The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Riverwoods, Illinois. He has four children, and is married to Sharon Wheat-Hester. Petitioner received his undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University in North Carolina. Petitioner also received a master’s degree and doctorate degree in theology from Share-A- Prayer and Word Theological School in Whitewater, Wisconsin. Petitioner is currently employed as the director of a ministry called Marketplace Movement Network. The ministry provides advice to businesses on Chritian business ethics. In that regard, Petitioner has published one book on the subject of Christian ethics in business. Petitioner is also the President and shareholder of Hester International, Inc., a Florida Corporation that since 1995, provides mortgage brokerage services in the State of Illinois and several other states. The corporation’s principal office is located in Illinois. The business has an established client list and referral list. Additionally, Petitioner is currently licensed as a mortgage broker in the Illinois, California, North Carolina and Hawaii. He has not had any disciplinary action taken against him in those states. On January 25, 1996, prior to the present license application at issue here, Petitioner sought licensure as a mortgage broker in Florida with the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Respondent’s predecessor agency. On the 1996 application Petitioner answered “no” to a question that asked whether he had ever had a license revoked. Petitioner’s 1996 application was denied for a material misrepresentation or omission. Petitioner did not challenge the 1996 denial. On February 16, 2004, also prior to the present application, Petitioner again applied for a mortgage broker license. On this application, question number six asked: Have you had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude? Yes No A “Yes” answer to question six required the applicant to attach details, provide a copy of allegations, and also supply documentation of the final disposition of the case. In response to question number six, Petitioner appeared to have marked both the answers “yes” and “no”, but then circled “yes.” On the second page of the application, Petitioner explained his answer to question number six, stating that he had had a real estate license ten years ago and that he had been involved with a dispute for $2,500 and lost the case. The explanation further stated that Petitioner was moving to Illinois at the time, so he voluntarily surrendered his license. On April 1, 2004, without investigating the facts to refresh his memory, Petitioner provided the requested signed letter of explanation. Subsequently, he withdrew his February application because he did not have time to deal with the ongoing questions the agency had regarding his application. Around July 13, 2004, after discussing the February 2004 application with Respondent, Petitioner submitted a revised Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Broker in the State of Florida. In response to question six, Petitioner marked “no” based on his memory that his real estate agent’s license had been “voluntarily surrendered.” Petitioner also submitted character reference letters. Additionally, Petitioner discussed with Respondent any proof of rehabilitation since the “voluntary surrender” of his real estate license. On page two of the July application, Petitioner wrote that his “only blemish” was a voluntary surrender of a real estate license in 1992. Petitioner stated, “[t]his was ‘not’ an act of moral turpitude or fraud.” In a deficiency letter dated July 28, 2004, the Office requested additional information from the Petitioner, including a signed statement explaining his side of the occurrence. On September 30, 2004, the Office received the same statement the Petitioner had previously forwarded to the Office for his February 2004 application. Petitioner again did not avail himself of the opportunity to discover the true facts surrounding the claimed surrender of his license. In the second paragraph of this explanatory letter Petitioner stated that the disciplinary action that led to surrender of his real estate license arose out of a transaction involving one of his customers who rented property to a third- party renter. Petitioner stated that the rental transaction between his customer and the third-party renter occurred in the lobby of Petitioner’s office without his knowledge or help. According to Petitioner’s, somewhat confusing, explanatory letter, the customer did not have the right to rent the house, but collected $2,500 from the renter and then left the state. Later, Petitioner discovered that the customer had closed in escrow and gained temporary occupancy of the home, thereby enabling the customer to ostensibly rent the home. Petitioner further explained that the renter sued him for the $2,500 and prevailed because the transaction took place in Petitioner’s lobby. Petitioner stated he lost the case because his attorney, Scott Hester (also his brother), was unavailable to make the closing argument and Petitioner had to do his own summation. In fact, Petitioner’s brother never represented Petitioner in the renter’s case because he did not have time to undertake the case. Petitioner did not supply the names of the people referenced in the letter because he did not remember them. As will be seen, at the time of the explanatory letter, Petitioner’s memory of the facts surrounding his license surrender is, at best, faulty. On April 19, 2005, the Office issued its Denial Letter, denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. As grounds for denial under Section 494.041(2)(c), (g), (i) and (q), Florida Statutes, the letter stated in relevant part: The Office’s background investigation and information you provided revealed the following: You answered Question #6 on your application as “no”, when it asks if you have had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude. On or about May 7, 1996, the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, denied your application for a license as a mortgage broker for making a material misstatement of fact on their application. On or about December 8, 1992, after the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate conducted an investigation, you surrendered your license with that agency and entered into a written agreement stating that you agreed to have your license revoked. Accordingly, the Real Estate Commission did revoke your license in their meeting of January 19, 1993 effective December 8, 1992. The Investigative Report attached to the Final Order to revoke reveals that you were sued for dishonest conduct and subsequently, on March 25, 1992, ordered to pay Johannes Fruhwirt $7,800 plus post- judgment interest. This order was by the County Court of Broward County as a result of a Final Judgment, Case #9103333 CC53 and a Writ of Execution. The investigation revealed that Hester left the State of Florida without leaving word of his whereabouts. Apparently, that judgment was never satisfied. On May 14, 1991 you promised to pay $3000 to Leonard Schoenfeld when closing occurred on a home Mr. Schoenfeld was purchasing. Closing occurred shortly afterward, and you have never made that payment. On or about July 17, 1995, the State of Illinois received an Application Form to Operate as a Residential Mortgage Licensee in the name of Hester International, Inc. on which you were listed as 50% owner. You signed the “Verification” portion of that form and your signature was notarized on June 20, 1995 indicating that you verified as being true all data entered onto that form. However, you responded “N/A” to Part III, Question #10 which asks that you list all licenses which you or your firm have applied for and been denied and/or any and all licenses issued to you or your firm which were subsequently suspended or revoked. You therefore failed to disclose the revocation of your license with the Florida Division of Real Estate that occurred in 1992. On the same application filed with the State of Illinois, in response to Part III, question 19(m), you did not disclose that a judgment had been entered against you on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. The renewal for Hester International Inc., with the State of Illinois, states under the section labeled, “Averment of License” in item “s” that the licensee will advise the Commissioner in writing of any changes to the information submitted on the most recent application for license within 30 days of said change. The State of Illinois reports that you never disclosed the denial of a mortgage broker license in 1996 with the State of Florida . (i) On November 18, 2004 in an electronic filing for corporation reinstatement for Hester International, Inc., you certified that as Registered Agent you maintained an office at 6278 N. Federal Highway, Suite #305 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In fact, that address is a mail drop leased to one Carl Thames, CPA. The signage required by Section 48.091(2), Florida Statutes, does not appear, and you and Hester International, Inc. are unknown at this location. In pre-hearing interrogatories, the Office asked Petitioner to provide more information about the transaction involving the transaction that had led to the revocation of his real estate license, including the identity of those individuals. Even though the importance of accuracy was apparent since Petitioner was now in litigation, Petitioner, again, without investigating the facts and relying solely on his improving memory answered the interrogatories posed to him. In his answers, Petitioner identified the “customer” who had collected the money as Leonard Schoenfeld and the “renter” as Johannes Fruhwirt. Petitioner went on, in his answers, to describe the transaction with Mr. Schoenfeld and Mr. Fruhwirt. This description is similar to the explanation offered in the explanatory letters supplied for his earlier applications. In his response to Requests for Admissions, Petitioner denied that in May of 1991 he acted as a real estate broker in the auction of a home located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Palm Beach County, Florida, and that he had been unable to deliver a mortgage at an agreed interest rate. Petitioner also denied that he had agreed to pay $3,000 for closing costs as deferred interest payments. Despite these denials, Petitioner admitted that he had signed an agreement to pay $3,000 to Mr. Schoenfeld. Petitioner explained these denials by claiming that these funds were never due because the agreement to pay $3,000 was contingent on closing. Since the real estate deal never closed, the $3,000 was never due. At his July 15, 2005, deposition, Petitioner essentially reaffirmed the inaccurate account of events in his interrogatory answers. At the deposition, Petitioner was asked to review documents related to the Schoenfeld transaction. Those documents included: (1) a copy of the May 14, 1991, agreement wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000, (2) a handwritten letter wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that he owed him, and (3) a warranty deed on property purchased by Mr. Schoenfeld. When he was shown the May 14, 1991, agreement, Respondent testified that he did not know why he would have agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000. Even when he was shown the deed on the property and even though he had notarized the signatures on that deed, Petitioner maintained that the deal never closed and he never owed the $3000. At hearing, Petitioner’s various and growing explanations during discovery significantly differ from his testimony. Petitioner testified that throughout his various explanations he had confused and combined several individuals into one transaction. Even though he knew that the true facts of these transactions were important to consideration of his application and in answering discovery in this case, Petitioner did not make any real attempt to refresh his memory of these transactions until shortly before the hearing. In fact, the Schoenfeld and Fruhwirt transactions involved different real estate deals and had nothing to do with each other. The Schoenfeld transaction occurred in 1991 and involved the sale of real property located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Florida. Mr. Schoenfeld was Petitioner’s customer. As part of the transaction, Petitioner guaranteed he could get a mortgage at a certain rate. After failing to get Mr. Schoenfeld a mortgage at a certain rate, Petitioner agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000 upon closing. When Petitioner failed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the $3,000 on closing, he asked Mr. Schoenfeld if he could make payments of $200 a month. In a letter to Mr.Schoenfeld, Petitioner confirmed that he would pay Mr. Schoenfeld the amount that was owed. Petitioner made two payments and then stopped making payments. In a letter dated July 1, 1991, Mr. Schoenfeld complained about his dealings with Petitioner to the Division of Real Estate. A few days before Mr. Schoenfeld’s deposition on July 25, 2005, Petitioner paid Mr. Schoenfeld $2,600. Mr. Schoenfeld accepted the payment since the money was still owed to him. However, the payment had been delayed for 14 years and did not include interest for those years. Petitioner testified that he made the payment because, once he remembered the details of the transaction, he felt morally obligated to pay Mr. Schoenfeld what he had promised. However, fulfillment of this obligation also occurred with this litigation pending and after denials that any money was due Mr. Schoenfeld. In short, Petitioner did not pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that was due him for 14 years until Petitioner was forced to acknowledge the true facts of the Schoenfeld transaction in this litigation. The Fruhwirt transaction involved a man named Mark Ritter who was a client of Petitioner. Mr. Fruhwirt met with Mark Ritter at a house he wanted to rent. Eventually, Mr. Ritter sent him to Petitioner to complete a lease agreement. Mr. Ritter did not know about leases and said Petitioner was a friend whose real estate office could set up the lease contract. Mr. Fruhwirt met Petitioner at his real estate office. Since it was lunchtime, they went to a nearby Burger King to finalize the lease. While at Burger King, Mr. Fruhwirt paid Petitioner $2,850 on the lease. Petitioner’s testified that he did not receive any money from Mr. Fruhwirt and did not accompany Mr. Fruhwirt to Burger King. Petitioner testified that Mr. Ritter and Mr. Fruhwirt met in his lobby and both went to Burger King to finalize the lease arrangement. However, given Petitioner’s past faulty memory, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. At some point, Mr. Fruhwirt moved into the house. Subsequently, Mr. Fruhwirt received a letter from an attorney representing the real owner demanding that he vacate the premises. Mr. Fruhwirt then discovered that Mr. Ritter was not the owner and had to hire an attorney to sort out his continued occupancy of the property. Eventually Mr. Fruwhirt bought this property. Mr. Fruhwirt sued Petitioner and the real estate office for the recovery of the $2,850 he had paid to rent the house. Petitioner was found liable, but the real estate office was found not liable because the transaction happened off its premises at Burger King. On March 25, 1992, the Broward County Court entered a judgment of $7,800 against Petitioner, finding that Petitioner had “breached his duty to disclose that Mark Ritter was not the owner of the involved property.” After Mr. Fruhwirt obtained the judgment, Petitioner declared bankruptcy. Mr. Fruhwirt pursued an adversary action in Petitioner’s bankruptcy proceedings. Subsequently, the Bankruptcy Court cited “11 U.S.C. 523 A(2) and 11 U.S.C. 523 A(4)” and refused to discharge the judgment debt. The Bankruptcy Court’s Order refusing to discharge the debt clearly conflicts with Dr. Hester’s repeated implications and statements that this debt was discharged in bankruptcy. Unable to collect from Petitioner, Mr. Fruhwirt filed with the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. The fund paid $2,850 to Mr. Fruhwirt and suspended Petitioner’s license. Mr. Fruhwirt used the money to defray some of his legal expenses. To date, Petitioner has not paid Mr. Fruhwirt any money on the judgment. The Fruwhirt transaction led to the revocation of Petitioner’s real estate license and, on January 19, 1993, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a final order revoking Petitioner’s real estate license. Despite Petitioner’s testimony that he never received a copy of the documents, the certificate of service for the final order indicates it was sent to Petitioner at 1101 Hidden Cove, Salem, SC 29676, which was the address where Petitioner was living at that time. Again, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. The Final Order referenced a December 8, 1992, agreement in which Petitioner agreed that his license would be revoked. In the December 8, 1992 agreement, entitled “Affidavit for the Voluntary Surrender of License, Registration, Certificate/Permit for Revocation,” signed by Petitioner, he agreed to the revocation of his license and to not apply for a new real estate license for ten years from the effective date of revocation. In particular, the December 8, 1992 agreement stated, “[t]he effective date of the revocation shall be upon signing this document.” Notwithstanding the clear language revoking the license, at the hearing, Petitioner maintained that because he had voluntarily surrendered his license, he did not believe his license had been revoked. In referring to the agreement he had signed, he testified that the agreement said, “that my license will be inactive, not revoked” and denied ever seeing the other documents revoking his license. This testimony is simply not credible and demonstrates Petitioner’s propensity to see or remember things in a way that is more flattering to him, irrespective of reality. The affidavit signed by Petitioner clearly stated that Petitioner’s license would be and was revoked upon signing. In 1995, Hester International applied to operate as a residential mortgage licensee in Illinois. The application identified Petitioner as the vice president and Sharon Hester as the president. Page one of the application indicated the application had to be executed “by two officers or all directors if the applicant/licensee is a corporation.” The application was signed by Petitioner and his wife. Petitioner did not disclose to Illinois that a judgment had been entered against him in Florida or that his real estate license had been revoked or suspended. Question 10 in Part III of the Application asked: “LIST ALL LICENSES WHICH YOU OR YOUR FIRM HAVE APPLIED FOR AND BEEN DENIED AND/OR ANY AND ALL LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU OR YOUR FIRM WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.” Petitioner responded “N/A.” (Id.). Question 19(m) in Part III of the Application asked: UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, I(WE) STATE THAT ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY (OUR) KNOWLEDGE AND FURTHER STATE THAT AS THE APPLICANT/LICENSEE: . . . (m) Has not committed a crime against the law of this State, any other state or the United States, involving moral turpitude, fraudulent or dishonest dealing, and that no final judgment has been entered against it in a civil action upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit which has not previously been reported to the Commissioner. The evidence did not demonstrate that the emphasized clauses in question 10 or the “I(WE)” in 19(m) direct such questions to individuals signing the application. One reasonable interpretation of the language is that the questions are directed to the business entity applying for the license. In short, the I(WE) language is simply language in a form meant to cover multiple types of business entities ranging from sale proprietorships to corporations. Therefore, Petitioner was not required by Illinois to disclose matters which involved him personally. To date, Illinois has not filed any disciplinary action against Petitioner or Hester International. Thus, the failure to disclose personal judgments or license actions to Illinois in a corporate application for licensure does not support a finding of dishonesty or denial of Respondent’s application at issue here. At some point, Hester International’s corporate status had to be reinstated in Florida. Petitioner reinstated the company’s corporate status in November of 2004. Petitioner filed as registered agent at 6278 North Federal Highway #305, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner had not lived at this address for some 15 years, but had lived there for seven years with his girlfriend. The evidence showed that Petitioner simply forgot to change the registered agent’s address and was not acting dishonestly. Once he discovered his mistake, Petitioner amended his filing to reflect the appropriate address. Again, these facts do not form a basis to deny Petitioner’s license application. Finally, Petitioner testified that until Spring 2005, he and his wife were 50/50 owners of Hester International, Inc., as reflected on the application and license renewals in Illinois. In September 2004, Ms. Hester submitted Hester International, Inc.’s application for Florida licensure as a mortgage broker business. The Hester International business application was submitted after the Office had denied Petitioner’s license application in 1996 and was scrutinizing his July 2004 application. In the application, Ms. Hester identified herself as 100 percent owner of the Hester International. Petitioner did review this application, but he intentionally did not take part in its filing. The purported change in ownership was not adequately explained at hearing and appears to have been done in order to forestall any problems with licensure of the corporation due to Petitioner’s participation in the corporation. While the change of ownership is troubling, given Petitioner’s history, and also adds to the evidence that Petitioner is less than forthright in his memory and past business dealings, the change of ownership for the corporation’s licensure application does not, by itself, support a denial of Petitioner’s application. On the other hand, too many inconsistencies exist between Petitioner’s hearing testimony and his earlier accounts to conclude that Respondent can be trusted to hold a mortgage brokerage license. At worst, the evidence shows that Petitioner is not truthful or acts with integrity. At best, the evidence shows that Respondent has the ability to convince himself of facts that do not quite fit the truth, but are more flattering to him. Under either scenario, Petitioner’s appreciation of honesty, truthfulness and integrity are suspect. Neither Petitioner’s letters supporting his good character, nor his success in his ministry demonstrates sufficient rehabilitation to overcome what appears to be long-time evasive behavior. Therefore, Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: A Final Order be entered denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Scott Hester, Esquire 13843 Longs Landing Road East Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Robert H. Schott, Esquire Gregg Morton, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Suite 526 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0376 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Respondent Anglickis is a Florida real estate broker holding license number 0001869. Respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker holding license number 0169476. The address of both respondents is 102 East Leland Heights Boulevard, Lehigh Acres, Florida. (P-26.) Respondent Anglickis is president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., and Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc. All three companies are located at the same address. (Testimony of Campbell; P-5, P-26.) On March 12, 1979, Louis G. Hofstetter and his wife, Dale I. Hofstetter, both residents of North Carolina, entered into a real estate contract with American Heritage Builders, Inc. Respondent Anglickis signed on behalf of American Hertiage Inc. Under the terms of the contract, the Hofstetters were to Purchase a lot and home to be constructed thereon by American Heritage Builders, Inc. The purchase price included the transfer of a lot owned by the Hofstetters and a cash down payment. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-1, P-3, P-26.) The contract estimated closing costs to be approximately $2,000". It also contained conflicting conditions relative to the time within which any mortgage financing must be obtained. . . . In the event PURCHASER'S application for mortgage financing is not approved within sixty (60) days from date hereof, all monies receipted for, less cost of credit report, will be returned to the PURCHASER and this contract will be null and void. * * * FOR MORTGAGE TRANSACTIONS: This contract of Purchase and Sale shall be void unless Purchaser's application for Mortgage has been approved by a bank or financial institution and Purchaser has executed the Mortgage Acceptance Form, within four (3) [sic] months from date of this Contract of Purchase. 2/ (P-1, R-1.) On March 12, 1979, the Hofstetters signed a mortgage loan application and submitted it to Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc. (P-26.) On May 5, 1979, 45 days after accepting the application, Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., submitted the Hofstetters' mortgage loan application to First Federal of DeSoto. (Testimony of Archer.) On June 15, 1979 (95 days after receiving the loan application), Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., wrote the Hofstetters indicating that the local lender needed additional information on their stock holdings, and enclosing a document titled "Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Charges". This document estimated that closing costs would be $2,754--$754 more than the estimate contained in the real estate contract. (P-5.) On June 22, 1979, the Hofstetters protested the increased closing cost, requested clarification, and provided the requested information on their stock holdings. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-26.) On July 7, 1979, the Hofstetters notified Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., that the increased closing cost deviated from the contract, that they therefore considered the contract cancelled and wanted the deposit refunded. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-8.) On June 29, 1979, Robert Campbell, vice-president of Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., wrote the Hofstetters and explained the meaning of each component of the closing cost. (P-7.) On July 17, 1979, respondent, as president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., wrote a letter to the Hofstetters expressing his position: * * * Let me try and put the contract in the proper perspective for you. It's our contention that you have reluctantly provided to us the information that would enable us to make a proper and expedient application to the lending institution and that much of this information has been confused, causing further delays. In accordance with the contract, you were to make this application as quickly and as expediently as Possible so that the contract would not expire. However, this is not the case. Thus, my immediate Position is that the contract should be expired and all of the deposits, including the cash and the lot which we gave you $6,995.00 trade for, would be forfeited as agreed upon liquidated damages. He ended by outlining other alternatives and repeating his asserted right to cancel the transaction and retain the Hofstetters' deposit as liquidated damages * * * First, the lending institution must make a quick determination based on the facts that they have that you are either eligible or not eligible for a mortgage loan as outlined in our contract. If they still do not have enough information, we have no other choice then but to ask you to pay the increase which we have experienced at this time (price list enclosed), and in paying that increase we would be willing to take another 90 days to try and secure a loan for you. If your mortgage loan is denied, your deposit less the costs of processing your mortgage application will be returned to you. Of course, the third choice is the choice I hope we do not have to take, and that is cancelling this transaction and retaining your monies as agreed upon liquidated damages. (P-9.) Mr. Hofstetter responded on July 22, 1979. He denied that he was responsible for any delay or confusion in the Processing of their loan application; asserted that 93 days had elapsed from the submission of their loan application and Mr. Campbell's letter of June 15, 1979, asking for additional financial information; and informed respondent Anglickis that the contract had already expired by virtue of the clause allowing 60 days to obtain mortgage financing. He then, again, asked that his deposit be returned. (P-10.) On July 30, 1979, respondent Anglickis, as president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., wrote to the Hofstetters indicating that the loan had been approved 3/ and he was prepared to build their home at the contract price. He then addressed Mr. Hofstetter's July 22, 1979, denial of any responsibility for delay in obtaining the mortgage loan: I have reviewed your letter of July 22, 1979 and I understand we certainly have a difference of opinion as to whose fault the delay has been caused by. However, I don't think it's time to look at whose fault the delay might be, since it all has worked out to your satisfaction. The mortgage has been approved and we are ready to build. I expect you will now sign the mortgage papers when receipted for so that we may begin construction immediately. (P-11.) On August 6, 1979, the Hofstetters restated to respondent Anglickis that they were not prepared to go ahead with construction, that the contract became null and void by operation of the 60-day mortgage financing clause, and that the deposit should be immediately returned. (P-12.) On August 31, 1979, respondent Anglickis notified the Hofstetters that, pursuant to the contract conditions, he was retaining their full deposit, including cash and the real estate lot for which they received a $6,995 credit toward the purchase price. The full down payment totaled $10,350. (P-1, P-13.) On September 8, 1979, the Hofstetters replied: We cannot understand why you continue to ignore the provisions of the second sentence of Paragraph Two on the reverse side of Contract No. 1997, dated 12 March 1979. You say you intend to invoke the Provisions of the third sentence of this para- graph, but this sentence is Predicated on the assumption that the mortgage would be approved within sixty (60) days. The mortgage was not approved until late July (your letter of 17 July 1979 indicated it was not yet approved, and your letter of 30 July 1979 stated that it had now been approved), more than 120 days past the date of the original contract. Our Position is as Previously stated on several occasions: on 12 May 1979 the contract became null and void, and on that date our deposit should have been refunded. Any action other than this is illegal, according to the terms of the contract. We are due return of our down payment, plus interest, from 12 May 1979. (P-24.) On October 3, 1979, First Federal of DeSoto, which had continued to process the Hofstetter loan application, issued a commitment approving the requested loan. On October 10, 1979, the Hofstetters rejected the mortgage loan. (P-26.) Subsequently, the Hofstetters wrote letters to the Florida Department of Legal Affairs and the Lehigh Chamber of Commerce complaining of respondent Anglickis' retention of their deposit; they, then, retained an attorney and filed a civil action against respondents in the circuit court of Lee County. That action was settled out-of-court. There is no evidence whatsoever to support respondent Anglickis' assertion to the Hofstetters that they were dilatory or responsible for confusion or delay in obtaining the necessary mortgage financing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges against respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., be dismissed; That respondent Richard A. Anglickis be administratively fined $1,000. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oaklnd Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Cherylyn Stoppler, at all times pertinent hereto, was licensed as a real estate saleswoman in the State Of Florida, holding license No. 0467803. Her last and current license was issued authorizing practice at Escambia Realty, Inc., 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. Respondent Dorothy Diane Owens, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license No. 0380831. Respondent Escambia Realty, Inc., at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed corporate real estate brokerage holding license No. 0232503. Its address is 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, related to the licensure of real estate brokers and salesmen, the real estate professional practice standards embodied in that chapter and with prosecuting alleged violators of those standards. On April 13, 1986, Kenneth and Linda Williams, also known as Linda Brewer, requested that Cherylyn Stoppler show them rental property consisting of a single family residence located at 6853 Lake Charlene Drive in Pensacola. They had observed the Respondent corporate broker's sign on the front of that premises, advertising it for rental. Respondent Stoppler, Respondent Owens and the Escambia Realty, Inc. represented the owners of the property. Kenneth and Linda Williams examined the property and decided that they wanted to rent it. In their discussion with Cherylyn Stoppler concerning the terms of the rental arrangement, they requested that they be allowed to paint the premises and that the garage door be repaired. Respondent Stoppler agreed to this and indicated the owners would supply two gallons of paint and the prospective tenants, the Williamses, could do the painting with the owners ensuring repair of the garage door. Respondent Stoppler and the Williamses agreed to those terms and to the rental amount of $625 per month. They also agreed to pay Respondent Stoppler a $400 deposit, on behalf of the owners. Ms. Stoppler informed the Williamses that if they did not consummate the lease arrangement, upon which they had verbally agreed, the $400 would be retained and remitted over to the owners of the property. The Williamses agreed to this arrangement. The Williamses and Ms. Stoppler returned to Ms. Stoppler's office and she noted these terms on a lease agreement form with the additional term that the owner would steam clean the carpet in the house. The lease terms also provided that the premises would be used by no more than two adults and "zero" children, but the lease agreement has the "zero" stricken through indicating that that term was to be deleted. The striking of the zero on the term concerning the number of children to occupy the premises appears to have been executed with the same pen, inasmuch as the ink is the same color as the rest of Mrs. Stoppler's handwritten terms on the lease form. In any event, the Williamses were anxious to return to their home in Louisiana directly from the Respondent's office that same afternoon and to accommodate them Ms. Stoppler agreed to mail the lease form to them to be executed, urging them to send it back immediately. When they left the premises that day, Respondent Stoppler removed her firm's sign from the front of the premises and also told the Williamses that the property would be off the market as of that day, hence her admonishment to them to waste no time in returning the executed lease since the property would be off the market during the interim on the strength of the verbal agreement. The Williamses did not inform Ms. Stoppler that Mr. Williams had two children who might visit them from time to time or live with them at the premises. The Williamses returned to Louisiana and the lease was mailed to them by Ms. Stoppler. The Williamses decided not to execute the lease and to not consummate the rental arrangement. They informed Ms. Stoppler of this by phone on April 24, 1986, as well as communicating on that day with Respondent Owens. They indicated they did not desire to rent the premises and one reason given was that they felt that the two children were precluded by the lease terms from living on the premises for any period of time with them. In fact, the Williamses had never mentioned that they had any children and had sought to negotiate a reduction in the rent when they originally discussed the matter with Ms. Stoppler on the basis that only the two of them would live in the premises. The terms and conditions of the rental arrangement were those given to Ms. Stoppler by the Williamses themselves. When they conferred with Ms. Owens and Ms. Stoppler, they were again informed that the $400 would be retained and transmitted to the owners, to which they did not then object. In fact, they never did make any demand upon the Respondents for return of the $400 which was actually communicated to the Respondents. There is a letter in evidence (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) which the Respondents never received, as is shown by the certified mail receipt card and by Respondents' and Ms. Celano's testimony. The Williamses objected to consummating the lease because they contended that Ms. Stoppler had assured them that they could 1ive in the premises rent- free from the beginning of the lease, April 26, until May 1, during the time in which they would be painting the house and instead they were being charged $84 for those days. Mrs. Williams' testimony is somewhat equivocal in this regard in that she exhibited an incomplete memory regarding certain critical dates in the transaction, for example, the date she allegedly called Mrs. Stoppler to inform her of their refusal of the rental and the date she believed the lease was to commence. Mrs. Stoppler's testimony was corroborated by that of Ms. Owens, and was not refuted by the Williamses. It is accepted over that of Mrs. Williams in establishing that indeed the lease period and the rental there for was to commence on April 26. The Respondents' testimony shows that the house was off the rental market from April 13, when the verbal agreement with Ms. Williams was entered into and the sign was removed from the property and that both Respondents informed Mrs. Williams on two occasions that the $400 was not refundable but would be remitted to the owners of the property. The Respondents also established that Escambia Realty, Inc. followed a consistent policy of retaining deposit monies and remitting them to the owners without refund to prospective tenants when the tenants agreed to lease the premises after being informed that the deposit would be retained and the property taken off the market, when such tenants elect of their own volition to negate a lease or rental agreement. The Williamses additionally maintained that they did not want to consummate the lease arrangement because, in their view, the Respondents and the owners would not permit any children unrestrictedly visit or to live on the premises. That was established not to be the case. They also objected because they would not be allowed to live in the premises rent-free for several days during the time in which they were painting the premises. Additional objections involved various inconsequential technical deficiencies, such as misspellings, in the content of the lease. The employment position Mr. Williams was to have taken in the Pensacola area, and which was in large measure their reason for moving to Pensacola and renting the subject premises, failed to materialize. Ultimately, however, the Williamses moved to Pensacola and rented a different house at the lower rate of $600 per month. In short, the complaining witnesses contend that they did not want to execute the lease because of the problem of the $84 prorated rent required of them by the Respondents and the owners for the days when they thought they would live rent-free while painting the premises, because they felt that Mr. Williams' children by a previous marriage were precluded from unrestricted visits at the rental premises and because they felt that the proffered lease did not contain the proper initial date of tenancy. Thus, the Williamses breached the agreement because the Respondents refused to "correct" the lease according to the Williamses' desires. Those desires were not communicated to the Respondents until, at the very earliest, the phone conversations of April 24, 1986, some twelve days after the verbal agreement to rent the premises to the Williamses had been entered into and the $400 deposited with the Respondents on behalf of the owners. During that time, and longer, the property was taken off the rental market and the Respondents and the owners forbore the opportunity to secure other tenants. The Williamses themselves acknowledged that the letter by which they sought return of the $400 deposit was never actually received by the Respondents. Further, Ms. Williams in the telephone conversation on April 24, 1986, acknowledged that the owners were entitled to the $400 deposit. Even so, Ms. Owens waited approximately 25 days before remitting the funds over to the owners. Thus, no dispute as to the deposit was ever communicated to the Respondents, and the Respondents never misrepresented to either Mr. or Mrs. Williams the manner of disbursement of the deposit funds. It is noteworthy that Mrs. Williams is a licensed realtor herself and had some experience in similar real estate transactions. The Respondents carried out their portion of the bargain. Finally, it has been demonstrated that Respondent Owens is a well- respected real estate practitioner in the Pensacola area, having served as an officer and director of her local board of realtors and having been accorded a number of honors and certifications in connection with her professional performance as a realtor and her securing of advanced training in the field of real estate brokerage. Ms. Stoppler is relatively new to the profession, but neither she nor Ms. Owens have been shown to have ever engaged in any questionable practice or conduct in the course of their practice and neither have been shown to have been the subject of any other complaint of any nature resulting from a real estate transaction.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondents Cherylyn Stoppler, Dorothy Diane Owens and Escambia Realty, Inc. be dismissed in its entirety. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3982 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-4. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as to its material import. 7-9. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 10-11. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 17-18. Accepted. 19. Rejected as to its material import. 20-21. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but rejected as to its material import. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 29-30. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 31. Accepted, but not as to its material import. 32-35. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but not to the effect that a demand for refund was made. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 39-41. Rejected. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact: Specific rulings are not separately made here because Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact are inseparably entwined with legal argument and recitations of, and arguments concerning, the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Cherylyn Stoppler Dorothy Diane Owens Escambia Realty, Inc. 310 South Pace Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32501 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, I make the following: The Defendant, Leroy Wilson, is a registered real estate broker with the Commission and during January 1, 1975 to November 5, 1975, Defendant was registered as trading as Overpass Real Estate. On April 27, 1975, Defendant was the owner of residential property located at 291 N.W. 29th Terrace, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. On April 28, 2/ Robert English and his wife Mazie English in response to a "for sale" sign posted at 291 N.W. 29th Terrace, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, went to the real estate brokerage office maintained by the Defendant at room 201 Romark Building, 3521 West Broward Boulevard, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Defendant and Mr. and Mrs. English discussed and negotiated a deposit receipt contract dated April 28, 1975, between the Englishes as purchasers and Defendant as seller for the purchase and sale of property owned by Defendant located at 291 N.W. 29th Terrace. Mrs. English testified that they put up an earnest money deposit of $300 acknowledged by Defendant, however, Defendant executed the deposit receipt contract reflecting an earnest money deposit of $600. (See FREC Exhibit number 2). Mrs. English testified that part of the terms of the contract was that she would apply for a mortgage loan but when it was determined that her daughter who was to participate with her in the purchase, was not able to stay with her, she and her husband decided not to apply for a mortgage loan. She explained to Defendant and he agreed to return the $300 deposit that she had submitted along with the deposit receipt contract. When the Englishes demanded the return of their deposit, Defendant advised them that "it was the law that the deposit must be kept for 6 weeks, and thereafter, he would have to keep the deposit another ten days." After the expiration of the six week period, the Englishes called the Defendant's office and was advised that he no longer lived there and other efforts by the Englishes to contact the Defendant were fruitless. Thereafter on or about August 20, 1975, the Englishes filed a complaint with the Commission. Approximately two days after the Commission initiated its investigation, the Defendant returned the $300 deposit to the Englishes. (See FREC Exhibit number 3). N.B. Wolf an employee of Gulf Atlantic Mortgage Brokers testified that she was familiar with the document received into evidence as Exhibit number 2 which is the deposit receipt contract entered into by the Defendant and the Englishes. She testified that she did not recall ever having taken a credit application for the Englishes to apply for a mortgage loan. Roy E. Conner, the operations officer for Plantation First National Bank testified that he caused to be gathered the bank records as they relate to the escrow account maintained by the Defendant at that bank. An examination of those bank records revealed that the Defendant's escrow bank account maintained at Plantation First National Bank had a shortage of $5 as of September 16 and that on August 14, his escrow bank account showed a balance of $65 when it should have reflected a balance of $300 in earnest money deposits. See FREC Exhibit number 4 received into evidence. Pruyn investigated Defendant's brokerage office on September 16, at 2951 N.W. Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Based on an official inspection, Pruyn noted a number of inadequacies in that there were no letterheads, no desks, no chairs, no business mail, no diary of witnesses or any official sign as required and set forth in Commission Rule 21V-10.07 and 10.09, Florida Administrative Code and Section 475.22, Florida Statutes. See FREC Exhibit number 5 received into evidence. As previously stated, the Defendant did not appear at the hearing nor did he have a representative present to present any defense to the charges made by the Commission in the administrative complaint.
The Issue Whether Carleen Chalk Lund, an active broker in Lund Realty, Inc. , a licensed corporate broker, failed to account or deliver to Daisy and Kenneth Parnell money in the form of a deposit which had come into her hands and which was not her property or which she was not in law or equity entitled to retain, under the circumstances, and at the time which was agreed upon or which was required by law or, in the absence of an agreed upon time, upon demand of the Parnells, who were entitled to such an accounting or delivery.
Findings Of Fact Carleen Chalk Lund and Norman Wayne Lund are registered real estate brokers holding current registration from the Florida Real Estate Commission and are active brokers in Lund Realty, Inc., a corporate broker registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission. On or about January 4, 1975, Daisy and Kenneth Parnell, the buyers, signed an offer to purchase the following real property from David and Wilma Hammer: East 184.5 ft. of NW 1/4 of SW 1/4 of Sec 6, Twp. 26 S, Range 29 E, N Osceola County. Said offer was accepted by the sellers. Subsequently, the buyers sent a telegraphic money order in the amount of $2,200 to Lund Realty, Inc. Therefore said money was deposited in the escrow account of Lund Realty, Inc. $2,000 as deposit on the Hammer's property and $200 to be used for closing costs. The following provisions of the Contract for Purchase between the buyers and the sellers are specifically noted and referenced: In accordance with provisions of paragraph 4, the contract was to be closed and the deed delivered on or before January 31, 1975. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6, the seller was to convey title to the aforesaid property to the buyer by agreement for deed. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7, the costs, if any, of preparation of closing documents and closing fee shall be borne equally by the seller and buyer. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 9, all closing costs were to be divided equally between the buyer and seller including title insurance. In accordance with paragraph G of said standards, if the buyer failed to perform any of the covenants of the contract within the time specified, the deposit paid by the buyer might be retained by or for the account of the seller as consideration for the execution of the contract and in full settlement of any claims for camages and all parties would be relieved of all obligations under the contract and each party would execute a separate release of the other at that time. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph P of the standards, in the event that the buyer failed to perform and the aforesaid deposit was retained, the amount of the deposit was to have been divided equally between the realtor and the seller provided that the amount to be retained and received by the realtor would not exceed the full amount of the commission and that any excess would be paid to the seller. In accordance with the provisions of the paragraph "Commission to Realtor", the seller acknowledged the employment of Lund Realty, Inc. and agreed to pay Lund Realty a commission in accordance with the commission agreement. On January 25, 1975, copies of the articles of agreement, closing statement, and title insurance cost disclosure were sent by Chelsea Title and Guaranty Company to Mrs. Daisy Parnell at 88 North Pasack Road, Spring Valley, New York, 10977. The letter accompanying the aforementioned documents indicated that the sellers had executed the closing papers on that date. Said letter further indicated that as soon as the papers were signed by the recipient, that Dee A Burttram, manager of Chelsea Title and Guaranty Company, would record the articles of agreement and insure title to property. These papers were net signed and returned to Chelsea Title, and on February 14, 1975 a subsequent letter was addressed from Dee A. Burttram to airs. Daisy Parnell at the aforestated address indicating that Chelsea Title had not received the documents forwarded to Mrs. Parnell and offering further information if they had not been completed. See Composite Exhibit 10. Between January 25 and February 28, 1975 efforts were made by Lund Realty, Inc. to contact airs. Daisy Parnell without success. On February 28, 1975 it was determined that Frank Townsend, Attorney at Law practicing in Kissimmee, had been engaged by Sidney Schwartz, Attorney at Law practicing in New York, to review the contract entered into by Mrs. Daisy Parnell. According to his testimony, Frank Townsend recommended to Schwartz that Mrs. Parnell not go through with the contract until certain discrepancies in the contract were clarified. The discrepancies involved were the conflict between the provision of paragraph 2 stating that $8,000 purchase money note and mortgage to the seller while paragraph 6 indicated that the seller would convey title by an agreement for deed; the lack of a scribner's statement note on the papers to be filed with the Court; and a discrepancy between the amount of monthly payment as stated in the Contract for Sale and Purchase and the Agreement for Deed. However, by his letter of March 5, 1975 to Mrs. Daisy Parnell, Townsend refers only to problems involving the use of the Agreement for Deed which he concluded was not a problem if the sellers insisted on that form of conveyance, and the fact that the Agreement for Deed is unacceptable because it is unrecordable (an apparent reference to the fact that a scribner's notation was not made on the Agreement for Deed). By his letter of April 3, 1975 to Mr. Sidney Schwartz, Mr. Townsend indicates that he had completed all back ground work on the transaction and had advised Mr. Murray W. Over street, attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Hammer three weeks prior that he (Townsend) was ready to provide a note and mortgage in exchange for a Warranty Deed and had requested that Overstreet arrange a closing date. Mr. Townsend closes indicating that he had again contacted Mr. Overstreet reminding him that the Parnells wished to close. Several things are apparent from Townsend's letters of March 5 and April 3, 1975. It is apparent from the letter to Mrs. Parnell from Townsend dated March 5, 1975 that substantial concern existed on the part of Schwartz that the use of an Agreement for Deed in the transaction would provide to Mrs. Parnell less protection than she would have in a situation in which a note and mortgage was used. However, as stated above, Townsend pointed out that the use of an Agreement for Deed under the Florida Law would afford Mrs. Parnell the same protection as a mortgage. It is also clear from the April 3 letter that all problems related to the Parnell-Hammer transaction had been resolved, that they were ready to close but insisted upon a note and mortgage in exchange for a warranty deed, and their position had bean communicated to counsel for the Hammers. The demand for the use of a note and mortgage by the Parnells is contrary to the provisions of the Contract for Sale and Purchase between these parties entered into on January 4, 1975 and as of April 3, 1975 was the only reason for the Parnell's refusing to close. On April 3, 1975, Mr. Murray Overstreet attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Hammer, advised Frank N. Townsend, attorney for Mrs. Parnell, that the Hammers considered their Contract for Sale and Purchase with Mrs. Parnell to be null and void because the transaction was to be closed on or before January 31, 1975 and that as of April 3, 1975 the matter had not been completed. Mr. Overstreet further advised that his clients made no claim on the deposit made to Lund Realty and that said deposit might be returned to the buyers. A copy of this letter was sent to Lund Realty, Inc. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph G of the Contract for Sale and Purchase referenced above, upon default of the buyer, the deposit paid by the buyer could be retained by or for the account of the sellers as consideration for the execution of the contract and in full settlement of any claims for damage. Under the provisions of paragraph P of said contract, said deposit would be divided equally between the realtor and seller; provided, however, that the amount retained or received by the realtor was not to exceed the full amount of the commission, in this instance $600. On April 4, 1975 in response to the copy of the letter from Overstreet to Townsend in which the Hammers declared the Contract for Purchase and Sale null and void, Lund Realty, Inc. wrote Frank Townsend advising him that the expenses for sales commission, cancellation fee, and termite inspection should be considered before any escrow funds were disbursed and requesting that Lund Realty be advised as to how Mrs. Parnell would like to handle the charges. Clearly, Lund Realty considered the Parnells to be in default and asserted a claim for commission. No evidence was received regarding any response from Townsend to the letter of Lund Realty, Inc. dated April 4, 1975. On May 14, 1975 Lund Realty wrote Mrs. Daisy Parnell sending her a check in the amount of $1,466, the amount of her deposit less expenses incurred by her for sales commission, cancellation fee, termite inspection, and insurance. The amounts of each of the expenses and copies of statements were enclosed. Although the check in question was retained by Mrs. Parnell, Lund Realty received a letter from Sidney Schwartz dated May 23, 1975 which states in pertinent part as follows: "I am led to believe that the seller in the proposed transaction did not perfect title and waived and/or released its interest in the contract. If this be so, the entire down pay ment of Mrs. Parnell must be returned to her imme- diately. Please inquire into this matter. You no doubt are aware that Mrs. Parnell has retained Florida counsel, namely, Frank N. Townsend, Esquire, Post Office Box 847, Kissimmee, Florida. This is further to advise that in the event there has been a wrongful retention of any of Mrs. Parnell's funds, complaints shall be lodged with all appropriate authorities including licen- sing authorities in the State of Florida." The next contact between the parties was a letter to Lund Realty from Frank Townsend dated June 19, 1975. In that letter, Mr. Townsend stated as follows: "This confirms our request in accordance with Mr. Overstreet's letter wherein no demand is made for any funds on behalf of the Hammers, the return of all funds deposited with you by the Parnells is specifically requested." A second follow-up letter was addressed to Lund Realty on July 14,1975 requesting a response to the aforementioned letter of June 19, 1975. It is clear that the basis for demand of return of the deposit receipt in its entirety was based on the statements in Overstreet's letter to Townsend dated April 3, 1975, that the Hammers made no claim to the deposit to Lund Realty, Inc. This position of the Hammers was subsequently clarified by Mr. Hammer in his letter of August 12 (Exhibit 7) and by Mr. Overstreet, who at the hearing, testified that the Hammers never intended to waive the amount of the commission and the cost. Lund Realty was entitled to its commission and the Hammers would have had a cause of action against the Parnells under the contract for the entire amount of the deposit. However, the existence of a dispute over claims to all or portions of the escrow funds developed slowly, and was based on whether the Hammers waived their rights to all or any portion of the escrow funds. In September 1975 Lund Realty requested an advisory opinion of the Florida Real Estate Commission regarding its duties. The conclusion of that advisory opinion was that disbursement should be made to the Parnells, and that the claims that Lund, Chelsea Title and any other individuals should be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The advisory opinion was silent, however, on Hammer's subsequent claim for the commission and cost from the deposit. As of the date of hearing, the $2,200 was on deposit in the escrow account of Lund Realty, Inc.
Recommendation The position and actions of the various individuals should also be considered in this case in arriving at a penalty because none of the parties have completely "clean hands." The Parnells precipitated the breach by insistence on a note and mortgage; the Hammers have made no attempt to clarify the situation by paying the commission and cost; and the attorneys kept Lund Realty completely in the dark about what was transpiring. The Lunds are the only ones involved in the transaction who have tried to carry out their obligation. Further, they also are the only ones who stand to lose financially without seeking judicial relief. While they have held the money, it has remained in escrow since the dispute arose. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and other factors bearing on the case, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Florida Real Estate Commission place Carleen Chalk Lund on probation for one year. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of January 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Carleen Chalk Lund 612 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 32741
The Issue The issue is whether respondent acted as a mortgage lender within the meaning of Section 494.001(3), Florida Statutes, and thus is subject to Division licensure requirements.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Division), is a state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the Florida Mortgage Brokerage and Lending Act which is codified in Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Among other things, the Division regulates mortgage lenders and requires such persons or entities to secure a license. Respondent, White Pine Resouces, Inc. (WPR), is a Florida corporation formed in March 1986. Its sole shareholder is John R. Grass, a Pensacola attorney. Although the corporation was originally formed for a number of purposes, its primary activity is the real estate investment business. It holds no licenses issued by, or registrations with, the Division. WPR's current business address is 358-C West Nine Mile Road, Pensacola, Florida. WPR's principal source of money is Grass, or his professional association, who loan money to the corporation. In some cases, the money is used to acquire parcels of property for resale, make necessary repairs or improvements, and then provide owner financing to the buyer. In other cases, WPR loans money to persons needing to make improvements to their homes or rental property and takes back a second mortgage from the borrower. These types of transactions, which occurred during the years 1992-95, are found in documents offered in evidence as petitioner's exhibits 1-5. Respondent has also stipulated that several other transactions of this nature occurred during that same period of time. In every case, WPR was investing its own money or that of its principal. In 1992, a Division examiner analyst noted the following listing in the Yellow Pages section of the Pensacola telephone directory under the heading of "Mortgages": White Pine Resources Having Trouble With Financing Residential & Land Fast Service on 1st Mortgages The advertisement also contained respondent's street address and telephone number. In the 1993-94 telephone directory, WPR carried the following advertisement under the "Mortgages" section of the Yellow Pages: White Pine Resources Specialists! Bad Credit - We Can Help Vacant Land Loans In the 1995-96 telephone directory, WPR placed the following advertisement in the "Mortgages" section of the Yellow Pages: White Pines Resources A Private Investor Not a Mortgage Broker Specialists! We Can Help Vacant Land Loans Although the Division first noted one of WPR's Yellow Page advertisements in 1992, for some reason it did not conduct a formal investigation of respondent's activities until February 28, 1994. On that day, an examiner analyst made an unannounced visit to respondent's office for the purpose of inspecting its records to determine if WPR was acting as a mortgage lender. However, WPR's principal, John R. Grass, was not in the office, and the analyst simply left his business card and a message for Grass to contact him. The next morning, Grass telephoned the analyst's supervisor and advised him that since WPR was merely a private investor, and not a mortgage lender, it was not subject to the Division's regulation, and hence it would not provide copies of its records. A subpoena duces tecum was then issued by the Division, records were produced pursuant to the subpoena, and this controversy ensued. The parties agree, however, that this action was not prompted by complaints from consumers or other persons having dealings with WPR. The record indicates that a mortgage lender differs from a private investor in several material respects. An important distinction is that a private investor uses its own funds rather than those of another party. Also, a private investor does not buy or sell paper, does not escrow taxes, does not split or broker commissions, and does not close its own loans. In all of these respects, WPR had the attributes of a private investor. When mortgage brokerage firms are involved in transactions with private investors, they must supply the private investor with certain documents that are not provided to an institutional investor. Among others, they include a disclosure agreement, receipt of recorded instruments, an appraisal or waiver of the same, and title insurance. In addition, Division rules require that a mortgage brokerage firm record its transactions with private investors in a log journal known as DBF-MB-888. The evidence shows that for transactions between WPR and at least two mortgage brokerage firms during the years in question, the two firms recorded those transactions on DBF-MB-888. They also provided WPR with documents typically given to private investors. The Division has adopted Rule 3D-40.290(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides that a person is deemed to be holding himself out to the public as being in the mortgage lending business if he advertises in a manner "which would lead the reader to believe the person was in the business of buying, making or selling mortgage loans." The rule has not been challenged and, for purposes of resolving this controversy, is presumed to be valid. In view of the representations that WPR provided "Fast Service on 1st Mortgages" and "Vacant Land Loans," it is fair to infer that the Yellow Page advertisements made by WPR would reasonably lead the reader to believe that WPR was in the business of buying, making or selling mortgage loans. Therefore, by virtue of advertising in the Yellow Pages, WPR is deemed to be holding itself out to the public as being in the mortgage lending business. During the years 1993-95, the Division routinely sent WPR questionnaires regarding various WPR transactions with licensed lenders. The transmittal letter accompanying the questionnaire noted that the Division was conducting "a routine examination" of the licensed lender (and not WPR), and WPR's comments would "be of material assistance to (the Division) in determining compliance with the Florida Mortgage Brokerage Act." By way of an estoppel defense, WPR has essentially contended that the questionnaires constituted a representation by the Division that WPR was merely a private lender. It further contends that, to its detriment, it relied upon that representation. But there is nothing in the documents that states that the Division considered WPR to be a private lender. Nor is there any evidence that the Division made any other oral or written representations to WPR that it did not need to secure a license. Finally, assuming arguendo that such a representation occurred, there was no showing that WPR relied to its detriment on such an alleged "misstatement of fact." WPR also raises the defense of laches arguing that it was severely prejudiced by the Division's delay in prosecuting this action. Except for testimony that respondent was forced to secure the services of an attorney to defend against this action, and its principal was required to attend a hearing, there was no showing of prejudice on the part of WPR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order requiring respondent to cease and desist from engaging in the mortgage lending business without a license. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-0290 Petitioner: Because petitioner's post-hearing filing is more in the nature of a memorandum of law containing argument rather than proposed findings of fact, specific rulings have not been made. Respondent: Because respondent's post-hearing filing is more in the nature of a memorandum of law containing argument rather than proposed findings of fact, specific rulings have not been made. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry L. Hooper, III, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Clyde C. Caillouet, Jr., Esquire 4900 Bayou Boulevard, Suite 103 Pensacola, Florida 32503 John T. Reading, Jr., Esquire 358-C West Nine Mile Road Pensacola, Florida 32534-1818
The Issue Has Petitioner, Unlimited Financial Services, LLC (Unlimited), conducted the unlicensed business of insurance in violation of section 626.112(7), Florida Statutes (2011)?1/ Has Unlimited engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice, false advertising, as prohibited by section 626.9541(1)(b)?
Findings Of Fact The Department is a state agency charged with administering chapters 624 and 626, Florida Statutes, governing the business of insurance. Unlimited is not a licensed Florida insurance agency. Matthew Dilday, its owner, is not a licensed Florida insurance agent. In the pre-hearing stipulation, Unlimited described itself as "an advertiser who obtains qualified leads for licensed Florida insurance agents." In its advertising materials directed at insurance agents, Unlimited describes itself as "the Nation's most sought after company for advisors in need of new marketing strategies" and "the Nation's No. 1 Annuity Leads and Preset Appointment Program." Unlimited promotes itself on its website as "No. 1 Annuity Lead Provider." Beneath that heading, Unlimited represents: When we talk with our annuity and investment lead prospects, our professionally trained call center staff is adamant about confirming that they have investment assets. When you purchase preset investment or annuity appointments from UFS Marketing [Unlimited], you also receive access to our highly recommended training programs that explain to you the best way to convert leads and appointments into sales. Unlimited's materials say: We provide annuity leads to financial professionals who sell deferred annuities, many who work for insurance companies. We also provide pre-qualified annuity leads programs to independent agents of the insurance companies who collect a commission from the insurance company when they sell an annuity. This commission is usually a a [sic] percentage of the total premium paid by the annuity investor. Unlimited's services facilitate contact between an agent and a potential client in several ways. According to the promotional materials, Unlimited's "Annuity Leads and Preset Appointment Programs are essential to insurance agents and financial advisors." Again, according to the materials, Unlimited sets "thousands of qualified appointments every month for agents nationwide." The program saves agents valuable time in prospecting for qualified prospective customers. Unlimited enters into marketing services agreements with Florida insurance agents and agencies designed to facilitate the marketing of life insurance products to Florida consumers. Unlimited is in the advertising and marketing business and operates a telemarketing call center. Although Mr. Dilday repeatedly testified that Unlimited was simply a "printing company," it is not. It is a direct mail and telemarketing marketing organization focused on developing customer leads for insurance agents.2/ In 2011, Unlimited entered into a contract with Florida Insurance Agent Andy Heygate titled, "Marketing Services Agreement" (Agreement). The "General Purpose" paragraph of the Agreement states: This Agreement will establish a business relationship among and between the aforementioned parties whereby UFS Marketing will supply fulfillment services on behalf of the Customer [Agent Heygate]. Marketing materials will be mailed to the general public on behalf of the Customer in accordance with the instructions received from the Customer and calls will be taken from the general public on behalf of the Customer in accordance with the Customer's instructions. The Agreement details marketing services and the parties' responsibilities. Among other things, it provides: Unlimited will send a mass mailing developed by the customer targeted at individuals who meet a demographic profile selected by the customer. The profile for the Agreement targeted homeowners aged 58-75 who had an annual income of over $30,000 and a home worth $150,000 or more. Unlimited will make a telephone bank available to accept responses from consumers following a script developed by the customer to screen the responses to make appointments or develop leads. Unlimited will make leads available and/or set appointments with consumers resulting from the inquiries generated from the marketing materials. The Agreement defines "Lead" as "a consumer who contacts an UFS Marketing representative in response to the Customer's marketing materials and agrees to be contacted by the Customer." The Agreement defines "Appointment" as "a consumer who contacts UFS Marketing in response to the Customer's marketing materials and schedules an appointment with the Customer for the purpose of discussing the Customer's products or services and is defined by [enumerated criteria]." The criteria include that the consumer has indicated "they are receiving regular statements for an investment or retirement plan," and the consumer has "indicated they will have their statements available at the time of the review." The Agreement requires the agent to pay Unlimited a fee. The "[f]ees are based upon the number of marketing pieces sent and resources required to take inbound calls, schedule appointments and develop leads on behalf of the [agent]." The fees are for the full range of services provided for in the Agreement, not just printing and mailing the postcards. The marketing materials and mass mailing the Agreement refers to are a postcard, which is an exhibit to the Agreement. The front address side of the postcard in very small print reads: Privacy Law Notice: This notice is provided in accordance with Federal Privacy Laws. The Policy of this agency is to protect the privacy rights of all consumers who respond to this notice. This agency DOES NOT POSSESS OR DISCLOSE NON-PUBLIC PERSONAL INFORMATION TO THIRD PARTIES IN ANY INSTANCE. If you choose to have an existing policy or contract reviewed by a licensed agent, that agent is also required to adhere to the state and federal consumer and privacy protection laws. Important information: This notice is being sent to you as a possible holder of an in-force annuity contract. This agency does not have a direct affiliation with the insurance carrier through which you are currently contracted. The agency is contracted with agents licensed to conduct insurance business in your state. This notice should be disregarded if you do not currently have an in-force annuity contract. The word "agency" evokes the concept of a government or insurance agency. Unlimited is not an agency. The description of Unlimited as an agency is false. The back side of the postcard in larger print states: This communication is to inform you that you may have an annuity that has reached the end of its surrender period. The end of a surrender period is a positive event that means an owner may cash in an annuity or make withdrawals without incurring a surrender charge. A surrender charges is a fee levied by an insurance company on an annuity contract for withdrawals before the end of the time set by the contract (the surrender period). Please contact the Annuity Department to discuss your options. (877) 836-2333 The first sentence on the back side of the postcard creates the impression that the sender has some knowledge of the financial circumstances and holdings of the addressee. The statement in the text box is an accurate statement. The overall import of the postcard, including the "Privacy Law Notice," the reference to Unlimited as an "agency," and references to the recipient having an annuity, create the impression that the sender has financial information about the recipient and some formal relationship with the recipient. This is so despite the disclaimers "may have" and "possible holder." It is also so despite the sentence stating the "agency" does not have a "direct" affiliation with the recipient's insurance carrier. Use of "direct" necessarily implies a relationship of some sort. The script is also an exhibit to the Agreement. The script calls for the operator to tell the caller: [I]f you've held an annuity for some time and you're due for a quick service review. This review will cover important contract features and make sure you are receiving all the benefits you are entitled to. The review will also cover information on how to stop paying taxes on your retirement investments. Have you been getting your statements on a regular basis? The script directs the operator to make sure the statement is a statement for an investment, not for social security. It also directs the operator to ensure that the amount of the last statement exceeded $20,000. The script calls for the operator to schedule an appointment with the agent and emphasize the importance of bringing the account statement. It does not provide for the recipient bringing the annuity contract, which is the document that would have terms such as the surrender period. After covering the annuity information and appointment conversation, the script goes on to lead the operator through similar questioning about an IRA or 401K and life insurance. The script is attached to this Recommended Order as Exhibit A. The Agreement requires Unlimited to provide the agent with recordings of every call resulting in an appointment or lead. The Agreement also contains several disclaimers. For instance it states: "UFS Marketing shall not participate in any sales activity or other business conducted by the Customer." It also states that "UFS Marketing shall not supervise or monitor the sales activity or other business activities of the Customer." The Agreement provides for the agent/customer to approve both the postcard and the script. The Agreement also includes several assertions by the agent/customer that they are properly qualified and licensed in the states where the appointments will be scheduled. In 2011, Unlimited mailed marketing postcards to Phyllis Sukut and Angie Perez Cabrera in Florida. The postcards were part of Unlimited's fulfillment of its Agreement with Mr. Heygate. Unlimited mailed approximately 240,000 of the postcards to Florida addresses. A copy of the postcard sent to Ms. Sukut pursuant to the Agreement is attached to this Recommended Order as Exhibit B. The postcard is identical to the Agreement's sample, except that it asks her to contact the "Scheduling Department," instead of the "Annuity Department" and includes the statement, "[w]ithdrawals may, however, still be subject to tax consequences." Before mailing the postcards, Unlimited did not know the insurance, investment, or financial circumstances of Ms. Sukut and Ms. Perez Cabrera. The postcard confused Ms. Sukut because it did not come from her insurance company, and she did not understand the references to "agency" and "surrender period." She called the number and spoke to a gentleman who wanted to schedule an appointment to discuss her "expiring" annuity. She declined. The gentleman gave her a number to call and Mr. Heygate's name, if she changed her mind. Ms. Sukut contacted her insurance agent, Ed Ludden, about it. Ms. Perez Cabrera also sent the card that she received to Mr. Ludden. Mr. Ludden forwarded the postcards to Prudential, who held the women's policies. He was concerned that somehow Prudential's confidential information about Ms. Sukut and Ms. Perez Cabera had been compromised. Even an experienced insurance agent like Mr. Ludden received the impression that the sender of the postcard had information about the recipients. Mr. Ludden also contacted the Department and provided the postcards to it.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final Cease and Desist Order: (1) finding that Unlimited Fulfillment Services, LLC, has engaged in the unlawful transaction of insurance; (2) finding that Unlimited Fulfillment Services, LLC, has engaged in a misleading or deceptive trade practice; and (3) ordering Unlimited Fulfillment Services, LLC, to cease and desist all written and oral insurance marketing or advertising efforts in Florida by means of direct mail, use of the internet, or telemarketing, unless and until it is properly licensed in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2013.
The Issue Whether Victor Jesus Monzon (Respondent) committed the violations alleged in the subject Administrative Complaint, and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been a state certified residential real estate appraiser, having been issued license RD-4245 on January 3, 2004. Respondent's licensure has not been previously disciplined by Petitioner. Respondent's business is named Heartland Appraisal Group, Inc. Respondent is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board (Board) by operation of chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes (2010). Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Board. Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints by operation of chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. On April 23, 2007, Respondent developed the Report on the Subject Property, which is a condominium unit located in a condominium complex known as the Jade Residences. Respondent prepared the Report for his client, Infinity Mortgage (Infinity). The Administrative Complaint was prepared in response to a complaint from J. P. Morgan Chase, also known as Chase Home Finance (Chase). No representative of Infinity or Chase testified at the formal hearing, so no finding has been made as to how Chase came to possess or utilize the Report. There is also no finding made as to whether Infinity or Chase was misled by any iteration of the Report. Respondent's work file contains a copy of a contract between "John Michael Pla" as seller and "Jeannette H. Lee Declaration of Trust Dated 9/25/98" as purchaser for the sale of the Subject Property in the amount of $1,307,500 (the contract price). In addition to the iteration of the Report that Petitioner received from Chase, Petitioner introduced four iterations of the Report as part of its Exhibit 1 that were copied from Respondent's work file. What was thought to be a fifth iteration obtained from Respondent's work file was also part of Petitioner's Exhibit 1, but it was later determined to be a duplicate of one of the other iterations. For ease of reference, the five iterations will be referred to by the letter I followed by a hyphen and its assigned number. Pages 18-40 of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 constitute the iteration of the Report Petitioner's investigator obtained from Chase (I-1). Respondent's work file did not have a copy of I-1. Page 20 of I-1 contains a photocopy of Respondent's handwritten notation: "Original 1." The handwritten notation does not appear on any of the other iterations. Pages 211-234 of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 constitute I- 2., pages 236-259 constitute I-3, pages 261-284 constitute I-4, and pages 311-335 constitute I-5. All five iterations of the Report were signed by Respondent. I-1 was signed April 24, 2007; I-2, I-4, and I-5 were signed on April 25, 2007; and I-3 was signed on July 25, 2007. All five iterations were effective as of April 23, 2007. All five iterations of the Report valued the Subject Property at $1,400,000. There was no evidence that the Report overstated the value of the Subject Property. There are two separate pages for I-1 marked "page one." On the I-1 page one with the handwritten notation, the name of the borrower is Jeannette Lee and the name of the owner of public record is John Pla. This same information is found on the page ones of I-2 and I-3. On the page one of I-1 without the handwritten notation, the name of the borrower is "LEE," and the name of the owner of record is "Wells Fargo Bank NA" (Wells Fargo). On the page one of I-4 and I-5, the name of the owner of record is Wells Fargo and the name of the borrower is Jeannette Lee. The contract price listed on all iterations except I-1 is $1,307,500. On both pages marked "one" on I-1, the contract price is listed as being $1,307,500 in one place and $1,370,500 in another place. In the "Comparable Sale" section of the reports, the unit number for comparable sale 3 is not listed for I-1 or I-5. The unit number for comparable sale 3 is listed for the other iterations. Also in the Comparable Sale section of the reports, I- 1 reflects the contract price for the subject property as being $1,370,500. In the same place on the other iterations, the contracted sales price is listed as being $1,307,500. Stating the contracted sales price for the subject property at $63,000 more than the actual contracted sales price was a mistake. There was insufficient evidence to establish that it was a deliberate mistake. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the mistake was anything other than a typographical error that Respondent subsequently caught and corrected. Petitioner failed to prove that the error had any effect on the appraised value Respondent put on the subject property. FARES is a software program which stands for "First American Real Estate Solutions." It is acceptable practice for an appraiser to use FARES in determining the ownership of property. Utilizing FARES, Respondent determined that the owner of the subject property was Wells Fargo. A Multiple Listing Service (MLS) entry reflected an unknown closed sale of the subject property with a sales price of $1,133,000. Respondent advised Infinity of the conflict, and he advised that he was using FARES instead of the MLS listing because he believed that FARES was more reliable. The copy of the sales contract in Respondent's work file reflected that the seller was JJohn (sic) Michael Pla. On March 8, 2007, Wells Fargo deeded the subject property to John Pla. This deed was recorded on April 14, 2007. The FARES search done by Respondent did not reveal the deed. The likely explanation for that failure is the delay in indexing public records in Dade County. After Respondent was able to verify this sale, he changed the name of the owner of the subject property on his Report and reflected the date of sale and the sales price of $1,133,000. I-1 and I-5 do not reflect a sale of the Subject Property in September 2004 for the amount of $860,000. Petitioner's expert agreed that that failure had no effect on the appraised value of the Subject Property in April 2007. I-2 and I-3 reflect that Pla was the owner and they reflected the $860,000 sale of the Subject Property in September 2004 and the sale of the property to Pla in 2007. On July 5, 2007, Infinity requested that Respondent change the name of the owner from Wells Fargo to Pla and provided Respondent with a copy of the deed from Wells Fargo to Pla. I-3, signed by Respondent on July 5, 2005, was prepared in response to that request. The record is unclear how I-2, signed on April 25, 2007, had that updated information. After I-3 was issued, the owner of record, the amount of the contract, and the sales history of the property were correctly stated. Respondent used four comparable sales in determining the value of the subject property. Respondent used a computer program to search for comparable sales that were similar in square footage, distance from the subject property, and time of sale. The use of the computer program and the parameters he used in selecting the comparable sales were reasonable. Petitioner asserted that Respondent erred in using comparable sale 1 because the use of that comparable inflated the price of the subject property. There was insufficient evidence to establish that comparable sale 1 was a fraudulent transaction or that Respondent erroneously relied on comparable sale 1 in determining the value of the subject property. Comparable sale 1 was another unit in the Jades Residences condominium complex that was on a higher floor than the Subject Property. Respondent made an adjustment to the sales price for comparable sale 1 to reflect the differences between the two units. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the adjustment was inappropriate. Further, Respondent used a weighted average which gave less consideration to comparable sale 1 than to the other comparables used. Respondent testified, credibly, that he sent two iterations of the Report to Infinity. The first report listed Wells Fargo as the owner and did not list the September 2004 sale of the property or the sale of the property to Pla in March 2007. That appears to be I-5, which was signed April 25, 2007. The other iteration was I-3, which was signed July 5, 2007. Petitioner's expert agreed that it was reasonable for Respondent to amend his Report in July 2007 after he learned of the September 2004 sale and after he verified the sale from Wells Fargo to Pla. The Jade Residences condominium complex became notorious for mortgage fraud in the latter part of 2007. There was no evidence that Respondent was aware of that mortgage fraud when he prepared his original Report in April 2007 or when he amended his original Report in July 2007. Respondent signed the Report which included the following representation: I performed this appraisal in accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Standard of Professional Appraisal Practice that were accepted and promulgated by the Appraisal Standards Board of the Appraisal Foundation and that were in place at the time this appraisal report was prepared. Appraisers are not required by state law to comply with USPAP standards, but it is the industry practice to do so.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. O'Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Donna Christine Lindamood, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 1420 Celebration Boulevard, Suite 200 Celebration, Florida 34747
