The Issue Whether Petitioner is "vested," as that term is defined in Subsection (45) of Section 121.021, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Prior to July of 2000, Petitioner worked on a permanent part-time basis as an adult education teacher for the Miami-Dade County School Board (School Board), accumulating 7.10 years of retirement credit. On Sunday, July 2, 2000, Petitioner was hospitalized because of a "blood disorder." Since his hospitalization on July 2, 2000, Petitioner has been under a doctor's care and has not been physically able to return, and therefore has not returned, to work. Petitioner was hospitalized again in 2001 and for a third time in 2002 for the same ailment. After each visit he has made to the doctor during the time he has been out of work, Petitioner has apprised the principal of the South Dade Adult Education Center (South Dade), where he had worked before his July 2, 2000, hospitalization, of his condition. It is now, and has been at all times following his July 2, 2000, hospitalization, Petitioner's intention "to return to work upon clearance from [his] doctor." Petitioner has not been paid by the School Board during the time he has been out of work. In April of 2001, Petitioner spoke separately with a representative of the United Teachers of Dade (UTD) and with a School Board staff member concerning his employment situation. The UTD representative advised Petitioner that Petitioner "was on an approved leave of absence." The School Board staff member told Petitioner that he "should be on an approved leave of absence"; however, she was unable to "find that authorization in the computer." She suggested that Petitioner go to School Board headquarters and inquire about the matter. Petitioner went to School Board headquarters, as the School Board staff member had suggested. The persons to whom he spoke "couldn't locate the [leave] authorization either." They suggested that Petitioner contact the principal of South Dade. Taking this advice, Petitioner wrote two letters to the principal inquiring about his employment status. He received no response to either letter. During the summer of 2001, Petitioner contacted the Division to ask about his eligibility to receive retirement benefits. Lisa Skovalia, a Benefits Specialist with the Division, responded to Respondent's inquiry by sending him the following letter, dated August 22, 2001: Our records indicate that you were neither actively employed (physically working and earning salary) as of July 1, 2001, nor on a school board approved leave of absence through that date. As such, you must return to active employment, to earn one additional year of service credit, before you will be vested in the Florida Retirement System and eligible for retirement benefits. I have enclosed a copy of the FRS Retirement Guide for the Regular Class for your information. Please call or write if you have any further questions. In February of 2002, Petitioner again made contact with School Board personnel and "was told that [his] name [had been] removed from the computer (school records)." In July of 2002, Petitioner wrote United States Senator Bob Graham "seeking [Senator Graham's] assistance in helping [Petitioner] get [his] retirement form Miami-Dade Public Schools." Petitioner's letter to Senator Graham was referred to the School Board's Superintendent of Schools, who responded by sending the following letter, dated August 29, 2002, to Petitioner: Your letter . . . to Senator Bob Graham was referred to me for response. A review of our records indicates that your earnings as a part-time teacher ended in July 2000. As a part-time employee, you were not eligible for a Board-approved leave of absence. You were notified by letter (copy attached) dated August 22, 2001 from Ms. Lisa Skovalia, Benefits Specialist, State of Florida, Division of Retirement, that because ". . . you were neither actively employed (physically working and earning salary) as of July 1, 2001, nor on a school board approved leave of absence through that date," you would have to return to active employment and earn one additional year of service credit before being vested in the Florida Retirement System. The State of Florida Division of Retirement is solely responsible for developing rules and procedures for implementing changes in the retirement law. If you disagree with their determination, you may request an administrative hearing by sending a written request to the Bureau of Retirement Calculations, Cedars Executive Center, 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. On September 12, 2002, Petitioner sent a letter to the Division's Bureau of Retirement Calculations (Bureau) "seeking [its] assistance in helping [him] get [his] retirement from Miami-Dade Public Schools." The Bureau responded to Petitioner's letter by providing him with the following Statement of Account, dated September 20, 2002: We audited your retirement account and you have 7.10 years of service through 07/2000. Please note that the vesting requirement for FRS members has been changed to 6 years of creditable service effective July 1, 2001 for those members who were actively employed on that date or on a board approved leave of absence. Former members with 6 years, but less than 10 years of creditable service who were not employed with a participating FRS employer on July 1, 2001, must return to covered employment for one year to become eligible for the six-year vesting provision. Per Maria Perez at the Miami-Dade County School Board you were not on a board approved leave of absence on July 1, 2001, nor were you eligible for a board approved leave of absence due to your position as a part time adult school instructor. Although your school may have allowed you to take a leave of absence, only board approved leaves fulfill the vesting requirements required by law. On November 15, 2002, Petitioner sent the Bureau a letter expressing the view that it was not "fair that, after all [his] efforts as a teacher, [he] should lose out [on his] retirement" and requesting "an administrative hearing concerning [his] efforts to get retirement benefits from Miami-Dade Public Schools." The State Retirement Director responded to Petitioner's letter by sending him the following letter, dated December 18, 2002: This is in response to your recent letter concerning your vesting and eligibility for retirement benefits. You currently have 7.10 years of retirement credit through July 2000, your last month of employment in a Florida Retirement System (FRS) covered position. [Section] 121.021(45)(b)1, F.S., states that "Any member employed in a regularly established position on July 1, 2001, who completes or has completed a total of 6 years of creditable service shall be considered vested. . ." An FRS employer (Dade School Board) last employed you in a regularly established position in July 2000 and you were not granted a leave of absence to continue the employment relationship. Dade School Board has informed us that as a part-time teacher, you were not eligible for an approved leave of absence. Therefore, you do not meet the statutory requirement for coverage under the six year vesting provision. [Section] 121.021(45)(b)2, F.S., provides the vesting requirement for members who were not employed on July 1, 2001, as follows: "Any member not employed in a regularly established position on July 1, 2001, shall be deemed vested upon completion of 6 years of creditable service, provided that such member is employed in a covered position for at least 1 work year after July 1, 2001 (emphasis supplied). It is certainly unfortunate that you had to leave your employment because of your illness, but the current retirement law requires that you must return to covered employment and earn one year of service credit to be vested and eligible for retirement benefits. This letter constitutes final agency action. If you do not agree with this decision and wish to appeal this action, you must file a formal petition for review in accordance with the enclosed Rule 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.) within 21 days of receipt of this letter. Your petition should be filed with the Division of Retirement at the above address. Upon receipt of the petition, you will be notified by the Division or the Administrative Law Judge of all future proceedings and hearings. If you do not file an appeal within the 21-day period, you will waive your right to request a hearing or mediation in this matter in accordance with Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C. By letter dated January 2, 2003, Petitioner "appeal[ed]" the "final agency action" announced in the State Retirement Director's December 18, 2002, letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order finding that Petitioner is not "vested," as that term is defined in Subsection (45) of Section 121.021, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2003.
The Issue Whether the purported selection of Option 2 for payment of Florida Retirement System disability retirement benefits to Lon Emory Sweely, now deceased, and his beneficiary, the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., was valid and effective.
Findings Of Fact On or about June 20, 1990, Lon Emory Sweely executed a Division of Retirement Form FR-13 Florida Retirement System Application for Disability Retirement. The application indicated that Sweely's disability resulted from AIDS-related conditions. It selected Option 1, which the application designates as the "Maximum Benefit" and describes as follows: Full benefits payable to the member for his lifetime. If death occurs before the total benefits paid to member equals the contributions made, the difference, if any, is refunded to beneficiary in a lump sum payment. In so doing, Sweely rejected Option 2, which the application designates as "Ten Years Certain," and describes: Lifetime benefit to member, but not less than 120 monthly payments to someone. A decreased retirement benefit payable to a member during his lifetime, and in the event of his death with a period of ten (10) years after his retirement, the same monthly amount shall be payable for the balance of such ten (10) year period to his beneficiary, or in case the beneficiary is deceased, in accordance with Section 121.091(3), Florida Statutes, as though no beneficiary has been named. The application, also designated the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., as Sweely's sole beneficiary. (Sweely previously had designated the Petitioner as his beneficiary, with the Petitioner's mother as the first contingent beneficiary, on a Division of Retirement Personal History Record Form FRS-M10 (Revised 3/89) executed by Sweely on January 25, 1990.) At the time of Sweely's application for disability retirement, Sweely knew that he had full-blown AIDS and that his life expectancy would have to be estimated at approximately two years or less. There also is evidence that Eulah Lee McWilliams, the principal at the elementary school where Sweely taught, counseled Sweely on his options and advised Sweely to select the "Ten Years Certain" option. It is clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided. McWilliams believed that Sweely wanted the Petitioner to have the benefits of the "Ten Year Certain" Option 2. Based on their conversations, McWilliams believed that Sweely concurred with her recommendation in order to provide the maximum possible benefit to the Petitioner upon Sweely's death. But, in the face of Sweely's knowledge and McWilliams's advice and understanding, the application indicates that Sweely selected Option 1. There was evidence that the Petitioner was present and assisting Sweely when the Form FR-13 was executed and that the Petitioner filled out part of the form at Sweely's direction, as writing was inconvenient and difficult for Sweely at the time. But there was no evidence that Sweely was unable to make informed decisions when he executed Division of Retirement Form FR-13 on or about June 20, 1990. The evidence also did not prove that Sweely's choice of Option 1 was inadvertent error. At that point in time, Sweely may have wanted to be optimistic and to be able to enjoy and share with the Petitioner the maximum possible monthly benefit for as long as Sweely lived. McWilliams testified that, at the time, Sweely was trying to remain "up-beat" concerning his illness, in part thinking that this might extend his lifetime. A decision to choose Option 1, contrary to McWilliams's recommendation, also would not have been inconsistent with an earlier decision by Sweely in April, 1990, (this time in conformance with McWilliams's recommendation) to postpone applying for retirement benefits until he exhausted all of his accumulated fully-paid sick leave. Had Sweely died while on sick leave, the Petitioner would not have received the additional retirement benefits he is seeking in this case. (It is not clear from the record exactly what the benefits would have been, but it seems that the Petitioner would not have been entitled to any of the additional retirement benefits he is seeking in this case. Cf. Section 121.091(7), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990); F.A.C. Rule 60S-4.008.) A little over a month later, Sweely's condition worsened, and on or about August 14, 1990, he had to be hospitalized again (as already had happened from time to time during Sweely's full-blown AIDS.) On or about August 15, 1990, the Division of Retirement approved Sweely's application for disability retirement, effective July 1, 1990. On the same date, the Division of Retirement also sent Sweely a Division of Retirement Form FST-40c (R5/89) Acknowledgement of Retirement Application and a blank FRS- 11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members." The Form FST-40c (R5/89) requested that Sweely "review carefully how the option one and two are paid to your beneficiary." The descriptions of the options in the Form FRS-11o were somewhat different from those in the Form FR-13 application. Option 1 was not called the "Maximum Benefit," and it was described as follows: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthy benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributionss I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. (Emphasis in the original.) Option 2 was not called "Ten Years Certain," and it was described as follows: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly benefit payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit payment in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both me and my beneficiary equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. The FRS-11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members" also stated in bold and underlined upper case type: "MEMBER MUST SIGN AND DATE IN THE PRESENCE OF A NOTARY PUBLIC." Whenever Sweely was hospitalized, the emotional strain on the Petitioner increased, and the time spent with Sweely in the hospital left the Petitioner less time to accomplish normal household tasks. The Petitioner's life and home usually became disorganized during Sweely's hospitalizations, and the Petitioner often allowed mail to pile up at their home at these times. The Petitioner testified that, notwithstanding Sweely's hospitalization and its disruptive effect on his life and habits, he happened to collect and read the mail on August 16, 1990. He testified that among the items of mail he read that day was the envelope postmarked the day before in Tallahassee, Florida, containing the Division of Retirement Form FST-40c (R5/89) Acknowledgement of Retirement Application and the blank FRS-11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members." The Petitioner testified that he telephoned McWilliams to discuss the forms with her, and she asked him to bring them to the hospital. He testified, and she confirmed, that she met with the Petitioner at the hospital, looked at the forms, and explained them to the Petitioner. Believing, based on the conversations she had with Sweely before June 20, 1990, that Option 2 was Sweely's actual choice, McWilliams advised the Petitioner to choose Option 2. McWilliams testified that she discussed the matter with Sweely and with the Petitioner in Sweely's presence on August 16, 1990. (It certainly is possible that, had they discussed the matter with Sweely on August 16, 1990, Sweely might have chosen Option 2 at that time.) But the Petitioner testified that they did not discuss the matter with Sweely on August 16, 1990. The Petitioner explained that, although Sweely was oriented and physically able to write his name and, from time to time, was mentally lucid on that day, the Petitioner did not think that Sweely was in a position to give full consideration to the matter at the time they were discussing the forms because he was on morphine, was lethargic, and was having difficulty breathing without a non-rebreather mask. The Petitioner also did not think it was necessary to trouble Sweely with the matter, since the Petitioner believed that the selection of Option 2 on the Form FRS-11o was redundant and also that he was authorized to execute the form for Sweely as his attorney-in-fact under a purported durable power of attorney which Sweely executed on or about February 28, 1990, authorizing the Petitoner to act in Sweely's behalf in all matters. Under the circumstances on the afternoon of August 16, 1990, the Petitioner did not think that Sweely would have wanted to be troubled with the matter unnecessarily. He checked Option 2 and signed Sweely's name to the Form FRS-11o. On numerous previous occasions, the Petitioner had signed Sweely's name on Sweely's personal checks to pay Sweely's bills. In doing so, the Petitioner believed that he was acting properly under the authority of the purported durable power of attorney, and the bank always honored the checks the Petitioner signed this way. But on June 13, 1990, a physician insisted that the Petitioner sign a Division of Retirement medical records release form FR-13b in his own name as attorney-in-fact for Sweely. Himself not thinking well or clearly under the circumstances, the Petitioner assumed that his signature on the Form FRS-11o was valid. The Petitioner testified that it did not occur to him that there were notary services available for his use at the hospital. He testified that, after checking Option 2 and signing the Form FRS-11o, he telephoned his father, who was a notary, and asked him to come to the hospital to notarize something for him. The Petitioner's father confirmed this and also confirmed the Petitioner's testimony that they met in the hallway outside Sweely's hospital room, where the Petitioner gave his father the signed form and asked him to notarize it. Both testified that they did not discuss the form in any detail before the Petitioner returned to Sweely's hospital room. The Petitioner's father testified that he notarized the form thinking that Sweely had signed it. Sweely died two days later on August 18, 1990.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order: (1) that the purported selection, on the Form FRS-11o dated August 16, 1990, of Option 2 for payment of Florida Retirement System disability retirement benefits to Lon Emory Sweely, now deceased, and his beneficiary, the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., was invalid and ineffective; and (2) that the previous selection of Option 1 on the Form FR-13 executed on or about June 20, 1990, is valid and shall be given effect. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to the Petitioner, his actions were not in accordance with the statement.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 12.-14. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to McWilliams, his actions were not in accordance with the statement, and McWilliams also testified that Sweely tried to remain "up-beat," thinking that this might extend his lifetime.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (Specifically, it was clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided.) Last sentence, not proven (as to expression of "clear and unqualified acknowledgment and understanding); also rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to McWilliams, his actions were not in accordance with the statement, and McWilliams also testified that Sweely tried to remain "up-beat," thinking that this might extend his lifetime.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (Specifically, it was clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided.) 17.-30. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 31. "Substantially," rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 32.-35. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-7. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Ultimate and penultimate sentences, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (The evidence was that the Patient Care Technician Records were prepared near the beginning of each nursing shift and reflected conditions at that time. Meanwhile, there was evidence that the patient's mental state would "wax" and "wane." When the patient "waned" and was lethargic, it was difficult to communicate with him. Changes during the course of a shift may or may not be noted in the Progress Notes. While the Patient Care Technician Records indicate that the patient was both oriented and lethargic, the 8 a.m. progress notes indicate "lethargic at times." The progress notes also indicate that, earlier in the day, the patient had difficulty breathing without the non-rebreather mask and that, by 2 p.m., he was wearing the mask continuously. Even disregarding the possibility that the morphine dosage was enough to affect his judgment, the patient's lethargy and his difficulty breathing without the mask probably would have made it difficult for him to communicate on legal matters on the afternoon of August 16, 1990.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Ultimate and penultimate sentences, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (He did not allege that Sweely could not communicate or write his name. He testified that he did not think Sweely would have been able to think clearly or want to be troubled with the form unnecessarily. He did not think he had to discuss it with Sweely or have Sweely sign it.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, Dr. Breen's curt medical evaluation of Sweely's general medical condition on August 16, 1990, was not for the purpose of evaluating whether it was possible or prudent to have him considering legal documents and making important legal judgments. In addition, Dr. Breen saw the patient early in the morning and would not have seen changes during the course of the day. 11.-12. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 13. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that Castillo, Jr., "insist[ed] that Sweely was incompetent, unable to provide or receive meaningful communication on August 16--and could not execute the form himself . . .." (Rather, he testified that he did not think Sweely would have been able to think clearly or want to be troubled with the form unnecessarily.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 14.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith F. Roberts, Esquire 201 North MacDill Avenue Tampa, Florida 33609 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) of the Florida Retirement System (FRS).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is now, and has been since December 19, 1974, an employee of the State of Florida. By virtue of her employment with the State of Florida, Petitioner is an active, regular class member of the FRS. Petitioner was considered “vested” for purposes of the FRS when she completed 10 years of creditable service with the State of Florida. The “normal retirement date,” for regular class members, is defined, in pertinent part, as the first day of the month following the date on which the member attains 62 years of age, with six or more years of creditable service,1/ or the date on which the member reaches 30 years of creditable service, regardless of age. § 121.021(29)(a), Fla. Stat. Petitioner was born on June 6, 1944 and reached the age of 62 on June 6, 2006. She reached 30 years of creditable service in November 2004. Petitioner’s “normal retirement date” for purposes of the FRS was established as December 1, 2004, by virtue of reaching 30 years of creditable service in November 2004. Petitioner was aware that her “normal retirement date” had been established as December 1, 2004. An active member becomes eligible to enter the DROP upon reaching his or her “normal retirement date.” A member must elect to participate in the DROP within 12 months of the date on which he or she first attains his or her normal retirement date. A member who fails to make an election within such 12-month limitation period forfeits all rights to participate in the DROP. § 121.091(13)(a), Fla. Stat. Petitioner’s period of eligibility to enter the DROP began on December 1, 2004 and ended on November 30, 2005. Petitioner requested DROP retirement benefit estimates from the Division on three separate occasions. On November 25, 2003, Petitioner asked Respondent to send her the first DROP retirement benefit estimate. On December 2, 2003, Respondent sent Petitioner the first DROP retirement benefit estimate. The Comments section of the document advised that the estimate was based on the assumption that Petitioner would enter the DROP effective 12/1/2004. Accordingly, the DROP Estimated Benefit Accrual Calculation section provided for a 12/2004 “DROP Begin Date,” an 11/2009 “DROP End Date,” and 60 “Months in DROP.” The first DROP retirement benefit estimate makes no reference to Petitioner’s normal retirement date. On December 1, 2004, Petitioner asked Respondent to send her a second DROP retirement benefit estimate. On December 1, 2004, Respondent sent Petitioner the second DROP retirement benefit estimate. The Comments section of the document advised that in order for Ms. Campbell to retain a 12/2004 DROP retirement date, she must complete and return the enclosed DROP application materials within 30 days of the date the second estimate was mailed. Again, the DROP Estimated Benefit Accrual Calculation section provided for a 12/2004 “DROP Begin Date,” an 11/2009 “DROP End Date,” and 60 “Months in DROP.” The second DROP retirement benefit estimate makes no reference to Petitioner’s normal retirement date. On October 24, 2005, Petitioner asked Respondent to send her a third DROP retirement benefit estimate. On October 25, 2005, Respondent sent Petitioner the third DROP retirement benefit estimate. Again, she was advised in that mailing that in order for Petitioner to retain a 10/2005 DROP retirement date, she must complete and return the enclosed DROP application materials within 30 days of the date the third estimate was mailed. The Comments section also advised that Petitioner’s 50 months of DROP participation would be from 10/01/2005 to 11/30/2009. Accordingly, the DROP Estimated Benefit Accrual Calculation section was changed to provide for a 10/2005 “DROP Begin Date,” an 11/2009 “DROP End Date,” and 50 “Months in DROP.” The third DROP retirement benefit estimate makes no reference to Respondent’s normal retirement date. Petitioner alleged at final hearing that she was confused by the language Respondent used in the third DROP retirement benefit estimate. Petitioner presumed that Respondent had changed her normal retirement date to 10/2005, and therefore she believed she had an additional 12 months to elect to participate in the DROP. There is no indication in Respondent’s records that Petitioner ever contacted Respondent’s personnel to express confusion about or to ask questions about any of the DROP retirement benefit estimates provided to her. Respondent’s standard practice is to enclose an informational brochure, entitled “Deferred Retirement Option Program,” when it sends DROP retirement benefit estimates. Petitioner also testified at final hearing that she was confused by certain language Respondent used in the DROP Brochure to her to explain when a member could begin the DROP, specifically: The earliest you may begin participation in DROP is the month you reach your normal retirement date based upon your age, or the month after the month you reach your normal retirement date based upon your years of service. Petitioner claim of confusion is not credible in view of the fact that the above language is followed by an example designed to help those members who may have difficulty understanding the meaning of the language: If you are vested (have at least 6 years but less than 30 years of service credit), and attain age 62 on May 22nd; your normal retirement date would be May 1st. Or, if you will complete 30 years of service in May, your normal retirement date is June 1st. (Exhibit R-10). Finally, the DROP Brochure was intended to put statutory language into laymen’s terms for the FRS membership. The DROP Brochure includes a disclaimer on the first page after the cover page which states: If questions of interpretation arise as a result of the attempt to make these retirement provisions easy to understand, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, Chapter 60S, Florida Administrative Code, and the Internal Revenue Code shall remain the final authorities. There is no indication in Respondent’s records that Petitioner ever contacted Respondent’s personnel to express her confusion about the wording of the DROP Brochure or to ask questions about when she could begin DROP or her DROP participation eligibility. Petitioner possesses both Bachelor’s and Master’s Degrees in Education. In addition, she formerly possessed a Florida Teaching Certificate. On the basis of her educational achievements and teaching certification, Petitioner is a well- educated individual. Petitioner’s former employer, the Division of State Group Insurance, was in the process of privatizing during 2005, and was therefore laying off some of its employees. Petitioner also feared lay-off and decided to delay filing her application materials for the DROP. Respondent received Petitioner’s Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (Form DP-11) on January 5, 2006. Petitioner signed the Form DP- 11 on December 22, 2005. Petitioner’s employer certified the Form DP-11 on December 29, 2005. Petitioner’s Form DP-11 also included the following acknowledgement: I . . . elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.). My DROP participation cannot exceed a maximum of 60 months from the date I first reach my normal retirement date as determined by the Division of Retirement. (Exhibit R-5). On January 5, 2006, Respondent also received Petitioner’s Notice of Election to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment (Form DP-ELE). Petitioner signed the Form DP-ELE on December 22, 2005. Petitioner’s employer certified the Form DP- ELE on December 29, 2005. Petitioner’s Form DP-ELE also included the following acknowledgement: I elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.), as indicated below. . . . I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach my normal retirement date as determined by law and that my DROP participation cannot exceed a maximum of 60 months from the date I reach my normal retirement date, . . . . (Exhibit R-6). On January 11, 2006, Respondent issued an initial agency action letter which advised Petitioner as follows: To participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), you were required to submit a Form DP-ELE (Notice of Election to Participate in the DROP and Resignation of Employment) within twelve months of the date you first became eligible to participate in the DROP. If the Form DP-ELE is not received within this twelve month period, the right to participate in DROP is forfeited. Your dates of eligibility to elect participation in the DROP was [sic] from 12/01/2004 to 11/30/2005. We received your Form DP-ELE and Form DP-11, Application for Service Retirement and DROP, in our office on 01/05/2006. Because the Division received the DP-ELE after the ending eligibility date, you are not eligible to participate in the DROP. The DP-ELE and DP- 11 forms are considered null and void. (Exhibit R-7). On March 6, 2006, Respondent issued a final agency action letter which advised Petitioner as follows: Section 121.091(13)(a)(2), Florida Statutes, gives all active Florida Retirement System (FRS) members the right to elect participation in the DROP provided that: “Election to participate is made within 12 months immediately following the date on which the member first reaches normal retirement date. . . A member who fails to make an elections [sic] within such 12-month limitation period shall forfeit all rights to participate in the DROP “ (emphasis added). You first became eligible to participate in the DROP on 12/01/2004, after earning 30 years of service credit in 11/2004. Therefore, your Form DP-ELE, Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment and Form DP-11, Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) must have been received no later than 11/30/2005 for you to be eligible to participate in the DROP. Your Forms DP-ELE and DP-11 were received in the Division of Retirement on 01/05/2006. Since the Forms DP-ELE and DP-11 were not submitted and received by the Division within the 12-month limitation period, you have forfeited your right to participate in the DROP. The Forms DP-ELE and DP-11 you submitted are null and void. It is unfortunate that your eligibility period to begin participation in DROP has expired, however because the 12-month eligibility period stated above is a statutory requirement and we have no authority to waive the law, we must deny your request for DROP participation. (Exhibit R-8)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a Final Order denying Petitioner’s application to participate in the DROP. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2006.
Findings Of Fact The petitioner, Leo A. Price, was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) at the time of his retirement in June, 1979. He became an FRS member on January 1, 1979, by transferring from the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS). Mr. Price was appointed to a teaching position for the 1950-51 school year on June 8, 1950, by the Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Florida. He performed some limited duties for the Board of Public Instruction at the beginning of the 1950-51 school year, but his service was cut short as a result of illness. He received no salary payments for this service. Mr. Price recovered from his illness and began teaching in Dade County on January 31, 1951. He enrolled in the Teachers' Retirement System in February, 1951, and represented on his enrollment blank that he began service on January 31, 1951, and that he had not taught in Florida in prior years. Enrollment forms are required prior to membership in TRS. Mr. Price taught continuously from January 31, 1951, through June 30, 1979. On June 20, 1979, the School Board of Dade County retroactively approved a leave of absence for Mr. Price for the period from September, 1950, through January 30, 1951. No leave of absence had been authorized by the School Board prior to this retroactive authorization. Ruth Sansom, Assistant Bureau Chief, Bureau of Benefits, Division of Retirement, testified that she has worked with TRS and FRS in a supervisory capacity since 1963. In these seventeen years, no member has been allowed a service credit for a leave of absence that was retroactively granted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner, Leo A. Price, seeking a service credit for the period of time from September, 1950, through January, 1951, be denied. It is further RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner, Leo A. Price, for interest on all uncashed benefit warrants, be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 19 day of September, 1980. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Leo A. Price 1000 N. E. 96th Street Miami Shores, Florida 33138 Diane R. Keisling, Esquire Suite 207C, Box 81 Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issue is whether payment of Petitioner's retirement benefits should have commenced after the filing of an application to retire with the Division of Retirement, with an effective date of April 1, 2004, or be retroactively changed to the date of his termination of employment, July 1, 2003.
Findings Of Fact On July 19, 1995, Petitioner applied for membership in the Special Risk Division of the Elected Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). On August 14, 1995, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter admitting him into FRS. On September 6, 1995, Sarabeth Snuggs, Chief of the Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions for Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter revoking his membership in FRS. On December 17, 1996, Petitioner wrote to Sarabeth Snuggs responding to Respondent's decision to revoke his membership in FRS. Petitioner cited Section 121.052(2)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that membership in FRS includes "any constitutional county elected officer assuming office after July 1, 1981, including any sheriff." The Consolidated City of Jacksonville was created by the Florida Legislature with the enactment of Chapter 67-1320, Laws of Florida. Section 1.01 of the Jacksonville Charter provides that the county government of Duval County and the municipal government of the City of Jacksonville are consolidated into a single body politic. The Charter further provides that the consolidated government succeeds to and possesses all of the properties of the former government. After being denied membership in FRS, Petitioner and other members of the consolidated government and its instrumentalities worked diligently to convince Respondent to admit Petitioner into FRS. During Petitioner's attempts to be included in FRS, Respondent repeatedly took the position that Duval County did not exist as a county agency. In a letter to Petitioner dated January 15, 1997, Ms. Snuggs wrote that the consolidated Duval County government "chose to consolidate as a 'city' government." Mr. Keane worked with the Duval County Legislative Delegation to amend Chapter 121 to specifically clarify the fact that the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court are constitutional officers entitled to participate in FRS. In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted language to clarify the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court's status with respect to FRS. In a letter dated June 24, 2002, Petitioner thanked Ms. Snuggs for recognizing his right to elect membership in FRS. Petitioner observed that, since he was in the last year of his second term as Sheriff (Duval County allows only two consecutive terms), he wanted confirmation of his "right to connect the previous seven (7) years of service as Sheriff." The June 24, 2002, letter also asked for "guidance" from Respondent. The purpose of the June 24, 2002, letter was for Petitioner to learn how Respondent intended to treat his first six years of service. Petitioner sought to avoid any problems since his retirement date was rapidly approaching. On October 10, 2002, Petitioner and Mr. George Dandelake, the Chief of the Budget and Management Division of the Sheriff's Office, wrote to Ms. Snuggs requesting a calculation of the amount of employer contributions required on Petitioner's behalf. The October 10 letter also requested that Respondent "identify what documents are required, in addition to the contribution amount which will be paid by the City, that must be supplied to the Florida Retirement System." Petitioner re-applied for membership in FRS, which was granted on June 1, 2002, after the effective date of the legislation designed to specifically admit the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court into FRS. On June 18, 2003, twelve days before the expiration of his term of office, still not having received confirmation of the status of his prior service, Petitioner sent a letter to Ms. Snuggs advising that FRS had not recognized his service from 1995 through 2002. Petitioner again stated in the letter that he was terminating his position as Sheriff on June 30, 2003. Less than a week prior to the termination of his term, Petitioner received two "Statement[s] of Account" dated June 24, 2003, indicating that "you have until retirement to pay the amount due on your account." The statements further indicated that "when you become vested for monthly benefits, we will provide you an estimate of benefits with and without this service." According to the first Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 1.6 percent multiplier rate for the FRS regular class. According to the second Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 2.0 percent multiplier rate for the FRS special risk class. Neither Statement of Account was correct, as both failed to permit Petitioner to purchase service at the 3.0 percent rate for special risk, despite the fact that Petitioner had served a continuous and uninterrupted term as Sheriff. The Statement of Account did not advise Petitioner that he must submit a separate retirement application, Form FR-11, in order to preserve his retirement date. The statement did advise Petitioner that interest would be assessed at a rate of 6.5 percent. This warning appeared in bold face on the Statement of Account. The June 24, 2003, statements were the first time that Petitioner was supplied with the amount due to purchase service credit. Since neither statement applied the correct multiplier rate (3.0 percent) for all eight years of Petitioner's service as Sheriff, neither statement was correct. Recognizing that only six days remained prior to the expiration of Petitioner's term as Sheriff, Mr. Keane advised Petitioner to submit payment to Respondent on an expedited basis. After receiving the June 24, 2003, Statements of Account, Petitioner prepared a letter dated June 26, 2003, to Cal Ray, the Director of the Department of Administration and Finance for the Consolidated City of Jacksonville. In this letter, Petitioner requested an employer contribution in the amount of $163,554.32 to purchase his prior service. Petitioner further requested an expedited preparation of the check to ensure delivery to Respondent by July 1, 2003. The letter to Mr. Ray requested payment of the amounts that would have been periodically contributed by the City of Jacksonville if Respondent had been acknowledged as a participant in FRS in 1995. On June 27, 2003, three days prior to the expiration of his term of office, Petitioner drove from Jacksonville to Tallahassee to meet with Respondent's representatives, including Ms. Snuggs, regarding Petitioner's retirement. Mr. Dandelake accompanied Petitioner on this trip. At the June 27, 2003, meeting, Petitioner personally delivered a check to Respondent in the amount of $163,554.32. Respondent accepted the check and issued a written receipt signed by Sarabeth Snuggs. Petitioner was never told during the June 27, 2003, meeting with Respondent that he would forfeit benefits if he failed to complete an application. Respondent knew that Petitioner was leaving office on June 30, 2003. Respondent never discussed the filing of an application for retirement benefits at any time during the course of its conversations and correspondence with Petitioner. Petitioner was never told by Respondent to complete any forms to protect his rights to the 2.0 percent multiplier during the pendency of his dispute with Respondent. Petitioner was never provided any handbook, notice, statutes, or rules indicating he would forfeit benefits under any circumstances. When Petitioner left the June 27, 2003, meeting, both he and Mr. Dandelake understood that he was still engaged in a dispute with Respondent over his entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Petitioner knew that he was required to file an application in order to receive retirement benefits. Petitioner testified that if he had left the June 27 meeting with any indication that he would forfeit benefits by not filing an application, he would have filed something, with advice of counsel, to preserve his rights. Petitioner received an Estimate of Benefits via fax from Respondent on June 27, 2003, reflecting an annual benefit of $23,105.90. This statement valued 6.92 years of Petitioner's uninterrupted special risk service as Sheriff using the 2.0 percent multiplier, and 1.08 years of service as Sheriff using the 3.0 percent multiplier. The June 27, 2003, statement lists Petitioner's retirement date as July 1, 2003. The estimate does not warn Petitioner that he must do anything in order to preserve his July 2003 retirement date. The estimate states only that it is subject to "final verification of all factors." Petitioner's term of office as elected Sheriff ended on June 30, 2003. Petitioner's employment terminated when his term expired on that date. Respondent was aware of the dates of the expiration of Petitioner's term of office as well as his employment termination date. When Petitioner's employment terminated on June 30, 2003, it was unclear whether he would be credited with the 3.0 percent multiplier for his eight years of special risk service. Petitioner was not notified by Respondent prior to the expiration of his term as Sheriff on June 30, 2003, that he needed to submit a retirement application. The first time Petitioner was advised by Respondent of the need to file an application for retirement benefits was in the comment section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefits provided to him by letter dated March 4, 2004. The warning was printed in bold face type. The Estimate of Retirement Benefits dated June 27, 2003, did not include the bold face warning to file an application. Respondent was not provided with a Division of Retirement publication entitled "Preparing to Retire" prior to his leaving service on June 30, 2003. In fact, the copy of the publication offered into evidence by Respondent is dated "July 2003," subsequent to Petitioner's retirement. As the only member of FRS in his office in Jacksonville, Petitioner had no staff or employees trained in FRS or Florida retirement benefits. Petitioner was provided with a "Preparing to Retire" booklet in March 2004. On November 3, 2003, Florida Attorney General Opinion 2003-46 confirmed that Petitioner, as the elected Sheriff, was eligible for membership in the Elected Officer's Class of the Florida Retirement System. On December 31, 2003, and on January 16, 2004, Petitioner's counsel attempted to obtain clarification from Respondent regarding Petitioner's retirement benefits. The December 31, 2003, letter noted that the "extraordinary delay" in resolving the issue of Petitioner's benefits was at no time due to fault on the part of Petitioner. Respondent never refuted or disputed this statement. By letter dated March 4, 2004, Petitioner was finally advised by Respondent that he was entitled to be credited with the higher 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight years of his service as Sheriff. Petitioner noted that the March 4, 2004, Statement of Account, while properly applying the 3.0 percent multiplier, now had changed Petitioner's retirement date to April 2004 from the previous estimates showing a retirement date of July 2003. The March 4, 2004, statement included the bold face notice to Petitioner that he must file an application for retirement benefits. No prior notices or correspondence from Respondent had informed Petitioner that he must file Form FR-11 in order to retain his retirement date of July 1, 2003. After formally being notified that he would receive the 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight of his years of service as Sheriff, and after having received the notice that he must file Form FR-11, Petitioner submitted the form in April 2004. Respondent is a fiduciary charged with acting in the best interest of participants in FRS. Andy Snuggs, who travels around the state educating employers and employees in FRS, acknowledged that Petitioner was not responsible for the delay by Respondent in recognizing Petitioner's entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Mr. Snuggs acknowledged that he does not tell employees that they will forfeit benefits if they delay the filing of their applications. Petitioner received his first retirement check in May 2004 which was based upon the benefit established in March 2004 of $32,624.58 annually, not the $23,105.90 previously established by Respondent in June 2003. Petitioner has received no retroactive benefits for the period of July 1, 2003, through April 30, 2004. In a letter dated May 6, 2004, Petitioner stated that his acceptance of the first retirement check was not to be construed by Respondent of a waiver of his rights to retroactive benefits from July 1, 2003, forward.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be awarded retirement benefits at the rate of 3.0 percent per year for his eight years of Elected Officer's Class of service, retroactive to July 1, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Klausner, Esquire Klausner & Kaufman, P.A. 10059 Northwest 1st Court Plantation, Florida 33324 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000
The Issue Whether Petitioner Deborah Barrington, the surviving spouse of Ronald Mitchell Barrington, is entitled to a monthly benefit from Mr. Barrington’s Florida Retirement System (FRS) pension plan.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes, with administering the FRS. In 1986, Mr. Barrington began employment with the Department of Revenue (DOR). Mr. Barrington was a member of the FRS pension plan based on his employment with DOR. Ms. Barrington was the spouse of Mr. Barrington. Ms. Barrington testified that she was married to Mr. Barrington for 43 years. On June 6, 2007, Mr. Barrington contacted Respondent, via email, to inquire as to when he could enter the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) administered by Respondent. Respondent requested some additional information from Mr. Barrington, which he provided, including the identity of his spouse, Ms. Barrington. Respondent received, on January 11, 2011, a form entitled “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment,” from Mr. Barrington. This form shows that Mr. Barrington intended to enter the DROP program on April 1, 2011, and that his termination and resignation date would be March 31, 2016. Mr. Barrington also completed a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP)” form, which Respondent also received on January 11, 2011. This form, similar to the form described in paragraph 5 above, listed Mr. Barrington’s intended dates to enter the DROP program, and his intended termination and resignation dates, but also listed Ms. Barrington as his primary beneficiary. Respondent also received Form FRS-11o, entitled “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Option Selection for FRS Members” (Option Selection Form), on January 14, 2011 (according to the facsimile header on this form). The Option Selection Form required Mr. Barrington to select one of four retirement benefit payment options. The Option Selection Form provided an explanation for each of the four options. The Option Selection Form reflects that Mr. Barrington initially selected to receive an Option 3 retirement benefit by checking the line next to the Option 3 benefit payment option. However, the Option Selection Form also reflects that Mr. Barrington struck through the checkmark next to the Option 3 benefit payment option, wrote his initials “RB,” and then checked the line next to the Option 1 benefit payment option, indicating he selected to receive the Option 1 retirement benefit. A significant difference exists between Options 1 and 3: Option 3 provides for a “reduced monthly benefit” during the member’s lifetime, and after death, the member’s joint annuitant would receive a lifetime monthly benefit in that same amount; while under Option 1, the member would receive the maximum benefit for the member’s life, with no continuing benefit to a joint annuitant after the member’s death. The Option Selection Form reflects that Deborah Holley notarized the signature of Mr. Barrington. Along with the Option Selection Form, Respondent received a form entitled “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Spousal Acknowledgement Form,” (Spousal Acknowledgment Form) on January 14, 2011 (according to the facsimile header on this form). The Spousal Acknowledgment Form provides that if the member is married and has selected Option 1 or 2 on the Option Selection Form, the member’s spouse must complete “Box 2” on the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. The Spousal Acknowledgment Form reflects that Ms. Barrington completed “Box 2,” but in the portion that states that she “acknowledge[s] that the member has selected Option 1 or 2[,]” the Spousal Acknowledgment Form reflects that “1 or 2” is stricken through, and instead, the number “3” is hand written nearby. The Spousal Acknowledgment Form further reflects the signature of Ms. Barrington, dated September 10, 2010, and that Deborah Holley notarized the signatures of both Mr. and Ms. Barrington. Respondent introduced into evidence Ms. Holley’s public commission as a notary in the State of Florida, indicating that Ms. Holley was a duly licensed notary, and which was effective when Mr. and Ms. Barrington executed the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. On February 1, 2011, Respondent mailed Mr. Barrington an “Acknowledgment of DROP Application,” acknowledging: (a) receipt of Mr. Barrington’s Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP); (b) his selection of Option 1 as the benefit payment option; and (c) his DROP begin date of April 1, 2011, and this DROP end date of March 31, 2016. The Acknowledgment of DROP application expressly states, in bold, all-caps letters, the following: AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION (OR 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS LETTER IS MAILED, IF LATER) RETIREMENT IS FINAL. YOU CANNOT ADD SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE, CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT OR ELECT THE INVESTMENT PLAN. On May 10, 2011, Respondent mailed Mr. Barrington a “Final Notice of DROP Benefit,” which included his final benefit accrual calculation based on Option 1. Respondent received (according to the facsimile header on this form) on December 14, 2015, a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) Termination Notification,” from Mr. Barrington, which reflected that he would terminate his employment with an FRS employer on March 31, 2016. On January 11, 2017, Mr. Barrington passed away. On February 23, 2017, Respondent sent a survivor letter to Ms. Barrington informing her that “[t]he option selected by the member does not provide a continuing benefit beyond the month of death.” After Ms. Barrington contacted Respondent to inquire about receiving a monthly benefit, Respondent sent Ms. Barrington a letter, dated November 30, 2020, which constituted final agency action, and which informed Ms. Barrington that Respondent paid Mr. Barrington’s retirement benefits according to his retirement option selection—Option 1—and that denied Ms. Barrington’s request to receive a monthly benefit. Testimony of Ms. Barrington and Mr. Halley Ms. Barrington testified that she never signed the Spousal Acknowledgment Form, that Mr. Barrington mistakenly selected Option 1 on the Option Selection Form, and that Ms. Holley failed to properly notarize these documents. Ms. Barrington further testified that Mr. Barrington was ill and, according to her, must have been confused when he selected Option 1. Ms. Barrington testified that she was not with Mr. Barrington when he completed the Option Selection Form. Ms. Barrington did not present any medical or other evidence to establish that Mr. Barrington lacked mental capacity at the time he executed the Option Selection Form or the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. Ms. Barrington did not present any additional evidence, other than her own testimony, to establish that Ms. Holley failed to properly notarize the Option Selection Form or the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. Mr. Halley testified that when Respondent receives the forms for processing a FRS member’s application to enter the DROP program, it reviews the forms “to make sure they are not blank or any information that is necessary is not omitted[,]” and “for any irregularities on the forms and things of that nature[.]” He testified that at any given time, there are more than one million members in FRS. He testified that it is an “impossibility” for Respondent to reach out to each FRS member to confirm that their signature is authentic, or to call and confirm with each FRS member that they intended the particular option that they selected. Based on the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at the final hearing, Ms. Barrington failed to establish that Mr. Barrington lacked the mental capacity to select a retirement option at the time he completed the Option Selection Form. Based on the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at the final hearing, Ms. Barrington failed to establish that Ms. Holley improperly notarized the Option Section Form or the Spousal Acknowledgment Form.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for a continuing monthly benefit from Mr. Barrington’s FRS pension plan. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2021. Deborah Barrington 44 Parkside Circle Crawfordville, Florida 32327-7413 William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Gayla Grant, Esquire Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to purchase leave of absence retirement credit on behalf of James Gapinski, Petitioner's ex- husband and a deceased member of the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Geraldine Gapinski, is the former spouse of James Gapinski, deceased. At the time of his death, Mr. Gapinski was an employee of Florida State University and a "vested" Florida Retirement Service (FRS) member. Petitioner is an employee of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and an active member of FRS. Mr. Gapinski was continuously employed by Florida's Univeristy System from approximately 1970, until his death on November 20, 2000, with the exception of a period from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977, during which period he took an approved leave of absence. During the period September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977, no contributions were made by Mr. Gapinski or on Mr. Gapinski's behalf to FRS toward his accruing retirement benefits and he earned no creditable service in FRS for this eight month period he was on his leave of absence. On May 4, 2000, Mr. Gapinski requested an audit and estimate of retirement benefits from Respondent. At the time of his request for an audit and estimate, Mr. Gapinski and Petitioner had begun a dissolution of marriage proceeding (divorce). At all times material, each litigant had independent legal counsel, and each lawyer was aware that Mr. Gapinski's FRS benefits were "on the table" for division of the marital estate in the course of the divorce proceedings. At all times material, Mr. Gapinski was terminally ill with cancer. On September 14, 2000, Mr. Gapinski applied for participation in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). His application (DROP Form DP11) requested a DROP "begin date" of September 1, 2000, and designated each of Mr. Gapinski's two adult daughters as 50 percent primary beneficiaries. Petitioner, who at that time was still married to Mr. Gapinski, was not even designated a secondary beneficiary. The application, which Mr. Gapinski signed, stated in pertinent part, I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach my normal retirement date as determined by law . . . I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement after my DROP begin date (emphasis in original). The application also specified eight required acts before Mr. Gapinski could retire and become a DROP participant, including, but not limited to, 4. A check payable to FRS for any amount you owe, or a written statement that you do not wish to claim the service . . . . On September 15, 2000, Respondent provided James Gapinski with two estimates of benefits. Estimate No. 1 showed the benefit Mr. Gapinski would be entitled to if he chose to purchase the one year leave of absence for $6,820.52, providing for a DROP beginning date of September 1, 2000. This estimate further advised that 6.5 percent per annum would be posted on June 30, 2001. It also stated, Comments: The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977. This amount must be paid for a DROP begin date of September 1, 2000. Mr. Gapinski was also notified of the need to purchase his leave of absence credit in a letter from Respondent dated September 15, 2001, stating, in pertinent part, as follows: The following items are pending. The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977. If you do not elect to pay the above amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notification of your intent. * * * Completion of the Option Selection for FRS members, . . . AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE OR CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT. * * * Estimate No. 2 sent to Mr. Gapinski on September 15, 2000, showed the benefit Mr. Gapinski would be entitled to if he chose not to purchase his leave of absence and waited until March 1, 2001, to participate in DROP, when he would accrue 30 years of service without counting the gap left by his 1976-1977 leave of absence. This estimate also stated: Comments: This estimate does not include the purchase of your leave of absence and is provided for comparison purposes. It is provided for DROP purposes with a March 1, 2001, DROP begin date (see the enclosed DROP brochure). If you do not elect to pay the amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notice of your intent. Apparently, neither attorney ever saw any of the foregoing papers. The thrust of Petitioner's attorney's actions and advice was to obtain survivorship retirement benefits, not necessarily DROP benefits, for Petitioner. On October 23, 2000, Petitioner's attorney was told by telephone by Ms. Ferguson, a representative of Respondent, that Petitioner must make a non-party request to release Mr. Gapinski's retirement information to her. So far as this record shows, no third party request was ever made, but that day, Petitioner's attorney and Ferguson also generally discussed retirement pay-out options that Mr. Gapinski could elect, and Petitioner's attorney was generally aware that the DROP process was not complete. On October 24, 2000, Petitioner's attorney discussed by telephone, retirement, divorce, and survivorship benefit issues and life insurance payment options with Ms. Hudson, a representative of Respondent. On October 26, 2000, Petitioner's attorney discussed, by telephone, retirement options and steps to be taken, with both Ms. Ferguson and Mr. Helms, another of Respondent's representatives. Mr. Helms told her the DROP application was not complete but if the couple were still married, Option No. 3 would give the most benefit for survivorship benefits. During the October 2000, conversations, Petitioner's attorney made each of Respondent's representatives aware of the impending divorce and of Mr. Gapinski's impending death, but the attorney did not specifically inquire how soon the lapsed time payment must be made and none of Respondent's representatives volunteered information on that issue. At Mr. Gapinski's request, the divorce proceeding was bifurcated. Prior to the divorce, Petitioner's attorney had done independent research and was aware that Mr. Gapinski had to pay the $6,820.52, in order to perfect the DROP program and in order to complete 30 years of creditable service in order to be eligible for survivorship benefits on his retirement. This information was communicated to Petitioner by her attorney and whether or not Petitioner would be willing to pay half the amount was discussed. Petitioner stated she would be willing to pay half the amount owed. As a condition to her agreement to bifurcate the divorce proceeding, that is, as a condition to letting Mr. Gapinski out of the marriage but reserving jurisdiction in the Circuit Court to resolve certain disputes concerning assets and entitlements, Petitioner required that the couple enter into an "Agreement" on October 27, 2000, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: BIFURCATION: The Husband shall be entitled to bifurcation of the dissolution action. The marriage of the parties shall be dissolved with the Court reserving on all remaining unresolved issues not addressed in this agreement. In light of the Husband's health, the Wife shall schedule and appear at an ex parte hearing to dissolve the marriage, to obtain Court-ordered approval of this agreement, and to ensure the Court's reservation of jurisdiction to hear any and all issues pertinent to support and the division of property not yet settled by the parties. * * * B. The Wife further agrees that all marital assets awarded to her in this cause (including proceeds from the Husband's retirement and life insurance in the event the Husband predeceases her), shall be placed in an inter vivos trust, from which she may draw living, personal, and medical expenses, during her life, with the parties' adult daughters named as the irrevocable beneficiaries of the remainder of such trust. C. The Husband agrees to bequeath sufficient marital assets, awarded to him in this cause, to the parties' adult daughters to aid in their comfort and support. HUSBAND'S RETIREMENT: The Husband shall elect an option on his retirement with the State of Florida that provides for survivorship benefits for the benefit of the Wife. The wife shall be entitled to all such retirement survivorship benefits which, like the other assets she receives in this bifurcated action, shall be placed in an inter vivos trust for her living, personal and medical expenses, during her life, with the adult daughters as irrevocable beneficiaries of the remainder of the trust. The Husband shall, simultaneously with the signing of the agreement, execute such documents as are necessary to create retirement survivorship benefits in accordance with this term. Should the Husband fail to execute the survivorship option on his retirement or should he ever change such option in contravention of this term, the Husband agrees that the obligation of this term is binding upon his estate, which estate shall be responsible for paying such retirement survivorship benefits to the Wife. The Agreement could have, but did not, specifically require that the leave of absence be purchased by either Mr. Gapinski or Petitioner. Petitioner's and Mr. Gapinski's Agreement does not bind the Respondent, which was in no way privy to that Agreement. Petitioner and Mr. Gapinski's marriage was dissolved on November 1, 2000. Petitioner's attorney provided Mr. Gapinski, through his counsel, with DROP forms (FST-12 and FRS-11o). On November 1, 2000, Mr. Gapinski executed Option 2 for his DROP retirement on these forms, naming Petitioner as his sole primary beneficiary and negating his prior designation of his adult daughters as beneficiaries. Option No. 2 provides for a reduced monthly benefit payable for the FRS member's (Mr. Gapinski's) lifetime. If the member dies before receiving 120 monthly payments, his designated beneficiary (Petitioner) would receive a monthly benefit in the same amount until the monthly benefit payments to both of them equaled 120 monthly payments, when payments would terminate. Option No. 2 is available for regular service retirements as well as DROP retirements. Option No. 3 is also available for regular service retirements and DROP retirements. Option No. 3 would have provided a reduced monthly benefit payable for Mr. Gapinski's lifetime, and upon his death, his joint annuitant, if living, would receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount as Mr. Gapinski was receiving. Then, no further benefits would be payable after both he and his joint annuitant were deceased. There are exceptions to the foregoing general description, none of which matter to the case at bar. Option No. 3 would clearly provide more money to Petitioner if she were eligible. On November 2, 2000, Petitioner's attorney had three short telephone conversations with Mr. Helms, who opined that since Mr. Gapinski had signed up for DROP while the couple were still married, Petitioner could still get Option No. 3, with DROP retroactive to September 1, 2000, but that the leave of absence must be paid for. Apparently, Petitioner's attorney did not ask what would happen if the gap was not paid for before Mr. Gapinski died and no representative of Respondent volunteered that information. The thrust of Petitioner's case continued to be to persuade Mr. Gapinski to pay the whole amount due and to change his Option election to No. 3. On or about November 3, 2000, Mr. Helms sent an estimate letter based on selecting a September 1, 2000, retirement date with Option No. 1, to Mr. Gapinski. This estimate letter stated Mr. Gapinski had 30.11 years of creditable service. It did not mention DROP or any pay back. It did state that no lump sum retirement or cash value payments were available. (Second page of attachment to Exhibit P-11). On November 3, 2000, Petitioner's attorney wrote Mr. Gapinski's attorney that Mr. Gapinski was considered by Respondent to be in the DROP program as of September 1, 2000, not March 1, 2001, as supposed before the divorce, but he had not bought back his leave by paying $6,820.52, and requested that Mr. Gapinski change his Option Election Form to Option No. 3 and authorize the payment of the $6,820.52 to Respondent. On or about November 9, 2000, Petitioner's attorney sent the already-executed FST-12 (Beneficiary Designation Form) and FRS-11o (Option Selection for FRS Members) showing Option No. 2 to Respondent. Mr. Helms acknowledged receipt. On or about November 9, 2000, Mr. Helms told Petitioner's attorney that the forms were correct and anyone could pay the $6,820.52. The attorney felt Mr. Gapinski was enrolled in DROP but that the $6,820.52 was still needed. On November 15, 2000, Petitioner's attorney sent Mr. Helms a letter memorializing their conversation, in which Mr. Helms had indicated it was not necessary for Petitioner to sign below the Option No. 2 selection paragraph on FRS 11o as long as she was aware of the option Mr. Gapinski had selected. On November 20, 2000, Mr. Gapinski passed away without anyone having purchased his leave of absence credit. Mr. Gapinski was only 57 years of age when he died. DROP retirement or regular service retirement with full benefits is possible at 62 years of age or upon attaining 30 years of creditable service. Mr. Gapinski remained in regular employment until his death. Because he had not purchased the leave of absence credit, Mr. Gapinski died with only 29 years and 9 months of creditable service for purposes of retirement. In other words, he was 3 months and ten days short of the 30-year retirement mark necessary to activate DROP or regular service retirement. Petitioner never communicated directly with Respondent until after Mr. Gapinski's death. Mr. Gapinski's will provided for the effective disinheritance of Petitioner to the extent provided by law. On December 14, 2000, Petitioner's attorney spoke by telephone with Mr. Helms, who told her he thought Petitioner could still pay the leave of absence money but he would call her back. On December 15, 2000, Stanley Colvin, another of Respondent's representatives, telephoned Petitioner's attorney to say Petitioner could not pay the amount after Mr. Gapinski's death. At no time prior to Mr. Gapinski's death did any representative of Respondent affirmatively represent to anyone that Petitioner could pay the money after Mr. Gapinski's death or the conditions under which no benefits would be paid or specifically what would happen if Mr. Gapinski died before the money was paid by someone. By a December 15, 2000, letter, Respondent notified Petitioner that since Mr. Gapinski had elected not to purchase the leave of absence, he could not have reached the required 30 years of service necessary to participate in the DROP program until March 1, 2001. It further stated that since Mr. Gapinski's death occurred before completion of the required months necessary to participate in DROP, his DROP application was cancelled and his choice of Option No. 2 was nullified. Moreover, Mr. Gapinski was viewed as an active FRS member on the date of his death, and because Petitioner, though designated as his beneficiary was not also a joint annuitant, she could only receive a refund of Mr. Gapinski's retirement contributions in the amount of $4,719.19,and was not eligible to receive Option No. 3. Respondent did not send a similar letter to prior beneficiaries, the decedent, or his estate/personal representatives. Petitioner requested a review, and on February 2, 2001, Respondent issued its proposed final agency action letter, to the same effect as the December 15, 2000, letter. Respondent did not send a similar proposed final agency action letter to prior beneficiaries, the decedent, or his estate/personal representatives. However, the undersigned notes that Mr. Gapinski's adult daughters, who also were his joint personal representatives, were present in the courtroom on September 24, 2001, the first day of hearing. As of the second day of hearing on October 21, 2001, the estate had been closed and the personal representatives had been discharged. Mr. Larry Hunnicutt, Benefits Administrator for the Bureau of Retirement Calculations, Division of Retirement, testified by deposition. He indicated that Respondent Division of Retirement has no rules in place specifically addressing DROP. Therefore, in DROP cases, Respondent interprets and applies Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and the existing rules addressing regular service retirement. In practice, Respondent gives DROP applicants a 90-day grace period from the date of application in which to finalize all the outstanding documents or other requirements for DROP eligibility, including payments of amounts due, even though there are no provisions in place authorizing a grace period for DROP applicants. If there are money amounts due, the member must pay up during this period. If the member fails to pay up during this period, the DROP application and the option selected for DROP is cancelled by a certified letter, but the designated beneficiary remains intact. Herein, because the amounts were not paid before Mr. Gapinski died, and because it would serve no purpose to notify the decedent, who could no longer complete his DROP requirements, Respondent did not send the deceased member a cancellation of his DROP application and Option No. 2 selection. Rather, it treated the DROP application and option selection as null and void and notified his ex-wife, the designated beneficiary, of what Respondent understood to be her rights. In this notification, Respondent applied the statutes as its personnel understood them to apply to a member who dies in active service prior to reaching either 62 years of age or 30 years of creditable service. Respondent would have permitted Petitioner to pay the money on Mr. Gapinski's behalf only during his lifetime. If the amount due had been paid, and Petitioner were qualified for Option No. 2, she would receive approximately $500,000 plus cost of living increases as opposed to $4,719.19. She would receive considerably more if she qualified for Option No. 3.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to purchase leave of absence credit on the account of James Gapinski. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Sergeant Ronald Behnke, should be allowed to withdraw from the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) of the Florida Retirement System (FRS).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a trooper with the Florida Highway Patrol and participant in the Florida Retirement System for 27 years. On January 26, 1999, the Division of Retirement (Respondent) received a "Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program" from Petitioner for entry into the DROP program, effective April 1999, the month of his 50th birthday. Petitioner's application, a Special Risk Management Member, was acknowledged and accepted by Respondent on February 23, 1999, and Petitioner received his estimate of benefits shortly after that time. The statute governing FRS at that time permitted Petitioner to defer his election of entry into the DROP program to a date within "twelve months immediately following the date the member attains 57, or age 50 for Special Risk Class members." Section 121.091(13)(a)2., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998). Respondent applied an internal policy requiring a member to elect to enter the DROP no later than the member's birth month at age 50. The statute permitted actual entry into DROP to be deferred by the member to any point within the 60-month duration of DROP eligibility. However, late entry could not extend the 60-month period, which is measured from the "date to which he or she is eligible to defer his or her election to participate." Section 121.091(13)(b)1., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998). Petitioner's 50th birthday was April 9, 1999. Shortly after filing his application for the DROP program, but before April 1999, Petitioner learned there was pending legislation, which, if passed by the Legislature and signed by the governor, would allow him to delay his entry into DROP until 12 months following his 52nd birthday. He and other troopers closely watched and discussed legislation that could affect their positions. On March 12, 1999, Petitioner communicated with staff of Respondent. Respondent's staff advised Petitioner to send a letter requesting a delay in the effective date of entry into the DROP program. The staff explained that Petitioner could repeatedly change the effective date of DROP entry, while watching the pending legislation. Pursuant to these instructions, on March 12, 1999, Petitioner transmitted a letter, through personnel in the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) to Respondent, modifying the DROP program entry date to commence on May 1, 1999. Thereafter, Petitioner continued to monitor the progress of the pending legislation closely. Shortly after April 23, 1999, Petitioner received a letter from Ira L. Gaines, Benefits Administrator, employed by Respondent, cautioning Petitioner about his letter delaying entry into the DROP program. The letter advised Petitioner that the month of April 1999, was the only month he could accomplish cancellation of his DROP application, and that if the pending legislation did not pass, he would not be able to establish a retroactive start date. On April 26, 1999, Petitioner received a telephone call from Ira L. Gaines concerning his letter delaying his entry into the DROP program until May 1, 1999. Petitioner testified that Gaines represented to Petitioner that the pending legislation, which would have extended the time for entering the DROP program until age 52, was most likely "dead." He explained that Petitioner would, therefore, lose substantial benefits unless he withdrew his letter delaying entry until May 1999. He recommended that Petitioner enter the program effective April 1, 1999. Although he understood that no Division employee could control the outcome of the legislation, Petitioner relied upon these representations by Respondent's benefits administrator and sent a letter to Respondent dated April 27, 1999, rescinding his March 12, 1999, letter and entered the DROP program, effective April 1, 1999. Thereafter, Petitioner ceased efforts to follow actions by the Legislature. On October 8, 1999, Petitioner learned the legislation had passed and become law permitting DROP entry at the age of 52. Petitioner immediately addressed the question of withdrawing from DROP until the age of 52 with the director of the Division of the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP). Petitioner received a verbal assurances that it would benefit FHP if Petitioner were permitted to delay entry into DROP until the age of 52, since FHP expected to lose a great many experienced officers in a short period of time. The division director told Petitioner he would make inquiry and get back with Petitioner about his desire to withdraw from DROP until the age of 52. When Petitioner had not heard from his chain of command by October 20, 1999, he again initiated contacts with benefits staff in the DHSMV and Respondent. DHSMV Human Resources Director, Ken Wilson, on behalf of the FHP Director, directed Petitioner to pursue the matter with Respondent and to notify him of Respondent's decision. Petitioner's employer, FHP, supported and approved Petitioner's request to withdraw from DROP, and notified Respondent of its approval and its commitment to repay retirement contributions. On October 25, 1999, Petitioner contacted Maurice Helms with Respondent, and requested consideration of his desire to withdraw from DROP. On November 3, 1999, Petitioner received a decision from Respondent notifying him that request to withdraw from DROP was denied. The decision was received by certified mail, return receipt requested. The decision recited that it constituted "final agency action" and notified Petitioner of his right to file a formal petition for review within 21 days of receipt of the final order. Another trooper, Corporal Dwight Wiles, testified that he was allowed to cancel his DROP application after his first month of participation. However, Corporal Wiles did not receive his estimate of benefits until after his first month of participation. Ira L. Gaines testified on behalf of Respondent that the Division's policy allowed all participants to withdraw their application within the month of their eligibility, or within 30 days of receiving their estimate of benefits, whichever was later. Mr. Gaines testified that it was an operational policy of the Division, as it was a new program and there were some 40,000 participants, the estimates of benefits could not always be accomplished by the DROP effective date. Mr. Gaines testified that this was done for the benefit of the members, so that they would have an opportunity to decide if the benefits were enough or if they wanted to continue accruing retirement credits. No formal rules have been adopted by the Division regarding the DROP program because it is still a new program. Mr. Gaines testified that Respondent's DROP Question and Answer memoranda was an internal office operational policy that was necessary to deal with the new program and that the information was not given to members. In fact, the memoranda was marked "DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OUTSIDE THE DIVISION--FOR INTERNAL USE." Mr. Gaines testified that allowing members to change their DROP effective date as they pleased would create a burden on the Division and that his section would be unable to handle the workload. There is no provision in the statute which speaks to withdrawal from the DROP program once participation has begun. Petitioner detrimentally relied upon misrepresentations of fact and/or law by staff of Respondent, who convinced him to withdraw the letter delaying entry into DROP. Respondent's staff had both the appearance of knowledge and authority to make representations on behalf of Respondent. On learning of erroneous information, Petitioner did not sit on his rights. He immediately took action to mitigate his injury by seeking to withdraw from the DROP program. Respondent has adopted policies of general applicability governing administration of DROP entry by members of the Florida Retirement System. Although Respondent has rule-making authority, pursuant to Section 121.091(13)(k), Florida Statutes, these policies have not been adopted as administrative rule pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. They have not been and are not otherwise distributed to members of the FRS or other agencies of Florida government. Rather, the policies are retained for internal use of Respondent. Two of Respondent's unadopted policies adversely affected Petitioner: (1) that of requiring an election to participate in DROP in the month of a Special Risk member's 50th birthday, rather than within 12 months of reaching 50 years of age; and (2) that of restricting withdrawal of a DROP application to the last day of the month of a member's 50th birthday or 30 days following receipt of a DROP estimate.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a final order granting Petitioner's request to withdraw from the Deferred Retirement Option Program, without loss of eligibility upon repayment of any retirement contributions. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry G. Traynham, Esquire Patterson & Traynham Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Ron Poppell, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Chief Legal Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
