The Issue Whether Petitioners should remain eligible for entitlement to a new quota alcoholic beverage license in St. Lucie County, Florida under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: On December 4, 1989 the Petitioners filed an application for inclusion in the drawing for a new quota alcoholic beverage license for St. Lucie County, Florida in accordance with Section 561.19(2), Florida Statutes. The application to participate in the drawing was properly and timely filed on DBR Form 747L, entitled, "Preliminary Application for New Quota Alcoholic Beverage License". Paragraph 4 of the General Instructions of DBR Form 747L, advised the applicants as follows: This is Part One of a two (2) part applica- tion. The Division will only accept final application (Part Two) and award licenses to those persons listed on the application, provided such persons are qualified under the beverage laws and are successful in the drawing. On March 29, 1990, the Respondent held a drawing in Tallahassee, Florida for 163 new quota liquor licenses. Petitioners were selected as a preliminary applicant for a new quota license in St. Lucie County. On April 6, 1990, the Petitioners were mailed a certified letter entitled "Notice of Selection" advising the Petitioners of their selection as preliminary applicants for a new quota liquor license in St. Lucie County. Petitioners received this letter on April 9, 1990. This letter clearly advises the Petitioners: that an application for either a "grant" or an "issuance" of a license must be filed; of the difference between "grant" and "issuance"; that a complete application for a "grant" or "issuance" must be filed within 45 days of the date of the letter which is calculated to be May 21 ,1990; that failure to timely file such applica- tion shall be deemed a waiver of the Peti- tioners' right to file for a new quota license and; of the immediacy of contacting the District 10 office in Ft. Pierce, Florida to obtain instructions and, if necessary, answer questions. On or about April 17, 1990 John Clark, Petitioners' employee went to the District 10 office in Fort Pierce and discussed with Irene Wahlenmeyer the suitability of a location of a former lounge. There was no evidence that Clark discussed the May 21, 1990 deadline for applying for the new quota liquor license with Wahlenmeyer at this time. On April 18, 1990 Petitioner, Owen Young contacted the District 10 office by phone and talked to Wahlenmeyer concerning the procedural aspects of applying for a new quota liquor license including the procedural aspects of applying for a "grant" of a license as opposed to applying for the "issuance" of a license. There is insufficient evidence to show that Wahlenmeyer suggested or implied that the Petitioners should apply for the "issuance" of a license as opposed to applying for a "grant" of a license. During the telephone conversation with Wahlenmeyer on April 28, 1990, Petitioner, Owen Young discussed with Wahlenmeyer the suitability of a location of a former lounge known as "Fanny's" and, the potential lease of this property. This was the same location discussed by Clark on April 17, 1990. There is no evidence that either of the Petitioners had any further contact with any of Respondent's employees subsequent to April 18, 1990 and prior to May 21, 1990, the final deadline to submit an application for a new quota liquor license. Although Petitioners' employee Clark visited the District 10 office sometime between May 10, 1990 and June 5, 1990, there is insufficient evidence to show that this visit was prior to May 21, 1990. Subsequent to April 18, 1990 Owen Young began work on the application process by publishing a fictitious name, applying for an occupational license and obtaining a distance waiver from the zoning board as to the Fanny's location. Additionally, Petitioners entered into a lease for the Fanny's location, expended considerable sums of money on remodeling and obligated themselves to a monthly expenditure of approximately $2,500.00 per month. There is no evidence that either of the Petitioners or Clark, on behalf of Petitioners, contacted the District 10 office or any of Respondent's other offices or any of Respondent's employees subsequent to April 6, 1990, the date of the notice of selection letter and prior to June 5, 1990, the date of the Notice of Intent to Disapprove letter inquiring as to the significance of the deadline date of May 21, 1990 or requesting an extension or waiver of the deadline date. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Wahlenmeyer or any of Respondent's other employees advised, suggested or implied that the May 21, 1990 deadline date could be or would be extended or waived. On June 5, 1990 a letter entitled, Notice of Intent to Disapprove was mailed to the Petitioners advising them that: (a) their application for a new quota liquor license had not been filed within the prescribed time period of 45 days from April 6, 1990 the date the Notice of Selection had been mailed; (b) it was Respondent's intent to deny the Petitioners' entitlement to apply for a new quota liquor license in St. Lucie County; (c) they were given until June 18, 1990 to respond as to why this entitlement should not be disapproved and; (d) this time period to respond should not be considered as an extension of the time originally granted to file the application. On June 8, 1990 Petitioners filed an Application for the Grant of a New Quota Liquor License with the District 10 office in Fort Pierce. This application was forwarded to Respondent's central office on an "Application Transmittal Form" which indicated a recommendation of approval by the District 10 office Investigator, Irene Wahlenmeyer on June 8, 1990 and her supervisor, Bob Young on January 11, 1990. Bob Young later withdrew his recommendation of approval. There is insufficient evidence to show why Young withdrew his initial recommendation of approval. On June 25, 1990, a letter entitled, "Notice of Disapproval" was sent to Petitioners from Respondent advising the Petitioners that their entitlement to apply for a new quota liquor license had been disapproved. The reasons stated for the disapproval was the failure of the Petitioners to timely file a complete application within the 45 days required by Section 561.19, Florida Statutes. On or about July 5, 1990 the Petitioner, Owen Young contacted Schoenfeld via telephone and followed up with a letter on July 6, 1990 concerning the "Notice of Intent to Disapprove" and the "grant" of a license application filed on June 8, 1990. Schoenfeld responded with an investigation of the matter with the assistance of Captain D. L. Gray of the West Palm Beach district office. Gray's investigation concluded with a memorandum dated July 16, 1990 wherein Gray advised Schoenfeld that while the Fort Pierce office should not have accepted the application for grant of license from Petitioners or recommended approval, the notice of disapproval of June 25, 1990 was justified. Respondent did not consider the application for grant of license filed on June 8, 1990 as being a completed application and as of December 6, 1990 the Petitioners have not filed any other application for a new quota alcoholic beverage license. Respondent has extended the deadline date or re-initiated the application process where it was shown that the Respondent had incorrectly advised an applicant or had lost an application resulting in the applicant's untimely filing of an application. The purpose of the "Notice of Intent To Disapprove" is to allow the applicant the opportunity to point out to the Respondent its error. There is insufficient evidence to show that Petitioners' failure to timely file their application was due to any incorrect advise given them by the Respondent notwithstanding Petitioners' contention that they were advised to apply for an issuance of a license as opposed to a grant of a license. In any event, the Petitioners neither requested nor were they advised by the Respondent that the deadline date could or would be waived or extended.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order finding that the Petitioners have waived their entitlement to apply for a new quota liquor license. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4470 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Sections 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner 1. - 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1 as modified. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 except the date was March 29, 1990 instead of April 6, 1990. - 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. - 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 but clarified. 8. - 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 but clarified. 10. - 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7 but clarified. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. - 19. Restatement of testimony and not of Finding of Fact but see Finding of Fact 14. 20. - 21. Not material or relevant. Third sentence adopted in Finding of Fact 10 otherwise not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12 as clarified otherwise not material or relevant. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Facts Submitted by Respondent 1. 7. - 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, and 10, respectively. Not material or relevant. 8. - 10. Adopted in Findings of Facts 11, 12, and 13, respectively. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard Ivey, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Joseph Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Eric S. Haug, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 James P. McCollum, Esquire 129 South Commerce Avenue Sebring, FL 33870
Findings Of Fact The first paragraph of charges in the Amended Notice to Show Cause reads as follows: That you, P & D SOUTH OF MARTIN COUNTY, INC. d/b/a STAGE EAST, licensed under the beverage laws of the State of Florida as a licensed vendor holding a SRX series license, did in the year of 1982, violate the beverage laws, to wit: you failed to maintain as 51 percent of your gross revenue the sale of food and non- alcoholic beverages, based upon the average monthly gross revenue for the period 12/81 to 12/82, contrary to F.S. 561.20(2)(a)(3), Rules 7A-3.14 and 7A-3.15(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code. In the Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation and again at the commencement of the formal hearing in this cause, Respondent admitted the violation alleged in that paragraph. Also at the commencement of the formal hearing, Petitioner dismissed with prejudice the charges contained within paragraphs numbered too and three of the Amended Notice to Show Cause. The case therefore proceeded forward for the presentation of evidence in aggravation or in mitigation of any penalty to be imposed against Respondent. Respondent corporation, P & D South of Martin County, Inc., does business as Stage East and is the holder of alcoholic beverage license No. 53- 352, Series 6-COP SRX. Stage East opened for business on November 25, 1981, at 200 South Dixie Highway, Stuart, Martin County, Florida. When Richard Pouser, Respondent's president, applied for an alcoholic beverage license, he spoke with Beverage Officer Richard White. White explained to Pouser that an SRX license is a special license, carrying with it a requirement that the restaurant derive at least 51 percent of its gross revenue from the sale of food and nonalcoholic beverages. Pouser advised White that Respondent intended to obtain an unrestricted quota license as soon as one became available in Martin County. When Respondent prepared to open Stage East, it leased a building containing two separate portions of space. It was Respondent's intention from the initial creation of its new business to open the first section of the restaurant as an area also geared to entertaining persons under the age of 50. In that section, Respondent has electronic games, televisions, pool tables, a dance and bandstand area, and two bars. There are approximately 25 tables in the "back bar" area and approximately 40 tables in the front or bandstand area. Full food service is available in both areas. In this section, Respondent also provides either recorded or live musical entertainment every day, ranging from local musical talent to "mini-concerts" by groups or individuals with national or international recognition. The second section of Stage East, which comprises an additional 4,000 square feet, is to be a family-type food service area, analogous to a "Bennigan's" style of restaurant. Only the first section of Stage East was opened on November 25, 1981, and Respondent continued its preparations to open the second section also. Respondent filed its plans for the proposed second section and application for a building permit and zoning approval with the City of Stuart on January 4, 1982. The City denied Respondent's application the same day, citing as its reason "inadequate parking." After Respondent expended substantial monies for legal fees and engineering studies, zoning approval was finally obtained in June 1983. The evidence is uncontroverted that the City had no legal basis for its denial of Respondent's application; rather, certain members of the City Commission personally did not approve of an establishment like Stage East. In February 1982, Beverage Officer White received an anonymous complaint that Respondent was not meeting its 51 percent requirement. He visited the premises and, upon examining the cash register receipts and food tickets, ascertained that only approximately 25 to 30 percent of Respondent's business had been from the sale of food and nonalcoholic beverages. On February 9, 1982, White served on Pouser an Official Notice with a compliance deadline of August 9, 1982. On September 15, 1982, White returned to Stage East to make a compliance inspection. After speaking with Pouser and ascertaining that the 51 percent requirement was still not being met, White issued a second Official Notice. Although that Notice contained a compliance deadline of January 1, 1983, White returned to Stage East on December 23, 1982, met with Pouser, and reviewed Respondent's records. A cursory examination revealed that Respondent still had not met the 51 percent requirement. Between the time that White first advised Pouser of the 51 percent requirement and the date of the formal hearing in this cause, Respondent attempted to obtain a quota license, which carries no requirements as to food consumption on the premises. For a year, Respondent advertised daily in the Stuart newspaper that it wished to purchase a quota license. Respondent contacted Beverage Officer White, liquor distributors, and owners of quota licenses in Martin County to ascertain if they had a quota license for sale or if they knew someone who did. During this time, the quota license for Harper's became available. The license holder asked $250,000 cash, Respondent offered $200,000 cash, and Walgreen's purchased Harper's license for $215,000. By the time of the formal hearing in this cause, Respondent had entered into favorable negotiations for the SR license at Boston's. Although Respondent had inquired whether Petitioner would permit the transfer of Boston's license to Respondent, Petitioner had not answered Respondent's inquiry at the time this cause was heard. In addition to taking steps to expand its restaurant area and to obtain an alternate license throughout the time period in question, Respondent did all it could to encourage its customers to purchase food so that Respondent could meet the 51 percent requirement to which its license was subject. Respondent hired an experienced chef and additional kitchen staff in order to offer a larger variety of food at lower prices. Respondent changed its menu to add "quicker" foods and advertised its menu in the Stuart News. Respondent opened for lunch and advertised its daily luncheon specials; advertised its food service when advertising its new "happy hours" and those prices; opened for breakfast after 2:00 a.m.; advertised its dinner programs; hired male dancers to perform during certain hours on Monday nights "for ladies only;" offered discount Prices for women on Tuesdays for "ladies night;" and attempted to attract an older crowd on Sundays by providing a buffet and a Dixieland band or "the big band sound." Respondent increased its radio advertising to six to eight ads a week, sometimes advertising as a restaurant with a nightclub and sometimes only as a restaurant. Although Respondent had on its premises during 1982 sufficient foods, utensils, and personnel to serve everything on its menus, Respondent started a nightly buffet which was either self-service or could be served by a waitress. The cost of the buffet depended upon the day of the week, with ladies paying a small price on Tuesdays, ladies' night, for example. Sometimes the cost of the buffet (which is collected as the customer enters the premises) included the customer's alcoholic beverages on an "all you care to consume" basis, and sometimes the customer paid for his alcoholic beverages in addition to paying for the buffet. On the evening before the formal hearing, the buffet cost $10, and the price of drinks was not included. Since Respondent opened Stage East, it has made continuing good faith efforts to encourage the purchase of food at its premises, to add the "Bennigan's" family-style restaurant, and to obtain an alternate license without the 51 percent requirement. During the three-month period immediately before the formal hearing, Respondent approached, just exceeded, and then just missed the 51-percent mark.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the charge in paragraph numbered one of the Amended Notice to Show Cause, dismissing with prejudice the charges in paragraphs numbered two and three of the Amended Notice to Show Cause, and imposing a civil penalty in the amount of $1,000 to be paid by Respondent within 30 days of the entry of the Final Order in this cause. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: John A. Boggs, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles L. Curtis, Esquire 1177 Northeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Gary R. Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Summit Application. By correspondence dated February 25, 1987, Summit was advised by the Division that it was one of the preliminary applicants selected in the drawing held February 18, 1987, for an available quota license in Hillsborough County. The letter clearly stated that Summit had forty-five days to file a full and complete application with the Division. Summit was given notice that failure to do so within that time frame would be deemed a waiver of its right to apply for the quota license. On July 1, 1987, Summit wrote to the Division requesting an extension of time in which to obtain zoning approval for the location sought to be licensed in Hillsborough County. Summit recited various zoning problems it was experiencing which might necessitate the filing of an amended application with an alternative location. On July 10, 1987, the Division notified Summit of its long-standing policy to grant extensions where a "good faith effort" was demonstrated by an applicant. Summit was further advised to contact the Division's Tampa Office and that the Division was prohibited by statute from granting an extension beyond August 17, 1987, the one hundred and eightieth day from the date of selection of Summit as a preliminary applicant, i.e., February 18, 1987. On August 4, 1987, the Division notified Summit that it would be granted an extension to submit an amended application no later than August 17, 1987. Summit failed to file an amended application by August 17, 1987. On September 1, 1987, the Division denied Summit's license application on the ground that there was no properly zoned location in which to place the license. On September 20, 1987, Summit requested an informal proceeding in accordance with Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. Paragraph six of this request indicated Summit's belief that there were no disputed issues of material fact. On November 2, 1987, the Division entered a Recommended Order, which recommended denial of Summit's license. On January 19, 1988, the Division by Final Order, adopted the recommendation and denied Summit's license. It was not until May 5, 1988, when Summit attempted to introduce certain factual matters on appeal, that the parties became aware of potential disputed facts. The Peterson Application. In January of 1984, Peterson submitted a preliminary application for a new quota alcoholic beverage licensed in Hillsborough County, Florida. By correspondence dated July 17, 1987, Peterson was advised by the Division that he had been selected as an alternative preliminary applicant for a quota liquor license in Hillsborough County. 1/ The correspondence also notified Peterson that he had forty-five days in which to file a full and complete application in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 7A- 2.017. Peterson also was personally familiar with the Division's license application process in that he had assisted his father in filing the Summit application. Peterson notified the Division by letter dated September 20, 1987, that during late July or early August, 1987, he had received the Division's July 17, 1987, notification. Peterson further advised of his change of address and asked that any future correspondence be mailed to his new address in Tampa. At no time prior to license denial did Peterson request an extension of time in which to file a license application. On September 29, 1987, the Division issued a Notice of Intent to Disapprove Peterson's license due to his failure to timely submit an application for the same. On October 7, 1987, Peterson first notified the Division that his failure to timely file an application was due to zoning problems in Hillsborough County. On October 21, 1987, the Division notified Peterson that his license application had been denied because he failed to file a full and complete application within the prescribed forty-five day time period. Peterson timely requested a hearing, indicating his uncertainty as to whether there were disputed issues of material fact, and the matter was scheduled for an informal proceeding on January 8, 1988. In lieu of appearing at the informal hearing, Peterson elected to provide the Division with written documentation and legal argument in response to the license denial. On February 23, 1988, the Division entered a Recommended Order, which recommended license denial. On May 19, 1988, the Division entered its Final Order which adopted the Division's prior recommendation of license denial. Zoning in Hillsborough County. The Beverage Law requires an application for a quota license to include a properly zoned location for operation of the license to be issued. To find a suitable location, the applicant must follow up leads on locations. In light of the $75,000 to $200,000 investment the applicant will be making in the business, it is reasonable for the applicant to want to conduct traffic counts and preview the competitive environment. The applicant then must negotiate a lease. To be considered proper, a location in Hillsborough County must be commercially zoned as well as "wet-zoned." In order to obtain wet-zoning, one must go through the zoning process in Hillsborough County. Just to apply for the zoning change, there are substantial expenses that must be paid by the applicant. The zoning application in Hillsborough County is more extensive, and the zoning laws are more complicated, than in many other counties in Florida. Typically, the application cannot be completed on one visit to the zoning office. Summit picked up its application in early March, 1987, and filed it on March 31, 1987. A hearing was scheduled before a zoning hearing officer on June 4, 1987, but the hearing was postponed to June 18, 1987. At the hearing, several neighbors appeared and opposed the application. The zoning hearing officer decided that the application should be granted, but the final decision was for the Hillsborough County Board of Commissioners to make. This hearing was scheduled for July 28, 1987, and the Board's final decision was to deny the application. When Summit saw the extent of the opposition to its wet-zoning application at the June 18, 1987, hearing, it became concerned about the eventual outcome and began looking for alternative locations. It also apprised the Division of its situation and was told that, if it was acting and continued to act in good faith, it could file an amended application with a suitable location with a "reasonable chance" of being properly zoned, so long as the amended application was filed by August 17, 1987, the 180-day deadline. When the zoning hearing officer recommended approval of wet-zoning for Summit, Summit suspended its search for an alternative location. When the Board denied wet- zoning, Summit tried to no avail to secure another properly zoned location. Peterson, who was directly involved in his father's efforts to secure a location for Summit, decided not to even try to do so when he was notified of his selection as an alternate preliminary applicant. In certain counties, including, but not limited to, Hillsborough County, the failure rate to comply with the 45-day rule is higher than in other counties. In Hillsborough County, it is difficult to find a location that is already properly zoned. A properly zoned location must be already zoned commercial and, in addition, must be wet-zoned in Hillsborough County. Summit and Peterson presented evidence that it had called officials from ten of 15 randomly chosen counties to inquire about their zoning requirements and the failure rate for applicants trying to obtain a wet-zoned location. All of the officials from the other counties relayed that in their experience and to their knowledge, no applications were denied once submitted. Hillsborough County, Florida, was the only county of those contacted that denied applications once submitted. There are 67 counties and over 500 municipalities in Florida that have various kinds of zoning laws with which applicants for a quota license must comply. Although some applicants from Hillsborough County have experienced difficulty with zoning, seven of the 18 original preliminary applicants in the 1984 Hillsborough County drawing found properly zoned locations within 45 days, and in the 1987 drawing, 14 of the 18 original preliminary applicants found properly zoned locations within 45 days. It was not proven that zoning difficulties are unique to Hillsborough County. To the contrary, the evidence shows examples of other jurisdictions in which local zoning recently presented difficulties for applicants -- parking restrictions in the City of North Miami Beach and liquor store restrictions in the City of Apalachicola. Originally, there was no 45-day rule for applications to be submitted. The 45-day period was chosen so that the Division would have ample time to perform its investigation before the 180-day period expired.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that both Summit's and Peterson's applications for a new quota liquor license be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of February, 1989 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 1989.
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for transfer of an alcoholic beverage license should be granted, or denied on the ground that the license has been revoked.
Findings Of Fact On January 25, 1977, Armando Calo, through counsel, filed a Notice of Lien with DABT stating that he was a bona fide mortgagee on an alcoholic beverage license (4-COP, lic. no. 23-1901) held by the Intimo Lounge, Inc., 1601 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida. Citing Section 561.65, Florida Statutes, he enclosed a copy of his chattel mortgage and a check payable to DABT in the amount of $5.00. (P-1) By return letter dated February 4, 1977, C. L. Ivey, Jr., DABT's Licensing Supervisor, acknowledged receipt of Mr. Calo's Notice of Lien and stated that it would be made part of the Intimo Lounge, Inc. license file. At that time, administrative license revocation proceedings were pending against Intimo Lounge, Inc. So Mr. Ivey sent a copy of his February 4, 1977 acknowledgment letter to DABT's Miami Office, and included this notation: P.S. John: You need to immediately notify Attorney Solomon's [Calo's attorney's] office if and when an order to revoke is issued. He will then go to court to seek a judicial transfer. (P-2) On March 22, 1977, Charles A. Nuzum, DABT's Director, executed an order revoking Intimo Lounge, Inc.`s alcoholic beverage license. (R-1) Eight days later, on March 30, 1977, Armando Calo sued Intimo Lounge, Inc., seeking to foreclose his chattel mortgage on its alcoholic beverage license. By letter of the same date, counsel for Mr. Calo, citing Section 561.65, Florida Statutes, notified DABT of the filing of the foreclosure action; he also asserted that Mr. Calo had no knowledge of or participation in the causes for which the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license was revoked. Copies of subsequent pleadings filed in the action were sent to DABT's legal department. DABT thus knew the suit was filed and was aware of its continued progress. (Testimony of Barone; P-3, P-4, P-11) The Circuit Court of Dade County ultimately entered a final judgment of foreclosure in Mr. Calo's favor. On August 17, 1979, pursuant to such judgment, the Clerk of the Court sold the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license, at public sale, to intervenor Rene Valdes, 1710 N.W. 7th Street, Suite 7201, Miami, Florida for $25,000. Notice of the sale was published in the Miami Review, a newspaper circulated in Dade County. On August 28, 1979, the Clerk issued a Certificate of Title pursuant to Chapter 45, Florida Statutes. This Certificate certified that Intimo Lounge, Inc.`s alcoholic beverage license (4-COP, license no. 23-1901) had been sold to Rene Valdes on August 17, 1979, and that "no objections to the sale have been filed within the time allowed for filing objections." (Testimony of Valdes; P-5, P-6) Although DABT was aware of the protracted mortgage foreclosure litigation involving the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license --which it had earlier revoked -- it never protested or sought to block the foreclosure action. It was not a party to the action; neither did it attempt to become one. (Testimony of Barone, Valdes) In September, 1979, a month after the judicial foreclosure sale, Nathaniel Barone, counsel for Intimo Lounge, Inc., wrote R. B. Burroughs, Jr., Secretary of the Department of Business Regulation, asking what steps were necessary to keep the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license viable. An internal memorandum suggests that DABT was, at first, unprepared to answer that question and preferred, instead, to delay answering until an application for the license was filed. But, on October 4, 1979, Harold F. X. Purnell, the Department's General Counsel replied on behalf of Secretary Burroughs: It is the Division's position that the . . . license has been and presently is revoked pursuant to the actions pre- viously taken by [DABT]. Further, that in the absence of an order of appropriate jurisdiction entered in a proceeding to which the Division is a party we are powerless to transfer such license. (Testimony of Barone; P-7, P-10) Meanwhile, Rene Valdes, notified DABT of his purchase of the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license and asked that it be held in escrow while he found a suitable purchaser and location. When DABT refused, Mr. Valdes petitioned the court, which had rendered the foreclosure judgment, to require DABT to process and transfer the license. The court denied his petition, at least in part, because DABT was not a party to the proceeding. After the court hearing, Mr. Valdes, together with his attorney, Charles Kelly, and DABT's counsel, Mr. Purnell, met outside the chambers and discussed their next step. Mr. Kelly discussed seeking a mandamus ordering DABT to issue the license. Mr. Purnell suggested, instead, that Mr. Valdes find a location and purchaser for the license, then submit an application to DABT -- something which Mr. Valdes had not yet done. Although Mr. Purnell did not assure them that the application would be approved, both Mr. Valdes and Mr. Barone gained an impression that it would be. 2/ Mr. Valdes, following Mr. Purnell's suggestion, found a location and buyer, then applied for a transfer of the license. DABT's denial resulted in this proceeding. (Testimony of Barone, Valdes) Under Section 561.65(1), Florida Statutes (1977), a lender licensed by the state holding a lien on an alcoholic beverage license had the right to enforcement of his lien against the license within 12 days after any order of revocation, provided it was revoked for causes which the lienholder had no knowledge and did not participate. If the lienholder purchased the license at foreclosure sale, he could operate under it or transfer it to a qualified person. Until August 17, 1980, it was DABT's long-standing practice and policy to make no distinction between licensed and unlicensed lenders (lien-holders). It allowed both licensed and unlicensed lienholders to file notice of liens against beverage licenses and honored the subsequent transfer of the license if the lien was enforced within 12 days of revocation. This practice was abruptly changed on the basis of an agency legal opinion. On August 17, 1980, one month before Gui-Dom filed its application, DABT's General Counsel rendered a legal opinion limiting Section 561.65 relief to lenders licensed by the state. After that date, until 1981, when the legislature removed the "licensed lender" language of Section 561.65, DABT applied Section 561.65 literally and only accepted liens filed by licensed lenders. (Testimony of LaRosa; P-13) But in October, 1980, DABT did not deny Gui-Dom's application for transfer of the Intimo Lounge, Inc. license because Armando Calo, the lienholder, lacked a lender's license. Instead, the application was denied because the license had been earlier revoked. As later explained by Barry Schoenfeld, DABT's Chief of Licensing: 2 [DABT] felt at the time that . . . there really was no license, that the license had already been revoked, and that there was no license for the court to sell [to Valdes]. (P-13, p. 25). But Section 561.65 specifically permits liens, under specified conditions, to survive license revocation. When asked to explain DABT's position in light of Section 561.65, Mr. Schoenfeld replied, "I don't know that I can explain it." (P-13, p. 16) Neither could Mr. Schoenfeld adequately explain why, in cases similar to this, DABT has approved license transfers while, here, they have not. (P-13, p. 23) It was not until after the denial of Gui-Dom's application that DABT contended that Section 561.65, Florida Statutes (1977), provides no relief because Armando Calo was not a licensed lender. (P- 9, P-13). Rene Valdes, a beverage license broker, operates a business known as "Beverage License, Inc." He specializes in obtaining and transferring alcoholic beverage licenses for clients and has a working knowledge of the Beverage Law, including DABT rules and practice. When he purchased the Intimo Lounge, Inc. license at the judicial sale, he did not know that it had been revoked by DABT. He did, however, know that there was license revocation litigation between Intimo Lounge, Inc. and DABT. He also knew that DABT had issued an emergency order suspending Intimo Lounge, Inc.'s license; and he knew that there were circuit court foreclosure proceedings involving the license. Yet he failed to ascertain the status of the license -- either by checking the files of DABT or the circuit court. But even if he had discovered that the license had been revoked, under DABT's long-standing practice and interpretation of Section 561.65, it would have made no difference. The license would have "survived" revocation because Armando Calo had timely enforced his lien. And it could have been sold at a judicial sale and transferred to a new qualified purchaser. (Testimony of Valdes, Harris; P-13) DABT has provided no record foundation for its abrupt discontinuance of prior agency practice and policy in August, 1980, a policy which allowed both licensed and unlicensed lien holders to file and timely enforce liens against beverage licenses. This policy enabled a lien to survive license revocation; and the license, which had been revoked earlier could then be transferred by judicial sale. The only explanation given for the change in policy, a change which DABT now relies on as cause for denying Gui-Dom's application, is that the agency changed its legal interpretation of Section 561.65 (1977). (Testimony of LaRosa; P-13)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Gui-Dom's application for transfer of alcoholic beverage license no. 23-1901, series 4-COP, be granted. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1983.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner may be issued a 2-COP License to operate a business to be known as the 101 Club located at 424 North 11th Street, Palatka, Florida.
Findings Of Fact On September 21, 1987, Petitioner, Johnnie Lee Simmons, submitted a completed application for a new permanent and temporary 2-COP (beer and wine) alcoholic beverage license(s) to the Respondent, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (DABT) at DABT's Gainesville, Florida District Office. The application involved the proposed "101 Club, located at 424 North 11th Street, Palatka, Putnam County, Florida." At the time Petitioner submitted the application(s) he was issued a temporary ninety-day license, numbered 64-00378. By the terms on the face of this first or initial temporary license, it expired on December 19, 1987. This first or initial temporary license likewise indicated on its face that it would expire upon disapproval of the pending permanent license application. The application listed Willie Lee Simmons, Sr., the Petitioner's father, as having a direct interest in the "101 Club" through a personal loan of $1,000.00 by which Petitioner would finance the "101 Club". Also in the Personal Questionnaire portion of the application, Petitioner admitted that he and his father had once held beverage license number 64-00029 for the "Palatka Blue Diamond", a bar previously located at the same address and location as the proposed "101 Club", and further admitted that the prior license had been revoked. Other "Personal Questionnaires" were also submitted simultaneously with, and as part of, the initial application. These had been completed by Petitioner's wife; the father, Willie Lee Simmons, Sr.; and Willie Lee Simmons, Sr.`s wife because the property at 424 North 11th Street, Palatka, Florida is owned together by these four family members. Petitioner and his father, Willie Lee Simmons, Sr., were formerly co- license holders for the "Palatka Blue Diamond". The revocation of that prior license was based upon Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Willie Lee and G. L. Simmons d/b/a Palatka Blue Diamond, DOAH Case No. 83-3023, resulting in a July 12, 1984 Final Order, which was upheld on appeal to the First District Court of Appeal in Simmons v. Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages, 465 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The First District Court of Appeal found, "[T]here was competent substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's findings that the underlying violations had occurred. We also conclude there was sufficient evidence of flagrant, persistent and recurring violations from which the hearing officer could infer that the licensees failed to supervise the premises in a reasonably diligent manner and thus, were culpable." Significant and material undisturbed findings of fact contained in the underlying Recommended Order of that case were that "Respondents did keep a public nuisance on the licensed premises by maintaining it as a place visited by persons for the unlawful use or sale of a controlled substance [marijuana], in violation of Section 823.10, F.S." The hearing officer specifically found that although Petitioner might not have been on the premises of the "Palatka Blue Diamond" when drug sales and gambling were going on, he surely knew about these activities from conversations with his wife who tended bar there. When Petitioner submitted the initial license application for the "101 Club" on September 21, 1987, Sgt. Homer Scroggin, DABT Supervisor of the Gainesville Sub-District, already knew the Petitioner and had knowledge about the revocation proceedings against Petitioner's prior license for the "Palatka Blue Diamond". He led Petitioner to believe that the prior revocation would not impede the new license application for the "101 Club", but he made no specific promise or guarantee of licensure. On December 1, 1987, seventy-one days after receiving Petitioner's application, DABT issued a written request to Petitioner for information concerning an alleged arrest in North Carolina. Subsequently, on December 16, 1987, DABT issued Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Disapprove his application for permanent licensure for failure to furnish information on the alleged North Carolina arrest. On December 23, 1987, ninety-three days after the license application and four days after the first temporary license had expired, but prior to the agency's completing its background checks, DABT's Gainesville office issued Petitioner the second of five temporary licenses. Also on that day, Petitioner signed a waiver, reading: I, Johnnie Lee Simmons, do hereby wave [sic) the 90 day period for my beverage license Sgt. Scroggin testified that if the Petitioner had not signed the foregoing waiver, he, Sgt. Scroggin, would have denied the Petitioner's application for a permanent 2-COP license at that point in time, December 23, 1987, because DABT cannot grant a license without receiving information concerning fingerprints and that information had not arrived. While it is clear that Sgt. Scroggin, told this to Petitioner, thereby inducing him to sign the waiver, the statement itself is erroneous and not credible because the thrust of the entire remainder of Sgt. Scroggin's testimony, the greater weight of the documentary evidence, and much of the testimony of DABT Licensing Bureau Chief, Barry Schoenfeld, is that Sgt. Scroggin's recommendations from the District are not binding on the Bureau of Licensing, located in Tallahassee, that the ultimate decision to grant or deny an application is made by Schoenfeld unless a prior revocation is involved, and that in unusual circumstances, such as appearance of a prior revocation history, an entire committee review procedure, culminating in the signature of the Director of DABT, Leonard Ivey's signature, was in place, and that in each alternative situation, Sgt. Scroggin was only the first recommender.1/ Moreover, the specific terms of the December 16, 1987 Notice of Intent to Disapprove is contrary to Sgt. Scroggin's December 23, 1987 statement to the Petitioner/applicant. That document provided, in pertinent part: The purpose of this letter is to notify you of our intention to recommend disapproval of your application for a license as referenced above. We are giving you ten (10) days in which to correct the deficiencies or supply additional documentation to correct the reason(s) for the recommended disapproval as indicated on the reverse of this letter. The response must be received or postmarked no later than ten (10) days from the date of this letter. If you have not complied within this time period the application will be sent to the Bureau of Licensing and Records in Tallahassee to be disapproved. No amendments or supplements will be accepted after this ten (10) day period unless specifically requested by the Division. Any documentation submitted after this period will be returned. XXX The application is deficient as indicated: 14 day letter was sent to applicant requesting disposition on case #FL0540000 Offense #4999, to date we have not heard from applicant as to his ability to clear up this matter. 14 day letter was dated on December 1, 1987. Despite the agency's characterization of this December 16, 1987 document (R-4, page 2), as an "intent to disapprove/deny," it is clearly nothing more than a repeated untimely agency request for the same information already untimely requested on December 1 (R- 4, page 1; see Finding of Fact No. 6, supra.) It is an untimely request for information, and not a denial of the permanent application. It also is clearly misleading to the applicant concerning his rights with regard to time limits which had become effective by operation of law. It specifically represents that Petitioner had until December 25 to prevent denial of his application, when in fact, the 90-day statutory period starting with the initial application date would lapse on December 20. It is also noted that Schoenfeld and Scroggin agreed, with regard to a subsequent Notice of Intent to Disapprove, that such a notice does not constitute final agency action; therefore, it is clear that both these notices in December, 1987 could not be "final" either. For these reasons and for the reasons set forth in the following Conclusions of Law, Sgt. Scroggin's statement was an erroneous legal conclusion, which either by error or design misled the Petitioner. Sgt. Scroggin also led Petitioner to believe that a backlog in license processing was the reason he needed the waiver signed. Petitioner was subsequently issued three more temporary licenses on March 31, 1988, June 30, 1988, and September 27, 1988. All five temporary licenses clearly notified Petitioner that they expired 90 days from issuance and would expire if the permanent license application were disapproved. The December 23 license lapsed March 22, nine days before the issuance of the March 31 license. The March 31 license lapsed June 28, two days before the June 30 license was issued. All the temporary licenses were issued without fee and permitted Petitioner to continue to operate his bar/nightclub, the "101 Club", pending further license processing which included out of state arrest inquiries, FBI fingerprint processing, and further background checks. Approximately January 22, 1988, the criminal background checks on all four members of Petitioner's family were completed and determined to be no impediment to licensure. On February 4, 1988, Sgt. Scroggin recommended that Tallahassee DABT approve the Petitioner's application and that it issue the requested permanent license. On or about May 18, 1988, Sgt. Scroggin received a memorandum from Mr. Schoenfeld questioning Sgt. Scroggin's February 4 favorable recommendation. Sgt. Scroggin then reconsidered and recommended that Petitioner's application should be disapproved for several reasons. At formal hearing, however, Sgt. Scroggin was unable to provide any evidence supportive of the allegations/reasons contained in this disapproval recommendation. Rather, and contrariwise to those allegations, Sgt. Scroggin admitted that his Gainesville office had received no complaints of any kind relating to the "101 Club" during the 15 months it had operated on its five temporary licenses; that he had, subsequent to his disapproval recommendation, determined that only one police incident report involving the "101 Club" had ever been made; and that that single report had been made by a customer whose boyfriend had slapped her. The DABT witnesses concede that this incident report does not reflect badly in any way on any "101 Club" principal and would not preclude issuing the license. On August 4, 1988, DABT sent Petitioner its "Amended Notice of Intent to Disapprove," naming Petitioner's prior "Palatka Blue Diamond" license revocation as the reason for disapproval. By the terms of that Amended Notice, and in response to it, Petitioner's attorney timely submitted further information, and Sgt. Scroggin, untimely, but by August 19, 1988, advised Tallahassee DABT in favor of licensure approval due to the results of his check of local police incident reports. On September 27, 1988, the fifth temporary license was issued to Petitioner with the approval of Tallahassee DABT. On December 1, 1988, Tallahassee DABT issued its final "Notice of Disapproval," citing the prior license revocation and Petitioner's and his father's lack of good moral character as the only reasons for the license denial. The record as a whole clearly shows that the only unfavorable evidence of moral character that DABT had before it with regard to this license application arose out of the prior license revocation 4-5 years before. Petitioner/applicant, Johnnie Lee Simmons, is 40 years old. He has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) of any offense against the beverage laws of Florida, the United States, or any other state; has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) in this state or any other state or the United States of soliciting for prostitution, pandering, letting premises for prostitution, keeping a disorderly place, or illegally dealing in narcotics; and has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) of a felony in this state, or the United States. Willie Lee Simmons, Sr., Petitioner/applicant's 58 year old father and an interested party, also has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) of any offense against the beverage laws of Florida, the United States, or any other state; has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) in this state or any other state or the United States of soliciting for prostitution, pandering, letting premises for prostitution, keeping a disorderly place, or illegally dealing in narcotics; and has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) of a felony in this state, or the United States. Upon the testimony of Dorothy Carter, accountant- bookkeeper for, and long-time friend of, all the Simmons family members, the testimony of Sgt. Scroggin, and admissible hearsay statements of Palatka Chief of Police Hill and Assistant Chief of Police Rowe (P-12), it is found that as of the date of formal hearing, Petitioner and his father respectively have good reputations for honesty, fair dealing, and personal character in the Palatka, Putnam County community. Both men are reputable and responsible business persons, each employing between 25 and 40 migrant laborers. They pay their taxes. They have established credit. Further, upon the record as a whole, it is found that the Simmons father and son, between them, support three Palatka city-league baseball teams and are also engaged in other activities which benefit the community with an emphasis on youth. Also, Johnnie Lee Simmons, the applicant/Petitioner, has long been active in the local chapter of the NAACP and served two years as its President. In so finding, the undersigned has assessed Mrs. Carter's credibility in several respects. First, it is recognized that as a social friend and business associate of all the Simmons family members, her view of them is favorably weighted by that association. Second, her view of the prior license revocation is also affected in their favor by their business and social association. Mrs. Carter has, in her own mind at least, minimized the importance of the prior license revocation by her belief that all wrongdoing in the "Palatka Blue Diamond" occurred while the Simmons men were out-of-town, for the purpose of transporting laborers to northern farms and while they were not physically within the licensed premises providing active management. This belief of Mrs. Carter is directly contrary to the responsibilities imposed by statute, rule, and case law upon beverage licensees who are required to know and to monitor affairs on their premises, but it is accurate in terms of the factual absence of applicant/Petitioner's absence from the "Palatka Blue Diamond" at times crucial to the prior revocation. However, third, and most importantly, it is found that Mrs. Carter was testifying concerning the status of the Simmons mens' affairs, conduct, and character in 1989, 6-7 years after the prior revocation events, 4-5 years after actual revocation, and at a time when other evidence confirms that Petitioner and his father have centralized all their business and community activities within the Palatka community. The moral character of the principals approximately 5 years after the prior revocation, at the time of the new application and the de novo formal hearing, is material and persuasive. Mrs. Carter, as a long-time local resident, has had opportunity and reason to know the current situation, and her testimony that the Simmons father's and son's character (based on her own experience and opinion) is now "good" is credible and unrefuted. Moreover, her conclusion with regard to their good character and reputation (arising from word of mouth in the community) is reinforced by Sgt. Scroggin's investigation and ultimate favorable recommendation, which in turn was based on the customary predicate for "reputation in the community". Mrs. Carter's evidence of current good character is direct and unrefuted. Sgt. Scroggins' testimony is in the nature of reputation testimony but is bolstered by his personal examination of the police incident reports and corroborates the statements/opinions of Palatka's Chief and Assistant Chief of Police, which, though hearsay, are admissible pursuant to Section 120.58 F.S. Sgt. Scroggins' and the officers' opinions are consistent as to reputation with Mrs. Carter's unrefuted opinion as to character.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages, issue a Final Order confirming that the permanent 2 COP beverage license was issued to Petitioner pursuant to operation of law on December 20, 1987. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of September 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1989.
The Issue Whether or not on or about September 30, 1978, the Respondent, Cesar Augustus Rodriguez, his agent, servant or employee did pay for the renewal of his alcoholic beverage license with a check which was later returned, not paid by the bank, marked "Not Sufficient Funds", contrary to Rule 7A-2.15, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact On September 30, 1978, the Respondent, Cesar Rodriguez, issued or caused to be issued a check in the amount of $1,750.00 made in behalf of the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The purpose of this check was to pay for the annual renewal of Respondent's beverage license, Number 39-216, 4-COP, under which the Respondent was trading as Port Tampa Bar. The requirement for payment of the renewal of the license is established by Section 561.27, Florida Statutes. The check for payment was drawn on the Central Bank of Tampa. When presented by the Petitioner for payment, the check was returned on the basis that there were insufficient funds for the check to be honored. The check number in question was check No. 177, drawn on account No. 1049755. The act of tendering payment for the license fee renewal with a check that was returned for insufficient funds constituted a violation of Rule 7A- 2.15, Florida Administrative Code. The facts as stated above were arrived at pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the parties and placed on the record during the process of a formal hearing conducted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Cesar Augustus Rodriguez trading as Port Tampa Bar, be fined in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) for the violation as established in this case, in accordance with the provisions of Subsection 561.29(4), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Cesar Augustus Rodriguez t/a Rene's Lounge 2605 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609
Findings Of Fact By Stipulation filed September 11, 1986, the parties agreed to findings of fact 1-11. Donna Sawyer filed a preliminary application to participate in the state lottery for liquor license on January 20, 1984, on Department of Business Regulation form No. 747L. On September 18, 1984, Donna Sawyer was notified by Respondent that she had been selected in the lottery held on September 12, 1984, to be eligible to apply for a state quota liquor license. That on or about November 2, 1984, Donna Sawyer, acting through her wholly owned corporation, Sarasota County Liquors, Inc., filed a sworn "application for Alcoholic Beverage License" (Department of Business Regulation Form No. 700L), with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. That application included a description of a location which was to be the licensed premises. A Personal Questionaire, Department of Business Regulation Form 710L, was also included by Petitioner with said application. The license application was denied by Respondent on March 8, 1985. The grounds for the denial as stated in the denial letter were Petitioner's failure to provide: (1) proof of right of occupancy to the premises Petitioner was seeking to license; (2) verification of financial investment; (3) business name, and (4) sketch of the premises affixed to the application. On April 10, 1985, Sandra Allen, Esquire, acting on behalf of Petitioner, requested an administrative hearing in order to contest the March 8, 1985, denial of the subject license. Joseph Forbes, Esquire, of Gainesville, Florida, was then retained by Petitioner to resolve the denial of the requested license, which was then pending before the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, as an informal administrative proceeding, pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. In this capacity, Forbes, among other things filed a Motion for Continuance and Stipulation in this case attached to a June 6, 1985 cover letter. Forbes thereafter reached an agreement in the informal proceeding with Thomas Klein, Esquire, then counsel of record for Respondent, evidenced by letter dated October 1, 1985, which in its relevant portions indicated: This is to continue our telephone conversation of October 1, 1985, in which the following was discussed and agreed upon: Sarasota Liquors - your client will have 45 days from the date of this letter to cure the defects set forth in the March 8, 1985 letter of denial. Please direct your client to respond to the Tallahassee office. In order to rectify the original deficiencies causing the license denial, Petitioner re-filed an Application for Alcoholic Beverage License, Department of Business Regulation Form 700L, including exhibits, with Respondent, on or about November 13, 1985. Petitioner's re-filed license application was denied by Respondent on February 19, 1986, for two reasons: (1) "Application incomplete as applicant does not have right of occupancy to the premises for which she is seeking to license," and (2) "Division is unable to fully investigate applicant's financial documentation." On or about November 4, 1985, while searching for a location to submit as the licensed premises, in the re-filed application of November 13, 1985, Donna Sawyer and Ocie Allen met with Alton Allen at 258 S. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida, who was an agent for Walter Spector, owner of several retail store spaces at that address. Ocie Allen, acting on behalf of his corporation, Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, entered into a lease for a store at 258 S. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida. On or about November 4, 1985, Ocie Allen, acting on behalf of his corporation Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, purportedly subleased the premises at 258 S. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida to Petitioner. That Petitioner had submitted a letter dated November 4, 1984, signed by Jim Irey, as President of Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc., which is attached to the November 13, 1985 application, which stated that certain financial support would be available to the subject alcoholic beverage sales contemplated by Petitioner. That as a result of the investigation following the November 13, 1985 application, Respondent was "unable to fully investigate applicant's financial documentation," since Respondent's agents were unable to locate Jim Irey or his company at the address indicated on the November 4, 1984 letter. Based upon the evidence presented, the following additional findings of fact are made: Donna Sawyer's preliminary application to participate in the state lottery for a quota liquor license included instructions to the applicant that it was the first part of a two part application and that the second part would require proof of occupancy for the premises to be licensed. The second part of the application was that license application filed with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco on November 2, 1984, and again on November 13, 1985. As part of the notification that she was eligible to apply for a state quota liquor license, Donna Sawyer was advised that she had 45 days to file a full and complete application and that if she failed to do so, this failure would be deemed as a waiver of her right to file for a new quota liquor license. The letter also advised her that the Division had 180 days from the date of the drawing to act upon her application. The Petitioner's first quota liquor license application was denied on March 8, 1985. March 8, 1985, was within 180 days of the applicable lottery drawing held on September 12, 1984. The agreement of the parties to resolve the March 8, 1985, denial of the subject license evidences an tacit agreement by the parties to waive any applicable time limits existing at that time in order to allow the Petitioner to resubmit a corrected application within 45 days as allowed by the Thomas Klein letter of October 1, 1985. The Division investigated the Petitioner's second application and determined that the applicant did not have a right of occupancy to the premises sought to be licensed, 258 Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida, because Petitioner only had a purported sublease for the subject premises from Ft. Myers A & T Corporation. Ft. Myers A & T Corporation had obtained a lease for the property on November 4, 1985, from Walter Spector, deceased at the time of the administrative hearing. Said lease between Walter Spector, lessor, and Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, lessee, provided that subleases must be approved by the lessor and be in writing. The Petitioner did not produce evidence of written authorization by Walter Spector to allow Ocie Allen or Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, Inc., to sublease the subject premises to the Petitioner or to any other person. The only evidence of such authorization was the hearsay statement by Ocie Allen that Walter Spector had orally given such authorization. Furthermore, Mr. Alton Allen, then agent for Mr. Spector for leasing this property testified he had no knowledge that Mr. Spector was ever informed of a sublease. Therefore it is found that the sublease violated a material provision of the underlying lease from Walter Spector to Ft. Myers A & T Corporation. Mr. Ocie Allen, agent for the Petitioner and Donna Sawyer, testified and it is found that there was no intention for the Petitioner to operate an alcoholic beverage license at the 258 Tamiami Trail location. Petitioner's November 13, 1985, license application was also denied on February 19, 1986, for: Application incomplete as . . . the Division is unable to fully investigate applicant's financial documentation. This denial was due to the Division's agents being unable to verify the availability of financial funding from Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc. The Petitioner had submitted a November 9, 1984 letter from that corporation in its November 13, 1985 license application offering certain funding. Upon checking phone directories and making attempted telephone calls to the source named in that letter, the Division was not able to find the named business as source of funding. The Division further investigated Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc. as an alleged source of funding by sending an agent, Robert B. Baggett, to the address supplied by the applicant in a November 9, 1984 letter from Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc., only to find that no such business was located there and no neighbors knew of a new location. Sandra Allen, Esquire, testified that the source of the funding at the time of the second application was a new company run by the same person who was behind Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc., which was named as the source in the November 9, 1984 letter. However, this new company's name and address and verification of continued financial support to the Petitioner could not reasonably be determined by the Division and no evidence was presented that the Division had ever been provided with said new company's name or location prior to the denial of the second license application. Contradictory testimony was presented by Lt. Ewing and Sgt. Mills as to the existence of a policy requiring a "14 day" deficiency notice letter to applicants. It is clear that that policy was not recognized in the office supervised by Sgt. Mills. It was also not established that Lt. Ewing had the authority to set or enunciate policy for the Division.
Findings Of Fact On September 30, 1978, the Respondent, Cesar Augustus Rodriguez, issued or caused to be issued a check in the amount of $1,750.00 made in behalf of the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The purpose of this check was to pay for the annual renewal of Respondent's beverage license, Number 39-994, 4-COP, under which the Respondent was trading as Tom's Place. The requirement for payment of the renewal of the license is established by Section 561.27, Florida Statutes. The check for payment was drawn on the Barnett Bank of Tampa. When presented by the Petitioner for payment, the check was returned on the basis that there were insufficient funds for the check to be honored. The check number in question was check No. 407, drawn on account No. 01704386. The act of tendering payment for the license fee renewal with a check that was returned for insufficient funds constituted a violation of Rule 7A- 2.15, Florida Administrative Code. The facts as stated above were arrived at pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the parties and placed on the record during the process of a formal hearing conducted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Cesar Augustus Rodriguez trading as Tom's Place, be fined in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) for the violation as established in this case, in accordance with the provisions of Subsection 561.29(4), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Cesar Augustus Rodriguez t/a Tom's Place 2605 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609
Findings Of Fact From 1972 until 1982, Bay Street, Inc., a Florida corporation, held a COP-type quota liquor license for the operation of a bar known as Howard's G- String at 102 East Bay Street in Jacksonville, Florida. Arthur Eisen and Bobby Joe McClain were owners of the stock in Bay Street, Inc., and Howard's G-String was operated by McClain as manager. After Bay Street's liquor license was revoked in October 1982, for reasons not pertinent here, a beer and wine license was issued to Lloyd Barrow, McClain's father-in-law, for an operation at the same East Bay Street location. The owner of the building at 102 East Bay Street is Arthur Eisen. Lloyd Barrow pays Eisen $1,000 per week for rental of the premises. On June 14, 1983, pursuant to foreclosure, the liquor license held by Jax's Bar, Inc., doing business as Terminal Bar (the license at issue here), was sold for $28,500 on the Duval County Courthouse steps. Purchaser of the license was Karen Alford. The money used to make this purchase was a loan from Arthur Eisen. This loan was repaid by Karen Alford by means of an undated check numbered 4-0486533 drawn on the Hollywood Federal Savings and Loan Association in the amount of $28,500 payable to the order of Harry Katz Escrow Account. Mr. Katz, in turn, transferred the sum of $28,500 by his escrow account check numbered 4125 to the said Arthur Eisen on November 3, 1983. Ms. Alford purchased the Hollywood Federal check with money drawn from two other accounts at the Hollywood Federal Savings and Loan Association. One portion, totalling $19,528, came from account number 341343 in the name of Karen Alford as trustee for Rosemond Eisen. The additional amount of $9,761 was drawn from account number 387056. This latter account was a joint account in the names of Karen Alford and Rosemond Eisen. The $789 difference between the $29,289 (the total of the two components) and the $28,500 repayment check was deposited into a third account in the name of Karen Alford, account number 141730. Petitioner introduced a copy of certificate of deposit number 8590 dated June 8, 1978, in the name of Karen J. Alford in the amount of $55,761 which, on January 9, 1979, was redeposited into account number 341356, which reflected that Karen J. Alford was trustee for Rosemond Eisen as beneficiary. Accompanying that certificate and deposit card is a notarized statement dated February 27, 1984, from Alicia Dyce, assistant manager/assistant secretary of the Hollywood Federal Savings and Loan Association, which indicates that Karen J. Alford was the sole owner of certificate account number 341375. The statement further indicates that when an account reads "in trust for" (ITF) it is to designate a beneficiary in the case of the death of the owner of the account. The statement further says that if the account had been owned by both parties the account would have stated the two names connected by the word "and" and not "ITF." Ms. Alford contends that the $55,761 utilized to purchase the initial certificate of deposit from which the subsequent $28,500 payment was made came from a divorce settlement received from her estranged and former husband and not from Arthur Eisen. Respondent was unable to present any evidence to contradict this contention by Petitioner. There is, however, other evidence dealing with the business relationship between Ms. Alford, as president of the Petitioner corporation, and Bobby McClain and Arthur Eisen, as manager and landlord respectively, which causes some question to arise as to the true relationship between the parties. Ms. Alford contends that as a result of the business arrangement she was to receive a draw of $500 per week from the operation plus a return on the investment of $750 per month. On a four-week month, this would amount to a return of approximately $2,750. In addition, out of the operation Ms. Alford was to make weekly rental payments of $1,000 to Arthur Eisen and, at Eisen's suggestion, was to pay Bobby Joe McClain a salary of $500 per week and an automobile expense of $50 per week. McClain was to make daily bank deposits from the business proceeds and was to send Ms. Alford weekly computer printouts reflecting the income and expenses for the period. Only one of these computer printouts was introduced. Covering the period from January 30, 1984, through February 4, 1984, the printout showed a gross profit before expenses of $2,868.03 and expenses of $2,923.44, with a net loss of $55.41. However, using the figures contained on the printout and computing profit on the basis of gross sales less cost of goods sold reflects a gross profit of $2,722.43 which, when thereafter subtracting the weekly expenses of $2,923.44, reflects a net loss of $201.01. It should be noted that the weekly expenses include such items as rent of $1,000, payroll of $1,235.30, utilities of $243.08, sales tax of $195.06, and a miscellaneous payment of $250. If this printout is a representation of the continuing success of the business, it is obvious that Ms. Alford will never see her stated profit, much less a return of her investment, while Arthur Eisen is drawing $1,000 per week ($4,000 per month) in rent receipts and his former associate, McClain, is receiving a handsome income from the business as well. Taken together, these figures tend to raise an inference that not only Eisen, but McClain as well, has an interest in the business, which is supported by the evidence that it was Eisen who suggested the investment to Ms. Alford in the first place, made the investment for her using his own funds, and insisted that he not be repaid until the redemption time had expired on the license foreclosure. It is also noteworthy that Eisen was the individual who suggested to Ms. Alford that she hire Bobby Joe McClain to manage the bar; and, notwithstanding Ms. Alford's contention that she had known McClain for close to 20 years, the fact also remains that McClain was a former associate and co-owner of another bar with Arthur Eisen. There are other inconsistencies in Ms. Alford's testimony and in the Petitioner's case which give rise to a suspicion that Ms. Alford is not in fact the true "owner" of the business but that the entire transaction is a screen to hide the interest by Arthur Eisen who, because of his prior license revocation location, would be ineligible to hold this license. Ms. Alford indicated that she put the money in question in trust for her sister so that, if anything would happen to her, the sister, Miss Rosemond Eisen, would be able to retrieve the money and, at her discretion, distribute it to Ms. Alford's children. Ms. Alford contends that her children are not equipped to handle money of this magnitude, yet she relates that one is an investment counselor and stock broker and another son is a geophysicist. Another inconsistency is that Ms. Alford contends she has invested as much as $35,000 in this business; yet she does not know how many people were hired by McClain, she does not know on what account checks were written, the checking accounts involved were in McClain's name and not hers, and she does not even recall the name on the checks she received. She contends that while it was in operation the bar grossed between $4,000 and $4,200 a week; yet, as was shown previously, the one income statement introduced by Petitioner reflected a gross income of substantially less than that and a net loss. Ms. Alford further contends that she does not know from a review of the weekly computer printouts what the liquor expense was. Her reason for this was that her son, who she claims is incapable of handling inherited funds, would review all the submissions made by McClain. She further contends that she has visited the bar three or four times since it has been in operation but cannot recall when these visits were. She did not see the business before she invested her money in it but relied solely on the advice given her by her former brother-in-law, Arthur Eisen. By her own admission, it was Eisen who did all the preliminary work relative to buying the license and setting up the business without her, and she had no participation save for the investment of money until she came up to apply for the licenses, at which time she met and worked with Mr. Katz. Eisen contends he asked Ms. Alford to invest in this business because he knew she had the money and knew she would be receptive to it. He called her by telephone and told her he had a business proposition for her, and, when she indicated some interest, he went to Miami to see her and tell her about it. He told her how much it would cost and what she should earn if she made the investment and operated it properly. He told her that McClain would manage it for her and that he did not want to do it himself because of his extended interests in the Houston area, on which he wanted to concentrate. Eisen states he felt safe in representing McClain because they had worked together for 18 years previously and that his only participation in this business owned by Ms. Alford is the lease which brings him $1,000.00 per week. This was, he claims the primary motivation for the deal. Eisen contends no participation in the business, either operational or financial. Notwithstanding this denial, the overwhelming circumstantial evidence indicating otherwise prevails.
The Issue Whether or not on or about September 28, 1978, the Respondent, Cesar Augustus Rodriguez, his agent, servant or employee did pay for the renewal of his alcoholic beverage license with a check which was later returned, not paid by the bank, marked "Not Sufficient Funds", contrary to Rule 7A-2.15, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact On September 28, 1978, the Respondent, Cesar Augustus Rodriguez, issued or caused to be issued a check in the amount of $1,750.00 made in behalf of the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The purpose of this check was to pay for the annual renewal of the Respondent's beverage license, Number 39-769, 4-COP, under which the Respondent was trading as Rene's Lounge. The requirement for payment of the renewal of the license is established by Section 561.27, Florida Statutes. The check for payment was drawn on the Barnett Bank of Tampa. When presented by the Petitioner for payment, the check was returned on the basis that there were insufficient funds for the check to be honored. The check number in question was check No. 1318, drawn on account No. 01393115. The act of tendering payment for the license fee renewal with a check that was returned for insufficient funds constituted a violation of Rule 7A- 2.15, Florida Administrative Code. The facts as stated above were arrived at pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the parties and placed on the record during the process of a formal hearing conducted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Cesar Augustus Rodriguez trading as Rene's Lounge, be fined in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) for the violation as established in this case, in accordance with the provisions of Subsection 561.29(4), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Cesar Augustus Rodriguez t/a Rene's Lounge 2605 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609
