency room of the Memorial Hospital-West Volusia. Memorial Hospital-West Volusia subsequently became known as Florida Hospital Deland (Hospital Deland). At 9:35 p.m., on June 28, 1999, Patient V.V., a 22-month-old female, was brought by her father to the emergency room of Hospital Deland with a complaint of fever and shortness of breath. It was reported to emergency room personnel that V.V. had experienced shortness of breath for many hours before she was brought to the emergency room. V.V. was born on August 29, 1997. V.V. had a history of multiple congenital deformities including panhypopituitarism and a severe cleft lip and palate, among other medical problems. V.V. had visited Hospital Deland at least 68 times previous to her visit of June 28, 1999. Panhypopituitarism means that the part of the brain that regulates all of the glands and hormones that the body requires to function, is not functioning. This gives rise to a host of problems, including hypothyroidism, retarded growth, and holoprosencephaly. This latter term means that the brain does not progress or develop much beyond the fetal stage. V.V. also experienced seizures and sodium imbalances which would range from very high to very low. V.V. was described by her Board-certified pediatrician, Dr. Susan Griffis, as being very difficult to manage medically. Dr. Griffis described V.V. as being basically in a vegetative state. She noted that V.V.'s deformities were not compatible with long-term existence. V.V.'s prognosis at birth was a life span of two years. By June 28, 1999, she had attained the age of 22 months. At 9:35 p.m., Nurse Hilbun noted a respiration of 60 and determined, through the use of a pulse oximeter, that V.V.'s concentration of oxygen was 60 percent. V.V. was placed on 100 percent oxygen along with an aerosol medicine through the application of a nonrebreather mask. V.V.'s skin was dry and pink which indicated that she was getting sufficient oxygen. Dr. Hunt, on June 28, 1999, first saw V.V. at 10:00 p.m. He conducted a physical examination which revealed, among other things, that the child had shortness of breath and a temperature of 101.8 degrees. The child was diagnosed with bilateral pneumonia. At 10:16 p.m., Dr. Hunt ordered diagnostic studies including a chest X-ray and laboratory studies, which include an RSV test for virus, and a complete blood count (CBC). The CBC could not be obtained because blood could not be drawn. Blood could not be drawn because V.V.'s veins were very small and because of scarring from numerous previous extractions of blood. Dr. Hunt attempted to contact Dr. Griffis, V.V.'s pediatrician, for advice on a course of treatment but was unable to reach her. Dr. Hunt then contacted Dr. Reinertsen, the pediatrician on call who advised Dr. Hunt to intubate the patient and transfer her to Arnold Palmer Hospital in Orlando. It cannot be determined from the record exactly when this telephone call transpired. Dr. Reinertsen did not come to the emergency room. Arnold Palmer Hospital had an intensive care pediatrics unit. No intensive care pediatrics unit was available at Hospital Deland. Dr. Hunt did not transfer the child because he determined that V.V. was not stable to the point where she would survive the trip. He also did not follow Dr. Reinertsen's advice to immediately intubate the child, nor was he required to follow his advice. At 9:35 p.m., V.V.'s oxygen saturation was 60 percent and she had a heart rate of 160. At 9:45 p.m., she had an oxygen saturation of 85 percent. At 11:00 p.m., V.V's oxygen saturation was 98 percent and her temperature had improved to 100.6 degrees. At 11:40 p.m., respiration had improved to 52 and her heart rate was down to 140. At 1:40 a.m., June 29, 1999, respiration was 52, her heart rate was 142 and oxygen saturation was 95 percent. At 2:30 a.m., respiration was 52 and her heart rate was 142. At 3:00 a.m., respiration was 60, her heart rate was 146 and oxygen saturation was 95 percent. During this period, from 9:35 p.m. until immediately before 3:00 a.m. on June 29, 1999, V.V. was not sufficiently stable for transfer but her condition was not deteriorating. At approximately 4:00 a.m., V.V.'s condition took a dramatic turn for the worse. The child began to have difficulty breathing and was experiencing apnea. When the child's condition began to deteriorate, Dr. Hunt asked for and received permission from V.V.'s parents to intubate V.V. Although V.V. had been placed on oxygen shortly after arrival, an oxygen mask will only put oxygen into the lungs. It will not facilitate exhalation. Intubation, if successful, provides a clear passage to the lungs and facilitates both inhalation and exhalation. Dr. Hunt was unsuccessful in intubating V.V. An anesthesiologist was called in and eventually succeeded in intubating V.V. Nevertheless, V.V. continued to rapidly deteriorate, and suffered cardiac and respiratory arrest at approximately 5:00 a.m. Unsuccessful efforts were made to defillibrate V.V. with electric paddles at 5:12 a.m., 5:13 a.m., and 5:14 a.m., but the child could not be resuscitated. Intubating any baby is a difficult and dangerous task. Intubating a baby with the deformities that characterized V.V. is particularly dangerous because the tube could easily penetrate the brain instead of going down the back of the throat as it should. V.V. had been hospitalized at Shands Hospital for a repair of her cleft palate and cleft lip when she was approximately 18 months of age. Shands is a well-known research hospital with a superb reputation. Before the repair could be accomplished, it was necessary to intubate V.V. and the surgeons at Shands were unable to do it. Dr. Hunt was aware of this. Because of these factors, Dr. Hunt was reluctant to intubate V.V. The testimony of the State's Expert Mark Slepin, M.D., testified as an expert witness in the area of the delivery of emergency medical care. He is the chief operating officer and chief compliance officer for ECS Holdings. ECS Holdings is a company which provides quality assurance services, among other things, to hospitals throughout Florida and to hospitals in many other states. Dr. Slepin served a residency in emergency medicine at the University Hospital, Jacksonville. Dr. Slepin practiced emergency medicine for ten years at hospitals in the southeastern Virginia area. He practiced at St. Mary's and Good Samaritan Hospitals in West Palm Beach, and at hospitals in Milton and Sarasota, prior to joining ECS. He is Board-certified in emergency medicine. He was accepted as an expert in the practice of emergency medicine. Dr. Slepin reviewed V.V.'s hospital records and statements made by Dr. Hunt. He opined that Dr. Hunt, for the most part, practiced within the standard of care that is expected of a reasonably prudent emergency physician with regard to his evaluation of the patient, his work-up of the patient, and his initial management of the patient in the early stages of the patient's course in the emergency room. Dr. Slepin thereafter opined that the plan of care was not a plan that a reasonably prudent emergency physician would take. There was no written "do not resuscitate" order. He opined that under those circumstances Dr. Hunt should have either admitted V.V. into the hospital or transferred her to a hospital with appropriate resources. Moreover, Dr. Hunt failed to provide appropriate airway management, in his opinion. He opined that Dr. Hunt left the patient in limbo for five hours and, therefore, the patient eventually succumbed because there was no definitive airway intervention in a patient who needed airway intervention. Dr. Slepin opined that the medical records adequately documented the patient's response to therapy and progress, except that there should have been additional physician's notes regarding the patient's progress filed between the initial evaluation and the eventual demise. The testimony of the Respondent's Experts Donald Hilbun, Jr., is a registered nurse who has a bachelor of science degree in nursing from the University of South Alabama. He was a medic in the military for three years and practiced in the labor and delivery unit of a military medical facility in Alaska where he delivered health care to babies. He is certified by the American Heart Association in advanced cardiac life support. Nurse Hilbun had worked at the Hospital Deland for one year on June 28, 1999. He was accepted as an expert on the practice of nursing. Nurse Hilbun prepared nurses notes for V.V., which were part of the overall medical record of V.V.'s care. It is Nurse Hilbun's opinion that V.V. was never stable enough to permit a successful transfer to the Arnold Palmer Hospital. He does not believe Dr. Hunt withheld appropriate treatment. Jay Edelberg, M.D., is a Board-certified emergency room physician. He has a degree in dentistry and received his medical degree in 1975. He did a surgical internship for one year at St. Francis Hospital in Hartford, Connecticut, and did an emergency medicine residency from 1976 to 1978 at what is now called Shands of Jacksonville. He is currently in private practice. He also works in the emergency room of Flagler Hospital which is similar in size to Hospital Deland. Dr. Edelberg has had a contract with the AHCA for the last seven or eight years. The contract provides that he is to review cases relating to emergency room physicians. He gives written opinions, when asked, to the probable cause panel of the Board of Medicine. He was accepted as an expert in the field of emergency room medicine. Dr. Edelberg reviewed V.V.'s hospital records. He opined that when treating a patient who is having shortness of breath, intubation is done only as a last resort. He opined that Dr. Hunt's decision to intubate V.V. at the time he did was the correct decision and that it would have been a mistake to have done it earlier. Dr. Edelberg opined that the events of the evening of July 28, 1999, and the morning of July 29, 1999, were adequately documented by Dr. Hunt. Dr. Edelberg pointed out that Dr. Reinertsen was on-call for Dr. Griffis, V.V.'s pediatrician. He was not on- call for the emergency room. He also pointed out that when someone like Dr. Reinertsen is consulted, unless that person comes in and takes over the case, it is the emergency room physician who must ultimately make all of the decisions with regard to care. Dr. Edelberg stated that it was his opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the care provided to V.V. met the required standard of care. Conclusion On the whole, the expert testimony of Dr. Edelburg and Nurse Hilbun, was more persuasive than that of Dr. Slepin.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue Kindred Hospitals East, LLC ("Kindred") and Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc. ("Select-Palm Beach"), filed applications for Certificates of Need ("CONs") with the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA" or the "Agency") seeking approval for the establishment of long-term care hospitals ("LTCHs") in Palm Beach County, AHCA District 9. Select-Palm Beach's application, CON No. 9661, seeks approval for the establishment of a 60-bed freestanding LTCH in "east central" Palm Beach County about 20 miles south of Kindred's planned location. Kindred's application, CON No. 9662, seeks approval for the establishment of a 70-bed LTCH in the "north central" portion of the county. The ultimate issue in this case is whether either or both applications should be approved by the Agency.
Findings Of Fact Long Term Care Hospitals Of the four classes of facilities licensed as hospitals by the Agency, "Class I or general hospitals," includes: General acute care hospitals with an average length of stay of 25 days or less for all beds; Long term care hospitals, which meet the provisions of subsection 59A-3.065(27), F.A.C.; and, Rural hospitals designated under Section 395, Part III, F.S. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.252(1)(a). This proceeding concerns CON applications for the second of Florida's Class I or general hospitals: LTCHs. A critically ill patient may be admitted and treated in a general acute care hospital, but, if the patient cannot be stabilized or discharged to a lower level of care on the continuum of care within a relatively short time, the patient may be discharged to an LTCH. An LTCH patient is almost always "critically catastrophically ill or ha[s] been." (Tr. 23). Typically, an LTCH patient is medically unstable, requires extensive nursing care with physician oversight, and often requires extensive technological support. The LTCH patient usually fits into one or more of four categories. One category is patients in need of pulmonary/respiratory services. Usually ventilator dependent, these types of LTCH patients have other needs as well that requires "complex comprehensive ventilator weaning in addition to meeting ... other needs." (Tr. 26). A second category is patients in need of wound care whose wound is life-threatening. Frequently compromised by inadequate nutrition, these types of LTCH patients are often diabetic. There are a number of typical factors that may account for the seriousness of the wound patient's condition. The job of the staff at the LTCH in such a case is to attend to the wound and all the other medical problems of the patient that have extended the time required for care of the wound. A third category is patients with some sort of neuro-trauma. These patients may have had a stroke and are often elderly; if younger, they may be victims of a car accident or some other serious trauma. They typically have multiple body systems that require medical treatment, broken bones and a closed head injury for example, that have made them "very sick and complex." (Tr. 27). The fourth category is referred to by the broad nomenclature of "medically complex" although it is a subset of the population of LTCH patients all of whom are medically complex. The condition of the patients in this fourth category involves two or more body systems. The patients usually present at the LTCH with "renal failure ... [and] with another medical condition ... that requires a ventilator ..." Id. In short, LTCHs provide extended medical and rehabilitative care to patients with multiple, chronic, and/or clinically complex acute medical conditions that usually require care for a relatively extended period of time. To meet the definition of an LTCH a facility must have an average length of inpatient stay ("ALOS") greater than 25 days for all hospital beds. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.065(34). The staffs at general acute care hospitals and LTCHs have different orientations. With a staff oriented toward a patient population with a much shorter ALOS, the general acute care hospital setting may not be appropriate for a patient who qualifies for LTCH services. The staff at a general acute care hospital frequently judges success by a patient getting well in a relatively short time. It is often difficult for general acute care hospital staff to sustain the interest and effort necessary to serve the LTCH patient well precisely because of the staff's expectation that the patient will improve is not met in a timely fashion. As time goes by, that expectation continues to be frustrated, a discouragement to staff. The LTCH is unlike other specialized health care settings. The complex, medical, nursing, and therapeutic requirements necessary to serve the LTCH patient may be beyond the capability of the traditional comprehensive medical rehabilitation ("CMR") hospital, nursing home, skilled nursing facility ("SNF"), or, the skilled nursing unit ("SNU"). CMR units and hospitals are rarely, if ever, appropriate for the LTCH patient. Almost invariably, LTCH patients are not able to tolerate the minimum three (3) hours of therapy per day associated with CMR. The primary focus of LTCHs, moreover, is to provide continued acute medical treatment to the patient that may not yet be stable, with the ultimate goal of getting the patient on the road to recovery. In comparison, the CMR hospital treats medically stable patients consistent with its primary focus of restoring functional capabilities, a more advanced step in the continuum of care. Services provided in LTCHs are distinct from those provided in SNFs or SNUs. The latter are not oriented generally to patients who need daily physician visits or the intense nursing services or observations needed by an LTCH patient. Most nursing and clinical personnel in SNFs and SNUs are not experienced with the unique psychosocial needs of long-term acute care patients and their families. An LTCH is distinguished within the healthcare continuum by the high level of care the patient requires, the interdisciplinary treatment model it follows, and the duration of the patient's hospitalization. Within the continuum of care, LTCHs occupy a niche between traditional acute care hospitals that provide initial hospitalization care on a short-term basis and post-acute care facilities such as nursing homes, SNFs, SNUs, and comprehensive medical rehabilitation facilities. Medicare has long recognized LTCHs as a distinct level of care within the health care continuum. The federal government's prospective payment system ("PPS") now treats the LTCH level of service as distinct with its "own DRG system and ... [its] own case rate reimbursement." (Tr. 108). Under the LTCH PPS, each patient is assigned an LTC- DRG (different than the DRG under the general hospital DRG system) with a corresponding payment rate that is weighted based on the patient diagnosis and acuity. The Parties The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the CON Program and licensing LTCHs and other hospital facilities pursuant to the authority of Health Facility and Services Development Act, Sections 408.031-408.045, Florida Statutes. Select-Palm Beach is the applicant for a free-standing 60-bed LTCH in "east Central Palm Beach County," Select Ex. 1, stamped page 12, near JFK Medical Center in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9661, was denied by the Agency. Select-Palm Beach is a wholly owned subsidiary of Select Medical Corporation, which provides long term acute care services at 83 LTCHs in 24 states, four of which are freestanding hospitals. The other 79 are each "hospitals-in-a- hospital" ("HIH" or "LTCH HIH"). Kindred is the applicant for a 70-bed LTCH to be located in the north central portion of Palm Beach County in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9662, was denied by the Agency. Kindred is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kindred Healthcare, Inc. ("Kindred Healthcare"). Kindred Healthcare operates 73 LTCHs, 59 of which are freestanding, according to the testimony of Mr. Novak. See Tr. 56-57. Kindred Healthcare has been operating LTCHs since 1985 and has operated them in Florida for more than 15 years. At the time of the submission of Kindred's application, Kindred Healthcare's six LTCHs in Florida were Kindred-North Florida, a 60-bed LTCH in Pinellas County, AHCA District 5; Kindred-Central Tampa, with 102 beds, and Kindred-Bay Area- Tampa, with 73 beds, both in Hillsborough County, in AHCA District 6; Kindred-Ft. Lauderdale with 64 beds and Kindred- Hollywood with 124 beds, both in Broward County, ACHA District 10; and Kindred-Coral Gables, with 53 beds, in Dade County, AHCA District 11. The Applications and AHCA's Review The applications were submitted in the first application cycle of 2003. Select-Palm Beach's application is CON No. 9661; Kindred's is CON No. 9662. Select-Palm Beach estimates its total project costs to be $12,856,139. Select-Palm Beach has not yet acquired the site for its proposed LTCH, but did include in its application a map showing three priority site locations, with its preferred site, designated "Site 1," located near JFK Medical Center. At $12,937,419, Kindred's estimate of its project cost is slightly more than Select-Palm Beach's. The exact site of Kindred's proposed LTCH had not been determined at the time of hearing. Kindred's preference, however, is to locate in the West Palm Beach area in the general vicinity of St. Mary's Hospital, in the northern portion of Palm Beach County along the I-95 corridor. This is approximately 15 to 20 miles north of Select's preferred location for its LTCH. There is no LTCH in the five-county service area that comprises District 9: Indian River, Okeechobee, St. Lucie, Martin, and Palm Beach Counties. There are two LTCHs in adjacent District 10 (to the south). They have a total of 188 beds and an average occupancy of 80 percent. The Agency views LTCH care as a district-wide service primarily for Medicare patients. At the time of the filing of the applications, the population in District 9 was over 1.6 million, including about 400,000 in the age cohort 65 and over. About 70 percent of the District 9 population lives in Palm Beach County. More than 70 percent of the District's general acute care hospitals are located in that county. Kindred's preferred location for its LTCH is approximately 40 to 50 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH; Select-Palm Beach is approximately 25 to 35 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH. The locations of Select Palm-Beach's and Kindred's proposed LTCHs are complementary. The SAAR Following its review of the two applications, AHCA issued its State Agency Action Report ("SAAR"). Section G., of the report, entitled "RECOMMENDATION," states: "Deny Con #9661 and CON #9662." Agency Ex. 2, p. 43. On June 11, 2003, the report was signed by Karen Rivera, Health Services and Facilities Consultant Supervisor Certificate of Need, and Mr. Gregg as the Chief of the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation. It contained a section entitled "Authorization for Agency Action" that states, "[a]uthorized representatives of the Agency for Health Care Administration adopted the recommendations contained herein and released the State Agency Action Report." Agency Ex. 2, p. 44. The adoption of the recommendations is the functional equivalent of preliminary denial of the applications. In Section F. of the SAAR under the heading of "Need," (Agency Ex. 2, p. 40), the Agency explained its primary bases for denial; it concluded that the applicants had not shown need for an LTCH in AHCA District 9. The discussions for the two, although not precisely identical, are quite similar: Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc.(CON #9661): The applicant's two methodological approaches to demonstrate need are not supported by any specific discharge studies or other data, including DRG admission criteria from area hospitals regarding potential need. The applicant also failed to provide any supporting documentation from area physicians or other providers regarding potential referrals. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Kindred Hospitals East, L.L.C. (CON #9662): The various methodological approaches presented are not supported by any specific DRG admission criteria from area hospitals suggesting potential need. The applicant provided numerous letters of support for the project from area hospitals, physicians and case managers. However, the number of potential referrals of patients needing LTCH services was not quantified. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Id. At hearing, the Agency's witness professed no disagreement with the SAAR and continued to maintain the same bases contained in the SAAR for the denials of the two applications The SAAR took no issue with either applicant's ability to provide quality care. It concluded that funding for each applicant was likely to be available and that each project appeared to be financially feasible once operating. The SAAR further stated that there were no major architectural concerns regarding Kindred's proposed facility design, but noted reservations regarding the need for further study and revision of Select Palm-Beach's proposed surgery/procedure wing, as well as cost uncertainties for Select Palm Beach because of such potential revisions. By the time of final hearing, however, the parties had stipulated to the reasonableness of each applicant's proposed costs and methods of construction. The parties stipulated to the satisfaction of a number of the statutory CON criteria by the two applicants. The parties agreed that the applications complied with the content and review process requirements of sections 408.037 and 409.039, Florida Statutes, with one exception. Select reserved the issue of the lack of a Year 2 of Schedule 6, (Staffing) in Kindred's application. The form of Schedule 6 provided by AHCA to Kindred (unlike other schedules of the application) does not clearly indicate that a second year of staffing data must be provided. The remainder of the criteria stipulated and the positions of the parties as articulated in testimony at hearing and in the proposed orders that were submitted leave need as the sole issue of consequence with one exception: whether Kindred has demonstrated that its project is financially feasible in the long term. Kindred's Long Term Financial Feasibility Select-Palm Beach contends that Kindred's project is not financially feasible in the long term for two reasons. They relate to Kindred's application and are stated in Select Palm Beach's proposed order: Kindred understated property taxes[;] Kindred completely fails to include in its expenses on Schedule 8, patient medical assistance trust fund (PMATF) taxes [citation omitted]. Proposed Recommended Order of Select-Palm Beach, Inc., p. 32, Finding of Fact 97. Raised after the proceeding began at DOAH by Select- Palm Beach, these two issues were not considered by AHCA when it conducted its review of Kindred's application because the issues were not apparent from the face of the application. AHCA's Review of Kindred's Application Kindred emerged from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings on April 20, 2001, under a plan of reorganization. With respect to the events that led to the bankruptcy proceeding and the need to review prior financial statements, AHCA made the following finding in the SAAR: Under the plan [of reorganization], the applicant [Kindred] adopted the fresh start accounting provision of SOP 90-7. Under fresh start accounting, a new reporting entity is created and the recorded amounts of assets and liabilities are adjusted to reflect their estimated fair values. Accordingly, the prior period financial statements are not comparable to the current period statements and will not be considered in this analysis. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30. The financial statements provided by Kindred as part of its application show that Kindred Healthcare, Kindred's parent, is a financially strong company. The information contained in Kindred's CON application filed in 2003 included Kindred Healthcare's financial statements from the preceding calendar year. Kindred Healthcare's Consolidated Statement of Operations for the year ended December 31, 2002, showed "Income from Operations" to be more than $33 million, and net cash provided by operating activities (cash flow) of over $248 million for the period. Its Consolidated Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2002, showed cash and cash equivalents of over $244 million and total assets of over $1.6 billion. In light of the information contained in Kindred's CON application, the SAAR concluded with regard to short term financial feasibility: Based on the audited financial statements of the applicant, cash on hand and cash flows, if they continue at the current level, would be sufficient to fund this project as proposed. Funding for all capital projects, with the support of its parent, is likely to be available as needed. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30 (emphasis supplied). The SAAR recognized that Kindred projected a "year two operating loss for the hospital of $287,215." Agency Ex. 2, p. Nonetheless, the SAAR concludes on the issue of financial feasibility, "[w]ith continued operational support from the parent company, this project [Kindred's] is considered financially feasible." Id. The Agency did not have the information, however, at the time it reviewed Kindred's application that Kindred understated property taxes and omitted the Public Medicaid Trust Fund and Medical Assistance Trust Fund ("PMATF") "provider tax" of 1.5 percent that would be imposed on Kindred's anticipated revenues of $11,635,919 as contended by Select-Palm Beach. Consistent with Select Palm-Beach's general contentions about property taxes and PMATF taxes, "Kindred acknowledges that it likely understated taxes to be incurred in the operation of its facility." Kindred's Proposed Recommended Order, paragraph 50, p. 19. The parties agree, moreover, that the omitted PMATF tax is reasonably projected to be $175,000. They do not agree, however, as to the impact of the PMATF tax on year two operating loss. The difference between the two (approximately $43,000) is attributable to a corporate income tax benefit deduction claimed by Kindred so that the combination of the application's projected loss, the omitted PMATF tax, and the deduction yields a year two operating loss of approximately $419,000. Without taking into consideration the income tax benefit, Select-Palm Beach contends that adding in the PMATF tax produces a loss of $462,000. Kindred and Select-Palm Beach also disagree over the projection of property taxes by approximately $50,000. Kindred projects that the property taxes in year two of operation will be approximately $225,000 instead of the $49,400 listed in the application. Select-Palm Beach projects that they will be $50,000 higher at approximately $275,000. Whether Kindred's or Select-Palm Beach's figures are right, Kindred makes two points. First, if year two revenues and expenses, adjusted for underestimated and omitted taxes, are examined on a quarterly basis, the fourth quarter of year two has a better bottom line than the earlier quarters. Not only will the fourth quarter bottom line be better, but, using Kindred's figures, the fourth quarter of year two of operations is profitable. Second, and most importantly given the Agency's willingness to credit Kindred with financial support from its parent, Kindred's application included in its application an interest figure of $1.2 million for year one of operation and $1.03 million for year two. Kindred claims in its proposed recommended order that "[i]n reality ... this project will incur no interest expense as Kindred intends to fund the project out of cash on hand, or operating capital, and would not have to borrow money to construct the project." Id., at paragraph 54, p. 20. Through the testimony of John Grant, Director of Planning and Development for Kindred's parent, Kindred Healthcare, Kindred indicated at hearing that its parent might, indeed, fund the project: A ... Kindred [Healthcare] would likely fund this project out of operating capital. Like I said, in the first nine months of this year Kindred had operating cash flow of approximately $180 million. So it's not as if we would have to actually borrow money to complete a project like this. Q And what was the interest expense that you had budgeted in Year Two for this facility? A $1,032,000. Q ... so is it your statement then that this facility would not owe any interest back to the parent company? A That's correct. Tr. 221-222 (emphasis supplied). If the "financing interest" expense is excluded from Kindred's statement of projected expenses in Schedule 8 of the CON application, using Kindred's revised projections, the project shows a profit of approximately $612,0002 for the second year of operation. If Select-Palm Beach's figures and bottom line loss excludes the "finances interest" expense, the elimination of the expense yields of profit for year two of operations in excess of $500,000. If the support of Kindred's parent is considered as the Agency has signaled its willingness to do and provided that the project is, in fact, funded by Kindred Healthcare rather than financed through some other means that would cause Kindred to incur interest expense, Kindred's project is financially feasible in the long term. With the exception of the issue regarding Kindred's long term financial feasibility, as stated above, taken together, the stipulation and agreements of the parties, the Agency's preliminary review contained in the SAAR, and the evidence at hearing, all distill the issues in this case to one overarching issue left to be resolved by this Recommended Order: need for long term care hospital beds in District 9. Need for the Proposals From AHCA's perspective prior to the hearing, the only issue in dispute with respect to the two applications is need. This point was made clear by Mr. Gregg's testimony at hearing in answer to a question posed by counsel for Select-Palm Beach: Q. ... Assuming there was sufficient need for 130 beds in the district is there any reason why both applicants shouldn't be approved in this case, assuming that need? A. No. (Tr. 398). Both applicants contend that the application each submitted is superior to the other. Neither, however, at this point in the proceeding, has any objection to approval of the other application provided its own application is approved. Consistent with its position that both applications may be approved, Select-Palm Beach presented testimony through its health care planner Patricia Greenberg3 that there was need in District 9 for both applicants' projects. Her testimony, moreover, rehabilitated the single Kindred methodology of three that yielded numeric need less than the 130 beds proposed by both applications: Q ... you do believe that there is a need for both in the district. A I believe there's a need for two facilities in the district. Q It could support two facilities? A Oh, absolutely. Q And the disagreement primarily relates to the conservative approach of Kindred in terms of not factoring in out-migration and the narrowing the DRG categories? A Correct. ... Kindred actually had three models. Two of them support both facilities, but it's the GMLOS model that I typically rely on, and it didn't on the surface support both facilities. That's why I reconciled the two, and I believe that's the difference, is just the 50 DRGs and not including the out-migration. That would boost their need above the 130, and two facilities would give people alternatives, it would foster competition, and it would really improve access in that market. Tr. 150-51. Need for the applications, therefore, is the paramount issue in this case. Since both applicants are qualified to operate an LTCH in Florida, if need is proven for the 130 beds, then with the exception of Kindred's long term financial feasibility, all parties agree that there is no further issue: both applications should be granted. No Agency Numeric Need Methodology The Agency has not established a numeric need methodology for LTCH services. Consequently, it does not publish a fixed-need pool for LTCHs. Nor does the Agency have "any policy upon which to determine need for the proposed beds or service." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)1. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2), which governs "Fixed Need Pools" (the "Fixed Need Pools Rule") states that if "no agency policy exist" with regard to a needs assessment methodology: [T]he applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)2. The Fixed Need Pools Rule goes on to elaborate in subparagraph (e)3 that "[t]he existence of unmet need will not be based solely on the absence of a health service, health care facility, or beds in the district, subdistrict, region or proposed service area." Population, Demographics and Dynamics The first of the four topics to be addressed when an applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology is "population, demographics and dynamics." The Agency has not defined service areas for LTCHs. Nonetheless, from a health planning perspective, it views LTCH services as being provided district-wide primarily for Medicare patients. Consistent with the Agency's view, Select-Palm Beach identified the entire district, that is, all of AHCA District 9, as its service area. It identified Palm Beach County, one of the five counties in AHCA District 9, as its primary service area. In identifying the service area for Select-Palm Beach, Ms. Greenberg drew data from various sources: population estimates for Palm Beach County and surrounding areas; the number of acute care hospital beds in the area; the number of LTCH beds in the area; the types of patients treated at acute care hospitals; and the lengths of stay of the patients treated at those hospitals. AHCA District 9 has more elderly than any other district in the State, and Palm Beach County has more than any other county except for Dade. Palm Beach County residents comprise 71% of the District 9 population. It is reasonably projected that the elderly population (the "65 and over" age cohort) in Palm Beach County is projected to grow at the rate of 8 percent by 2008. The "65 and over" age cohort is significant because the members of that cohort are most likely to utilize hospital services, including LTCH services. Its members are most likely to suffer complications from illness and surgical procedures and more likely to have co-morbidity conditions that require long- term acute care. Persons over 65 years of age comprise approximately 80 percent of the patient population of LTCH facilities. Both Select-Palm Beach and Kindred project that approximately 80 percent of their admissions will come from Medicare patients. Since 90 percent of admissions to an LTCH come from acute care facilities, most of the patient days expected at Select-Palm Beach's proposed LTCH will originate from residents in its primary service area, Palm Beach County. When looking at the migration pattern for patients at acute care facilities within Palm Beach County, the majority (90 percent) come from Palm Beach County residents. Thus, Select- Palm Beach's projected primary service area is reasonable. Just as Select-Palm Beach, Kindred proposes to serve the entire District. Kindred proposes that its facility be based in Palm Beach County because of the percentage of the district's population in the county as well as because more than 70% of the district's general acute care hospitals are in the county. Its selection of the District as its service area, consistent with the Agency's view, is reasonable. Currently there are no LTCHs in District 9. Availability, Utilization and Quality of Like Services The second topic is "availability, utilization and quality of like services." There are no "like" services available to District residents in the District. Select-Palm Beach and Kindred, therefore, contend that they meet the criteria of the second topic. There are like services in other AHCA Districts. For example, AHCA District 10 has at total of 188 beds at two Kindred facilities in Fort Lauderdale and Hollywood. The Agency, however, did not present evidence of their quality, that they were available or to what extent they are utilized by the residents of AHCA District 9. Medical Treatment Trends The third topic is medical treatment trends. Caring for patients with chronic and long term care needs is becoming increasingly more important as the population ages and as medical technology continues to emerge that prolongs life expectancies. Through treatment provided the medically complex and critically ill with state of the art mechanical ventilators, metabolic analyzers, and breathing monitors, LTCHs meet needs beyond the capability of the typical general acute care hospitals. In this way, LTCHs fill a niche in the continuum of care that addresses the needs of a small but growing patient population. Treatment for these patients in an LTCH, who otherwise would be cared for without adequate reimbursement to the general acute care hospital or moved to an alternative setting with staff and services inadequate to meet their needs, is a medical trend. Market Conditions The fourth topic to be addressed by the applicant is market conditions. The federal government's development of a distinctive prospective payment system for LTCHs (LTC-DRG), has created a market condition favorable to LTCHs. General acute care hospitals face substantial losses for the medically complex patient who uses far greater resources than expected on the basis of individual diagnoses. Medicare covers between 80 and 85 percent of LTCH patients. The remaining patients are covered by private insurance, managed care and Medicaid. LTCH programs allow for shorter lengths of stay in a general acute care facility, reduces re-admissions and provide more discharges to home. These benefits are increasingly recognized. Numeric Need Analysis Kindred presented a set of needs assessment methodologies that yielded numeric need for the beds applied for by Kindred. Select-Palm Beach did the same. Unlike Kindred, however, all of the needs assessment methodologies presented by Select-Palm Beach demonstrated numeric need in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applications. Select-Palm Beach's methodologies, overall, are superior to Kindred's. Select-Palm Beach used two sets of needs assessment methodologies and sensitivity testing of one of the sets that confirmed the methodology's reasonableness. The two sets or needs assessment methodologies are: (1) a use rate methodology and (2) length of stay methodologies. The use rate methodology yielded projected bed need for Palm Beach County alone in excess of the 130 beds proposed by the two applicants. For the year "7/05 - 6/06" the bed need is projected to be 256; for the year "7/06 - 6/07" the bed need is projected to be 261; and, for the year "7/07 - 6/08" the bed need is projected to be 266. See Select Ex. 1, Bates Stamp p. 000036 and the testimony of Ms. Greenberg at tr. 114. If the use rate analysis had been re-computed to include two districts whose data was excluded from the analysis, the bed need yielded for Palm Beach County alone was 175 beds, a numeric need still in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applicants. The use rate methodology is reasonable.4 The length of stay methodologies are also reasonable. These two methodologies also yielded numeric need for beds in excess of the 130 beds proposed. The two methodologies yielded need for 167 beds and 250 beds. Agency Denial The Agency's general concerns about LTCHs are not without basis. For many years, there were almost no LTCH CON applications filed with the Agency. A change occurred in 2002. The change in the LTCH environment in the last few years put AHCA in the position of having "to adapt to a rapidly changing situation in terms of [Agency] understanding of what has been going on in recent years with long-term care hospitals." (Tr. 358.) "... [I]n the last couple of years long-term care hospital applications have become [AHCA's] most common type of application." (Tr. 359.) At the time of the upsurge in applications, there was "virtually nothing ... in the academic literature about long- term care hospitals ... that could [provide] ... an understanding of what was going on ... [nor was there anything] in the peer reviewed literature that addressed long-term care hospitals" id., and the health care planning issues that affected them. Two MedPAC reports came out, one in 2003 and another in 2004. The 2003 report conveyed the information that the federal government was unable to identify patients appropriate for LTCH services, services that are overwhelmingly Medicare funded, because of overlap of LTCH services with other types of services. The 2004 report gave an account of the federal government decision to change its payment policy for a type of long-term care hospitals that are known as "hospitals-within- hospitals" (tr. 368) so that "hospitals within hospitals as of this past summer [2004] can now only treat 25 percent of their patients from the host hospital." Id. Both reports roused concerns for AHCA. First, if appropriate LTCH patients cannot be identified and other types of services overlap appropriately with LTCH services, AHCA cannot produce a valid needs assessment methodology. The second produces another concern. In the words of Mr. Gregg, The problem ... with oversupply of long-term care hospital beds is that it creates an incentive for providers to seek patient who are less appropriate for the service. What we know now is that only the sickest patient ... with the most severe conditions are truly appropriate for long-term care hospital placement. * * * ... [T]he MedPAC report most recently shows us that the greatest indicator of utilization of long-term care hospital services is the mere availability of those services. Tr. 368-369. The MedPAC reports, themselves, although marked for identification, were not admitted into evidence. Objections to their admission (in particular, Kindred's) were sustained because they had not been listed by AHCA on the stipulation required by the Pre-hearing Order of Instructions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Agency for Health Care Administration that: approves Select-Palm Beach's application, CON 9661; and approves Kindred's application CON 9662 with the condition that financing of the project be provided by Kindred Healthcare. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 2005.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is liable for overpayment of Medicaid claims for the period of January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations of the parties and the evidence presented at the hearing, the following relevant Findings of Fact are made: AHCA is the state agency charged with the regulation of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida, and has the authority to perform Medicaid audits and recover overpayments, pursuant to Section 409.913(2), Florida Statutes (2001). Petitioner is a Florida, not-for-profit corporation that was enrolled as a Medicaid provider during the audit period of January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2001. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was authorized to provide medical services to Medicaid recipients. The selection of records for and the conduct of the audit was not a matter of controversy between the parties. The records in this case were requested within the five-year window for record retention and agency investigation provided by Section 409.913(8), Florida Statutes (2001). Medicaid pays a per diem rate for inpatient hospital care and treatment. This per diem payment covers all services and items furnished during a 24-hour period. The audit in this case dealt exclusively with inpatient services at Florida Hospital Orlando. Deborah Lynn, a medical health care program analyst for AHCA, reviews the agency's inpatient hospital audits. The agency selects a hospital for audit on a random basis, then selects for review, a random sample of that hospital's patients admitted during the audit period. AHCA sends a demand letter to the hospital, which then sends the relevant patient records to AHCA. Florida Hospital Orlando had to be granted a 30-day extension, but eventually provided, to AHCA, all of the requested patient records. The hospital's records were first provided to a nurse consultant, who reviewed the records and made a suggestion as to the number of days for which Medicaid reimbursement should be denied for each patient. The nurse consultant's suggestions were then calculated into an initial overpayment amount and included in the PAAR that was sent to Petitioner on January 20, 2005. Ms. Lynn acknowledged that the PAAR constituted the first notice to Petitioner that AHCA disputed the length of stay for some patients based on medical necessity. After receipt of the PAAR, Petitioner was given the opportunity to examine the days that AHCA preliminarily questioned and to provide additional information in defense of its Medicaid billings. Petitioner did, in fact, submit additional documentation. The records, the additional documentation, and the nurse consultant's recommendations were then forwarded to a peer reviewer; a physician who uses his or her medical expertise to determine the medical necessity of the services provided. In this case, AHCA employed the services of two peer reviewers. Dr. Laura Machado was the peer reviewer for the inpatient medical cases, and Dr. Rahul Mehra was the peer reviewer for the inpatient psychiatric cases. The peer reviewers prepared reports that offered their opinion as to which days of the patients' stays were medically necessary. Ms. Lynn then calculated the amount of the alleged overpayment and communicated that number to Petitioner in the FAAR on August 20, 2005. General issues regarding patient discharge Ms. Lynn emphasized that the peer reviewer's job is simply to determine medical necessity, not to base coverage decisions on the convenience of the patient or provider. She rejected the suggestion that it was any part of the peer reviewer's task to consider what medical facilities and services are actually available in Orlando, at the time that Florida Hospital Orlando is contemplating the discharge of a Medicaid patient. Ms. Lynn reiterated that hospital services under Medicaid are governed by the Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, the January 2001 edition, of which sets forth the following "Service Requirements": Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a covered service. Dr. Ross Edmundson, Florida Hospital Orlando's medical director for health care management, agreed that a clinically stable patient can be sent home or to a skilled nursing facility "in the best of all worlds." However, Dr. Edmundson pointed out that a safe discharge plan is the primary consideration for the treating physician, and that a safe discharge plan may render things "medically appropriate" that might not be found "medically necessary" in purely clinical terms. For example, if the Medicaid patient has no home, and the physician knows full well that the patient will be living under a bridge if he is discharged to the street, then it would be grossly negligent to discharge that patient without a plan to get better care. If the patient requires $500.00 worth of medications for the next month, and has no way of obtaining them, it may be grossly negligent for the physician to send that patient out the hospital door. The InterQual Products Group's "ISD" (Intensity of Service, Severity of Illness Discharge Screens) is a nationally recognized set of utilization guidelines that are used by hospitals, Medicare and Medicaid. Dr. Edmundson believed that these discharge guidelines take into account factors beyond the purely clinical: You have to have a discharge treatment plan. If you have a place to follow up, if you have [an] accepting physician, if you have a plan, if you know that they can make it there in the next three days and they require follow up in three days, that is clinically appropriate. If you know that they're going to live in a box and you have no assurance that this patient is going to make it back for any follow up, then that is not a safe discharge plan, it is not medically appropriate. The criteria really has that built in. There are barriers that may prevent the hospital from discharging the patient to an alternative location. Even if the hospital has met the patient's immediate medical needs and the patient's condition is stable, the patient's financial situation may present an obstacle to placement in a skilled nursing facility or to obtaining home health care. Petitioner has access to "a very limited number" of providers who will give follow up care to Medicaid and self-pay patients. Most nursing homes in central Florida have a set number of Medicaid beds for which they will accept patients. Medicaid will not pay a sub- acute facility or a nursing home any additional money for expensive medications, such as intravenous (IV) antibiotics, which further discourages those facilities from accepting patients upon their discharge from the hospital. Florida Hospital Orlando has severe capacity problems. The hospital has about 1,800 beds on its seven campuses, and these beds are almost always full. It is not unusual for the hospital's daytime census to be above 100 percent, with patients backed up in the emergency room waiting for beds to become available. Given the hospital's capacity problems and the low reimbursement rates of Medicaid, there is no motive for Petitioner to keep Medicaid patients in the hospital any longer than is absolutely necessary. Tammy Rikansrud is Florida Hospital Orlando's director of case management, utilization management, and denial management. According to Ms. Rikansrud, the hospital begins discharge planning within 24 hours of a patient's admission, and immediately begins seeking referrals as soon as its knows the patient will be discharged to a sub-acute facility. A major problem is that many facilities limit the number of beds for Medicaid patients, if they accept Medicaid patients at all. Robert Fleener is Petitioner's director of case management. Based on Mr. Fleener's testimony, the impediments to placing a patient in a nursing home from the hospital include rejection of the patient for "payer constraints," meaning that the Medicaid system does not reimburse the nursing home enough to cover its costs. Petitioner seeks placement for its Medicaid patients throughout the state of Florida and beyond, if necessary. Aside from nursing homes, Petitioner uses Shands Teaching Hospital in Gainesville, and long-term acute care hospitals such as those operated by Kindred Healthcare. Petitioner always assesses the practicality of home care for its patients. Petitioner also seeks to place its patients at outpatient clinics when appropriate, but there are few clinics in Orlando, and they are not required to accept Petitioner's discharged patients. The usual practice with ambulatory patients is to discharge them from the hospital, then have them come back on an outpatient basis for follow up treatment. Petitioner always assesses its patients to achieve discharge to the least restrictive setting. If the patient is ambulatory, the hospital will seek to place the patient in an assisted living facility. If the patient is not ambulatory, the hospital will look to a skilled nursing facility that is able to provide the necessary level of service. As also noted by Dr. Edmundson, a patient's need for expensive medicines can make it difficult to place the patient in a nursing home because of reimbursement problems. According to Mr. Fleener, nursing homes look very closely at accepting homeless patients, because they assume that if they accept a homeless person, they will have that patient for the rest of his life. Petitioner has "unavoidable" inpatient days for its Medicaid patients, where the care could have been provided in a nursing home but the hospital was unable to place the patient, due to lack of beds, patient behavior problems, age, or the cost of clinical care. Stephen William Bailey is the clinic coordinator for Petitioner's department of psychiatry. Petitioner has a 76-bed psychiatric inpatient unit and a medical psychiatric unit for patients with a psychiatric diagnosis and co-morbid medical problems. The hospital must obtain state approval to place a psychiatric patient in a nursing home, assuming it is possible to find a nursing home that is equipped to handle psychiatric issues and is willing to take the patient. It is not uncommon for Petitioner to admit a patient with behavior disturbances from a nursing home, stabilize the patient's medications and treatment, then have the nursing home refuse to take the patient back. Petitioner has no incentive to prolong inpatient stays. Patients are waiting to be admitted on a regular basis, and there are, at times, as many as 20 psychiatric patients in the emergency room waiting for admission. Cara Lee Staples is a social worker at Florida Hospital Orlando. She attends treatment team meetings, assesses patients for discharge needs, researches placement availabilities, and meets with families to plan care after discharge. Based on Ms. Staples' testimony, many of Petitioner's Medicaid patients have chronic mental illnesses and often have no involvement with their families. As soon as a patient is admitted, Ms. Staples seeks to obtain a psychosocial history of the patient, which includes where the patient came from and whether the patient can return upon discharge. If the patient cannot return to, for example, the assisted living facility from which he was admitted to the hospital, then Ms. Staples must attempt to find an appropriate placement for the patient so that he may be safely discharged once he is stabilized. According to Ms. Staples, there is a range of alternative placements she may explore, depending on the patient's circumstances. Those persons who do not need structured care may be placed in a boarding home. Those requiring minimal care may be placed in an assisted living facility or a retirement home. The next level of care would be provided by an extended care facility, which Ms. Staples described as an intermediate facility between an assisted living facility and a skilled nursing facility. Other placement options include substance abuse rehabilitation facilities, halfway houses, 28-day programs, and shelters. The hospital faces some placement problems. Assisted living facilities tend not to accept patients with recent histories of drug abuse. Some assisted living facilities will not accept patients who are incontinent and unable to change themselves. Assisted living facilities without locked units will not accept Alzheimer's patients who tend to wander. Nursing homes will often reject young psychiatric patients in need of skilled nursing services because of their age. Nursing homes are generally reluctant to accept Medicaid patients, particularly those who are homeless, because of the difficulty they will face in placing the patient after the need for skilled nursing services has passed. Nursing homes will decline to accept a patient once they learn he is on a psychiatric unit because they "cannot meet their needs," which Ms. Staples described as a global catch-all phrase for their general desire not to accept psychiatric patients. Acute Care Inpatient Hospital Stays By the time of the hearing, the acute care inpatient hospital stays of 16 patients remained at issue. The findings below are set forth in the order that the patients were listed in AHCA Exhibit 6, the recipient spreadsheet indicating the dates of the patients' stays, the dates denied by the peer reviewers, and the amount of claimed overpayment. Patient #1 R.B. R.B. was admitted on March 30, 2001, and was discharged on April 8, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that two days, April 6 through 8, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care.3 Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that R.B. was a 46-year-old female with scleroderma. She was admitted with chest tightness and found to be in near end-stage renal failure. Standard enzyme testing ruled out a heart attack. Her renal function continued to deteriorate and it became clear she would soon need dialysis. R.B. underwent placement of a Tessio catheter on April 3, and arrangements were begun for her to receive dialysis at an outpatient center in her hometown of Pensacola. Dialysis could not be arranged at the outpatient center until after she underwent dialysis at the hospital on April 4 and 5. Dr. Machado agreed that it would not have been safe to discharge her until adequate arrangements had been made for her outpatient dialysis, but that she was medically stable and ready for discharge by April 5 with an outpatient treatment plan in place. The care R.B. received in the hospital after April 5, including two blood transfusions on April 7, could have been provided on an outpatient basis. Petitioner's expert witness, Dr. Yithak Daniel Haim, testified that R.B. was not discharged as scheduled on April 6, because of changes in her mental status. She had nausea and episodes of confusion. On April 7, her medications were reviewed in light of their propensity to cause confusion in persons with poor kidney function. It was thought that her confusion could be due to OxyContin. Dr. Haim also noted that R.B.'s hemoglobin dropped on April 7, and she required a transfusion. Treating physician Dr. Daniel Tambunan confirmed that R.B. was kept in the hospital after April 6 due to her mental status, which developed into hallucinations on April 7. Dr. Tambunan also noted that R.B. had developed tachycardia on April 5 probably due to low hemaocrit, which was measured at 22.3 on April 7. Dr. Haim stated that a normal hematocrit is between 39 and 45. Dr. Haim agreed with Dr. Machado that dialysis can usually be done on an outpatient basis, but that he decided to keep her in the hospital due to the combination of the tachycardia, low hematocrit necessitating a transfusion, and the need to ascertain whether the hallucinations were caused by medications or by the dialysis. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that April 6 through April 8 should not have been denied. Dr. Machado's opinion was supportable regarding the ability of the patient to receive transfusions and dialysis on an outpatient basis. However, Dr. Machado's testimony ignored R.B.'s hallucinations and the reasonableness of keeping her in the hospital until the treating physician could ascertain their cause. Therefore, AHCA offered no evidence to conflict with the testimony of Dr. Haim that it was medically necessary to keep R.B. in the hospital until her discharge on April 8. Patient #2 F.C. F.C. was admitted on March 5, 2001, and was discharged on March 12, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that the admission should be denied and a 23-hour observation should be approved.4 Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that F.C. was a 43-year-old female smoker with high blood pressure. She was admitted with chest pain for 3 days and by some notes was chronic over the last year. An electrocardiogram (EKG) did not show ischemia, and serial enzyme tests ruled out a heart attack. A spiral computer tomography (CT) scan was negative for a pulmonary embolism, i.e., a blood clot in the lung. Dr. Machado wrote that F.C.'s vital signs were stable, and that an outpatient work-up of her chest pain would have been appropriate. Instead, she had a stress test on March 7. The results were still "pending," according to a note on March 11. She also underwent work-up of abnormal findings on her abdominal CT/ultrasound, all of which could have been accomplished safely in the outpatient setting. Petitioner's physician expert, Dr. Haim, concurred with Dr. Machado's denial of this admission. The treating physician, Dr. Ashok Khanna, offered plausible reasons for keeping the patient in the hospital, including the fact that F.C. was a drug addict who could not be relied upon to comply with testing required to rule out coronary artery disease on an outpatient basis. However, the greater weight of the evidence supports Dr. Machado's denial of the admission. Patient #3 J.C. J.C. was admitted on July 6, 2000, and was discharged on July 12, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that five days, July 8 through July 12, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued care on the medical ward. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that J.C. was a 55-year-old male initially admitted to the psychiatric unit due to depression and suicidal gesture. Psychiatric notes indicate that J.C. complained of three weeks of exertional chest pain and fatigue. On July 6, he was transferred to the medical ward for further evaluation. Serial enzyme tests ruled out a heart attack, and he was hemodynamically stable. He underwent a stress test on July 6, with no chest pain and no EKG changes. Dr. Machado concluded that a transfer back to the psychiatric unit or to home would have been appropriate, with follow-up. She believed it was not medically necessary to keep J.C. on the medical ward while awaiting the nuclear images of the stress test, as he was chest pain free and hemodynamically stable after July 7. Treating physician Dr. Luis Allen testified that he was called in on a psychiatric consultation on J.C. while he was in the medical unit. Dr. Allen found that J.C.'s depression was significant and that he would be in need of inpatient psychiatric treatment. Dr. Allen therefore followed J.C. until he was transferred to the inpatient psychiatric unit. The transfer was delayed while the cardiac workup was completed, so that the physicians could be confident that J.C. was medically stable before his transfer back to the inpatient psychiatric unit. Dr. Allen noted that J.C. had a history of depressive disorder and experiencing feelings of helplessness, hopelessness, that his level of depression was significant, and that he had been admitted for a suicidal gesture. Dr. Allen testified that J.C.'s psychiatric symptoms were too marked to be treated on an outpatient basis. Dr. Allen believed that his stay through July 12, was necessary when the combination of the patient's medical and psychiatric conditions are considered. Petitioner's medical expert, Dr. Haim, disagreed with Dr. Machado that J.C. could have been transferred from the medical ward on July 7, because the results of his cardiac stress test did not come back until July 9. Dr. Haim agreed that J.C. could have then been transferred off the medical ward on July 9. However, there was no bed available on the psychiatric floor on July 9. J.C.'s condition indicated a need for acute psychiatric hospitalization, meaning that he could not be discharged home. Thus, he remained on the medical ward until a psychiatric bed became available. Dr. Haim agreed that this was not strictly a medical reason, but contended that the lack of beds constituted a "reality reason" that justified the full admission. Petitioner's expert psychiatrist, Dr. Alan Berns, agreed with Dr. Allen and Dr. Haim that the full stay was justified. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last five days of J.C.'s admission. The record established that J.C. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on July 7. The reason for keeping J.C. on the medical unit after July 7 was administrative convenience, not medical necessity.5 Patient #4 P.C. P.C. was admitted on July 9, 2000, and was discharged on July 17, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that six days, July 11 through July 17, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that P.C. was a 64-year-old female with a history of leg cellulitis treated with IV antibiotics. She was admitted through the emergency room with increased swelling of her lower left leg, which raised concerns about deep vein thrombosis (DVT), compartment syndrome, or progression of her cellulitis. P.C. also had chronic anemia, which had worsened. DVT was ruled out and she was continued on IV antibiotics. She had a blood transfusion due to her anemia. P.C. declined inpatient gastrointestinal (GI) work for her anemia, so the hospital planned to schedule the GI work after her discharge. Dr. Machado concluded that the remainder of her hospital stay could have been outpatient. She did have one further transfusion of packed red blood cells (PRBCs) on July 12, but she did not need to remain in the hospital for this, as she continued to refuse further workup and was asymptomatic. Dr. Machado testified that the physician's note on July 10 stated that the patient "looks and feels better, no complaints," and that P.C. was sufficiently improved to be discharged on that date. She could have been continued on IV antibiotics at home through home health care, or could have received the treatment at a skilled nursing facility. Dr. Machado acknowledged that the patient received a blood transfusion on July 12, but stated that this could have been provided on an outpatient basis. Blood could have been drawn after the transfusion for lab testing, and there would have been no need to call P.C. back in unless there was a problem with the labs. Dr. Haim testified that P.C. was diabetic, had kidney problems, peripheral vascular disease, and congestive heart failure. As of July 11, the status of her infection had improved, but she was still on IV antibiotics and her hematocrit had dropped. Because P.C. had several chronic medical problems, it was important to raise her hematocrit. She was given the transfusion on July 12, but her hematocrit continued to drop. Dr. Haim testified that this raised intense concerns as to "where is this blood going to." A CAT scan of her abdomen revealed no internal bleeding. Her release was planned for July 15, but blood testing on that date showed that her kidney function had deteriorated. It was feared that one of her IV antibiotics, Vancomycin, was affecting her kidney function. Dr. Haim concluded that her drop in hemoglobin and kidney function necessitated keeping her in the hospital until July 17. J.C.'s treating physician, Dr. Sidiab Elalaoui, testified that he could not have given the patient transfusions in his office. He disagreed with Dr. Machado that J.C. could have been seen in an outpatient setting as of July 11. Dr. Elalaoui noted that J.C. had been getting IV antibiotics at home, but that her condition nonetheless worsened to the point where she had to be brought to the emergency room on July 9. Dr. Elalaoui stated that J.C. did not have a simple infection. She had a bacteremia, a bacteria that went from the skin into the blood of a patient with diabetes and high blood pressure. Dr. Elalaoui could not be sure if her condition was life- threatening, but confidently stated that it was "severe." The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that July 11 through July 17 should not have been denied. Dr. Machado's opinion was supportable regarding the ability of the patient to receive a transfusion and IV antibiotics on an outpatient basis. However, Dr. Elalaoui's testimony as the treating physician, in combination with Dr. Haim's expert testimony, credibly established that, whatever the patient's theoretical ability to receive transfusions and IV antibiotics on an outpatient basis, under the actual circumstances, it was medically necessary to keep J.C. in the hospital through July 17. Patient #5 A.F. A.F. was admitted on November 30, 2000, and was discharged on December 7, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that four days, December 3 through December 7, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that A.F. was a 32-year-old female admitted with a severe headache and apparent new onset seizures. She underwent a CT scan, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and an electroencephalogram (EEG), all of which reported negative. She had undergone a lumbar puncture previously for the severe headaches, which was also negative. Dr. Machado concluded that A.F. could have been discharged with oral medications and outpatient follow-up for treatment of her apparent migraine headaches. Instead, A.F. underwent further testing for low back pain, depression, and substance abuse. Dr. Machado believed that the treating physicians allowed the patient's subjective complaints to outweigh the objective clinical findings, noting that A.F. had been seen sitting up and talking on the phone during the time when she was complaining of a severe headache. Petitioner's expert, Dr. Haim, agreed with Dr. Machado that the days denied were redundant. Thus, it is found that the greater weight of evidence supports AHCA's denial of four days of A.F.'s inpatient stay. Patient #6 C.G. C.G. was admitted on May 3, 2001, and was discharged on May 14, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that eight days, May 5 through May 14, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that C.G. was a 47-year-old female admitted with increasing chest pain and numbness in her left arm. She was found to have a mass in the middle of her chest and possible early superior vena cava (SVC) syndrome. Serial enzymes and a CT scan respectively ruled out heart attack and pulmonary embolism as the cause of her chest pain. She was started on steroids and pain medication, with satisfactory pain relief. Dr. Machado concluded that the remainder of her stay focused on a workup on the mediastinal mass, which could have been done on an outpatient basis. The steroid and pain medications she was receiving through IV, could have been given orally. None of the progress notes documented sufficient evidence for inpatient workup. In her deposition, Dr. Machado explained that the SVC is the large blood vessel that returns blood from the heart to the upper portion of the body. When there is a mass in that area of the chest, it can compress the SVC and cause swelling from the backing up of the blood. Dr. Machado believed that once immediate life-threatening diagnoses such as heart attack and pulmonary embolism were ruled out, and C.G.'s pain was managed with medication, the matter of determining the nature of the mediastinal mass could have been handled on an outpatient basis. Treating physician Dr. Vajihuddin Khan, an internal medicine specialist at Florida Hospital Orlando, testified that he kept C.G. in the hospital until May 14 to complete the workup and perform all the necessary investigations of the mediastinal mass. Dr. Khan noted that C.G. could not have been released and observed daily on an outpatient basis because of transportation or financial problems. The patient lacked outside support. If she had gone out of the hospital with no place to stay and no friends to support her, the workup might never have been completed. C.G. was ultimately diagnosed with Hodgkins lymphoma. Dr. Haim testified that on May 7 the patient was ordered NPO (nothing by mouth) for a biopsy to be performed the next day. She had a swollen face, neck, and arm, with a large, undiagnosed mass in her chest. The chest pain and shortness of breath had not gone away. Dr. Haim believed it would be irresponsible to discharge C.G. in that condition without a diagnosis. The biopsy was performed on May 8 and showed cancer. The pathology report on May 9 was inconclusive, but her physicians knew it was "something bad," either lymphoma or a small cell carcinoma of long standing. Dr. Haim testified that it was important to differentiate the type of cancer because the treatments would be different for each. Therefore, it was necessary to perform surgery to obtain a larger sample of the mass. Dr. Haim noted that the surgery was not performed prior to C.G.'s discharge on May 14, due to the surgeon's unavailability. Dr. Haim agreed that reimbursement for the dates of May 10 through May 14 were "somewhat questionable" because C.G. was, in essence, sitting in the hospital waiting for a surgeon. The record did not disclose why she was forced to wait for a surgeon. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last eight days of C.G.'s admission. The record established that C.G. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on May 5. Patient # 7 C.G. C.G. was readmitted on May 25, 2001, and was discharged on June 3, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that the last day should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that C.G. was a 47-year-old female admitted for elective mediastinoscopy to diagnose a mediastinal mass. The procedure was attempted but was unsuccessful due to a large goiter. A thoroactomy was performed that diagnosed lymphoma. C.G. did fine postoperatively but her discharge was delayed after an episode of chest pain, determined to be non-cardiac. When the oncologist saw her on May 30, he felt that she had SVC syndrome and called for an urgent radiation oncology consult. She was started on IV Decadron and improved dramatically by June 2, when she received her first radiation treatment. Dr. Machado saw no reason to keep the patient in the hospital for an extra day, until June 3. Dr. Haim testified that it was reasonable to wait for hours after the radiation treatment to note any improvement or adverse reaction. The greater weight of the evidence supports Dr. Haim's opinion that it was medically necessary to keep C.G. in the hospital through June 3. Patient #8 THE. THE. was admitted on April 3, 2001, and was discharged on April 9, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that three days, April 6 through April 9, should be denied due to lack of clear documentation showing medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that THE. was a 21-year-old pregnant patient admitted with dehydration from hyper emesis gravid arum (the nausea and vomiting commonly called "morning sickness"). She had lost 14 pounds in the week prior to admission. This was the only abnormal vital sign, as she was not hypertensive or tachycardia and her electrolytes were not abnormal. No blood urea nitrogen (BUN) or cretonne was documented, indicating normal kidney function. She had two previous admissions for hyper emesis. She received sufficient IV hydration by April 4 for a 10 pound weight gain and was documented by nursing notes as feeling better and tolerating oral medications. She did have an increase in vomiting on April 5, but by April 6 this was much less and her weight was stable. Most of her anti-emetics were switched from IV to oral, and her IV was locked off for the remainder of her hospital stay. Her vital signs remained stable throughout her hospital stay, and there were no new labs to document continuing dehydration. Dr. Machado testified that the record showed no treatment after April 6 that necessitated a hospital stay. She believed THE. could have been discharged on April 6, with outpatient oral anti-nausea medications in a trial to see how she would do. Treating physician Dr. Andre Jakubowski testified that he saw THE. in his office on April 2, for an obstetrical visit. She was about 12 weeks pregnant and complaining of nausea, vomiting and the inability to keep down fluids. At her March 26, visit, she had weighed 134 pounds. On April 2, she weighed 120 pounds, a loss of 14 pounds. Dr. Jakubowksi immediately admitted T.H. to the hospital. For the first few days of T.H.'s hospitalization, Dr. Jakubowski gave her IV hydration in order to correct her electrolytes. On April 6, the IVs were discontinued and T.H. was placed on oral medications and food. Between April 6 and 7, she lost two and one half pounds. Dr. Jakubowski testified that he could not send T.H. home because she was still vomiting and was generally "not in good shape." He started her on IV hydration again and adjusted her medications. She began to eat and was able to go home on April 9. Dr. Jakubowski testified that it is not within the standards of practice to discharge a patient who has been taken off IV hydration without observing for 24 hours to be sure the patient is taking food and/or liquids orally and keeping them down. On April 8, the IV hydration was stopped for the second time. This time, T.H. was able to keep down some oral foods and liquids. Dr. Jakubowski watched her for 24 hours, then sent her home on April 9. Dr. Haim testified that laboratory testing is not necessary to document continued dehydration when the patient continues to vomit. With a weight loss of 14 pounds in a woman who was 12 weeks pregnant, this was clearly more than ordinary morning sickness. T.H. could not be discharged when she could not keep food on her stomach. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that April 6 through April 9 should not have been denied. Dr. Jakubowski's testimony as the treating physician, in combination with Dr. Haim's expert testimony, credibly established that, although T.H. showed some improvement and was taken off IV fluids on April 6, it was reasonable to wait 24 hours to make sure that she could keep down oral nutrition. When she was unable to do so, the IV hydration was resumed and it was reasonable to keep her in the hospital until she was able to keep some food on her stomach. Under all the circumstances, it was medically necessary to keep T.H. in the hospital through April 9. Patient #9 J.H. J.H. was admitted on July 7, 2001, and was discharged on August 7, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that 21 days, July 17 through August 7, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that J.H. was a 63-year-old female lung transplant candidate with end-stage pulmonary fibrosis. She was admitted with a cough, low-grade fever, and increased shortness of breath. She also appeared to have a postoperative wound infection from recent vascular surgery in the right groin. A CT scan was negative for pneumonia or pulmonary embolism and her respiratory symptoms stabilized and, fairly quickly, returned to their concededly poor baseline. The infected right groin area was the cause for J.H.'s extended stay. The wound was debrided on July 14, following treatment with IV antibiotics and wound care. The infectious disease consultant agreed on July 16 that home IV antibiotics would be appropriate. However, the patient declined a PICC line (peripherally inserted central catheter, a long–term catheter that is inserted into the arm and threaded into central circulation) due to a past poor experience. She therefore, continued to get IV antibiotics in the hospital until July 26, when she was changed to oral Keflex. Dr. Machado found that the reasons for her continued hospital stay were unclear, except for wound care. On August 3, J.H. left the hospital for a few hours on a day pass. During her stay, she underwent other tests that are required for lung transplant evaluation, but weren't necessary during this hospitalization. In her deposition, Dr. Machado testified that J.H.'s lung condition stabilized, but the groin became the problem. The treating physician initially thought the problem was fluid collection, but the increased white blood cell count indicated an infection. J.H. was given proper wound care, but Dr. Machado could not see anything done in the hospital during the last 21 days of J.H.'s stay that required an inpatient stay. Dr. Machado concluded that IV antibiotics and wound care could have been given in a sub-acute skilled nursing facility or with home health. Treating physician Richard Young Feibelman is board certified in internal medicine and pulmonary medicine. He is a pulmonary physician, and was J.H.'s primary physician during this admission. In his deposition, Dr. Feibelman testified that he had followed this patient for some time prior to this admission. J.H.'s primary underlying problem was severe and progressing idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis, a scarring debilitation of the lungs causing progressive shortness of breath and requiring increasing oxygen. It typically results in death within two to three years of the diagnosis. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. had recently been evaluated at the University of Miami for a lung transplant, which she desperately wanted despite the high risk of death associated with this surgery. J.H. had been undergoing workup in Miami, about two weeks before this admission, including a carotid artery angiogram and cerebral angiogram. After the angiogram, she developed a pseudo aneurism or partial false leak of the puncture site from the catheter insertion. She then developed a hematoma in that area, with wound infection and fever that made necessary her admission to the hospital. Dr. Feibelman testified that at the time of admission, it was difficult to tell whether the infection came from her groin, or whether it was a superimposed respiratory infection on top of her underlying pulmonary fibrosis. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. was extremely sick, near the end stage of chronic fibrotic lung disease. He stated that this was an important hospitalization, because J.H.'s infection had to be under control to ensure she could make it to Miami, and survive the lung transplant. Before her admission, she was on immunosuppressive therapy, which increases the risk of infection. Dr. Feibelman treated her with IV antibiotics, and he described the wound care as "aggressive," an effort to heal the wound before the lung disease killed her. The wound was debrided, and J.H. was seen by an infectious disease consultant and vascular surgery consultant. There was difficulty with her blood pressure, and an episode of arm and leg numbness that required a neurological consultation to rule out a transient ischemic attack or pulmonary embolus. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. was still getting IV antibiotics to almost the end of her hospitalization. She was on high flow oxygen. The pain in her wound was such that she required intravenous morphine to change her dressings. Dr. Feibelman concluded that any additional setback for J.H. would have been fatal. Her disease has a fairly rapid stair- step pattern, in which there is a drop-off, then stabilization, then a further drop-off, then stabilization. Dr. Feibelman stated that J.H. could not afford a further drop-off before her lung transplant. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. was allowed to leave the hospital for two hours on a day pass. He stated that this was in all likelihood her last chance to go home, and he thought it was worth letting her go. Dr. Haim disagreed that the last 21 days of J.H.'s stay should be denied, but agreed that the last week or two were debatable, depending on the support system she had at home and the possibility of giving her IV antibiotics at home. Dr. Haim stated that she could have had IV antibiotics at home with a PICC line. However, J.H. had prior poor experiences with PICC lines and told her physicians they were not going to "torture" her again. She would also have needed assistance with her oxygen tanks if she went home. Dr. Haim stated that J.H. needed help with all of her activities of daily living (ADLs), as would any patient requiring six liters of oxygen every day. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last 21 days of J.H.'s admission. Dr. Machado correctly observed that the patient could have received IV antibiotics, oxygen, and wound care in a skilled nursing facility. She conceded that it would have been correct to keep the patient in the hospital if no skilled nursing facility was available. Petitioner offered no evidence that it attempted to place J.H. in a skilled nursing facility. Dr. Feibelman's concerns about J.H.'s precarious condition are fully credited, but the record as presented established that C.G. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on July 16. Patient #10 C.J. C.J. was admitted on March 31, 2001, and was discharged on April 9, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that six days, April 3 through April 9, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that C.J. was a 67-year-old female admitted with abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting, two days after a colonoscopy. She also had poorly controlled diabetes. The nausea and vomiting resolved quickly after admission, and she was hemodynamically stable throughout her stay. A CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis was performed, which showed a large pelvic mass (likely the recurrence of a previous cancer) with accompanying hydronephrosis (swelling of the kidney caused by obstruction of urine flow). The gastroenterologist cleared C.J. for discharge on April 2. The remainder of her stay involved consultations with urology and oncology specialists regarding the pelvic mass, which could have been accomplished in the outpatient setting. She did not have a ureteral stent (a surgical device implanted to hold the ureter open so that urine can flow freely from the kidneys to the bladder) placed until April 6. Dr. Machado wrote that it was unclear from the notes what was keeping her in the hospital after April 6. In her deposition, Dr. Machado testified that C.J. should have been discharged on April 3 with arrangements for an outpatient workup of the pelvic mass, which was likely a recurrence of the cancer that C.J. had ten years previously. Dr. Machado testified that the placement of the stent was necessary, either during the hospitalization or as an outpatient, and noted that if it had been an emergency, the stent would have been placed sooner in C.J.'s stay. The stent was actually placed one week after C.J.'s admission. Treating physician Dr. Alan Varraux, a specialist in pulmonary medicine, testified that C.J. was weak and somewhat frail, but underwent a colonoscopy because of gastrointestinal symptoms. The procedure caused her much nausea and vomiting. Her complaints and Dr. Varraux' concerns about dehydration led to her hospitalization on March 31. On admission, she was kept NPO and IV fluids were started. She was allowed to start eating on April 1. A GI specialist saw her on April 2 and performed an upper GI endoscopy and a colonoscopy. A consulting oncologist saw the patient on April 3. Dr. Varraux stated that an X-ray showed hydronephrosis, a blockage of the ureter system causing urine to back up into and dilate the kidney. The stent could not be placed on an outpatient basis because C.J. was a debilitated, immuno-compromised cancer patient who could be killed by a urinary tract infection. She was a high risk patient and needed to be cleared by a urological specialist before discharge. The urologist planned to place the stent on April 6, after which C.J. could be discharged if all went well. Dr. Haim testified that the stent was actually placed on April 7 and that C.J. needed to stay in the hospital for an additional 24-to-48 hours to ensure that she had adequate urine output, and that her fever was going down, and that her subjective feelings were improved. After reviewing the depositions of Dr. Varraux and Dr. Haim, Dr. Machado testified that she saw no reason to change her opinion. Dr. Machado stated that the medical record showed C.J.'s cancer was 10 years prior to this admission. This led Dr. Machado to disagree with Dr. Varraux's assumption that C.J. was immuno-compromised and unable to fight infections normally. Dr. Machado also did not see anything in the medical record to support the concerns about a urinary tract infection. C.J.'s urinalysis was normal on admission. There was glucose in her urine, which was consistent with her diabetes. On April 3, her white blood count was normal, indicating that if there was an infection, it had been treated adequately. No culture or urinalysis was performed on that date. Dr. Machado opined that the patient's low grade fever throughout her stay was not a reason to keep her in the hospital, as evidenced by the fact that she was still running a low grade fever on the day she was discharged. She was treated with antibiotics that can be given orally, but that they chose to give via IV. Dr. Machado could find no notes from the primary treating physician from April 6, until his discharge note on April 9. Dr. Machado found nothing in the medical record to support the view that the stent had to be placed in the hospital. The stent certainly needed to be placed, to allow urine to drain properly from the kidney. However, this is not always an inpatient procedure. Dr. Machado noted that the urologist's post-operative orders were written as outpatient orders. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last six days of C.J.'s admission. The record as presented established that C.J. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on April 3. Patient #11 G.M. AHCA Exhibit 6 indicates that G.M. was admitted on July 6, 2000, and was discharged on July 20, 2000. However, Dr. Machado noted that the records provided by the hospital indicate that this patient was admitted directly to a rehabilitation facility, and was never an acute medical admission. Therefore, Dr. Machado determined that the entire 14-day stay should be denied. Dr. Haim testified that his own abbreviated notes show that the patient came into the hospital, was in respiratory failure, had shortness of breath, coded with cardiac arrest, and was intubated. However, the lack of medical records provided by the hospital to AHCA require that Dr. Machado's denial determination be sustained. Patient #12 N.P. N.P. was admitted on January 8, 2000, and was discharged on January 14, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that two days, January 13 through January 14, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that N.P. was a 46-year-old male with cardiomyopathy and poorly controlled diabetes. He was admitted with increasing shortness of breath, fever, cough, and chest pain. He was started on antibiotics, diuretics, and respiratory treatments, and his symptoms improved rapidly. Serial enzyme tests ruled out a heart attack and his chest pain was not thought to be cardiac in nature. On January 11, his IV medications were changed to oral, and it was felt he was near ready for discharge. Though he felt better, his oxygen saturations were slow to improve and he was still saturating in the high 80's on room air, which was not his baseline. Dr. Machado found it reasonable to monitor him for one more day in the hospital to see if this would improve before sending him home with oxygen. The saturations stayed the same the following day, and he continued to feel better. Dr. Machado concluded that discharge would have been safe on January 12, with home oxygen and close outpatient follow-up. Dr. Haim testified that N.P. could have probably been discharged on January 13 on oxygen, with outpatient follow-up. He noted that N.P. was started on a new medication on January 12, and that it is reasonable to keep the patient for an additional 24 hours to gauge his response. However, Dr. Haim also noted that the medication was a diuretic, not an antibiotic. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last two days of N.P.'s admission. The record, as presented, established that N.P. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on January 13. Patient #13 T.S. T.S. was admitted on September 18, 2001, and was discharged on October 16, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that 12 days, October 4 through October 16, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that T.S. was a 55-year-old man with cirrhosis and a history of drug abuse and hypertension. He was admitted for treatment of a non-healing venous ulcer that had failed outpatient therapy. T.S. was also experiencing uncontrolled pain despite oral pain medications. He was started on broad-spectrum antibiotics and underwent debridement of the wound on September 21. Plans were made to discharge him to a skilled nursing facility for several weeks of wound care and IV antibiotics. On September 22, his pain continued to be poorly controlled. On September 25, he had a fever of 101 degrees and diarrhea, which prompted further work- up. Cultures of the wound continued to show a polymicrobial infection that also had a fungal component. Oral Sporanox was added to his medications to address the fungal component. On September 27, a pain management consultation was requested due to his continued uncontrolled pain, mostly during dressing changes. T.S. was placed on a Dilaudid PCA (patient controlled analgesic) pump, which did control his pain. During this time, T.S. had waxing and waning mental status due to the pain medications. Because of T.S.' increasing lethargy, the PCA was discontinued on October 3, and T.S. was thenceforth maintained on oral medications. The patient also had chronic anemia on admission that slowly worsened during his stay. He was found not to be acutely bleeding and was transfused PRBCs with improvement in his hematocrit level. Dr. Machado agreed that it would have been difficult to discharge T.S. to a skilled nursing facility for dressing changes and IV antibiotics if he was unable to tolerate dressing changes without a PCA pump for pain. Therefore, she would allow the hospitalization through October 3, when T.S. was switched to oral pain medications and could have gone to a skilled nursing facility. Treating physician Dr. Pradeep Vangala testified that he saw T.S. in his office, prior to his hospital admission. T.S. came in with what appeared to be cellulitis in his legs, and was treated with oral antibiotics. When the condition failed to respond to treatment, Dr. Vangala admitted T.S. to the hospital. Dr. Vangala stated that T.S. was kept in the hospital after October 4 because his cellulitis had not resolved and the patient was not stable enough to be changed to oral antibiotics. Dr. Vangala testified that it was not a simple decision to send T.S. home with IV antibiotics because of complicating issues. Secondary to his cirrhosis, T.S. had significant edema in most of his body in general, and his legs in particular. Dr. Vangala stated that T.S. required close observation of his skin integrity and his cellulitis, and that his cirrhosis was the cause of the edema. Though T.S. had a lot of excess fluid, most of it was in the subcutaneous tissues rather than the blood vessels. This means that his fluid status had to be closely monitored, because of the danger that he might become intravascularly volume depleted, which could affect renal function. Dr. Vangala stated that the cirrhosis had altered T.S.'s mental status for a significant portion of his stay, and that an acutely confused patient is not a candidate for discharge because he is not able to follow discharge instructions. T.S. also had significant anemia, which meant that his hemoglobin had to be watched. Dr. Haim testified that during all 12 days denied by Dr. Machado, T.S. was still running a fever and had a depressed mental status. He was still receiving IV medications, and had a significant swelling of the abdomen that required drainage. His mental status was abnormal, and physicians were having a very difficult time titrating his pain medications. A neurologist was called in on October 4 because of T.S.'s impaired mental status. The gathering fluids in his body were causing swelling and making it difficult for him to breathe. Dr. Haim testified that the IV antibiotics that T.S. was receiving after October 4 had to be closely supervised, though he conceded that a skilled nursing facility could handle their administration. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last twelve days of T.S.'s admission. Dr. Machado's opinion that the medications administered via IV after October 4 could have been given outside of the inpatient hospital setting was uncontradicted. Dr. Vangala's concerns were genuine, but mostly consisted of monitoring actions he wished to perform as a precaution, rather than acute care needs. The record as presented established that T.S. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on October 4. Patient #14 & 15 (two denials) F.T. F.T. was admitted on March 27, 2000, and was discharged on May 13, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that: March 27 through April 4, should be approved for treatment of coagulopahty, subdural hematoma, and evaluation of the patient's near-syncopal episode; April 14 through May 7, should be approved for chemotherapy and treatment of neutropenic fever; and that April 5 through April 13 (nine days) and May 8 through May 13, (five days) should be denied because the treatment during those periods could have been administered on an outpatient basis. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that F.T. was a 49-year-old female with metastatic breast cancer admitted with a coagulopathy and near-syncope (almost fainting). She was found to have new subdural hematomas and a new pathologic fracture of the left femur. Her coagulopathy was reversed and she was evaluated by neurosurgery and radiation oncology. No surgery was recommended. She began palliative radiation therapy to the brain and left femur on March 29. She remained hemodynamically and neurologically stable, and neurosurgery signed off on the case on April 4. Her pain responded well to radiation. Between April 4 and April 14, F.T.'s hospital care involved continued radiation therapy and the biopsy of a left auxiliary lymph node (on April 11) to determine the receptor status of the breast cancer, which would enable the oncologist to decide if chemotherapy would be of benefit. Dr. Machado concluded that this evaluation and the radiation therapy could have been done on an outpatient basis. On April 14, F.T. began chemotherapy over two days and very soon began experiencing fever and neutropenia (an abnormally low level of neutrophils, the white blood cells produced in the bone marrow) and then respiratory distress. She was started on IV antibiotics and IV diuretics. She was also started on a feeding tube due to poor oral food intake. The fevers and neutropenia were resolved by April 25, but she continued to decline, with increased shortness of breath requiring more diuresis to clear fluid from the lungs. It became evident she was deteriorating and her feeding tube was discontinued by May 4. By May 8, comfort measures only were initiated, and evaluation for inpatient hospice care was requested. In her deposition, Dr. Machado testified that between April 4 and April 14, F.T. was receiving radiation as her main treatment, as well as further evaluation to determine whether anything more could be done for her cancer. Everything she received during this period, including the lymph node biopsy, could have been done on an outpatient basis. On April 14, she started chemotherapy, which was reasonable to perform in the hospital. By May 8, the medical chart notes indicate the initiation of "comfort only" measures. At that point, she could have been sent home with hospice care or to a hospice house. Dr. Machado conceded that some patients do receive inpatient hospice care, but she testified that this should have been done in a hospice bed, not an acute care medical bed. Dr. Haim testified that during the period of April 5 through April 13 F.T. was receiving radiation to the fractured femur and awaiting a lymph node biopsy. The initial pathology report did not have sufficient material for receptor studies, so a surgical biopsy would need to be performed. On April 5, the hospital social worker was awaiting orders to transfer F.T. back to the nursing home from which she had been admitted. However, F.T. had an episode of nausea and vomiting. Dr. Haim stated that nausea and vomiting in a patient who has metastasis is extremely serious because it could indicate more brain swelling or bleeding in the brain. She was started on IV Decadron, a steroid given to combat nausea and vomiting in chemotherapy patients. Dr. Raul Castillo, F.T.'s oncologist, met with a pathologist on April 7 to discuss the need for an open biopsy of F.T. On April 8, F.T. was receiving radiation and was started on a new chemotherapy drug, IV Aredia. She was monitored closely for side effects. Pain management was a persistent problem. On April 10, she was given the open biopsy under a local anesthetic. On April 13, an orthopedist saw her and ordered a specially fitted brace, because she had difficulty sitting due to her spinal problems. Dr. Haim concluded that, because of all the treatments F.T. was undergoing, including IV chemotherapy, it was mandatory for her to stay inpatient from April 5 through April 13. She could not get the chemotherapy in a non-acute care facility. The hospital was the only place she could get IV Aredia, the brace hadn't arrived until April 13, and she had multiple problems that required monitoring, including advanced cancer and bleeding in the brain. Dr. Haim did not believe that a skilled nursing facility had the capacity to handle F.T. As to F.T.'s second stay, Dr. Haim testified that from May 8 to May 13 F.T. was very weak. Her abdomen was markedly distended, which could have meant that her bowels weren't working well. The abdomen was X-rayed. Her platelet count was dangerously low. An oncology note dated May 9 stated that she was a full code (meaning that all resuscitative efforts must be attempted), by her own choice. Her full code status forced the doctors to plan the performance of tests on her abdomen. On May 10, F.T. voluntarily changed her instructions to DNR (do not resuscitate). Comfort measures were instituted and hospice was consulted. However, when the hospice nurse arrived, F.T. was out having an ultrasound preparatory to having the abdominal fluid drained. The hospice decided not to see her, because she was getting a procedure. The hospice nurse never saw the patient on that day. F.T. was admitted to hospice on May 13. The oncologist, Dr. Castillo, testified that his medical group first saw F.T. in March 2000. F.T. had been diagnosed with breast cancer in 1988, and treated in Puerto Rico, with a left mastectomy and chemotherapy. After she completed the chemotherapy, she had radiation. She indicated that in December 1999, she was told she had metastatic cancer in her bones. In 2000, she developed pain over her hips and legs. She had a fracture over her left femur and a prosthesis over her left leg. She had been taking Coumadin, and Dr. Castillo became involved when F.T. presented with bleeding secondary to Coumadin toxicity. Dr. Castillo described this as a very complex and emotional case in which a few strands of information had to be pieced together to determine the best case management. F.T.'s case history was incomplete because she spoke only Spanish, creating a big language barrier with most of the hospital staff. Dr. Castillo speaks Spanish, and was able to get a "full but scattered history" from F.T. F.T. had metastatic disease. Dr. Castillo testified that it is extremely important to determine if the patient has an estrogen receptor or hormonally positive tumor. Patients who are hormonally sensitive have a much higher probability of responding positively to therapy. To make things more difficult, F.T. developed a subdural hematoma, for which the medical team had to correct her coagulation. Dr. Castillo testified that they felt uncomfortable discharging F.T. while treatment planning was underway. Because of her previous exposure to chemotherapy and radiation, F.T. was at high risk for complications such as the sepsis that eventuated. Dr. Castillo emphasized that this was a complex case, and that the treatment team lacked all the information necessary to make rapid and clear decisions. One event followed another, and the team concentrated on trying to catch up and get the patient somewhat stable. Dr. Castillo stated that a problem with treating a patient this sick on an outpatient basis is the lack of supervision by a specialist. Such a patient will not have access to a site where she is going to get one-to-one care from the oncological standpoint. Dr. Castillo agreed that radiation is commonly done on an outpatient basis, but he noted that this was a patient who had bleeding on the brain and was getting radiation to the brain. If she was in a skilled nursing facility and had a subdural hematoma, she would probably have died on her way to the hospital. Dr. Castillo stated this his group's philosophy is to discharge a patient when they consider the patient stable, and not to leave a patient in the hospital for a mere workup. However, this was a patient who could become a neurosurgical emergency case at any moment. Dr. Castillo concluded that he would not have done anything different in the management of this patient. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that April 5 through April 13 and May 8, through 13 should not have been denied. Dr. Castillo's testimony as the treating oncologist, in combination with Dr. Haim's expert testimony, credibly established that F.T.'s condition was so precarious that her entire inpatient stay was medically necessary. Patient #16 J.Y. J.Y. was admitted on March 3, 2001, and was discharged on March 21, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that five days, March 16 through March 21, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that T.S. was a 39-year-old female admitted due to swallowing a dental appliance that had become lodged in her esophagus. She underwent an endoscopy on March 3, and the foreign body was removed with some difficulty. Her esophagus was perforated due to the foreign body. She began having fever and pain. A CT scan on March 6 showed extensive edema and air tracking compatible with esophageal perforation. She was kept NPO, hyperalimentation (feeding tube) was started, and IV antibiotics were continued. Clinically, she improved and conservative treatment was continued, as the patient wished to avoid surgery. Dr. Machado believed that it was still prudent to monitor and treat the patient in the hospital, due to the possibility of serious complications from this type of injury. A barium swallow was performed on March 12, which showed that a leak persisted in the esophagus. Because she was clinically so much better, it was decided to repeat the CT scan of the neck on March 14 to check for improvement. The scan showed that soft tissue gas and swelling had decreased considerably. By March 16, her IV antibiotics were discontinued and it was decided to give her a trial of fluids by mouth. She was hemodynamically stable and afebrile. Dr. Machado concluded that she should have been discharged with home health and hyperalimentation, with an outpatient swallowing study and close follow-up, rather than waiting in the hospital until March 19. Dr. Haim testified that the March 12 barium swallow results led to J.Y.'s being kept on no food by mouth and total parenteral nutrition (TPN, another term for a feeding tube). On March 16, J.Y. was noted to be clinically stable, but her liver function tests were noted to be high. Dr. Haim noted that the TPN itself could be causing the liver problems, so there was a GI consult. The gastroenterologist recommended a change of antibiotics as a possible solution to the increase in her liver enzymes. Contrary to Dr. Machado's statement, no trial of fluids by mouth was done on March 16. As of March 17, J.Y.'s orders were still nothing by mouth and TPN, and her liver enzymes continued to rise. On March 18, there were no major interventions and J.Y. was scheduled for a swallow study. Her liver enzymes were noted to be decreasing for the first time. Her swallow study results were pending on March 19. Also on March 19, a pulmonary note indicated phlebitis in J.Y.'s arm, in the area of the IV feeding. An order to replace the PICC line was written. On March 20, J.Y. was started on an oral diet and her PICC line was replaced. The gastroenterologist recommended a liquid diet for several weeks. On March 21, the patient was discharged home on IV TPN and a liquid diet. Dr. Haim concluded that the acute care setting was required for the denied days. Treating surgeon Dr. Stephen Huber testified J.Y. came in having swallowed her partial plate, which had become lodged in her esophagus. The emergency room physicians could not get it out, and so J.Y. was taken to surgery. Dr. Huber kept her NPO because he was afraid she might have torn her esophagus. He placed her on IV antibiotics and ordered a swallow study, which revealed a small leak. Dr. Huber called in an infectious disease specialist to manage J.Y.'s antibiotics because he was worried about contamination from the leak spreading into her neck. She was started on IV feedings and the medical team watched for an abscess to develop in her neck. A few days later, another swallow study was performed, which indicated the leak was smaller but still persistent. J.Y. was kept NPO and kept on IV antibiotics. A third swallow study showed the leak had resolved, and she was started on regular food the next day. Once she was cleared by all her specialists, she was discharged from the hospital. Dr. Huber testified that he kept J.Y. in the hospital after March 16 mainly to watch her. Even after the last swallow study, there was still a small leak in the esophagus. J.Y. had not eaten for a couple of weeks, but she was getting better clinically, and Dr. Huber decided to feed her. He started with clear liquids, then advanced her diet slowly over the next few days. Dr. Huber testified that J.Y. had to be watched for fevers and neck swelling caused by her eating, and that he could not evaluate her progress if she was at home. J.Y. did not speak English, and there would have been difficulty monitoring her condition if she were not under direct observation. Seeing her on an outpatient basis might prove harmful if she developed an abscess in her neck, or sepsis. J.Y. remained on IV antibiotics until she was discharged. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last five days of J.Y.'s admission. Dr. Huber's concerns were genuine, but mostly consisted of monitoring actions he wished to perform as a precaution, rather than acute care needs. The record as presented established that J.Y. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on March 16. Psychiatric Inpatient Hospital Stays By the time of the hearing, the psychiatric inpatient hospital stays of 13 patients remained at issue. The findings below are set forth in the order that the patients were listed in AHCA Exhibit 6. Patient #1 H.A. H.A. was admitted on February 20, 2001, and was discharged on February 26, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Rahul Mehra determined that three days, February 23 through February 26, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that H.A. was a 57-year-old female with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. She was admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act on February 20, for reasons unclear in the medical record. As of February 23, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient's psychotic symptoms may have persisted, but these symptoms appeared to be baseline. As of February 23, she did not need 24-hour nursing care. She was discharged on the same dose of anti-psychotic medication she was taking upon admission. Dr. Mehra concluded that, as of February 23, outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Generally the Medicaid standards for whether a patient requires an inpatient psychiatric bed are as follows: whether the patient is actively suicidal or homicidal; whether the patient is so acutely psychotic that her ability to care for herself is impaired; whether the patient is physically aggressive or manic; and whether the patient is having a "complicated withdrawal" from alcohol or drugs that might cause a seizure or other acute health problem. Dr. Mehra testified that it was appropriate to admit H.A. because of her family's concerns that she might have a handgun and was threatening self-harm. At admission, she was having some psychotic symptoms, displaying disorganized thoughts. However, as of February 23, she was no longer actively suicidal or homicidal, which was the reason she was admitted. She did have psychiatric symptoms, such as visual and auditory hallucinations, but these seemed to be her baseline level of functioning. No changes were made to her medications. Dr. Mehra's recommendation would have been to transfer H.A. to an outpatient setting or a nursing home. Petitioner's psychiatric expert, Dr. Alan S. Berns, testified that H.A. was admitted through the emergency room for increasing auditory hallucinations and religious preoccupation. She had a history of non-compliance with her outpatient treatment, mood swings, and unpredictable impulse control. She denied hallucinations, but was noted to talk to herself as a religious preoccupation. The diagnostic impression was of acute exacerbation of chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, and rule out schizoaffective disorder. The psychosocial note on admission stated that the patient is talking to God and dead relatives. The emergency room nursing notes stated that the patient wanted to hurt an unidentified person with a handgun. She was labile, crying and laughing. H.A. had been admitted to Lifestream, a mental health center in Lake County, three times since November 2000. She had a history of "cheeking" her medications. She required assistance with her ADLs and ate poorly. The social worker reported that she did not attend group therapy sessions, and that she heard God talking to her all the time. By February 24, H.A. showed an improved mood and affect, with no overt agitation. She was observed talking to herself and appeared to be responding to internal stimuli. She also demonstrated some looseness of association. On February 25, she denied auditory or visual hallucinations and any suicidal or homicidal ideations. However, she remained seclusive, with pressured speech and a depressed, blunted affect. She refused to participate in groups. She was discharged on February 26 with improved mood and affect, no evidence of delusions, and denied hallucinations and suicidal or homicidal ideations. She was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and discharged with prescribed Seroquel and Paxil, the same medications she was taking on admission. Dr. Berns concluded that H.A. warranted another day or two past the February 23 discharge authorized by Dr. Mehra. The nursing notes from February 23 show the patient alert and oriented times three (time, place and person), and indicate that she was cooperative, pleasant, and denied suicidal ideation. However, H.A. also stated that God talks to her and she sees the Holy Spirit. On February 24, she was still exhibiting some looseness of association, indicating that her thinking was not organized, which could in turn affect her ability to perform her ADLs. At this point, she did not appear a danger to herself in terms of intentionally inflicting harm. Dr. Mehra agreed that the symptoms cited by Dr. Berns, such as looseness of association, loose thoughts and disorganization, can be indicative of the need for a longer inpatient stay. However, loosening of associations is a common finding in a patient with schizophrenia, which is a lifelong disorder. Looseness of association in a schizophrenic patient does not, in and of itself, invoke the Medicaid guidelines that the patient is acutely and gravely psychotic. Dr. Mehra reasoned that if her acute condition had been such a great concern, then her antipsychotic medication could have been increased to effect a change in the observed loosening of associations. Her subtherapeutic dosage was never changed during her inpatient stay. Dr. Mehra concluded that just having loosening of associations is not sufficient, under the Medicaid guidelines, to continue an inpatient level of care. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last three days of H.A.'s admission. The record as presented established that H.A. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on February 23. Patient #2 T.E. T.E. was admitted on March 19, 2001, and was discharged on March 27, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that three days, March 25 through March 27, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. However, in his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that he now agreed with the hospital that the entire stay should be approved.6 Patient #3 S.G. S.G. was admitted on October 25, 2001, and was discharged on November 1, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that four days, October 28, through November 1, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that S.G. was a 42-year-old male with diagnosis of schizophrenia admitted, involuntarily under the Baker Act from Orange County Jail, for psychotic symptoms and homelessness. The patient had a previous admission to Florida Hospital Orlando's psychiatric unit, having been discharged on October 8, 2001. Dr. Mehra found that as of October 28, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient's psychotic symptoms were still present but improved. The patient was cooperative, directable, and interacting with some peers. His delusions appeared to be chronic. He did not require seclusion or restraints and was not a management problem on the unit. His vital signs, appetite, mood and sleep were stable. Placement became an issue during his inpatient stay. Dr. Mehra concluded that the appropriate level of care as of October 28, was outpatient, with closely supervised living arrangements. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that S.G. was admitted with auditory hallucinations and delusions, reaching the level of psychotic behavior. During his stay, S.G.'s speech and thought became more organized. His psychotic symptoms became less intrusive. By October 28, he was not a danger to himself or others and was ready to move into a sub-acute setting. Dr. Mehra conceded that S.G. was probably still delusional on October 28, but noted that his delusions were probably chronic and at this time were not interfering with his ability to perform his ADLs. Treating physician Dr. Rex A. Birkmire testified that S.G. was initially very psychotic, delusional, and disorganized. He had not been taking his prescribed medications. S.G. thought that one of the his nurses was the Queen of England. He heard voices and had a religious preoccupation about Satan, aliens and dragons. Staff at the jail believed S.G. needed a higher level of care, and therefore had him admitted to the hospital under the Baker Act. Dr. Birkmire testified that as late as October 31, S.G. was still so psychotic, he thought the medication Artane was a "gasoline pill." His conversation continued to be irrelevant and rambling. He said that "people see the smell but they don't see me." On October 31, S.G. was so disorganized that he could not identify the medications he would need to stay stable, and hospital staff felt he could not maintain his basic ADLs. Dr. Birkmire noted that by October 28, S.G. was "passively compliant" with his medications, meaning that he would take them when the nurses gave them to him. Dr. Birkmire stated that S.G. could have been managed in a skilled nursing facility with a 24-hour nursing staff. Dr. Berns testified that S.G.'s prior admission on October 8 raised questions as to the adequacy of his prior treatment, his compliance upon discharge, and his stress level during the interval between admissions. The notes for the current admission stated that S.G. was readmitted due to medication noncompliance. The admission note stated that the patient was psychotic and disorganized, with jumbled thoughts, and had ideas of reference as to the television, i.e., that it was sending him special messages. S.G. was reported to be hyper-religious, and carried a Bible. He had a history of hearing voices and was diagnosed with chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia. A note from Dr. Luis Allen stated that on October 28 the patient was still "very loose," meaning his thoughts were disorganized and psychotic. Hospital staff reported that S.G. remained delusional, and there was concern from the social worker that he might be responding to internal stimuli. On October 29, a note reported that S.G. was psychotic and manic, though starting to make more sense. On October 30, the notes stated that S.G. was still rambling and tangential, and that his ADLs were not good. Staff was concerned that S.G. was not committed to taking medication as an outpatient. Dr. Birkmire recommended the decanoate form of antipsychotic medicine, a long-acting intramuscularly administered form. Dr. Berns stated that some of these medications can be injected such that a dose can last from two- to-four weeks, which can improve patient compliance. A November 2 note from an advanced registered nurse practitioner stated that the patient seemed confused when given discharge instructions to follow up at Lakeside Alternatives. Dr. Berns testified that such confusion can be a red flag that the patient is not ready for discharge. Dr. Berns stated that S.G.'s chronic schizophrenic condition could deteriorate if he were discharged without being well stabilized and not committed to following through with his medications. Dr. Berns concluded that the length of stay was appropriate, and that he might have kept S.G. in the hospital even longer if he appeared confused on the day of discharge. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that the psychotic symptoms, including delusions that his nurse was the Queen of England, did not mean that S.G. must remain in the hospital. Dr. Mehra stated that the note in the chart that the patient believed Artane was a "gasoline pill" was not necessarily a delusion, but could have been an uneducated patient's way of saying that the pill peps him up. Dr. Mehra argued that if the medical concern was persistent psychotic symptoms so severe that he needed hospitalization, then the medical team needed to make dosage adjustments. However, no such adjustments were made after October 26. Dr. Mehra's opinion remained that S.G. did not meet Medicaid guidelines as of October 28. The patient was cooperative on the unit, not a management problem. He could live outside the hospital and still have delusions that someone was the Queen of England. Dr. Birkmire testified that S.G. was rambling, disorganized, and thought the nurse was Queen even after October 28, but that does not necessarily mean he should be in the hospital. Dr. Mehra pointed out that plenty of people walking the street have schizophrenia, are psychotic, and ramble. Dr. Mehra stated that one possible reason S.G. was kept in the hospital was concern as to where he would go upon discharge, because he came from jail and was homeless. Dr. Mehra testified that Medicaid does not cover the period of time when someone is needing placement. Dr. Mehra agreed that S.G. showed psychotic symptoms, but stated that the psychotic symptoms should affect the patient's ability to function in order to justify inpatient treatment. This patient was taking his medications, eating, participating in activities on the unit, and was directable. He did not require any means of seclusion or physical restraints and did not demonstrate aggressive behavior. Dr. Mehra agreed with Dr. Berns that it is a concern any time a patient is readmitted, because it speaks to the chronic nature of schizophrenia and psychoses, and how the symptoms persist over a period of time. "Loose" symptoms probably continued until the day he left. Dr. Mehra also agreed with Dr. Berns that schizophrenics can stabilize and have their thoughts become more organized, depending on the patient and his response to medications. One patient can be loosely organized and live on the street, and another may regain full control of his thoughts. However, Dr. Mehra saw no reason to amend his original opinion. A patient with loose thinking, who is psychotic and disorganized, may need hospitalization, if he is not taking his medicine, not eating, not sleeping appropriately, or is being aggressive. Otherwise, those symptoms may be as good as things are going to get for this patient, given that he has been in jail, has had frequent inpatient hospitalizations, and is homeless. Again, Dr. Mehra noted that S.G. remained in the hospital for several days with no changes to his medications. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last four days of S.G.'s admission. The record as presented established that S.G. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on October 28. Patient #4 C.M. C.M. was admitted on March 2, 2001, and was discharged on March 10, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that four days, March 6 through March 10, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that C.M. was a 16-year-old male admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act from the Orange County jail, where he was banging his head on the wall. Hospital records indicated concerns by hospital staff that C.M. was malingering in an effort to avoid his pending legal woes. Dr. Mehra found that, as of March 6, C.M. was not actively suicidal, homicidal, grossly psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Dr. Mehra concluded that the patient should have been discharged to the juvenile detention center, with psychiatric consultation. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that the hospital had a range of diagnoses for this patient, from "malingering," meaning that he was intentionally inventing his symptoms, to a concern about schizophrenia. Dr. Mehra's review of the hospital records led him to conclude that C.M. was malingering, based primarily on C.M.'s statement to his grandmother that he would get himself placed in the psychiatric unit anytime he went to jail. The record stated that C.M. said the devil was telling him to kill himself, but the physician and staff all thought C.M. was malingering. C.M.'s statement about killing himself led to no increase in precautions, and his medications were not increased until the next day. By the end of C.M.'s hospitalization, the physician was talking about tapering the boy completely off of Respiradol, an anti- psychotic, and was convinced that C.M. was feigning his symptoms. Attending physician Scott D. Farmer7 contended that C.M. remained very dangerous on March 6, because he was still complaining of command hallucinations. "Command hallucinations" cause the patient to believe there are voices telling him to act in a dangerous way, and are recognized as a "unique risk factor" justifying inpatient care. On March 6, C.M. was hearing the voice of his grandfather reassuring him, but he was also hearing the voice of the devil telling him to kill himself. Dr. Farmer testified that patients have been known to kill themselves when they have persisting command hallucinations, and this was a patient who bangs his head against a brick wall. This was an indication that his medications had not been properly adjusted, and that they could not be so adjusted on an outpatient basis. Dr. Farmer's opinion was that it was "ludicrous" to think this patient could be placed in a more complex environment and get better. To discharge C.M. on March 6, would have constituted "abandonment." Dr. Farmer contended that it is a "glib assumption" to say that C.M. was faking his illness, and it is not within the spirit of psychiatry to prejudge that a patient is falsifying his expressed distress. The tradition in medicine is to compassionately adjust medication to remedy the symptom complex, which in this case pointed toward schizophrenia. Dr. Farmer stated that the faking allegation is "a reflection of the lowest form of psychiatric practice. It is a departure from the Hippocratic oath to do no harm. It is an assumption that you can climb inside of somebody else's head and then make conclusions that are a distinct departure from what the patient is saying." Dr. Farmer pointed out that C.M. had been treated at least once for a prior suicide attempt. He also pointed out that a "first break" psychotic episode is the best opportunity for treatment to have a favorable impact in the case of a patient with command hallucinations. Subsequent episodes require more aggressive treatment and higher doses of medications. C.M. was being treated with antipsychotic and antidepressant medications. On March 6, he was taking Wellbutrin, an antidepressant that has the lowest likelihood of triggering manic-type symptoms, and Risperdal. His medications were increased on March 6 and March 7. On March 8, C.M. was still responding to internal stimuli, carrying on a conversation with an internal voice. Dr. Farmer agreed that C.M. was stabilized by March 9 and should have been discharged on that date rather than on March 10. Dr. Berns noted the suspicions of malingering, but also considered that jail staff could not handle C.M., that he appeared to be in imminent danger of harming himself, and he had been treated for at least one suicide attempt in the past. These factors raised concerns as to how much of C.M.'s behavior was malingering and how much indicated genuine illness. Dr. Berns was influenced by the fact that C.M. requested an increase in his dosage of Risperdal, which is not a medication that can be abused or used for intoxication. Dr. Berns acknowledged that C.M. lost some credibility with his statement that he would continue getting Baker Acted if incarcerated. He also acknowledged that C.M.'s age and impulsiveness made it harder to determine the extent of his malingering, but that there was undoubtedly some malingering present in this case. Dr. Berns concluded, as did Dr. Farmer, that C.M. could have been discharged a day or two earlier than March 10. Dr. Mehra replied that it was the treating physician, Dr. Birkmire, who concluded that C.M. was malingering. The auditory hallucinations on March 6 were not sufficient to keep him in the hospital where the treating physician and the medical team believed he was making up the symptoms. Nothing in the testimony of Dr. Farmer or Dr. Berns caused Dr. Mehra to change his opinion. Both doctors referred to this patient's having a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Dr. Mehra called this a "serious and unusual diagnosis" for a 16-year-old, similar to a diagnosis of cancer in that the patient will have to live with it for the rest of his life. Dr. Mehra would expect that such a diagnosis would have led the treatment team to meet with C.M.'s family to offer the appropriate treatment planning and education regarding schizophrenia, but the record indicated that no such meeting occurred. Dr. Mehra believed that there was cause to admit C.M. for evaluation, because he was only 16 years old. Even if it turned out he was malingering, it was prudent to admit him for four days to evaluate him. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last four days of C.M.'s admission. The record as presented established that C.M. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 6. Patient #5 L.M. L.M. was admitted on May 16, 2001, and was discharged on May 22, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that three days, May 20 through May 22, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Florida Hospital Orlando did not contest Dr. Mehra's denial of three days for this admission. Patient #6 H.P. H.P. was admitted on March 7, 2001, and was discharged on March 14, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that four days, March 10 through March 14, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that H.P. was a 34-year-old female admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for "suicidal ideation and auditory hallucinations." As of March 10, H.P. was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Her sleep, vital signs, and appetite were stable. Dr. Mehra concluded that the patient no longer needed 24-hour psychiatric nursing care and could have gone back to the skilled nursing facility on March 10. Outpatient was the appropriate level of care. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that H.P.'s improvement was such that she could have been discharged on March 10. There was no deterioration in her condition after March 10. She denied suicidal or homicidal ideations, hallucinations, and delusions throughout the day. Dr. Mehra noted that H.P. was HIV-positive and obese, and would therefore chronically be at risk for suicidal ideation. She had been hospitalized many times for suicidal ideation and auditory hallucinations. H.P. claimed to have jumped from a five-story building when she was 18 years old. Dr. Mehra did not think H.P. was schizophrenic, though her attending physician was concerned about major depression with psychotic features. Attending physician Dr. Luis Allen testified that H.P. was admitted from a skilled nursing facility. She had had multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, and on this admission was presenting with psychotic symptoms, hearing voices and having suicidal thoughts. Dr. Allen conceded that there was one day during her stay when H.P. reported not having suicidal thoughts, but he added that these thoughts resumed the next day. Given that H.P.'s history made her a higher risk for suicide, Dr. Allen felt that he had to ensure she was stable psychiatrically before she could return to the skilled nursing facility. Dr. Berns testified that the March 7 admission note indicated that H.P. had a history of depressive disorder and multiple psychiatric admissions to Florida Hospital Orlando. H.P. reported insomnia and auditory hallucinations, which were mostly command and derogatory hallucinations, voices calling the patient "stupid" and a "dummy" and saying that she should kill herself. H.P. had a history of several suicide attempts and had been taking Risperdal, Prozac, and Remeron. She reported suicidal thoughts, but no plan, and was alert times three. The admitting diagnosis was major depressive disorder, recurrent with psychotic features, and rule out mood disorder secondary to medical condition with depressive-like features. Dr. Berns agreed that the March 10 notes showed that H.P. was depressed with blunted affect, and that she denied suicidal ideation. On March 11, the notes indicated that H.P.'s mood was improved, that she slept better during the night, that her suicidal thoughts were significantly decreased, and that she was compliant with her medications and reported no auditory hallucinations or delusions. However, the attending physician continued to note that she was depressed and hopeless, and the social worker reported that H.P. discussed having no desire to live any more and be a burden to her children. On March 13, her behavior was improved, she had a very good appetite, and she had no hallucinations, delusions, or suicidal thoughts. On March 14, she denied suicidal ideation and hallucinations and was discharged back to the skilled nursing facility. Dr. Berns testified that H.P.'s stay was necessary, and disagreed that she could have been discharged to a skilled nursing facility on March 10. She had a previous suicide attempt, and she had suicidal thoughts and heard voices telling her to harm herself. Dr. Berns agreed that many people express thoughts such as those H.P. expressed to the social worker on March 11, but Dr. Berns pointed out that many people do not also have previous attempts or voices telling them to kill themselves. H.P. was showing improvement by March 11, but her symptoms were still present. Dr. Berns did not agree with Dr. Mehra that suicidal ideation, without the means to carry out a plan, is never sufficient to keep a patient in the hospital. Dr. Berns stated that if the patient is having thoughts of suicide and staff is documenting that the patient is helpless and hopeless, the suicide risk may be sufficient to hospitalize the patient, particularly where there have been previous hospitalizations and suicide attempts. After reviewing the testimony of Dr. Allen and Dr. Berns, Dr. Mehra maintained his opinion that H.P. should have been discharged on March 10. Dr. Mehra pointed out that no physician saw the patient on March 10, probably because it was a Saturday.8 Regardless of the day of the week, if the patient's condition is so acute that it is necessary to hospitalize her with a risk factor of attempted suicide, then she should be seen by a doctor. The unit notes for March 10 indicate she was showing no evidence of psychoses or suicidal ideation. Dr. Mehra noted that even H.P.'s mental status exam at the time of admission showed no active suicidal plan. If the patient is sick enough to be in the hospital, then she should have been seen by a physician. Dr. Mehra concluded that there appeared no need for H.P. to be seen by a doctor on March 10. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last four days of H.P.'s admission. The record as presented established that H.P. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 10. Patient #7 J.R. J.R. was admitted on March 2, 2001, and was discharged on March 15, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that ten days, March 5 through March 15, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that J.R. was a 46-year-old female admitted from a skilled nursing facility under the Baker Act for being "suicidal." As of March 5, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. She needed intensive outpatient treatment to address her depressive symptoms, eating issues, and possible addiction to narcotics. J.R. refused to see a chronic pain specialist while in the hospital. Dr. Mehra's report also raised a "serious quality of care concern" in the fact that the patient was immediately referred for electroconvulsive therapy ("ECT") treatment based on "unclear, poorly documented reasons." The physician's decision to use ECT was based purely on the patient's report, without documentation, of failed past treatments. The patient reported that she had not had psychotherapy in years. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that the admitting concern was that the patient was suicidal in her skilled nursing facility, and Dr. Allen had her Baker Acted into the hospital. Dr. Farmer performed the psychiatric evaluation on admission and stated that the patient was not actively suicidal, not psychotic, and was angry with Dr. Allen for Baker Acting her. Dr. Farmer diagnosed J.R. with major depression and anorexia nervosa. Dr. Mehra concluded that J.R. should have been discharged on March 3, because the initial admission evaluation did not establish medical necessity for an inpatient psychiatric hospitalization. Dr. Mehra testified that it was difficult to determine why the patient was at this level of care because Dr. Farmer found that J.R. was not suicidal, actively suicidal with a plan, or psychotic, had no form of auditory or visual hallucinations, and was not manic or involved in a complicated withdrawal. Dr. Mehra stated that, while he did not come out and say that J.R. should not have been Baker Acted, Dr. Farmer did repeatedly note the patient's anger at being Baker Acted, which is highly unusual in a psychiatric evaluation report. Dr. Mehra also observed that the Baker Act documents were not dated, and, thus, there was no way of saying they were completed on the day of J.R.'s admission. A Baker Act is an involuntary commitment of a patient, and it involves a patient's rights. Dr. Mehra stated that because the papers must be completed within a specified period of time of having face-to- face contact with the patient, they must note the date and time. The failure to fill out the papers completely causes a concern about the appropriateness of the patient's admission. Dr. Mehra believed that the indication for ECT was not clear. There are specific criteria to initiate a patient on ECT, and the medical record here did not support it. One of the ECT criteria is that the patient must have failed a minimum of three antidepressants at adequate doses for an adequate length of time. The only documentation in the record was the patient's own report that medications had not worked. There was no objective data in the record regarding her medication history. Dr. Mehra found it very significant that J.R. had no prior psychiatric hospitalizations, especially in the context of her being given ECT. There was not adequate medical confirmation that she had failed previous antidepressant therapy. Dr. Mehra noted that J.R. had a history of a cervical spinal fusion and issues of lumbar back pain, which should have raised concerns about inducing a grand mal seizure by way of ECT. Dr. Mehra saw no MRI or CAT scan of the brain, which is usually done prior to the administration of ECT in order to rule out a mass in the brain. Dr. Allen testified that J.R. had a history of recurrent depression with psychotic features and an eating disorder. During her initial visit to the skilled nursing facility, she was found to be anxious, depressed, and experiencing some suicidal thoughts, and was referred for inpatient treatment. She had experienced significant weight loss and had issues of untreated depression. ECT was initiated and performed three times a week. Dr. Allen conceded that ECT may sometimes be done on an outpatient basis, but stated that J.R.'s history of psychiatric symptoms and the low level of support she had in the community necessitated inpatient placement. She was at a nursing home and would have had to be transported at 5:30 every morning for the treatment. There was no transportation available for her to come in as an outpatient. Dr. Allen also felt that she needed to remain inpatient because of the confusion and disorientation that she was developing with each treatment. Dr. Allen stated that the primary reason for keeping J.R. as an inpatient was to give the ECT treatment. He decided to complete the course of ECT treatment and discharge her back to the nursing home. Dr. Farmer was the second opinion doctor who actually performed the ECT treatment. Dr. Allen stated that ECT is usually reserved for patients who are considered treatment intolerant or "refractory" to treatment, with a history of failing different trials of medications or having developed side effects, or patients who had a very high risk of suicide. With J.R., it was not clear how much the eating disorder was playing into her depression, but Dr. Allen believed that her inner functions were clearly deteriorating, as evidenced by the fact that she was in a nursing home at age 45. The ECT was to address her primary mood symptoms and appetite. At the nursing home, she was only eating percent of her meals. She was eating 50 percent of her meals when she left the hospital, and she continued to show improvement at the nursing home. Dr. Berns testified that J.R. showed a history of cervical spinal cord injury. J.R. was a nurse, and an aggressive patient had caused her injuries when she worked in the emergency room. She had a history of anorexia, depression, and alcohol abuse. She was agitated in the emergency room during admission. J.R. claimed she had had trials on all available antidepressants, which were only partially helpful or failed. She had insomnia and took Klonopin for restless legs. On admission, she was also taking OxyContin, Wellbutrin, Flomax, Trazedone, and Zofran. Her mental status examination indicated lethargy and monotone speech. She was depressed, helpless, and hopeless, but denied suicidal ideation. J.R. stated that she had an overdose of medications at age 16. On March 5, she was withdrawn, depressed, and complained of anergia (lack of energy) and anhedonia (inability to experience pleasure). She also complained of dizziness. She showed the same symptoms on March 6, hopeless and helpless but denying suicidal thoughts. She again complained of feeling weak and dizzy, and she had low blood pressure, 73 over 53. Because of concerns that her medications may have been the cause of her medical complaints, the treatment team decided to withhold all psychiatric medicines and initiate ECT. J.R.'s first ECT treatment was on March 7. On that date, she was depressed, withdrawn, had anergia, but no suicidal thoughts. Her dose of Klonopin was lowered. On March 8, her mood was depressed and she showed anergia, anhedonia, and a variable appetite. A trial of a new anti-depressant, Remeron, was commenced, and J.R. was given an Ambien sleeping pill at bedtime. Her blood pressure was still low, 70 over 50, and the treatment team decided to withhold the OxyContin. J.R. refused to see the psychiatrist and stayed secluded in her room. By the second ECT treatment on March 9, J.R.'s mood was improving and her blood pressure was up to 90 over 57. ECT was scheduled for three days during the next week. On March 10, J.R. complained of depression and suicidal thoughts, and stayed alone in her room most of the day. On March 11, she again stayed secluded in her room, depressed and with flat affect. On March 12, she slept fairly well and ate 75 percent of her meals. Her mood was improving and suicidal thoughts decreased. She had ECT in the morning then rested in bed most of the day. She was depressed and anxious, with poor insight and judgment. On March 13, her mood was improving and she denied suicidal ideation. J.R. was more goal oriented and showed less psycho- motor retardation. She was scheduled for discharge on March 14, after her ECT treatment. She had the treatment, but her discharge was placed on hold because the skilled nursing facility did not want to accept her. Dr. Berns was not sure why the facility did not want to take J.R. back, unless they considered her a problem patient or didn't want to handle a depressed patient. Such problems can hold up discharge. Dr. Berns testified that it would not be acceptable to discharge this patient to the street, and that the length of stay was medically necessary. Dr. Mehra countered that feeling depressed, helpless and hopeless is not enough to justify an inpatient admission. On J.R.'s mental status exam upon admission, Dr. Farmer documented no suicidal ideation, no psychotic symptoms, and patient anger at being Baker Acted. She was given ECT for reasons that Dr. Mehra thought were not very well documented in the medical record. Dr. Mehra stated that it is a complex question as to whether giving her the ECT treatment is reason enough for an inpatient admission. J.R. was taking a heavy narcotic medication, OxyContin, which can make one depressed, withdrawn, and isolative. Dr. Mehra could find in the medical record no real theory as to why J.R. was still taking these medications. For reasons unclear to Dr. Mehra, there seemed to be an immediate desire to give her ECT. Dr. Mehra believed that March 2, should be authorized just to see what was going on with her, given that she had been Baker Acted by a physician. However, as far as the record indicated, J.R. had no history of inpatient psychiatric treatments. Dr. Mehra found it very unusual that ECT treatments would be given on a patient's first inpatient stay. ECT is routinely performed on an outpatient basis. Dr. Mehra acknowledged that where patient compliance is a problem, it may be proper to keep the patient in the hospital. However, this did not seem to be the case with J.R. One of the cornerstones of the decision process leading to ECT is a documented failure of past antidepressant therapy, and Dr. Mehra found no such documentation in the medical record. Lack of support in the community or transportation problems are not reason enough, standing alone, to keep someone in the hospital. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last ten days of J.R.'s admission. The record as presented established that J.R. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 3. Patient #8 J.R. J.R. was admitted on March 16, 2001, and was discharged on March 27, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that six days, March 21 through March 27, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that J.R. was a 24-year-old male with a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, who was admitted for symptoms of agitated, psychotic behavior. As of March 21, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. J.R. may have still been psychotic, but the symptoms had improved. The patient's vital signs, sleep, and appetite had stabilized. He no longer needed 24-hour psychiatric nursing care. Dr. Mehra concluded that sub-acute treatment was the appropriate level of care as of March 21. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that J.R. met discharge criteria on March 21, and could have gone into a sub- acute setting such as a skilled nursing facility or group home. Dr. Mehra could not recall whether there was a problem with bed availability in the skilled nursing facility, but added that after a patient meets discharge criteria, it is not Medicaid's responsibility to pay for a longer hospital stay while the patient awaits placement. Once the schizophrenic's acute crisis is resolved, he no longer meets the criteria for medical necessity. Dr. Birkmire was the treating physician, and his notes indicated compliance and improvement on March 20, and 21. J.R. was having some religious preoccupation, which was probably a baseline issue for him. Religious preoccupations in people with schizophrenia are sometimes chronic and never go away. Dr. Mehra testified that being psychotic and having auditory hallucinations do not alone establish grounds for remaining inpatient. Such symptoms are consistent with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, which is chronic. Dr. Mehra stated that J.R. would probably display these symptoms no matter how long he was kept in the hospital. Dr. Mehra testified that there is a vast difference between J.R.'s having an auditory hallucination and his having a command auditory hallucination to harm himself or someone else. Treating physician Dr. Birkmire testified that J.R. was very disorganized on admission, with a grandiose religious preoccupation that indicated he was in a manic stage. J.R. was also sexually inappropriate with some of the other patients and staff. On March 21, he was inappropriate, grandiose, and sexually preoccupied. On March 22, he was still very psychotic, hearing the voice of Britney Spears, with whom he had delusions of being married. He had sexually explicit conversations with other patients and staff. On March 23, he was severely agitated, requiring staff intervention. He was illogical and bizarre, talking to himself in the hallway, reporting that he heard voices and remaining delusional. He was hearing the voice of the devil and having paranoid thoughts about people around him. On March 24, he was unchanged, still delusional and still hearing voices, though they were becoming less intense and he was becoming less manic. Dr. Berns testified that schizoaffective disorder is an illness with symptoms of psychosis in the absence of symptoms of a mood disorder such as mania or depression. It is a chronic mental illness. Dr. Berns agreed with Dr. Mehra that the presence of a chronic illness is not grounds for hospitalization. It is only when the condition becomes acute, where the patient presents a danger to himself or others, that an inpatient psychiatric hospital may be the option. J.R.'s admission note stated that he was previously hospitalized in January 2001, for agitation, bizarre delusions, and concerns about violent behavior. He stated dead people were talking to him. On March 17, the psychiatrist noted marked auditory hallucinations, grandiosity, paranoid delusions, and tangential thought processes. The plan was to keep him on Risperdal, an antipsychotic, and Lithium, which is a mood stabilizing, anti-manic medication. Dr. Berns testified that the usual practice with these medications is to start with a low dose and build it up slowly and gradually. If the patient is in the hospital, the physician can be more aggressive because he can closely monitor blood work and vital signs. Lithium takes seven to ten days to build up to a therapeutic level. The medical notes from March 22 showed that J.R. remained psychotic, had auditory hallucinations, had delusional thoughts regarding Britney Spears and Judy Garland, was responding to internal stimuli, and was sexually preoccupied. On March 23, he was agitated and illogical with bizarre ideation. On March 24, he continued to report auditory hallucinations and was labile and agitated about his upcoming discharge. On March 25, he was still having auditory hallucinations, but less of the manic behavior. On March 26, there was some improvement in his mood and his auditory hallucinations were resolving, but he was still having problems in a group situation. Dr. Berns noted that on March 17, J.R. tried to kiss a nurse, then called her a "bitch with an attitude." There were concerns about his impulse control and potential for committing a sexual offense if released before he was fully stabilized. Dr. Berns agreed with the length of hospitalization, because J.R. had shown poor impulse control and sexually inappropriate behavior on admission, had been admitted two months earlier, and there were concerns about psychosis and violent behavior. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last six days of J.R.'s admission. The record as presented established that J.R. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 3. Patient #9 N.R. N.R. was admitted on March 4, 2001, and was discharged on March 16, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that three days, March 13 through March 16, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that N.R. was a 21-year-old female admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for psychotic agitation and delusions. The authorization was based on the patient's presenting symptoms, diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy, and a positive test for syphilis. As of March 13, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Her vital signs, sleep, and appetite were stable. She was taking prescribed medications and following unit rules. Her psychosis had decreased and she was not an immediate danger to herself or others. She appeared to have support from her mother. Dr. Mehra concluded that outpatient was the appropriate level of care. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that the physician's note of March 13 stated that N.R. had no recent episodes of bizarre behavior, and no episodes of agitation or aggressive behavior. The physician progress notes for March 14 say the same thing. N.R.'s initial evaluation was for a psychotic disorder, and she was diagnosed with schizophrenia, a chronic condition. Dr. Mehra noted that the hospital did not obtain N.R.'s previous psychiatric history and that her mother could have been contacted about N.R.'s medical records. The treating physician, Dr. Allen, testified that N.R. was psychotic and grandiose on admission, and was noted at the jail to be head-banging, smearing feces, and playing in the toilet. She was pregnant with an unknown gestational age, and had a positive Rapid Plasma Reagin ("RPR") test for syphilis. She needed a lumbar puncture to determine if she had some form of neurosyphilis or another disorder that could influence her psychiatric behavior. Dr. Allen testified that she lacked the social network for the lumbar puncture to be done on an outpatient basis. He conceded that on March 13 she was compliant with her medication, but stated that she was still disorganized. The initial RPR was performed on March 4, but it took an additional ten days for the lumbar puncture to be successfully performed. One puncture was performed on March 10, but the specimen was not good, so another puncture was performed on March 14. Dr. Allen testified that the lumbar puncture requires the patient to remain very quiet in a hunched position as the needle is going through her back. An agitated, restless patient could cause problems. N.R. needed to be stabilized before the puncture could be performed. N.R. was found positive for syphilis and was discharged to her mother's home rather than to the jail. A visiting nurse went to the home to give the treatments. Dr. Allen explained that N.R. was not released to her mother between lumbar punctures because the mother had a history of depression, according to the history provided by N.R., which Dr. Allen conceded may not have been accurate. Dr. Allen also noted that N.R.'s mother was very difficult to contact. Dr. Berns testified that N.R. was psychotic on admission. At the jail, she was stripping off her clothing and hearing voices telling her that her husband was messing around with other women. She was hitting her head against the wall to get rid of the voices. Dr. Berns concluded that the length of stay was medically necessary and reasonable. N.R. was a pregnant female from the jail, psychotic, with self-destructive behavior. Her physician wanted to be extra careful in view of N.R.'s being pregnant. She was placed on antipsychotic medication. N.R. was eventually going back to the jail, and they wanted to stabilize her condition as much as possible, because the jail is a very stressful place to be. Dr. Berns agreed that, as of March 13, N.R.'s psychosis had decreased and she was not an immediate danger to herself or others. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last three days of N.R.'s admission. The record as presented established that N.R. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 13. Patient #10 R.S. R.S. was admitted on May 19, 2001, and was discharged on May 30, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that nine days, May 22 through May 30, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that R.S. was a 38-year-old female diagnosed with schizophrenia who was admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for worsening of her psychotic symptoms. As of May 22, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient was still psychotic but the symptoms were not worsening and appeared to be at baseline, given that they remained unchanged even at discharge. After May 22, the record disclosed no evidence that R.S. required seclusion or emergency treatment orders to force her to take medications. She voluntarily took medications and followed unit rules, and no longer needed 24-hour nursing care. Dr. Mehra concluded that sub-acute treatment was the appropriate level of care as of May 22. Dr. Mehra testified that his main concern with the length of R.S.'s stay was that she persisted with active psychotic symptoms even up to the day of discharge. There was not much difference in her symptoms between May 22 and May 30. After May 22, she received no medication on an "as needed" ("PRN") basis and required no seclusion or restraints. Despite her other noted symptoms, if she was not having command hallucinations telling her to hurt herself, she could have been treated as an outpatient. Dr. Mehra agreed that if she expressed a desire to hurt herself after May 22, then any such days should be authorized. Dr. Mehra did not have the benefit of R.S.'s past medical records and stated this made it difficult to determine if R.S. was a patient whose baseline level of functioning is so low that she could never care for herself. He agreed that the attending physician had the advantage of having seen the patient in person. Attending physician Dr. Birkmire testified that R.S. had just been discharged from a medical psychiatric unit but had to be readmitted on a Baker Act because she was not taking her medications and was psychotic again, hearing and responding to voices and unable to communicate in a meaningful manner to staff. On May 22, she was noted as unchanged from admission, still psychotic, disorganized, hearing voices, depressed, and oriented only to person and place, not date and time. She was secluded in her room, not going to any treatment groups. Dr. Birkmire testified that his greatest concern was that R.S. was so psychotic and disorganized that she would probably not take her medications and would not be not able to care for herself. On May 23, she remained regressed, bizarre and psychotic. She was "dirty and careless" in her ADLs, and was complaining of suicidal command ideations, voices telling her to hurt herself by taking an overdose. On May 24, she was showing mild signs of improvement and was a little less reclusive and bizarre. She was still hearing voices and claimed they were telling her to be a friend to everybody, but she also admitted to suicidal ideations. On May 25, R.S. was still psychotic with suicidal ideations, disorganized, and paranoid. By this time, the voices were telling her to do more good things than bad, but she needed more time to stabilize on her medications. She was still dirty and careless in her appearance, and depressed with a flat affect. On May 26, she showed further mild improvement, was less paranoid, and reported that the voices were less intense. She remained in her room most of the time, and her ADLs were still careless. On May 27, R.S. was now oriented to person, place and time. The treatment team still thought she would stop taking medications on release, and made, further, two more medication changes. On May 28, the hallucinations had resolved. She was more logical and organized and less paranoid, though her ADLs were still poor. By May 29, she was safe to go home, but her appearance was still disheveled, she had poor concentration and hygiene, still heard voices, and was depressed and anxious. She went to group therapy, but was distracted by auditory hallucinations. Dr. Birkmire believed that May 29 or May 30, would be an appropriate discharge date. Dr. Berns testified that R.S.'s diagnosis was schizophrenia. He acknowledged that R.S.'s suicidal ideations on May 22 did not indicate a plan. However, in the hospital setting, a patient may not always reveal her plans for fear of prolonging the hospitalization. On May 23, she was having command auditory hallucinations to hurt herself with a plan to overdose. Dr. Berns found this very serious, because patients have been known to hoard medications in the hospital in order to take an overdose. After reciting the same day-by-day review conducted by Dr. Birkmire, Dr. Berns concluded that he concurred with the length of stay. Noting that she was still psychotic, mumbling and hallucinatory at the time of discharge, Dr. Berns testified that he did not necessarily agree that R.S. should have been released even on May 30. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that he agreed with many of the concerns expressed by Dr. Birkmire, but did not see them evidenced in the medical record. Dr. Birkmire testified that as of May 22, R.S. was so psychotic and disorganized that she would probably not take her medications after discharge. Dr. Mehra agreed this is grounds for keeping someone in the hospital, but did not see this concern noted in the medical record. Dr. Mehra also found nothing in the medical record to indicate she was having command auditory hallucinations to hurt herself with a plan to overdose. Dr. Mehra stated that the record did show that on May 23 she was regressed, bizarre and psychotic, but he noted that those symptoms were also present at the time of R.S.'s discharge. However, the psychiatry unit patient notes do indicate that R.S. told a student nurse on May 23, that "she was having suicidal ideations and a plan to overdose." The other notations cited by Dr. Birkmire, with the exception of the May 22 notation regarding staff's suspicions regarding R.S. medication compliance, were all found in the psychiatry unit patient notes. It must be concluded that Dr. Mehra simply overlooked this section of the record, and that if he had seen that the record supported Dr. Birkmire's concerns, Dr. Mehra would have authorized the full stay for R.S. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that May 22 through May 30, should not have been denied. Dr. Mehra's reason for denying these days was not that he disagreed with Dr. Birkmire's concerns regarding the patient, but that he could not find those concerns reflected in the record. In fact, the record supported Dr. Birkmire's concerns and rendered R.S.'s entire inpatient stay medically necessary. Patient #11 D.T. D.T. was admitted on May 9, 2001, and was discharged on May 21, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that nine days, May 12, through May 21, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care.9 Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that R.S. was a 14-year-old female with an extensive psychiatric history who was voluntarily admitted from a community mental health center for mood swings, violent tendencies, and a report of auditory hallucinations. As of May 12, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, grossly psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient was taking her medications, following unit rules, and participating in activities. The patient's sleep, vital signs, and appetite were stable. Dr. Mehra concluded that she did not require 24-hour nursing care as of May 12 and that outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Mehra testified that D.T. was admitted for mood swings, a history of violence, and some personality issues. She was diagnosed as bipolar, though Dr. Mehra was not clear as to what features led to that diagnosis. She was also diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder. Further, she was diagnosed under Axis II of the DSM-IV, which includes personality disorders. Dr. Mehra found this significant because personality disorder symptoms are treated differently than bipolar disorder. Dr. Mehra found no indication in the record that D.T.'s history records were ordered or reviewed for purposes of continuity of care and current treatment. She was admitted and served on the inpatient unit, and her medications were continued: such as Wellbutrin, Topamax, and Risperdal. She was started on Geodan, an antipsychotic, which was then changed to Seroquel, and then back to Risperdal. Dr. Mehra concluded that D.T. met discharge criteria as of May 12. Nothing remarkable happened between May 12, and the date of her discharge. She continued to have some difficulties on the unit, but nothing that warranted inpatient care. She could have been sent to outpatient and returned to foster care. Given her documented history, return to a stable group home or foster home would be appropriate to help her engage with her symptoms. For someone with a personality condition to be on an inpatient psychiatric unit can worsen the symptoms. Dr. Mehra believed that D.T. needed an environment with a lot less stimulation and less potential for her to become agitated and act out. Dr. Mehra acknowledged that the records do show serious medication side effects on May 15, such as akathisia, but he stated that people have these symptoms frequently as outpatients. Dr. Mehra was curious as to why D.T. was on three different antipsychotic drugs. Three different psychotropic medications is a concern because there is insufficient clinical and medical data to use them in children when the diagnosis is not clear. They have potential long-lasting side effects, such as tardive dyskinesia, where the patient develops permanent tic- like movements of the lips, mouth and jaw. Cogentin is a medication for side effects from antipsychotics, and its use caused Dr. Mehra to question whether research was done as to whether this child had been on such medications before. Dr. Mehra stated that such research is essential, especially when the patient starts showing side effects. Treating physician Dr. Scott Farmer testified that all of the denied dates represented necessary periods of care to stabilize D.T. and make her discharge safe. On May 15, she was still experiencing severe mood swings and dissociative symptoms, which Dr. Farmer described as "a watershed between normal and neurotic." In a spectrum moving toward psychosis, dissociative thinking has features of both psychotic and neurotic thinking. Dr. Farmer explained that if a physician has a patient in his office who is disassociating, the physician must watch the patient until the patient has demonstrated several hours of improved functioning. If a patient drifts into a dissociative state during psychotherapy and becomes agitated, the patient requires hospitalization. Dr. Farmer stated that D.T. could not have been released on May 15. She was still requiring Haldol due to episodes of anger, and due to her inability to recognize people who are caring for her and distinguish them from threats. Her agitation was so extreme that Dr. Farmer had to change the dose of Haldol. This was complicated by the fact she was having side effects of the antipsychotic medication. Akathisia is an acute dystonia, a side effect of these powerful medications. It is a restlessness, an inability to sit still. The patient wants to stretch her legs and flex her muscles to relieve tension that feels like an unrelenting, very slowly developing cramp. Dr. Farmer testified that akathisia is not as dramatic as other side effects because it looks like the disease itself: the patient is restless, can't sit still, and wants to walk around. There is a ramping up in the intensity of treatment for akathisia, culminating in Propranolol, which itself causes 40 percent of users to have a new onset of major depression within a year. Dr. Farmer stated that D.T. was so resistant to taking medications that at times intramuscular medications were required. Geodon was the medicine initially chosen to treat D.T.'s psychotic features because it has the least likelihood of causing weight gain. By May 15, Dr. Farmer had deemed it a failure and was in the process of replacing it with Seroquel. On May 16, D.T. remained actively psychotic with visual and auditory hallucinations, side effects of the medication. Dr. Farmer testified that the dosages of medicine that could possibly make the hallucinations go away, had the side effect of incapacitating her. D.T. could not sit in group and match her mood and comments to the group process. She was too lethargic to function. Dr. Farmer believed that as of May 16, D.T. could not be anywhere but an acute care setting, with nurses and physicians monitoring her response to medications. On May 17, D.T. reported seeing what she described as flashing lights. She moved out of her lethargy into accelerated speech. She was irritable and paranoid, different from the day before when she appeared overdrugged and lethargic. On May 18, she had a severe reaction to the Seroquel, active symptoms of delusional, confused and agitated behavior. Seroquel was discontinued and a new antipsychotic, Restoril, was introduced. On that day, D.T. was noted to be crying and hallucinating. She saw a man in her room and held so fast to the idea of being in danger that she required additional medication, Ativan PRN, to make her relax. On May 19, her Risperdal had to be further adjusted because she was overly sedated. She was disheveled, easily agitated, and still required PRN medications in addition to her standard medicines. On May 20, she remained labile, easily upset and crying. Dr. Farmer concluded, by stating, that this case involved a very complex juggling of medications to get control of auditory hallucinations with other medications striving to compensate for side effects. Dr. Berns testified that D.T. had an extensive psychiatric history and was admitted for mood swings, violent tendencies, and report of auditory hallucinations. The admissions note stated that D.T. was depressed and angry, "ready to kill everybody." She was having problems with flashbacks regarding her history of fights with her father, and was fearful that her mood changes and lability would cause her to lose her foster placement. She had been in foster care since January 2001. D.T. had a history of arrests for fighting, breaking and entering, grand theft auto, and battery. She had a decrease in appetite with a four-pound-weight-loss in the past week. She said that she felt paranoid a lot, and she overreacted to intrusions into her physical space. She heard voices with command features telling her to cut her arms instead of battering her father, and admitted to some prior plans of killing her father. The May 15 notes showed severe mood swings and unspecified dissociative symptoms. She received Haldol for anger episodes. Dr. Farmer discontinued Geodon and began Seroquel, another antipsychotic also used in the treatment of bipolar disorder. She was also given Cogentin intramuscularly, because she had tremors and akathasia. On May 16, D.T. was anxious with sleep disturbance, undescribed auditory and visual hallucinations, and said she was lethargic. On May 17, she was reporting flashbacks about "angel trumpet," which may have been a psychedelic drug. She was observed to have accelerated speech, irritable, perseverant and loquacious. Dr. Farmer raised the level of the Seroquel. D.T. was incoherent from midnight to 6:30 a.m., with auditory and visual hallucinations. She was seeing people, carrying on conversations, making and unmaking her bed, trying to open a window, and mumbling. At times she was manic, hyper-verbal, crying and laughing. She said she was high on her medications. The Cogentin was discontinued. They raised the Seroquel and put her on intramuscular injection of Ativan. On May 18, she had a severe reaction to Seroquel. She was delusional, confused and agitated, but showed no aggression. Dr. Farmer stopped the Seroquel and started Risperdal. She hallucinated seeing a man in her room. On May 19, she was anxious and irritable, having non-command hallucinations. Her Risperdal dosage was increased. On May 20, she was upset and emotional. She requested Haldol and Ativan to calm herself down. On May 21, she was organized, with no flight of ideas or loose associations, and was discharged. Dr. Berns noted that Dr. Mehra found that by May 12, D.T.'s sleep, vital signs and appetite were stable, that she was following unit rules of participating in activities, and that she was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic or in withdrawal. Dr. Berns disagreed with this assessment. On May 16, D.T. still had active psychotic symptoms. On May 17, she was paranoid and irritable, carrying on conversations with unseen people. On May 18, she had visual hallucinations. On May 19, she was disheveled and easily agitated. On May 20, she was labile, and very easily upset. Dr. Berns agreed with Dr. Farmer that the entire stay was medically necessary. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that he was aware of Dr. Farmer's statement that on May 15 D.T. was still experiencing severe mood swings and disassociative symptoms, "which are a watershed between normal and neurotic." Dr. Mehra did not know what that means in terms of the issues in this case, because disassociation is not sufficient to warrant keeping her in the hospital. Visual and auditory hallucinations, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to keep her in the hospital unless they are command hallucinations. Dr. Mehra pointed out that the treating physician's own discharge summary stated that D.T. has personality issues of concern. "Personality issue" means that a lot of the symptoms do not necessarily indicate a major, Axis I diagnosis such as schizophrenia or major depression, but are more about the patient's character and how she relates to people. Dr. Farmer noted on May 16 that, due to side effects of medication, D.T. was lethargic and could not function. Dr. Mehra stated that this might be sufficient to keep her in the hospital, though, again, the treating physician must keep the treatment options in mind and distinguish between someone with a personality disorder who is experiencing hallucinatory symptoms and someone who is schizophrenic. Dr. Mehra was concerned that the physicians were injecting this 14-year-old child with potent anti-psychotic medications and that she was having an adverse reaction. He was further concerned that she was not having much of a response to the medications, which Dr. Mehra found would not be unusual if the diagnosis were inaccurate. Based on the documentation in the record, Dr. Mehra could not be sure that D.T. had a true psychotic disorder that would respond to anti-psychotic medications. Because D.T. was in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services, Dr. Mehra believed there was "a great likelihood" that she had been physically and/or sexually abused. Many of her symptoms would be easier to understand in the context of past abuse rather than as a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Dr. Mehra found the record confusing as to the rationale for this hospitalization. In the admission mental status exam, the physician documented no well formulated plan for the patient to harm herself. No psychotic symptoms were noted in the admission mental status exam. However, because the patient was presenting with symptoms such as auditory hallucinations, Dr. Mehra authorized and approved a three-day evaluation period. Dr. Mehra stated that he would authorize less time for an adult, but with a child it is important to take sufficient time to obtain a good history. What confused Dr. Mehra was that the medical record showed no clear documentation of collateral information regarding D.T.'s past to understand why she may be disassociating or having mood swings. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last six days of D.T.'s admission. The record as presented established that D.T. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on May 12. However, as stated in note 10, AHCA's recovery is limited to May 14 through May 21. Patient #12 S.T. S.T. was admitted on March 7, 2001, and was discharged on March 17, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that eight days, March 9 through March 17, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that S.T. was a 34-year-old female admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for violent, agitated, self-harming behavior in a community services van. The patient had a history of moderate mental retardation, cerebral palsy, seizure disorder, and abnormal EEGs. The patient was prescribed Haldol PRN, but required none on March 9, 10, or 11. As of March 10, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, grossly psychotic, or manic. Later in her hospitalization, the patient did require Haldol/Ativan PRN on several days, though no adjustments were made to her routine antipsychotic doses. Dr. Mehra noted that the only adjustment made to S.T.'s psychotropic dosing was on March 8, when her Depakote was increased. Dr. Mehra also noted that the patient was allowed to sign a voluntary consent for treatment, when her legal guardian should have been involved in the consent process. Dr. Mehra found in the record no informed consent for psychotropic medications. Dr. Mehra found that the diagnostic studies performed on S.T. could have been done on an outpatient basis. Dr. Mehra concluded that, as of March 10, outpatient treatment with a return to the group home setting was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Mehra testified that S.T. was admitted through the emergency room under the Baker Act when she became violent and agitated in a van operated by Spectrum Community Services, the group home where S.T. lived. Her admitting diagnosis was mental retardation in the moderate range, as well as organic mood disorder. Dr. Mehra found no physician's notes in the record for March 8 or 9, which indicated that S.T. must not have many problems. The nurse's notes for March 9 indicated that S.T. was sleeping through the night. The unit notes from three different shifts on March 9 indicated that her behavior was under control and that she denied hallucinations. All of the above findings in the record, coupled with a lack of physician notes, led Dr. Mehra to conclude that S.T. should be discharged. Dr. Mehra stated that everything relative to making a medical decision must be documented in the record. If something is not in the record, then a peer reviewer must assume it did not happen. In this connection, Dr. Mehra noted there was no indication in the record that the hospital contacted S.T.'s group home for a treatment history and status before initiating invasive diagnostic procedures. On March 8, S.T. had a fall on the unit, hitting and cutting her head on the cinderblock wall. Dr. Mehra stated that a patient with cerebral palsy and mental retardation, who is having acute psychological problems and has fallen, is a grave concern, yet he could find no record that she was seen by a physician on March 9. He did find a March 9, note calling for a consultation with Dr. Henry Comiter regarding S.T.'s fall, but no actual physician's visit on that date. The record indicated that S.T. was placed in restraints on March 13 and engaged in threatening behavior on March 14. However, Dr. Mehra noted there had been no such incidents on March 11 through 12. He testified that, if a patient with these underlying medical and psychiatric conditions is kept long enough, she will probably act out. The incident on March 13, alone, was not enough to keep her without getting a legal guardian involved to continue her voluntary legal status in the hospital. This was a great concern to Dr. Mehra because the hospital appeared to be relying on a voluntary consent form signed by S.T. on March 10. S.T. was mentally retarded and possibly incompetent to admit herself to the hospital. Treating physician Dr. Farmer described S.T. as a 34- year-old mild-to-moderately retarded woman living in a group home. The incident that led to her admission was her deteriorated impulse control, agitation, and aggression directed toward the van and toward the staff and other peers during a van ride on an outing. She struck at her peers and the van driver, bit herself on the hands and arms, and stated that she wanted to hurt herself. S.T. was already scheduled to have an outpatient neurology consultation in late March with Dr. Comiter, out of concern for a seizure disorder that was not adequately managed. Because of her agitation, S.T. was sent to the psychiatric unit, which began the process of adjusting her medications. The adjustments were ongoing on March 8. She was seen by Dr. Comiter on March 8, as indicated by a consultation note in the record.10 Dr. Comiter ordered an EEG and CT scan of the head. The CT brain scan was scheduled for March 9, but S.T. was too agitated to undergo the procedure. On March 10, S.T. remained agitated. She refused a shower and was generally careless with regard to her ADLs. On March 11, Dr. Farmer reduced S.T.'s dosage of Ativan in order to calm her and make her more manageable for the CT scan. On March 12, she was less agitated, but not calm enough for the CT and EEG to be completed. She was too agitated to go for the CT study, but too fatigued from the medications to be functional on the psychiatric unit. The reduction in her Ativan dosage did enable her to respond more promptly to questions. On March 13, staff attempted to transport S.T. in the van for her EEG, but she began swinging her arms and had to be placed in seclusion and restraints. On March 14, Dr. Farmer characterized S.T. as naïve regarding her manic grandiosity, unable to recognize that her reactions are disproportionate to the circumstances. Her vocal volume was threatening and her intrusiveness was with ominous import, but she believed she was justified in her reactions. She was paranoid and misreading the likelihood of danger and pain, and so was attempting to intimidate people away from her. By this time, Dr. Farmer believed that she was reacting well to the adjusted medications. However, when the medications got her to the point at which she was not threatening others, she began having balance problems and falling again. On March 15, the medications had slowed S.T.'s psychomotor skills, and she was not assaultive. She was taking her medicines by mouth. S.T. was beginning to return to baseline and Dr. Farmer began considering discharging her back to the group home. She was denying any suicidal or homicidal ideation and denying hallucinations. She was able to be redirected from biting her hand, which was a continuing problem for S.T. She was able to participate in group therapy without disruption, though her ADLs remained careless. On March 16, she remained restless, distractable, impulsive, and aggressive, though the hospital did manage to complete the EEG on that date. The EEG showed no evidence of a seizure disorder. On March 17, S.T. was discharged back to the group home. Dr. Farmer concluded that it was in the best interest of S.T.'s care to keep her through March 17. It was best to accomplish all the needed adjustments to her anticonvulsant medications on an inpatient basis, especially since there were no EEG results until March 16. Those results could have required further adjustments, and Dr. Farmer believed that relying on the group home to make the changes in her medications might not work and could result in her readmission. Dr. Berns agreed with the length of stay because the attending physicians were not only trying to make sure that S.T. was no longer suicidal, they were trying to decrease her agitation and aggression while completing important diagnostic tests. Dr. Berns thought that authorizing her stay only through March 10 would be premature. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that March 10 through March 17, should not have been denied. Dr. Mehra's opinion in this instance was at least partly based on a misreading of the record, i.e., that S.T. was not seen by a physician on March 8 or 9. Dr. Mehra's concerns regarding S.T.'s consent to treatment are serious, but cannot be resolved on this record and do not appear relevant to the question of the medical necessity of S.T.'s hospital stay. Dr. Farmer's testimony as the treating psychiatrist credibly established that S.T.'s entire inpatient stay was medically necessary. Patient #13 W.W. W.W. was admitted on June 17, 2001, and was discharged on June 28, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that five days, June 23 through June 28, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that W.W. was a 43-year-old female admitted to the psychiatric unit after an intentional overdose of psychotropic medications. Dr. Mehra wrote that his authorization was based on continued documentation of the patient's having command auditory hallucinations to hurt herself. As of June 23, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Her sleep, appetite, and vital signs were stable. She was not a management problem on the unit. Dr. Mehra concluded that, as of June 23, the patient no longer required 24-hour nursing care and that outpatient treatment was the appropriate level of care. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that W.W. was on the medical floor, then transferred to the psychiatric floor after two days. On discharge, her Axis I diagnosis was alcohol abuse, history of cocaine abuse, and rule-out schizoaffective disorder. The hospital's discharge summary stated that the reason for admission was severe depression, no psychotic features, and having suicidal thoughts. She was integrated into the milieu of the inpatient psychiatric unit and prescribed antidepressant medication. Dr. Mehra believed W.W. should have been discharged on June 23. He stated that, even on the psychiatric unit's admission mental status exam, dated June 17, Dr. Allen noted that W.W. was slightly more cooperative than on the previous day's consult, meaning that Dr. Allen probably saw her on the medical floor after her overdose. Dr. Allen noted there was no active suicidal ideation with a plan. Dr. Mehra testified that this admission psychiatric exam, standing alone, would indicate that W.W. did not need to be admitted at all. However, the totality of her presentation and history showed numerous overdoses on psychotropic medications. Based on her history and the mental status exam showing her mood was still depressed, her admission through June 22 was approved. Attending physician Dr. Birkmire testified that, in the weeks before the overdose, W.W. described becoming increasingly depressed with feelings of helplessness and hopelessness. Her history showed at least eight or nine other psychiatric hospitalizations. She indicated a history of being sexually abused by her father at age 12. Her admitting diagnosis was schizoaffective disorder, depressed, subtype provisional, depressive disorder not otherwise specified, alcohol abuse and history of cocaine abuse. W.W.'s global assessment of functioning ("GAF") upon admission was 35. Dr. Birkmire testified that a GAF below 50 indicates that a patient should be in a residential program, at least, and that a GAF below 40-to-45 indicates the patient should be on an inpatient unit. On June 23, the medical notes show she was still somewhat confused. Her mood had improved but she still had suicidal ideations. The hospital was holding her in part to see if the blood test for syphilis was negative. She felt better but complained about mood swings. On June 24, a Sunday, there were no notes. Dr. Birkmire explained that the physicians who take rounds on the weekends are required to see each patient on either Saturday or Sunday, but not both days. On June 25, W.W. was less psychotic. Her auditory hallucinations were present but decreased, and she was taking her medications. On June 26, she continued to have auditory hallucinations. She was disorganized, paranoid, and isolating herself. She reported fear in being released because she might make another suicide attempt. She was given Ativan PRN to treat reported anxiety. On June 27, her mood was euthymic (normal, neither depressed nor highly elevated in mood). She showed no psychotic symptoms, denied suicidal ideations, and felt safe for discharge. However, hospital staff said that W.W. still seemed to be responding to voices. Dr. Birkmire stated that he had reservations about releasing W.W. on June 27 because she seemed to be telling the staff she was doing better than she really was. The voices had played a role in her suicide attempt, and, thus, the knowledge that she was still hearing them would be a strong factor in deciding to keep W.W. hospitalized. In Dr. Birkmire's opinion, W.W.'s problems could not be addressed in a skilled nursing facility. Dr. Birkmire testified that, with the exception of psychiatrists who perform peer reviews and medical authorizations, there is not one psychiatrist in the country who would say that a patient should not be in an acute care setting unless she has a definite plan for suicide or the means to complete the plan. Dr. Birkmire stated that no doctor is going to risk his license in that fashion. Whole books are written on how to perform a suicide assessment, and the assessment is based on much more than what the patient tells the physician. It is based on the patient's history, her degree of hopelessness, degree of disorganization, degrees of psychosis, and her access to the means of doing the suicide. Dr. Birkmire stated that one of the best predictors of suicidality is past attempts. Dr. Berns testified that W.W.'s history of multiple psychiatric hospitalizations indicated a probability of chronic illness. He stated that the number of prior hospitalizations automatically raises the question of past suicide attempts, and noted that her history indicated three attempts prior to this one. She was diagnosed with "depressive disorder" but not otherwise specified, as well as alcohol and cocaine abuse. She took an overdose of Haldol, Cogentin, and Sinequan. Dr. Berns explained that Sinequan is an older antidepressant, a tricyclic, with which a higher number of suicides occur. Thus, an overdose of this medication is more serious than overdoses of other medicines. There were concerns about neurosyphilis because she had a positive RPR. Her physicians were concerned that inadequate treatment for this condition would complicate her psychiatric course as well as cause physical complications leading to dementia and death. Dr. Berns concluded that W.W.'s stay was medically necessary. Her physicians were trying to stabilize her condition and treat a gradual illness that can become fatal. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that the evaluation for neurosyphilis on June 23 and 24, was not, standing alone, a ground for keeping the patient in the hospital. Dr. Mehra also stated that the suicidal thoughts, hallucinations, and psychotic disorganized paranoia are not grounds to keep the patient in the hospital, unless she was actively suicidal with a plan and unless her psychoses were causing imminent danger to herself or others, or she was aggressive or noncompliant. W.W. was taking her medications, eating, and sleeping and was not requiring seclusion or restraints on the unit, which meant that she was, at some level, functioning. Dr. Mehra was adamant that Medicaid and InterQual guidelines require more than a suicidal ideation; they require a plan. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that June 23 through June 28, should not have been denied. Dr. Birkmire's testimony as the treating psychiatrist, as well as Dr. Berns' expert testimony, credibly established that W.W.'s entire inpatient stay was medically necessary. Summary of Findings At the time of the hearing, AHCA sought from Petitioner overpayments in the amount of $198,582.54 for 29 patients who stayed at Florida Hospital Orlando between January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2001. The findings of fact above upheld AHCA's denial of days for the following: Acute Care Inpatient Hospital patients 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 16; and Psychiatric Inpatient Hospital patients 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11. The findings of fact above found that the greater weight of the evidence supported Petitioner's position that AHCA should not have denied the days for the following: Acute Care Inpatient Hospital patients 1 (2 days x reimbursement rate of $1,168.38 = $2,336.76), 4 (6 days x $1,206.42 = $7,238.52), 7 (1 day at $1,168.38), 8 (3 days x $1,168.38 = $3,505.14), 14 (9 days x $919.27 = $8,273.43), and 15 (5 days x $919.27 = $4,596.35); and Psychiatric Inpatient Hospital patients 10 (9 days x $1,168.38 = $10,515.42), 12 (8 days x $1,168.38 = $9,347.04), and 13 (5 days x $1,168.38 = $5,841.90). The total dollar figure for days that should not have been denied is $52,822.94, reducing the total overpayment due AHCA from Petitioner to $145,759.60.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order revising its Final Agency Audit Report as directed herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2007.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent withdrew controlled substances from the narcotics dispensing system and failed to document the administration or wastage of those substances; if yes, whether this conduct fails to conform to minimum acceptable standards of prevailing nursing practice; and, if yes, what penalty should be imposed on Respondent's license as a registered nurse.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of nursing in the State of Florida. Respondent Marla Gunderson ("Respondent") is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed registered nurse in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 2832622 by the Florida Board of Nursing in 1994. Respondent was employed by Lee Memorial Health Care System Rehabilitation Hospital ("Lee Memorial") as a registered nurse from about January 29, 2001, until about March 22, 2001. During the first three or four weeks of Respondent's employment, she participated in a full-time training program through Lee Memorial's education department. A part of this training included training in the administration of medications to patients. After completing the three or four-week training program, Respondent began working directly with patients. From about mid-February 2001 through early-March 2001, Respondent had no problems with documenting the administration of medications to patients. Some time in or near the middle of March 2001, Melanie Simmons, R.N. ("Simmons"), Lee Memorial's Nursing Supervisor, received a complaint from the night nurse following Respondent's shift. The complaint alleged that a patient's wife reported that the pain medication her husband was given by Respondent was not the Codeine that had been ordered by the physician. Pursuant to Lee Memorial's policies and procedures, Simmons conducted an investigation into the allegations of the above-referenced complaint regarding the Respondent. Lee Memorial's policies and procedures set out a specific method for conducting investigations regarding the administration of medications to patients. First, the physician's orders are checked to see what medications have been ordered for the patient. Next, the Pyxis records are pulled to determine if and when medications were withdrawn for administration to patients. The Pyxis system is a computerized medication delivery system. Each nurse has an assigned user code and a password, which must be entered before medication can be withdrawn from the Pyxis system. Then, medication administration records (MARs), the documents used by nurses to record the administration of medications to patients, are checked to verify whether the nurse documented the administration of the medications to the patients for whom they were withdrawn. Finally, the Patient Focus Notes, the forms used by nurses to document non-routinely administered medications, are also checked to determine if, when, and why a medication was given to a patient. If after comparing the physician's orders, Pyxis records, MARs, and Patient Focus Notes, it is determined that medications were not properly administered or documented, the nurse making the errors is advised of the discrepancy and given an opportunity to review the documentation and explain any inconsistencies. Simmons' investigation, which included comparing the physician's orders, Pyxis records, MARs and Patient Focus Notes, revealed discrepancies in medications withdrawn by Respondent and the MARs of the three patients under her care. The time period covered by the investigation was March 12 through March 17, 2001. Of the six days included in the investigation period, Simmons determined that all the discrepancies had occurred on one day, March 13, 2001. Nurses are required to record the kind and amount of medication that they administer to patients. This information should be recorded at or near the time the medication is administered. It is the policy of Lee Memorial that should a nurse not administer the medication or the entire amount of the medication dispensed under his or her password, that nurse should have another nurse witness the disposal of the medication. The nurse who serves as a witness to the disposal of medication would then enter his or her identification number in the Pyxis. As a result of that entry, the nurse who observed the disposal of the medication would be listed on the Pyxis report as a witness to the disposal of the medication not administered to patients. Such excess medication is termed waste or wastage. The physician's order for Patient F.R. indicated that the patient could have 1 to 2 Percocet tablets, to be administered by mouth, as needed every 3 to 4 hours. On March 13, 2001, at 14:06 Respondent withdrew 2 Percocet tablets for Patient F.R. However, there was no documentation in the patient's MAR, focus notes, and other records which indicated that Respondent administered the Percocet tablets to Patient F.R. The physician's order for Patient G.D. indicated that 1 to 2 Percocet tablets could be administered to the patient by mouth as needed every 4 to 6 hours. On March 13, 2001, at 11:18 Respondent withdrew 2 Percocet tablets and on that same day at 17:16, Respondent withdrew another 2 Percocet tablets for Patient G.D. However, there was no documentation in the patient's MAR, focus notes, or any other records which indicated that Respondent administered the Percocet tablets to Patient G.D. The physician's order for Patient T.G. indicated that 1 to 1.5 Lortab/Vicodin tablets could be administered to the patient by mouth as needed every 4 to 6 hours. On March 13, 2001, Respondent withdrew 2 Lortab/Vicodin tablets for Patient T.G. However, Respondent failed to document on the patient's MAR, focus notes, or other records that the medication had been administered to Patient T.G. With regard to the above-referenced medications withdrawn by Respondent on March 13, 2001, there is no documentation that any of the medications were wasted. All the medications listed in paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 are narcotics or controlled substances. Because Respondent did not document the patients' MARs or focus notes after she withdrew the medications, there was no way to determine whether the medications were actually administered to the patients. Proper documentation is very important because the notations made on patient records inform nurses on subsequent shifts if and when medications have been administered to the patients as well as the kind and amount of medications that have been administered. Without such documentation, the nurses taking over the subsequent shifts have no way of knowing whether medication has been administered, making it possible for affected patients to be overmedicated. Respondent has been a registered nurse since 1994 and knows or should have known the importance of documenting the administration of medications to patients. Respondent does not dispute that she did not document the administration and/or wastage of the narcotics or controlled substance she withdrew from the Pyxis system on March 13, 2001, for the patients identified in paragraphs 13, 14, and 15. Moreover, Respondent provided no definitive explanation as to why she did not properly document the records. According to Respondent, she "could have been busy, called away, [or] got distracted." Following Simmons' investigation of Respondent relating to the withdrawal and/or administration of medications, Respondent agreed to submit to a drug test. The results of the drug test were negative. Prior to being employed by Lee Memorial, all of Respondent's previous experience as an R.N. had been in long- term care. Except for the complaint which is the subject of this proceeding, there have been no complaints against Respondent's registered nurse's license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a Final Order (1) imposing an administrative fine of $250; (2) requiring Respondent to remit the Agency's costs in prosecuting this case; (3) requiring Respondent to complete a continuing education course, approved by the Board of Nursing, in the area administration and documentation of medications; and (4) suspending Respondent's nursing license for two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Reginald D. Dixon, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration General Counsel's Office-Practitioner Regulation Post Office Box 14229 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Marla Gunderson 1807 Northeast 26 Terrace Cape Coral, Florida 33909 Ruth R. Stiehl, Ph.D., R.N. Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4080 Woodcock Drive, Suite 202 Jacksonville, Florida 32207-2714 Mr. R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
