The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive supplemental compensation under the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been employed as a firefighter with the City of Deland Fire Department. By submitting course transcripts on September 18 and 20, 1989, Petitioner applied to the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, Division of the State Fire Marshall, Department of Insurance for additional compensation under the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation Program. The course transcripts were from Brevard Community College and Valencia Community College. The Brevard transcript showed that, over a four-year period ending September 13, 1989, Petitioner had earned 69 semester credit hours, for which he was awarded an associate in arts degree in August, 1988. (All credit hours reported below are semester credit hours.) The courses for which Petitioner earned credits at Brevard are as follows (three credit hours for each course unless indicated otherwise in parentheses): general psychology, general chemistry I and II, general chemistry lab I and II (each 1), engineering graphics (4), college algebra, weight training (1), communications I and II, stage band (1), archery (1), fundamentals of speech communication, swimming (1), college trigonometry, first aid and safety (2), organic chemistry I and II, organic chemistry lab I and II (each 1), academic/career planning, U.S. history I and II, oceanography, introduction to physical geology, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (1), tennis (1), survey of American literature, contemporary humanities of the 20th century, and--following the receipt of the degree-- developmental psychology. After earning his associate in arts degree, petitioner took ten credit hours at Valencia Community College during the second session of the 1988-89 school year. The courses and their credit hours are: fundamentals of emergency medical technology (4), fundamentals of emergency medical technology practice (3), and emergency medical technician clinical practicum (3) By notice dated October 18, 1989, the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, Division of the State Fire Marshall, Department of Insurance informed Petitioner that the information that he had submitted for entry into the Supplemental Compensation Program was not acceptable. The notice explains that Petitioner "does not have 18 hours fire science within degree transcript." The notice advises at the bottom: "When you have all of the appropriate paperwork properly filled out, please resubmit." By letter dated November 8, 1989, Frederick C. Stark, Chief of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, informed Petitioner that his transcripts failed to disclose a "major study concentration area" to qualify for supplemental compensation. The letter quotes Rule 4A-37.071(2), Florida Administrative Code: The major study concentration area, at least 18 semester hours or 27 quarter hours, must be readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. Those major study concentration areas specifically identified in Rule 4A-37.073 are considered by the Division to be readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. The letter advises Petitioner of his right to a hearing. Following some communications from Petitioner, Mr. Stark wrote another letter to Petitioner dated November 27, 1989. The letter states in its entirety: After further review of your transcript from Valencia Junior College, may I suggest that you take the necessary courses needed to get an Emergency Medical Technology degree. I feel that this would be the best way to go since you already have courses in this area. If I can be of any further assistance please call me at [number omitted]. Petitioner re-enrolled in Brevard Community College for the second semester starting January 8, 1990. He completed a three-credit hour course in statistics and a two-credit hour course in medical terminology. He also received credit, through a CLEP examination, for four credit hours in general biology. On June 18, 1990, Petitioner resubmitted the transcript materials showing the additional coursework at Brevard Community College. By letter dated July 10, 1990, Mr. Stark informed Petitioner that his application for entry into the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program had been denied for noncompliance with Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 4A-37, Florida Administrative Code. The letter quotes Rule 4A-37.085(2) as follows: "To be eligible to receive the Supplemental Compensation provided for by Section 633.382(3), Florida Statutes, the following requirements must be met: Possess an eligible Associate or Bachelors Degree." Prior to advising of a right to a hearing, the letter concludes: "it has been determined that your Degree is not readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related, per Rule 4A- 37.084. By letter dated July 17, 1990, to the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, Petitioner requested a formal administrative hearing. The letter states that Petitioner had at least 18 semester hours readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. In the July 17 letter, Petitioner asserts that he had called Mr. Stark prior to taking the additional courses and had been told that he needed only six additional semester hours, because he had 12 semester hours in approved courses. The letter claims that Mr. Stark had approved specific courses prior to Petitioner's taking them and had said it was unnecessary to confirm anything in writing. Petitioner complains in the letter that he was only lately told that he could meet the 18 semester-hour requirement only by earning a new associate degree. To earn an associate in arts or associate in science degree from Brevard Community College, a student must satisfy various requirements, such as completing a "prescribed course of study which includes at least 64 semester hours of credit," according to the college catalog. The associate in arts degree offers no opportunity to declare a major. 1/ The associate in science degree offers various majors. The associate in science technical program offers a major in fire technology that is designed to "qualify fire personnel for career advancement." The coursework described in this program represents strong evidence of the kind of courses that are fire- related. The coursework for the associate in science degree with a major in fire technology requires, among other things, the following courses and credit hours: two English courses (3 each), one physical science course (3), one chemistry course (3), one algebra course (3), two government courses (3 each), one human relations course (3), and two physical education courses (1 each). Although Petitioner did not take the identical courses required for the associate in science degree with a major in fire technology, he took comparable courses that, in each case, were more difficult than those required for the associate in science degree. The courses that Petitioner took that correspond in subject matter and credit hours to the Brevard requirements for a major in fire technology are: general psychology (3), general chemistry I (3), college algebra (3), communications I (3), fundamentals of speech communication (3), weight training and swimming (2), and U.S. history I and II (6). Other fire-related courses are first aid and safety (2) and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (1). Petitioner thus earned, prior to receiving his associate in arts degree, 26 hours in courses that are readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. Valencia Community College is similar to Brevard Community College in offering no majors within the associate in arts degree. Valencia's associate in science degree with a major in fire science requires the following courses and credit hours: composition (3), U.S. government (3), psychology in business and industry (3), business math (3), fundamentals of speech (3), technical communication (3), introduction to general chemistry (4), introduction to sociology (3), and humanities (3). when measured against the requirements of Valencia Community College for a major in fire science, in terms of subject matter and credit hours, Petitioner earned a total of 25 or 28 credit hours in fire-related courses. Adding the first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation courses, Petitioner earned, in this comparison to the Valencia requirements, between 28 and 31 credit hours in courses that are clearly fire-related and within a major study concentration area that is fire-related. Neither an associate nor bachelor degree is required for Petitioner's present job as a firefighter. His job responsibilities include preventing and extinguishing fires, maintaining firefighting equipment, and conducting life support activities. His specific responsibilities include raising and climbing ladders, using chemical extinguishers, performing rescue activities, conducting fire education, performing life-support activities, and attending training courses to learn more about fire prevention and protection.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance, Division of State Fire Marshall, issue an amended final order determining that Petitioner is eligible to receive supplemental compensation of $50 monthly commencing no later than the first full calendar month following the date of the initial final order entered in this case. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Attorney Lisa S. Santucci Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Peter T. Campbell, III 445 Clarewood Boulevard Titusville, FL 32796
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Lydia Miller, ran for election to the Hillsborough County Commission, District 4, in 1992. It was her first campaign for election to public office. She declared her candidacy in September, 1991, and appointed her husband as her campaign treasurer and herself as deputy campaign treasurer. She ran as a Republican and had several Republican opponents in the primary. She did not have the backing of the Republican Party and had difficulty attracting financial support, especially at first. Of necessity, she ran a "grass roots" campaign and spent countless hours going door-to-door in her district asking for support and, when possible, making public appearances. She also tried to capitalize on the "grass roots" nature of her campaign. Trying to emulate a campaign technique that worked for Governor Lawton Chiles, she pledged that she would not accept financial contributions in excess of $100 (versus the $500 statutory maximum) and would not accept financial contributions (or endorsements) from "special interests." To substantiate the strength of her "grass roots" campaign, the Respondent saw value in her campaign treasurer's reports showing as large a number of relatively small contributions from individuals. In all, the Respondent raised less than $14,000. Yet, she was able to survive the first primary, win the second primary, and beat her Democrat opponent in the general election. Cash Not Deposited or Reported The Respondent admitted that she accepted a $20 cash contribution from Irene Herring and put it in her campaign's petty cash without reporting it in her campaign treasurer's reports. Herring made two other cash contributions to the Respondent's campaign- -one in the amount of $20 and another in the amount of $30. Neither contribution was reported. Both contributions were given to Susie Farmer, a campaign worker. Similarly, David Gill contributed between $50 and $100 cash to the Respondent's campaign, but the contribution was not reported. This contribution also was given to Susie Farmer. The Respondent denied specific knowledge of the two other cash contributions from Herring and the cash contribution from Gill. The only evidence which could support a finding that the Respondent knew of them was testimony of Larry Sweat, an aide the Respondent hired after her election but fired three months later. From an evaluation of the testimony of the Respondent and Sweat, taking into account all of the relevant evidence as well as their demeanor and overall credibility, and it is found that Sweat's testimony was not sufficient to overcome the Respondenet's denials by a preponderance of the evidence. By her own admission, however, it would not have been unusual for the Respondent to use small cash contributions (or allow and approve their use) to replenish her campaign's petty cash without reporting them in her campaign treasurer's reports. It certainly is possible that the other two cash contributions from Herring and the cash contribution from Gill were handled in that manner. The Respondent was aware that all contributions had to be deposited in her campaign account and reported in her campaign treasurer's report. Yet, for reasons not fully explained in her testimony, the Respondent also thought that it was permissible to use small cash contributions to replenish her campaign's petty cash. It is possible that the Respondent misread or misunderstood the election campaign financing laws dealing with petty cash and the reporting of expenditures from petty cash. See Conclusions of Law 79 through 81, below. The Respondent certainly was not handling the small cash contributions that way to "beef up" her campaign treasurer's reports. Cash Deposited and Reported But Donor Allegedly Unknown The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports show the following cash contributions: $100 from Phillip Preston on August 17, 1992 $ 90 from Robert Preston on August 17, 1992 $100 from Kelley Preston on August 22, 1992 Robert, Kelley, and Phillip are the minor children of Allen and Rosina Preston, aged 16, 4, and 2. It is possible but improbable that Robert donated $100 of his own cash to the Respondent's campaign; it is all but impossible that Kelley or Phillip did. The Prestons were supporters of the Respondent and contributors to her campaign. The Respondent's Sun City Center campaign headquarters was in office space donated by Allen Preston. The offices of Preston's business also was in the same building. Allen Preston often visited the campaign headquarters and helped with the campaign, in addition to his financial contributions. Yet, Preston denied donating $290 cash in the names of his children. Preston does not think his wife would have done so without telling him, but his wife did not testify. The Respondent denies any specific knowledge concerning the $290 in cash contributions attributed to the Preston children. But it would not have been unusual for Susie Farmer or other campaign workers to leave cash contributions with "Post-It" notes attached to identify the donors. The campaign treasurer's reports normally would be prepared using the information on the "Post-It" notes. Especially in the days leading up to the three elections, the campaign headquarters became hectic and confused, and it is possible that incorrect information inadvertently was placed on the "Post-It" notes for these cash contributions. When the Respondent saw cash contributions from the Preston children in preparing or reviewing reports, she would not have questioned the accuracy of the information. She would have assumed that the Prestons had made the donations in the names of their children. She did not think there was anything wrong with adults making campaign contributions in the names of their minor children. She denies intentionally misreporting the contributions in order to hide contributions from Allen and Rosina Preston, or their businesses, or artificially to "beef up" the number of small contributions reflected in her campaign treasurer's reports. The evidence was not sufficient to overcome the Respondenet's denials by a preponderance of the evidence. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports also show a $25 cash contribution from Evelyn Ackerman on October 14, 1992. The parties stipulated in their Joint Prehearing Stipulation that Ackerman is an elderly woman on a fixed income and that Ackerman denies making the contribution. But the Respondent has a specific recollection that Ackerman offered the contribution, that the Respondent tried to decline in view of Ackerman's meager financial means, and that Ackerman insisted. It is found that the Respondent's testimony outweighs the statements from Ackerman, who has been know to hallucinate and whose memory may not be trustworthy. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports also showed a $100 cash contribution from Henry Farmer on October 18, 1992. Henry Farmer denies making the contribution and does not believe that his wife, Susie, would have donated $100 cash in his name without telling him. Susie did not testify, but she was an enthusiastic supporter, campaign worker and fund-raiser for the Respondent's campaign, and it certainly is possible that she donated the cash in her husband's name without his knowing it. Regardless of the actual source of the cash, the Respondent testified to her recollection of seeing a $100 cash contribution with a "Post-It" notes attached indicating that it was from Henry Farmer. She indicated that she had no reason to think it was not a contribution from Susie's husband, and it would not have been unreasonable for the Respondent to believe, without question, that the information on the "Post-It" note was accurate. The evidence was not sufficient to overcome the Respondent's testimony by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence did not prove that the Respondent knew her campaign treasurer's report of the $100 cash contribution from Henry Farmer was not accurate. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports also showed a $100 cash contribution from Marie Schrag on October 18, 1992. Neither she nor her husband made the contributions. The Respondent did not testify to any specific recollection about the Schrag contribution. But Schrag was Allen Preston's bookkeeper and worked in the same building of Preston's where the Respondent's Sun City Center campaign headquarters was. Although she was not an active campaign worker for the Respondent, she did type one letter for the campaign, and her husband stuffed envelopes for the campaign on at least one occasion. In addition, she had been friends with Susie Farmer, one of the Respondent's most successful fund-raiser, for over 20 years. If the Respondent saw a $100 cash contribution with a "Post-It" notes attached indicating that it was from Marie Schrag, she would have had no reason not to believe, without question, that the information on the "Post-It" note was accurate. The evidence did not prove that the Respondent knew her campaign treasurer's report of the $100 cash contribution from Marie Schrag was not accurate. Alleged Business Contributions Allegedly Falsely Reported From Individuals The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a June 1, 1992, contribution in the amount of $25 from "Phil Boggs, Occupation (if over $100), Boggs Jewelry," when the check was written on the account of Boggs Jewelry, and signed by Phil R. Boggs. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Boggs contribution was reported. When the Respondent pledged not to take financial contributions or endorsements from "special interests," she did not intend to indicate that she would not accept financial support from any businesses or corporations. (In her mind, "special interests" meant political action committees, not any and all businesses and corporations.) The Respondent does not know Phil Boggs, and Boggs Jewelry had no business before the County Commission during the Respondent's term. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Boggs contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Boggs contribution or make it look like it was coming from Boggs, individually, instead of the business, Boggs Jewelry. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on June 2, 1992, in the amount of $25 from "Charles Hostetter, Occupation (if over $100), Fisher Beauty Salon," when the check was written on the account of Fisher's Beauty Salon, and signed by Charles Hostetter. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Hostetter contribution was reported. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Hostetter contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Hostetter contribution or make it look like it was coming from Hostetter, individually, instead of the business, Fisher's Beauty Salon. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on June 22, 1992, in the amount of $25 from "Charles Bingham, Occupation (if over $100), c/o Floral Decor Florist," when the check was written on the account of Floral Decor Florist, and signed by Charles Bingham. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Bingham contribution was reported. Bingham is a personal friend of the Respondent and personally gave the check to the Respondent. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Bingham contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Bingham contribution or make it look like it was coming from Bingham, individually, instead of the business, Floral Decor Florist. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on June 24, 1992, in the amount of $100 from "John Williams Coppes Kitchen, Occupation (if over $100), Owner," when the check was written on the account of Williams Kitchens & Baths, Inc. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the John Williams contribution was reported. The Respondent knows Williams's business as "John Williams Coppes Kitchens," the name on the business's signage. (Coppes is the name of the brand Williams sells.) The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the John Williams contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the John Williams contribution or make it look like it was coming from Williams, individually, instead of the business, whether known as Williams Kitchens & Baths, Inc., or as John Williams Coppes Kitchens. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on August 16, 1992, in the amount of $100 from "Ann Williams, Guys & Dolls," when the check was written on the account of Guys 'N Dolls of Brandon, Inc., and signed by Ann Williams. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Ann Williams contribution was reported. Ann Williams is the Respondent's regular hairdresser and personally gave the check to the Respondent at the beauty parlor. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Ann Williams contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Ann Williams contribution or make it look like it was coming from Ann Williams, individually, instead of the business, Guys 'N Dolls of Brandon, Inc. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on September 12, 1992, in the amount of $50 from "Martha Simmons, Tropical Fish Farms," when the check was written on the account of Gerald Simmons Tropical Fish Farm, and signed by Martha Simmons. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Simmons contribution was reported. The Simmonses were neighbors of the Farmers. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Simmons contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Simmons contribution or make it look like it was coming from Martha Simmons, individually, instead of the business, Gerald Simmons Tropical Fish Farm. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on September 23, 1992, in the amount of $50 from Tommy Brock, when the check was written on the account of Brock Farms, and signed by Tommy Brock. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Tommy Brock contribution was reported. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Brock contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Brock contribution or make it look like it was coming from Tommy Brock, individually, instead of the business, Brock Farms. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 15, 1992, in the amount of $100 from William Stearns, when the check was written on the account of F.E. Stearns Peat Co., Inc., and signed by William Stearns. If the Respondent had carefully compared check to the report, she probably should have known that the Stearns contribution was not reported properly. The check arrived in the mail, and there was no reason to think it was not from the F.E. Stearns Peat Co., Inc. Nonetheless, the Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Stearns contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the Stearns contribution or make it look like it was coming from Williams Stearns, individually, instead of the business, F.E. Stearns Peat Co., Inc. It just as easily could have been a mistake or oversight. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 15, 1992, in the amount of $100 from "William Bishop, c/o L.L. Corporation," when the check was written on the account of Leslie Land Corporation, signed by William Bishop, with the "memo": "William L. Bishop." If she had carefully compared check to the report, the Respondent probably should have known that the Leslie Land Corporation contribution was not reported properly. However, the "memo" on the check indicated "William L. Bishop," and the report gave Bishop's address as "c/o L. L. Corporation." It was not proven that the Respondent intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the Leslie Land Corporation contribution or make it look like it was coming from William Bishop, individually, instead of the business, Leslie Land Corporation. It is just as possible that the intention was to include all of the information on the check for full disclosure and that the initials "L. L." were used instead of the full name of the Leslie Land Corporation by mistake or oversight, or to compress all of the information into the limited space allotted on the report form. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 22, 1992, in the amount of $100 from the "Bill Kincaid Company," when the check was written on the account of the Kincaid Company, and signed by William F. Kincaid. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Kincaid contribution was reported. All the report did was provide the additional information of Kincaid's first name, along with the company name. It was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Kincaid contribution or make it look like it was coming from Kincaid, individually, instead of from the Kincaid Company. The Respondent also reasonably did not perceive the Kincaid contribution to have come from a "special interest." The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 29, 1992, in the amount of $50 from Kenneth Wetherington, when the check was written on the account of the Morgan and Wetherington Chiropractic, and signed by Kenneth Wetherington. The Respondent did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Wetherington contribution was reported. She thought that a chiropractor in partnership with other chiropractors acted in his own behalf when making a political contribution, even when writing a partnership check. Although the Respondent probably incorrectly reported this contribution, the Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Wetherington contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the Wetherington contribution or make it look like it was not coming from the partnership of Morgan and Wetherington Chiropractic. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 28, 1992, in the amount of $100 from Paul Rozeman, when the check was written on the account of the McCaw Communications of Florida, Inc., and signed by someone other than Rozeman. (The signature was illegible, and it could not be identified through testimony.) However, the check was delivered by Rozeman, who worked in McCaw's local office, and who introduced himself to the Respondent. Although McCaw Communications is a large corporation, the Respondent was not familiar with it and was willing to assume that the contribution was from Rozeman's company and to decided err on the side of using his name. Obviously, her assumption was incorrect, and the report was in error. In any event, the Respondent probably should have known that the contribution was not reported properly. (See Finding of Fact 36, above.) But the evidence did not prove that the Respondent was lying, and that she actually perceived McCaw Communications to be a "special interest," and intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the contribution and make it look like it was coming from Rozeman, individually, instead of from McCaw Communications. In all, the Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports that were admitted in evidence listed 216 separate contributions. ($3,052 in cash and check contributions and $1615.80 of in-kind contributions would have been listed in earlier reports that were not admitted in evidence.) Of the 216 separate contributions, 31 (aside from the ones discussed in paragraphs 15 through 43, above) unambiguously and properly listed the contributions as coming from corporations, businesses or organizations. Contributions Allegedly Over $100 And Falsely Reported As Several $100 Contributions On or about October 5, 1992, the Respondent's campaign received a $500 check on the account of, and signed by Allen Preston, with explicit instructions to consider it and report it as being a $100 contribution from each of the five family members: Allen; his wife, Rosina; and their three children, Robert, Kelley, and Phillip. On or about September 3, 1992, the Respondent's campaign received a $300 check on the account of Aquarius Water Refinery, Inc., and signed by Joe Gaskill, with explicit instructions to consider it and report it as being a $100 contribution from him, another $100 contribution from his wife, and another $100 contribution from his company, Aquarius Water Refinery, Inc. On or about September 3, 1992, the Respondent's campaign received a $200 check on the account of Care Animal Hospital, Inc., and signed by Richard Kane, a veterinarian and the corporation's president, with explicit instructions to consider it and report it as being one $100 contribution from him and another $100 contribution from his corporation. The Respondent did not specifically request that the Preston, Gaskill and Kane contributions be considered and reported as being several contributions of $100. Preston, Gaskill and Kane all were aware of the Respondent's campaign pledge to limit contributions to $100, and it was their desire and intention not to cause the Respondent to violate the pledge. The Respondent did not think it was improper or illegal or inaccurate to reports the Preston, Gaskill and Kane contributions as requested. It appears that the Petitioner has issued an advisory opinion that contributions in excess of the statutory maximum by check drawn on a joint account only can be divided into smaller contributions from more than one account holder if all of the donors sign the check. (The Petitioner's investigator testified to the existence of such an advisory opinion, but none was admitted in evidence at the hearing. The Petitioner attached to its proposed recommended order a copy of what purports to be its advisory opinion on the subject, designated DE 93-10, but technically the advisory opinion still is not in evidence in this case.) But there is no evidence that the advisory opinion was furnished to the Respondent or that she was aware of it. If the Respondent were aware of the advisory opinion, she should at least have been on notice to inquire whether it was permissible to report the contributions as she did. But it still would not have been clearly impermissible. Allegedly False Termination Report And Improper Disposition of Surplus Funds The deadline for submission of the Respondent's termination campaign treasurer's report was 90 days after the general election, or Monday, February 1, 1993. As the deadline approached, the Respondent reasonably thought she needed two things in order to file the termination report: first, the January, 1993, bank statement on the campaign account; and, second, the resolution of a dispute she had with the phone company (GTE of Florida, Inc., or GTE) about charges on bills she received after having the campaign headquarters phone disconnected. On the weekend before the termination report was due, the Respondent attempted to obtain the bank statement but was told that it just had been put in the mail and could not be regenerated by the bank's computer at that time. The bank personnel advised the Respondent to wait until the statement arrived in the mail. Without the bank statement, the Respondent reasonably could not prepare the termination report before the deadline. She asked officials at the local elections supervisor's office for advice and was told to write a note explaining the reasons why she could not meet the deadline. She wrote a note dated February 1, 1993, stating that she "could not report on the closing of my campaign account until I received the final Banking Statement." It is found that the note was truthful and that she did not have the January, 1993, bank statement at the time she wrote it. Testimony from Larry Sweat to the effect that the Respondent came into her office that day and gave him the bank statement to hide in a drawer is rejected as false or mistaken. The Respondent did not receive the bank statement in the mail until later that week. It is possible, as testified by Sweat, that he and the Respondent had a discussion to the effect that it was to the Respondent's advantage that her termination report would not be available for public scrutiny on the deadline, along with the reports of other candidates (assuming they were filed on time). But it is as likely, or more likely, that Sweat thought of the fortuitous side- benefit of filing late. In any event, it is found that the Respondent did not intentionally file late in order to reap the perceived side-benefit that might have been discussed. It is possible that, when the January, 1993, bank statement was received in the mail, the Respondent brought it into the office and gave it to Sweat to keep in his desk drawer until she was in a position to prepare the termination report. (The dispute with the telephone company still was not resolved.) But it is found that, contrary to Sweat's testimony, the Respondent did not give the bank statement to Sweat to "hide" in his desk drawer. On February 18, 1993, the Respondent filed the termination report. It showed a January 6, 1993, check on the campaign account (check number 1070) in the amount of $88.45, made out to cash. The check memo stated, "petty cash reimbursement," but the report clarified that the cash actually was paid to the Respondent and two others for the purchase of party goods for the celebration of the Respondent's victory in the general election. The February 18, 1993, termination report also showed that a February 16, 1993, check for $48.95 to GTE of Florida (check number 1072) "on account, balance due in dispute" was written on the campaign account on the day of the report. The report also showed a zero balance in the account. Check number 1072 never was presented to the bank, and its whereabouts is not known. The Petitioner contends that check number 1072 and the disputed telephone bill were fabrications to cover the improper disbursement of $48.95 of surplus to the Respondent. But the check just as easily could have been lost or, for some reason, simply not presented to the bank for payment. Besides, as reflected in the following Findings of Fact, the evidence was clear both that there was in fact a dispute regarding the GTE bill and that the $48.95 was not disbursed to the Respondent in February, 1993. The Petitioner presented the GTE telephone records for the Respondent's campaign office telephone account in an apparent attempt to prove that, as of November 10, 1992, there was only a $1.02 balance on the account and that GTE was not pursuing collection of the $1.02. But, while only a $1.02 balance appeared on the campaign telephone account as of November 10, 1992, approximately $154.68 was transferred at that time from the campaign telephone account to the Respondent's personal home telephone account. It was the transferred charges that the Respondent was disputing. For reasons not apparent from the record, on or about December 10, 1992, GTE reduced the balance transferred to the Respondent's home phone bill to $131.37. Apparently, GTE further reduced the transferred balance to $84.09 on December 19, 1992; again, no explanation for the further reduction is apparent. The $84.09 charge remained on the GTE records at least until an entry on one of the records indicating that GTE wrote it off as uncollectible on or about February 12, 1993. Although the records include the notation dated February 12, 1993, indicating that GTE was writing off the $84.09 charge as being uncollectible, the Petitioner did not call a witness from GTE to explain the GTE records, and the records presented at the hearing do not go beyond the February 12, 1993, entry. It is not clear from the records that GTE stopped soliciting payment of the charge at that time. On May 12, 1993, the Respondent filed an amended termination report showing a March 30, 1993, disbursement to the Respondent in the amount of $36.95 for reimbursement for partial payment of the campaign's GTE bill. It also attached a copy of the March 31, 1993, bank statement on the campaign account showing a beginning balance as of March 1, 1993, in the amount of $36.95 and one withdrawal/debit in the same amount during the month, for a zero balance at the end of the month. The Respondent testified that she paid the $84.09 charge in June, 1993. Unfortunately, the Respondent's testimony was not corroborated by any records. But the GTE records presented by the Petitioner did not go beyond February 12, 1993, and without testimony from a witness from GTE, they were insufficient to disprove the Respondent's contention that she paid the charge in June, 1993. If the June, 1993, payment date is correct, the amended termination report filed on or about May 12, 1993, would indicate that the Respondent disbursed the $36.95 balance of the campaign account (representing the $48.95 she thought she had paid to GTE on or about February 16, 1993, less a $12 bank service charge for February, 1993) to herself on or about March 30, 1993, believing that there still was a disputed $84.09 charge to GTE, and that she held the money pending resolution of the disputed charge. When she paid the GTE charge, she considered the March 30, 1993, disbursement to herself to be reimbursement for her payment of the GTE charge. The Respondent knew or should have known that it was improper to disburse surplus from the campaign account to herself, except to reimburse her own contributions to her campaign. But, according to the Respondent's testimony, she did not consider the $36.95 payment to herself to be "surplus" since she considered there to be an outstanding disputed liability to GTE.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order dismissing the charges against the Respondent, Lydia Miller. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-6612 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. First sentence, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. The rest is conclusion of law. 2.-3. Last two sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last two sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. (Rather, she complied with the donors' instructions as to the source of the donations and how to report them.) First sentence, rejected as argument. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the Respondent willfully filed false reports. As to Ackerman, rejected as not proven that the report was inaccurate. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as not proven that he admitted his wife did not make the contribution. (He said it was possible that she made it but he does not think she did.) Second sentence, rejected as not proven as to Ackerman but otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Third sentence, rejected as not proven that she said Suzie Farmer was responsible; the Respondent admitted to handling the Ackerman contribution and testified that said that someone, quite possibly Farmer, attached an explanatory "Post-It" note to the other cash contributions. Last sentence, rejected as not proven. Third, fifth and last sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the Respondent willfully made false reports. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. First, sixth penultimate and ultimate sentences, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. The rest is rejected as not proven. (A review shows that she usually followed Barr's advice although not in each and every case.) Penultimate sentence, rejected as not proven as to petty cash. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. Last sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Third sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Penultimate and ultimate sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First and last sentences, ejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First, sixth, seventh and eighth sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as not proven as to petty cash. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary or argument. Third paragraph, fourth sentence (that the small size of the individual alleged "masked" cash donations makes the allegation "absurd"), rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (The point of the Petitioner's argument that a single fairly large cash contribution--which could have been in addition to reported contributions--could have been "masked" by fabricating many small cash contribution.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary or argument. Second paragraph, first sentence (that the dispute concerned check #1072), rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Third paragraph, first sentence, rejected in part (omission of January, 1993, bank statement as a cause of initial delay) as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and in part (the Respondent's first campaign and the amounts involved) as irrelevant on the issue whether she willfully violated the law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary or argument. COPIES FURNISHED: David R. Westcott, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State, Division of Elections The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Ralph C. Stoddard, Esquire Hampton, Stoddard, Griffin & Runnells 915 Oakfield Drive, Suite F Brandon, Florida 33511 Carlos Alvarez, Chairman Florida Elections Commission Room 1802, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
The Issue Did the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) improperly deny funds to Maurice Parkes for the purchase of bottled water?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of administering the Medicaid Developmental Disabilities Home and Community-Based Services Waiver Program (Medicaid Waiver Program), the Family care program, and the provisions of in-home subsidies. Petitioner is a developmentally disabled child who lives in his family's home and receives numerous services from the Department for his developmental disability, medical, and physical problems. The services presently being furnished to Petitioner are funded through the Medicaid Waiver Program. The bottled water at issue is not funded through the Medicaid Waiver Program and would have to be funded through General Revenue funds. General Revenue funds appropriated by the legislature for the fiscal year 2001-2002 to the Department have largely been moved to the Medicaid Waiver Program to obtain the benefit of federal matching funds, which are provided at the rate of 55 cents for each 45 cents of state funds. The use of General Revenue Funds to obtain matching federal funds for the Medicaid Waiver Program allows the Department to service some of those developmentally disabled clients that are presently eligible for the Medicaid Waiver Program but have not been receiving services due to lack of funding. There are no uncommitted funds in the General Revenue category of the Developmental Services' budget that could be used to fund the purchase of bottled water for Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to provide him with bottled water. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank H. Nagatani, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Maurice Parkes c/o Erika Parkes 2229 Bonita Way, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33712 Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact In 1975 the Florida Legislature passed the Medical Malpractice Reform Act, Chapter 75-9, Laws of Florida, now codified in Chapter 768, Florida Statutes. Part of this legislative package included the creation of the Fund. This legislation was passed in response to a medical malpractice insurance crisis which arose when the primary underwriter for the Florida Medical Association sought to stop issuing medical malpractice policies in Florida, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, for physicians or hospitals to obtain medical malpractice insurance coverage at reasonable rates. As a result of this problem, many physicians began to practice defensive medicine, curtail or abandon their practices or practice without coverage of any kind. The Fund is a private not-for-profit organization, participation in which is totally voluntary for its member health care providers. Insofar as Petitioners are concerned, membership in the Fund is but one of several options available to provide legally required evidence of financial responsibility in order to obtain licensure as a hospital facility in Florida. In fact, of the approximately 260 hospitals in Florida, only 125 satisfy their financial responsibility requirement via membership in the Fund. Physicians, hospitals, health maintenance organizations and ambulatory surgical centers who become members of the Fund must maintain at least $100,000 in primary professional liability insurance. Membership in the Fund grants to each participant a limitation of liability above the $100,000 in primary coverage. To the extent that any settlement or judgment exceeds the primary coverage of the participant, it is paid by the Fund without limitation. The Fund is operated subject to the supervision and approval of a board of governors whose membership is required by law to consist of representatives of the insurance industry, the legal and medical professions, physicians' insurers, hospitals, hospitals' insurers and the general public. The Department is charged by statute with certain regulatory functions concerning the Fund. The base fee for Fund membership is set by statute at $500 for physicians, after an initial $1,000 enrollment fee for the first year of participation, and at $300 per bed for hospital members. The statute requires the Department to set additional fees based upon the classifications of health care providers contained in the statute. In the event that base fees are insufficient to pay all claims asserted against the Fund for a given Fund year, the Department is empowered, upon request of the Board of Governors of the Fund, to order additional assessments against Fund participants to meet any such deficiency. Under the original legislation, all classes of health care providers could be assessed unlimited amounts to make up any deficiencies. As a result of legislative amendments in 1976, however, the amount which participants, other than hospitals, could be assessed was limited to the amount each Fund member had paid to join the Fund for that particular coverage year. 1976 legislative amendments also required that each fiscal year of the Fund be operated independently of preceding fiscal years, and further required that occurrences giving rise to claims in a particular Fund year be paid only from fees or investment income on these fees collected for that particular year. Thus, it is entirely possible for the Fund to experience deficits in a given year, and yet hold surplus funds for other years. The dispute in these consolidated proceedings arises from assessments for deficits incurred for the Fund years 1977-1978 and 1978-1979. Each of the hospitals named as Petitioners in the Petition for Administrative Proceedings in Case No. 82-776 were members of the Fund during the Fund year 1977-1978. Each of the hospitals named in the style and listed on Exhibit "A" to the Amendment to Petition for Administrative Proceedings in Case Nos. 82-530 and 82-571 were members of the Fund during the Fund year 1978-1979. On October 31, 1981, the Fund certified to the Department a deficiency in the amount of $1,350,672 for the Fund year 1977-1978. On January 18, 1982, the Fund certified to the Department an additional deficiency for the Fund year 1977-1978 in the amount of $1,759,591. On January 18, 1982, the Fund certified to the Department a deficiency of $13,935,927 for the Fund year 1978-1979. On January 13, 1982, the Department issued an "order" assessing various classes of health care providers the deficiency originally certified by the Fund for the Fund year 1977-1978. The "order" of January 13, 1982, was amended by the "order" of February 1, 1982, for the Fund year 1977-1973. The amended order contained the same dollar amount of assessments, but altered the amount charged to various classes of Fund members. On February 17, 1982, the Department issued its "order" granting the second assessment for the Fund year 1977-1978. On January 22, 1982, the Department issued its "order" granting the assessment for the 1978-1979 Fund year. The Department has not promulgated any rules pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, pertaining to its regulation of or duties in conjunction with the Fund under Section 768.54, Florida Statutes. As members of the Fund, each of the Petitioners' interests are substantially affected by the Orders of January 13, 1982; January 22, 1982; February 1, 1982; and February 17, 1982. For the Fund year 1977-1978 the total assessment ordered by the Department is $3,110,263. The total assessment for the Fund year 1978-1979 is $13,935,972. For the Fund year 1977-1978, physicians and professional association members are proposed to be assessed $1,730,207. During the Fund year 1977-1978, hospital members paid into the Fund, exclusive of interest earned on the fees, the amount of $5,292,498. For the Fund year 1977-1978, physicians and professional association members paid into the Fund the sum of $2,326,541. For the Fund year 1978-1979, hospital members paid into the Fund, exclusive of interest earned on their fees, the sum of $5,627,553. Interest earned through December 31, 1981, on these fees is $1,725,845. For the Fund year 1978-1979, physicians and professional association members paid into the Fund, exclusive of interest earned on their fees, the sum of $2,411,205. Interest earned through December 31, 1981, on the fees contributed by physicians and professional associations is $739,463. For the Fund year 1977-1978, the proposed assessments against hospital members of the Fund is $1,374,827. For the Fund year 1978-1979, the Fund retained the services of an independent actuarial firm to study and recommend appropriate additional fees to charge its members. The following table reflects the statutory base fees, the fees recommended by the actuary, the fees sought by the Fund and the fees ordered by the Department of Insurance for the 1977-1978 Fund year. Base Fees Actuary's Additional Additional Paid Recommended Fees Fees Pursuant Additional Requested Ordered to Stat. Fees by FPCF By DOI Class I Physicians $ $ $ $ Dade/Broward Co. 500.00 2,233.00 2,233.00 -0- Rest of State 500.00 l,749.00 1,749.00 -0- Class II Physicians Dade/Broward Co. 500.00 4,420.00 4,420.00 -0- Rest of State 500.00 3,549.00 3,549.00 -0- Class III Physicians Dade/Broward Co. 500.00 12,619.00 12,619.00 -0- Rest of State 500.00 10,297.00 10,297.00 -0- Hospitals (per occupied bed) 300.00 222.00 222.00 -0- Ambiatory Surgical Centers -0- 22.00 22.00 -0- (per 100 patients) Health Maintenance Organizations -0- 150.00 150.00 -0- (per 100 subscribers) Professional -0- 20 percent of additional (SAME) -0- fee to be paid by each individual member For the Fund year 1978-1979, the Department made no independent actuarial study of the recommended fees proposed by the independent actuary employed by the Fund, and no member of the Casualty Actuarial Society evaluated the Fund's recommendations on behalf of the Department. The independent actuary employed by the Fund was the only actuary who presented any evidence at the hearing conducted by the Department on the Fund's fee increase request for the Fund year 1978-1979. Each year since the Fund year 1977-1979 the Fund has employed the services of an actuary who, among other things, projected the expected losses above the claims previously paid and reserves established for known claims. These expected losses are reported as IBNR ("incurred but not reported") for each Fund year. The IBNR projected by the actuary employed by the Fund in the most recent report (October 1981) for the Fund year 1977-1978 is $6,306,036, and for the Fund year 1978-1979 is $15,965,324. The Department computed the portion of the assessment to be paid by the different classes of health care providers for the Fund year 1977-1978 based upon an approach known as the "indicated rate method." It is concluded from the record that this method is the most feasible of all suggested alternatives under existing law for reflecting the statutory classifications and, at the same time, providing immediate funds necessary to meet all claims against the Fund. This method is represented by the following formula: The Department started with rates which should have been charged each class in 1981-1982. This is called the "indicated rate by class." (The indicated rates were taken from the October, 1980 report by the Fund actuary.) The Department then applied the following formula for each class: Indicated Rate by Class x Number of Members in the Class = Total indicated fees by Class Total Indicated Fees by Class - Total Indicated Fees for ALL Classes Percentage of Indicated Fees by Class. Percentage of Indicated Fee by Class x Total Expected Loss for ALL Classes Expected Loss by Class. (Expected loss is all losses for the fund year included claims previously paid, reserves established on claims asserted and IBNR (incurred but not reported) Expected Loss by Class - Actual Fees paid by Class = Potential Loss Assessment by Class. Potential Loss Assessment by Class - Potential Loss Assessment for ALL Classes Percentage of Potential Loss Assessment by Class. Percentage of Potential Loss Assessment by Class x Total Assessment to be Ordered by the DOI = Amount of Assessment by Class. The following chart shows the amount each class would have paid under the "indicated rate method" for the Fund year 1977-1978, and the amount actually proposed to be assessed in the "orders" of the Indicated Rate Assessment Department: Actual Assessment a) Class I Physicians $ 146,487.00 $ 138,000.00 b) Class II Physicians 213,502.00 438,297.00 c) Class III Physicians 2,195,383.00 813,048.00 d) Hospitals 521,560.00 1,374,827.00 e) HMO 614.00 Surgical Centers 1,381.00 79,953.00 Professional Associations 28,336.00 Based upon the "indicated rate method" and based upon the application of Section 768.54, Florida Statutes, employed by the Department, assessments for the Fund year 1977-1978 which would otherwise be attributable to physician members of the Fund in the approximate amount of $1,500,000 were not charged to any class of physician. Based upon the "indicated rate method" and based upon the application of Section 768.54, Florida Statutes, employed by the Department, assessments for the Fund year 1978-1979 otherwise attributable to physician members of the Fund in the approximate amount of $9,000,000 were not charged to any class of physicians. The assessments described in the "orders" of the Department for the Fund year 1977-1978 which could not be applied to physician members, based upon the Department's interpretation of Section 768.54, Florida Statutes, were spread among the other classes of health care providers based upon their percentage of "expected losses." The Petitioners in this case, each of whom are members of the Fund, consist of 30 government hospitals, 43 private, nonprofit hospitals, and seven private, for-profit hospitals. During the Fund years 1977-1978 and 1978-1979, the Fund consisted of the following classes and numbers of members: 1977-1978 1978-1979 a) Class I Physicians 1392 1516 b) Class II Physicians 814 971 c) Class III Physicians 1584 1690 d) Hospitals 120 130 e) HMO 2 3 f) Surgical Centers 11 14 g) Professional Associations 572 855 The "orders" of the Department dated January 13, 1982; January 22, 1982; February 1, 1982; and February 17, 1982, were the first time any member of the Fund has been assessed under Section 768.54, Florida Statutes. The fees paid into the Fund; the investment income earned through December 31, 1981, on such fees; the expenses incurred through December 31, 1981; the amounts paid on claims through December 31, 1981; reserves established through and the IBNR for each Fund year for 1975-1976 through 1980-1981 are reflected on the table on page 10a. (IBNR figures are projections of future losses prepared by the Fund's actuary in October 1981.) The rates applicable to physicians and hospital members of the Fund for the years 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 were the base fees provided in Section 768.54, Florida Statutes. No additional fees were set for those Fund years. The rate order for the 1978-1979 year entered by the Department on June 9, 1978, was not appealed. The Fund in fact experienced deficits in both Fund years in controversy in this proceeding. The Fund certified to the Department the amount of its projected deficit for the years in question. The amount of money ultimately certified by the Fund to the Department accurately reflects the amounts derived from the following formula: FUND YEAR: 1975-1976 1976-1977 1977-1978 FEES PAID $2,928,672 $6,303,257 $7,467,605 INTEREST EARNED 1,475,41 3,000,118 2,592,179 ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES (54,846) (95,002) (148,113) NET FUNDS AVAILABLE 4,349,227 9,208,373 9,911,671 TO PAY LOSSES LOSSES PAID TO DATE (3,004,273) (6,869,395) (8,271,696) INDEMNITY EXPENSES (300,334) (343,433) (391,858) RESERVED LOSSES (971,733) (4,249,604) (3,663,348) RESERVED EXPENSES (57,584) (111,466) (172,869) PRESENT SURPLUS/DEFICIT (14,697) (2,365,525) (2,588,100) LOSSES INCURRED NOT YET REPORTED (IBNR) (AS OF 6/30/81) (1,189,136) (3,878,887) (7,970,235) FUND YEAR: 1978-1979 1979-1980 1980-1981 FEES PAID $8,060,374 $9,836,157 $11,225,275 INTEREST EARNED 2,543,698 2,589,547 1,882,319 ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES (128,556) (279,838) (406,641) NET FUNDS AVAILABLE 10,475,506 12,145,866 12,700,953 TO PAY LOSSES LOSSES PAID TO DATE (9,760,650) (3,410,358) (37,500) INDEMNITY EXPENSES (532,197) (206,616) (32,619) RESERVED LOSSES (13,782,271) (6,445,000) (3,750,000) RESERVED EXPENSES (267,932) (342,787) (114,417) PRESENT SURPLUS/DEFICIT (13,867,544) (1,741,105) (8,766,417) LOSSES INCURRED NOT YET (14,979,237) (28,295,428) (51,500,564) REPORTED (IBNR) (AS OF 6/30/81) FUND YEAR: TOTALS FEES PAID $45,821,340 INTEREST EARNED 14,083,262 ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES (1,113,006) NET FUNDS AVAILABLE 58,791,596 TO PAY LOSSES LOSSES PAID TO DATE (31,353,872) INDEMNITY EXPENSES (1,837,057) RESERVED LOSSES (32,861,956) RESERVED EXPENSES (1,067,055) PRESENT SURPLUS/DEFICIT (8,328,344) LOSSES INCURRED NOT YET (107,813,487) REPORTED (IBNR) (AS OF 6/30/81) Total fees paid during the Fund Year + Investment Income attributable to the Fund Year Expenses allocated to that Fund Year Amount paid on claims for that Fund Year Amount reserved for all known claims for that Fund Year. The Department entered orders levying the assessments on January 13, 1982; January 22, 1982; February 1, 1982; and February 17, 1982. The parties to this proceeding stipulated that the assessments entered by the Department for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 are to be considered to be proposed agency action as to such parties. The Department limited the amount assessed against any physician member to an amount equal to the annual membership fee paid by the physician for the year giving use to the assessment. According to the "orders" of the Department for the Fund year 1977- 1978, Class III physicians' share of the assessment, based upon the assessment formula utilized, was in excess of the amount of membership fees paid by that group, and the balance was spread over the rest of the classes of health care providers. According to the "orders" of the Department for the Fund year 1978- 1979, Class I, II, and III physicians' share of the assessment, based upon the assessment formula utilized, was in excess of the amount of membership fees paid by those groups, and the balance was spread among those health care providers described in Section 768.54(1)(b)l.,5.,6., and 7., Florida Statutes. The Department, by order dated June 9, 1978, denied the Fund's request for additional fees for the year 1978-1979. In April 1981, at the request of the Department, the Fund filed a "Retrospective Rating Plan." This plan provided that at such time as the Fund dropped below 25 percent of the original fees paid in any fund year an assessment would be triggered. The plan further provided for the assessment to be based upon all settlements or final judgments entered but unpaid at the time of the assessment, and all reserves established by the Fund at the time of the assessment. This "Retrospective Rating Plan" was approved by the Department, but not adopted pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Although the Fund sought to amend the plan both before and after the assessments now at issue, the original plan remained in effect at all times material to this cause. Although Petitioners have not disputed the amount of the reserves set by the Fund, such reserves constitute a substantial portion of the assessment amounts requested by the Fund. The Department has not made any evaluation of the accuracy of the case reserves, nor has the Department made any analysis of the method employed by the Fund in setting case reserves. There was some evidence that the cash shortages experienced by the Fund for the Fund years 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 may have been caused in part by the manner in which the Fund has paid claims. In 1976 the Florida Legislature limited the amount which the Fund could payout on claims to $100,000 per person, per year. In addition, the law provides that reasonable attorneys' fees and costs shall be paid to a successful claimant within the first 90 days following a judgment or settlement. In most instances, the Fund does not inquire into the fee arrangement between plaintiffs and their attorneys. Moreover, no claim for attorneys' fees is required to be submitted to the Fund or the trial court to set a reasonable percent fee for such services. The Fund has indicated that for claims paid for the Fund years 1977-1978 and 1978-1979, the Fund simply assumed that attorneys' fees and costs equalled 40 percent of the amount of the settlement or judgment. In most cases, the Fund does not consider any portion of the attorneys' fees as having been paid by the primary insurance carrier. In some instances, it appears that payments made by the Fund may have disregarded the $100,000 per person, per year payout limitation, and in other instances the Fund has been ordered to pay amounts in excess of the statutory limit and has not pursued an appeal of such orders. In still other instances the Fund has purchased annuities to fund settlements or judgments, the cost of which annuities exceeded the $100,000 payout limitation. The Fund does not consider such payments to be subject to the payout limitation although no rights of ownership in the annuities are retained by the Fund. It is possible that the cumulative effect of these practices has been significant. Petitioners adduced evidence estimating "excess payments" by the Fund for 1977-1978 over the statutory limit could be as high as $2,684,737. For the Fund year 1978-1979 these "excess payments" could be as high as $4,827,690. Under the Department's application of Section 768.54, Florida Statutes, no physician member will again be assessed for the Fund years 1977- 1978 and 1978-1979. Yet, based upon the latest estimates by the Fund's consulting actuary, additional claims for those two years which have not yet been reported could reach as high as $22,949,472. Under the Department's construction of the statute, hospital members will have to pay all of these additional losses, if the actuary's projections prove correct.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation for profit located at 1933 Commonwealth Lane, Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. At all times pertinent to this case Petitioner has operated a business in Florida. Respondent is a Florida state agency. Its duties include the administration of Community Development Block Grants in Florida, (hereinafter referred to as CDBG). Petitioner requested Respondent to reimburse money related to administrative services which Petitioner provided to Okaloosa County, Florida related to a CDBG. The petition for those monies was filed in February, 1993. The request for reimbursement was in the amount of $43,274.92. Respondent denied that request. In turn, by opportunity provided by Respondent, Petitioner sought an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to challenge Respondent's preliminary agency decision denying the request for reimbursement. The case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings to assign a hearing officer to conduct a formal hearing to resolve the dispute between Petitioner and Respondent. The administrative proceeding concerning the reimbursement claim was considered in the case Clark, Roumelis & Associates, Inc., v. State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs, Respondent, DOAH Case No. 93-1306. At the time Petitioner initiated the action to seek reimbursement and was afforded the point of entry to contest the preliminary action denying the reimbursement request, Petitioner employed no more than twenty-five (25) full- time employees and had a net worth of not more than $2 million dollars. Following a formal hearing a recommended order was entered by the undersigned which recommended that Petitioner be paid $43,274.92. The recommended order was entered on September 29, 1993. In turn, Respondent's final order dated December 28, 1993 denied the petition for reimbursement. Petitioner took an appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, Case No. 94-0151. In an Opinion filed February 16, 1995, the First District Court of Appeal decided in favor of Petitioner by reversing Respondent's final order and remanding the case. Respondent sought rehearing and rehearing on en banc which was denied on March 24, 1995 by the First District Court of Appeal. Respondent sought further review before the Florida Supreme Court, Case No. 85,581, which denied that review by not accepting jurisdiction. That decision by the Florida Supreme Court was made on September 6, 1995. On September 13, 1995, Petitioner filed a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Through that action Petitioner sought the reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs associated with DOAH Case No. 93-1306 and the appeals that followed the December 28, 1993 final order denying the reimbursement. Contrary to the requirements set forth in Section 60Q-2.035(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code, Respondent did not file a response to the petition within twenty (20) days of the filing of the petition seeking reimbursement attorney's fees and costs. Neither party has sought an evidentiary hearing for the Division of Administrative Hearings to consider Petitioner's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs. Therefore this case has proceeded without an evidentiary hearing. Rule 60Q-2.035(7), Florida Administrative Code. In that setting Respondent is deemed to have waived its opportunity to contest whether the attorney's fees and costs claimed are unreasonable; whether Petitioner is not a prevailing small business party in DOAH Case No. 93-1306; whether Respondent's actions in denying Petitioner's claim for monetary reimbursement related to administrative services provided to Okaloosa County, Florida in the CDBG was a decision which was substantially justified in law and fact; whether circumstances exist which would make the award of attorney's fees and costs unjust and to present the defense that the Respondent was only a nominal party in DOAH Case No. 93-1306. See Rule 60Q-2.035(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Consistent with Rule 60Q-2.035(7), Florida Administrative Code the following additional facts are found for or against the award of attorney's fees and costs, based upon the pleadings and supporting documents in the files and records in the Division of Administrative Hearings: Petitioner is a small business party and a prevailing small business party in the matters considered in DOAH Case No. 93-1306 and the court appeals that followed. Petitioner's attorney has submitted an affidavit claiming, "In the administrative proceedings of this action, 140.8 hours were expended to the date of Respondent's Final Order of December 28, 1993. Total Fees: $21,120.00." Petitioner's attorney has submitted an affidavit claiming, "In the administrative proceedings of this action, $2,141.78 in costs were incurred to the date of Respondent's Final Order of December 28, 1993." Petitioner's attorney has submitted an affidavit claiming, "In the appellate proceedings in this action (First District Court of Appeal Case No. 94-0151 in Florida Supreme Court, Case No. 85,581), 79.0 hours were expended and $310.66 in costs were incurred to the date of the Supreme Court's denial of September 6, 1995. Total Fees: $13,258.00. Total Costs: $310.66." The affidavits submitted by Petitioner concerning the claim for attorney's fees and costs incurred to the date of Respondent's final order of December 28, 1993, failed to adequately " . . . reveal the nature and extent of the services rendered by the attorney as well as the costs incurred in preparations, motions, [and] hearings . . . in the proceeding" by "itemizing" the claim. Section 57.111(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes. By contrast, the attorney's affidavit filed for attorney's fees and costs in the appellate proceedings was adequate to identify services rendered by the attorney and costs incurred related to appeals in the proceeding. Section 57.111(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes. The amount of attorney's fees and costs for appellate proceedings is within the $15,000.00 cap for recovery of attorney's fees and costs as set forth in Section 57.111(4)(d)2., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Peace River Center for Personal Development (herein Petitioner) is a community service center that offer services to clients who are victims of crimes. Petitioner has been awarded VOCA funds in the past by Respondent. Pursuant to the contract with Respondent, Petitioner was advised that VOCA funds were awarded specifically and that renewal was not automatic but would be considered each funding year. The contract and the VOCA guidelines grant Respondent the discretion to renew or not renew funding requests By letter dated March 23, 1994, Respondent advised Petitioner that its VOCA contract was expiring on June 30, 1994. Petitioner was also advised that its contract may or may not be renewed for an additional year depending on the outcome of a program evaluation and the availability of VOCA funds. In the March 23, 1994 letter to Petitioner, Respondent advised Petitioner that federal VOCA funding to Florida for the 1994/95 fiscal year had been reduced and the reduction would be passed on to applicants. The issuance of renewal funds for the 1994/95 VOCA contracts were based on three criteria, (1) the grant renewal requests, goals and objectives, and budget; (2) an evaluation of the VOCA program's effectiveness in serving victims of crime; and (3) the availability of funds. For fiscal year 1993/94, Petitioner received $55,000 in VOCA funds. Those funds were to assist with the provision of services to adult sexual abuse and domestic violence victims. Petitioner submitted documentation in support of its initial VOCA funding request and indicated that part of its funding would be used to hire a coordinator therapist and a child care advocate. However, during the course of the 1993/94 fiscal year, Petitioner did not fill those positions until the second half of the year based on delays that it experienced in building a new facility. As a result, a portion of the VOCA funds lapsed. Because of those delays, a contract amendment was executed by the parties allowing the lapsed money, which would have been spent for those professional positions, to be used for furniture and supplies. Based on the modification, revised goals were established. Thus, Petitioner set out to serve only 20 children in the child care unit instead of the 60 as noted in the funding request and to provide only 300 hours of child care to children of domestic violence victims instead of the 1000 hours as requested. The modification was an effort to maximize funding in the interest of the community for the 1993/94 fiscal year. Respondent established a procedure for evaluating all applicants for VOCA funding grants in 1994/95. This procedure included forwarding a packet of information which was sent to all applicants. The packet included a cover letter, instructions, a check list and various forms to be completed. As noted, the federal VOCA grant to Respondent was reduced by 5 percent for fiscal year 1994/95. Although Respondent's staff initially recommended to the Attorney General that all VOCA grants be reduced by 5 percent, Respondent reconsidered and decided that it would be more appropriate to evaluate each program to determine which programs were more efficient and were providing the most needed services to the communities. Respondent also reviewed those programs which provided services that were offered by VOCA monies and were achieving the goals and objectives that were originally stated in the funding request. The Respondent implemented this procedure and in doing so, set up a competitive process to rate each of the 48 existing VOCA grantees. To be awarded VOCA funds, the applicants were initially requested to submit renewal applications. Secondly, Respondent solicited comments from community representatives concerning the performance of the grantee over the preceding fiscal year and evaluated those comments. Next, Respondent reviewed and analyzed the funding by the internal monitoring system that was in place at the time. Utilizing this procedure, the grant managers within Respondent's office reviewed their internal reviews, evaluated the monitoring report of the agency that they had prepared including monthly reimbursement requests and any communication or correspondence that had been entered into between the agencies. Respondent's input from the community centered around the performance of the grantees. In measuring their performance, Respondent attempted to get at least three certifiers from persons in the community who worked with, or were familiar with, the grantees. Respondent selected three of the certifiers that had originally certified the grantee program prior to the award of the first VOCA grant and sent forms to those entities. In addition, Respondent attempted to get two additional certifiers, the state attorney's office or local law enforcement, to participate in the certification process. This second group of certifiers was contacted by telephone. In Petitioner's case, only three certifications were submitted. Respondent reviewed those written certifications and rated Petitioner. One certifier observed that Petitioner had insufficient staffing, that waiting periods were too long for victims to get in and that rape crisis volunteers needed to be matched in age with rape victims. That certifier did not intend for her review to impact adversely upon Petitioner's VOCA grant request although she stood by the representations made in the certification. The next certifier related that Petitioner displayed a program weakness in that victims of domestic violence were required to attend the same domestic violence treatment program class as the abuser or pay an additional $200 to attend a different treatment program. She also noted that certain child care victims were not assisted during court appearances, which was an area that Petitioner specifically noted that it would provide services under the VOCA grant. The next certifier related that Petitioner had a number of weaknesses in its program, albeit unspecific, and that she was familiar with the quality of services that Petitioner rendered with VOCA funds since February of 1994. Upon receiving all of the certification information, Respondent compiled a report and ranked each applicant by assigning a numerical value to each applicant. The ranking was based on the totality of the responses received by Respondent. All of the applicants were rated and based on those ratings, their VOCA grant applications were either renewed or not renewed. Of the 48 applicants evaluated, 45 were funded in whole or in part based on their numerical ranking and 3 requests were not funded, including Petitioner's request. Of all the applicants, Petitioner was ranked 48th or last. Specifically, Petitioner was advised of the non-renewal by Respondent in a June 10, 1994 letter that: This decision was based on an internal performance evaluation and upon performance evaluations of your program by agencies and organizations within your community. A major factor in the non-renewal determination was the administration of the VOCA funds, resul- ting in hiring delays, causing a de-obligation of funds and unnecessary waiting lists for crime victims. The effectiveness of services to your community was also a major factor in not offering your agency a renewal contract. Finally, Respondent's chief of advocacy and grants management of the Attorney General's office, Marcie Davis, was formerly employed in a position where she answered a toll-free information line to assist victims of crimes. Ms. Davis recalled an attempt, by her, to get counselling for a child who was a victim of domestic violence in Petitioner's service area (his mother was murdered by her boyfriend) during the 1993/94 fiscal year. Ms. Davis was unable to get services from Petitioner for that child due to its waiting list - a period of eight to thirteen weeks. Respondent's denial of Petitioner's application for VOCA funds was a non-renewal and was not a termination for cause. Respondent utilized sound discretion in awarding the VOCA funding to the various grantees. There was no evidence that the ranking of any grantee, including Petitioner, was either arbitrary or capricious.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to reverse the discretionary decision made to deny Petitioner's request for VOCA funding for the 1994/95 fiscal year. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraph 4, rejected, not probative, paragraph 5 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraphs 11-13, Recommended Order. Paragraph 7, rejected, speculative and not probative. Paragraph 9, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, Paragraphs 9 and 10, rejected contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraphs 12 and 17, Recommended Order. Rulings on Respondent's proposed findings of fact Paragraph 11, rejected, irrelevant and not probative. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis Eshman, Esquire 1745 Highway 17 South Bartow, Florida 33830 M. Catherine Lannon, Esquire Gregory A. Chaires, Esquire Office of the Attorney General PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Honorable Robert Butterworth Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, Petitioner forfeited his retirement benefits under the City of Longwood's (City's) Police Officers' and Firefighters' Pension Trust Fund (Pension Fund) by having pled nolo contendere to felony counts of burglary with assault/battery while armed (firearm) and aggravated assault with a firearm while on duty.
Findings Of Fact The City is a small municipality in southwestern Seminole County lying just north of Altamonte Springs and west of Winter Springs. Petitioner was employed as a patrol corporal by the City Police Department and was a member of the Pension Fund. On January 29, 2011, while on duty, Petitioner was involved in an incident at a residence in the City where his former wife, Kimberly Zeh, also a police officer and then separated but not yet divorced from Petitioner, was temporarily living with a friend, Carol Ericson. At the time of the incident, Petitioner was on duty, in uniform, and in possession of City issued equipment, including a firearm. Around 4:00 p.m. that day, Petitioner drove to the residence in his police cruiser and first attempted to telephone his wife, then rang the door bell, and finally knocked on the door. When there was no response, without permission Petitioner entered the dwelling through a sliding glass door in the kitchen. He did not have a warrant relating to the residence and there were no exigent circumstances that warranted his entry into the residence. Petitioner's mannerisms upon entering the home demonstrated and were consistent with the emotion of anger. After entering the dwelling, Petitioner observed his former wife "walk[ing] across the hallway partially dressed" and Bennett Feld in the bedroom. Mr. Feld is a physician assistant then employed by the Zeh's family physician. Petitioner believed Mr. Feld was having an affair with his wife. Petitioner drew his service weapon, entered the bedroom, and pushed Mr. Feld against a wall. He then pointed his service weapon at Mr. Feld's head and asked: "Do you think you're going to take my wife?" He also stated that if his former wife did not move back home then three dead bodies would be found at the residence. After holstering the weapon, he struck Mr. Feld in the face. Prior to leaving the residence, Petitioner requested that his former wife return home and stated that the incident that just took place would be forgiven. On March 1, 2011, an Information was filed in State of Florida v. John W. Zeh, Case No. 2011-00503-CFA, in the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Seminole County, charging Petitioner for the incident occurring on January 29, 2011. In relevant part, the Information states: Count I: In that John W. Zeh, on or about January 29, 2011, in the County of Seminole and State of Florida, did violate F.S. 810.02(1) by knowingly entering or remaining in a dwelling, the property of Carol Ericson as owner or Kimberly Zeh as custodian, with the intent to commit an offense therein, and in the course of committing the burglary made an assault or battery upon Kimberly Zeh and/or Bennett Feld, and during the commission of the burglary John Zeh was in actual possession of a firearm, contrary to Florida Statute 810.02(2)(a), 810.02(2)(b) and 775.087. (1 DEB FEL, PBL). * * * COUNT IV: In that John W. Zeh on or about January 29, 2011, in the County of Seminole and State of Florida, while in possession of a firearm, did intentionally and unlawfully threaten by word or act to do violence to the person of Bennett Feld, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, which created well-founded fear in that such violence was imminent, and further did commit the assault with a handgun, a firearm or deadly weapon, contrary to Florida Statutes 784.021(1)(a) and 775.087(2). (3 DEG FEL). On October 11, 2011, Petitioner, represented by counsel, entered a plea of nolo contendere to, in relevant part, the following: (1) burglary with assault/battery while armed in violation of sections 810.02(2)(b) and 775.087(1)(a); and (2) aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of section 784.021(1)(a). On January 4, 2012, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of the above crimes and was sentenced accordingly. After the incident, Petitioner voluntarily resigned from his position as a City police officer. Upon becoming aware of Petitioner's plea, the Pension Fund initiated proceedings to determine whether Petitioner's pension fund benefits should be forfeited pursuant to chapter 112 and/or the Pension Fund's terms and conditions. On October 15, 2013, the Pension Fund conducted a probable cause hearing resulting in the determination that Petitioner's rights and benefits be forfeited under the Pension Fund. Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the Notice of that decision was sufficient to apprise him of the intended action. The Notice precipitated the filing of Mr. Zeh's request for a hearing. Paragraphs A.-G. of section 21 of the Pension Plan are identical with section 112.3173(2)(e), cited in the Conclusions of Law, so the Plan provisions will not be restated here. Like the cited statute, subsection (2) of section 21 provides in part that "[c]onviction shall be defined as . . . a plea of guilty or nolo contendere."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees for the City of Longwood Police Officers' and Firefighters' Pension Trust Fund enter a final order determining that Petitioner has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Pension Fund, except for the return of his accumulated contributions as of the date of his termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Jamison Jessup 557 Noremac Avenue Deltona, Florida 32738-7313 Scott R. Christiansen, Esquire Christiansen & Dehner, P.A. Suite 107 63 Sarasota Center Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34240-9385 Christopher R. Conley, Esquire Fishback, Dominick, Bennett, Ardaman, Ahlers, Langley & Geller, LLP 1947 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789-1834
The Issue Whether the Notice of Change to proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a) of Respondent is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, under Subsection 120.56(1)(c), Florida Statutes, because the proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious and because Respondent has failed to follow rulemaking procedure or requirements in attempting to change its proposed rule.
Findings Of Fact The undisputed material facts are as follows: Carrie Johnson is the maternal grandmother and caretaker of Jevon Kyshan Evens, aged 17, and Willard Cody Sanders, aged 15. Ms. Johnson and her grandchildren live at 806 E. James Street, Tampa, Florida 33603. Ms. Johnson has court-ordered custody of both of her grandchildren. During all times relevant to these proceedings, Jevon Kyshan Evens was a minor child. Ms. Johnson currently receives a maximum of $637 in Supplemental Security Income (hereafter "SSI") subsistence disability benefits. She gets governmental housing assistance. She also gets TCA for both grandsons to help her care for them. For her two grandsons, the most Ms. Johnson is eligible to receive in TCA is a grant of $241 each month. Respondent's records show that, at least as early as 1992, Jevon lived with Ms. Johnson. At one time, Jevon went to live with his natural mother. However, Jevon moved back in with his grandmother, Carrie Johnson. Respondent charged Jevon's natural mother with an overpayment of $2,562 in TCA benefits. Respondent reduced Petitioner's cash assistance benefits as a means to recover the outstanding cash assistance overpayment claim established against the mother. The authority cited for Respondent's action was Florida Administrative Code Rule 65A-1.900, which implements Section 414.41, Florida Statutes. Prior to October 1, 2007, Respondent began to collect Jevon's mother's overpayment by reducing the amount of TCA it gave to Carrie Johnson for Jevon. Respondent recouped at least $369 of Jevon's mother's overpayment from Jevon's temporary assistance between 2005 and the end of 2007. Respondent continued to reduce Ms. Johnson's TCA benefits to recoup Jevon's mother's overpayment until the end of December 2007. Effective October 1, 2007, however, Respondent changed its cash assistance program's benefit recovery policy based on a different interpretation of Subsection 414.41(1), Florida Statutes. Prior to October 1, 2007, all participants in the cash assistance program at the time an overpayment occurred were identified as a "responsible person" for purposes of repayment of a cash assistance overpayment claim. However, as of October 1, 2007, the meaning of "responsible person" was changed by making "adults" the only group of people who could be responsible for repaying cash assistance overpayment claims. Therefore, it excluded recovery of cash assistance overpayments from minors. Consistent with the new policy concerning "adults" and "responsible persons," Respondent voluntarily restored cash assistance benefits to currently active cash assistance households that contained a minor child in the assistance group if the household's cash assistance benefits had been reduced to recover repayment of an outstanding overpayment cash assistance claim. The restoration period covered October 1, 2007, through December 31, 2007. Petitioner's household was a benefactor of Respondent's decisions to restore the cash assistance benefits for the months of October and November, 2007. Although Respondent paid Ms. Johnson supplemental TCA to offset the benefits it recovered in October and November 2007, Respondent did not return to Jevon or Carrie Johnson any of the money that it kept from Jevon's cash assistance prior to October 1, 2007, in order to recoup his mother's overpayment. Carrie Johnson is substantially affected by the Proposed Rule and, thus, has standing in this challenge. On December 14, 2007, Respondent published Notice of Development of Rulemaking with the stated purpose of "align[ing] . . . policies for recovery of overpayment in the public assistance programs." On March 7, 2008, Respondent published Notice of Proposed Rule stating that "the proposed rule aligns policies for recovery of overpayment in the public assistance programs. . . . The proposed rule amends language about who is responsible for repayment of overpayment of public assistance benefits." The operative date of October 1, 2007, was set forth in the second sentence of the proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a) ("Cash assistance benefits will not be paid to offset recovery prior to October 1, 2007, from individuals who were children in the overpaid assistance group"). Petitioner alleged that the operative date of October 1, 2007, was arbitrary and capricious. Proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a), as published on March 7, 2008, reads, in its pertinent parts, as follows: * * * Persons Responsible for Repayment of Overpayment. Persons who received AFDC and cash assistance overpayments as an adult shall be responsible for repayment of the overpayment Cash assistance benefits will not be paid to offset recovery prior to October 1, 2007 from individuals who were children in the overpaid assistance group. * * * (e) For the purpose of this rule, an adult is defined as: Eighteen (18) years of age or older, A teen parent receiving assistance for themselves as an adult, An emancipated minor, or An individual who has become married even if the marriage ended in divorce. (Underlining in original) The summary section of the proposed rule states that it ". . . amends language about who is responsible for repayment of overpayment of public assistance benefits. . . ." The purpose and effect of the proposed rule making is the alignment of policies for recovery of overpayment in the public assistance program. Subsection 414.41(1), Florida Statutes, reads, in its pertinent parts, as follows: 414.41. Recovery of payments made due to mistake or fraud. -- (1) Whenever it becomes apparent that any person . . . has received any public assistance under this chapter to which she or he is not entitled, through either simple mistake or fraud on the part of the department or on the part of the recipient or participant, the department shall take all necessary steps to recover the overpayment. Recovery may include Federal Income Tax Refund Offset Program collections activities in conjunction with Food and Consumer Service and the Internal Revenue Service to intercept income tax refunds due to clients who owe food stamp or WAGES debt to the state. The department will follow the guidelines in accordance with federal rules and regulations and consistent with the Food Stamp Program. The department may make appropriate settlements and shall establish a policy and cost-effective rules to be used in the computation and recovery of such overpayments. (Emphasis added.) Following the filing of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Final Order on the Second Petition, Respondent moved to delete the contested sentence Petitioner objected to. Thereafter, Respondent's Notice of Change was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly striking the sentence which read: ". . . [c]ash assistance benefits will not be paid to offset recovery prior to October 1, 2007, from individuals who were children in the overpaid assistance group. " Following publication of the Notice of Change, the Third Petition was filed, in which Petitioner seeks a determination that the Notice of Change, the scheduled public hearing, and Respondent's intent to change the language of proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, as originally published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, by deleting a sentence constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See § 120.52(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007) At no time at any public hearing on proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a) was testimony given suggesting that the sentence challenged by Petitioner in proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a) should be placed in a rule other than Rule 65A-1.900. Respondent did not receive any written material or objections from the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) advising Respondent that the challenged sentence should be moved from Rule 65A-1.900. When Respondent submitted documents to JAPC concerning a Notice of Change to Proposed Rule 65A-1.900, no reason for the change was included in these documents. JAPC wrote to Respondent and asked the agency to explain the reason for the Notice of Change. Respondent has not responded to JAPC's request for an explanation of the reason for the Notice of Change. There is no written record of JAPC instructing Respondent to hold a public hearing to discuss the Notice of Change. Respondent published a Notice of Rule Development to amend Florida Administrative Code Rule 65A-4.220. The draft text of the proposed rule was published and a public hearing was held on October 8, 2008. Following the public hearing, a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of Proposed Rule 65A-4.220 was filed October 20, 2008 (hereafter "Fourth Petition"), and assigned DOAH Case No. 08-5227RP.
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Petitioner qualifies for a certificate of exemption as a charitable organization within the meaning of Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes. 1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located in Winter Park, Florida. Petitioner operates 10 additional offices throughout Florida. Petitioner is a non-profit corporation for purposes of the federal income tax. Petitioner obtained an exemption from federal income tax in accordance with Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner is engaged in the business of providing financial counseling services to the general public. Financial counseling services include debt consolidation, debt management, financial counseling, and budgeting. Debt consolidation services are those in which Petitioner negotiates a payment plan between its clients and the clients' creditors. Debt management services are those in which a client makes one payment to Petitioner and Petitioner disburses the client's money in multiple payments to the client's various creditors. Financial counseling involves assistance in the management of client cash flow and the avoidance of default on client debts. Budgeting services are incidents of the other services. Petitioner does not provide its services free of charge. Petitioner derives its revenue from client fees and payments from creditors for collection and remittance on debts owed by clients. Client fees make up approximately 25 to 35 percent of Petitioner's revenues. Creditor payments make up approximately 65 to 75 percent of Petitioner's revenues. Client fees consist of a $20 registration fee and a monthly fee of up to $15 per month for disbursing payments to creditors. The amount of the monthly fee is determined at the discretion of Petitioner's counselors based on such factors as the total debt, number of creditors, nature of the bills, and the ability of the client to pay. Petitioner's counselors are instructed to offer services to anyone who requests it without charge. Counselors have the authority to waive the $20 registration fee in particular cases. Clients are required to sign a service agreement in which they employ Petitioner to represent them in negotiating with creditors and making payments required under the terms of a negotiated plan. A client who does not pay monthly payments required under a negotiated plan for three months is dropped as a client. Client funds are deposited into a regular checking account maintained by Petitioner. The client checking account is separate from Petitioner's checking account but does not pay interest on client funds. Petitioner has approximately 3,000 clients in Florida. The annual income of Petitioner's clients ranges from $6,000 to $120,000. 2/ Approximately 73 percent of client creditors are credit card companies, finance companies, and medical groups. The remaining 27 percent are other creditors. Approximately half of the clients' creditors pay Petitioner for collecting money from their debtors and remitting payments to them. The majority of creditors who pay Petitioner a fee for debt collection pay approximately 10 to 12 percent of the debt amount collected and remitted. Approximately 10 percent of the creditors pay Petitioner 15 percent of the debt amounts collected and remitted. Petitioner does not raise funds for any other charitable organization. Petitioner does not provide volunteers for other charitable organizations. Petitioner is not a member of the National Foundation for Consumer Credit Counseling. Petitioner does not receive any contributions from any charitable or civic organizations, including United Way. Petitioner does not provide any of the services prescribed under applicable state statutes or rules for qualification as a charitable organization. Petitioner does not provide social welfare services and does not provide the services it renders free of charge or at a substantially reduced rate. A reasonable percentage of Petitioner's clients are not persons who are unable to pay, disadvantaged, or who suffer a hardship.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for exemption from sales tax as a charitable organization. RECOMMENDED this 22d day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22d day of September, 1995.
