The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondents committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaints and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Preliminary matters Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged, inter alia, with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, including Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Mizeral Robinson (Robinson), is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0484257. From July 18, 1988, through January 5, 1997, Robinson was registered with the Department as a broker/officer of Wakefield Realty, Inc. (Wakefield Realty), a broker-corporation, and from January 6, 1997, through June 30, 1997, Robinson was registered as an active broker-salesperson with Township Realty, Inc., a broker-corporation located at 1333 South State Road 7, North Lauderdale, Florida. Since June 30, 1997, Robinson has been registered as a broker-salesperson without a current employer, with an address of 6372 Harbor Bend, Margate, Florida. From July 18, 1988, through January 6, 1997, Wakefield Realty was registered with the Department as a broker-corporation (registration number 0255869), with an address of 4699 North State Road 7, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. However, in October 1996, without notice to the Florida Real Estate Commission, Wakefield Realty relocated its offices to 2240 Woolbright Road, Boynton Beach, Florida. On January 6, 1997, the license of its corporate broker, Robinson, was reissued as a broker-salesperson with Township Realty, Inc., and, no active broker having been appointed to fill the vacancy within 14 calendar days, Wakefield Realty's corporate registration was cancelled. Rule 61J2-5.018, Florida Administrative Code. The Dobson contract and related matters (DOAH Case No. 97-5041) On October 31, 1995, Respondents, Robinson and Wakefield Realty, as agents for Hubert and Ruth Dobson, the Buyers, presented a written offer to purchase a house owned by Adrienne and Nancy Cutler, the Sellers, at 951 Southwest 88th Terrace, Pembroke Pines, Florida. On November 7, 1995, following negotiations, the Dobsons' offer was accepted by the Sellers. The agreed purchase price was $123,480, with the method of payment as follows: a $2,000 deposit tendered with the offer; an additional deposit of $4,000 "due within 10 United States banking days after date of acceptance"; the proceeds ($117,306) of a new conventional mortgage to be secured by the buyers; and, a balance of $174 to be paid by the buyers at closing. All deposits were to be held in escrow by Wakefield Realty. In addition to the provisions of the agreement relating to the deposits, discussed supra, the agreement contained the following pertinent provisions: D. NEW MORTGAGES: . . . if this Contract provides for Buyer to obtain a new mortgage, then Buyer's performance under this Contract shall be contingent upon Buyer's obtaining said mortgage financing upon the terms stated, or if none are stated, than upon the terms generally prevailing at such time in the county where the property is located. The buyer agrees to apply within 5 banking days . . . and to make a good faith, diligent effort to obtain the mortgage financing. In the event a commitment for said financing is not obtained within 45 banking days . . . from the date of this Contract, then the other party may terminate this Contract by delivery of written notice to the other party or his agent, the deposit shall be returned to the Buyer and all parties shall be released from all further obligations hereunder. This right of termination shall cease upon the Buyer obtaining a written commitment letter for mortgage financing at the rate and terms of payment previously specified herein prior to the delivery of the notice of termination. * * * X. DEFAULT: In the event of default of either party, the rights of the non- defaulting party and the broker shall be as provided herein and such rights shall be deemed to be the sole and exclusive rights in such event; (a) If Buyer fails to perform any of the covenants of this Contract, all money paid or deposited pursuant to this Contract by the Buyer shall be retained by or for the account of the Seller as consideration for the execution of this Contract as agreed and liquidated damages and in full settlement of any claims for damages and specific performance by the Seller against the Buyer. . . . * * * (CHECK and COMPLETE THE ONE APPLICABLE) (X) IF A WRITTEN LISTING AGREEMENT IS CURRENTLY IN EFFECT: Seller agrees to pay the Broker named above including cooperating sub-agents and/or cooperating Buyers Agents named, according to the terms of an existing, separate written agreement; * * * If Buyer fails to perform and deposit(s) is retained, 50% thereof, but not exceeding the Broker's fee above provided, shall be paid Broker, as full consideration for Broker's services including costs expended by Broker, and the balance shall be paid to Seller. To finance the purchase, Robinson submitted an application on the Dobsons' behalf for a conventional residential mortgage loan with Citizens Federal Bank. That application was denied January 8, 1996. Following the denial of their application, the Dobsons made demand of Respondents, under the mortgage contingency provision of the purchase agreement, for the return of their $6,000 deposit.3 Respondents, notwithstanding the rejection of the Dobsons' application for financing and the Sellers' execution of a release of deposit, which directed the escrow agent to disburse the escrow deposit of $6,000 to the Dobsons, failed and refused to return any portion of the deposit to the Dobsons. To date, such failure continues, and the proof is compelling that Respondents have converted the deposit to their own use and benefit.4 The Rafiee contract and related matters (DOAH Case No. 98-0003) On October 25, 1996, Respondent, Mizeral Robinson, procured a written offer from Iran Rafiee to purchase a triplex owned by Henry Sweigart, located at 11460 Northwest 39th Street, Coral Springs, Florida. The stated purchase price was $195,000, with the method of payment as follows: a $1,000 deposit tendered with the offer; an additional deposit of $9,000 "due within 5 United States banking days after date of acceptance"; the proceeds ($156,000) of a new conventional mortgage to be secured by the buyer; and, a balance of $30,000 [sic] to be paid by the buyer at closing. All deposits were to be held by Wakefield Realty, Inc., Mizeral Robinson, escrow agent. According to the "Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase," Rafiee's offer was accepted on what appears to be October 27, 1996 (Petitioner's Exhibit 12), and Rafiee's initial deposit, which was in Robinson's possession by at least October 25, 1996,5 was deposited on October 30, 1996.6 Accepting October 25, 1996, as the date Robinson received the check, the check was deposited "no later than the end of the third business day following receipt."7 Rule 61J2-14.008(d), Florida Administrative Code. In addition to the provisions of the agreement relating to the deposits, discussed supra, the agreement contained the following pertinent provisions: 29. DEFAULT: In the event of default of either party, the rights of the non- defaulting party and the broker shall be as provided herein and such rights shall be deemed to be the sole and exclusive rights in such event. If Buyer fails to perform any of the covenants of this Contract, all money paid or to be paid as deposits pursuant to this Contract by the Buyer shall be retained by or for the account of the Seller as consideration for the execution of this Contract as agreed and liquidated damages and in full settlement of any claims for damages and specific performance by the Seller against the Buyer. * * * (CHECK AND COMPLETE THE ONE APPLICABLE) (X) IF A WRITTEN LISTING AGREEMENT IS CURRENTLY IN EFFECT: Seller agrees to pay the Broker(s) named above according to the terms of an existing, separate written professional service fee agreement; * * * If Buyer fails to perform and deposit(s) is retained, 50% thereof, but not exceeding the Broker's fee above provided, shall be paid Broker, as full consideration for Broker's services including costs expended by Broker, and the balance shall be paid to Seller. Within days of the acceptance of her offer, Ms. Rafiee decided that she no longer desired to purchase the property and, on or about October 31, 1996, notified Robinson of her decision and requested the return of her deposit. At the time, Robinson was noncommittal and, observing that the check had only recently been deposited and likely had not yet been paid, stated they would have to speak of the matter at a later date. Thereafter, when pressed regarding the return of Ms. Rafiee's deposit, Robinson informed her that the deposit had been given to the seller, as required by the contract. Nevertheless, when Ms. Rafiee voiced her intention to pursue the matter further, Robinson agreed to pay her $800 (the parties agreeing that Robinson was entitled to $200 for her efforts) by December 20, 1996. Following the passage of a number of deadlines, and one check returned for insufficient funds, Robinson, in or about May 1997, eventually paid Ms. Rafiee the $800.00. At hearing, Robinson averred that because of Ms. Rafiee's default, she and the seller were, under the terms of the contract, each entitled to 50% of the $1,000 deposit, and that she disbursed the deposit accordingly. As for her offer to pay Ms. Rafiee $800, it was Robinson's view that such offer was made to appease Ms. Rafiee, since Robinson expected to secure further business from her, and should not be considered an admission that Ms. Rafiee was entitled to the return of any of her deposit. Given Ms. Rafiee's default under the purchase agreement, it must be concluded that Robinson, as the broker, had apparent authority to retain 50% ($500) of the deposit and to remit the remaining 50% ($500) to the seller. This is what Robinson avers she did and, given the proof or, stated differently, the lack thereof, it cannot be resolved, with the requisite degree of certainty, that she did otherwise.8
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered revoking Respondents' licensure and eligibility for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1998.
Findings Of Fact FHFC administers the Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bond Program (Bond Program) as set forth in Chapter 420, Part V, Florida Statutes, and related administrative rules. Worthwhile timely filed an application in the 1999 Bond Program cycle which was assigned number 99-040 to finance a development called Heritage Apartments in Collier County, Florida. FHFC initially deemed said application to be incomplete for the reasons set forth in a letter dated February 4, 1999. Worthwhile timely filed a Petition for Formal Hearing challenging FHFC's determination that application number 99-040 was incomplete, which Petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and assigned Case No. 99-1518. Upon further review by FHFC and in consideration of the deposition testimony of FHFC representatives in this cause, the parties stipulate and agree that: Worthwhile's application number 99-040 was not incomplete as initially determined by FHFC; Worthwhile's application number 99-040 is complete and must now be further processed pursuant to appropriate rules and procedures; and If it qualifies after further processing, application number 99-040 is to be funded with the next uncommitted bond proceeds made available to FHFC for allocation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that FHFC enter a Final Order which finds and concludes that: Worthwhile's application number 99-040 was not incomplete as initially determined by FHFC; Worthwhile's application number 99-040 is complete and must now be further processed pursuant to appropriate rules and procedures; and If it qualifies after further processing, application number 99-040 is to be funded with the next uncommitted bond proceeds made available to FHFC for allocation. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Hauser, Esquire Skelding, Labasky, Corry, Hauser, Jolly & Metz, P.A. 318 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David A. Barrett, Esquire Barrett & Pelham, P.A. Post Office Box 930 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0930 Brad Baker, Executive Director Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1329 Stephen M. Donelan, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1329 Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley & McMullen 227 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Victor Jesus Monzon (Respondent) committed the violations alleged in the subject Administrative Complaint, and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been a state certified residential real estate appraiser, having been issued license RD-4245 on January 3, 2004. Respondent's licensure has not been previously disciplined by Petitioner. Respondent's business is named Heartland Appraisal Group, Inc. Respondent is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board (Board) by operation of chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes (2010). Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Board. Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints by operation of chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. On April 23, 2007, Respondent developed the Report on the Subject Property, which is a condominium unit located in a condominium complex known as the Jade Residences. Respondent prepared the Report for his client, Infinity Mortgage (Infinity). The Administrative Complaint was prepared in response to a complaint from J. P. Morgan Chase, also known as Chase Home Finance (Chase). No representative of Infinity or Chase testified at the formal hearing, so no finding has been made as to how Chase came to possess or utilize the Report. There is also no finding made as to whether Infinity or Chase was misled by any iteration of the Report. Respondent's work file contains a copy of a contract between "John Michael Pla" as seller and "Jeannette H. Lee Declaration of Trust Dated 9/25/98" as purchaser for the sale of the Subject Property in the amount of $1,307,500 (the contract price). In addition to the iteration of the Report that Petitioner received from Chase, Petitioner introduced four iterations of the Report as part of its Exhibit 1 that were copied from Respondent's work file. What was thought to be a fifth iteration obtained from Respondent's work file was also part of Petitioner's Exhibit 1, but it was later determined to be a duplicate of one of the other iterations. For ease of reference, the five iterations will be referred to by the letter I followed by a hyphen and its assigned number. Pages 18-40 of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 constitute the iteration of the Report Petitioner's investigator obtained from Chase (I-1). Respondent's work file did not have a copy of I-1. Page 20 of I-1 contains a photocopy of Respondent's handwritten notation: "Original 1." The handwritten notation does not appear on any of the other iterations. Pages 211-234 of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 constitute I- 2., pages 236-259 constitute I-3, pages 261-284 constitute I-4, and pages 311-335 constitute I-5. All five iterations of the Report were signed by Respondent. I-1 was signed April 24, 2007; I-2, I-4, and I-5 were signed on April 25, 2007; and I-3 was signed on July 25, 2007. All five iterations were effective as of April 23, 2007. All five iterations of the Report valued the Subject Property at $1,400,000. There was no evidence that the Report overstated the value of the Subject Property. There are two separate pages for I-1 marked "page one." On the I-1 page one with the handwritten notation, the name of the borrower is Jeannette Lee and the name of the owner of public record is John Pla. This same information is found on the page ones of I-2 and I-3. On the page one of I-1 without the handwritten notation, the name of the borrower is "LEE," and the name of the owner of record is "Wells Fargo Bank NA" (Wells Fargo). On the page one of I-4 and I-5, the name of the owner of record is Wells Fargo and the name of the borrower is Jeannette Lee. The contract price listed on all iterations except I-1 is $1,307,500. On both pages marked "one" on I-1, the contract price is listed as being $1,307,500 in one place and $1,370,500 in another place. In the "Comparable Sale" section of the reports, the unit number for comparable sale 3 is not listed for I-1 or I-5. The unit number for comparable sale 3 is listed for the other iterations. Also in the Comparable Sale section of the reports, I- 1 reflects the contract price for the subject property as being $1,370,500. In the same place on the other iterations, the contracted sales price is listed as being $1,307,500. Stating the contracted sales price for the subject property at $63,000 more than the actual contracted sales price was a mistake. There was insufficient evidence to establish that it was a deliberate mistake. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the mistake was anything other than a typographical error that Respondent subsequently caught and corrected. Petitioner failed to prove that the error had any effect on the appraised value Respondent put on the subject property. FARES is a software program which stands for "First American Real Estate Solutions." It is acceptable practice for an appraiser to use FARES in determining the ownership of property. Utilizing FARES, Respondent determined that the owner of the subject property was Wells Fargo. A Multiple Listing Service (MLS) entry reflected an unknown closed sale of the subject property with a sales price of $1,133,000. Respondent advised Infinity of the conflict, and he advised that he was using FARES instead of the MLS listing because he believed that FARES was more reliable. The copy of the sales contract in Respondent's work file reflected that the seller was JJohn (sic) Michael Pla. On March 8, 2007, Wells Fargo deeded the subject property to John Pla. This deed was recorded on April 14, 2007. The FARES search done by Respondent did not reveal the deed. The likely explanation for that failure is the delay in indexing public records in Dade County. After Respondent was able to verify this sale, he changed the name of the owner of the subject property on his Report and reflected the date of sale and the sales price of $1,133,000. I-1 and I-5 do not reflect a sale of the Subject Property in September 2004 for the amount of $860,000. Petitioner's expert agreed that that failure had no effect on the appraised value of the Subject Property in April 2007. I-2 and I-3 reflect that Pla was the owner and they reflected the $860,000 sale of the Subject Property in September 2004 and the sale of the property to Pla in 2007. On July 5, 2007, Infinity requested that Respondent change the name of the owner from Wells Fargo to Pla and provided Respondent with a copy of the deed from Wells Fargo to Pla. I-3, signed by Respondent on July 5, 2005, was prepared in response to that request. The record is unclear how I-2, signed on April 25, 2007, had that updated information. After I-3 was issued, the owner of record, the amount of the contract, and the sales history of the property were correctly stated. Respondent used four comparable sales in determining the value of the subject property. Respondent used a computer program to search for comparable sales that were similar in square footage, distance from the subject property, and time of sale. The use of the computer program and the parameters he used in selecting the comparable sales were reasonable. Petitioner asserted that Respondent erred in using comparable sale 1 because the use of that comparable inflated the price of the subject property. There was insufficient evidence to establish that comparable sale 1 was a fraudulent transaction or that Respondent erroneously relied on comparable sale 1 in determining the value of the subject property. Comparable sale 1 was another unit in the Jades Residences condominium complex that was on a higher floor than the Subject Property. Respondent made an adjustment to the sales price for comparable sale 1 to reflect the differences between the two units. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the adjustment was inappropriate. Further, Respondent used a weighted average which gave less consideration to comparable sale 1 than to the other comparables used. Respondent testified, credibly, that he sent two iterations of the Report to Infinity. The first report listed Wells Fargo as the owner and did not list the September 2004 sale of the property or the sale of the property to Pla in March 2007. That appears to be I-5, which was signed April 25, 2007. The other iteration was I-3, which was signed July 5, 2007. Petitioner's expert agreed that it was reasonable for Respondent to amend his Report in July 2007 after he learned of the September 2004 sale and after he verified the sale from Wells Fargo to Pla. The Jade Residences condominium complex became notorious for mortgage fraud in the latter part of 2007. There was no evidence that Respondent was aware of that mortgage fraud when he prepared his original Report in April 2007 or when he amended his original Report in July 2007. Respondent signed the Report which included the following representation: I performed this appraisal in accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Standard of Professional Appraisal Practice that were accepted and promulgated by the Appraisal Standards Board of the Appraisal Foundation and that were in place at the time this appraisal report was prepared. Appraisers are not required by state law to comply with USPAP standards, but it is the industry practice to do so.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. O'Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Donna Christine Lindamood, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 1420 Celebration Boulevard, Suite 200 Celebration, Florida 34747
The Issue The issues in this case are as follow: Did Respondent violate Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by representing to Laverne Hahn that he would rent his house to her if she sold her house, representing to Ms. Hahn that he would deliver certain papers to her attorney, and representing to Ms. Hahn that the closing on her house would not occur until after February 15, 1981? Did Respondent violate Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by failing to deliver survey, abstract and title insurance policy documents to Ms. Hahn or her attorney?
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, the Respondent, Allan R. Heuton, held real estate salesman license #0313305 Assued by the Board of Real Estate (now Florida Real Estate Commission). At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was registered as a salesman with Hugh Anderson Real Estate, Inc., at 2631 East Oakland Park Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339. Respondent listed with his employer, Hugh Anderson Real Estate, Inc., Laverne Hahn's offer to sell her residence and advised Ms. Hahn at that time that upon the sale of her residence she could rent his residence for a period of six months at the rate of $300 per month. In reliance on Respondent's statement, Ms. Hahn proceeded to sell her residence and made no other arrangements for a place to live, expecting to move into Respondent's house upon closing as per their agreement. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Pages 5 and 8.) Respondent testified to the events surrounding the transaction which gave rise to the Administrative Complaint. The Board presented the deposition of Ms. Hahn taken in Lakeland, Florida. Respondent admitted that he had advised Ms. Hahn it was not unusual to have closings delayed 60 days, and did offer and stood ready to rent his house to Ms. Hahn. Respondent testified that he did not recall picking up any documents from Ms. Hahn, but that had he done so it was his normal business practice to immediately deliver the documents to the attorney handling the closing. Ms. Hahn's deposition reflects that she could not locate the Respondent although she attempted to contact him through his broker's office. This was the reason she could not rent his house. Respondent testified that Ms. Hahn never asked to rent his house. Respondent testified that on January 14, 1981, the day after his birthday, he was suddenly taken ill and had to have emergency surgery in the early morning hours of that day. Respondent's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Sheilah Kirk, who testified that she visited Respondent in the hospital on January 14 or 15, 1981, and that he was recovering from surgery at that time. Respondent testified that he was hospitalized for more than one week. Respondent testified that he was visited by the manager of the brokerage office for which he worked. It is hardly credible that Ms. Hahn could not find a man who was sick in a hospital for more than one week and whose whereabouts were known to his brokerage office. Wherefore, the Hearing Officer disregards the deponent's testimony and accepts the Respondent's testimony as the more credible concerning the rental of his house Ms. Hahn's deposition reflects that Respondent told her she would not have to move out until February of 1981. Respondent admits he told Ms. Hahn that closings were frequently delayed 60 days or more. The contract for sale originally provided for closing on December 29, 1980, a time which was changed to January 15, 1981, by persons unknown on a date unknown. The contract was signed by Ms. Hahn, who is presumed to have known its terms. Notwithstanding Respondent's statements as to delayed closings, Ms. Hahn had no basis for using such statement as a basis for planning in light of the contract which she signed. Again, Respondent's testimony is deemed to be more credible in light of the closing date provided in the contract for sale. A further conflict exists between Ms. Hahn's deposition and Respondent's testimony regarding the allegation that Respondent picked up certain documents from her but failed to deliver them. Respondent's statement that he had no recollection of the events, but that his regular practice was to deliver such documents immediately, and that since the time in question he has not discovered any such documents in his papers, is deemed credible.
Recommendation Having found that the allegations against the Respondent, Allan R. Heuton, were not proven, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Allan R. Heuton 6891 Forrest Street Hollywood, Florida 33024 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue By an information filed by the Florida Real Estate Commission, respondent Thomas F. Thayer was charged with fraud, dishonest dealing and breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Florida Statutes s.475.25(1)(a). In essence, the information charges that respondent, as the real estate broker for the Jacobs and in order to obtain a ninety percent loan commitment for the Jacobs, falsely represented to a mortgage corporation that the Jacobs Intended to move into the duplex they planned to purchase and sell their present home.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times to this proceeding, respondent was a registered real estate broker. Respondent had been an acquaintance of Mr. and Mrs. Richard Jacobs for a period of four to five years. Some two years before the transaction in question, Jacobs had expressed to respondent his desire to purchase property containing a duplex for purposes of a tax shelter. Mr. Jacobs testified that he intended the purchase to be an Investment somewhere in the neighborhood of $5,000.00. There was also evidence that Mr. Jacobs understood that there were tax shelter benefits from living in half the duplex and depreciating the other half. In April of 1974, respondent showed the Jacobs a duplex. At the time, the Jacobs were living in a two bedroom, two bath waterfront home with a swimming pool, valued somewhere in the neighborhood of $60,000.00. The location of the duplex was in a lower rent neighborhood near some railroad tracks. However, the front portion contained three bedrooms, two baths, a thick shag carpet and a built-in bar. There were also two large screened-in patios. The Jacobs were impressed with the duplex, and on April 19, 1974, they signed a deposit receipt contract prepared by respondent to purchase the duplex for $41,000.00. This contract was subject to the Jacobs being able to obtain ninety percent financing at 9.25 percent annual Interest within fifteen days from the date of acceptance by the sellers. The contract also contained certain conditions regarding inspection of the rear apartment; electrical, plumbing, roofing and appliance defects; termite damage and the inclusion of a metal storage shed. Such conditions were included in the contract at the request of Mr. Jacobs. In order to obtain ninety percent financing, it was necessary that the lender be assured that the borrower actually intends to reside on the mortgaged property. This assurance comes about through either an affidavit executed by the borrower at the time of closing and/or the filing with the lender of a sales listing on the present home of the borrower. From this point forward, disputes in the testimony arise. Respondent testified that Mr. Jacobs was aware of the financing requirement that he would have to indicate an intent to sell his present home. Jacobs acknowledged that he was so aware, but testified that he never had any intent to move from his waterfront home to the duplex, and so informed respondent. However, when he went in to make the loan application with the mortgage company, he told its representative that he would be living in the duplex. Respondent then informed the mortgage company that he would be sending them a multiple listing form on the Jacobs' present residence. Jacobs stated at the hearing that he and his wife never intended to reside in the duplex and that he followed respondent's advice regarding the filing of a multiple listing only because he had faith and trust in respondent, who told him such things were done all the time. Respondent testified that the Jacobs never informed him that they did not intend to live in the duplex or that they did not intend to sell their present home. In fact, there was testimony from Mr. Jacobs that between the time of the deposit receipt contract and the first letter approving the mortgage loan commitment, he and his wife were looking at other homes on the water in which to live. The multiple listing form was signed by the Jacobs and delivered to the mortgage company by respondent, but it was never turned in to the multiple listing service. Sometime subsequent to receiving the mortgage loan commitment on May 29, 1974, Jacobs inspected the rear apartment of the duplex and became very upset and disgusted with its condition. Repairs were estimated at $1,000.00 and the sellers only offered to contribute approximately $75.00 toward such repairs. Jacobs then went to an attorney who advised him that it would be illegal to continue with the purchase because of the misrepresentation as to the Jacobs' intent to reside in the duplex. Jacobs then called the mortgage company and told them he did not intend to live in the duplex. Thereafter the mortgage company informed Jacobs that they were unable to obtain a mortgage commitment. Respondent testified that he first became aware that the Jacobs did not intend to live in the duplex the night after Jacobs inspected the rear apartment and spoke with his attorney. In summary, the testimony in this case is conflicting with respect to respondent's knowledge of the Jacobs' intent as to where they would actually reside. In order for respondent to be found guilty of fraud, dishonest dealing and breach of trust in a business transaction, as prohibited by Florida Statutes s 475.25(1)(a), the Real Estate Commission must prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent actually knew that the Jacobs never intended to reside at the duplex property. That proof is lacking in this case. Here, the substance of the matters in dispute are as readily susceptible of proving respondent's innocence as they are susceptible of proving guilt. Jacobs testified that he originally wanted the duplex as an investment which would provide a tax shelter and that he did not intend to live in it. Yet, he verbally represented to the mortgage company that he did intend to live in the duplex, signed a multiple listing agreement and actually did look at other homes to live in during the period of time between signing the deposit receipt contract and obtaining knowledge of the original loan commitment. There was no evidence that respondent had any knowledge of or was involved in the Jacobs' search for another home in which to live. Jacobs was willing to go through with the purchase of the duplex until he became aware of the extent of damages to the rear apartment. It was at this time that he Informed the mortgage company that he did not have any intention of living in the duplex or selling their house. And, it was at about this same time, according to respondent, that respondent first learned that the Jacobs did not intend to reside in the duplex. There is no clear and convincing evidence in this record that proved that respondent knew that the Jacobs did not plan to live in the duplex at the time respondent forwarded the multiple listing to the mortgage company on April 30, 1974. The most credible evidence tending to show such knowledge on respondent's behalf is the fact that after the multiple listing agreement was signed and delivered to the mortgage company, the house was never actually put up for sale, was not shown to anyone, and the agreement was not filed with the multiple listing service. Yet, this is consistent with the evidence that the Jacobs did not receive word of the loan commitment until after May 29, 1974 (later to be rescinded on July 5, 1974) and the fact that the Jacobs were in the process of looking for yet another home to purchase. It is logical to assume that they were not yet ready to sell their present home with the uncertainties that existed, and this Instructed respondent to delay the selling process. In summary, it is concluded that the Real Estate Commission failed in its burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the misconduct charged; to wit: fraud, dishonest dealing and breach of trust in a business transaction. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the information charging respondent with a violation of Florida Statute 475.25(1)(a) be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30th day of December, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Louis B. Guttman, III, Esquire Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 James F. Spindler, Jr., Esquire and James R. Eddy, Esquire EDDY AND SPINDLER, P. A. 700 East Atlantic Boulevard Pompano Beach, Florida 33060
Findings Of Fact Jan Tomas is and was at all times pertinent hereto the holder of real estate broker registration certificate No. 0089450 from the Florida Real Estate Commission. The pleadings in this case show that on April 21, 1976, a Notice of Hearing was mailed to Jan Tomas by the Florida Real Estate Commission at two addresses; the first being Post Office Box 10887, Tampa, Florida 33609 and the second address being 364 Candler Park Drive, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30307. This Notice of Hearing was for hearing to be held on May 19, 1976, the date of the final hearing herein. This Notice was received by Jan Tomas as evidenced by the letter marked Exhibit 6 to Delphene C. Strickland, the then assigned Hearing Officer in this cause. On March 22, 1974, Jan Tomas applied for renewal of his certificate of registration as an active real estate broker. In his application he listed his business address and residence address as 417 A E Hanlon Street, Tampa, Florida 33604. Tomas was issued renewal certificate No. 099351 at the foregoing address which certificate expired September 30, 1975. By application dated February 7, 1975, Jan Tomas applied for a renewal of his active broker registration certificate setting forth his business and residence address as 105 South Hale, Tampa, Florida 33609. Pursuant to that application he was issued renewal certificate No. 207246 at the foregoing address which certificate expired September 30, 1975. At no time during 1974 or 1975 did Jan Tomas occupy the premises located at 417 A E Hanlon Street, Tampa, Florida either in a business capacity or in a residential capacity. Throughout 1974 and 1975, 105 South Hale, Tampa, Florida was a vacant lot. At no time during 1974 or 1975 did Jan Tomas maintain a business or residence at 105 South Hale, Tampa, Florida. Nor, during 1974 or 1975 did Jan Tomas maintain a business or residence at 103, 104 or 107 South Hale, Tampa, Florida.
