The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed yacht broker, committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994, and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been a licensed Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent resides in and has his principal place of business in Martin County, Florida. Respondent's corporation, Rampage of Stuart, Inc., has been licensed by Petitioner at all times pertinent to this proceeding. The parties stipulated that Respondent's corporation was, at times pertinent to this proceeding, doing business as Stuart Cay Marina, a fictitious name that had not been registered with the Petitioner. The parties stipulated that Respondent was guilty of violating the provisions of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994. The parties also stipulated that the appropriate penalty for this violation is an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00. James Withers began working for Respondent at Stuart Cay Marina in January 1994. At the time he began working at Stuart Cay Marina, Mr. Withers was not licensed under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Respondent knew or should have known that Mr. Withers was not licensed when he first became employed at Stuart Cay Marina. On January 27, 1994, Mr. Withers attended an educational seminar sponsored by Petitioner where the attendees received instruction as to the requirements for licensure as a salesman or a broker under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. The successful applicant must submit a completed application form, a completed fingerprint card, the proper application fee, and a surety bond. The Petitioner's processing of the application includes having the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) run a fingerprint check on the applicant. The attendees of the educational seminar were told that the application fee had increased from $538.00 to $539.00 as of December 20, 1993, due to a $1.00 increase in the fee charged by the FBI to process fingerprint cards. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers could not act as a salesman until after his license had been issued. In late January 1994, Mr. Withers applied for licensure as a salesman pursuant to the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Because the application form used by Mr. Withers reflected the old application fee, Mr. Withers submitted a check in the amount of $538.00 with his application and fingerprint card. There was no evidence as to where Mr. Withers had obtained this application form. Mr. Wither's application package was received by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office on February 4, 1994. The check for the application was deposited and the application forwarded for further processing. On February 7, 1995, Mr. Withers was advised by mail that his application was deficient since the application fee was short by $1.00. This letter, from the Petitioner's Yacht and Ship Section, advised Mr. Withers that the $1.00 was needed to continue the application process. Mr. Withers forwarded his $1.00 check, dated February 9, 1994, to the Petitioner to correct this deficiency. This check was received and deposited by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office, which is located in the John's Building in Tallahassee, on February 17, 1994. The Finance and Accounting Office released the application package for further processing on February 18, 1994. From the Finance and Accounting Office, the application package went to the Division Director's Office located in the Warren Building in Tallahassee. From that office the application package was sent to the Yacht and Ship Section located in the Bloxham Building in Tallahassee, where it was received February 21, 1994. Licenses are not completely processed until after the Yacht and Ship Section receives notification that the entire application fee has been paid. Processing of Mr. Withers' application was completed by the Yacht and Ship Section and his license was issued on February 21, 1994. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers had not received his license from the Petitioner as of February 18, 1994. 1/ There was no evidence that either man had reason to believe as of February 18, 1994, that the license had been issued and was being forwarded by mail. Both men correctly believed that Mr. Withers had substantially complied with the licensure requirements as of February 18, 1994, and that the license would be issued at some juncture since the only deficiency had been corrected. Mr. Withers represented Respondent at the Sixth Annual Miami Brokerage Yacht Show on February 18, 1994, where he acted as a salesman within the meaning of the Yacht and Ship Brokers's Act. Respondent permitted Mr. Withers to use his company name at this show. On Friday, February 18, 1994, James Courchaine and Peter Butler, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, located Mr. Withers at the boat show and inquired as to whether he was licensed. Mr. Withers told them that he had completed his application package and was merely waiting to receive his license in the mail. Mr. Butler thereafter called his office in Tallahassee and learned that Mr. Withers' check for $1.00 may have been received, but that the application had not been received by the Yacht and Ship Section and that the license had not been issued. Mr. Butler informed Mr. Withers that the earliest his license could be issued was Monday, February 21, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings and conclusions contained herein, that imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, and that imposes an additional administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.06(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January 1996.
Findings Of Fact The claim imposed by the Department of Revenue stems from an audit conducted by Mr. George Thomas Lloyd, Jr., an employee of the Department of Revenue. Mr. Lloyd examined the books of the corporation and the receipts for items purchased and compiled a ledger of particular items which, in Mr. Lloyd's opinion, were not parts of the ship and upon which a use tax was due. At the hearing on this case this ledger was introduced as Joint Exhibit No. 1. It is a composite exhibit consisting of 157 pages. This ledger reflects purchases in the amount of $1,953,426.13 upon which the Department of Revenue claims tax is due. The total tax claimed by the Department of Revenue is $72,630.19 for taxes, penalties, and interest through February 16, 1976. The Petitioner is a Norwegian corporation with principal offices located in Oslo, Norway, and an office in Miami at Biscayne Boulevard. Petitioner owns three cruise vessels of Norwegian ownership and registration which sail out of the port of Miami, Florida to ports in the Caribbean. These cruises last several days. The parties have agreed that the Petitioner is in the exclusive business of transporting passengers and goods in foreign commerce. Mr. Lloyd, who conducted the audit above mentioned, testified that he prepared Joint Exhibit No. 1 by evaluating the items described in the corporation's records and used his own independent judgment in a determination as to whether those items were, or were not, parts of a vessel. If he determined they in fact were not parts of the vessel, he concluded that a use tax was owed to the State on the purchase price of those items. Mr. Lloyd stated that his determination as to whether a particular item was indeed a part of a ship was based on his independent judgment which was largely a question of whether the item was physically attached to the vessel. The individual items are far too numerous to describe in any detail herein, but they range from napkins, stirrers, postage meters, paper products, grinding wheels, coffee pots, towels, party favors, games, sandpaper, repairs to a shotgun, movie rentals, hardware items, batteries, flowers, bug spray. The items in question were delivered to Petitioner's warehouse on Dodge Island, Miami, Florida for lading on board one of Petitioner's three cruise vessels. The cruise vessels tie up next to the warehouse where the goods are stored and from time to time these goods are brought aboard each of the vessels. The items in question are all used aboard each vessel during the vessels' passenger cruises. The only time the cruise vessels spend within the territorial limits of Florida are for a period of time on Saturday of each week for the purpose of embarking and disembarking passengers for each weekly cruise. These articles, somewhat above described, are all used in connection with the ship's operation which is the conduct of weekly pleasure cruises from Miami to the Caribbean. The question of whether a particular item is a part of a vessel is one of definition and common sense. The auditor, Mr. Lloyd, appeared to accept a definition similar to what one would use in determining whether or not an item was a fixture in regard to realty. However, there are all types of vessels and it appears to this Hearing Officer that what may be a part of one type of vessel would have no function on another. There is really no relationship between what may be considered a part of real estate and what may be considered a part of a ship. There also appears to be no logic behind a definition which limits "parts of a ship" to those items which are physically attached to the vessel. Most would agree that pumps are parts of a ship; even though they may not be attached and can be easily removed, they are necessary in keeping a vessel afloat. Similarly, a compass and other navigational equipment may be removed, but that would hardly make them any less a part of a ship. As the Petitioner points out in its Memorandum, the most logical approach to a finding as what is truly a part of a vessel must ultimately hinge on the nature of the vessel, and a broad definition of seaworthiness. What are clearly parts of some ships have no purpose on others. A cargo freighter would need hoists and cranes which are not required on a tug. Each type of vessel uses equipment suited to that ship's purpose and type of cargo. While a tanker may be in the business of transporting oil, a very specialized cargo, a cruise ship is in business of transporting people and catering to their needs and entertainment. Therefore the equipment of a cruise ship would appear more frivolous to those accustomed to ships transporting basic raw materials. Both vessels, however, are in the shipping business. Since the parts of a ship must be defined as those items which serve a useful purpose to the operation of the ship, the decision then depends not on the nature of the item, but of the vessel. An oil tanker might conceivably have equipment or parts which are so specialized that they could serve no other useful purpose except aboard that type of vessel. The cruise ships in question in this case, however, use equipment which are apparently commonplace and equally useful on land as on sea. What items may properly be considered parts of a cruise ship depend on how those items relate to the operation of the vessel. While the equipment of an oil tanker would hardly be expected to be directed toward mirth; likewise, it is unreasonable for the equipment of a cruise ship to be limited to the bare necessities of a spartan voyage. As the testimony on behalf of Petitioner indicated, all the items listed on Joint Exhibit No. 1 do serve a purpose aboard the vessel and all items were purchased for use aboard the company's three vessels. It is therefore concluded that all the items listed on that schedule are in fact parts of the vessels owned by the Petitioner. The Petitioner has raised several other issues in its defense to tax assessment of the Department of Revenue. Among other things the Petitioner claims that the items in question are not stored for use in Florida. The facts above indicated that the items were purchased by the corporation and no sales or use tax has yet been paid upon them. The items are stored at the Dodge Island Warehouse owned by the Petitioner and are from time to time placed aboard vessels operated by the Petitioner corporation. From the facts presented at this hearing, the ships only spend several hours in the port of Miami each Saturday of every week. The items, therefore, are principally used while the vessels in question are on the high seas or in foreign ports. Except for this period of time on each Saturday when the vessels are in port, these items are used while the vessels are in engaged in foreign commerce.
Recommendation For reasons that the items in question are parts of the vessels and that they are used and consumed outside the state of Florida the tax assessed by the Department of Revenue should be disallowed. ENTERED this 20th day of October, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. KENNETH G. OERTEL, Director Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel G. LaPorte, Esquire 150 Southeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 E. Wilson Crump II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Ed Straughn, Executive Director Department of Revenue Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE KLOSTERS REDERI A/S, d/b/a NORWEGIAN CARIBBEAN LINES, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-428 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Petitioner carried his burden of proving his good moral character and entitlement to a yacht salesperson's license under chapter 326, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, the oral and documentary evidence, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Stipulated Facts Respondent is the state agency charged with enforcing chapter 326, the Yacht and Ship Brokers Act, and the administrative rules promulgated thereunder. On June 8, 2016, Petitioner submitted to Respondent an application for a yacht salesperson's license. On Petitioner's application, the application question, number 14, relating to criminal history, was answered "yes." Petitioner failed to attach a complete and signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, names, and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or were pending, as required by the application for the yacht salesperson's license. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, a felony, in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to 57 months' incarceration in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to three years of supervised release following incarceration in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner was ordered to pay $6,567,496.00 in restitution in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. On April 22, 2016, Petitioner was released from incarceration and placed under supervised release, set to expire on or about April 21, 2019. Petitioner failed to certify to Respondent that Petitioner has never been convicted of a felony in Petitioner's application for a yacht salesperson's license. Petitioner timely received a copy of Respondent's Notice of Intent to Deny License Application on July 19, 2016. Petitioner completed programs in Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program, the Wellness Program, and the Community Treatment Services Program at Dollan Mental Health Clinic. Petitioner served his time without issue. Petitioner has been sponsored by a South Florida yacht broker who is going to supervise his activity as a yacht salesman. Facts Adduced at the Hearing Pursuant to chapter 326, Respondent has regulatory jurisdiction over yacht and ship licensees and is responsible for the approval or denial of applications for licensure for yacht salespersons and yacht brokers. Petitioner's younger sister, Beatriz Llorente, who is a practicing real estate and criminal defense attorney, testified. She described Petitioner as a "father figure" to her. She testified that Petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud "devastated" her, because she felt that her reputation was being questioned.1/ When she drove him to federal prison, Petitioner "asked her for forgiveness." She was familiar with his prison experience. As far as she knew, Petitioner had no disciplinary problems in prison and was awarded maximum gain time. Furthermore, his 57-month sentence was reduced to less than two and one-half years. Despite his incarceration and current probation status, she stated that he is very active with his children and shares a great deal of time with them. He told her, "I will work for the rest of my life to regain your trust." His sister is convinced that Petitioner has overcome his faults, and she emphatically stated he is of good character. On cross-examination, she testified that Petitioner had no drug or alcohol problems when he was growing up, but they arose during the years preceding his conviction. An attorney friend of Petitioner's, Francisco Pines, testified. Pines has known Petitioner since 1988. They attended school together. More recently, their families have interacted and spent time together. They participated together in recreational activities, such as boating and fishing, before Petitioner's incarceration for the federal crime. Since Petitioner was released from prison, Pines has had contact with him three or four times. Pines was also asked about Petitioner's character. In his view, Petitioner knows that what he did was wrong and has made changes to get his life in order. Pines testified that Petitioner is very loving, caring and nurturing with his children. The witness has seen a "change for the better." According to him, Petitioner has always demonstrated a strong work ethic, more so now than before the criminal incident. A licensed mental health counselor, Sandra Rico, was also called by Petitioner. Beginning in 2011, she provided mental health therapy and counseling to Petitioner related to his anxiety due to a crisis in his marriage. She determined that he used and abused alcohol to relieve this anxiety. She treated him on and off until 2013. She also emailed him while he was in federal prison to make sure that he was getting continued treatment for his anxiety and alcohol abuse issues. After he was released from prison, Rico counseled him once a month from July 2016 through the fall of 2016. Her current treatment with him is more in the nature of prevention and maintenance, and to help him develop coping skills. She testified that the therapy he received in prison helped him and that Petitioner changed while in prison. As examples, she cited that he is more involved and willing to do more of her treatment assignments and that he now journals his feelings. Rico related that she is surprised by Petitioner's progress and that she believes he is no longer drinking. He is making better choices and being more careful. She opined that he gathers his thoughts more deliberately now, primarily because he wants to impress his children and reach "goals" he has set for himself. In her opinion, he is of good character now. His treatment with her continues "as needed." Lazaro R. Navarro is the chief executive officer at Florida Yachts International and manages approximately ten sales associates. He has known Petitioner's family for over 15 years. When Petitioner was released from federal prison, the family asked Navarro if he would consider employing Petitioner and sponsoring him. He gave Petitioner a job doing "online marketing," which involved managing leads and performing back office work. Navarro characterized Petitioner as a great asset to his company and trustworthy. He has no doubts about Petitioner and his work habits. Petitioner arrives at work early and is usually the last one to leave. Petitioner has exceeded all of his expectations, and is a very dedicated employee. As the employing yacht broker, Navarro supervises Petitioner and ensures that all of his work is done correctly. Although no details were offered, Navarro testified that Petitioner has accepted full responsibility for his criminal conduct and is a great father. Based upon the financial procedures and protocols used at Navarro's yacht company, he testified that Petitioner would not need to handle or accept any cash as a part of his sales responsibilities. Instead, finances and money exchanges are handled and processed by a closing specialist and the chief financial officer.2/ Navarro commented that he would trust Petitioner with money handling, if that occasion arose. Petitioner offered his own testimony. He received a Florida real estate license in February 2005 and worked for his cousin as a real estate salesperson until 2008. He was indicted for conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud in March 2012. This federal indictment stemmed from activities in 2006 while he worked as a licensed real estate salesperson. He confirmed that he visited with Rico for mental health counseling related to problems with his wife, as well as anxiety related to the government's criminal investigation of him in 2009. Although his prison sentence did not include mandatory alcohol or drug treatment, he followed the advice of a psychiatrist at the prison and voluntarily enrolled in a residential drug and alcohol abuse treatment program. He also participated in a health and nutrition wellness class for nine weeks. He completed both programs successfully. While in prison, he took several foreign language classes, thinking they would be useful for the yachting business. He also participated in a hazmat (hazardous materials) program outside the prison on a naval base. Apparently, a Navy Admiral retained him for the program. Also, while in prison, he was hired on the naval base to provide cleaning and maintenance services at a dormitory. He was allowed to serve a reduced prison sentence-- 32 months of his 57-month sentence, and he was released six months early to go to a halfway house. While there, he became eligible for home confinement. He was released from home confinement in April 2016. Although he is still under supervised release (probation), he is no longer required to make personal visits and can report to his probation officer remotely through the Internet. He is jointly and severally liable for over $6 million in restitution with the other defendants in his criminal case. It was undisputed that he is current with his restitution payments of $151.00 each month. Petitioner is active in his Catholic Church and gave "his testimony" at a recent church retreat. He characterizes his relationship with his children as being one of honesty and emphasized that it is important to have God in his life. When Respondent called requesting additional information for his application, he promptly provided his federal Termination Report and Certificates of Completion. Pet. Exs. 3, 4, and 5. Petitioner expressed a passion for boating and believes he is good at sales. He wants the yacht salesperson's license, in part, so that he can pay off the criminal restitution more quickly. He claims to no longer act impulsively and believes that his children are the most important thing in his life. On June 8, 2016, Petitioner submitted to Respondent an application for a yacht and ship salesperson's license. On Petitioner's application, he answered question number 14 "Yes," indicating that he had a criminal history.3/ Applicants who answer "Yes" to question number 14 on the application are directed to attach a complete and signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, names, and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending.4/ However, Petitioner failed to submit this statement. When asked about this omission, Petitioner testified, "I turned back for the next one (question), and I didn't bother looking. It shows part of impulsive behavior." Petitioner thought the information request at the bottom of the page he overlooked was simply a part of the next question.5/ Respondent obtained a Florida Department of Law Enforcement criminal background check on Petitioner, which indicated that, on October 12, 2012, Petitioner pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud. Resp. Ex. 4. Certified court records obtained by the Division indicated that Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, a felony, and sentenced to 57 months' incarceration in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons with three years of supervised release following incarceration. Petitioner was ordered to pay $6,567,496.00 in restitution.6/ Notably, Petitioner's federal "Judgment In A Criminal Case" included Special Conditions of Supervision. This included a "Related Concern Restriction." Petitioner testified that this provision prohibited him from "touch[ing] funds" while under supervised release. His employer at Florida Yacht International wrote a letter, ultimately filed with the probation office, that Petitioner "would not be dealing with any funds." Resp. Ex. 1, pp. 1-7.7/ Petitioner certified on his application that, in February 2005, he was licensed as a real estate sales associate in the state of Florida, having been issued license number SL3111375. Petitioner testified that, in order to become a real estate sales associate, he completed a pre-licensing course; applied with and was approved to take the state licensing exam by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation; and passed the Florida Real Estate Sales Associate Examination. Petitioner stated that, at the time, he was familiar with the laws regulating the profession of real estate contained in chapter 475, Florida Statutes.8/ Petitioner testified that between 2005 and 2008, he worked as a real estate sales associate for Llorente Realty Group, under a supervising broker, Petitioner's cousin. While employed there as a Florida licensed real estate sales associate, Petitioner engaged in an illegal real estate fraud scheme which lead to his 2012 federal criminal conviction. On several occasions, Petitioner provided up to $150,000.00 of his own funds to make seven or eight improper short-term loans of approximately ten to 15 days each. Petitioner made a profit of approximately eight to ten percent per loan.9/ Petitioner testified that these transactions involved buying houses under an individual's name (the straw buyer) and, after closing, executing a quitclaim deed to transfer title of the property to one of the co-conspirators, to whom Petitioner had made the loan. The property was subsequently transferred to the co-conspirator's family trust, leaving the outstanding mortgage in the name of the straw buyer. When the straw buyer failed to pay the outstanding mortgage, the lender would initiate foreclosure proceedings against the straw buyer who was no longer in possession of the property. This fraudulent scheme was carried out against several lending institutions. After the lenders became aware of the scheme, a criminal investigation was initiated. The government characterized his involvement as a breach of his fiduciary duty. In mid-2009, Petitioner was notified that he was under federal investigation for his involvement in the "straw buyer" scheme. After finding out about the investigation, Petitioner began to have relationship problems with his wife and to abuse alcohol. This prompted him to see Rico, a licensed mental health counselor. On March 8, 2012, Petitioner was indicted on eight counts related to the bank fraud scheme. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty and was adjudicated guilty of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, a felony, in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. Resp. Ex. 1. Petitioner was incarcerated at Pensacola Prison Camp beginning March 1, 2013. Petitioner earned eight months' "gain time" off of his sentence. Additionally, while incarcerated, Petitioner completed the RDAP, Residential Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program, which qualified Petitioner for a 12-month reduction in his sentence. Due to these reductions and good behavior, Petitioner served only 32 months of his 57-month sentence in federal prison. During his incarceration, Petitioner also completed a nine-week wellness course on various subjects such as nutrition and exercise and worked at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Corry Station Naval Technical Training Center, and the Pensacola Prison Camp. On October 27, 2015, Petitioner was released to a halfway house and shortly thereafter began working for Navarro at Florida Yacht International as a clerk. On November 10, 2015, Petitioner became eligible for home confinement, and, by April 18, 2016, Petitioner completed TDAPT, a transition recovery program. On April 21, 2016, Petitioner was released from custody, and, on April 22, 2016, he was placed under supervised release, currently set to expire on April 21, 2019. Petitioner testified that he has paid $6,000.00 towards the restitution he owes in the amount of $6,567,496.00. As previously mentioned, this restitution is owed with several co- conspirators who are jointly and severally liable with him. Resp. Ex. 1, p. 5. Petitioner testified that he is up to date on required payments pursuant to the order of restitution. Navarro monitors and supervises Petitioner's work and is ultimately responsible for Petitioner under his own yacht broker license. Petitioner is also currently employed as a part- time driver for Uber. In compliance with the Related Concern Restriction of his criminal conviction, Petitioner has not been placed in a position of trust or responsibility over sums of money at Florida Yachts International. Petitioner stated that upon obtaining a job as a clerk with Florida Yachts International, Navarro was required to certify to Petitioner's supervisors through the halfway house that Petitioner "would not be dealing with any funds," pursuant to the "Related Concern Restriction" of Petitioner's Special Conditions of Supervision.10/ Resp. Ex. 1, p. 4; Resp. Ex. 4, p. 51. Following his release from incarceration, Petitioner continues to see Rico for therapy sessions on a monthly basis. Rico provided a letter of recommendation for Petitioner. As mitigation and in an effort to show his good moral character, Petitioner testified that he is not abusing alcohol anymore, has made substantial efforts to reconnect with his children, and has maintained a close relationship with his sister both before and after his incarceration. Licensed yacht salespersons are not restricted and may work under any licensed yacht broker. They may also switch their registered broker if they wish to work for someone else. Additionally, salespersons become eligible to apply for their own yacht and ship broker license after two years as a salesperson. A representative of Respondent, Chelisa Kirkland, testified for Respondent. A yacht salesperson's license is only required for the sale of used or pre-owned vessels in excess of 32 feet. Vessels less than 32 feet and new vessel sales of any size do not require a license. Kirkland confirmed that Petitioner's probation, or court supervision, does not end until April 2019. Applying the statutory and rule criteria, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for a yacht salesperson's license. More specifically, Respondent was concerned about the nature and seriousness of the federal crime, particularly because Petitioner held a professional real estate license at the time the criminal bank fraud offenses were committed. Additionally, as of the date of the application, Petitioner's government supervision and probation had not been completed, and there was a very significant amount of restitution still owed, in excess of $6,000,000.00. Finally, Respondent felt that there had not been a significant passage of time since the conviction in 2012. As a result of the totality of these circumstances, Kirkland recommended that Petitioner's application be denied. She acknowledged that her recommendation was based solely on the conviction for conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud. She conceded that Florida law does not impose an "automatic" denial just because Petitioner owes restitution, is still under supervision, or was convicted of a federal crime.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes, confirm its previous denial and enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a yacht salesperson's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 2017.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Ralph B. Snyder, Jr. ("Respondent"), was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license No. 0082998. Respondent was the qualifying broker for Home Hunters V, Inc., a corporate real estate broker having been issued license No. 0221795, with a principal business address of 2829 Okeechobee Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida. In September, 1981, Respondent registered Home Hunters V, Inc., as a real estate brokerage corporation, with himself as qualifying broker. The office remained open until April, 1982. Respondent was not present in the West Palm Beach office of Home Hunters V on a full-time basis because, in addition to that business, he was involved in a construction business on Sanibel Island, Florida. In late September or early October, 1981, Respondent hired Greg Howle to manage the Home Hunters V office in West Palm Beach. At all times material hereto, Howle was not registered as either a broker or salesman. Respondent's business, insofar as here pertinent, consisted of maintaining card files of rental properties available in the West Palm Beach area, and advertising availability of those properties for the owners. When a prospective tenant came to Respondent's office in response to advertisements or otherwise, those tenants would sign an agreement with Home Hunters V, Inc., and, after payment of a $60 fee, would be furnished information concerning available properties in the area that generally conformed to the types of properties prospective tenants were seeking. The standard procedure in Respondent's office was that the prospective tenants would first meet with Greg Howle, the office manager, who would have them execute the agreement with Home Hunters V, Inc., collect the $60 fee from them, and then refer prospective tenants to other office employees. Among these other office employees were Ilana Frank, a licensed real estate salesperson who began employment with Respondent in late September or early October, 1981, and Sheryl Kimball, an unlicensed employee, who was employed by Respondent on or about October 16, 1981, and continued as an employee until about November 29, 1981. Respondent testified that Ms. Kimball was hired as a receptionist and, in addition, performed general clerical responsibilities in the office, including greeting potential customers and referring them to licensed salespersons. The record in this cause establishes that Ms. Kimball did, on at least two occasions, speak with persons on the telephone concerning sales, and on both of those occasions she was reprimanded by Respondent for acting outside the scope of her employment. Ms. Kimball was never directed by Respondent to negotiate the rental of any real property nor does this record establish that Respondent knew of Ms. Kimball's engaging in any such activity. Respondent testified that Ms. Kimball was paid $150 per week for her services, and, in addition, was compensated for any overtime work she might have performed. Ms. Kimball testified, however, that she was paid $150 per week together with $3.00 for each contract she negotiated. However, Ms. Kimball could identify only one such contract on which she worked. With regard to that contract, which involved a customer named Paul Palmero, Respondent never received any funds, and the record in this cause does not reflect that any services were ever performed for Mr. Palmero. Further, the entire Palmero transaction was conducted in the presence of another of Respondent's employees, Ilana Frank, who, as indicated above, was a licensed salesperson. Accordingly, there is insufficient credible evidence of record in this cause to establish that Sheryl Kimball ever negotiated the rental of real property or interest therein; procured lessees of the real property of others; or performed any of the acts of a broker or salesman as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Further, the record in this cause contains no evidence establishing the amounts actually paid to Ms. Kimball during the six-week period in which she was employed by Respondent. In reaching this conclusion, the Hearing Officer has taken into account the testimony and interests of both Ms. Kimball and Respondent in the outcome of this proceeding in attempting to reconcile the direct conflicts in their testimony. Ms. Kimball was discharged from Respondent's employ after having received two reprimands and having been accused of misappropriating funds. Thereafter, Ms. Kimball filed a complaint against Respondent with the Florida Real Estate Commission. Conversely, Respondent obviously has an interest in retaining his license as a broker. When viewed as a whole, it is concluded that facts of record in this cause with respect to Counts I and II are qualitatively and quantitatively insufficient to establish the factual allegations contained therein. Count III of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent ". . . inserted or caused to be inserted fraudulent, false, deceptive or misleading advertisements in the Post and Evening Times newspaper of West Palm Beach, Florida." The same count further alleges that those advertisements were fraudulent, false, deceptive or misleading ". . . in that the content thereof stated to the public that respondents had available for lease through their firm various rental units at stated prices when in fact rental units of the advertised type were not available through their firm at the stated price." There is no evidence of record in this proceeding that would in any way establish the facts alleged in Count III of the Administrative Complaint. In fact, the only evidence of record on this issue is the testimony of Ms. Kimball that she observed Mr. Howle, the office manager, copying listings from Fort Myers newspapers for use in the West Palm Beach area. However, Ms. Kimball conceded that she did not know if any such ads were ever placed in the West Palm Beach newspaper. No such advertisements were introduced into evidence in this proceeding from which any comparison to any of the listings available through Respondents could be made to determine whether the ads were fraudulent, false, deceptive, or misleading. County IV of the Administrative Complaint charges the Respondent with having solicited and accepted money as advance rental fees with knowledge that rental units of the type and price desired by potential tenants were not available through Respondent's firm, and with making false representations as to the availability of rental units. Again, there is no evidence of record in this cause to establish a single, identifiable instance in which Respondent either individually or through its employees represented that rental units were available of a type and price that were not in fact so available.
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether Petitioner has standing to bring this action and, if so, whether Respondent Stuart Yacht Corporation is entitled to the General Permit which the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) intends to issue.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns Lot 4 in St. Lucie Settlement, a subdivision in Stuart, Florida. The subdivision has one border along the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. The subdivision has a finger fill that extends to the South Fork with canals on both sides. There are four lots on the finger fill, Lots 1 through 4 of the subdivision. Lot 4 is farthest from the river. On the north side of Petitioner’s property he has a dock where he keeps a boat. The dispute in this case involves the canal on the south side of Petitioner’s property. All references to “the canal” hereafter, unless otherwise noted, will be to the canal on the south side of Lot 4. Between Lots 2, 3, and 4 and the canal is a road which provides access to the lots on the finger fill. Between the road and the canal is a narrow strip of land. Petitioner owns this narrow strip of land where it corresponds with his lot lines. In other words, the southern boundary of his Lot 4 abuts the canal. However, because the canal is artificial, having been created by dredging, Petitioner has no riparian rights associated with the canal. That was the holding of the circuit court for Martin County in the litigation between Stuart Yacht Corporation and Petitioner. It was also established in the circuit court litigation that St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., which is the homeowner's association for the subdivision, owns the northern half of the canal and Stuart Yacht Corporation owns the southern half of the canal. No subdivision documents were presented to show the extent of rights granted to homeowners within St. Lucie Settlement related to the construction of docks or other uses of water bottoms that are included within the subdivision. Petitioner testified that he terminated his membership in the homeowners association three-and-a-half years ago. Stuart Yacht Corporation owns and operates a marina on the south side of the canal which includes docks over the water. At some point in the past, but before Petitioner purchased Lot 4 in 1995, Stuart Yacht Corporation constructed a dock along the north side of the canal, over the water bottom owned by St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. The dock along the north side of the canal has been used for mooring large yachts. The portion of the dock that ran along the boundary of Lot 4 was recently removed by Stuart Yacht Corporation following the rulings in the circuit court. The balance of the dock along the north side of the canal would be removed as a part of the proposed permit that Petitioner has challenged. In addition to removing the dock along the north side of the canal, the proposed permit authorizes Stuart Yacht Corporation to construct a new dock that is four feet wide and runs 150 feet along the property boundary in the center of the canal. No part of the proposed new dock would be on the property of St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., did not challenge the proposed permit. In his petition for hearing, Petitioner alleged that the proposed new dock would cause the following injuries to his interests: interference with ingress and egress to Petitioner’s shoreline; interference with Petitioner’s desire to obtain a permit in the future to construct a dock or to “harden” the southern shoreline; and interference with Petitioner’s riparian rights. Petitioner’s testimony about his past use of the canal was inconsistent. He said he moored his boat in the canal once in 1995. He said he boated into the canal to fish on several occasions. He said that (at least twice) when he attempted to enter the canal by boat, he was denied access by representatives of Stuart Yacht Corporation. However, in a deposition taken before the hearing, Petitioner said he had never attempted to use the canal. The only testimony presented by Petitioner to support his claim that the proposed permit would interfere with his navigation, fishing, and desire to obtain a dock permit in the canal was the following: I couldn’t get a boat in there with that proposed dock in the center line of the canal right on their side of the canal. It would be 150 feet long. It would be a huge Wall of China. My neighbor and I couldn’t get to our shoreline. The evidence presented was insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to navigate into the canal in a small boat or to fish in the canal if the proposed dock is constructed. The evidence was also insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to construct any kind of dock for any kind of watercraft if the proposed dock is constructed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department dismiss the petition for hearing based on Petitioner's failure to prove standing, and issue the proposed permit to Stuart Yacht Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Tom Beason, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael W. Sole, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Paul B. Erickson, Esquire Alley, Maass, Rogers & Lindsay, P.A. 340 Royal Poinciana Way, Suite 321 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Amanda Gayle Bush, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Office of the General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Stop 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Guy Bennett Rubin, Esquire Rubin & Rubin Post Office Box 395 Stuart, Florida 34995
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, David E. Rabren was licensed as a Tampa Bay state pilot and was president of the Tricounty Pilot's Association (TRICO). At the time the movement of the OCEAN LORD occurred, there was only one state licensed pilot who was a member of TRICO. That was David E. Rabren. Other members held only federally issued pilot's licenses. Prior to the movement of the VOMAR, a second state licensed pilot joined TRICO. At present, there are four licensed state pilots and one deputy pilot associated with TRICO. The vessel OCEAN LORD arrived in Tampa Bay February 18, 1986, and was piloted by Captain Rabren to its berth at C. F. Industries (CFI). After taking on cargo, the OCEAN LORD was moved the same date to Gadsden Anchorage. During this move, Captain Murphy, a federally licensed, but not state licensed, pilot was on board. Captain Murphy is associated with TRICO. On February 21, 1986, the OCEAN LORD was moved from Gadsden Anchorage to the CSX Transportation dock at Rockport. Again, Captain Murphy was the pilot. On September 21, 1986, the vessel VOMAR was moved from Rockport to a dock at Big Bend with Captain Murphy as the pilot. Anita Rabren determined that the movement could be accomplished with a federally licensed pilot on board. On October 5, 1986, the vessel ASPEN, an American flag vessel, arrived at Tampa Bay, and the ship's agent requested TRICO provide a pilot. Due to a misunderstanding of the agent's statement that the ASPEN was coming from the west coast, Anita Rabren assumed this was from the west coast of the United States. Actually, the ASPEN's last port of call was in Korea. Had the vessel come from a west coast of the United States port, the voyage would have been a coastwise trip, and a federally licensed pilot would be required. A federally licensed pilot was assigned to pilot the ASPEN. The last port of call of the ASPEN was ascertained after the pilotages up Tampa Bay commenced, and the fact that an improperly licensed pilot was used was reported forthwith. TRICO paid a double pilot fee to the Tampa Bay Pilot's Association. Tampa Port Authority has jurisdiction over all of Hillsborough County and establishes rules and regulations for that area. They do not regulate pilotage of vessels. Many of the terminals in Hillsborough County are owned by the Port Authority, but some are privately owned such as Big Bend and Rockport, both of which are in the port of Tampa. The Port Authority controls the allocation of berths at all terminals owned by the Port Authority, but does not control the berths at privately owned terminals. The CFI terminal is owned by the Port Authority who establishes wharfage rates and docking rates at this terminal. The berths at Rockport and Big Bend are privately owned, and tariff rates are not set by the Port Authority. CSX Transportation owns a dock at Rockport where phosphate is loaded onto vessels. No wharfage or dockage charge is levied, but such charges are included in charges for the commodity loaded. Ships can clear customs at any of the terminals above noted. The Big Bend facility is under the jurisdiction of Gulf Coast Transit Company. Vessels bring coal to Big Bend for use by Tampa Electric Company. The AGRICO terminal at Big Bend is used for loading phosphate rock. All of these privately owned terminals are licensed by the Tampa Port Authority to whom they pay a fee and submit reports of their activities. The Tampa Port Authority charges a fee to vessels who load or unload cargo at the Gadsden Anchorage which is also in the port of Tampa. Section 310.002(4), Florida Statutes, defines "port" to mean, any place in the state in which vessels enter and depart. For Tampa Bay, this section lists Tampa, Port Tampa, Port Manatee, St. Petersburg and Clearwater as ports. Of those listed ports, Tampa and Port Tampa are in Hillsborough County and come under the jurisdiction of the Tampa Port Authority. No evidence was submitted showing the areas encompassed by the Port of Tampa and Port Tampa. The Port of Tampa's Terminal and Facilities Map (Exhibit 5) showing the port facilities at Tampa, Florida, does not show the facilities at Port Tampa; it shows only those facilities on the east side of the Tampa peninsula, and does not reach as far south as Big Bend. Presumably, if there are only two ports in Hillsborough County that portion of Hillsborough County west of the Tampa peninsula would comprise Port Tampa, and that portion of Hillsborough County east and south of the Tampa peninsula would comprise the Port of Tampa. If so, all of the movements here complained of occurred in the Port of Tampa. Exhibit 5 supports this conclusion. Finally, no credible evidence was presented that Respondent assigned a federally licensed, but not a state licensed, pilot to the OCEAN LORD, VOMAR and ASPEN as alleged, except Exhibit 3 which states the assignment of a federally licensed pilot to the Aspen was due to an error on the part of Captain Rabren. The direct testimony presented in this regard is that Anita Rabren assigned federally licensed pilots to those ships. Further, this determination that use of a federally licensed pilot for those movements of foreign flag vessels within the Port of Tampa was proper was made by Anita Rabren after receiving legal advice regarding the in-port movements of foreign flag vessels that can be piloted by a federally licensed pilot.
Findings Of Fact Notices to Show Cause were issued by the Department against Roy D. Mathew, and William Gannaway on April 9, 1976. (See: Agency Exhibits 1 and 2). The final hearing was scheduled by notice dated May 12, 1976. (See: Agency Exhibit 3). Roy D. Mathew, d/b/a Anchorline Yacht Brokerage holds Yacht and Ship Broker License No. 12433, issued by the Department on December 18, 1975. (See: Agency Exhibit 5). Mathew has at all material times held a yacht and ship broker license issued by the Department. William G. Gannaway holds Yacht and Ship Salesman License No. 12657, issued by the Department on December 18, 1975. (See: Agency Exhibit 4). Gannaway has at all material times held a yacht and ship salesman license issued by the Department. Gannaway has at all material times served as a yacht and ship salesman for Roy D. Mathew and Anchorline Yacht Brokerage. Prior to July, 1975, R. A. McKenzie, the owner of a yacht called The Anokone, decided to sell the yacht. The yacht was housed at Anchorline Yacht Brokerage in St. Petersburg, Florida, and McKenzie agreed to pay Anchorline a commission for selling the yacht. On or about July 8, 1975, Jean C. Noll, a resident of Jacksonville, Florida, saw the yacht, and believed that it was the sort of vessel that she and her husband had been looking for. She entered into a purchase agreement with the understanding that her husband, the Reverend Joseph E. Noll, Jr., would have the opportunity to make a personal inspection. William G. Gannaway represented Anchorline Yacht Brokerage in the transaction, and received a deposit from Mrs. Noll. (See: Agency Exhibit 6). On or about July 15, 1975 Reverend Noll came to St. Petersburg from Jacksonville and inspected the yacht. Gannaway at that time advised Reverend Noll that the starboard engine on the yacht was broken down and would require extensive repairs. Reverend Noll liked the yacht, and hired the Wilkinson Company to conduct a survey of the yacht. Dean Greger conducted the survey on behalf of the Wilkinson Company. A very thorough inspection was performed by Greger. He made 24 recommendations respecting & repairs, some of which were significant, and some of which were minor. He was not able to conduct a sea test of the vessel because of the broken down engine. His report was issued on July 22, 1975. (See: Agency Exhibit 7). McKenzie was somewhat disturbed about the large number of discrepancies, and he offered the following alternatives to the Nolls: He would sell the boat "as is" for $15,000; he would sell the boat "as is" with a new starboard engine installed for $17,000; or he would sell the boat for $19,500 with a new engine, with him making all additional repairs up to $1,000 and with all remaining repairs being split evenly three ways between the Nolls, McKenzie, and Anchorline. The Nolls accepted the latter option, and a contract reflecting it was signed. (See: Agency Exhibit 28). All work was to be performed at Whistlers Yacht Service, Inc., which was located adjacent to Anchorline. Shortly after July 22, 1975, it became apparent that a new replacement starboard engine could not be obtained, because the engine was no longer in production. Gannaway advised the Nolls that Whistlers indicated to him that they could replace the "shortblock" of the engine, rebuild the engine, and that they would stand by their work. Gannaway told the Nolls that he thought the rebuilt engine would carry a one year guarantee. Reverend Noll believed that the guarantee would be for no more than 90 days, and he agreed to a rebuilt engine rather than a new engine. Extensive work was performed by Whistlers Marina, and more than $2,100 was paid to Whistlers to perform the repairs. (See: Agency Exhibits 14, 22, 23, 24, 25). Dean Greger conducted a supplemental survey, including a sea test of the vessel on or about August 14, 1975. Fourteen of the 24 discrepancies noted in the original report were found to have been satisfactorily corrected. It was noted that the generator, the depth sounder, the auto pilot, the signal horn, the marine air conditioning, and the docking lights were not performing properly. (See: Agency Exhibit 8). The Nolls were aware of these problems when they closed the transaction and purchased the yacht on approximately August 20, 1975. The closing took place at a Federal Credit Union in Jacksonville. No representative of Anchorline was present at the closing. Following the closing the Nolls took possession of the yacht, and renamed it "Escape Hatch II". The Nolls were advised by several persons, including personnel at Whistlers Yacht Basin, and personnel at Anchorline, that they should familiarize themselves with the vessel in the immediate area prior to their taking any long excursions. The Nolls nonetheless left St. Petersburg in early September to return to Jacksonville. On this return trip the Nolls experienced many mechanical difficulties. Major repairs needed to be performed on the vessel in Ft. Myers (See: Agency Exhibit II), and minor repairs were performed in Stuart and Melbourne (See: Agency Exhibits 12 and 13). Upon return to Jacksonville major repairs were required and are continuing to be performed. (See: Agency Exhibits 16, 17, and 27). It is apparent that the starboard engine was not properly repaired, and that considerable dry rot remained on the vessel. The Nolls are presently engaged in litigation respecting their liabilities in connection with the vessel. Whistlers disclaimed any liability for making repairs, but Mrs. Coe, the general manager at Whistlers testified that she would have performed any repairs within 90 days if the vessel had been returned to the yacht basin. Mr. Gannaway and Mr. Mathew had sound reason to believe that there were no discrepancies respecting the operability of the yacht other than those set out in the marine surveys. Mathew and Gannaway had sound reason to believe that all of the repairs required to rectify these discrepancies had been performed at Whistlers. There was no evidence offered to show that either Gannaway or Mathew intentionally misstated any facts to the Nolls, or that they knew or should have known that any statements they made to the Nolls were false. There was no evidence to establish that Mathew had any personal knowledge of any of the dealings or discussions between Gannaway and the Nolls.
The Issue Whether Respondent, while acting as pilot aboard the M/V Itanage in the St. John's River, Jacksonville, Florida on August 29, 1990, engaged in a practice which did not met acceptable standards of safe piloting. (F.S.A. s. 310.101(1)(k))
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed pilot in the State of Florida. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 1) Respondent has been issued license number SP0000032. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 2) On or about August 29, 1990, Respondent was piloting the M/V Itanage outbound in Jacksonville, Florida. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 4) The Itanage is a 12,000 gross ton, Brazilian registered diesel powered container vessel. (Transcript p. 164) From May 1988 to August 1990 the Itanage entered and exited the port of Jacksonville under pilotage fifteen times without navigational incident. (Transcript pp. 21, 22) The same crew abroad the Itanage at the time of the allision was on the Itanage on its previous voyage of the Itanage. (Transcript p. 22) Respondent has piloted the Itanage or similar vessels many times previously. (Transcript p. 355) The Itanage was equipped with an overhead rudder angle indicator which is visible from the bridge wing. The rudder angle indicator exhibits the degree angle of the rudder and is color coded red for port and green for starboard so the pilot can glance up and see whether port or starboard rudder is applied. 2/ (Transcript pp. 166, 167) Each bridge wing of the Itanage was equipped with an RPM indicator which shows whether the engine was going ahead or astern and the number of revolutions per minute. (Transcript p. 168) The Itanage was equipped with an engine room telegraph which was operated by the second mate to communicate engine commands to the engine room. 3/ On August 29, 1990, the docking master, Captain Meers, undocked the vessel from Jacksonville Port Authority berths 3 and 4, turned, headed down the river on slow ahead, and disembarked around Coastal Petroleum. (Statement of Captain Steele; DPR Report, p. 2) Respondent assumed responsibility for directing the ship at 1454 hours with the vessel parallel to and favoring the west bank of the river. (Statement of Captain Steele; DPR Report, p. 8; engine bell book, Transcript p. 175) It was a clear day, the ride was at or near slack water, the weather was perfect. (Transcript pp. 92. 169, 170, 198) Respondent gave commands to the second mate who remained positioned by the engineroom telegraph on the bridge. The second mate repeated the commands in English then repeated the commands to the helmsman in Portuguese. (Transcript pp. 195, 337); Statement of Second Mate) The second mate spoke very little English and the helmsman did not speak any English. (Transcript p. 331) At 1454 the Respondent ordered course 320 degrees and slow ahead, which was executed. At approximately 1456, Respondent ordered a course of 310 degrees and full speed ahead. (Transcript pp. 82, 83, 191, 192; DPR Report p. 8; engine bell book; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman, Master, and Chief Mate; Statement of Captain Steele) Respondent's orders issued at 1456 were executed, and the engine speed was set at full ahead and the Helmsman steered 310 degrees. (Transcript p. 186; DPR Report p. 8; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman, Master, and Chief Mater; engine bell book; Statement of Captain Steele; Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 8) Respondent was in the wheelhouse and observed the master-gyro-compass. (Transcript p. 331; Statement of Captain Steele) Because the view forward was blocked by the deck cargo, Respondent went to the starboard wing to observe Buoy 71. (Statement of Captain Steele) At 1455 Respondent ordered "10 degrees port" from the starboard wing. (Transcript pp. 337, 338; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman) The helmsman steered 10 degrees to port (left). (Transcript p. 192; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman) After the order of "10 degrees port", Respondent remained on the starboard wing and had a radio conversation using a hand held marine radio with the master of the tug "Ann Moran" which took approximately 45 seconds about a ship they had handled the previous day. (Transcript pp. 338, 340, 247) At 1456 as Itanage approached Buoy 71, at point "D" on Hearing Officer Exhibit 1, from the starboard bridge wing, Respondent ordered hard right (starboard) rudder and engine ahead full. (Transcript p. 343) This was to start the turn around Buoy 71. (Transcript p. 384) Captain Steele did not at that time, however, go to the pilot house. Captain Steele remained on the wing to observe the response of the vessel. (Transcript p. 395) After a few seconds, Captain Steele observed the bow of the vessel swinging to port (left) not to starboard (right). (Transcript p. 345) He immediately rushed to the pilot house, repeating his hard starboard (right) rudder order as he did so. (Transcript p. 345) The rudder angle indicator in the pilot house, however, indicated the actual position of the rudder was passing from port (left) 20 degrees to starboard when Captain Steele entered the pilot house. (Transcript p. 345) Captain Steele did not alter the prior order for ahead full. Captain Steele reached the helm console and grabbed the helm. By that time, the helm was already in the hard starboard position. The only explanation as to how the rudder got to 20 degrees port (left) was that when Captain Steele gave the command hard to starboard, the helmsman actually went hard to port (left), then the helmsman realized his error and was correcting it when Captain Steele entered the pilot house. No one suggests that any other command was given which would account for the port swing of the vessel. (Transcript p. 235) Captain Steele again went to the wing to observe the response of the vessel. When it became apparent the vessel would not make the turn, Steele ordered full astern and ordered both anchors dropped. The vessel continued to make way in a sweeping curve alliding with the Shell Oil Terminal on the western edge of the Chaseville turn at approximately 1459 hours. The allision was not caused by a mechanical failure, weather, or tide. (Transcript p. 69). The allision was set up by the helmsman's turning the ship to port (left) instead of starboard (right). However, the Respondent contributed to this error by failing to give the steering command, "Right, full rudder," as required by the Rules of Road. See 33 USC 232. The Coast Guard conducted an investigation and prepared a report (Petitioner's Exhibit 1), the second page of which is a data sheet taken from the ship's bridge. This data sheet contains a diagram of the ship's turning circle to both port (left) and starboard (right) at half and full speeds. An overlay in proper scale was prepared and attached to Hearing Officer Exhibit 1 at the point where the turn was executed, Point D. The scaled extract of the Coast Guard report is attached to the back of Hearing Officer Exhibit 1. The overlay reveals that the vessel could not make the turn at full speed from Point D because the vessel's course takes it almost exactly to the point of allision. If the vessel's course is offset slightly to the left due to the helmsman's mistake and the vessel's turning circle adjusted for less speed, as would have occurred if the vessel went from half speed to full speed when the order for the turn was given, the vessel's projected track would again place the vessel at the point of the allision. The primary cause of the allision was Respondent's use of full speed in the turn. Although there was controversy about whether the vessel proceeded north the entire way at full speed or whether full speed was ordered as the turn was ordered approaching Buoy 71 (Point D on Hearing Officer Exhibit 1), there is no controversy that Captain Steele intended to execute the turn at full speed. The distance from where Captain Steele assumed control of the ship to where it came to rest is approximately 1 and 1/8 nautical miles. According to the logs, the vessel covered this distance in between four and five minutes. In order to cover that distance in that time, the ship was at or close to its full speed, adjusted for a dirty hull, of 15 knots. The advance and transfer of the ship was extended at full speed in such a way that the vessel could not make the turn in the sea room available. Referring again to the overlay, the vessel could have turned within the searoom available from Point D at half speed. The ship might have completed the turn at half speed from a point left of and forward of Point D, its track as the result of the helmsman's error, particularly with the reserve of thrust available to assist in turning after the emergency developed. The Chaseville turn is a tight turn without a great amount of sea room, and requires care to be exercised by pilots. (Transcript pp. 354, 362, 170, 171). The Respondent's failure to maintain proper speed caused the allision with the Shell Oil Terminal.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Pilot commissioners issue a final order suspending Captain Henry A. Steele for three (3) months and levying a civil penalty of $5,000 against him. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1992.
The Issue Whether the application of Ronald J. Palamara (“Palamara”) for licensure as a yacht and ship broker under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was previously a licensed yacht and ship broker in Florida, holding Yacht Broker License No.324. On April 28, 1999, the Petitioner’s prior license expired. The Petitioner reapplied for a Yacht Broker license on February 24, 2000. Robert Badger (Badger), at that time an investigator with the Division, investigated the application for form pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(2), Florida Administrative Code, and found that there were no problems with the form of the application. Badger also reviewed the application for moral character of the applicant pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(3), Florida Administrative Code. On the application, the Petitioner indicated that he had a criminal background, but failed to disclose the nature of the criminal background on the application. In a letter from the Division addressed to the Petitioner, additional information was requested regarding his criminal background. The Petitioner replied in a letter that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor for resisting an officer without violence. The Petitioner also disclosed on the application that he had a civil Final Judgment against him in the matter of Chinnock Marine, Inc. v. Barthelemy & Palamara, Case No. 98- 19512 (Fla. 17th Cir. 1999). He did not fully disclose the details relating to events that led to the judgment. Instead, he stated on the application that the claims were “unfounded” and that Chinnock Marine “misled the court.” The subject application is dated February 22, 2000. On that application, the Petitioner was specifically required to disclose any “pending” civil suits involving a yacht. At the time of his application, another civil matter was pending against the Petitioner in World Class Yachts v. Palamara, Case No. 99-12923 (Fla. 17th Cir. 2001), which was filed on July 22, 1999. The Petitioner failed to disclose the pending World Class Yachts civil suit.2 Subsequent to the filing of the subject application, a non-final order was entered against the Petitioner finding that he was in default and rendering judgment for World Class Yachts in the amount of $157,500. The Petitioner took an interlocutory appeal of the circuit court’s non-final order of default to the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order of default. Palamara v. World Class Yachts, Case No. 4D01-3260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The Petitioner admits that the World Class Yachts case relates to a yacht. Although the circuit court had not entered a Final Judgment against the Petitioner in the amount of $157,500.00 at the time of the hearing in this case, the World Class Yachts civil litigation involving a yacht should have been disclosed on the application pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(3)(a)6, Florida Administrative Code. In both Chinnock Marine and World Class Yachts, the Petitioner has moved to vacate the default judgments, alleging that he was not properly served. The Petitioner has worked in the yacht brokerage business in South Florida for many years. He has never had any disciplinary action taken against his license. In the community in which he lives and works he enjoys a reputation for being a person of integrity, honesty, and good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued in this case granting the license sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2002.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: At all times material to the allegations, Respondent was a licensed pilot in the State of Florida having been issued License No. 0000025. On January 15, 1986, Respondent boarded the ship Act 5 as her state pilot for approaching an intended berth at Port Everglades. The Act 5 was over 700 feet long, had a single handed screw, a single rudder and was equipped with bow thrusters. The ship drew 34 feet at her stern on the date in question. The ship had a bulbous bow which protruded outwardly under the forward waterline. A tugboat, the Captain Nelson, captained by John A. Cummings was beside the Act 5 to assist in the berthing maneuver. The approach to Port Everglades is negotiated through a narrow canal. Vessels seeking berth proceed through the canal, past a jetties area, and into a turning basin. Once inside the basin a turn is required in order to bring a ship parallel to the intended berth. On January 15, 1986, the Act 5 was to be berthed at a location on pier 3 identified as berth 17. In order to approach berth 17 a sweeping turn to port must be made. On that date the Captain Nelson was positioned off the starboard bow during the Act 5's swing to port. Once this swing had been initiated, the Respondent ordered the tug to proceed to the port stern quarter. It was intended that the tug would assist to breast the ship beside the docking area. After the tug had begun its trip from starboard bow to stern, Respondent realized that the ship's swing would not be sufficient to bring her parallel to the dock. Accordingly, the Respondent ordered the tug to hook up and to pull at full throttle to slow the ship and bring her parallel. Additionally, since it was apparent the ship might collide with the dock, the despondent ordered the Act 5 to reverse at full throttle. Despite the corrective efforts, the Act 5 did not swing sufficiently to port and her bulbous bow struck the underplatting of the dock at berth 17. The platting cracked and the fill behind it washed out. When the fill washed out, the road built on top collapsed and the dock eroded. Approximately sixty feet of dock surface was destroyed. Unpredictable surface and subsurface currents in Port Everglades very dramatically affect docking procedures. The tides, which are repetitive, also affect docking maneuvers. Given the fluctuating tides and currents within the Port Everglades turning basin, it is not uncommon for a ship's handling to be predictable. Given the tide and current conditions known to Respondent on the date at issue, the collision was unpredictable and unforeseeable by a reasonably prudent pilot. Given the times and speeds noted in the Act 5's "bell book," the Respondent approached the intended berth under prevailing standards used by other pilots at Port Everglades.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Pilot Commissioners enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's, DPR/Board of Pilot Commissioners, proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 4, the times and speeds noted in the Act 5's bell book are estimates which are within a reasonable range for approaching berth at Port Everglades. Distances are in unsubstantiated estimates and should not suggest Respondent used excessive speed. Three witnesses testified the ship approached at a reasonable rate. Such direct evidence controls over speculative estimates. Accordingly, paragraph 4 is rejected. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are accepted. Paragraphs 7 and 8 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 9, the cause of the collision is unknown. The ship did not swing to port sufficiently to become parallel to the dock. This lack of swing, coupled with the forward movement of the ship, resulted in the collision. As to why the ship did not continue its swing is speculative. Surface tides and currents as well as subsurface currents interfere with docking maneuvers and may have inhibited the swing. With regard to paragraph 10, the tides and currents noted were only surface ones. The subsurface currents which run deeper and which might effect a ship the size and draw of the Act 5 were not measured or charted. With that clarification, paragraph 10 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 11, it logically follows that Respondent's unforeseeable encounter would then serve as a warning to pilots involved in future docking procedures. That such pilots have benefitted from Respondent's incident does not suggest Respondent should have prejudged the problems. Accordingly, paragraph 11 is rejected as immaterial, irrelevant, and unnecessary. Rulings on Respondent's proposed finding of fact: Paragraphs 1-51 are accepted. Paragraph 52 is rejected as argumentative. Paragraph 53 is rejected a unnecessary, irrelevant or immaterial. Paragraphs 54-58 are rejected as unnecessary, irrelevant, immaterial, or argumentative. Paragraphs 59-62 are accepted. With regard to paragraphs 63 and 64, the Act 5 did collide with the underplatting at berth 17. The impact was felt by the tug Captain. Whether the dock was poorly maintained (and should have withstood the impact) or whether the fenders should have absorbed the shock is speculative but the touching was established. However, such touching was not caused by excessive speed or conduct falling below acceptable standards of safe pilotage. With that clarification, the paragraphs 63 and 64 are accepted. Paragraph 65 is accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Margaret Mathews, Esquire One Tampa City Center Suite 2600 201 N. Franklin Street Tampa, Florida 33602 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Pat Guilford, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Pilot Commissioners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
