The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Petitioner was discriminatorily dismissed from her employment by the Respondent on the basis of race and whether she was retaliated against by the Respondent for filing a complaint of discrimination with the City of Jacksonville.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, the University of Florida, is a state university located in Gainesville, Florida. The Respondent, through its Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, operates a Cooperative Extension Service, which maintains a county extension office in each of the 67 counties in the State of Florida. Each of these offices is headed by a county extension director. On September 13, 1991, the Petitioner, Pamela R. Dallis, was hired by the University of Florida as a part-time secretary for the Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program (EFNEP) in the Duval County Extension Office located in Jacksonville, Florida, which is headed by Mr. Thomas Braddock. The Petitioner was hired in a temporary position known as Other Personal Services (OPS). The Petitioner was initially interviewed for a permanent position, but she did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position because she did not achieve the required score (35 c.w.p.m.) on the typing test. The Respondent changed the classification of the position from permanent to temporary in order to be able to hire the Petitioner despite her typing deficiency. As an OPS employee, she did not have permanent status in the position and was not subject to a probationary period or to periodic written evaluations concerning her performance. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Ms. Deborah Patterson, provided the Petitioner training as to the policies and procedures applicable to her position. Specifically, the Petitioner received training concerning data entry, reimbursement of expenses incurred for EFNEP and travel reimbursement vouchers. The Petitioner was also provided assistance concerning computer data entry from another employee in EFNEP. The Petitioner was provided oral counseling concerning deficiencies in her performance on several occasions beginning on January 7, 1992. By June 22, 1992, Respondent considered dismissing the Petitioner from her employment because of her performance deficiencies. Due to budgetary constraints, the decision was made to work more closely with the Petitioner because if she were dismissed, there was no assurance that her position could be filled by another individual. On July 6, 1992, in order to provide closer supervision to the Petitioner, the Respondent moved the Petitioner's work station to a location close to her supervisor's office. Prior to this time, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor had requested to Mr. Braddock that this move be made. Mr. Braddock did not approve the request and recommended that the Petitioner be counseled concerning her work performance. In July, 1992, Mr. Braddock agreed to the move because the Petitioner's performance had not improved despite the performance counseling provided. On July 24, 1993, a few weeks after the Petitioner's work station was moved, she reported to Mr. Braddock an incident that had occurred with a white co-worker, Rachel Fleming. Mr. Braddock spoke separately with each employee and asked for their written description of the incident. There were no other witnesses to the incident. Mr. Braddock received conflicting reports from the Petitioner and Ms. Fleming. The Petitioner stated that on July 24, 1992, after informing Ms. Fleming of her dislike for "chain letters" while talking in the printing room, Ms. Fleming placed a chain letter on the Petitioner's desk with her name on it. The Petitioner scratched her name, placed Ms. Fleming's name on the letter and taped it on Ms. Fleming's desk drawer. The Petitioner stated that she later went to the restroom, and as she was exiting, Ms. Fleming came in, blocked her exit, pushed and grabbed her, and said, "I don't like you no more than you like me, bitch!" Ms. Fleming then allowed her to exit. Ms. Fleming acknowledged in her statement that she had an exchange of words with the Petitioner concerning a chain letter that she had given the Petitioner. Ms. Fleming stated that the Petitioner told her, "This is stupid and so are you." Ms. Fleming also stated that about 15 minutes later, she saw the Petitioner as she was leaving the restroom, asked to speak with her, but the Petitioner "brushed past her" saying nothing. Ms. Fleming grabbed the Petitioner, turned to face her and told her that they did not like each other and to "leave me the hell alone". Ms. Fleming denied pushing the Petitioner or calling her a "bitch". She said she called the Petitioner "a biddy". Based upon the unsubstantiated conflicting reports given by each employee, Mr. Braddock determined that no disciplinary action was warranted and counseled each employee. A few weeks after the incident with Ms. Fleming, the Petitioner filed a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office of the City of Jacksonville on the basis that Ms. Fleming had not been disciplined. After having learned of the complaint, the Petitioner's second level supervisor, Ms. Halusky, advised the Petitioner that the proper avenue for her to file a complaint was through the University's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, not the City of Jacksonville. The City of Jacksonville did not proceed with the Petitioner's complaint because she was not an employee of the City of Jacksonville. The Petitioner never filed a complaint with the University of Florida. Despite the performance counseling and assistance provided to the Petitioner, her performance did not improve. The deficiencies concerning the Petitioner's data entry skills continued. Two reports that were due in September, 1992 at the main EFNEP office in Gainesville were late because the work done by the Petitioner had to be redone. The Petitioner's supervisor decided that the Petitioner's continuing performance deficiencies were causing additional work for the EFNEP staff and, even without the assurance of a replacement, it was better to have the position vacant rather than having to redo the Petitioner's work to correct the mistakes. By letter dated September 10, 1992, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor advised her of her termination effective at the close of business that day. The reason given for her dismissal was that she had not developed in her job as expected and because of performance deficiencies. Sixty-six percent of the employees in EFNEP in the Duval County Office are African American. They serve a clientele that is 75 percent African American. Thus, EFNEP is interested in hiring and retaining African American employees for the program. Three of the individuals who testified at the Petitioner's request are African Americans who work at the Duval County Extension Office. They testified that they had not experienced discrimination in their employment at the Duval County Extension Office. Two of those three employees are in EFNEP. One has been an employee in the office for 23 years, and the other has been an employee for 14 years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are all accepted. The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Pamela R. Dallis 8050 Arlington Expressway #C-401 Jacksonville, FL 32211 Isis Carbajal de Garcia, Esq. Associate General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, FL 32611
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a correction officer for the 16-month period between March, 1981 and July, 1982. She was assigned to the St. Johns County Jail, where her duties included booking and releasing both male and female inmates, taking mug shots, obtaining fingerprints, delivering food and mail, and providing general security. Petitioner satisfactorily completed a one-year probationary period and achieved permanent status. She became aware of her pregnancy in March, 1982, and informed her supervisor of this fact. 1/ She was initially told by her supervisor to report "downtown" for reassignment. However, the officer in charge of that department knew nothing of the proposed change in assignment and sent Petitioner back to the jail. Petitioner then resumed her correctional duties but was assigned exclusively to the booking desk based on her pregnancy. Around May, 1982, Petitioner was reassigned within the jail to the canteen, where her duties were clerical rather than correctional. On May 28, 1982, the jail administrator wrote to Petitioner's physician inquiring as to whether Petitioner could continue to perform correctional duties based on her physical ability and safety considerations. The physician's reply established that her physical ability would permit her to continue working until the date of her confinement, which he anticipated would occur about October 14, 1982. The physician declined to evaluate her condition in terms of job safety. In mid-July, Petitioner was told by her immediate supervisor, Sgt. Threet, that she should take maternity leave. Petitioner declined in the belief that she had a choice in the matter and that she was able to continue working. However, her unwillingness to take leave was not communicated to Captain Janson, who advised her by letter that he was placing her on leave as agreed. A meeting was held to discuss the proposed leave, but apparently the misunderstanding continued. Petitioner reported for work on July 21, 1982 and was directed to leave by her former supervisor, who advised Petitioner that she was no longer on the payroll. Petitioner's apparent termination on July 21, 1982 was confirmed by a letter from the St. Johns County Sheriff dated July 30, 1982 (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). The Sheriff's letter and other after-the-fact statements of subordinate officials indicated their belief that Petitioner and her fetus were in "obvious jeopardy" (Petitioner's Exhibit 2), so long as she continued to have contact with jail inmates. Additional reasons given for her removal were that she could not backup her commands to inmates because of her physical condition, and that she was becoming too large physically to work behind the booking desk (Respondent's Exhibit 1). The lack of any policy with respect to pregnancy and the confusion in this case were evident in the two attempted reassignments of Petitioner prior to her discharge and referral of the matter, at one point, to Petitioner's physician. Both Petitioner and her immediate supervisor, Sgt. (now Lieutenant) Threet are women of small physical stature. They are essentially unarmed while on duty and must rely on outside help if there is a major disturbance within the jail. Lieutenant Threet concedes that she would not be able to overpower a strong male prisoner if confronted by one. Therefore, the physical demands of the correctional officer position must be considered limited. There was no medical evidence presented that indicated Petitioner was unable to perform her assigned duties at the time of her discharge. She was aware of the physical risk to herself and fetus (although the degree of such risk was not established) and accepted this responsibility as a condition of her continued employment. The argument regarding Petitioner's alleged physical difficulty at the booking desk is rejected as pretextual and was not pursued at the hearing. Her alleged inability to backup commands to inmates due to her condition is likewise rejected in that she, as well as her female supervisor, were not at anytime capable of physically enforcing their commands with respect to the large and stronger male prisoners.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order directing that Petitioner be reinstated by Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1984.
The Issue Whether Respondent Department of Corrections (Respondent or the Department) violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes,1/ by discharging Petitioner Theresa Williams (Petitioner) in retaliation for her participation as a witness during the investigation of an alleged discrimination claim brought by another employee.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Corrections is a state agency as defined in chapter 110, Florida Statutes, and an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. At all times material, Petitioner was employed as a nurse at the Department's Lake Correctional Institution (“the Institution”) in Clermont, Florida. She was hired by the Department as a Licensed Practical Nurse effective July 12, 2007. Petitioner was terminated from her position with the Institution in May 2013. At the time of Petitioner's termination, her official title was “Senior Licensed Practical Nurse.” Prior to her termination, the Department provided Petitioner with a letter dated April 16, 2013, advising her of her proposed dismissal and scheduling a meeting (“termination conference”) with the Institution's Warden to discuss the reasons why Petitioner was being considered for termination. The letter was excluded from evidence because it was not timely disclosed as an exhibit by the Department as required in the Order of Prehearing Instructions in this case. Nevertheless, Respondent testified that she attended the termination conference and that, during the termination conference, she was provided, and they discussed, three incident reports against her that she had previously seen. The termination conference was attended by the Institution's Warden, the Assistant Warden, and Dr. Virginia Mesa, the Institution's Chief Health Operator. The incident reports discussed at Petitioner's termination conference included Petitioner's alleged violation on February 8, 2013, of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) for which Dr. Mesa recommended Petitioner’s dismissal; Petitioner's alleged failure on February 8, 2013, to carry out an assignment to log walking canes provided to inmates; and an alleged argument on February 18, 2013, with a supervisor regarding Petitioner's reassignment to process transferred inmates known as "new gains." There is no indication that the termination conference changed the Department's proposed decision to terminate Petitioner. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified and presented evidence designed to prove that the incidents outlined above did not occur. However, following her termination in 2013, Petitioner timely filed a career service system appeal with the State of Florida, Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), contesting her termination. Following an evidentiary hearing and a PERC hearing officer's recommended order in that proceeding, PERC entered a final order on November 6, 2013, providing in its pertinent part: The relevant facts found by the hearing officer relate three separate incidents that led to [Theresa] Williams' dismissal. On February 8, 2013, Dr. Virginia Mesa observed Williams showing Captain Reed, who was the security officer-in-charge of the shift, something in a green file. A green file is the type of medical file kept for each inmate. The green file was open in Williams' hand and Reed and Williams were looking into it. Mesa observed Williams flipping through the file with Reed in the public hallway. The Agency's policy and federal law strictly prohibit prison medical personnel from allowing non-medical staff to see inmate medical records. That same day, Debra Elder, who was a senior health services administrator and new manager, asked Williams to record various information about canes that were issued to inmates and to label each cane with an identifying mark. Williams turned to a co- worker and told her to do it. Elder considered Williams' attitude insubordinate and wrote an incident report as soon as she returned to her office. On February 18, Williams was assigned to be the "sick call" nurse when she reported for her shift at 6:45 a.m. However, she was informed that, if the prison received a significant number of "new gains," she would be re-assigned to assist the two nurses doing that work. "New gains" is the Agency's term for the processing of inmates transferred to the institution from another facility. Around 8:00 a.m., Williams' supervisor, Joyce Isagba, arrived at work. Isagba reviewed the assignments and directed a subordinate to assign Williams to new gains that day. Williams believed Isagba, a relatively new supervisor, had a pattern of changing her assignment from sick call nurse to new gains and did not like it. Williams approached Isagba and questioned why she was being reassigned. Williams and Isagba became loud and argumentative. Other nurses were present in the room. The conversation lasted some time and Williams repeatedly stated that the change of her assignment was unfair and repeatedly wanted to know why she was being reassigned. Isagba told her she was more qualified to do that work and that she did not have to give her reason for her decisions. The dispute lasted several minutes and Williams reluctantly assisted with new gains. Later that day, Williams was sent to sick call to finish that duty. Isagba considered Williams to have been insubordinate and wrote an incident report. Based on these factual findings, the hearing officer concluded that the Agency had grounds to discipline Williams for poor performance, violating the Agency's medical information privacy, and insubordination in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-36.005. He recommended that [PERC] adopt his recommended order and dismiss Williams' appeal. * * * Upon review of the complete record, including the transcript, we conclude that all of the hearing officer's facts are supported by competent substantial evidence received in a proceeding that satisfied the essential requirements of law. Therefore, we adopt the hearing officer's findings. § 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. Furthermore, we agree with the hearing officer's legal analysis of the disputed legal issues, his conclusions of law, and his recommendation. Accordingly, the hearing officer's recommendation is incorporated herein and Williams' appeal is DISMISSED. The hearing officer's Recommendation and PERC's Final Order in the PERC Proceeding, Williams v. DOC, 28 FCSR 284 (2013), were submitted by both parties and received into evidence without objection in this case as Exhibits P-4 and P-5, respectively, and Exhibits R-B and R-C, respectively. The PERC Proceeding involved the same parties as in this case and the allegations in the incident reports discussed at Petitioner's termination conference were actually litigated and determined in the PERC Proceeding. In other words, whether the incidents outlined in those incident reports occurred and are sufficient to support the Department's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment has already been determined.2/ Moreover, Petitioner failed to show, in this case, that the incidents did not occur. Although Petitioner testified that she did not show Captain Reed the inmate's medical chart in violation of HIPAA and introduced Captain Reed's written statement stating that Petitioner did not show him the chart, the evidence adduced at the final hearing showed that when she met with Captain Reed during the incident, she was flipping through papers with the medical chart in her hand. As found in the PERC hearing officer's Recommended Order: Williams violated the Agency's privacy policy when she held an open inmate medical file so a security staff officer could see the inmate's writing and signature. This was not a reasonable procedure to accomplish the task of notifying the officer of a potential security threat to other inmates. There was a real possibility that the sick call slip had been forged. It was unnecessary to show Captain Reed an inmate's medical file to determine if the slip was forged. Williams could have done that herself with the same accuracy as Reed, since neither is a handwriting expert. Williams v. DOC, 28 FCSR 284 (Recommended Order, 08/26/13). Dr. Mesa's testimony in this case was consistent with the hearing officer's finding and is credited. Regarding the other two incident reports, while Petitioner denied asking another to perform her assigned task of logging inmates' canes, she admitted that she delayed performing the task. Petitioner also admitted that she questioned her supervisor, Ms. Insagba, as to why she was being assigned "new gains," that during the incident Ms. Insagba raised her voice, and that they "were both talking at the same time and I guess she was trying to get a point across and I was just trying to ask her why." In addition to the incidents addressed in the three incident reports, during cross examination in this case, Petitioner revealed that she was also disciplined twice in 2012. In August 2012, Petitioner received a record of counseling for insubordination. And in December 2012, Petitioner received a written reprimand for failure to follow instructions. In sum, the record supports a finding that, by May 2013, the Department had cause to terminate Petitioner. Although it has been determined that the Department had cause to terminate Petitioner's employment at the Institution, in this case Petitioner asserts that the real reason for her dismissal was her participation as a witness in a discrimination charge brought by another employee against the Department and Dr. Mesa. The disciplinary incidents supporting Petitioner's dismissal occurred in February 2013, and before. The investigation in which Petitioner participated began in March of 2013 and Petitioner provided testimony in that investigation on April 23, 2013, after Dr. Mesa had already recommended Petitioner’s dismissal and after Petitioner had been notified by the Department that she was being considered for dismissal. Petitioner was dismissed in May 2013. In finding probable cause, the Commission stated in its summary of the Investigative Memorandum: Complainant did not demonstrate that she was harassed or disciplined because of participation in the internal investigation. Complainant provided no evidence of harassment, and she was not disciplined after her protected activity occurred. Respondent admitted that Complainant was disciplined for the alleged HIPAA violation, but this occurred prior to her protected activity. Based on the information received during the investigation, it does appear that Complainant was terminated in retaliation for her participation in the internal investigation. If the alleged HIPAA violation was a true terminable offense, Complainant should have been terminated in February of 2013 when it occurred. Instead, Respondent waited nearly three months to terminate her, which was about three weeks after her protected activity. Additionally, Respondent has a progressive disciplinary policy which it did not follow. The alleged HIPAA violation is Complainant's only documented incident. Respondent also claimed that Complainant was terminated after she was disciplined several times prior to the HIPAA event, yet it could provide no evidence that she had a disciplinary record prior to February of 2013. Unlike the limited information available to the Commission in its probable cause determination, the evidence in the de novo proceeding conducted in this case demonstrated that Petitioner had a number of disciplinary offenses in February that were found by PERC to support her dismissal, and that Petitioner had been written up for two other disciplinary infractions in 2012. Moreover, the showing necessary for a probable cause determination is less than Petitioner's burden to prove discrimination. While there was a delay in Petitioner's termination, the evidence showed that Dr. Mesa recommended Petitioner for dismissal when she wrote up the incident report for the HIPAA violation in February 2013. Although it is evident that management, including the Warden and Dr. Mesa, was generally aware that Petitioner had participated as a witness in another employee's discrimination claim in April of 2013, Petitioner did not show that she was terminated because of that participation. And, while the Department's delay in dismissing Petitioner remained unexplained at the final hearing,3/ that delay, in light of the other facts and circumstances of this case, including Petitioner's numerous disciplinary infractions outlined above, is an insufficient basis to support a finding that Petitioner was terminated in retaliation for her participation in a protected activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSotoBuilding 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2015.
Findings Of Fact On or about July 12, 1993, Petitioner filed a complaint, including attachments, with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) alleging that Respondent had discriminated against him on the basis of sex/gender (male) and marital status (single) in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act. In his complaint, Petitioner states in pertinent part: I am writing to file a FORMAL SEX/MARTIAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT against: 7) Lighthouse Academy at 3701 NE 22nd Avenue, Lighthouse Point, FL 33064. * * * 6) Lighthouse Point Academy - Many times throughout the year I contacted +/or applied for positions at this private school for special education children. Because of their lack of acknowledgement, I question whether or not their hiring practices are discrim- inating. On August 9, 1993, Petitioner filed the same complaint with the U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) but alleging that the discrimination was in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII). On May 23, 1995, the EEOC issued its determination that Respondent had not considered Petitioner's gender or marital status and that no violation of Title VII had been committed. Furthermore, the EEOC notified Petitioner in its determination that he had 90 days in which to file a civil suit in federal district court and that the suit was his exclusive remedy. On or about August 5, 1995, Petitioner requested a formal hearing from the FCHR which had not issued a determination on the complaint filed with it. Petitioner requested a hearing on his claim of discrimination based on gender/sex (male) and marital status (single). On August 14, 1995, Petitioner filed suit in federal district court alleging that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. On April 30, 1996, the federal district court issued a final judgment in Respondent's favor, resulting from cross-motions for summary final judgment. 1/ The court determined that, based upon the motions, the record, and the status of the case, and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Petitioner, Petitioner had failed to raise a genuine issue of fact that he was intentionally discriminated against by Respondent on the basis of sex. In the instant case, at no time material hereto did Respondent make inquiry as to Petitioner's marital status. In the case at hand, at no time material hereto did Petitioner inform Respondent as to his marital status. In the instant case, at no time material hereto did Respondent have any knowledge of Petitioner's marital status.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Steve J. Longariello be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1996.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to discrimination in the work environment by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) due to Petitioner's race, sex, and martial status in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Lince Musgrove Favors, a single African- American female (who has since married), began working for DCF as a Human Services Counselor III with the Aging and Adult Services Program in DCF's Panama City, Florida, office on October 3, 1988. In this capacity, Petitioner occupied Department Position Number 50790. Petitioner's duties involved services designed to help elderly persons remain in the community. One of her colleagues, fellow Human Services Counselor III Rebecca Schwetz, had the duties of implementing the Home Care for the Elderly and Home Care for the Disabled Programs, which focused on finding residential placements for the elderly and disabled in adult living facilities and adult family homes. In September 1995, due to budget cuts and the transfer of certain functions from DCF to the Department of Elder Affairs, a memorandum issued from DCF state headquarters announcing that 134 positions in DCF's Aging and Adult Services Program would be eliminated. District II of DCF, the District in which Petitioner worked, would eliminate 11 of these positions. George Benner, then the Operations and Program Administrator over the Aging and Adult Services Program in one portion of District II, had the responsibility of eliminating four of these positions. Benner, in making this difficult decision, sought to minimize the adverse impact on workers occupying these positions. Accordingly, he selected those positions which were already vacant or which were about to be vacated. As a consequence, Benner’s four choices of positions to be eliminated were the following: a) the position of Sydney Canaday, a white female clerical worker whose position was deemed to be less essential than others; b) the position of John Johnston, a white male who had indicated an interest in finding another position; c) the position of Petitioner who had expressed to Benner and others in the office, inclusive of her immediate supervisor, that she intended to marry and leave District II to find other employment; and d) a vacant position. While Petitioner, in the course of her testimony at hearing, denied saying that she intended to leave her position after her impending marriage, the testimony of her immediate supervisor and Benner that Petitioner intended to get married around the beginning of 1996 and leave District II to live with her new husband, was direct, candid, and credible. The testimony of Petitioner on this point is not credited. Petitioner made numerous attempts to find employment in DCF's District I during the months of October and November 1995. On October 13, 1995, Benner wrote a letter to the district program manager in District I recommending Petitioner for employment there. Benner also telephoned the district program manager with a recommendation for Petitioner. At this time, Benner still believed that Petitioner intended to leave District II and seek employment within District I. On October 31, 1995, DCF notified Petitioner in writing that the effective date of the deletion of her position would be December 29, 1995. The notification letter advised her of her right to request reassignment or demotion. Petitioner submitted a Request for Reassignment or Demotion on November 6, 1995. A Personal Interest Form submitted by Petitioner the same day specified that she was seeking employment in Okaloosa, Santa Rosa, Walton, and Escambia Counties. As the effective date of the position deletion drew near, DCF continued to search for a position for Petitioner. On December 1, 1995, DCF offered Petitioner a Human Services Counselor III position in the Developmental Disabilities Program in the Panama City, Florida, office. Petitioner declined this position because it involved different skills and a different clientele. Petitioner did not explain why she felt that it would be unacceptable to be required to acquire new knowledge and skills. As the December 29, 1995, deadline approached and Petitioner still had no other employment prospects, DCF took unilateral action to preserve Petitioner's employment and reassigned her, effective December 22, 1995, to a Health Services Representative position at the Bay County Public Health Unit. Petitioner received the same pay in the new position as she did in the Human Services Counselor III position. DCF continued to let Petitioner know that it would assist her in finding another position either in District II or elsewhere if she so desired. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever attempted to avail herself of this assistance. Due to legislatively mandated reorganization in the executive branch, the Department of Health was created and Petitioner's position at the Bay County Public Health Unit became a position within the Department of Health at some point subsequent to her reassignment to that position. In July 1999, Petitioner was still employed as a Health Services Representative with the Department of Health. At this time, the Department of Health informed Petitioner that her duties would now include drawing blood samples from the Health Department’s clientele. The Department of Health offered Petitioner training in how to safely draw blood, but she decided to resign instead. She was convinced that she would not be able to safely perform these tasks after receiving training in the proper technique, but she was able to offer no reasons at the hearing to support this belief. Petitioner submitted her resignation on July 19, 1999, effective August 5, 1999. The Department of Health accepted the resignation on July 20, 1999, and Petitioner voluntarily left her employment with the State of Florida on August 5, 1999. No evidence of any kind, direct or inferential, testimonial or documentary, was introduced to establish that DCF or any of its personnel were motivated negatively by concerns of race, sex, or marital status with regard to Petitioner. No pleading has identified with any specificity the type of relief sought. No evidence was introduced at the final hearing to establish what remedy would be required to make Petitioner whole relative to back pay, benefits, or other forms of relief.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Families 2639 North Monroe Street Building A, Suite 104 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Cecile M. Scoon, Esquire Peters & Scoon 25 East 8th Street Panama City, Florida 32401 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its business located in Tampa, Florida. Respondent is a stated agency charged with responsibility for investigating and resolving unlawful employment practices. Its duties and powers are enumerated in Chapter 23, Florida Statutes, the Human Rights Act of 1977. 2. Respondent has adopted Rules 9D-8.06, 8.22(2), 9.03(4), and 9.03(7), Florida Administrative Code. These rules authorize Respondent to issue subpoenas, serve them by registered mail, and enforce them through judicial proceedings. The rules specifically authorize issuance, service, and enforcement of subpoenas in connection with investigations of unfair employment practices. They provide that inferences may be drawn from the failure of a person to provide requested information. . . Linda Parties filed a complaint against Petitioner with the Respondent, alleging sex discrimination by Petitioner. Based upon the complaint, Respondent initiated an investigation. It formally requested information from Petitioner on July 13, 1979. On April 7, 1981, Respondent issued a subpoena in connection with the investigation and served it by registered mail in accordance with its rules. Petitioner objected to the subpoena and has not provided the requested information. Respondent has sought to enforce the subpoena through a "Petition for Enforcement" filed in Circuit Court in Leon County, Florida. Circuit Judge Donald O. Hartwell has entered an Order which provides: This cause came to be heard on the Motion To Dismiss Petition For Enforcement of Investigatory Subpoena filed by the Human Development Center, Respondent. Both parties were represented by Counsel who presented argument to the court. The court being otherwise fully advised enters this its order; therefor it is, Ordered that the service of an investigatory subpoena served by certified mail pursuant to Rule 9D-8.22, Florida Administrative Code is valid service. Such service is not required to be served in accordance with Florida Statutes 48.031 or Rule 1.410(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. It is further, Ordered that the Motion To Dismiss Petition For Enforcement of Investigatory Subpoena is denied. It is further, Ordered that further proceedings to enforce the investigatory subpoena in this cause are stayed pending the ruling of Hearing Officer G. Steven Pfeiffer in Case No. 81-2101RX now set for hearing on October 21, 1981. Respondent has made no determination of reasonable cause to believe that Petitioner has engaged in any unlawful employment practice.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Troy Perry, was denied service at Respondent's, Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, d/b/a Starvin' Marvin, service station because of his race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 39-year-old, African-American male. Respondent operates and maintains an automobile service station in Palm Bay, Brevard County, Florida. On the evening of May 24, 2000, Petitioner attempted to obtain gasoline for his automobile at Respondent's service station. For the preceding two years Petitioner had frequently obtained gasoline at Respondent's service station without incident or any suggestion of racial discrimination. The gasoline pumps at Respondent's service station utilize computers in their operation. On this particular evening, the computers were not functioning properly and, as a result, Rose Locasio, a cashier at Respondent's service station, had announced over a speaker system audible at the gasoline pumps that all customers would have to pre-pay for gasoline purchases. There is no evidence that Petitioner heard this announcement. Ms. Locasio had been an employee of Respondent's service station from January 1998 until July 2000. Her employment is coincident with Petitioner's frequent patronization of the service station. Petitioner removed the gasoline nozzle from the pump and inserted it into his gas tank. He was not able to pump any gas. After waiting a few minutes for the gasoline pump to be activated, Petitioner went into the service station and presented $15 to Rose Locasio. She activated the gasoline pump. At this point, Petitioner questioned Ms. Locasio regarding the requirement that he pre-pay suggesting that he was required to pre-pay because he was black. Ms. Locasio commented that she discriminated against all minorities, blacks, Hispanics, Indians, and whites. Feeling insulted by Ms. Locasio's comment, Petitioner decided he didn't want to purchase gasoline from Respondent's service station and requested his $15 back. Ms. Locasio explained that she could not refund the $15 once the computer had been activated without the station manager's permission. The station manager was not on duty. Petitioner called the police, as did another of Respondent's employees. When the police arrived they effected the return of Petitioner's $15.
Recommendation Based of the Foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner has failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination based on race; therefore, his Petition For Relief should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Susan P. Norton, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A 121 Majorca Avenue, Suite 300 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Troy Perry 2010 Paradise Court Palm Bay, Florida 32905 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent Al Packer Ford, Inc. terminated the employment of Petitioner Woodrow Samuel on the basis of race, which is an unlawful employment practice pursuant to Section 23.167 (1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was discharged from his employment on August 8, 1978 and believes that his discharge was because he is black. Petitioner was hired on April 4, 1978 by the Service Manager for Respondent corporation who had been his supervisor at Dominion Chevrolet in Richmond, Virginia. Petitioner was employed as a quick service mechanic and worked for approximately three (3) monthe. During that time Petitioner's Production was low and at least on two (2) occasions made serious errors in servicing customers automobiles. Once he failed to put in oil, and once he failed to replace brake slices. He received a warning from his employer but was not discharged. Thereafter he was transferred to the Okeechobee Road Used Car Lot as a Lot Man. There he had the opportunity to make more money under a pay plan which did not depend on mechanical work by the job. After two (2) weeks he was transferred to the Respondent's main used car lot on Military Trail under the supervision of George Mills, and his salary was increased by forty (40) dollars per week. Prior to Petitioner's discharge Petitioner's immediate supervisor, George Mills, was on vacation. During this period Petitioner took a used Cadillac for his personal use from the lot in West Palm Beach and drove it to Miami for the weekend. Petitioner had not been authorized by Mills or by anyone else to use the Cadillac, according to the testimony of Mills which is more credible then the testimony of Petitioner. Mills learned of the use of the car by Petitioner after his return from vacation and after it had been scheduled for repairs. Mills stated that Petitioner had been warned not to use vehicles for his private use and, when he learned of the use of the Cadillac, terminated his employment and told him why. Petitioner appealed to his original employer, George Hollifield, who then was the supervisor of Petitioner's direct supervisor, for reemployment but was refused. Use of vehicles from the used car lot by employees of Respondent is allowed as a general company policy only upon specific authorization. A witness, another black man, had seen Petitioner use vehicles on occasion from the lot but did not know whether the use was authorized. About 10 percent of the employees of Respondent are Hispanic or Black, and the stated policy of the business is to employ competent people to make money for the corporation, and race is not a factor or consideration. Petitioner Samuel and Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact, memoranda of law and proposed recommended orders. These instruments were considered in the writing of this order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in or are inconsistent with factual findings in this order, they have been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the complaint and petition he dismissed by the Florida Commission on Human Relations. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Franklin G. Callas, Esquire 125 Worth Avenue, Suite 308 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Norman A. Jackson, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100, Montgomery Building 2652 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas E. Kingcade, Esquire Post Office Box 2755 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Mr. Al Packer Al Packer Ford, Inc. 1530 North Military Trail West Palm Beach, Florida 33403
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was discriminated against on the basis of his race, color, or national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2000).1
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Bamawo is a black male from Nigeria. Mr. Bamawo began working for the Department at the Dade Correctional Institution ("DCI") as a correctional officer in March 1993. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Bamawo was a career service employee whose duties included the care, custody, and control of inmates of the institution. Mr. Bamawo normally worked the third shift, from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. During most of the time Mr. Bamawo was employed at DCI, Captain Scott Pardue, as the third shift supervisor, directly supervised Mr. Bamawo. According to Mr. Bamawo, he and Captain Pardue did not "see eye-to-eye" even though Mr. Bamawo tried to get along with Captain Pardue. The first incident that Mr. Bamawo considers discriminatory occurred in 1995, when Captain Pardue formally disciplined Mr. Bamawo for writing graffiti.3 Mr. Bamawo denies that he wrote the graffiti, and he made a verbal complaint to a superior officer identified as "Colonel Thompson." Mr. Bamawo also asserts that, in 1995, an Anglo corrections officer was promoted to sergeant, and Mr. Bamawo was required to follow his orders. Mr. Bamawo asserted that he made many complaints to Captain Pardue about this sergeant but that Captain Pardue did nothing. Also in 1995, Captain Pardue made two remarks to Mr. Bamawo that Mr. Bamawo considered offensive: On one occasion, Captain Pardue apparently was looking at a picture of an African woman in a National Geographic magazine when he asked Mr. Bamawo if "you people live in houses or sleep in trees"; Mr. Bamawo believed Captain Pardue was making a derogatory comment about Mr. Bamawo's being a native of Africa. Another occasion was at Thanksgiving, when Mr. Bamawo brought a can of corn to a covered-dish lunch; Mr. Bamawo opened the can of corn and set it on the table with the other food, and Captain Pardue asked if this was the way people in Africa ate corn. These remarks caused Mr. Bamawo to be humiliated and embarrassed in front of his co-workers. Mr. Bamawo asserts that Captain Pardue refused to approve his requests for time off the job but would approve time off for Anglo officers. When Captain Pardue refused Mr. Bamawo's requests for time off, Mr. Bamawo asked other captains for approval, and, when they refused to approve his requests for time off, Mr. Bamawo called in sick. Mr. Bamawo recalls that, on one occasion, he was forced to miss an appointment because Captain Pardue ordered him to work overtime. According to Mr. Bamawo, Captain Pardue accused Mr. Bamawo of being a minute late on one occasion and penalized him, although Mr. Bamawo recalls that Captain Pardue did not penalize others for being late. It was Mr. Bamawo's perception while he worked at DCI that, countless times, Captain Pardue changed the work assignments of Anglo officers when they requested a change, but that Captain Pardue never changed Mr. Bamawo's work assignment when he requested a change. Mr. Bamawo believed that he was given the assignments that no one else wanted. On March 21, 2000, Mr. Bamawo was involved in an altercation with Sergeant Frankie Tindall. Mr. Bamawo called Sergeant Tindall "bitch" and threatened to "blow away" Sergeant Tindall when Sergeant Tindall questioned Mr. Bamawo about trash that littered his post.4 On April 23, 2000, Captain Pardue designated Correctional Officer Orol as third-shift supervisor in DCI's north annex "Yard One"; Mr. Bamawo was one of three other correctional officers assigned to Yard One at the time. As designated supervisor, Mr. Orol had the authority to assign tasks to the three other officers. Mr. Bamawo protested Captain Pardue's choice of Mr. Orol because Mr. Orol had been out of the academy only six months; Mr. Bamawo felt that he should have been designated supervisor because he was the senior officer on the shift. Captain Pardue told Mr. Bamawo that he felt more confident with Mr. Orol in the position of supervisor. Mr. Bamawo told Captain Pardue that he was going to file a grievance. At some point during the daylight hours of the third shift on April 23, 2000, Mr. Orol told Mr. Bamawo to complete a check of the perimeter fence, which Mr. Bamawo considered a difficult job to do in the daylight because it was very hot work. Mr. Bamawo refused the order and told Mr. Orol that he would do the fence check when the sun went down. After a time, Mr. Orol called Mr. Bamawo on the radio and told him again to check the perimeter fence; Mr. Bamawo again refused, using a radio shorthand phrase meaning, "Do it yourself." Captain Pardue was monitoring the radio transmission and heard the exchange between Mr. Bamawo and Mr. Orol. Captain Pardue thought that Mr. Bamawo had responded to Mr. Orol in a "nasty" tone of voice, and, fearing that Mr. Bamawo and Mr. Orol might get into a confrontation, Captain Pardue radioed Mr. Bamawo and told him to come to the control room. Captain Pardue took Mr. Bamawo into a copy room and confronted him about his attitude toward Mr. Orol. Mr. Bamawo again complained about Captain Pardue's choice of Mr. Orol as supervisor rather than Mr. Bamawo. During the discussion, Mr. Bamawo became agitated, turned, and walked away from Captain Pardue. Captain Pardue called to him and told him to come back; Mr. Bamawo turned back and approached Captain Pardue with his fists clenched, called Captain Pardue "bitch," and said he would "bust" Captain Pardue.5 At this point, Captain Pardue, fearing for his safety, called Jeffrey Wainwright, who was the acting warden of DCI. After talking with Captain Pardue and Mr. Bamawo, Mr. Wainwright reassigned Mr. Bamawo to the women's facility across the street from DCI. Mr. Bamawo threatened to file a discrimination complaint if Mr. Wainwright did anything to him as a result of the incident with Captain Pardue. Mr. Bamawo was terminated from his employment with the Department on May 4, 2000. Mr. Bamawo appealed his termination to PERC, which found that the Department had just cause to terminate him based on the incidents of March 21 and April 23, 2000. Mr. Bamawo testified that, through the years, Captain Pardue made "countless" derogatory remarks about Mr. Bamawo's race and national origin. At first, according to Mr. Bamawo, he thought that Captain Pardue was joking, but that, eventually, he saw hate behind Captain Pardue's remarks.6 Mr. Bamawo also claims that Captain Pardue gave him bad work assignments; refused to give him days off; and used rookie officers like Mr. Orol to "agitate" him. Mr. Bamawo believes that he was terminated in retaliation for having threatened to file a grievance against Captain Pardue for unprofessional conduct because Captain Pardue designated Mr. Orol as the supervisor on April 23, 2000, and allowed him to give orders to more senior correctional officers. Other than his complaint to "Colonel Thompson" about the graffiti incident in 1995, Mr. Bamawo did not complain during the years he worked at DCI, either verbally or in writing, that Captain Pardue made racist remarks or derogatory remarks about his national origin or that Captain Pardue discriminated against him in any respect. Mr. Bamawo stayed in his job as a correctional officer at DCI because he liked the job, thought everyone was friendly, and liked working with the inmates. He had no problem with anyone on the job except Captain Pardue and Sergeant Tindall.7 Summary The evidence presented by Mr. Bamawo is not sufficient to support a finding that his termination by the Department was motivated by discriminatory intent or retaliatory. Mr. Bamawo failed to present any evidence to support a finding that the Department has ever imposed a lesser penalty on anyone not a black or a person of African origin for having threatened a Department sergeant or captain with violence. Mr. Bamawo has failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that his termination was retaliatory because he had not, at the time he was terminated, filed an employment discrimination complaint; rather, Mr. Bamawo had merely threatened Mr. Wainwright that he would file such a complaint if disciplinary action were taken against him for the April 23, 2000, incident involving Captain Pardue. The evidence presented by Mr. Bamawo is not sufficient to support a finding that he was subjected to continual harassment based on his race or national origin such that his ability to function as a correctional officer was impeded. Although Mr. Bamawo, as a black man of African origin, is a member of two protected classes, he did not present evidence sufficient to establish that he was treated differently from other correctional officers with respect to pay, assignments, time off, or any other aspect of his employment with the Department, and he did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that he was forced to endure an abusive and hostile work environment at DCI. The evidence submitted by Mr. Bamawo is sufficient to establish that, in 1995, Captain Pardue made a remark about Africans sleeping in trees and a remark about the manner in which Africans served canned corn, but, even though Mr. Bamawo was humiliated and embarrassed by these boorish remarks, these two isolated instances of derogatory comments based on race and national origin are not indicative of a pervasively hostile or abusive work environment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief of Oghenerhoro Bamawo. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2003.
