The Issue Whether the Respondent has sufficient general revenue funds to provide the Petitioner with services under the Respondent's Developmental Disabilities Program.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with administering and determining eligibility for services to developmentally disabled individuals pursuant to Florida's Developmental Disabilities Prevention and Community Services Act, Chapter 393, Florida Statutes. Section 393.065, Florida Statutes. The program developed by the Department is known as the Developmental Disabilities Program. Jake is a resident of Miami, Florida, and is four and one-half years of age, having been born October 6, 1997. On October 24, 2000, Jake's parents submitted on his behalf an application requesting that the Department enroll him in its Developmental Disabilities Program and provide him with physical, occupational, and speech therapy services as a developmentally disabled individual.2 The parties stipulated to the following facts: Jake has a rare genetic disorder called "Williams Syndrome," which causes significant developmental delays. Jake also has a significant hearing impairment, which exasperates his developmental delays. Among other developmental delays, Jake cannot walk on his own, is unable to talk, and is unable to respond to verbal requests. Jake requires regular and frequent physical, occupational, and speech therapies, and Jake is eligible to receive these services under the Department's Developmental Disabilities Program. A social worker employed by the Department advised Jake's mother on October 25, 2000, that Jake was eligible for the requested services. The social worker developed a family support plan, which Jake's mother signed on January 12, 2001. Pursuant to the Department's policies, the Department considered Jake a "client" of the Department and eligible for services on the date the family support plan was signed. According to the Department's witness, the funding category at issue in this case is state general revenue funds appropriated by the Florida Legislature and not federal funds. Upon receiving Jake's application for services under the Department's Developmental Disabilities Program, the Department reviewed the request and implemented a prioritization schedule set forth in a Department memorandum dated June 1, 2001. The subject matter of the memorandum is identified as "State Fiscal Year 2001-2002 Spending Plan Implementation Instructions ("Spending Plan")."3 The Spending Plan was developed in accordance with the following directive of the Legislature, which is found in the Conference Report on SB 2000: General Appropriations for 2001-02, May 1, 2001 ("Conference Report"): Funds in Specific Appropriations 374 and 377 are intended to provide Home and Community- Based Services Waiver Services in accordance with a spending plan developed by the Department of Children and Family Services and submitted to the Executive Office of the Governor for approval by November 1, 2001. Such plan shall include a financially feasible timeframe for providing services to persons who are on waiting lists for fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 and those eligible persons who apply for services during fiscal year 2001-2002. Such persons shall be enrolled in the waiver in accordance with the department's policy for serving persons on the waiting list. The Spending Plan relates to the distribution of funds to persons served through the Home and Community-Based Waiver Services program ("Waiver Program"), which is co-funded by the federal government as part of the Medicaid program.4 The Spending Plan establishes five "priority" categories for providing services through the Waiver Program: Persons who were clients as of July 1, 1999; members of the class in the case of Cramer v. Bush; persons not on the original waiting list who are in crisis (an estimated ten new clients monthly, statewide); persons discharged from the Mentally Retarded Defendant Program; and "[p]ersons who have become clients since July 1, 1999, in date order (new waiting list) -- projected to be approximately 6,284 persons remaining to be phased in between March 2002 and June 2002, subject to vacancies on the Waiver and available funding." The Spending Plan further provides that "[i]n order to serve the estimated additional 6,774 individuals who are projected to want and need Waiver services during FY 01-02, enrollment on the Waiver will be phased in as described above." According to the procedure specified in the Spending Plan, a waiting list for Waiver Program services is maintained by the Department's Central Office of the Developmental Disabilities Program, and that office advises the various districts when they may begin providing services to a person on the list. According to the Spending Plan, services are to be provided to individuals on the waiting list "subject to vacancies on the Waiver and available funding." Upon review of his application for services, the Department classified Jake in the fifth category of the Spending Plan as a person who become a client after July 1, 1999, and his name was placed on the waiting list to receive services provided through Waiver Program funding. Although no evidence was presented on this point, it is apparent from the text of the Spending Plan that, in addition to the Waiver Program funding for services to the developmentally disabled, there is a second source of funding for services to these individuals, Individual and Family Supports ("IFS") funding.5 The Department did not provide any indication in its denial letter and it did not present any evidence at the final hearing to establish that the "general revenue funds" at issue were IFS funds. It has been necessary to infer from the record that such is the case.6 Although the Department presented no evidence with respect to Jake's eligibility for services from IFS funds or with respect to the availability of IFS funds to provide Jake with the services for which he is eligible, the Spending Plan provides: "The use of non-Waiver funds (Individual and Family Supports (IFS) budget category) to fund services for additional persons who are awaiting enrollment on the Waiver is prohibited." The only possible inference from the evidence presented by the Department and from the record as a whole is that, notwithstanding the reasons stated in the Department's denial letter in this case, Jake was denied services from IFS funds because he was placed on the Medicaid Waiver Program waiting list.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order finding that Jake Cheskin shall remain on the waiting list for Home and Community-Based Waiver Services under the Developmental Disabilities Program and ordering that Jake Cheskin shall be provided with the physical, occupational, and speech therapy services for which he is eligible as soon as a vacancy occurs or additional funding is available under the Department's Developmental Disabilities Program.8 DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2002.
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Sections 120.68 and 766.311, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. See Section 766.311, Florida Statutes, and Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Carreras, 598 So. 2d 299 (Fla. Ist DCA 1992). The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner and her family are entitled to services on account of her developmental disability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born on September 8, 1981. Seven years ago, she suffered a severe brain injury as a result of five hours of diabetes-induced seizures resulting from low blood sugar. The incident left Petitioner in an entirely dependent state. Presently, at 20 years old, Petitioner has the intellectual development of a two-year-old and requires constant care, seven days a week, 24 hours a day. Petitioner's present condition actually represents a marked improvement from her condition immediately after the seizures and brain injury. Declining to institutionalize Petitioner, her parents have provided the care that Petitioner has needed to regain her abilities to walk and talk (with considerable difficulty) and to use her arms and hands. Despite these dramatic developments, Petitioner still requires as much care as she required immediately after the injury; she cannot, for example, feed herself or maintain continence. Behaviorally, Petitioner presents a considerable challenge due to her nonexistent impulse control and tendency toward explosive outbursts. At 5 feet, seven inches tall and 200 pounds, Petitioner is strong, and she is capable of attacking with unmediated force. Petitioner's father, who is 48 years old, is six feet, one inch tall and weighs 350 pounds. Her mother, who is 42 years old, is at least the size of Petitioner. When infuriated, Petitioner can physically overpower her parents, as well as her 18-year-old and 22-year- old siblings--all of whom have suffered injuries from Petitioner's attacks. Petitioner's father has suffered cellulitis at the site of an injury that he sustained from one of his daughter's attacks. Petitioner has a very limited attention span and frustrates easily. She does not like being closed in, and, when upset, she strikes out. In addition to attacking her caregivers, Petitioner has damaged property in her outbursts. Her father estimates that Petitioner has broken seven motor vehicle windshields--sometimes while the vehicle was in operation. Several times a day Petitioner becomes agitated and engages in physical outbursts. Managing Petitioner's unpredictable and dangerous behavior has placed considerable demands on her parents. Petitioner's father is the senior pastor of North Palm Baptist Church in Miami. Petitioner's mother is an administrative assistant to the Director of Missions of the Miami Baptist Association. Each weekday during the school year, Petitioner leaves home at 6:00 a.m. to ride a bus to her special school, and she returns by bus at 3:30 p.m. Her father must cut short his workday to meet the school bus each afternoon. For respite care, Petitioner's parents seek the assistance of a person capable medically of supervising Petitioner's severe diabetes, such as administering her injections, and capable physically of handling Petitioner's disruptive behavior. Petitioner's father normally sleeps near Petitioner, who wakes up every time her covers come off, which may happen 75 times a night. The intensive, unending care that Petitioner's parents have had to provide their daughter has caused them great stress. For speech therapy, Petitioner's parents seek assistance to remediate Petitioner's extensive verbal deficits. For two years after the incident, Petitioner was nonverbal. Her ability to articulate has slowly improved, but she remains nonverbal at school. For personal services, Petitioner's parents seek the assistance of a person to meet Petitioner when she gets off the bus from school, give her a snack, bathe her, and attend her until her parents come home from work. This person must have the physical capability of ensuring that Petitioner does not injure herself or others during one of her frequent and unpredictable outbursts. Petitioner and her parents moved to Florida from South Carolina in July 2000. Within a month, Petitioner had applied for developmental disability services. However, Petitioner has not been able to obtain general revenue-funded services or Home and Community-Based Waiver services funded by Medicaid. In rejecting Petitioner's request for services, Respondent has relied on two documents: "Developmental Disabilities Home and Community Based Services Waiver Fiscal Year 2001-2002 Spending Plan Instructions" (Spending Plan) and "Developmental Disabilities Program Crisis Identification Tool-- revised 9/2001" (Crisis Identification Tool). Respondent also relies on testimony that Petitioner lacks the funds to provide developmental disability services to all applicants. Although Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner otherwise qualifies for the developmental disability services that she seeks--from both programs--Respondent contends that she does not qualify under the Spending Plan and related documents, which Respondent contends it must apply due to the lack of funds. The Spending Plan states in part: By June 30, 2001, [Respondent] expects to serve 25,002 persons through the Developmental Disabilities Home and Community Based Services Waiver (Waiver). . . . In order to be able to serve the greatest number of persons possible within the legislative appropriation for Waiver services, [Respondent] will implement a number of strategies to ensure that appropriate Waiver services are provided in the most cost-effective manner. . . . * * * Spending Plan priority for FY 01-02: Remaining persons from July 1, 1999 waiting list--350 persons who will be served during July and August 2001. Cramer v. Bush class members--estimated 20 persons who will be served upon request, throughout the fiscal year. Persons who are determined to be [in] crisis who were not on the original waiting list--estimated at 10 persons per month and to be served throughout the fiscal year. Persons discharged from the Mentally Retarded Defendant Program. Persons who have become clients since July 1, 1999, in date order (new waiting list)--projected to be approximately 6,284 persons remaining to be phased in between March 2002 and June 2002, subject to vacancies on the Waiver and available funding. The list of such individuals will be developed at the central office; persons will be served in date order, based on the date the individual became a client. In order to serve the estimated 6,774 individuals who are projected to want and need Waiver serves during FY 01-02, enrollment on the Waiver will be phased in as described above. Compliance with the Spending Plan Compliance with the approved Spending Plan for FY 2001-2002 is required of all Department employees. The Central Office will monitor all enrollment activity and notify districts when an individual has been enrolled on the Waiver, and to proceed with the provision of services. The Central Office of the Developmental Disabilities Program will review and process District requests for assignment of a Waiver slot, based on the District's "crisis" determination. Upon completion of the Central Office review, where the Central Office has confirmed a determination of "crisis", the District will be notified when the individual is enrolled on the Waiver, and to proceed with the provision of services. The use of non-Waiver funds (Individual and Family Supports (IFS) budget category) to fund services for additional persons who are awaiting enrollment on the Waiver is prohibited. Personal Care Assistance Services As required by Medicaid regulations, [Respondent] must require the use of regular Medicaid State Plan services when the individual is eligible to receive the services through the Medicaid State Plan. Provision of Waiver services must also comply with federally approved service definitions. Developmental Disabilities currently provides personal care assistance services to 1,232 children. Some of these children may be eligible under regular Medicaid EPSDT (Early, Periodic Screening, Diagnosis & Treatment) coverage. Medicaid state plan covers Personal Care Assistance for children who are eligible to receive nursing services. Children eligible for personal care assistance under Medicaid state plan must receive the service through this funding. [The ensuing five paragraphs continue to discuss children, the Medicaid state plan, and the Waiver.] New requests for personal care assistance will be assessed first to determine whether Medicaid state plan is appropriate. If this is not appropriate, the need for coverage under the Waiver will be made according to the federally approved service description. * * * Require Use of Waiver Funding, where available Because of limited funding and the need to maximize the use of General Revenue funds by obtaining federally matching funds wherever possible, Individual and Family Supports (IFS) funding is no longer available for persons who are eligible to receive Waiver- funded services, but who have refused services funded through the Waiver. Some people who are eligible have rejected services funded through the Waiver. [Respondent] will offer Waiver services to those individuals. For those who continue to refuse services funded through the Waiver, IFS expenditures will be discontinued due to lack of funding, with appropriate due process notice. Maximize Federal Funding Similarly, effective immediately, all covered Waiver services must be provided through Waiver funding. The purchase of Waiver billable services through the IFS budget category is no longer allowable, unless the Central Office has approved an exception. * * * The legislative proviso language supplied after the hearing by Respondent consists of selections of "Conference Report on SB 2000: General Appropriations for 2001-02--May 1, 2001." The relevant portion states: Funds in Specific Appropriations 374 and 377 are intended to provide Home and Community-Based Services Waiver Services in accordance with a spending plan developed by [Respondent] and submitted to the Executive Office of the Governor for approval by November 1, 2001. Such plan shall include a financially feasible timeframe for providing services to persons who are on waiting lists for fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 and those eligible persons who apply for services during fiscal year 2001-2002. Such persons shall be enrolled in the waiver in accordance with [Respondent's] policy for serving persons on the waiting list. Two other, related documents are relevant. The Crisis Identification Tool identifies several categories of crisis. The first category is a criminal court order. The second category is a danger to self or others, which requires a current exhibition of "behaviors that": result in harm to the person or others that, in turn, creates a life-threatening situation for the person or others or will result in bodily harm to the person or others that will require emergency medical care from a physician if services are not provided immediately. The other categories are "confirmed abuse/neglect," "homeless[ness]," "caregiver unable to give care," and "health issues." Under the unable-caregiver category, the Crisis Identification Tool adds: The individual's current caregiver is expressing extreme duress, is no longer safely able to provide care for the individual due to advanced age, illness or injury and the individual is in immediate need of services in order to remain living with the caregiver or to locate an alternative living arrangement. . . . The remainder of the Crisis Identification Tool warns applicants that there is a waiting list for services in the Waiver program, even for those applicants classified as in crisis. Developmental Disabilities Program Policy Directive PD#01-07, issued September 25, 2001 (Policy Directive), confirms this warning when it warns: With 2001-02 appropriations and the Spending Plan, "[Respondent] will have funding to enroll up to a total of ten persons per month statewide on the Waiver, who are in crisis." Noting that the Crisis Identification Tool will remain in effect until June 30, 2002, the Policy Directive emphasizes that "[t]his policy will clarify the procedures used in determining the ten crisis cases per month statewide in accordance with the 2001-2002 Spending Plan." The Policy Directive describes the procedures for completing and examining a Crisis Identification Tool. The Policy Directive notes that, for applicants posing a danger to self or others, the District's behavioral analyst, local review committee chair, or other appropriate behavior analysis professional must review the Crisis Identification Tool and make a recommendation. After completing its tasks, the District committee sends the Crisis Identification Tool to the Developmental Disabilities central office in Tallahassee. The central office meets one week monthly, through June 2002, to "determine individuals in most critical need." The Policy Directive adds that the "[i]ndividuals who were not selected . . . will be carried forward and reconsidered each month until they are determined to be one of the ten crisis cases for a month or they are served in accordance with the spending plan." In the alternative, the central office may also find that the individual is "not . . . in need of immediate waiver services" and inform the individual of its finding. As noted in the Preliminary Statement, Petitioner seeks developmental disability services in DOAH Case No. 02-1238 and in DOAH Case No. 02-1241. The Developmental Disabilities Hearing Request described in the Preliminary Statement distinguishes between two programs based on funding sources: Medicaid waiver and general revenue. DOAH Case No. 02-1241 requests services under the Home and Community-Based Services Waiver program, in which the federal government has provided Florida with funds, under a waiver of institutionalization requirements, for certain developmental disability services to eligible persons. DOAH Case No. 02-1238 requests services under a state program in which Respondent uses largely, if not exclusively, general revenue funds to purchase certain developmental disability services for eligible persons. The focus of both these cases has not been on Petitioner's general eligibility, but on Respondent's limited funds and Petitioner's eligibility based on spending-prioritization policies that Respondent has adopted and the Legislature has approved. The Spending Plan, Crisis Identification Tool and legislative proviso language approving the Spending Plan all expressly pertain to the Waiver program. The Spending Plan addresses the relationship between the Waiver program with the general revenue-funded program, which is identified at least partly as Individual and Family Supports funding, by warning that persons who have refused Medicaid Waiver-funded services or who are even "awaiting enrollment" in the Waiver program may no longer obtain general revenue-funded services. Under the Spending Plan, Crisis Identification Tool and legislative proviso language, Petitioner is properly denied developmental disability services under the Medicaid Waiver-funded program. In addition to confirming the insufficiency of funds in the Waiver program, these documents demonstrate that Petitioner fails to satisfy a prioritization criterion that could gain her earlier funding. Arguably, Petitioner was entitled to classification as an individual in crisis, either due to her posing a danger to her self or others or due to the "extreme duress" suffered by her parents as caregivers. However, the record permits no basis to overturn the decision of Respondent's central office that, for each month, other crisis applications posed greater urgency. Although the central office should have maintained Petitioner's Crisis Identification Tool for reconsideration each month, the record permits no basis to revisit any of the central office's decisions during the ensuing months, and the term of the procedures governing the use of the Crisis Identification Tool expired at the end of last month. However, the Spending Plan, Crisis Identification Tool, and legislative proviso language do not address the general revenue-funded program. Petitioner is eligible for developmental disability services covered by this program. Respondent's proof of lack of funds in this program is itself insufficient, unsupported by the documentation that accompanies Respondent's same claim as to Medicaid Waiver-funded services.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for covered developmental disability services in DOAH Case No. 02-1238 and denying Petitioner's application for developmental disability services in DOAH Case No. 02-1241. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Reverend Ronald Satterwhite Qualified Representative 8260 Northwest 172nd Street Hialeah, Florida 33015 Hilda Fluriach District 11 Legal Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-1020 Miami, Florida 33128
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in the practice of discrimination against Petitioner when terminating him from employment as a firefighter due to a medical condition.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jonathan Race, was employed by Respondent, Orange County Fire Rescue Department, since January 1989, and worked in the Operations Division as a Lieutenant/EMS Supervisor. In this role, he managed, coordinated, and performed firefighting and emergency rescue services. In the mid-1990s, Petitioner was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation which ultimately resulted, in July 2001, in his undergoing an open heart surgical procedure known as the "MAZE" procedure. Following the open heart surgery, Petitioner had a pacemaker installed in August 2001. Petitioner's cardiologist from 1997 to January, 2005, was Arnold Einhorn, M.D. Barry Portnoy, M.D., is a physician under contract with Orange County to perform annual physical examinations for members of the Orange County Fire Rescue Department. While Dr. Einhorn served as Petitioner's cardiologist, he had periodic conversations with Dr. Portnoy concerning Petitioner's cardiac condition. On May 20, 2003, Dr. Einhorn wrote a letter to Dr. Portnoy in which he stated that Petitioner, "continues to be on medical therapy with beta blockers and Digoxin and his underlying heart rate is in the 30s and this making him dependent on the pacemaker approximately 80% of the time." Dr. Einhorn concluded at that time that Petitioner needed to continue with his medications and use of the pacemaker. Petitioner, concluded, Dr. Einhorn, "is dependent on the pacemaker." On January 16, 2004, Dr. Portnoy conducted an annual physical for Petitioner. On February 6, 2004, Dr. Portnoy stated in his evaluation of Petitioner: "Classification deferred pending additional information. . . . Employee may continue in his/her present duties for no more than 30 days while awaiting further evaluation." On June 4, 2004, Dr. Portnoy completed his evaluation of Petitioner, imposing a restriction of "No functioning as a member of a team or independently where sudden incapacitation could result in harm to himself, risk to others, or mission failure." Dr. Portnoy placed Petitioner on light duty, which resulted in his assignment to an office job at fire headquarters. Respondent's policy dictates that, when an employee is placed on light duty, a medical review is conducted. After being placed on restricted or light duty, a medical review of Petitioner was commenced in June 2004. Respondent's medical review committee requested that Petitioner obtain from his cardiologist, Dr. Einhorn, information concerning Petitioner's cardiac condition. On January 5, 2005, Dr. Einhorn, at Petitioner's request, sent a letter to Dr. Portnoy in which he stated, in part, "We have been trying to wean the patient off beta blockers and Digoxin to see if the patient is still pacemaker dependent. He is now not on any Digoxin and Toprol and interrogation of his pacemaker revealed 30% atrial paced with 16 runs of atrial fibrillation." Based upon the information received from Dr. Einhorn by Dr. Portnoy, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter dated February 17, 2005, which stated that Respondent had determined there was a preponderance of evidence that restrictions placed on Petitioner by Dr. Portnoy would continue indefinitely and that Petitioner would not be able to return to his position in the Operations Division as Lieutenant/EMS Supervisor. Respondent concluded that under Article 34.11 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Petitioner would be medically separated from his employment with the County, effective March 26, 2005, at 19:30 hours. While on light office duty, Petitioner was given additional time to pursue other jobs with Orange County. Petitioner did not find another job with Orange County. On March 10, 2005, after Petitioner had received the February 17 letter from Respondent, Amish Parikh, M.D., wrote a letter "To Whom It May Concern", in which he stated that Petitioner "is now pacing only 0.8% of the time and it is not considered pacemaker-dependent. I believe the pacemaker is not a limiting factor in his ability to perform his job and he should be permitted to return to full duty without restrictions." Nothing in this letter makes reference to any medications Petitioner would be required to take in the future. On April 15, 2005, after Petitioner had been terminated from his employment with Respondent, Petitioner was examined by another cardiologist, Sunil M. Kakkar, M.D., who concluded that Petitioner was not pacemaker dependent and could return to full duties with Respondent. Neither Dr. Parikh nor Dr. Kakkar testified at the hearing. Their written reports appear to be based upon one visit by Petitioner with each of them. On March 23, 2005, Dr. Portnoy reviewed the March 10 letter from Dr. Parikh. Dr. Portnoy did not change his determination that Petitioner was pacemaker dependent after his review of Dr. Parikh's letter. Dr. Portnoy did not lift the restrictions he had imposed on Petitioner. At the time of hearing, Petitioner continued to take medications, both aspirin and Toprol, for his cardiac condition. David Hart worked as a firefighter with Respondent from March 16, 1981, through his voluntary retirement, with the rank of Engineer, on February 10, 2005. Mr. Hart was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation in 1992 and was treated for the condition with medications for the ensuing six years. Mr. Hart had a pacemaker implanted in October of 1998, and had the pacemaker in place through his retirement. While still employed by Respondent, Mr. Hart's private cardiologist, Dr. Filart, provided Respondent and Dr. Portnoy with information concerning the pacemaker, and determined that Mr. Hart was not pacemaker dependent. Based upon Dr. Filart's determination that Mr. Hart was not pacemaker dependent, Mr. Hart was not removed from duty or placed on restricted duty due to his pacemaker. Mr. Hart agreed that the decision with respect to pacemaker dependency should be made by the patient's cardiologist. Petitioner claims that he was discriminated against by Respondent due to disparate treatment between himself and David Hart. He alleges he is not pacemaker dependent, is similar to Mr. Hart, and, therefore, should not have been medically separated from his employment with Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that the Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jonathan A. Race 1081 Dean Street St. Cloud, Florida 34771 Gary M. Glassman, Esquire Orange County Attorney's Office Litigation Section 435 North Orange Avenue, 3rd Floor Orlando, Florida 32801 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner Ryan Flint, the minor son of his personal representative and mother, Madeline Flint, should immediately receive developmental services or remain on a waiting list for such services until funding is available.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the hearing, Ryan Flint was three years old and has been identified as being on the "autism spectrum." Autism spectrum puts Ryan at risk of having a developmental disability, but is not itself a developmental disability. Testing at a later date will ascertain whether he actually has a developmental disability. Until such testing can be accomplished, however, pursuant to federal law and long-standing policy, the Department regards Ryan Flint as a client because of his risk status. The parties stipulated that Ryan is eligible for services of the Developmental Services Program. Ryan became a client of Developmental Services on June 20, 2000. Despite the rejection language of the notice of denial letter, Ryan was placed on a waiting list and may ultimately be provided the requested services from Respondent. Currently, there are approximately eight thousand persons who became clients of the Developmental Services Program after July 1, 1999. Ryan was receiving services through Children's Home Society. However, because he turned three years old he no longer qualifies for services under that program. Children's Home Society referred him to Developmental Services for evaluation. Mrs. Flint recalls that the "intake" for services was done May 11, 2000. It was Mrs. Flint's impression from the intake interview that Ryan would receive the requested services. This continued to be her impression when Ryan's service plan was written in June of 2000. Ryan currently receives some occupational therapy services through the local school board. However, these occupational services are limited to those which are only educationally necessary such as writing skills and do not extend to other non-educational skills such as running. A long and complex chain of events and circumstances led to the situation faced by Ryan Flint. Prior to the 1999 legislative session, the Department identified 23,361 Developmental Services clients who were either not getting services from the developmental services program or who were not receiving adequate services. The Department's Legislative Budget Request for fiscal year 1999-2000, included a plan to address the underserved clients over a two-year period. Under this plan, 15,984 of the identified 23,361 clients would be served during fiscal year 1999-2000, with the remaining 7377 clients to be added to the group in fiscal year 2000-2001. The Legislature elected to route the new moneys into the Medicaid Waiver program. That program provided for a 45/55 State/Federal match, under which fifty-five cents of federal moneys would be provided for every forty-five cents contributed by the Florida Legislature. Since most of these clients resided in the community and not in institutions, the program utilized under this plan was not the Institutional Medicaid program, but the Home Community Based Waiver program. The Home Community Based Waiver program, also called the Medicaid Waiver program, differs from the Institutional Medicaid program. The Institutional Medicaid program is an entitlement program. The Medicaid Waiver program is not. Consequently, the moneys which fund the Medicaid Waiver program are limited and claims on such programs must be prioritized. The Legislature directed the Department to prioritize these limited funds in proviso language of the 1999-2000 Appropriations Act: . . . Priorities for this funding, in order, are as follows: 1) Transitions for those requesting transfers from Intermediate Care Facilities for the Developmentally Disabled (ICF/DD) institutional placements into Home and Community Based Waiver residential placements, and 2) Meeting the needs of identified under-served participants in the Home and Community Based Waiver Services after accurately assessing the actual costs of each person's support plan. The 2000 Appropriations Act contained proviso language identical to that found in the 1999 Appropriations Act referenced in paragraph 9. The Department implemented this legislative mandate by implementing policy that, except for crisis situations, only persons who were clients on July 1, 1999, would receive services. All others would be put on a waiting list. Ryan Flint is not eligible for the Medicaid Waiver Program. The funds Mrs. Flint seeks come from another source, the Individual and Family Support appropriation. However, as a matter of policy, the Department has applied the prioritization described in paragraph 11, not only to the appropriations made through the Medicaid Waiver program, but also to those relating to the Individual and Family Support appropriation. This policy was communicated to the Department's District Administrators and Developmental Services Program Administrators in a memorandum dated May 22, 2000. Utilizing this policy, the result in this case is the same as if Ryan had been on the Medicaid waiver. Jo Ann Braun, a Human Services Counselor with the Department, was not aware of the new policy until August of 2000. Thus, she could not have been aware of the new policy at the time she wrote Ryan's service plan which was in June 2000. According to Ms. Braun, as this policy was in the process of being disseminated through the Department, there may have been some clients who did not meet the crisis criteria and who entered the system after July 1, 1999, who received services. However, once the Department staff received and began implementing the policy, new clients were put on the waiting list and did not begin to receive services. In the past two years, the Legislature has not appropriated any new funds under the Individual and Family Support Program. Thus, since the existing client base in Developmental Services remained static, the new client base has increased by approximately 8,000 clients since July 1, 1999. Since the client base increased by 8,000 but the funding did not increase, the Department was faced with a decision as to how to fairly and consistently use the funding that was available. The Department determined that the only way it could provide funds to new clients would be by withholding services from existing clients who already received these services. However, it is not the policy of the Department to take money from someone who already is receiving services and give it to someone new. Faced with two choices, neither of which was desirable, the Department implemented a policy which requires that the allocation of Developmental Services moneys be made on a consistent basis. That is, the Department elected to apply these moneys in a manner consistent with the Medicaid Waiver appropriation. Moreover, many of the clients who receive Medicaid Waiver funds also receive Individual and Family Support funds. Additionally, the Department's prioritization puts at the top of the list those clients who are in crisis. Under these circumstances, the Department's decision to allocate the Individual and Family Support moneys in the same manner as the Medicaid Waiver moneys is not unreasonable or arbitrary. Applying the Department's policy, Ryan can only receive services if he is in crisis because he became a client after July 1, 1999. The Department has identified six conditions which, if present, constitute a crisis which would permit it to provide services to persons who became clients after July 1, 1999. These are: A court order from a criminal proceeding requires the Department to provide services. The client is highly dangerous to himself or others, and danger will continue if services are not provided immediately. The client is living in a high risk situation in which abuse and/or neglect is occurring or likely to occur. The client is homeless, living either in a homeless shelter or on the street. The caregiver is unable to provide care for the client, no alternative arrangements are possible, and without the provision of services, the client cannot safely remain with the caregiver. Other circumstances exist which will present a danger to the client's safety and/or security if services are not provided. The parties stipulated that Ryan Flint met none of the foregoing criteria. Consequently, the Department did not provide him the services his mother sought on his behalf.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order leaving Ryan Flint on the waiting list of clients to be served by the Department's Developmental Services Program, and providing those services to him as soon as funds become available to do so. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Madeline Flint 1327 Conservancy Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32312 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 100A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner based on his disability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed as a correctional officer by Respondent at all times pertinent to this proceeding at Tomoka Correctional Institution (TCI) in Volusia County, Florida. The prison houses adult male inmates. Staff at TCI has the primary mission of providing for the public safety through the care, custody and control of the inmates housed in that facility. In early 1998, Petitioner was diagnosed with Non- Hodgkin's Lymphoma and began treatment for the disease. He was granted leave as needed for treatment and continued otherwise to work. Petitioner requested and was eventually granted the privilege of working a double shift only in those situations where he could take the next day off. In December of 2000, he requested that he be assigned to a perimeter post half of the time, and that he not be assigned to the chow hall or to guard sick inmates. Since Petitioner did not provide sufficient medical information to support the requested accommodation, it was denied. Respondent assigned Petitioner to be a "roving perimeter officer" on June 18, 2001. These officers observe the secure perimeter of the facility to ensure that no unauthorized entry into or out of the facility takes place. Each officer on this assignment is issued a shotgun, revolver and a motor vehicle. Each officer has a specific part of the perimeter fence to guard. Petitioner, as a result of medication he takes for his condition, experienced an urgent need to defecate, and left his post after calling for a replacement. As a consequence, Petitioner was thereafter assigned duty only where he would have immediate access to bathroom facilities. Petitioner provided documentation from his health care provider to Respondent indicating that Petitioner could work any post in the facility subject to certain qualifications. He should be given 16 hours' advance notice of the assignment to permit him to plan his medication schedule if he were assigned to the perimeter or other station where bathrooms were not readily available. Additionally, Petitioner was to be relieved within nine minutes of requesting a needed bathroom break. Petitioner also needed to have constant access to cold water and not be subjected to temperatures in excess of 90 degrees for more than an hour. As a result of his special needs, Petitioner remained assigned mainly to inside posts. He meets all requirements to work in the TCI observation towers, which have bathroom facilities and are climate controlled. He is assigned to such a tower one day per week. Respondent will not provide Petitioner 16 hours' notification of a future assignment so as to permit him to schedule his medication in such a way as to avoid urgent bathroom usage. Further, Respondent will not provide relief within nine minutes so that Petitioner can use the restrooms when necessary. Petitioner is generally assigned by Respondent to dormitory duty with the exception of tower duty one day per week. The dormitory is air-conditioned, but such assignment is stressful, fatiguing, and could adversely affect Petitioner's physical condition of lymphoma which is presently in remission.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ernest L. Reddick, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Lawrence A. Lopenski 2482 Barbarossa Avenue Deltona, Florida 32524 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Barnett is a resident of Ocala, Florida. She executed Lifestream's employment application form on January 30, 2007. She claimed a bachelor's degree from Brooklyn College and a Master's in Social Work from Upsala College in East Orange, New Jersey. Her application indicated that she was a social worker in New York from September 1987 until December 2003. Ms. Barnett moved to Florida and was employed by the Marion County Drug Court, but quit, according to Ms. Barnett, because she had a heart attack in November 2005. Thereafter, she worked for a company named ResCare in Gainesville, Florida. Her job entailed working with mentally handicapped adults. She was discharged from this job for losing her temper. Lifestream operates a detoxification facility and crisis stabilization unit among other things. It provides services to children, adults, and the elderly. Lifestream's mission is to provide quality life enrichment services through prevention, education, and treatment. Ms. Barnett was employed as an emergency evaluator on or about February 15, 2007. An emergency evaluator works in the receiving area of the Lifesteam facility. Clients are brought to the facility by law enforcement or friends or family. Some clients appear voluntarily. Clients enter the facility at irregular hours. As an emergency evaluator, it was Ms. Barnett's job to search new clients to ascertain if they possessed weapons, in order to ensure the safety of the client and staff, and to evaluate them for mental status using Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV. It was her job to notify the nursing supervisor of the health status of new clients and to prepare records. Occasionally clients were violent, and at least once Ms. Barnett was attacked by a client. This attack occurred on May 3, 2007. She claimed that she had 17 injured discs in her back. She claimed that these injuries occurred in part while working for Lifestream, although she did not assert that all of these injuries occurred during the alleged attack. Ms. Barnett also stated that she was scheduled for surgery and stated that a steel rod would be inserted in her back at Tampa General Hospital. Although there was no medical evidence introduced that corroborated her testimony, it was unrebutted and is accepted as true. There was no proof that these claimed medical deficiencies resulted in a disability. In any event, the record is completely devoid of any evidence that anyone at Lifestream was aware of that Ms. Barnett might have been disabled or that anyone perceived her as disabled. Moreover, she never requested an accommodation. Ms. Barnett's alleged disability first surfaced in Ms. Barnett's Employment Complaint of Discrimination, subsequent to her termination, which occurred on December 15, 2007. During the approximately 10 months of employment at Lifestream, Ms. Barnett was absent for her scheduled shift on 56 days. She did not inform Lifestream in advance that she was not going to appear for work and as a result, Lifestream found it necessary to replace her with other employees. This often resulted in Lifestream bearing the cost of overtime pay. When Ms. Barnett did work, her performance was poor, and she was counseled about it. The charts that she was required to maintain often failed to contain necessary documentation and signatures. During the course of her employment, she received five verbal and written reprimands addressing her poor job performance. Lifestream's constant uncertainty regarding Ms. Barnett's attendance at work, an essential part of her job, coupled with her poor performance, culminated in her being removed from the work schedule in October 2008. She was not formally discharged until December 2008. She remains eligible for re-hire at Lifestream.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition of Candice Barnett. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Candice Barnett 1850 Southeast 18th Avenue, No. 1601 Ocala, Florida 34491 Victoria McCloskey, Esquire Albert Guemmer, Esquire Guemmer & Ritt 3002 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Robert F. Cameron, was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Osceola County, based on his disability, race, or national origin in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act. 1 All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (2020), unless otherwise noted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner brings this action alleging that the County discriminated against him based on his disability, race (white), and national origin (Canadian). Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the County failed to provide him a reasonable accommodation to allow him to participate in the application and selection process for a County job. The County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and under the governance of the Osceola County Board of County Commissioners. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that he is a disabled individual with at least seven disabilities. Pertinent to this matter, Petitioner stated that he is partially deaf in one ear which limits his ability to hear.4 In addition, Petitioner relayed that his disability(ies) affect his normal life in that he has frequent medical appointments and requires an increased number of restroom breaks. On October 15, 2019, Petitioner, who is from Canada, applied for the position of Budget Analyst II (the "Analyst Position") with the County. The Analyst Position falls within the County's Office of Management and Budget Department ("OMB"). The OMB is responsible for preparing the County's 2 By requesting a deadline for filing a post-hearing submission beyond ten days after the filing of the hearing transcript, the 30-day time period for filing the Recommended Order was waived. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.216(2). 3 Petitioner filed a revised version of his post-hearing submittal on October 9, 2020, which the undersigned considered as Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order in writing this Recommended Order. 4 At the final hearing, Petitioner initially strenuously objected to identifying his specific disability, asserting that his right to privacy protects him from having to disclose personal medical information, except as requested by a medical professional. annual budget, as well as analyzing and evaluating budget transfers for the County Commissioners. The County initiated the recruitment process for the Analyst Position by posting the opening on the website www.governmentjobs.com on October 14, 2019. Petitioner found the posting on the website and submitted his application through the same. At total of 15 individuals applied for the position, including Petitioner. The application window for the Analyst Position closed on October 21, 2019. Thereafter, the County's Human Resources Department screened the 15 applications to ensure the interested persons met the minimum qualifications for the job. Eleven applicants, including Petitioner, possessed the required qualifications. The Human Resources Department forwarded those 11 applications to the OMB for consideration. The OMB reviewed the 11 applications and selected three individuals to interview. These applicants included Petitioner (a white male), Lizette Rivera (a Hispanic female), and Sean Lower (a white male). Thereafter, the Human Resources Department set up a panel of five County employees to interview the candidates. Petitioner learned that he was being considered for the job on Thursday, October 24, 2019. That morning, the County called Petitioner at his home in Canada to inquire whether he was available for an interview the next day, Friday, October 25, 2019. Damaris Morales, an administrative assistant in the OMB, made the call. This case centers around what was said during that morning phone call. Petitioner and Ms. Morales left the conversation with vastly different impressions of what transpired. The Phone Call According to Petitioner Petitioner testified that Ms. Morales called him at a most inopportune time. His home phone rang at 8:44 a.m. At that moment, Petitioner was rushing out of his apartment to reach a 9:00 a.m. doctor's appointment. In fact, Petitioner had already started his car with an automatic starter, and it was running in his driveway. After he heard his phone ring, however, he turned back to answer the call. Petitioner answered the phone and greeted the caller. The caller identified herself as "Tamaris" from Osceola County.5 Ms. Morales then informed Petitioner that she was calling to set up an interview for the Analyst Position. Petitioner initially expressed to Ms. Morales that her call was "great" news. He then explained that he was running out the door to a medical appointment. Therefore, he asked if she would email him details about the interview, and he would respond to her as soon as he returned home. Ms. Morales informed Petitioner that the interviews would take place the next day (Friday). Petitioner was alarmed at the short notice. He explained to Ms. Morales that he was currently at home in New York state and could not travel to Florida for an in person interview the next day. Ms. Morales replied that she could arrange a telephone interview. Petitioner then asked Ms. Morales when the interview on Friday was scheduled. Ms. Morales relayed that she would email him the specific information when she obtained the time from her manager. Petitioner stated that he would "clear my schedule tomorrow for that interview." Petitioner then signed off saying, "Thank you. I do have to run. Sorry." Ms. Morales hung up the phone first. The conversation lasted 1 minute and 30 seconds. As Petitioner left for his doctor's appointment, he was under the impression that Ms. Morales would email him imminently regarding available times for the Friday telephone interview. The Phone Call According to Ms. Morales At the final hearing, Ms. Morales described a vastly different conversation with Petitioner. As further discussed below, Ms. Morales's 5 At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that he heard Damaris Morales state her name as "Tamaris." initial impressions of Petitioner from that phone call ultimately led the OMB to decide not to interview Petitioner for the Analyst Position. When Petitioner answered the phone, Ms. Morales testified that Petitioner's "aggressive" tone quite startled her. In a "loud" voice, Petitioner declared, "Yeah. What do you want? I don't have time to talk right now. I've got to be somewhere." Ms. Morales was not expecting such an abrupt and jarring reception. After a few seconds of stunned silence, Ms. Morales explained to Petitioner that she was calling about his application for the Analyst Position. Continuing in his harsh tone, Petitioner replied, "I have somewhere I need to be right now. Send me all the information via email. I am in Niagara Falls, New York." Petitioner then hung up the phone first without providing Ms. Morales his availability for a Friday interview. The whole conversation took less than 30 seconds. At the final hearing, in response to Ms. Morales's testimony, Petitioner suggested that she may have overheard an exchange between him and his son, Stewart, with whom he lives. Petitioner explained that, as he was leaving his apartment, his son called out from his bedroom asking whether the bathroom was free. Petitioner yelled back, "What do you want, Stewart? I am leaving." Petitioner explained that his phone may have malfunctioned and engaged Ms. Morales' call without him actually picking up the receiver. Petitioner strongly denied that he directed the comment "what do you want?" at Ms. Morales. Petitioner also theorized that if he spoke in a loud tone with Ms. Morales, it may have been due to his disability. As indicated above, Petitioner testified that he is deaf in one ear. Petitioner explained that Ms. Morales was talking very fast during their phone call. In responding to her questions, Petitioner was not trying to be abrupt or argumentative. However, he was in a rush to reach his appointment and was frustrated at the delay. Continuing with Petitioner's story, after the phone call, as Thursday morning progressed into Thursday afternoon, Petitioner did not receive an email back from Ms. Morales. Therefore, around 2:15 p.m., Petitioner called the County to speak with her. He was forwarded to her office phone, where he left a voicemail. In his message, Petitioner expressed that he was available for an interview any time the next day (Friday). He also left his Skype contact information. Time continued to pass on Thursday. With no response over the next two hours, at 4:14 p.m., Petitioner again called for Ms. Morales. This time, he was able to reach her. Petitioner inquired about his interview time for Friday. Ms. Morales momentarily demurred, telling Petitioner that she had to check with her manager. After several minutes, Ms. Morales came back on the line. She then told Petitioner that the Friday interviews were "full up." When Petitioner asked about an interview on another day, Petitioner claims that Ms. Morales promptly "slammed the phone down in my ear." Ms. Morales, on the other hand, testified that after she informed Petitioner that no interview times were available on Friday, Petitioner got angry and threatened her with a "legal matter." Petitioner then hung up on her. Petitioner was not content to let the matter drop. Therefore, on Friday morning at 9:47 a.m., he emailed the County Manager, Don Fisher, to complain about the County's Human Resources Department and the OMB. In his email, Petitioner summarized the events from the previous day. Petitioner focused on the fact that Ms. Morales told him that she would provide him an interview time. Then, when he contacted her Thursday afternoon, Ms. Morales informed him that the interviews were "full up," and he would not be offered an opportunity to interview for the Analyst Position. Petitioner sent Mr. Fisher follow-up emails at 10:01 a.m. and 10:03 a.m. In the first follow-up email, Petitioner stated: I am disabled and covered under the ADA Act. I make this request for accommodation under the ADA Act. At 10:10 a.m., Petitioner sent an email to another County employee, Maria Colon, the Director of the Human Resources Department and the County's Americans with Disability Act ("ADA") coordinator. In this email, Petitioner stated: You are the designated ADA Act Coordinator, but you are discriminating against me and denying my ADA rights to accommodation under the ACT and Title VII. I formally ask for this interview to be rescheduled and Oscola [sic] County to stop this discrimination. Attached to this email, Petitioner included a copy of his Ontario Disability Support Program Certificate of Disability ("ODSP Certificate"). At the final hearing, Petitioner explained that the ODSP Certificate, which was determined in 2013, is proof of his disability. Petitioner's certificate states: Your file with the Disability Adjudication Unit has been adjudicated and you have been found to be a person with a disability as defined in the Ontario Disability Support Program Act. 1997. At the final hearing, Petitioner expounded on the reasons for his request, explaining that he sought an accommodation to enable him to conduct a telephonic interview because his disability prevented him from driving from Canada to Florida to interview in person. Furthermore, as a disabled person, he needed more time to prepare and participate in the recruitment process. The specific accommodation he desired was to be allowed to interview by telephone on Monday, October 28, 2019. Not hearing a response from Ms. Colon by Friday afternoon, at 3:03 p.m., Petitioner dispatched another email to her. He again attached his ODSP Certificate. In this email, Petitioner wrote that "your staff member Tamaris" refused to schedule an interview and then "hung up the phone on me." Petitioner also repeated that he was "requesting reasonable accommodation for the Budget Analyst II position." Ms. Colon called Petitioner shortly after his second email. During this call, Petitioner informed Ms. Colon that he was disabled, and he needed a telephone interview for the County job opening. Petitioner added that he was located out of state, and he could not travel to Florida in time for an in-person interview. Petitioner further declared that the County was discriminating against him because of his disability and his national origin. Ms. Colon advised Petitioner that she would look into his concerns and get back to him. Petitioner claims that Ms. Colon ended this conversation by slamming the phone in his ear. During this call, despite Ms. Colon's request, Petitioner refused to identify his specific disability. At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that the law protects those with disabilities from having to disclose their actual medical conditions. He said that, to safeguard their privacy, the disabled do not have to reveal their disability, except to the limited extent necessary to relate the disability to the requested accommodation. At 6:01 p.m. on Friday evening, Ms. Colon emailed Petitioner stating, "Per our phone conversation, I will look into your concerns and get back with you on Monday." By late Monday morning, October 28, 2019, however, Petitioner had not heard from Ms. Colon. Therefore, he sent her two emails. At 11:43 a.m., Petitioner wrote, "When is my interview? I am not available tomorrow." With no response to this first email, at 3:48 p.m., Petitioner wrote, "As per your reply above, you indicated my accommodation request under the ADA and interview time would be dealt with today. It is 4 pm EST. Please respond." Petitioner then signed off, "I am available for an interview 10am to 11 am tomorrow and then on Wednesday, Thursday or Friday." Petitioner received a response from Ms. Colon at 6:10 p.m., Monday evening. In her email, Ms. Colon wrote: I had the opportunity to look into your concerns. To be honest, customer service is very important in the Budget Analyst II role, and we're assessing those skills in every contact with candidates. The OMB Department had concerns about the way you handled the call and treated the employee that contacted you on October 24th for the purpose of scheduling an interview. Therefore, the Department has moved forward with other candidates. Petitioner was most displeased at Ms. Colon's email, and at 6:54 p.m., he responded: I did nothing except indicate I was available for an interview. Regardless none of this over-rides the ADA and my rights to employment and accommodation. I will be discussing your actions, the "OMB" in denying my constitutional and ADA rights, my Title VII rights with [a County attorney] tomorrow. If they fail to resolve this, then I will be suing you personally, Tamaris, the OMB and the County on a substantial indemnity basis for well in excess of $500g. Petitioner ended the email with "See you soon in court." Six minutes later, at 7:01 p.m., Petitioner sent another email to Ms. Colon. In this message, Petitioner stated: I must commend you for trying to deflect the egregious violation of my rights through trying to claim my rights to an interview are somehow superceded [sic] by this department withdrawing an interview based on race, geography, nationality and disability … in a call in which this Tamaris said and I quote – "we are full up" … . I asked her to leave my interview time through an email. If that qualifies as "poor customer service" then you have a very BIG legal problem using that as a diversion for blantant [sic] discrimination based on race, color, nationality, and disability. Petitioner ended this email with, "I will be happy to take you to Federal Court not the Courthouse right across the street. See you soon in court." Petitioner wrote Ms. Colon once more at 7:03 p.m. In this email, Petitioner accused Ms. Colon of "a blatant discrimination of interest in applying the ACT. Your superiors told you to deny me my rights under the ADA and you did so." Petitioner then declared that he was going to "sue you personally. … Trust me on that." After Monday, October 28, 2019, Petitioner never heard back from Ms. Morales or Ms. Colon regarding his application for the Analyst Position. Consequently, Petitioner claims that the County, by refusing to respond to his request for a telephone interview, denied him his rights under the FCRA and the ADA. At the final hearing, Petitioner vehemently denied that he was rude to Ms. Morales or during his call with Ms. Colon. Petitioner professed that he was perfectly polite to Ms. Morales. In addition, he asserted that Ms. Morales's testimony that he hung up the phone on her is totally false. Petitioner also contended that he did not threaten Ms. Colon with legal action as a means of intimidation. He was just exercising his rights as a disabled person. Petitioner further charged that the County's excuse for removing him from consideration was based on a misconstrued comment overheard during a brief phone call. Petitioner insists that his single utterance, "What do you want (Stewart)," cannot and should not justify the County's discriminatory action. The County ultimately hired Lizette Rivera for the Analyst Position. Petitioner alleges that the decision to hire Ms. Rivera is evidence of the County's female employees working together to eliminate white, male candidates. Petitioner maintains that Ms. Morales, a Hispanic female, favored another Hispanic (nondisabled) female (Ms. Rivera) for the Analyst Position. Consequently, Petitioner claims that Ms. Morales rigged the process and discriminated against Petitioner. At the final hearing, the County did not dispute that, while the OMB initially considered Petitioner for the Analyst Position, it quickly decided not to interview him for the job. The County also confirmed that the OMB did interview, and ultimately hire, Ms. Rivera to fill the Analyst Position. Regarding the County's decision not to interview Petitioner, after the initial phone call, Ms. Morales testified that she was quite startled by Petitioner's rude and unprofessional conduct. She immediately reported the conversation to her supervisor, Sharon Chauharjasingh, who is the Director of the OMB. Ms. Morales expressed to Ms. Chauharjasingh how shocked she was by Petitioner's behavior. Ms. Morales further relayed that because Petitioner was "in a rush," he did not provide her his availability for a telephone interview. Consequently, she had no information which would allow her to schedule him for an interview on Friday. Ms. Morales's testimony describing the telephone interaction with Petitioner was credible and is credited. Petitioner admitted to parts of Ms. Morales's versions, including that fact that he was in a rush and that he yelled, "what do you want?" Other than the two phone calls with Petitioner on Thursday, October 24, 2019, Ms. Morales was not involved in the OMB's decision not to interview Petitioner or to hire Ms. Rivera. (Those decisions belonged to Ms. Chauharjasingh.) Ms. Morales did not participate on the interview panel for either Ms. Rivera or Mr. Lower. Ms. Morales further testified that at no time during her phone calls with Petitioner did he inform her that he had a disability, or that he needed an accommodation to participate in the interview process. Ms. Chauharjasingh also testified at the final hearing. Ms. Chauharjasingh initially explained that the OMB is tasked with preparing the County's annual budget of approximately $1 billion. The person who fills the Analyst Position will work in the OMB. The duties of the Analyst Position include reviewing the budgets of the different County departments, as well as assisting those departments with budget questions and preparation related tasks. The Analyst Position will also review budgetary impacts and projections, and be prepared to personally discuss these issues with County representatives. In addition, the Analyst Position will interact daily with other staff members and occasionally contact outside companies and the public. Regarding the hiring of Ms. Rivera, Ms. Chauharjasingh disclosed that, because she oversees the OMB, she was responsible for selecting the person to fill the Analyst Position. For this opening, Ms. Chauharjasingh was the individual who narrowed down the applicants to the shortlist of three individuals including Petitioner, Ms. Rivera, and Mr. Lower. In selecting these candidates, Ms. Chauharjasingh looked at each applicant's past experience as a budget analyst, as well as their aptitude to efficiently assume the job duties. Based on their resumes, Ms. Chauharjasingh believed that each finalist was qualified for the Analyst Position. After selecting the three candidates, Ms. Chauharjasingh asked her assistant, Ms. Morales, to call each applicant and set up an interview. Ms. Chauharjasingh asked Ms. Morales to schedule the interviews for either Friday, October 25, 2019, or Monday, October 28, 2019. At the final hearing, Ms. Chauharjasingh represented that the County routinely interviews job applicants by telephone. Ms. Chauharjasingh further testified that the decision not to continue the interview process with Petitioner was hers. Ms. Chauharjasingh recounted that on Thursday morning, October 24, 2019, Ms. Morales came into her office looking "shaken up." Ms. Morales reported that she had just spoken to Petitioner, and he yelled at her and was rude and unprofessional. Ms. Chauharjasingh had never heard of a job candidate reacting the way Ms. Morales described. Ms. Morales has never complained to her about any other applicant. Based on Ms. Morales's interaction with Petitioner, Ms. Chauharjasingh immediately decided to remove Petitioner from consideration for the Analyst Position. She therefore directed Ms. Morales to "move on" from Petitioner and not to communicate with him any further. Instead, Ms. Morales was to only schedule interviews with the other two candidates (Ms. Rivera and Mr. Lower). The County's panel of five interviewers, which included Ms. Chauharjasingh, conducted an in-person interview of Ms. Rivera on Friday, October 25, 2019, at 11:30 a.m. Mr. Lower was interviewed, in person, on Monday morning, October 28, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. Following the interviews, the panel ranked the candidates, and then sent the list to Ms. Chauharjasingh. Ms. Chauharjasingh extended the offer of employment to Ms. Rivera, who was the top-ranked candidate. Ms. Chauharjasingh concluded her testimony by asserting that Petitioner's disability played no role in her decision not to interview him. Ms. Chauharjasingh explained that, at the time she decided to terminate the interview process with him, neither she nor Ms. Morales had any knowledge or information regarding Petitioner's disability. Instead, the sole basis for removing Petitioner from the shortlist was Ms. Morales' interaction with him during her initial phone call. Ms. Chauharjasingh testified that, based on the specific responsibilities of the Analyst Position, personal traits such as good communication skills, decorum, and telephone etiquette are very important. For example, the Detailed Job Posting for the Analyst Position includes a Physical Demand Requirement of "Expressing or exchanging ideas by spoken word or perceiving sound by ear." Consequently, upon hearing Ms. Morales's description of Petitioner's attitude and behavior during the telephone call, Ms. Chauharjasingh decided that the County did not need to consider Petitioner's application any further. In her testimony, Ms. Colon expressed that she had no part in the OMB's decision not to interview Petitioner. She became involved in this matter only after she received Petitioner's email, addressed to her as the County's ADA coordinator, on Friday morning, October 25, 2019. Ms. Colon stated that after she read Petitioner's email, she did not immediately respond because she first wanted to determine what exactly had transpired between Petitioner and Ms. Morales the previous day. Ms. Colon spoke with both Ms. Morales and Ms. Chauharjasingh on Friday. From these conversations, Ms. Colon heard that Petitioner was "rude" during Ms. Morales's first telephone call. Further, Petitioner was so "abrupt" that Ms. Morales was not able to offer him an interview time. Ms. Morales also informed Ms. Colon that Petitioner did not mention a disability or request an accommodation during either of their calls. Regarding her own phone call with Petitioner on Friday afternoon, Ms. Colon described an experience very similar to Ms. Morales's. Ms. Colon testified that the conversation was "not pleasant." As with Ms. Morales, Ms. Colon recounted that Petitioner was "agitated," loud," and "extremely unprofessional." During the exchange, Petitioner also threatened to sue her and the County. Regarding her email to Petitioner on Monday evening, October 28, 2019, in which she wrote that, "The OMB Department had concerns about the way you handled the call and treated the employee that contacted you on October 24th," Ms. Colon stated that the decision not to schedule Petitioner for an interview was made on October 24, 2019. Specifically, after talking with Ms. Morales and Ms. Chauharjasingh, Ms. Colon learned that Ms. Chauharjasingh had decided not to interview Petitioner immediately after Ms. Morales reported to her regarding Petitioner's rude and unprofessional interaction with her during their first phone call. As a final witness, Ms. Fatima Lozano testified regarding her participation on the interview panel for the Analyst Position. Ms. Lozano described herself as a Human Resources "generalist" with the County. Ms. Lozano has taken part in a number of interviews of applicants for County employment. She relayed that the County routinely conducts telephonic interviews. Ms. Lozano repeated that, when hiring employees, the department responsible for the position sets up the interviews and selects the winner. For the Analyst Position, the OMB selected the applicants who would interview for the job. Regarding scheduling the interviews for the Analyst Position, Ms. Lozano testified that, on October 21, 2019, she received a calendar invite requesting her availability. The interviews then took place on Friday, October 25, 2019, at 11:30 a.m. and Monday, October 28, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. While the above findings chronical the key aspects of Petitioner's discrimination claim, Petitioner also raised several other complaints against the County. Petitioner was exceedingly frustrated by the County's failure to schedule his interview through the www.governmentjobs.com website. At the final hearing, Petitioner elicited testimony from several County employees that, although the County pays a hefty annual fee to recruit employees through governmentjobs.com, the County only uses the website to solicit applications. Petitioner was "shocked" to learn that the County did not take advantage of the website's functions to schedule interviews with candidates. Petitioner was also "stunned" at the County's attempt to schedule his interview with less than one day's notice. Petitioner found the practice unprofessional and unacceptable. Petitioner represented that the standard process used by governmentjobs.com is to email a notification to the job applicant at least four to seven days prior to the agreed interview time. Based on the competent substantial evidence in the record, the preponderance of the evidence does not establish that the County discriminated against Petitioner based on his disability (handicap), race, or national origin. Instead, the credible evidence establishes that the decision not to interview Petitioner was made without knowledge of his disability prior to his request for an accommodation, and without regard to his race or national origin. The decision to not interview Petitioner was based solely on his own behavior, considered rude and unprofessional, effectively disqualifying him from the job. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that the County committed an unlawful employment practice against him in violation of the FCRA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Robert F. Cameron, did not prove that Respondent, Osceola County, committed an unlawful employment practice against him, and dismissing his Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Robert Finley Cameron 1 Churchill Street, Apartment 10 St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada L25 2-P3 C (eServed) Frank M. Townsend, Esquire Osceola County Attorney's Office 1 Courthouse Square, Suite 4700 Kissimmee, Florida 34741 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent, the Orange County Convention Center, discriminated against Petitioner, Norman H. Siales, on the basis of a handicap within the meaning of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first employed by Respondent in October 2000 as a set-up worker on an on-call basis. In June 2001, Respondent hired Petitioner in a regular full-time position as a set-up worker. Throughout his employment with Respondent, Petitioner's supervisors considered him a good employee who always performed his job properly and did assigned tasks to the best of his ability. Petitioner was incarcerated on or about July 8, 2004. Shortly after his incarceration, Petitioner called Steve Miller, one of the assistant supervisors in the Event Set-Up Department, and informed him that he was in the county jail. Petitioner was then told that he should keep Respondent updated on his situation. On or about July 9, 2004, Mr. Miller advised Mr. Schildgen, his supervisor, that Petitioner had called and reported that he was incarcerated. After first learning that Petitioner was incarcerated, Mr. Schildgen never heard from Petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Schildgen asked the two shift supervisors if they had heard from Petitioner, and they indicated they had not. Mr. Schildgen considered Petitioner a good employee and wanted him to return to work. However, in late July or early August 2004, after not hearing from Petitioner for about three weeks, Mr. Schildgen, in consultation with the manager of the Event Set-Up Department, determined that Petitioner's continued absence from the workplace, without notice, was a violation of the Orange County policy. According to the policy, employees could be terminated from employment if they were absent from the workplace for three consecutive days without notice to the employer. At or near the time Petitioner was employed by Respondent, he received a copy of the Orange County Government Employee Handbook (on June 11, 2001). He also received training on the Orange County Policy Manual. Petitioner signed an Employee Acknowledgement (March 30, 2004) form stating that he had received the training. The Employee Acknowledgement form, signed by Petitioner, further stated "I understand that I am responsible for complying with all Policies, Operational Regulations, Departmental Operating Procedures, and Departmental Guidelines, and that the failure to do so may be grounds for corrective action, up to and including termination." As a result of the training described in paragraph 6, Petitioner was aware of the Orange County policy that authorized employees to be terminated if they were absent from work three consecutive days and did not notify Respondent. Based on Petitioner's extended absence from the workplace and his failure to communicate with his supervisors regarding the absences, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment. By letter dated August 26, 2004, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment with the Event Set-Up Department. The reason for Petitioner's termination was that he had not communicated with Respondent since July 8, 2004. The letter also stated, "while we understand there were some extenuating circumstances involving the Orange County Sheriff's Office, we can no longer wait to address this violation of . . . policy." According to the termination letter, the applicable policy provides the following: "Failure to work for three (3) or more consecutive working days without proper authorization shall be considered job abandonment and result in immediate termination, unless the employee presents written proof that he/she was unable to make appropriate notifications through no fault of his/her own." When he was first incarcerated, Petitioner thought he would be held for 24 to 48 hours. However, he was not released until December 3, 2004. After Petitioner was released from jail, he went to his employer and asked if he could return to work, but was told that he could not return due to his excessive and consecutive absences without notifying his employer. Petitioner had a psychological evaluation when he was incarcerated, and a psychological report dated October 11, 2004, was generated as a result of that evaluation. Petitioner did not offer the evaluation into evidence, but testified that the evaluation indicated he had a mental illness. However, this report and the findings and conclusions therein have no bearing on this case as the report was prepared after Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment. Respondent was unaware of the psychological evaluation or report until the final hearing. During his employment with Respondent, Petitioner never advised his supervisor that he had a disability. Petitioner testified that in 2002 or 2003, he asked his three supervisors to help him "with the grievances." At hearing, Petitioner explained that when he used the term "grievances" he meant the mental, psyche, and physiological abuses he was suffering. In early 2002, while employed with Respondent, Petitioner sent a letter to Mr. Schildgen. According to Petitioner, the letter was about "psychological and physiological experimentations of science and technology." Mr. Schildgen found the letter described in paragraph 17 to be somewhat "strange," but nothing in the letter stated that Petitioner had a handicap or disability. After receiving the letter, Mr. Schildgen and two other supervisors met with Petitioner and asked him about the letter. During the meeting with his supervisors, Petitioner broke out in a cold sweat and rather than talking about the letter, started talking about subjects such as "Sigmund Freud and other stuff [Mr. Schildger and the other two supervisors] and we didn't quite understand where it was going." At no time during the meeting did Petitioner state or indicate that he had a disability. Moreover, there was nothing in Petitioner's personnel file that indicated he had a disability. At no time during his employment with Respondent did Petitioner advise anyone there that he had a handicap or disability. Also, Respondent never knew or considered Petitioner to be handicapped or disabled. The sole basis for Petitioner's termination was his violation of Orange County's "absentee policy."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Norman H. Siales', Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Norman H. Siales Post Office Box 1772 Orlando, Florida 32802 P. Andrea DeLoach, Esquire Orange County Attorney's Office 435 North Orange Avenue, Suite 300 Orlando, Florida 32801
