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MAXIMUS HEALTH SERVICES, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 09-006384BID (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 19, 2009 Number: 09-006384BID Latest Update: Feb. 15, 2010

The Issue Pursuant to Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2009), the issue is whether Respondent Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) properly determined that Petitioner Maximus Health Services, Inc.'s (Maximus) reply to Invitation to Negotiate 0904 (ITN 0904) was non-responsive for failure to meet mandatory criteria.

Findings Of Fact Beginning in 2006, the Florida Legislature required the AHCA to implement Medicaid Reform. Medicaid Reform was intended to empower consumers to take an active role in their health care decisions. To serve that purpose, the Legislature required the AHCA to contract with a choice counseling/enrollment broker to provide Medicaid services in Broward, Duval, Nassau, Clay, and Baker counties. ITN 0904 sought to procure an enrollment broker for a three-year contract. It was released on March 9, 2009. The resulting contract is worth in excess of $30 million dollars from June 1, 2009, through June 30, 2011. ITN 0904 consisted of a series of attachments, including the following in relevant part: (a) Attachment C contained “Special Conditions"; (b) Attachment E provided “Evaluation Criteria”; and (c) Attachment G set forth "Required Certifications." The mandatory requirements of ITN 0904 were announced at Section C.7 of ITN 0904 as follows: C.7 Mandatory Requirements: The State has established certain requirements with respect to responses submitted to competitive solicitations. The use of "shall", "must", or "will" (except to indicate futurity) in this solicitation, indicates a requirement or condition from which a material deviation may not be waived by the State. A deviation is material if, in the State's sole discretion, the deficient response is not in substantial accord with the solicitation requirement, provides an advantage to one respondent over another, or has a potentially significant affect of the quality of the response or on the cost to the state. Material deviations cannot be waived. The words "should" or "may" in this solicitation, indicate desirable attributes or conditions, but are permissive in nature. Deviation from, or omission of, such desirable feature (sic) will not in itself cause rejection of a response. Section C.13 set forth the required certifications as follows in pertinent part: Required Certifications: The following certifications, contained in Attachment G, are required and must be submitted with the response: * * * Certification Regarding Terminated Contracts - certifying the vendor (including its subsidiaries and affiliates) has not unilaterally and willfully terminated any previous state or federal contracts for cause within the past five (5) years. FAILURE TO SUBMIT ATTACHMENT G, REQUIRED CERTIFICATIONS, SIGNED BY AN AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL WITHOUT EXCEPTIONS OR CAVEATS, WILL RESULT IN THE REJECTION OF A PROSPECTIVE VENDOR'S RESPONSE. Section C.14 described the proposal guarantee as follows in relevant part: Proposal Guarantee: The original technical response must be accompanied by a proposal guarantee payable to the State of Florida in the amount of $260,000. The respondent must be the guarantor. Section C.38 contains general instructions for response preparation and submission as follows in pertinent part: The solicitation response shall consist of the following parts: A. Transmittal Letter This letter is mandatory . . . . The following documentation shall also be included with the transmittal letter: Proposal Guarantee, as required in Section C.14. Signed Attachment G, Required Certifications, as required in Section C.13. Signed Attachment L, Attestation of No Conflict, attesting that the vendor has no conflict of interest as described in Section C.31. FAILURE TO SUBMIT THE MANDATORY TRANSMITAL LETTER, INCLUDING ITEMS 1-3 ABOVE, WILL RESULT IN REJECTION OF THE PROPOSAL. In Attachment E of ITN 0904, AHCA set forth the evaluation criteria it would use to assess the merits of responses. In Section E.1, the Agency announced that it would review mandatory criteria as follows: E.1 Review of Mandatory Criteria The Procurement Office will evaluate responses to this solicitation against the mandatory criteria found in Part I, Mandatory Criteria. Responses failing to comply with all mandatory criteria will not be considered for further evaluation. Part I is entitled Technical Response Mandatory Criteria. It is a checklist of some of the mandatory requirements of ITN 0904 and states as follows in relevant part: This evaluation sheet will be used by the Agency for Health Care Administration to designate proposals as "responsive" or "non- responsive". If the answer to any of the questions in the table below falls in to the "No" column, the proposal will be designated as "non-responsive" and will not be considered for further evaluation. QUESTIONS YES NO A. Does the response include a transmittal letter, signed by an individual having authority to bind the vendor, containing the following information, as outlined in Section C.38.A? The proposal guarantee, as specified in Section C.15 (sic)of this solicitation; ? A signed Attachment G, Required Certifications, as specified in Section C.13 of this solicitation; ? Attachment G is a form for all required certifications, including but not limited to the following: Certification Regarding Terminated Contracts I hereby certify that my company (including its subsidiaries and affiliates) has not unilaterally or willfully terminated any previous contract prior to the end of the contract with a state or the federal government and has not had a contract terminated by a state or the federal government for cause, prior to the end of the contract, within the past five years. Signature of Authorized Official Date On July 30, 2008, after receiving questions from interested vendors, AHCA issued an Addendum No. 1 to ITN 0904. The purpose of the addendum was to provide clarification and additional information, to make changes to certain attachments, and provide AHCA's response to questions received from prospective vendors. The addendum included the following statement: To the extent this Addendum gives rise to a protest, failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The following pertinent questions and answers were included in Addendum No. 1: Question 1: Pursuant to Attachment A.9 and Attachment C.13, please clarify whether the certification relates to the vendor terminated a contract or the government agency terminated a contract, or two different certifications. Answer: Please see Attachment G, Required Certifications, as referenced in Attachment C.13. This certification relates to the vendor (including its subsidiaries and affiliates) unilaterally or willfully terminating any previous contract prior to the end of the contract with a state or the federal government, and to the vendor having a contract terminated by a state or the federal government for cause prior to the end of the contract, within the past five years. * * * Question 8: Attachment C.13 - Please clarify whether the bidder will be disqualified if there is even one instance where a government contract was terminated for cause in the past 3 years. Answer: Respondents must submit a signed certification (Attachment G) in order to be considered responsive. Maximus admits that it asked Question 8 and received the answer set forth above. Maximus did not challenge any of the specifications in ITN 0904 after issuance of Addendum No. 1. Bruce Caswell, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Maximus, signed the required certifications on Attachment G on August 24, 2009. On the following page, Mr. Caswell included information about a terminated contract involving its parent company, Maximus, Inc., as set forth below. AHS, Maximus, and Policy Studies, Inc. (PSI) submitted replies to ITN 0904 on or about August 24, 2009. AHCA opened the replies that same day and forwarded them to AHCA's Procurement Officer, Barbara Vaughan. Ms. Vaughan had the responsibility to determine compliance with ITN 0904's "Technical Response Mandatory Criteria," using the checklist set forth above. Ms. Vaughan has been AHCA's Procurement Administrator since April 2009. She does not have knowledge and experience in all the technical areas for which AHCA may procure services. During the hearing, Ms. Vaughan did not know what an enrollment broker service is. She did not read the technical responses to ITN 0904. She only examined whether the responses included the mandatory items on the checklist. Sometime in September 2009, Ms. Vaughan determined that Maximus had submitted a non-responsive proposal because it included information regarding a contract that the State of Connecticut terminated with Maximus, Inc. Specifically, Maximus included the following additional information following its certification on Attachment G: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR ITN ATTACHMENT G As noted in the form on the previous page, we certify that MAXIMUS Health Services has not terminated any contract or been terminated prior to the end of the contract term during the past five years. Since, MAXIMUS Health Services is a subsidiary of MAXIMUS, Inc. we offer information about the parent company with respect to this certification. Of the thousands of contracts held by MAXIMUS, Inc. during the past five years, there is one incident of relevance. In this situation, in 2007, a MAXIMUS, Inc. contract to provide an updated criminal justice information system was terminated by the State of Connecticut prior to the end of the contract term after the primary subcontractor of MAXIMUS, Inc. abandoned the project. MAXIMUS, Inc. is disputing the State's termination and has sued its primary subcontractor. Mr. Caswell decided to include the forgoing exception or caveat following his certification because he understood that Maximus, Inc., as Maximus' parent company, was an affiliate and he did not want any misunderstanding. Mr. Caswell's interpretation of the word "affiliate" is consistent with the definition applied by AHCA in its review of the Technical Response Mandatory Criteria. At the hearing, Mr. Caswell, testified regarding the Connecticut contract. According to Mr. Caswell, Maximus, Inc., found itself in a position where it was unable to deliver on a contract for an integrated criminal justice solution with the State of Connecticut due to the mal-performance of its subcontractor. Mr. Caswell stated that Maximus, Inc., then moved to terminate the contract for convenience pursuant to the contract's terms; however, the State of Connecticut rejected Maximus' termination for convenience. Mr. Caswell admitted that the State of Connecticut then terminated the contract for cause and filed suit against Maximus, Inc., in approximately November 2007. Maximus is defending itself and suing its former sub-contractor in that on-going litigation. The State of Connecticut has alleged damages of $6.5 million dollars in their claim against Maximus, Inc. As a company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, Maximus, Inc., had annual revenues of approximately $717 million during the most recent fiscal year. The company has no debt and $87 million of cash on hand. The Connecticut dispute is less than one percent of the company's annual revenues. The following facts are undisputed: (a) Maximus has performed thousands of contracts without cancellation; Maximus is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Maximus, Inc.; Maximus, Inc., is a leading provider of health and human services and consulting and program management services primarily to state governments; (d) Maximus, Inc., offers Medicaid-managed care enrollment brokerage services for thirteen states around the country, serving nearly 15 million Medicaid beneficiaries; and (e) Maximus performs enrollment broker contracts for several states. These facts do not make the Connecticut litigation immaterial considering AHCA's clear intent in drafting ITN 0904 relative to terminated contracts. The mandatory requirement for a certification regarding terminated contracts, without exceptions or caveats, was a reasonable specification because, as Mr. Caswell testified, disputes like the one between Connecticut and Maximus, Inc., are common in the industry. Ms. Vaughan correctly interpreted the language of ITN 0904 when she concluded that no explanation of a terminated contract involving a vender or its affiliates was allowed by the solicitation. Therefore, Ms. Vaughan did not forward Maximus' proposal for scoring by the evaluation team. In comparing Maximus' submission to the mandatory requirement for a proposal guarantee to the checklist included in Attachment E, Ms. Vaughan determined that Maximus' submission was responsive. She reached this conclusion even though Maximus' proposal guarantee was not in its own name as required by Section C.14. Instead, Maximus included a "Bid Bond" guaranteed by Maximus, Inc. The bond identifies Maximus, Inc., as Principal, Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, as Surety, and AHCA, as Obligee. The bond erroneously states that Maximus, Inc., has submitted a bid for Solicitation Number AHCA ITN 0904, Florida Medicaid Enrollment Broker Services. The bond then goes on to describe its terms and conditions. There is no mention of the Surety guaranteeing performance by any subsidiary or affiliate of Maximus, Inc., or specifically by Maximus. Ms. Vaughan made her decision to reject Maximus’ bid just a week or two after bid openings, sometime in September 2009. However, AHCA did not announce its bid decision as it related to Maximus at that time. Instead, AHCA announced the rejection of Maximus after it announced the intended award of contract to AHS. The notice of Maximus' rejection followed an evaluation of responses by AHS and PSI, a negotiation session with AHS and PSI, and a subsequent negotiation session with AHS, who then provided the best and final offer.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Seann M. Frazier, Esquire Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32302-7742 Rachic Avanni Wilson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 David W. Nam, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William E. Williams, Esquire Gray Robinson, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Thomas W. Arnold, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57287.012287.057
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BRIDGEWAY CENTER, INC., AND FOSTER AMERICA, D/B/A MANAGED FAMILY SERVICES vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 00-004162BID (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Oct. 06, 2000 Number: 00-004162BID Latest Update: Feb. 07, 2001

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent’s decision to disqualify Petitioner’s response to an invitation to negotiate was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious and whether Respondent’s decision not to disqualify Intervenor’s response to the same invitation to negotiate was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.

Findings Of Fact On May 26, 2000, Respondent’s Office of the District Administrator, District 1, issued Invitation to Negotiate ITN-00-AJ01 (ITN). The ITN is for a contract under which the successful applicant would become the “community-based lead agency for foster care and related services in Escambia County.” Section 1 of the ITN is the Introduction. Section 1.1 of the ITN states that Section 409.1671, Florida Statutes, “directs [Respondent] to identify and contract with highly qualified community based organizations that are interested in serving as the lead agency for an integrated system of foster care and appropriate related services.” In response to this legislative mandate, District 1 “is planning a system redesign in which community-based organizations will assume the service provision role currently held by the state.” Section 1.2 of the ITN states that the purpose of the ITN is to solicit the community-based agency that will serve as the lead agency in Escambia County for the integrated provision of foster care and related services. Foster care and related services include “protective services, family preservation, independent living, emergency shelter, residential group care, foster care, therapeutic foster care, intensive residential treatment, foster care supervision, case management, post- placement supervision, and family reunification.” Section 1.2 notes that state-employed protective investigators will continue to receive and investigate complaints of child abuse. Section 1.2.A of the ITN describes this project as one of “major scope” and cautions that “[i]t will take a significant period of time for the selected lead agency to fully develop and implement a community-based system of care for this population.” Within the framework of existing laws, the selected agency “will be encouraged to develop innovative child focused intervention protocols and program components.” Section 1.2.A identifies the “minimal design elements” that must be included in any contract, regardless how the selected lead agency structures the project. These elements include: The selected lead agency will be responsible for all aspects of the delivery of foster care and related services. Within the scope of their expertise and resources, the lead agency can directly supply needed services to children and their families. A network of sub-providers will be developed by the lead agency to assure access to services not available through the lead agency. Capacity and financial risk issues will be managed by the lead agency. An automated system will be put in place by the district in collaboration with the selected lead agency that will allow for real-time communication as well as data transfer between [Respondent], the lead agency and the judicial system. This mechanism will allow judges to be quickly apprised of the progress of children and families under the supervision of the court. A comprehensive quality improvement system must be established by the lead agency. The lead agency and provider network will be accredited in accordance with department policy. In addition, the lead agency will identify and meet the training and job skill development needs of all employees of the system. . . . Section 1.2.C of the ITN describes the relationship between District 1 of Respondent and the lead agency. This ITN starts the process by which Respondent will be relieved of responsibility for foster care and related services in Escambia County. Section 1.2.C notes: “The district will shift from performing to technical assistance and quality assurance.” Section 1.2.E of the ITN describes the start-up process. Section 1.2.E states that the most important part of this process of the privatization of foster care and related services is “[m]oving forward in a planned and deliberate manner.” Section 1.2.E warns: “Transitioning from a broad concept to a carefully implemented system of community-based care requires a period of concurrent planning between the district, the alliance [a community group initially comprising the District 1 Health and Human Services Board and the Circuit Court Chief Judge’s Children’s Council] and the selected lead agency.” Section 1.2.E anticipates a “start-up contract” for a term of six to nine months, during which time Section 1.2.E identifies several deliverables that Respondent will require from the lead agency. Among these deliverables is: “The lead agency will develop a plan for the maximization of Medicaid dollars and all other federal funding streams associated with child protective services.” Section 1.2.E states that, during the start-up period, Respondent will continue to assure the safety of children, while the lead agency submits the deliverables. The end of the start-up contract occurs when the lead agency “demonstrates readiness to assume the management of the sub- provider network and the actual delivery of foster care and related services.” Section 1.2.E states that, at this point, Respondent and the lead agency will negotiate a “service contract,” which will “systematically stage the transfer of foster care, protective supervision, adoptions and all related functions from the department to the lead agency.” Section 1.2.E contemplates that the parties will sign the service contract by July 6, 2001. Section 1.3 of the ITN restates that Respondent will enter into a “start-up contract” with the applicant that Respondent chooses as the lead agency. Conflicting somewhat with Section 1.2.E as to the term of the start-up contract, Section 1.3 states that the term may be six to twelve months. More importantly, Section 1.3 restates the purpose of the start-up contract: “At the conclusion of this contract, [Respondent] will make a determination of the readiness of the provider for a service contract. This determination will be made on the basis of a review of the deliverables required under the start-up contract . . ..” The resulting service contract will be for a three-year term. Section 1.4.A of the ITN defines “[a]pplicant” as: “A not for profit community-based agency that successfully submits an application for consideration under this [ITN].” Section 1.4.R defines “[s]elected applicant” as: “The applicant selected for negotiation under the terms and conditions of this [ITN].” Section 1.4.M defines “[l]ead agency” as: “The not for profit community-based provider responsible for coordinating, integrating and managing a local system of supports and services for children who have been abused, abandoned or neglected and their families. The lead agency is also referred in any contract awarded from this [ITN] as the ‘Provider.’” Section 2 of the ITN is the Invitation to Negotiate Information. Section 2.2 of the ITN warns: Failure to have performed any contractual obligations with [Respondent] in a manner satisfactory to [Respondent] will be a sufficient cause for termination. To be disqualified as an applicant under this provision, the applicant must have: 1) previously failed to satisfactorily perform in a contract with [Respondent], been notified by [Respondent] of the unsatisfactory performance, and failed to correct the unsatisfactory performance to the satisfaction of [Respondent] or, 2) had a contract terminated by [Respondent] for cause. Section 2.6 of the ITN states: “Attendance at the applicant’s conference is a prerequisite for acceptance of applications from individuals or firms.” Section 2.9 of the ITN sets a deadline for submitting all applications by 5:00 p.m. local time on August 24, 2000. This section adds: “[Respondent] reserves the right to reject any and all applications or to waive minor irregularities when to do so would be in the best interest of the State of Florida. Minor irregularities are defined as variations from this [ITN] terms and terms and conditions which does [sic] not effect [sic] the price of the application, or give the prospective applicant an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other prospective applicants, or does not adversely impact the interest of [Respondent].” Section 2.13 of the ITN provides that any person who is adversely affected by Respondent’s decision concerning a procurement solicitation or contract award may file a protest, pursuant to Section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes. Section 2.14 of the ITN sets forth the evaluation procedures. Section 2.14.A states: “Before the district initiates a negotiation with any potential provider, all applications received will be ranked according to the evaluation criteria and score sheet contained in Appendix II of this [ITN]. . . .” Section 2.14.B states: [The evaluation] team will utilize the methods described in Section 7 and the criteria listed in Appendix II of this [ITN] to rank each application received by the district. . . ..” Section 2.14.C adds: “At the conclusion of the evaluation process, the District Administrator will designate a Lead Negotiator and four additional persons to enter into negotiations with the highest ranked applicant for selection of a lead agency. This negotiation for a start-up contract will begin with the highest ranked applicant and continue through the rankings until an award is made. ” Section 3 of the ITN identifies the Minimum Program Requirements. Section 3.1 of the ITN describes Respondent’s expectations of the services to be delivered by the “selected applicant.” Section 3.2 of the ITN adds that the “selected applicant” shall be knowledgeable of all relevant state and federal laws and shall ask Respondent for assistance when necessary. Section 3.2 notes that, at a minimum, the “selected applicant” will be conversant with nine groups of federal and state laws. Among these requirements is Section 3.2.D, which states: “The selected applicant shall ensure compliance with Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), Title XIX (Medicaid), and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) requirements.” Section 3.3 of the ITN states: “The purpose and intent of any contract awarded from this [ITN] is to meet the following departmental goals and the principles outlined in Section 1.1 of this [ITN] . . ..” What follows are 13 specific goals to assure the safety and welfare of the children served by the lead agency. Section 3.8 of the ITN states: “District 1 intends to enter into the start-up contract referenced above. The objective of this start-up contract is to prepare the selected lead agency to perform the tasks listed in this section. Written evidence of an organization’s capacity, prior experience and potential to ultimately perform tasks of this scope will be given considerable emphasis and weight when [Respondent] determines with which applicant to enter into negotiations.” Section 3.8.A then details numerous requirements to be imposed by the “selected applicant,” including the submittal, for prior approval, of any new procedures or policies that may affect the State Plan regarding Title IV-E claims or other sources of federal funds. Section 3.9 of the ITN states: Applicants shall include in their application the proposed staffing for technical, administrative, and clerical support. The successful applicant shall maintain an adequate administrative organizational structure and support staff sufficient to discharge its contractual responsibilities. The selected applicant and any subcontractors shall meet, at a minimum, the staff ratios found in Chapter 65C-14, F.A.C., for residential group care. Section 3.10 of the ITN requires the “selected applicant” to ensure that its staff and the staff of its subcontractors meet the qualification requirements of Chapters 65C-14 and 65C-15, F.A.C.; the background screening requirements of Section 435.04, Florida Statutes; and the training and certification requirements of CFOP 175-78, Certification Procedure for Professional Child Protection Employees. Section 3.20 of the ITN identifies the performance measures to be applied to the evaluation of the services provided by the lead agency. Section 3.20.A lists outcomes such as 95 percent of the children served will not be the victims of verified reports of abuse or neglect while receiving services, 85 percent of the children in foster care for less than one year will have had less than two placements, and 100 percent of all judicial reviews will be completed within the statutory deadlines. Section 3.20.B identifies other outcomes whose percentage of achievement will be established in the future; samples of these are the percentage of children who have been in shelter for more than three days who have a family-safety plan upon their release from the shelter and the percentage of children who are placed in out-of-home care and who are later reunited with their families. Section 3.21.C of the ITN warns: “Upon execution of the contract resulting from this [ITN], the successful applicant must meet the standards set forth in Section 3.20 ” Section 3.23 of the ITN provides that the “selected applicant will agree” to coordinate with various other agencies in providing foster care and related services. Section 4 of the ITN covers Financial Specifications. Section 4.2 of the ITN requires the “selected applicant” to submit a “cost allocation plan” that it has been developed in accordance with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-122. The cost allocation plan “must describe the allocation methodologies used by the selected applicant to claim expenditures for reimbursement under any service contract awarded from this [ITN].” Section 4.4 of the ITN requires the “selected applicant” to submit a “financial and service plan” that assures that, among other things, “[s]tate funds in the contract must be spent on child protection activities in ways that allows the state to maximize federal funding.” Section 5 of the ITN addresses Standard Contract Provisions. Section 5.1 of the ITN incorporates the appendix containing model contract provisions to be incorporated into any contract resulting from the ITN. Section 6 of the ITN contains Instructions to Prospective Applicants to the ITN. The flush language under this section states that Respondent “will not . . . consider. . .” applications submitted after the deadline and that applicants must submit one original and nine copies of their applications. Also, an officer of the “selected applicant agency” must sign at least one copy of the application. Another provision covers the typographical presentation of application material. The last sentence of the flush language states: “Each application must follow the document structure listed in Sections 6.1 through 6.9 of this [ITN].” Section 6.1 of the ITN requires the execution of a standard acknowledgement form. Section 6.2 requires that the second page of the application consist of a title page with such information as the ITN number and name of the applicant. Section 6.3 requires a one-page executive summary of the application. Section 6.4 requires a table of contents following the executive summary and, after the table of contents, a cross-reference table covering all of the responses required by Section 6 of the ITN. Section 6.5 requires a demonstration of the applicant’s “comprehensive understanding of the scope of the issues associated with the delivery of child protection services in Escambia County” and a presentation of the applicant’s “perspective regarding community[-]based . . . care with foster care and related services. ” Section 6.6 of the ITN is entitled, “Description of Organizational Capacity.” The flush language in Section 6.6 states: “In this section the applicant will, at a minimum[,] address the following factors ” Section 6.6.A is headed, “Description and Qualifications of the Organization.” Section 6.6.A requires 13 items, including articles of incorporation, services currently provided, and formal and informal connections to Escambia County. Section 6.6.B is headed, “Administrative/Fiscal: The applicant must supply the following information ” Section 6.6.B requires the following nine items: The organization’s annual budget. A three-year history of audited financial statements. An estimate of advance payments (if needed) to support this project. The most recent audit reports complete with the management response. Evidence of compliance with previous correction action plans proposed by [Respondent] through any contract. A documented history of maximizing Medicaid revenues. Provide a discussion of the organization’s system of staff recruitment, screening, pre-service training, in-service training, staff development and employee evaluation. Include a three-year staff retention study. A copy of the organization’s disaster readiness plan(s). [Deleted from ITN] A copy of minority business enterprise certificate issued by the Department of Management Services, if applicable. Section 6.6.C is headed, “Scope of the Organization: The applicant must address the following capacity issues . . ..” Section 6.6.C requires eight items, including Section 6.6.C.2, which states: “Evidence of an infrastructure that includes automated communication and record keeping systems that can be linked to the judicial system and the department.” Section 6.6.D is headed, “Clinical Capacity: The application must address each of the following items ” Section 6.6.D lists six items. Section 6.6.E is headed, “Quality Improvement: The application must address each of the following items ” Section 6.6.E lists seven items, including Section 6.6.E.3, which states: “The ability of the organization and the structure through which the standards found in Section 3.20 of this document will be met.” Section 6.7 of the ITN is entitled, “Proposed Statement of Work.” The flush language explains that the statement of work is “to be general and increase in specification during the period of time covered by a start-up contract.” Section 6.7.G states: “Explain how the applicant will provide for integrated generic and specialized case management.” Section 6.8 of the ITN is entitled, “Proposed Implementation Plan.” This section requires the “applicant’s proposed time-lines for sequencing of all the activities that will lead to full implementation of the items in Section 3.” Section 6.9 of the ITN is entitled, “Mandatory Certifications, Assurances and Statements.” This section lists several executed documents that the application must include. Section 7 of the ITN is entitled, “Application Evaluation Criteria and Rating Sheet.” Section 7.A states that the score sheets “for evaluating the [ITN responses]” are in Appendix II. Section 7.A warns: “The score sheet is the instrument used to assess the degree to which the applicant’s response meets the criteria of this [ITN].” Appendix II of the ITN is entitled, “Evaluation Criteria and Scoring Sheet.” The first section of Appendix II is the “Evaluation Methodology,” which states in its entirety: The evaluation team will score the application using the criteria and scoring procedures found in each domain of this appendix. The score for each criteria will be established by consensus of the evaluation team. The scores assigned to each criteria [sic] will be added to determine the final score for each domain. The scores from each domain will be summed to determine the final score for the application and annotated on the attached score sheet. Domain A (Disqualifying Criterion) contains fatal items that must be present if the application is to be scored. With no disqualification resulting from the review of Domain A, Domains B though E will be scored based on the procedures and standards listed. Appendix II, Domain A is entitled, “Disqualifying Criteria.” The first section under Domain A is “Scoring Procedure,” which states: “Score each criteria [sic] as present or absent. If any of these criteria are scored as absent, the applicant is disqualified.” The second section under Domain B is “Criteria,” which lists 23 items. The 23 items are: Application was received at the time and date specified in Section 2.9 of this [ITN]. One original and 9 copies of the application were received by the department in the manner and location specified in Section 2.9 of this [ITN]. The application included a signed and original State of Florida Invitation to Negotiation Contractual Services Acknowledgement Form, PUR 7105. (See Appendix IX) The application included an original signed Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension, Ineligibility and Voluntary Exclusion Contracts/Subcontracts. (See Appendix X) The application included an original signed Acceptance of Contract Terms and Conditions indicating that the applicant agrees to all department requirements, terms and conditions in the [ITN] and in the department’s Standard Contract. (See Appendix XI) The application included an original signed Statement of No Involvement form. (See Appendix XII) The application included an original signed District 1 Statement of Assurances (See Appendix XIII) The application followed the document structure listed in Section 6.1-6.9 of this [ITN]. All forms submitted included an original signature from an individual authorized to bind the applicant to the terms and conditions of this [ITN]. The application contains the title page, the abstract, the table of contents and cross reference table as required in Sections 6.2-6.4 of this [ITN]. Articles of Incorporation. [deleted from ITN] Certificate of Good Standing from the Secretary of State. Documentation from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service of the organization’s Section 501(c)(3) status. Evidence that the applicant provides for and supports a Drug-free Workplace. Evidence that the applicant is willing to comply with the Environmental Tobacco Smoke Restrictions. Evidence the applicant does not employee unauthorized aliens. Three history of financial statements. A disclosure of any financial difficulties and extraordinary obligations. An estimate of advanced payments if needed to support this project. Documentation of compliance with past departmental or Florida state contracts. Most recent financial audit reports complete with management response including evidence of sound credit rating. A copy of the Application Guarantee. Attendance at all applicant conferences is a pre-requisite for acceptance of applications from individuals or firms. [deleted from the ITN] Appendix II, Domains B through E are score sheets. Domain B covers Section 6.5, Domain C covers Section 6.6, Domain D covers Section 6.7, and Domain E covers Section 6.8. Domain C, Factor B, Item 2 covers Section 6.6.B.2. This item states: 2. Analysis of the three year audited financial statements. (See Section 6.6B.2) Points Standard Poor Average Above Average Excellent NOTE: The analysis of the financial statements by the department will at a minimum include: Calculation of selected financial ratios Review of accounting policies A review of credit history will be included in this analysis No items in Domains B through E cover Section 6.6.B.3 through 6.6.B.5. Domain C, Factor B, Item 3 covers Section 6.6.B.6. This item states: 3. History of maximization of Medicaid revenues. (See Section 6.6B.6) Points Standard No history Some experience Experienced Well documented history Domain C, Factor B, Item 4 covers Section 6.6.B.7. This item states: 4. Organization’s system of staff recruitment, training, evaluation and retention. (See Section 6.6B.7) Points Standard No system Incomplete system System in place Well developed / comprehensive system Domain C, Factor C, Item 2 covers Section 6.6.C.2. This item states: 2. Automated communication and record keeping systems. (See Section 6.6C.2) Points Standard No automated systems Limited automation, internal only Currently automated, limited external applications Comprehensive systems Petitioner and Intervenor attended the applicant’s conference, which was held on June 23, 2000. Respondent duly answered all questions of Petitioner and Intervenor. Petitioner timely submitted a response to the ITN on August 22, 2000, and Intervenor timely submitted a response to the ITN on August 24, 2000. These were the only responses to the ITN. Respondent opened the responses on August 25, 2000. Respondent initially disqualified Petitioner’s response by, letter dated August 29, 2000, on the erroneous ground that Petitioner had not attended the applicant’s conference. Withdrawing the August 29 letter, Respondent disqualified Petitioner’s response on other grounds, as cited in a letter dated September 6, 2000. The September 6 letter disqualifies Petitioner’s response because it omitted several items identified in three criteria contained in Appendix II, Domain A. The September 6 letter cites seven “mandatory elements from Section 6 that were referenced in Criteria [sic] 8,” but Respondent later cited only three omissions under Criterion 8: 6.6, B.2: only the 1998-1999 fiscal year audited financial statement was included. 6.6, B.5: Family Safety Program contract corrective action plans were not included. 6.6, B.7: a three year staff retention study was not included. Relying on Criteria 18 and 21, respectively, the September 6 letter cites the following grounds for disqualification of Petitioner’s response: Only two years of financial statements were included, but three were required. Incomplete documentation was provided. No evidence of compliance with the Family Services Program was found in the proposal. Petitioner timely filed a protest and formal written protest of Respondent’s disqualification of Petitioner’s response. Petitioner contends that the disqualification of its response was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, and capricious. In particular, Petitioner contends that Respondent applied more stringent standards in its examination of Petitioner’s response than it did in its examination of Intervenor's response. The introduction to Petitioner’s response identifies Bridgeway Center, Inc., as the proposed lead agency, and Foster America, Inc., as its presumably prime subcontractor, although Foster America, Inc., will do business in Florida under the name of Managed Family Services. The title page to Petitioner’s response identifies Bridgeway Center, Inc., and Managed Family Services as the “applicant organization.” Section 2.1.B of Petitioner’s response details the substantial experience of Foster America, Inc., as “the first company established in the United States to address the issues pertaining specifically to the management of foster care.” Considerable portions of the ensuing sections of Petitioner’s response describe the capabilities of Foster America, Inc., to meet the requirements of the ITN. Appendix 16 of Petitioner’s response is entitled “Three-Years of Financial Statements.” Appendix 16 consists of the following financial information for Bridgeway Center, Inc.: statements of financial position for fiscal years ending in 1996-99 and statements of activities for fiscal years ending in 1996-99. At the bottom of each of the four pages containing these statements is the declaration: “The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.” No notes accompany the financial statements contained in Appendix 16. Nothing in Petitioner’s response indicates that these financial statements were audited. These financial statements do not include a statement of functional expenses and statement of cash flows. The attached financial statements do not contain auditor’s reports describing the scope of the opinion. Appendix 18 of Petitioner’s response is entitled, “Most Recent Audit Reports with Management Response Including Evidence of Sound Credit Rating.” Pertaining to fiscal year ending 1999, this set of documents starts with an “independent auditor’s report, stating, among other things, that the financial statements “present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Bridgeway Center, Inc. as of June 30, 1999 and the statement of activities and its cash flows for the year then ended in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.” Following the main independent auditor’s report, the 1999 financial statements comprise a statement of financial position, statement of activities, statement of functional expenses, and statement of cash flows. Following the four financial statements, twelve pages of notes explain in detail many of the individual items contained in the financial statements. Following a nonrequired schedule of revenues, a schedule of expenditures of federal awards and other contract and grant activity, with accompanying notes, responds to the requirements of OMB Circular A-133. Following these items is another independent auditor’s report, also responding to the requirements of OMB Circular A-133. Next is another independent auditor’s report, responding to the state requirement that it opine as to management’s assertion of its compliance with state law. The final document in this set is a management letter from the auditor identifying deficiencies in internal controls, making recommendations for improving operating efficiency, and recording management’s response to each of these observations and recommendations. Strictly speaking, Appendix 18 of Petitioner’s response contains audited financial statements, including notes, only for the fiscal year ending in 1999. However, the statement of financial position and statement of cash flows contain the identical information for the fiscal years ending 1998 and 1999. The statement of activities contains nearly the same information for both years, adding for 1999 only a breakdown of which revenues are unrestricted and which are restricted. The statement of functional expenses contains considerably more detailed information for 1999. The main independent auditor’s report states: “Information for the year ended June 30, 1998, is presented for comparative purposes only and was extracted from the financial statements from that year, on which we presented an auditor’s report dated [approximately one year earlier].” Thus, Petitioner’s response contains audited financial statements only for the fiscal year ending in 1999, but also contains considerable, but not all, information from the audited financial statements for the preceding fiscal year. Petitioner’s response contains considerably less information for the fiscal year ending in 1997. The adequacy of Petitioner’s response, of course, depends on the determination of the specific requirements of the disqualification provisions. There is little agreement on these specific requirements. Respondent and Intervenor erroneously contend that Criterion 8 of Domain A incorporates by reference all of the requirements of Sections 6.1 through 6.9. However, Criterion 8 requires only that the “application followed the document structure listed” in these sections. Nothing in the record casts much light upon the meaning of “document structure.” At a minimum, though, the requirement that each application “follow” the “document structure” listed in Sections 6.1 through 6.9 would be an odd way of requiring that the application contain all of the items required in these sections. In opposition to this contention of Respondent and Intervenor, Petitioner identifies several scoring matrices that assign zero points to responses showing no evidence in response to a specific requirement within Sections 6.1 through 6.9. Petitioner reasons that the absence of evidence is tantamount to the omission of an item. Petitioner then concludes that it would make little sense if the absence of evidence, or omission of such an item, meant the disqualification of the application. Petitioner makes a good point here. The scoring matrices for items for which an omission explicitly means disqualification, such as financial statements, do not assign zero points for the omission of such items. The scoring matrices assign zero points for the omission of an item only as to items that are not explicitly the subject of disqualification. Petitioner relies upon the common definition of structure as, according to Webster’s III New College Dictionary (1995): “Something made up of a number of parts held or put together in a specific way. The manner in which parts are arranged or combined to form a whole.” This is a good definition of “structure” and helps define the meaning of the somewhat obscure phrase, “document structure.” It suffices for this case to determine that “document structure” does not mean each and every requirement contained in Sections 6.1 through 6.9. Most likely, “document structure” means only that each application has to contain documents corresponding to each of the requirements stated in each of these sections: i.e., a standard acknowledgement, title page, executive summary, table of contents and cross- reference table, organizational perspective, description of organizational capacity, proposed statement of work, proposed implementation plan, and all of the specified mandatory certifications. Thus, an applicant could avoid disqualification under Criterion 8 by, as to Section 6.6, including a document describing its organizational capacity, even though the document may have omitted certain items required under Section 6.6, such as professional affiliations of the applicant. Because “document structure” does not incorporate all of the Section 6 requirements into Criterion 8, Respondent has erroneously relied upon the first three, bulleted grounds for disqualification, which identify omissions of Section 6 requirements. Respondent and Intervenor have never contended that Petitioner’s response fails to satisfy the narrower interpretation given “document structure” in this recommended order. Thus, Criteria 18 and 21 are the only grounds on which Respondent could disqualify Petitioner’s response. Criterion 18 requires a “three [sic] history of financial statements.” This obvious typographical error did not obscure for Petitioner the intended meaning of this criterion: any application omitting three years of financial statements would be disqualified. The key question is exactly what the ITN requires, as to financial statements, to avoid disqualification. The failure of Criterion 6 to incorporate, among other provisions, the specific requirements of Sections 6.6.B.2 for a three-year history of “audited” financial statements is significant. Criterion 18 does not require “audited” financial statements, so, unless Criterion 18 incorporates Section 6.6.B.2 into the disqualifying criteria, the omission of audited financial statements, while possibly a scoring matter, is not a basis for disqualification. The identification of a requirement in Domain A does not equate to the identification of a near counterpart to that requirement in Sections 6.1 through 6.9. For example, Criterion 19, which requires disclosure of “any financial difficulties and extraordinary obligations,” has no counterpart in Section 6, or anywhere else in the ITN. Likewise, the portion of Criterion 22 requiring “evidence of sound credit rating” has no counterpart in Section 6, or anywhere else in the ITN. By adding new requirements for disqualification purposes, Domain A does not serve merely as a collection of references to requirements contained in Section 6 or elsewhere in the ITN. This means that it is not possible to read into or out a specific Domain-A requirement that resembles a specific Section-6 requirement those elements necessary to transform it into the Section-6 requirement. Therefore, except for the uncontroversial correction of the obvious typographical error, Criterion 18 is a complete statement of the disqualification requirement concerning financial statements. And Criterion 18 obviously omits the requirement in Section 6.6.B.2 that the financial statements be “audited.” For a not-for-profit corporation, a set of financial statements comprises four financial statements: a statement of financial position, statement of activities, statement of functional expenses, and statement of cash flows. Petitioner’s response contains a full set of the four, audited financial statements applicable to not-for-profit corporations, but only for the fiscal year ending in 1999. These 1999 financial statements are accompanied by all required independent auditor’s reports and notes. Petitioner’s response also contains the three prior years of two of the four financial statements--the statement of financial position (resembling what was traditionally known as the balance sheet for for-profit corporations) and the statement of activities (resembling what was traditionally known as the income statement for for-profit corporations). However, these additional financial statements are unaccompanied by notes and independent auditor’s reports. Petitioner’s response for 1997 and 1998 includes the two financial statements that provide the most information and for 1998 includes considerable information from one of the two missing financial statements. Criterion 18 does not explicitly require all of the financial statements that constitute a complete set of financial statements, so the omission of the information from the 1997 and 1998 financial statements is not necessarily disqualifying, at least if the information provided is substantially complete. The omission of the notes for 1997 and 1998 merits careful consideration. Petitioner’s auditor warns, on each financial statement, that the accompanying notes are an “integral” part of the financial statements. According to the American Heritage Dictionary (1981), “Integral” means: “Essential for completion; necessary to the whole constituent.” In other words, the financial statements submitted by Petitioner are not whole or complete without the accompanying notes. The notes accompanying the 1999 financial statements add explanatory material. Note 1 discloses that Bridgeway Center, Inc. is an accrual-basis taxpayer; values its inventory on the lower of cost or market basis on a last-in, first-out basis; and capitalizes all equipment expenditures over $500 and depreciates its fixed assets over stated cost-recovery periods. Note 3 schedules the receivables owed Bridgeway Center, Inc. by payor and, in the case of Respondent, program. Note 6 details notes payable and lines of credit with terms, interest rates, and monthly payments. Note 7 describes a bond payable in the amount of nearly $2 million. Note 8 identifies real estate leases and rental payments for which Bridgeway Center, Inc. is obligated. Note 10 itemizes by program the sources of income from the State of Florida. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, the determination of whether Petitioner’s response contains three years of financial statements is governed by the less- deferential standard of a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the more-deferential evidentiary standard of clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the omission of two financial statements for 1997 and the omission of some information from the same two financial statements for 1998 does not necessarily preclude its satisfaction of the disqualification requirement of three years of financial statements. However, Petitioner’s omission of the notes for 1997 and 1998 precludes its satisfaction of this disqualification criterion, even by a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner’s auditor describes the notes as “integral” to those selected financial statements that Petitioner submitted. Absent an integral part of the already-incomplete submission, Petitioner has failed to prove, even by the less deferential preponderance standard, that its response satisfies the requirement of Criterion 18 for three years of financial statements. Criterion 21 requires “[d]ocumentation of compliance with past departmental or Florida state contracts.” Appendix 19 of Petitioner’s response contains, by program type, 171 schedules identifying compliance issues, corrective action plans, responsible persons, and completion dates. Again, Respondent and Intervenor attempt to add elements from Section 6 to this disqualification criterion of documentation of compliance with past agency contracts. Both parties contend that Criterion 21 should be read in conjunction with Section 6.6.B.5, which requires: “Evidence of compliance with previous correction action plans proposed by [Respondent] through any contract.” For the reasons set forth above, it is impossible to engraft onto Criterion 21 the more demanding requirements of Section 6.6.B.5. In this instance, Respondent answered a question posed by Intervenor consistent with Respondent’s present interpretation of Criterion 21, but this answer--absent an accompanying amendment of the ITN--cannot override the clear disqualification requirement imposed by Criterion 21. Petitioner’s response omits corrective action plans related to contracts for the Family Services Program. This omission was inadvertent, occasioned by the death of the sole Bridgeway employee with knowledge of these matters. As for Criterion 21, Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that its response contains documentation of compliance with past agency contracts. Even if a substantiality requirement were inferred as to Criterion 21, Petitioner’s substantive response would still, by a preponderance of the evidence, satisfy this disqualification requirement. Criterion 21 does not incorporate the comprehensiveness required by Section 6.6.B.5, which requires information concerning “any contract.” Petitioner raises numerous challenges to Intervenor’s response. Partly, these challenges are intended to show how Respondent evaluated Petitioner’s response more stringently. Partly, these challenges are intended to show that Intervenor’s response should be disqualified, regardless of whether Petitioner prevails on its challenge to the disqualification of its response. The latter purpose of Petitioner’s challenges depends upon a ruling allowing it to amend its petition to raise the issue of whether Intervenor’s response should also be disqualified. In challenging Intervenor’s response, however, Petitioner repeats the same mistaken assumptions made by Respondent and Intervenor about the relationship between Domain A and Section 6. In fact, Petitioner extends these mistaken assumptions one level by faulting Intervenor’s response for failing to satisfy non-Domain A provisions that are not even applicable to responses to the ITN. The ITN imposes very few requirements upon ITN responses outside Section 6 and Domains A through E of Appendix II. The two such requirements are Section 2.2, which disqualifies certain applicants with unsatisfactory histories with Respondent; Section 2.6, which requires attendance at the applicant’s conference; Section 2.9, which sets the deadline for submitting responses; and Section 3.9 (first sentence), which requires that responses include proposed staffing for technical, administrative, and clerical support. Apart from some general background descriptions contained in the introductory sections of the ITN, the remainder of the ITN, apart from Section 6 and Domains A through E, deal with the start-up contract and the ultimate service contract. This orientation is amply revealed by frequent use in these provisions of the future tense and descriptions of the non-agency party as the “successful applicant,” “lead agency,” or “selected applicant.” In its proposed recommended order, Petitioner first challenges Intervenor’s response with respect to Criterion 22, which requires the most recent financial audit reports “complete with management response.” Criterion 22 is in Domain A, so it is a disqualification requirement. However, Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such a response is required when, as here, Intervenor’s auditor uncovered no material weaknesses or disagreements to which Intervenor was obligated to respond. In its proposed recommended order, Petitioner challenges Intervenor’s response with respect to Section 6.6.E.3, which addresses the ability of the applicant with respect to federal funding. This is not a Domain-A requirement. In fact, Petitioner’s contentions require application of ITN provisions apart from Section 6 and Domain A that involve the start-up process and are inapplicable to the present stage of this procurement. The deficiency described in the preceding paragraph characterizes the remainder of Petitioner’s challenges to Intervenor’s response, such as with respect to a staff- retention study and demonstration of infrastructure capability. It is thus unnecessary to consider the extent to which Intervenor’s response addresses these items. Based on these findings, Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent’s proposed determination disqualifying Petitioner’s response is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Based on these findings, Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent’s proposed determination failing to disqualify Intervenor’s response is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order dismissing the protest of Petitioner to the disqualification of its response to the ITN and to the failure to disqualify Intervenor’s response to the ITN. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Wilbur E. Brewton Kenneth J. Plante Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A. 225 South Adams Street, Suite 250 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Katie George Chief Legal Counsel Lori Lee Fehr Legal Counsel Department of Children and Family Services District 1 160 Government Center, Room 601 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Martha Harrell Chumbler Kelly A. Cruz-Brown Carlton Fields Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.595435.04 Florida Administrative Code (2) 60A -1.00260A-1.001
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SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 13-003030BID (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 15, 2013 Number: 13-003030BID Latest Update: Dec. 11, 2013

The Issue Whether the Department of Corrections? action to withdraw its Intent to Award and to reject all replies to ITN 12-DC-8396 is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, and if so, whether its Intent to Award is contrary to governing statutes, rules, policies, or the solicitation specifications.

Findings Of Fact The DOC is an agency of the State of Florida that is responsible for the supervisory and protective care, custody, and control of Florida?s inmate population. In carrying out this statutory responsibility, the Department provides access to inmate telephone services. On April 15, 2013, the DOC issued the ITN, entitled “Statewide Inmate Telephone Services, ITN 12-DC-8396,” seeking vendors to provide managed-access inmate telephone service to the DOC. Responses to the ITN were due to be opened on May 21, 2013. The DOC issued Addendum #1 to the ITN on April 23, 2013, revising one page of the ITN. The DOC issued Addendum #2 to the ITN on May 14, 2013, revising a number of pages of the ITN, and including answers to a number of vendor questions. EPSI, GTL, and Securus are providers of inmate telephone systems and services. Securus is the incumbent contractor, and has been providing the Department with services substantially similar to those solicited for over five years. No party filed a notice of protest to the terms, conditions, or specifications contained in the ITN or the Addenda within 72 hours of their posting or a formal written protest within 10 days thereafter. Replies to the ITN were received from EPSI, GTL, Securus, and Telmate, LLC. Telmate?s reply was determined to be not responsive to the ITN. Two-Part ITN As amended by Addendum #2, section 2.4 of the ITN, entitled “ITN Process,” provided that the Invitation to Negotiate process to select qualified vendors would consist of two distinct parts. In Part 1, an interested vendor was to submit a response that described certain Mandatory Responsiveness Requirement elements, as well as a Statement of Qualifications, Technical Response, and Financial Documentation. These responses would then be scored using established evaluation criteria and the scores would be combined with cost points assigned from submitted Cost Proposals. In Part 2, the Department was to select one or more qualified vendors for negotiations. After negotiations, the Department would request a Best and Final Offer from each vendor for final consideration prior to final award decision. The ITN provided that the Department could reject any and all responses at any time. High Commissions and Low Rates Section 2.5 of the ITN, entitled “Initial Cost Response,” provided in part: It is the Department?s intention, through the ITN process, to generate the highest percentage of revenue for the State, while ensuring a quality telephone service with reasonable and justifiable telephone call rate charges for inmate?s family and friends similar to those available to the public-at- large. Section 2.6 of the ITN, entitled “Revenue to be Paid to the Department,” provided in part that the Department intended to enter into a contract to provide inmate telephone service at no cost to the Department. It provided that, “[t]he successful Contractor shall pay to the Department a commission calculated as a percentage of gross revenues.”1/ The commission paid by a vendor is the single largest expense in the industry and is an important aspect of any bid. Contract Term Section 2.8 of the ITN was entitled “Contract Term” and provided: It is anticipated that the initial term of any Contract resulting from this ITN shall be for a five (5) year period. At its sole discretion, the Department may renew the Contract in accordance with Form PUR 1000 #26. The renewal shall be contingent, at a minimum, on satisfactory performance of the Contract by the Contractor as determined by the Department, and subject to the availability of funds. If the Department desires to renew the Contracts resulting from this ITN, it will provide written notice to the Contractor no later than thirty days prior to the Contract expiration date. Own Technology System Section 3.4 of the ITN provided in part: The successful Contractor is required to implement its own technology system to facilitate inmate telephone service. Due to the size and complexity of the anticipated system, the successful Contractor will be allowed a period of transition beginning on the date the contract is executed in which to install and implement the utilization of its own technology system. Transition, implementation and installation are limited to eighty (80) days. The Department realizes that some "down time" will occur during this transition, and Respondents shall propose an implementation plan that reduces this "down time" and allows for a smooth progression to the proposed ITS. GTL emphasizes the language stating that the successful contractor must implement “its own” technology system, and asserts that the technology system which EPSI offers to install is not owned by it, but by Inmate Calling Solutions, LLC (ICS), its subcontractor. However, EPSI demonstrated that while the inmate telephone platform, dubbed the “Enforcer System,” is owned by ICS now, that EPSI has a Master User Agreement with ICS and that an agreement has already been reached that before the contract would be entered into, a Statement of Work would be executed to create actual ownership in EPSI for purposes of the Florida contract. GTL alleges that in EPSI?s reply, EPSI relied upon the experience, qualifications, and resources of its affiliated entities in other areas as well. For example, GTL asserts that EPSI?s claim that it would be providing 83 percent of the manpower is false, since EPSI has acknowledged that EPSI is only a contracting subsidiary of CenturyLink, Inc., and that EPSI has no employees of its own. While it is clear that EPSI?s reply to the ITN relies upon the resources of its parent to carry out the terms of the contract with respect to experience, presence in the state, and personnel, EPSI demonstrated that this arrangement was common, and well understood by the Department. EPSI demonstrated that all required capabilities would be available to it through the resources of its parent and subcontractors at the time the contract was entered into, and that its reply was in conformance with the provisions of the ITN in all material respects. EPSI has the integrity and reliability to assure good faith performance of the contract. Call Recording Section 3.6 of the ITN, entitled “Inmate Telephone System Functionality (General),” provided in part: The system shall provide the capability to flag any individual telephone number in the inmate?s „Approved Number List? as „Do Not Record.? The default setting for each telephone number will be to record until flagged by Department personnel to the contrary. Securus alleges that section 3.6 of the ITN implements Department regulations2/ and that EPSI?s reply was non-responsive because it stated that recording of calls to specific telephone numbers would be deactivated regardless of who called that number. Securus alleges that this creates a security risk because other inmates calling the same number should still have their calls recorded. EPSI indicated in its reply to the ITN that it read, agreed, and would comply with section 3.6. While EPSI went on to say that this capability was not connected to an inmate?s PIN, the language of section 3.6 does not mention an inmate?s PIN either. Read literally, this section requires only the ability to “flag” any individual telephone number that appears in an inmate?s number list as “do not record” and requires that, by default, calls to a telephone number will be recorded until it is flagged. EPSI?s reply indicated it could meet this requirement. This provision says nothing about continuing to record calls to that same number from other inmates. Whether or not this creates a security risk or is what the Department actually desired are issues which might well be discussed as part of the negotiations, but this does not affect the responsiveness of EPSI?s reply to section 3.6. Furthermore, Mr. Cooper testified at hearing that EPSI does have the capability to mark a number as “do not record” only with respect to an individual inmate, at the option of the Department. EPSI?s reply conformed to the call-recording provisions of section 3.6 of the ITN in all material respects. Call Forwarding Section 3.6.8 of the ITN, entitled “System Restriction, Fraud Control and Notification Requirements,” provided that the provided inmate telephone services have the following security capability: Ability to immediately terminate a call if it detects that a called party?s telephone number is call forwarded to another telephone number. The system shall make a “notation” in the database on the inmate?s call. The system shall make this information available, in a report format, to designated department personnel. In response to an inquiry noting that, as worded, the ITN did not technically require a vendor to have the capability to detect call-forwarded calls in the first place, the Department responded that this functionality was required. Securus alleges that EPSI is unable to comply with this requirement, citing as evidence EPSI?s admission, made some months before in connection with an RFP being conducted by the Kansas Department of Corrections, that it did not yet have this capability. EPSI indicated in its reply to the ITN that it read, agreed, and would comply with this requirement. As for the Kansas solicitation, EPSI showed that it now possesses this capability, and has in fact installed it before. EPSI?s reply conformed to the call-forwarding provisions of section 3.6.8 of the ITN in all material respects. Keefe Commissary Network Section 5.2.1 of the ITN, entitled “Respondents? Business/Corporate Experience,” at paragraph e. directed each vendor to: [P]rovide and identify all entities of or related to the Respondent (including parent company and subsidiaries of the parent company; divisions or subdivisions of parent company or of Respondent), that have ever been convicted of fraud or of deceit or unlawful business dealings whether related to the services contemplated by this ITN or not, or entered into any type of settlement agreement concerning a business practice, including services contemplated by this ITN, in response to a civil or criminal action, or have been the subject of any complaint, action, investigation or suit involving any other type of dealings contrary to federal, state, or other regulatory agency regulations. The Respondent shall identify the amount of any payments made as part of any settlement agreement, consent order or conviction. Attachment 6 to the ITN, setting forth Evaluation Criteria, similarly provided guidance regarding the assessment of points for Business/Corporate Experience. Paragraph 1.(f) provided: “If any entities of, or related to, the Respondent were convicted of fraud or of deceit or unlawful business dealings, what were the circumstances that led to the conviction and how was it resolved by the Respondent?” Addendum #2. to the ITN, which included questions and answers, also contained the following: Question 57: In Attachment 6, Article 1.f. regarding respondents “convicted of fraud, deceit, or unlawful business dealing . . .” does this include associated subcontractors proposed in this ITN? Answer 57: Yes, any subcontractors you intend to utilize on this project, would be considered an entity of and related to your firm. As a proposed subcontractor, ICS is an entity of, or related to, EPSI. There is no evidence to indicate that ICS has ever been convicted of fraud or of deceit or unlawful business dealings. There is no evidence to indicate that ICS has entered into any type of settlement agreement concerning a business practice in response to a civil or criminal action. There is no evidence to indicate that ICS has been the subject of any complaint, action, investigation, or suit involving any other type of dealings contrary to federal, state, or other regulatory agency regulations. The only evidence at hearing as to convictions involved “two individuals from the Florida DOC” and “two individuals from a company called AIS, I think that?s American Institutional Services.” No evidence was presented that AIS was “an entity of or related to” EPSI. Conversely, there was no evidence that Keefe Commissary Network (KCN) or anyone employed by it was ever convicted of any crime. There was similarly no evidence that KCN entered into any type of settlement agreement concerning a business practice in response to civil or criminal action. It was shown that KCN “cooperated with the federal government in an investigation” that resulted in criminal convictions, and it is concluded that KCN was therefore itself a subject of an investigation involving any other type of dealings contrary to federal, state, or other regulatory agency regulations. However, KCN is not an entity of, or related to, EPSI. KCN is not a parent company of EPSI, it is not a division, subdivision, or subsidiary of EPSI, and it is not a division, subdivision, or subsidiary of EPSI?s parent company, CenturyLink, Inc. EPSI?s reply conformed to the disclosure requirements of section 5.2.1, Attachment 6, and Addendum #2 of the ITN in all material respects. Phases of the ITN Section 6 describes nine phases of the ITN: Phase 1 – Public Opening and Review of Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements Phase 2 – Review of References and Other Bid Requirements Phase 3 – Evaluations of Statement of Qualifications, Technical Responses, and Managed Access Solutions3/ Phase 4 – CPA Review of Financial Documentation Phase 5 – Review of Initial Cost Sheets Phase 6 – Determination of Final Scores Phase 7 – Negotiations Phase 8 – Best and Final Offers from Respondents Phase 9 – Notice of Intended Decision Evaluation Criteria in the ITN As amended by Addendum #2, the ITN established scoring criteria to evaluate replies in three main categories: Statement of Qualifications (500 points); Technical Response (400 points); and Initial Cost Sheets (100 points). It also provided specific guidance for consideration of the commissions and rates shown on the Initial Cost Sheet that made up the pricing category. Section 6.1.5 of the ITN, entitled “Phase 5 – Review of Initial Cost Sheet,” provided in part: The Initial Cost Proposal with the highest commission (percentage of gross revenue) to be paid to the Department will be awarded 50 points. The price submitted in Table 1 for the Original Contract Term, and the subsequent renewal price pages for Table 1 will be averaged to determine the highest commission submitted. All other commission percentages will receive points according to the following formula: (X/N) x 50 = Z Where: X = Respondents proposed Commission Percentage to be Paid. N = highest Commission Percentage to be Paid of all responses submitted. Z = points awarded. * * * The Initial Cost Proposal with the lowest telephone rate charge will be awarded 50 points. The price submitted in Table 1 for the Original Contract Term, and the subsequent renewal price pages for Table 1 will be averaged to determine the highest commission submitted. All other cost responses will receive points according to the following formula: (N/X) x 50 = Z Where: N = lowest verified telephone rate charge of all responses submitted. X = Respondent?s proposed lowest telephone rate charge. Z = points awarded. The ITN as amended by Addendum #2 provided instructions that initial costs should be submitted with the most favorable terms the Respondent could offer and that final percentages and rates would be determined through the negotiation process. It included the following chart:4/ COST PROPOSAL INITIAL Contract Term 5 years ONE Year Renewal TWO Year Renewal THREE Year Renewal FOUR Year Renewal FIVE Year Renewal Initial Department Commission % Rate Proposed Initial Blended Telephone Rate for All Calls* (inclusive of surcharges) The ITN, including its Addenda, did not specify selection criteria upon which the determination of best value to the state would be based. Allegation that EPSI Reply was Misleading On the Certification/Attestation Page, each vendor was required to certify that the information contained in its reply was true and sufficiently complete so as not to be misleading. While portions of its reply might have provided more detail, EPSI did not mislead the Department regarding its legal structure, affiliations, and subcontractors, or misrepresent what entity would be providing technology or services if EPSI was awarded the contract. EPSI?s reply explained that EPSI was a wholly owned corporate subsidiary of CenturyLink, Inc., and described many aspects of the contract that would be performed using resources of its parent, as well as aspects that would be performed through ICS as its subcontractor. Department Evaluation of Initial Replies The information on the Cost Proposal table was reviewed and scored by Ms. Hussey, who had been appointed as the procurement manager for the ITN. Attempting to follow the instructions provided in section 6.1.5, she added together the six numbers found in the boxes indicating commission percentages on the Cost Proposal sheets. One of these boxes contained the commission percentage for the original five-year contract term and each of the other five boxes contained the commission percentage for one of the five renewal years. She then divided this sum by six, the number of boxes in the computation chart (“divide by six”). In other words, she calculated the arithmetic mean of the six numbers provided in each proposal. The Department had not intended for the commission percentages to be averaged in this manner. Instead, they had intended that a weighted mean would be calculated. That is, they intended that five times the commission percentage shown for the initial contract term would be added to the commission percentages for the five renewal years, with that sum then being divided by ten, the total number of years (“divide by ten”). The Department did not clearly express this intent in section 6.1.5. Mr. Viefhaus testified that based upon the language, Securus believed that in Phase 5 the Department would compute the average commission rate the way that Ms. Hussey actually did it, taking the arithmetic mean of the six commission percentages provided by each vendor, and that therefore Securus prepared its submission with that calculation in mind.5/ Mr. Montanaro testified that based upon the language, GTL believed that in Phase 5 the Department would “divide by ten,” that is, compute the weighted mean covering the ten-year period of the contract, and that GTL filled out its Cost Proposal table based upon that understanding. The DOC posted a notice of its intent to negotiate with GTL, Securus, and EPSI on June 3, 2013. Telmate, LLC, was not chosen for negotiations.6/ Following the Notice of Intent to Negotiate was this statement in bold print: Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, or failure to post the bond or other security required by law within the time allowed for filing a bond shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. On June 14, 2013, the DOC issued a Request for Best and Final Offers (RBAFO), directing that Best and Final Offers (BAFO) be provided to the DOC by June 18, 2013. Location-Based Services The RBAFO included location-based services of called cell phones as an additional negotiated service, requesting a narrative description of the service that could be provided. The capability to provide location-based services had not been part of the original ITN, but discussions took place as part of the negotiations. Securus contends that EPSI was not a responsible vendor because it misrepresented its ability to provide such location-based services through 3Cinteractive, Inc. (3Ci). EPSI demonstrated that it had indicated to the Department during negotiations that it did not have the capability at that time, but that the capability could easily be added. EPSI showed that due to an earlier call it received from 3Ci, it believed that 3Ci would be able to provide location- based services to it. EPSI was also talking at this time to another company, CTI, which could also provide it that capability. In its BAFO, EPSI indicated it could provide these services, explained that they would require payments to a third- party provider, and showed a corresponding financial change to their offer. No competent evidence showed whether or not 3Ci was actually able to provide that service on behalf of EPSI, either at the time the BAFO was submitted, or earlier. EPSI showed that it believed 3Ci was available to provide that service, however, and there is no basis to conclude that EPSI in any way misrepresented its ability to provide location-based services during negotiations or in its BAFO. Language of the RBAFO The RBAFO provided in part: This RBAFO contains Pricing, Additional Negotiated Services, and Value Added Services as discussed during negotiation and outlined below. The other specifications of the original ITN, unless modified in the RBAFO, remain in effect. Respondents are cautioned to clearly read the entire RBAFO for all revisions and changes to the original ITN and any addenda to specifications, which are incorporated herein and made a part of this RBAFO document. Unless otherwise modified in this Request for Best and Final Offer, the initial requirements as set forth in the Department?s Invitation to Negotiate document and any addenda issued thereto have not been revised and remain as previously indicated. Additionally, to the extent that portions of the ITN have not been revised or changed, the previous reply/initial reply provided to the Department will remain in effect. These two introductory paragraphs of the RBAFO were confusing. It was not clear on the face of the RBAFO whether “other specifications” excluded only the pricing information to be supplied or also the specifications indicating how that pricing information would be calculated or evaluated. It was not clear whether “other specifications” were the same thing as “initial requirements” which had not been revised. It was not clear whether scoring procedures constituted “specifications.” While it was clear that, to the extent not revised or changed by the RBAFO, initial replies that had been submitted -- including Statements of Qualifications, Technical Response, Financial Documentation, and Cost Proposals -- would “remain in effect,” it was not clear how, if at all, these would be considered in determining the best value to the State. In the RBAFO under the heading “PRICING,” vendors were instructed to provide their BAFO for rates on a provided Cost Proposal table which was virtually identical to the table that had been provided earlier in the ITN for the evaluation stage, including a single square within which to indicate a commission rate for the initial five-year contract term, and five squares within which to indicate commission rates for each of five renewal years. The RBAFO stated that the Department was seeking pricing that would provide the “best value to the state.” It included a list of 11 additional services that had been addressed in negotiations and stated that, “in order to provide the best value to the state,” the Department reserved the right to accept or reject any or all of these additional services. It provided that after BAFOs were received, the Negotiation Team would prepare a summary of the negotiations and make a recommendation as to which vendor would provide the “best value to the state.” The RBAFO did not specify selection criteria upon which the determination of best value to the State would be based. In considering commission percentages as part of their determination as to which vendor would receive the contract, the Negotiation Team decided not to consider commissions that had been listed by vendors for the renewal years, concluding that the original five-year contract term was all that was assured, since renewals might or might not occur. On June 25, 2013, the DOC posted its Notice of Agency Decision stating its intent to award a contract to EPSI. Protests and the Decision to Reject All Replies Subsequent to timely filing notices of intent to protest the intended award, Securus and GTL filed Formal Written Protests with the DOC on July 5 and 8, 2013, respectively. The Department considered and compared the protests. It determined that language in the ITN directing that in Phase 5 the highest commission would be determined by averaging the price for the original contract term with the prices for the renewal years was ambiguous and flawed. It determined that use of a table with six squares as the initial cost sheet was a mistake. The Department determined that the language and structure of the RBAFO could be read one way to say that the Department would use the same methodology to evaluate the pricing in the negotiation stage as had been used to evaluate the Initial Cost sheets in Phase 5, or could be read another way to mean that BAFO pricing would not be evaluated that way. It determined that the inclusion in the RBAFO of a table virtually identical to the one used as the initial cost sheet was a mistake. The Department determined that the language and the structure of the RBAFO could be read one way to require further consideration of such factors as the Statement of Qualifications and Technical Response in determining best value to the State, or could be read another way to require no further consideration of these factors. The Department prepared some spreadsheets demonstrating the varying results that would be obtained using “divide by six” and “divide by ten” and also considered a spreadsheet that had been prepared by Securus. The Department considered that its own Contract Manager had interpreted the Phase 5 instructions to mean “divide by six,” while the Department had actually intended the instructions to mean “divide by ten.” The Department had intended that the Negotiation Team give some weight to the renewal-year pricing, and had included the pricing table in the RBAFO for that reason, not simply to comply with statutory requirements regarding renewal pricing. The Department determined that the way the RBAFO was written and the inclusion of the chart required at least some consideration of ten-year pricing, and that vendors had therefore been misled when the Negotiation Team gave no consideration to the commission percentages for the renewal years. Specifically, based upon the Securus protest, the Department determined that the RBAFO language had been interpreted by Securus to require that the Phase 5 calculation of average commission percentage be carried over to evaluation of the pricing in the BAFOs, which Securus had concluded meant “divide by six.” The Department further determined that based upon the GTL protest, the RBAFO language had been interpreted by GTL to require the Department to consider the renewal years in pricing, as well as such things as the Statement of Qualifications and Technical Response in the BAFO stage. The Department determined that had “divide by six” been used in evaluating the BAFOs, Securus would have a computed percentage of 70 percent, higher than any other vendor. The Department concluded that the wording and structure of the ITN and RBAFO did not create a level playing field to evaluate replies because they were confusing and ambiguous and were not understood by everyone in the same way. Vendors naturally had structured their replies to maximize their chances of being awarded the contract based upon their understanding of how the replies would be evaluated. The Department concluded that vendor pricing might have been different but for the misleading language and structure of the ITN and RBAFO. The Department did not compute what the final award would have been had it applied the scoring procedures for the initial cost sheets set forth in section 6.1.5 to the cost elements of the BAFOs. The Department did not compute what the final award would have been had it applied the scoring procedures for the Statement of Qualifications and Technical Response set forth in section 6.1.3 to the BAFOs. Ms. Bailey testified that while she had originally approved the ITN, she was unaware of any problems, and that it was only later, after the protests to the Notice of Intended Award had been filed and she had reviewed the specifications again, that she had come to the conclusion that the ITN and RBAFO were flawed. Following the protests of the intended award by GTL and Securus, on July 23, 2013, the DOC posted to the Vendor Bid System a Notice of Revised Agency Decision stating the DOC?s intent to reject all replies and reissue the ITN. On August 5, 2013, EPSI, GTL, and Securus filed formal written protests challenging DOC?s intended decision to reject all replies. Securus subsequently withdrew its protest to DOC?s rejection of all replies. As the vendor initially notified that it would receive the contract, EPSI?s substantial interests were affected by the Department's subsequent decision to reject all replies. GTL alleged the contract had wrongly been awarded to EPSI and that it should have received the award, and its substantial interests were affected by the Department's subsequent decision to reject all replies. The Department did not act arbitrarily in its decision to reject all replies. The Department did not act illegally, dishonestly, or fraudulently in its decision to reject all replies. EPSI would likely be harmed in any re-solicitation of bids relative to its position in the first ITN, because potential competitors would have detailed information about EPSI?s earlier reply that was unavailable to them during the first ITN. An ITN requires a great deal of work by the Department and creates a big demand on Department resources. The decision to reject all replies was not undertaken lightly. The State of Florida would likely benefit in any new competitive solicitation7/ because all vendors would be aware of the replies that had been submitted earlier in response to the ITN, and bidders would likely try to improve upon those proposals to improve their chances of being awarded the contract.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Corrections issue a final order finding that the rejection of all replies submitted in response to ITN 12-DC-8396 was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, and dismissing all four protests. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2013.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57287.012287.057
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ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs MONICA MAHTANI, 10-009244TTS (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 22, 2010 Number: 10-009244TTS Latest Update: Apr. 29, 2011

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Orange County School Board (Petitioner) has just cause to terminate the employment of teacher, Monica Mahtani (Respondent).

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was employed as a first grade classroom teacher at Shingle Creek Elementary School (SCES) by the Petitioner under a professional services contract. According to performance evaluations, the Respondent has been considered as an effective teacher. The Respondent was on authorized medical leave from May 3, 2010, through June 4, 2010. The Respondent did not return to work on June 7, 2010, and was absent from that date through June 11, 2010. Attempts by school personnel to contact the Respondent during June 7 through June 11, 2010, and to determine her whereabouts were unsuccessful. By letter to the Respondent dated June 11, 2010, the SCES principal noted that the Respondent's approved leave had expired on June 4, 2010. The letter advised the Respondent that, because school personnel had been unable to contact the Respondent and no documentation to support the unapproved absence had been submitted, the unapproved absence was being classified as unauthorized leave without pay. In response to the principal's letter, the Respondent submitted a document dated June 23, 2010, purporting to be authored by "The Providers at Orlando Behavioral Healthcare," which stated that the Respondent had been under the care of doctors and therapists at the facility for a period of time including June 7 through June 11, 2010. The document was not printed on letterhead paper and bore no signature. Upon review of the document and after contacting officials at Orlando Behavioral Healthcare (OBH), the Petitioner determined that the document dated June 23, 2010, was not generated by OBH. Upon inquiry at a predetermination meeting conducted on August 18, 2010, the Respondent insisted that the document was genuine and had been provided by OBH. At a termination meeting conducted on August 31, 2010, the Respondent admitted that she had generated the document. No one from OBH was involved in the creation of the June 23, 2010, document. At the time the Respondent falsified the document, she knew the difference between right and wrong and knew that creating the document was wrong. At the hearing, the Respondent asserted that she submitted a written request for leave for the period of June 7 through June 11, 2010, but there was no documentation or additional testimony offered in support of the assertion, and it has not been credited. The Respondent testified that certain medications may have affected decisions underlying the circumstances at issue in this proceeding, but there was no credible medical or pharmacological evidence offered in support of the assertion, and the testimony has not been credited. Because the Respondent falsified the document and then insisted upon inquiry that the document was authentic, the SCES principal testified, without contradiction, that she did not believe that the Respondent could be trusted. The principal testified that she would be "very uncomfortable" were the Respondent returned to teach in the SCES classroom. The testimony has been credited.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Orange County School Board enter a final order, terminating the employment of Monica Mahtani. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Derek B. Brett, Esquire Egan, Lev & Siwica, P.A. Post Office Box 2231 Orlando, Florida 32802 John C. Palmerini, Esquire Orange County School Board 445 West Amelia Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Lois Tepper, Acting General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Ronald (Ron) Blocker, Superintendent Orange County School Board 445 West Amelia Street Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (6) 1012.331012.391012.561012.57120.569120.57
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PROFESSIONAL TESTING SERVICE, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 91-007429BID (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 18, 1991 Number: 91-007429BID Latest Update: Jan. 24, 1992

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background On August 16, 1991, respondent, Department of Professional Regulation (DPR), issued Request for Proposal No. 92-002 (RFP) to various firms inviting them to submit proposals for assisting DPR and the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) in the production and scoring of the Florida Real Estate and Appraisal Examination for the period beginning January 1, 1992, through June 30, 1993, with a renewal option for one to two years. More specifically, the contract called for the successful firm to develop examinations from a bank of questions provided by the Commission, administer periodic examinations, score and analyze tests, and perform other related support services. Such proposals were to filed no later than 2:00 p.m. on September 20, 1991. Thereafter, and in accordance with the RFP, a six-person committee composed of representatives of the DPR, Commission and Division of Real Estate (Division) would evaluate the proposals and make a recommendation to the Secretary of DPR, who retained final authority to award the contract. Proposals were timely filed by three firms, including petitioner, Professional Testing Service, Inc. (PTS), Applied Measurement Professionals, Inc. (AMP), and National Assessment Institute (NAI). After these proposals were evaluated by the committee, AMP was recommended for award of the contract. By a 4-3 vote, the Commission concurred with this recommendation. On October 24, 1991, the Secretary of DPR selected AMP as the recipient of the contract, and notice to that effect was posted. Citing various alleged irregularities in the review process, PTS filed its formal protest to the award of the contract on November 4, 1991. After efforts to informally resolve this dispute were unsuccessful, this proceeding ensued. The Vendors Who Submitted Proposals Petitioner is a Florida corporation with offices located at 223 Pasadena Place, Orlando, Florida. It has provided various licensure examination services to DPR for the past eighteen years. Except for a two year break in 1984 and 1985, for the last eleven years PTS has held the contract with DPR to provide licensure examination services on the real estate examination, and pending resolution of this dispute, it continues to provide such services. AMP did not intervene as a party in this cause. However, according to its proposal, AMP is a Kansas corporation with offices at 8310 Nieman Road, Lenexa, Kansas, and has been in the business of developing and administering examinations since 1984. Among other things, it now provides assistance to the State of Michigan for the real estate licensure examination. AMP maintains no offices or personnel in the State of Florida. Although NAI submitted a response to the RFP, it is not a party to this action. Located in Clearwater, Florida, with branch offices in other cities in Florida and throughout the country, NAI has provided assessment services to various state governments since 1976. It has administered the DPR contractor examination for the last fourteen years. Events Leading to the Issuance of RFP 92-002 In May 1991, DPR issued RFP 91-009 requesting proposals for assistance in the development and administering of real estate examinations. That RFP requested proposals on three components of the real estate examination services, including (a) application processing, (b) test development, grading and review, and (c) administration of the examination. Items (a) and (c) and a portion of item (b) had previously been handled by the Division, the administrative arm of the Commission. In response to RFP 91-009, proposals were filed by PTS, AMP, NAI, and two other vendors. PTS was recommended for award of the contract as to two components while AMP was recommended for the award of the contract as to one component even though its proposal had been deemed to be nonresponsive. However, DPR eventually decided to reject all proposals and issue a new RFP. The new RFP (91-002) did not call for proposals on items (a) and (c) and the test development portion of item (b) since the Division determined that it would continue to perform those functions. Even so, while RFP 91-002 was more narrow in scope of services than was 91-009, it nonetheless contained some of the same terms, conditions and requirements as did the earlier RFP. It is also noted that, with one minor exception relating to on-site grading, the scope of services under the existing contract held by PTS and those enumerated in RFP 91- 002 are the same. Prior to the time for submitting responses to RFP 91-009, the Division, whose director was designated as contract manager, and Commission conducted a pre-bid conference with interested vendors to answer questions concerning the RFP. Both RFP 91-009 and 91-002 contained an identical requirement that the successful firm "(m)aintain an office/center in the greater Orlando area." In response to a question by a vendor as to whether DPR would "accept proposals that identify Tallahassee as the office/center site for the provider's office in lieu of Orlando", the response given was "no, Orlando is the designated site." Other questions and answers concerning the same topic were as follows: Q. Would the Department consider allowing the contractor (for application processing function only) to maintain offices in Tallahassee instead of Orlando, provided that 1)regular meetings are held in Orlando, and 2) reports can be delivered to the Department's offices in Orlando? A. No. Because the application processing function relating to deficient applications must be closely coordinated with the records section, the investigative section, the legal section, administrative section of the Division of Real Estate and the Florida Real Estate Commission. Florida Statutes require that the office of the Division of Real Estate and the Florida Real Estate Commission be located in Orlando. Therefore, Divisional functions must be performed in the Orlando area. Q. Is Orlando the only site the Department will agree to, or is the Department flexible to the location if all requirements can be met from another site in the State of Florida? Orlando is the only site. The above questions and answers, together with others asked and answered at the conference, were transcribed by DPR and then furnished to all interested vendors. Since AMP filed a proposal in response to RFP 91-009, it may be reasonably inferred that AMP was privy to the above clarifying information. It is noted that there was no pre-bid conference prior to the filing of proposals in response to RFP 91-002. The RFP A copy of RFP 91-002 is found on pages 90 through 108 of petitioner's composite exhibit 1. The RFP includes sections relating to statement of need, purpose, scope of work, DPR responsibilities, provider responsibilities, general information, documents required in submitting a proposal, the proposal format, proposal rating criteria, and an appendix delineating the manner in which points would be awarded in the evaluation process. Prior to the submission of the proposals, no vendor formally challenged any provision in the RFP as being unreasonable, ambiguous, or otherwise unlawful in any respect. A number of provisions within RFP 91-002 are relevant to this controversy and are cited below. First, there is a general requirement found in Article VIII which requires all responses to be prepared in a manner consistent with the requirements of the RFP. More specifically, this article provided that Respondents must follow the proposal format as set forth under Section III in this request for proposal. The provider shall refer to the request for proposal to ensure all required information is submitted. By following the designed format of proposals, respondents will have a uniform method of presenting information helping assure complete fairness by the review team in evaluating proposals. Next, Article VII set forth those documents that were required to be submitted with the proposal. Among them was a requirement in paragraph 1 that the vendor submit "evidence that the organization is a legal entity." The purpose of this requirement was to ensure that DPR could enforce the agreement in the event the successful firm later attempted to back out of its commitment. The RFP also prescribed twenty-three major services that were within the scope of work to be provided by the successful firm. Indeed, the RFP stated in unequivocal language that "(t)he provider shall perform the following services as outlined below." (Emphasis added) Specifically, paragraphs 22 and 23 of Article III specified that the successful firm would Furnish to each candidate an unofficial grade report at the examination site at no additional cost to the candidate according to specifications approved by the Department. Maintain an office/center in the greater Orlando area. These two requirements, both unambiguous, were reasonably construed by participating vendors to mean that (a) the successful firm would furnish, at no cost to the candidate, on-site grade reports to those candidates who desired an unofficial grade after the examination was completed, and (b) the successful firm would maintain an office in the Orlando area to provide technical and other assistance to Commission and Division personnel regarding the examination. The interpretation as to paragraph 23 was especially reasonable since it conformed to clarifying information given to vendors at the pre-bid conference prior to the submission of proposals for RFP 91-009. Finally, despite DPR's contention to the contrary at hearing, the requirements in paragraphs 22 and 23 were considered material by the Division and Commission. From DPR's perspective, an important consideration was the costs to be charged both the candidate who sat for the examination and the candidate who made application but did not take the examination. This was because DPR's experience indicated that each year a large number of candidates apply for the examination but then fail to appear and sit for the examination. Indeed, during the most recent fiscal year of record, DPR had received 38,886 applications to take the various real estate and appraiser examinations but almost 3,000 did not appear. These figures were contained in RFP 91-009 and thus were available to all vendors, including AMP. Accordingly, DPR inserted a provision in the RFP directing each vendor to develop a cost schedule reflecting the cost for both the candidates scheduled for examination and the candidates who were actually examined. This material requirement was embodied in paragraph 1 of Article VI, which provided the following instructions to the vendors: The costs schedule for this proposal shall be priced on a per candidate examined for the first year and each of the option years provided. *Differences between the number of candidates scheduled for exam and the number of candidates examined shall be compensated for at a specific rate per candidate to be set forth by the provider.* (Emphasis added between *) The above provision was consistent with the manner in which the existing contract holder (PTS) had calculated its candidate costs for DPR during the preceding five years. Very simply, this meant that the proposal had to include one cost figure for candidates examined and another cost figure for scheduled candidates who did not appear. In calculating the costs for scheduled candidates, Appendix I, Section IV, page 3 of 3, required that all vendors develop a cost for services, including a "cost per candidate scheduled" to be made up of eight cost components: scan sheet costs, examination booklet production costs, scanning and microfilming costs, on-site grading costs, scoring costs, grade reporting/grade summary costs, security costs, and item bank maintenance costs. Therefore, each vendor was required to segregrate its costs per candidate into the eight prescribed categories, with the sum of those eight components representing the total costs per candidate scheduled. The Responses A copy of AMP's proposal filed on September 20, 1991, is found at pages 257 through 392 of petitioner's exhibit 1. In response to the requirement that the vendor give "evidence that the organization is a legal entity", AMP responded that it was a private stock corporation incorporated in 1982 in the State of Kansas. Although AMP represented that "a Certificate of Good Standing with the State of Kansas is available upon request," no such certificate was enclosed with its proposal. Documentation offered by PTS confirmed that AMP is not a Florida corporation, and there is no evidence to show that AMP, as an out- of-state corporation, has registered with the Department of State to transact business in the State of Florida. In its proposal, AMP provided an overall price "per candidate" but failed to differentiate between the costs incurred for candidates examined and candidates who were scheduled to take the examination but did not appear. This was contrary to the requirement in Article VI that such costs be identified for both categories and caused the proposal to be nonresponsive in a material respect. Although the RFP specifically required the vendor to set out eight cost components in developing the cost per candidate scheduled, AMP submitted nine specific costs as follows: 1. Test Development $3.72 2. Scan Sheet 0.10 3. Examination Booklet Production 2.47 4. Scanning 1.01 5. Scoring 1.05 6. Grade Tape Preparation 0.43 7. Security 0.32 8. Item Bank Maintenance 0.50 9. On-Site Grading 0.20 TOTAL $9.80 It should be noted that the first item, "Test Development" costs, which included 38 percent of AMP's total price, was not a category contained in or authorized by the RFP. Thus, the proposal was nonresponsive in this material respect. According to its proposal, AMP did not intend to maintain an office/center in the greater Orlando area. Rather, it proposed that: as an alternative to staffing an office in Orlando, AMP proposes to conduct regular monthly meetings in Orlando with the Division and key AMP project staff, typically the doctorate level Program Director and a Test Development Specialist. AMP will bring its portable computer equipment, and paper and computer files of the draft test and the item banks to these meetings. Any changes to examinations, as required by the Division, can then be immediately made in the draft tests and reviewed by the Division. It is AMP's opinion that this procedure will provide the Division with the direct responsiveness desired, and ensure efficient communication between the Division and the key project staff, without information being filtered through a lesser qualified individual in a satellite office. Additional urgent concerns can be discussed using the telephone or FAX equipment with the Program Director. (page 272, petitioner's exhibit 1) By filing this response, AMP contravened the material requirement in paragraph 23 of Article III that it maintain an office/center in the greater Orlando area. In response to the material requirement that it "furnish to each candidate an unofficial grade report at the examination site at no additional cost to the candidate according to specifications approved by the Department", AMP responded that it would: train the Department's test administration personnel to use this equipment to this end . . . . AMP's cost proposal is based on using the Department's personnel. If this is not possible, an additional per candidate fee will be determined based on using AMP personnel. Thus, AMP's response unilaterally modified the RFP requirement that AMP personnel rather than DPR personnel perform the task of providing unofficial grade reports at the examination site. Moreover, AMP's proposal did not state what its price per candidate would be if DPR enforced the RFP requirement. Under AMP's proposal, it calculated a cost of 20 cents per candidate for providing this service assuming DPR personnel were used. This was $2.27 less per candidate than the charge given by PTS ($2.47). Thus, AMP gained an economic advantage by its failure to provide on-site grading with its own personnel. Accordingly, this portion of the proposal was nonresponsive. The proposal of PTS was responsive to the RFP in all respects. This finding was not contradicted by DPR. It is noteworthy that two potential vendors, H. H. Block & Associates, Inc., a Gainesville, Florida firm, and Psychological Services, Inc., a firm located in Glendale, California, both advised DPR in writing that because of the requirement in the RFP that the successful vendor locate a center/office in the greater Orlando area, they would not be filing a proposal. The latter two vendors were obviously prejudiced by DPR's failure to advise them that it did not intend to enforce the requirement in paragraph 23 of Article III. This failure by DPR to enforce the provision also gave AMP an economic advantage over other vendors since AMP did not have to incur the costs of operating an Orlando office. The Evaluation Process The committee selected to evaluate the proposals was made up of six individuals appointed by the Secretary of DPR. It met in Tallahassee on September 30, 1991, to evaluate the proposals. The committee was chaired by Ella D. Hall, a DPR psychometrician. In accordance with the instructions in the RFP, the committee reviewed only the technical aspects of the proposals and did not review the cost data. Article IX of the RFP outlined the responsibilities of the evaluation committee and the procedure for evaluating proposals. Among other things, the committee was assigned the responsibility to: first determine if all required documents are included, that the proposal format is followed, and that all responses to the request's responsibilities of the provider are properly addressed. The cost data will not be reviewed as part of the technical evaluation. The committee utilized both a scoring guide and an evaluation guide in arriving at its recommendation. A total of 300 possible points were to be given to a vendor, of which 226 were related to technical matters. As noted above, the committee did not consider cost in its evaluation. Contrary to Article IX of the RFP, the committee did not initially determine whether the proposals were responsive. More specifically, the committee did not "first determine if all required documents (were) included, that the proposal format (was) followed, and that all responses to the request's responsibilities of the provider (were) properly addressed." According to the committee's chairperson, the committee was never told to determine if the proposals were responsive before evaluating them on their merits. Indeed, the chairperson assumed, albeit incorrectly, that someone else had previously evaluated the proposals in terms of responsiveness. As it turned out, none of the proposals were evaluated for responsiveness prior to or during the committee evaluation process. Through its chairperson, the committee issued a written report on October 9, 1991, recommending that AMP be awarded the contract. Although the committee considered the responses by AMP and PTS to be almost equal in terms of technical ratings, it gave a slight edge to AMP's proposal in the cost rating and recommended that AMP be awarded the contract. NAI was a very distant third in the evaluation process. Because of the committee's report, and AMP's announcement on October 16, 1991, as discussed below, that its price per candidate scheduled but not examined would be zero, the Commission voted 4-3 to endorse the committee's recommendation. The Secretary received the proposals in that posture. Events Occurring After the Committee Evaluation On October 4, 1991, or before the contract was awarded but after the committee evaluation was completed, AMP's president, Steven K. Bryant, sent a letter to the Secretary of DPR. The letter was received by DPR on October 9, 1991, and a copy of same has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit It provides in relevant part as follows: Dear Secretary Stuart: At the request of Lou Ritter, I am writing to you due to our concerns about the opportunity for our company to fairly compete for testing services business in your state. The recent rebidding of the Florida Cosmetology and Real Estate Programs have generated some serious questions in my mind as to whether or not it is in our interest to continue to respond to Florida RFPs. I hope you will investigate the following concerns and use the power of your office to correct these circumstances: The second RFP regarding real estate was clearly written to ensure that the current vendor retains the contract. The requirement that the vendor have an office in Orlando staffed by an individual whose only job would be to serve as a liaison with the Real Estate Commission makes it basically impossible for any organization based outside of the state of Florida to compete with the current vendor. An organization such as ours cannot afford to put a doctorate level individual in an office in Florida to be at the beck and call of the Real Estate Commission to answer examination development questions and economically survive. At best, we could put a clerical person in an office in Orlando who would be unable to answer any of the Commission's test development concerns. In our response to the RFP, we indicated that we would not establish an Orlando office, but would provide a doctoral level measurement expert and a test development specialist to meet once a month with the Real Estate Commission to revise the real estate examinations to their specifications using very highly qualified individuals. The second real estate RFP also requires that the examination booklets be printed and shipped to Florida examination centers within a seven day time frame, after the examinations are reviewed by the Real Estate Commission. This item was clearly written for the current vendor, which is basically photocopying examination materials as soon as the Commission provides approval on examination copy. There is no real reason why the examinations could not be reviewed and approved by the state to allow a longer time frame for printing, so that higher quality offset printed examination booklets could be prepared and shipped to Florida by a vendor residing out of state. In fact, we could provide several months of examinations in advance for the Commission's approval and avoid the crisis mode of printing which a seven day turnaround would cause. Although, we could provide the seven day turnaround through the use of overnight air carriers and the like, clearly the Real Estate Commission had in mind the current vendor when making this unreasonable requirement. * * * The letter also carries a handwritten note by the Secretary in the upper right hand corner which reads "Discussed with Lou Ritter/Steve Bryant - file 10/21". According to the Secretary, Ritter (a former Secretary of DPR) is now a consultant for AMP. The Secretary acknowledged that he spoke with Ritter and Bryant concerning the letter and advised them the agency was proceeding with the RFP. The Secretary's assertion that he followed up on the letter only to the extent that he wanted to ascertain if AMP had been unfairly penalized in the evaluation process was not contradicted. On October 16, 1991, Bryant sent a second letter on behalf of AMP to the Secretary of DPR. It read as follows: Dear Secretary Stuart: This is to confirm our telephone discussion regarding our price proposal for RFP #92-002 (sic) for Real Estate Examination Services. Since the RFP calls for AMP to provide examination booklets to the test centers the department administers, it was our intention to charge the state $9.80 per candidate tested, based on the number of answer sheets actually scored by AMP. Thus, there would not be a charge for candidates who do not appear for testing. Thank you for the opportunity to provide this information. Please let me know if there are any other questions. The above letter was solicted by the Secretary after he and Bryant spoke by telephone on or about October 15, 1991. The purpose of the letter was to allow AMP to clarify and amend its proposal which failed to include a cost for candidates who were scheduled to take the examination but did not appear. In contrast, neither PTS nor NAI were offered the opportunity to clarify or change their proposals after being filed. Thus, AMP was allowed to correct a material deviation from the terms of the RFP thereby giving it an advantage over its competitors. The contract was thereafter awarded to AMP on or about October 24, 1991. Summary of Errors in the RFP Process By failing to file evidence that it was a "legal entity", failing to file a cost per candidate scheduled but not examined, and submitting a price per candidate based on nine cost components rather than the prescribed eight, AMP failed to follow the proposal format required of all vendors by Article VIII. AMP's proposal was materially nonresponsive in four respects. First, it failed to differentiate between costs incurred for candidates examined and candidates who were scheduled but did not appear. Second, it utilized nine cost components in developing the cost per candidate scheduled instead of the eight components specified by the RFP. Third, in declining to establish an office in the greater Orlando area, AMP deviated from a material requirement. Fourth, contrary to the RFP, AMP proposed that DPR personnel rather than its own personnel provide unofficial grade reports to candidates at the examination sites. If this was unsatisfactory to DPR, AMP proposed to assess DPR an unspecified charge for providing this service. By waiving the enforcement of a material requirement (paragraph 23, Article III) after the proposals had been filed and evaluated, DPR gave a competitive advantage to AMP not enjoyed by other vendors. Further, by allowing AMP to correct a material variance from the RFP on October 16, 1991, as to the price charged for candidates scheduled but who did not take the examination, DPR gave a competitive advantage to AMP not enjoyed by other vendors. Collectively, these considerations support a finding that (a) the proposal submitted by AMP was materially nonresponsive and should be rejected, and (b) DPR created unfair competition and favoritism by waiving material requirements and allowing AMP to amend its proposal after being filed and evaluated.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of facts and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by respondent rejecting the proposal filed by Applied Measurement Professionals, Inc. in response to RFP 91- 002 and awarding the contract to one of the other vendors who filed a response. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner: Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. Partially adopted in findings of fact 11, 12, 13 and 22. Partially adopted in findings of fact 6 and 7. Partially adopted in finding of fact 7. Partially adopted in findings of fact 2, 3 and 4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 24. Partially adopted in findings of fact 10 and 14. Partially adopted in findings of fact 7, 11, 17, 19 and 29. Partially adopted in findings of fact 11, 18 and 29. Partially adopted in findings of fact 12, 15, 28 and 29. Partially adopted in findings of fact 13, 16, 28 and 29. Respondent:* 1. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. 2-3. Partially adopted in finding of fact 22. Partially adopted in findings of fact 1, 20 and 24. Partially adopted in finding of fact 24. Partially adopted in finding of fact 13. 6a. Partially adopted in findings of fact 3, 15 and 19. 6b. Rejected as being contrary to the evidence. 6c. Partially adopted in finding of fact 16. 7-8. Partially adopted in finding of fact 24. 9-10. Partially adopted in finding of fact 26. Partially adopted in findings of fact 10 and 14. Partially adopted in finding of fact 16. Partially adopted in finding of fact 17. The second sentence is specifically rejected as being contrary to the evidence. Partially adopted in finding of fact 16. Partially adopted in finding of fact 11. Partially adopted in finding of fact 18. Rejected as being unnecessary. * Respondent's proposed findings of fact included numbers 4, 5, 6, 4, 5, 6. Therefore, the second set of findings numbered 4, 5 and 6 have been renumbered 6a, 6b and 6c for purposes of this Appendix. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially adopted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, subordinate, not supported by the evidence, redundant, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Post Office Box 1116 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33302 Vytas J. Urba, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 George Stuart, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Jack L. McRay, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (2) 1.01120.57
# 6
HEMOPHILIA HEALTH SERVICES, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 05-002804BID (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 03, 2005 Number: 05-002804BID Latest Update: Jan. 26, 2006

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the proposed award of contracts by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to Caremark, Inc. (Caremark), and Lynnfield Drugs, Inc., d/b/a Hemophilia of the Sunshine State (Lynnfield), pursuant to AHCA's Request For Proposal (RFP) 0507, was contrary to AHCA's governing statutes, AHCA's rules or policies, or the solicitation specifications.

Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency authorized to make payments for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (the "Medicaid" program). There are approximately 250 Medicaid-eligible individuals ("beneficiaries") in Florida who have hemophilia. Hemophilia is a bleeding disorder caused by a deficiency in one of numerous clotting proteins or "factors" that contribute to the ability of a person's blood to clot. The disease is treated by administration of the deficient clotting factor to a person. The costs for hemophilia medicines ("factor products") and treatment for this relatively small group of beneficiaries are extremely high, estimated to be $46 million in 2005. Half of these costs are paid by Florida, half by the federal government. Section 287.057, Florida Statutes (2004),2/ requires an agency to make a written determination that an Invitation to Bid is not practicable for procurement of commodities or services prior to issuance of an RFP. On August 24, 2004, AHCA made the written determination that an Invitation to Bid was not practicable for procurement of the services called for in the MCHM program. Pursuant to Subsection 120.57(3)(b), Florida Statutes, a challenge to the terms and specifications of an RFP must be filed within 72 hours of notice of the posting of the RFP. There were no challenges filed to the terms and specifications of RFP 0507. RFP 0507 contemplates a statewide hemophilia management program that combines pharmaceutical management and disease management. Section 5.0 of the RFP identifies the two fundamental requirements for vendors responding to the RFP: The vendor must demonstrate that it has the capability to design, implement, monitor and evaluate a comprehensive hemophilia management program. The vendor must demonstrate that it has the experience in designing and implementing projects similar to the one prescribed in this RFP. Under the terms of the RFP, AHCA was to contract with up to three experienced vendors for a period of two years, with an option to extend the contract for an additional two-year period. Beneficiaries of the hemophilia services will be notified and instructed to choose one of the winning vendors or, for beneficiaries who do not make a choice, AHCA will assign a winning vendor on an equal, rotational basis. The RFP provides that the successful vendors will be paid on the basis of the factor products dispensed to eligible Medicaid beneficiaries. All other services required by the RFP must be delivered within the revenue provided by AHCA's reimbursement of factor product costs. Originally, RFP 0507 called for the submission of a technical proposal and a separate cost proposal. The cost to the State for the services provided was not to exceed the total cost of the factor products dispensed, discounted to the Average Wholesale Price (AWP) of the factor product, minus 39 percent. Cost proposals would have been scored separately from technical proposals, and then the two scores were to be combined to determine the ranking of the competing vendors. On January 21, 2005, prior to the deadline for responses to RFP 0507, AHCA issued Addendum 5 to the RFP, which eliminated the requirement for a separate cost proposal. All vendors were required to provide the technical services for the revenue they would receive under a reimbursement methodology set forth in Addendum 5. The reimbursement methodology makes AWP, minus 39 percent one of several measures of cost, the lowest of which determines the maximum reimbursement that Florida will pay the vendor. The change to RFP 0507 brought about by Addendum 5 did not change the fundamental nature of the RFP. Both the original RFP and the revised RFP created a competition among vendors to provide the best hemophilia management services to the State for a maximum cost. Addendum 5 changed the maximum cost from AWP, minus 39 percent, for factor products to a cost determined by the reimbursement formula. Under both the original RFP 0507 and the RFP as modified by Addendum 5, vendors could propose to provide factor products at a cost to the State lower than AWP, minus 39 percent. However, greater weight or importance would have been given to a proposal to provide factor products at a lower cost under the original RFP, because it called for cost proposals to be separately presented, evaluated, and scored. Based on the maximum scores attainable for the technical and cost proposals (1000 and 500, respectively), the cost proposal would have accounted for a third of a vendor's total score under the original RFP. Under the revised RFP, cost-saving measures offered by a vendor were relevant to only a few of the technical items in the RFP, such as those related to the management and dispensing of factor products. Even in the aggregate, these evaluation criteria allowed for the award of relatively few points for cost-saving measures contained in a proposal. AHCA received eight proposals in response to RFP 0507. One proposal was rejected by AHCA because it was determined to be non-responsive. The seven remaining proposals were made a part of the case record. Although RFP 0507 stated that up to three contracts would be awarded, AHCA decided to award contracts only to Caremark and Lynnfield. In a memorandum dated May 16, 2005, AHCA explained that "the points awarded indicate the top proposals scored significantly higher than the others. A difference of 124 points between the number two and the number three ranked proposal indicates a measurable difference in quality." The Organization of HHS's Proposal Section 6.0 of the RFP sets forth "Proposal Instructions." These instructions include a requirement to submit the proposal in a three-ring binder and to number the pages of the proposal. Another requirement imposed on the form of the proposal, as opposed to its content, was that the proposal had to use four tabs with specified titles. Tab 4 was to contain each vendor's technical response to the RFP. The RFP stated, "This is the most important section of the response with respect to the organization's ability to perform under the contract." Section 6.1E of the RFP describes the various categories of information that are required to be part of the vendor's technical response. There are eight general categories: Summary; Organizational Background and Experience; Project Staffing; Technical Approach; Innovations; Implementation Plan; Systems, Security and Confidentiality; and Certification Relating to Contracts. Some of these general categories were broken down further into separately numbered items of required information. For example, under the heading "Organizational Background and Experience," there are 11 numbered paragraphs describing the information required to be included in the proposal. Some of the numbered paragraphs are further divided into information requests identified by letter, such as item 9, which is divided into 23 information requests, lettered a through w. A logical manner in which to organize a proposal would be to present the information in the same order as the information is requested in the RFP, using the same headings, numbers, and letters that are used in the RFP. All the vendors, except HHS, organized their proposals so that the technical information required by Section 6.1E of the RFP was located under a divider or page labeled "Tab 4" or "Technical Proposal," and presented in the same order as the information was requested in the RFP. HHS's proposal has a "Tab 4" with a first page that includes the title "Technical Proposal" and begins with the required "Summary." Following the summary, however, HHS skips items 1 through 8 that were set forth in the RFP under the general category "Organizational Background and Experience" and presents a response to item 9. Then, HHS skips other items set forth in the RFP and presents information about "Innovations." At the end of HHS's Tab 4 is the heading "Additional Requested Information," followed by a list of seven appendices. Some of the information required to be in HHS's technical proposal is contained in these seven appendices. HHS's proposal included a table of contents that listed 31 other appendices, with subject titles, that contained more of the information that the RFP required to be included in each vendor's technical proposal. HHS chose to organize its proposal as it did because it believed the information it placed in the appendices was responsive to several parts of the RFP, and it would "irritate" the evaluators to see the same information repeated in several places. However, HHS's proposal did not always include notations that directed the evaluators to the appendices where relevant information was located. HHS acknowledged that it could have done "a much better job" in organizing its proposal. In the case of some items of requested information, very little effort was required for the evaluators to find the information in HHS's technical proposal. For example, it was relatively easy for an evaluator looking for information related to project staffing to find it in HHS's Appendix AG, entitled "Project Staffing." In other cases, however, greater effort was needed to find the information HHS says was relevant to a particular information request in the RFP. For example, HHS did not include behind Tab 4 a direct response to item 5 under "Organizational Background and Experience," which requests a detailed description of the vendor's organizational structure and ownership, and HHS did not refer the evaluator to a particular appendix. HHS contends the requested information is provided in Appendix AL, entitled "2004 Accredo Annual Report," which contains the Form 10-K for Accredo Health, Inc., HHS's parent company. Another example is HHS's response to item 8 under "Organizational Background and Experience," which requests a plan for the use of woman- or minority-owned businesses. HHS did not respond directly to this request under Tab 4 of its proposal, and its proposal merely contains a letter in Appendix AJ, entitled "Ethnically Diverse Utilization," from a woman-owned business to Accredo Health, Inc., acknowledging an existing relationship with HHS's parent company.3/ One of AHCA's evaluators said she gave HHS a score of zero for 27 evaluation criteria because she could not find the relevant information in HHS's proposal. The record evidence does not show that any other evaluator was unable to find information presented in HHS's proposal or failed to review the proposal in its entirety and score the proposal on its substantive merits. Whether HHS's Proposal Was Non-Responsive AHCA and the Intervenors claim that HHS's proposal was non-responsive to RFP 0507 because it does not include information required by Sections 7.2I and 7.2L of the RFP. Section 7.2 is entitled "Evaluation of the Mandatory Requirements of the Technical Proposal" and states in relevant part: During this phase, the Agency will determine if the technical proposal is sufficiently responsive to the technical requirements of the RFP to permit a complete evaluation. In making this determination upon opening the technical proposal, the overseer(s) will check each technical proposal against the following list: * * * Does the proposal include a table of contents listing sections included in the proposal and the corresponding sections of the RFP to which they refer? * * * L. Does the technical proposal include a description of the vendor's corporate background and experience at the level outlined in Section 6.1E of the RFP? Section 7.3 states that only those technical proposals determined to meet the mandatory technical requirements set out in Section 7.2 will be further evaluated. Presumably, AHCA determined that HHS's technical proposal included all mandatory requirements, because the proposal was not rejected. The table of contents in HHS's proposal accurately describes the information that is presented in its proposal. However, it does not list all the headings and information items as they appear in the RFP. There are over 30 itemized information requests in Section 6.1E related to the vendor's background and experience. HHS's proposal included information about its corporate organization and experience. However, the organization of the proposal made some of the information difficult to find. Sandra Berger, the AHCA employee who has coordinated contracts and procurements for the Medicaid program, stated that AHCA's policy regarding the review of RFPs is that the evaluator is to review the entire proposal; and if information is not found where it should have been presented, the evaluator will look elsewhere in the proposal for the information. AHCA's expectation is that the evaluator will read every sentence in every paragraph of each proposal. AHCA's Consideration of HHS's Guarantees HHS contends that three cost-saving measures that it offered in its proposal were not considered at all or not fairly considered by the evaluators. HHS offered an "assay management guarantee," an emergency room visit guarantee, and an outdated product guarantee. Because clotting factors are proteins or "biologics," the manufacturers of factor products cannot create a precise potency; they can only target potency. In the same sense that ore is assayed to determine its content of gold or other mineral, factor products are assayed to determine their content of clotting factor (potency). A manufacturer of factor products will generally produce products with low range, mid-range, and high-range potencies. Even within a targeted range, there will be variances of potency between particular vials of product that are dispensed. The recommended potency for some hemophilia treatments, such as a prophylactic regimen, is less than for others, such as for break-through bleeding. Therefore, "assay management" for factor products is a fundamental component of the current treatment of hemophilia. AHCA has established 105 percent as a threshold for evaluation of assay management. That means AHCA has an expectation that the factor dispensed to a patient will generally deviate less than five percent above the factor assay or potency prescribed for the patient by the physician. The 105 percent figure is a monitoring and evaluation threshold, not an absolute maximum. The State is required to pay for factor products exceeding the 105 percent threshold if they were medically necessary. HHS offered an "assay management guarantee" to repay AHCA on a quarterly basis for the cost of factor product that exceeded 102 percent of the target dose. Based on an HHS study done with 56 patients, the guarantee would have created a cost savings of $154,000. If a similar savings rate were realized for the approximately 250 Medicaid-eligible hemophilia patients in Florida, the savings would be approximately three times greater. Caremark also offered an assay management guarantee, but structured differently. However, AHCA does not view this particular type of guarantee as necessarily beneficial. AHCA believes it could create an incentive for the provider to withhold care, not based on medical considerations, but on financial considerations. A provider might reduce factor products dispensed to the patient in order to avoid exceeding a guarantee and having to repay the State. HHS also offered an emergency room visit guarantee so that AHCA would not have to pay for unnecessary emergency room visits. HHS defined unnecessary emergency room visits as those caused by the patient not having the correct amount or type of factor or a sufficient amount or type of infusion "ancillaries." HHS offered to credit AHCA $500 for each unnecessary visit. Another cost-saving measure offered in HHS's proposal was to replace outdated product without cost to AHCA. AHCA did not dispute that these two cost-saving measures would be of benefit to the State. No evidence was presented regarding the estimated value of the benefit. Few of the evaluation criteria for RFP 0507 related directly to the cost-saving measures offered by HHS. HHS presented information about its assay management guarantee in items 9.j and l, under "Organizational Background and Experience." Information about HHS's outdated product guarantee was presented under item 9.k. Information about HHS's emergency room visit guarantee was presented under item 9.v. The maximum score that HHS could have received for these four items was 20 points, out of a total score of 1000 for all criteria.4/ The Scoring Criteria For purposes of evaluation and scoring of proposals, AHCA formed the technical requirements of the RFP into 50 separate criteria, each worth from zero to 10 points, for a maximum possible score of 1000 points. The scoring scale for the 50 criteria was as follows: Points Vendor has demonstrated 0 No capability to meet the criterion 1-3 Marginal or poor capability to meet the criterion 4-6 Average capability to meet the criterion 7-9 Above average capability to meet the criterion 10 Excellent capability to meet the criterion Each of the 50 criteria was set forth on a separate evaluation sheet used by the evaluators. Each evaluation sheet identified from where in the RFP the criterion came. The 50 criteria in the evaluation sheets, however, did not correspond to 50 evaluation criteria, identified as such, in the RFP. RFP 0507 rarely uses the term "criteria." Instead, the itemized information requests in the RFP are alternately referred to as "instructions" (Section 6.0), as "specifications" (Section 6.1E), and as "requirements" (Section 7.3). In seven instances, two or more itemized information requests in the RFP were combined to form one criterion on an evaluation sheet. An example is page 13 of the evaluation sheets that grouped together items 9.e, f, g, and h, under "Organization Background and Experience." Judith Saltpeter, the AHCA employee who was principally responsible for the creation of the evaluation sheets, grouped these items together because they all related to vendor assistance to "physicians, specialists and other providers." Another example is the combination of items 9.j, k, and l into one criterion for scoring on page 15 of the evaluation sheets. These three items were combined by Ms. Saltpeter because they were all related to the vendor's proposed handling of factor products. There were two instances in which a single information request in the RFP was divided into more than one criterion for scoring on the evaluation sheets. For example, the evaluation criteria on pages 25, 26, and 27 of the evaluation sheets are derived from a single paragraph of the RFP under "Project Staffing": 2. Identification of staff along with details of training and experience of those individuals who will serve as the Project/Contract Manager, Clinical Pharmacist Coordinator, and Care Management Coordinator. Resumes and relevant licensure of all identified/named staff shall be included in an appendix to the proposal. AHCA made each of the three positions named in this paragraph a separate criterion for evaluation and scoring because of the perceived importance of these positions to the quality of the vendor's performance. The 50 evaluation criteria used for RFP 0507 were almost identical to the 50 evaluation criteria used for RFP 0403, in which HHS participated. Section 7.3 of the RFP, entitled "Evaluation of Technical Proposals," states in relevant part: Only those technical proposals determined to meet the technical requirements of this RFP will be further evaluated. Evaluation of technical proposals will involve the point scoring of each proposal by component specified in the RFP. The Agency will evaluate the extent to which the services offered in the proposal and the procedures and methods for performing such services meet the requirements of the RFP. For this purpose, evaluators will judge a vendor's description and explanation of the services it will perform to meet the service requirements of each component. Included in Addendum 5 to RFP 0507 and made a part of the RFP are "Agency Responses to Bidders' Questions," which include questions asked by the vendors at the vendors conference held prior to submittal of proposals and AHCA's answers. Two questions and answers are relevant here: Question: How will scoring for the technical proposal be evaluated? Do some [technical] questions have higher weight: If so provide weighting. Answer: All technical items have equal weight. Question: What specific factors will be used for the technical proposal evaluation pursuant to Section 7.3 of the RFP? What will be the relative weight of each factor? Answer: Equal consideration will be given to all items found under Section 6, excluding 6.3 Cost Proposal Requirements and 6.4, Cost Proposal Instructions. The organization of the technical requirements of the RFP into itemized lists and AHCA's statements to the vendors that "All technical items have equal weight" and "Equal consideration will be given to all items found under Section 6," communicated to the vendors a scoring process that was not followed by AHCA. There is nothing in the RFP that informs prospective vendors of the scoring process that was actually used. The combining and dividing of the information requirements in the RFP for scoring purposes affected their relative importance, but no prospective vendor would know from reading RFP 0507 that some of the requirements of the technical proposal would be combined for scoring and other requirements would be divided for scoring. No prospective vendor would know which items in the RFP would be worth up to 10 points, which items were worth only 1/3 or 1/4 as much and which items were worth twice as much. There is no evidence that AHCA acted arbitrarily or capriciously in combining and dividing the technical requirements of the RFP to create the 50 evaluation criteria. There was a rationale behind the combinations and divisions. However, RFP 0507 did not indicate the relative importance of the criteria. Their relative importance was only determinable by reviewing the evaluation sheets, which were not made a part of the RFP. Nevertheless, HHS failed to demonstrate that this error by AHCA made any difference to the contract awards under RFP 0507. The combining and dividing of technical requirements affected all vendors equally. Adjusting the scores so that every itemized technical requirement from the RFP is given equal value would not change the rankings. For example, if an evaluator gave a score of "5" for a criterion that was created from four requirements set forth in the RFP, the score was adjusted to 20 (four times five), and this kind of adjustment was made to all scores for all affected criteria, HHS would still finish in sixth place. Even if the actual scores might have varied from the adjustment just described, there is no evidence to explain how the variance could be more than de minimus or could change HHS's ranking. A related issue concerns item 3 under "Project Staffing" and item 20 under "Technical Approach," also related to staffing, that did not become evaluation criteria for scoring purposes. HHS claims that AHCA's decision to not make these items evaluation criteria was prejudicial to HHS because its proposal regarding project staffing was superior to what was offered by the other vendors. However, if these two items had become two evaluation criteria, they would have been worth a maximum of only 20 points. Even assuming that HHS had been given the highest points by all four technical evaluators for these two items, HHS's ranking would not have changed. Scoring by the Evaluators The four AHCA employees who evaluated the technical proposals were Linda Barnes, a registered pharmacist (Scorer "A"); Maresa Thomas, a registered nurse (Scorer "B"); Bruce McCall, who holds a doctorate in pharmacy (Scorer "C"); and Nancy Knox, a registered nurse (Scorer "D"). Kay Newman, a certified public accountant, reviewed only the financial information provided by the vendors. The evaluators were each provided a copy of the seven proposals, the original RFP, Addendums 5 and 11 to the RFP, an evaluation packet, and a conflict of interest form. The technical evaluators were given an instruction sheet and verbal instructions for evaluating the technical proposals. The instruction sheet distributed to the evaluators provided that the evaluators "should" justify their scores in the "comments" section of the score sheets. Some of the evaluators made comments, others did not. Each evaluator worked independently. The evaluators did not confer with each other or with anyone else during their evaluation of the proposals. The evaluators conducted their evaluations over a period of three weeks. Because each evaluator worked independently, the scores on each proposal differed. It can be expected, and was true in this case, that some evaluators will generally assign lower scores than other evaluators; some evaluators will tend to assign higher scores. There was no evidence that any evaluator for RFP 0507 was inconsistent in the application of his or her scoring approach to all proposals. In addition to the points awarded by the technical evaluators for the 50 criteria, each proposal also received "Financial Audit" points (between one and ten) from Kay Newman. Ms. Newman scored the seven proposals as follows: Caremark 9 Lynnfield 9 AmeriHealth 0 OptionCare 8 Maxim 8 HHS 9 PDI Pharmacy 4 Points were also assigned to the vendors based on telephone "reference reviews" conducted by AHCA employees Hope Chukes and Patricia Morena. Two references were selected for each vendor from the references listed in the proposals. The reviewers used a form with questions related to whether the vendor had fulfilled its obligations under previous contracts. In most cases, three points were given to the vendor when the reference reported that the vendor had performed the particular obligation; otherwise, a score of zero was given. The maximum score that could be obtained for the reference review was 19 points. Some questions on the reference review form were not relevant to the previous contract between the vendor and the reference organization. In those instances, Ms. Chukes was directed to give vendors a score of "3" for the question, rather than penalize the vendors with a score of zero. Because the reference reviews indicated that all vendors had performed their obligations under previous contracts, AHCA gave all vendors the maximum total score of 19. Following the conclusion of the technical evaluations, Ms. Chukes tallied the scores from the four technical evaluators, the financial audit scores from Ms. Newman, and the reference review scores. The resulting total scores and ranking of proposals were as follows: 1 Caremark 1437.2 2 Lynnfield 1384.9 3 AmeriHealth 1207.83 4 OptionCare 1107 5 Maxim 964.3 6 HHS 889.3 7 PDI Pharmacy 774.55 There are some fractional scores, because Ms. Thomas (and only Ms. Thomas) scored multi-part criteria by initially assigning a score to each subpart, using the zero-to-ten scale, and then averaging the result. Although this scoring approach would have caused a variance, in some cases, from the score that Ms. Thomas would have assigned if she had simply scored the criterion as a whole, the variance would have been de minimus. It would not have changed HHS's ranking. For reasons not explained in the record, AHCA manipulated the raw scores by averaging them, assigning the highest ranked vendor a score of 1000, and dividing the average scores of the other vendors by 1000. These manipulations did not change the ranking that resulted from the total raw scores as indicated above. None of the evaluators ranked HHS higher than fourth. One evaluator ranked HHS fourth, one ranked HHS fifth, and two ranked HHS seventh (last). Scoring by Ms. Thomas Ms. Thomas assigned HHS's proposal a zero for 27 of the 50 evaluation criteria. In her notes on the evaluation sheets and in her testimony at the hearing, Ms. Thomas explained that she gave HHS zeroes because she could not find HHS' responses for these criteria, and she assumed they had been omitted. For example, because she did not see information under Tab 4 of HHS's proposal numbered 1 through 7 to correspond to paragraphs 1 through 7 of the RFP, she assumed that the information had been omitted from HHS's proposal. Ms. Thomas did not always look through HHS's entire proposal to determine whether the information she expected to see in Tab 4 was located in an appendix or elsewhere. When she did not find information where she expected it, she often made a notation "nothing presented" on the evaluation sheet and assigned a zero for the criterion. There was no evidence that any other evaluator did the same. The other three evaluators apparently looked through HHS's entire proposal, found the relevant information, and assigned points for each criterion based on their review of the information. As stated above, AHCA's policy regarding the review of a proposal is that the evaluator is to review the entire proposal and, if information is not found where it should have been presented, the evaluator will look elsewhere in the proposal for the information. AHCA's expectation is that the evaluator will read every sentence in every paragraph of each proposal. There is no evidence that Ms. Thomas was biased either for or against any particular vendor. However, it was the duty of the evaluators to read each proposal in its entirety. Nothing in the RFP instructions authorized the evaluators to ignore information in a proposal if it were in the "wrong" place. In most cases, the information Ms. Thomas claims she could not find required little effort to find and was found by the other three evaluators. Ms. Thomas' failure to consider all the information presented in HHS's proposal when assigning scores under the 50 evaluation criteria was contrary to agency policy. Her assignment of a zero to HHS in 27 categories was arbitrary. However, HHS failed to demonstrate that, but for the arbitrary scoring by Ms. Thomas, HHS would have been awarded a contract under RFP 0507. If all of Ms. Thomas's scores are deleted, HHS still ranks sixth. If all of the zeroes that Ms. Thomas gave HHS were converted to tens, HHS would only move up to fourth place and would still not win a contract under RFP 0507. HHS complained of other aspects of the evaluation process used for RFP 0507, such as the separate financial audit performed by Ms. Newman and the reference review. However, HHS failed to prove that if all these alleged errors by AHCA were eliminated, HHS would have been a winner under RFP 0507.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Heath Care Administration enter a final order awarding contracts under RFP 0507 to Caremark, Inc., and Lynnfield Drugs, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 2005.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57287.057409.912
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DOUGLAS REYMORE vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 95-003137BID (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jun. 22, 1995 Number: 95-003137BID Latest Update: Dec. 05, 1995

The Issue The issue presented is whether the Department acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in determining that the Intervenor, rather than Petitioner, should be awarded the contract for child support enforcement legal services for Martin and Okeechobee Counties.

Findings Of Fact On July 1, 1994, the Department of Revenue (hereinafter "Department") assumed responsibility for the State of Florida's Child Support Enforcement (hereinafter "CSE") Program, taking over those responsibilities from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter "HRS"). As part of that program, HRS had in place for most counties in Florida contracts with private attorneys to establish and/or enforce child support obligations. Petitioner Douglas Reymore was, by contract, the legal services provider for Martin, Okeechobee, Indian River, and St. Lucie Counties. The Department renewed that contract for an additional year. The Department determined to rebid the legal service provider contracts for some of the counties in Florida for the 1995-1996 fiscal year. The contract for Martin and Okeechobee Counties was one of those contracts. The Department prepared a Solicitation Package and distributed it to the Department's regional offices. The Department also distributed to its regional offices a document entitled Instructions to CSE Regions for Handling the Solicitation for Legal Services Providers (hereinafter "Instructions") to govern the solicitation, evaluation, and award of the CSE contracts. The stated purpose of the Solicitation Package was to "obtain the highest possible level of legal representation at the lowest possible cost while ensuring free and open competition among prospective proposers." The solicitation was advertised in Martin and Okeechobee Counties in a timely manner from April 1 through April 5, 1995, as required in the Instructions. Upon their requests, copies of the Solicitation Package were sent by the Department to both Petitioner Douglas Reymore and to Intervenor Thomas & Associates. The Department did not provide a copy of the Instructions to any proposers prior to the opening of the proposals. Proposals were required to be received by the Department by 3:00 p.m. on Friday, May 12, 1995. Both Reymore and Thomas & Associates timely submitted proposals. The proposals were opened in the Program Administrator's Office in West Palm Beach at 4:00 p.m. that same day. The proposals timely submitted were forwarded, after opening, to the Evaluation Committee established by the Department. The Evaluation Committee was required to conduct its review and evaluation consistent with the Evaluation Committee procedures set forth in the Instructions, including attachments. Members of the Evaluation Committee for the Martin/Okeechobee Counties contract were Elaine Rosnow (Chair), Terrie Almond, Janice Blount, Donna Hilley, and Henry Smith. The names of the members of the Evaluation Committee were not disclosed to proposers prior to the opening of the timely submitted proposals. None of the members of the Evaluation Committee is an attorney, and none is considered an expert in computer technology. The Child Support Enforcement Solicitation of Proposals Evaluation Sheet, included with the Instructions, identified nine Mandatory Requirements. Those same Mandatory Requirements were also identified in the Solicitation Package sent to Reymore and to Thomas & Associates. If any of the Mandatory Requirements identified in the Evaluation Sheet and the Solicitation Package were not met by a proposal, the proposal was not to be considered further by the Evaluation Committee. The Evaluation Committee reviewed and evaluated the proposals. The proposal of Thomas & Associates was rated highest, and the Reymore proposal was rated second highest. The Evaluation Committee forwarded its scores on the proposals to the Program Administrator, who was required to award the contract to the highest ranking proposer. The Department issued its notice of award for the CSE contract for Martin and Okeechobee Counties to Thomas & Associates on May 22, 1995. The term of the contract was to be for an annual period to begin on July 1, 1995, and end on June 30, 1996. Thomas & Associates was also named as the Department's intended recipient for two other CSE contracts, those for Palm Beach County (intrastate) and Palm Beach County (interstate). A CSE legal practice under state contract, such as that for which proposals were solicited in the instant case, is high volume in nature. Currently, approximately 200 cases in Martin County and approximately 65-70 cases in Okeechobee County go to court each month. These court cases are handled by using three docket days in Martin County and one docket day in Okeechobee County each month. The Solicitation Package for the Martin/Okeechobee Counties contract projected 156 referrals to the legal services provider each month. Upon the receipt of a referral from the Department's Child Support Office, the legal services provider under contract with the Department must take the appropriate legal action to collect child support from the non-custodial parent. These legal actions include establishing paternity, obtaining support orders, and enforcing support orders. The greatest, and a substantial, difference between a private family law practice and a CSE legal practice under state contract is the caseload. Another difference is the limited funds available for expenses, such as for taking depositions and for service of process. There are also legal issues, concepts, and terms encountered in a CSE practice which are not encountered in a private family law practice. Petitioner Reymore has practiced CSE law under a state contract for three years in Martin, Okeechobee, St. Lucie, and Indian River Counties. No attorney employed by Thomas & Associates has ever practiced CSE law under a state contract. The Solicitation Package, on page four, provided as follows: Each proposal will be reviewed for responsiveness to the mandatory requirements set forth in Attachment V. Proposals that fail to satisfy all of the mandatory requirements will not be considered further. No points will be awarded for the mandatory requirements. Above the listing of Mandatory Requirements on Attachment V, similar language appears, specifically: "If any of these requirements are not met, your proposal will not be considered further." The Mandatory Requirements set forth in Attachment V include the following: The attorney/attorneys assigned to per- form contract services shall be members of The Florida Bar. A certificate of good standing from The Florida Bar shall be attached for each designated attorney. A resume for each attorney designated to do child support work shall be included with proposal. Page one of the Solicitation Package also recites that any proposal submitted must include: 1) Resumes on all attorneys who will be assigned to this contract. 4) Certificates of good standing from The Florida Bar on all attorneys who will be assigned to this contract. The Thomas & Associates proposal included resumes and certificates of good standing from The Florida Bar for the following attorneys: Jeffrey F. Thomas, Mary Bobko Thomas, L. Denise Coffman, and Charles Willoughby. In the section of its proposal entitled Time and Personnel, Thomas & Associates specifically represented that two lawyers would be assigned to the contract: Charles Willoughby and Denise Coffman. It further represented that Jeffrey Thomas would directly supervise the lawyers and that he would also personally attend all hearings where the other party was represented by counsel. The proposal then represented that Thomas & Associates was also bidding on the Palm Beach interstate contract and the Palm Beach intrastate contract. As to the Palm Beach interstate contract, the proposal represented that Jeffrey Thomas would directly supervise the lawyers and would also personally attend all hearings where the other party is represented by counsel. The proposal then represented that the following attorneys would be assigned to Jeffrey Thomas to work on the Palm Beach interstate contract: Charles Willoughby and Denise Coffman; John C. Thomas and Kim Nutter would serve as "back ups." As to the Palm Beach intrastate contract, the Thomas & Associates proposal represented that four attorneys would staff that contract full time, and Jeffrey Thomas would directly supervise all attorneys and personally appear at all hearings where the other party is represented by an attorney. The proposal then stated that the following attorneys would be assigned to Jeffrey Thomas for that contract: Charles Willoughby, Denise Coffman, John C. Thomas, and Kim Nutter. The Thomas & Associates proposal then represented that if Thomas & Associates were awarded more than one contract, two additional lawyers would be hired. The proposal failed to identify or include any information about the two additional attorneys Thomas & Associates would hire in the event it was awarded more than one contract. The Department awarded all three contracts to Thomas & Associates. The date of the award of the other contracts is not part of the record in this cause. However, since Charles Willoughby and Denise Coffman are to be assigned full time to the Palm Beach intrastate contract and are also to be assigned to the Palm Beach interstate contract, and since Thomas & Associates represented to the Department that it would hire more lawyers if awarded more than one contract, Charles Willoughby and Denise Coffman are either not available to be assigned to the Martin/Okeechobee Counties contract, or are not the only attorneys who will perform contract services. The Solicitation Package precludes a proposer from assigning attorneys to perform services under the contract without identifying those attorneys in the proposal and submitting their resumes and certificates of good standing as part of the proposal made to the Department. The representations of Thomas & Associates committing to hire additional attorneys if it received more than one contract, as well as Thomas & Associates' commitment to assign attorneys to work on the contracts as represented in the Thomas & Associates proposal, would become conditions of any contract entered into with the Department as would all other representations in the proposal. The Thomas & Associates proposal failed to meet all of the mandatory requirements set forth in the Solicitation Package due both to the failure of Thomas & Associates to identify all attorneys to be assigned to work on the contract and Thomas & Associates' failure to include resumes and certificates of good standing for those attorneys as part of its proposal. Accordingly, the Evaluation Committee should have rejected any further consideration of the proposal submitted by Thomas & Associates and should not have gone forward with scoring the proposal submitted. The Evaluation Committee members were aware that Thomas & Associates had submitted proposals for all three contracts, that the proposal pledged the same attorneys to work on one contract full time while pledging them to work on two additional contracts, and that the proposal represented that additional lawyers would be hired if Thomas & Associates received more than one contract. Yet, the Evaluation Committee members did not consider the multiple mutually- exclusive assignments of the same attorneys in the Thomas & Associates proposal and did not consider the representation that additional unidentified attorneys would be hired. The Evaluation Committee members specifically marked their Evaluation Sheets to reflect that Thomas & Associates had met all mandatory requirements for having its proposal evaluated and scored when Thomas & Associates had not done so. Page seven of the Solicitation Package provides as follows: The proposer must provide three references for whom the proposer has rendered services similar to those being proposed. Proposals must include the name, address, telephone number, and the Name and Title of the primary and alternate contacts for each reference. The Thomas & Associates proposal failed to comply with this requirement. No references were provided in the proposal for the firm of Thomas & Associates, the proposed legal services provider. The only references provided were for Jeffrey Thomas, one of three identified attorneys designated by the Thomas & Associates proposal to perform work under the contract. No references were provided for Willoughby and Coffman, the other two attorneys identified to be assigned to the contract, and no references were provided for the two unidentified attorneys to be assigned to the contract should Thomas & Associates receive more than one contract. The Thomas & Associates proposal contained four references for Jeffrey Thomas. However, only two of those references were clients. No references were provided in the Thomas & Associates proposal from clients for whom high-volume child support or family law legal services had been provided. Accordingly, the Thomas & Associates proposal failed to include three references for whom the proposer has rendered services similar to those being proposed, as required by the Solicitation Package. The Thomas & Associates proposal also failed to include alternate contacts for each reference, as required by the Solicitation Package. Alternate contacts should have been provided for individual references in case the Evaluation Committee was unable to make contact. For Jeffrey Thomas' individual references, only office telephone numbers were provided. Alternate contacts for Jeffrey Thomas' individual references could have been provided in the form of home telephone numbers. For Jeffrey Thomas' individual references, alternate references could have been provided in lieu of alternate contacts, but were not. Due to Thomas & Associates' failure to provide alternate contacts for Jeffrey Thomas' references, or even the required number of references, the Evaluation Committee was able to reach only one of Jeffrey Thomas' references for the purpose of conducting an interview. The requirement of three references for whom the proposer has rendered services similar to those being proposed is a material requirement for the personal services contract under consideration in this cause. Thomas & Associates' failure to meet this requirement also made its proposal non- responsive to the Department's solicitation. Rather than declaring the proposal non-responsive, the Evaluation Committee members awarded points to the Thomas & Associates proposal for providing sufficient and appropriate references. No points should have been awarded to Thomas & Associates for its references. Page four of the Solicitation Package advises that any proposal must contain a detailed written Plan clearly demonstrating the proposer's ability to process referrals or case establishment activities, and identifying existing resources and proposed resources. Pages 17-20 set forth the criteria for the provision of legal services. The Plan contained in the Thomas & Associates proposal is, for the most part, simply a verbatim recitation of the language on those pages of the Solicitation Package. The few portions of the Thomas & Associates Plan which were not copied verbatim from the Solicitation Package cannot be implemented or, if implemented, would delay the processing of the Department's high-volume caseload. The Thomas & Associates Plan commits to obtaining a court date for all enforcement hearings which is no later than 45 days after receipt of a referral. The Plan further commits to using interrogatories and requests to produce in each enforcement case. Due to the time necessary for the sheriff to serve pleadings on a CSE respondent and the applicable discovery response times, it is not possible to utilize interrogatories and requests to produce in each enforcement action within the time frames asserted by Thomas & Associates in its Plan. Further, interrogatories are not necessary in many cases, and the information that can be obtained through them can also be obtained from the non- custodial parent at the final hearing. Thomas & Associates' Plan also commits to scheduling a support hearing within 45 days of receipt of a case referral from the Department when paternity is in dispute and a Human Leukocyte Antigen Test or other DNA test is requested. This schedule cannot be achieved since DNA test results are not received until four to eight months after the court orders such a test to be performed. The Thomas & Associates Plan also commits to ensuring that the judge signs appropriate income deduction orders at the time of hearing. This is not possible in Martin and Okeechobee Counties because hearings are conducted by hearing officers who then submit their written recommendations to the judge before the judge will enter an income deduction order. It is usually not possible to have a hearing, get the hearing officer's written recommendation, and have the judge review that recommendation and issue an income deduction order all in a single day. The Thomas & Associates proposal asserts that Jeffrey Thomas would appear at all hearings where the non-custodial parent is represented by an attorney under the Palm Beach County intrastate contract, the Palm Beach County interstate contract, and the Martin/Okeechobee contract. That commitment would be a special condition of any contract between the Department and Thomas & Associates, as would all provisions of the Thomas & Associates proposal. Charles Willoughby graduated from law school in 1994 and became licensed to practice in the State of Florida some time thereafter. His resume reflects no experience in any facets of marital and family law. The Thomas & Associates proposal commits that Jeffrey Thomas will "personally train" and "supervise" Willoughby in the performance of his duties. The Thomas & Associates proposal also represents that Jeffrey Thomas will personally attend all meetings with Department child support staff. It is common for the non-custodial parent to come to a hearing in a CSE case represented by an attorney without that attorney having made a prior appearance in the case or having notified anyone that the attorney will be making an appearance in the case. In Martin and Okeechobee Counties, when the non-custodial parent is represented by an attorney, the attorney first appears on the day the hearing is set in approximately 40 percent of the cases. It is impossible for a single attorney to attend every hearing under the Martin/Okeechobee Counties, Palm Beach County intrastate, and Palm Beach County interstate CSE contracts where the opposition is represented by counsel because often hearings occur simultaneously before multiple domestic relations commissioners, hearing officers, and judges at multiple courthouses. It would be inappropriate for a CSE attorney under state contract to request a continuance of a hearing to allow a more experienced attorney to appear on behalf of the Department. Further, there is no basis for believing that such a motion would be granted. Accordingly, given the Thomas & Associates commitment that Jeffrey Thomas will personally train and supervise attorney Willoughby and personally attend all meetings with Department staff, and given the numerous courthouse locations where hearings will be conducted under the three contracts awarded Thomas & Associates, it would not be physically possible for Jeffrey Thomas to personally attend all hearings where the opponent is represented by counsel. Consequently, it is not possible for Thomas & Associates to perform under the CSE contracts awarded to it in accordance with the representations made in the proposal. Members of the Evaluation Committee knew that Jeffrey Thomas could not attend all hearings where the other parties are represented by counsel at the time they were scoring the Thomas & Associates proposal. Yet, they believed that the Instructions given to them for scoring proposals did not permit them to consider the impossibility of performance. Points were awarded to the Thomas & Associates proposal for the staffing ratio of attorneys and paraprofessionals proposed. The proposal represented that each attorney will have one paralegal and one legal secretary assigned to work on the contract. The proposal, like the letterhead used by Thomas & Associates for the purpose of submitting proposals to the Department, represented that Jacquelynne O. Benefield, a certified legal assistant, would supervise the paralegal department. Her resume was also included in the proposal. Benefield is not a certified legal assistant. The Thomas & Associates' misrepresentation regarding her credentials was not known to the Evaluation Committee members when they scored the proposal. The Department's evaluation mechanism provided for extra points for minority ownership of a proposer. Page one of the Solicitation Package specified that a copy of the certificate of minority business enterprise, if applicable, must be included with the proposal. However, page six provided different information by specifying that a copy of the certification must be attached to the proposal if a business has been certified as a minority business enterprise. However, if the business has not been certified, but has at least 51 percent minority ownership, such minority ownership must be documented. The Thomas & Associates proposal asserted that Mary Thomas, Jeffrey Thomas' wife, is an American woman and owns 60 percent of Thomas & Associates. The proposal asserted that Thomas & Associates is not certified as a minority business enterprise and had only applied for such certification. The Solicitation Package, therefore, required that Thomas & Associates document Mary's minority ownership. The only documentation submitted was a copy of an application for certification without any proof that the application had even been filed. The application was dated May 4, 1995, and represented that Mary Thomas had acquired her 60 percent ownership in Thomas & Associates, a business which earned $220,000 in 1994, on April 30, 1995. The application also reflected that Jeffrey Thomas, the 40 percent owner of the firm, is the president of Thomas & Associates, while Mary Thomas, the 60 percent owner of the firm, is only the vice president. Thomas & Associates submitted no documentation of Mary Thomas' minority ownership. Had Thomas & Associates submitted even the documents required to be submitted as part of the application for certification as a minority business, the Evaluation Committee would have seen that Mary Thomas bought her 15 shares of stock by writing a check in the amount of $15 from the joint checking account of her and her husband Jeffrey. The stock certificate issued to her was dated May 30, 1995, subsequent to the Department awarding to Thomas & Associates the contract which is the subject of this proceeding. The stock certificate issued to Mary bears certificate number 1 while the stock certificate for ten shares issued to Jeffrey on September 21, 1989, bears certificate number 2. The stock transfer ledger also reflects that Mary was issued stock certificate number 1 and Jeffrey was issued stock certificate number 2 five and a half years earlier. The Thomas & Associates proposal did not document the alleged minority ownership, and Thomas & Associates was entitled to receive no points for that category. The Evaluation Committee was concerned about the alleged minority ownership being documented only by an application dated one week before the deadline for submitting proposals to the Department. The Committee contacted the Department's Tallahassee office for guidance as to how to score the alleged minority ownership. The Evaluation Committee was advised to score that category in any manner the individual members saw fit. No guidance was given to the Evaluation Committee members and no criteria were suggested for grading that category which allowed a range of points from zero to five. The scores given by the Evaluation Committee to the Thomas & Associates proposal for minority ownership covered the range from zero to five. It is illogical to give partial credit for a category such as minority ownership. Thomas & Associates either is a minority business, thereby being entitled to full credit, or it is not, thereby being entitled to no credit. Since Thomas & Associates failed to comply with the Solicitation Package requirements by documenting the alleged minority ownership, it was entitled to no points in that category. The Solicitation Package advised prospective proposers that the "evaluation of all proposals will be made by an Evaluation Committee of qualified persons who are familiar with child support services". In making the representation that the membership of the Evaluation Committee would consist of "qualified" persons, the Department intended those persons to be familiar with the requirements to carry out the terms of the CSE legal services contract, including the various means for doing that work. The Department made no effort to insure that members of the Evaluation Committee were familiar with the necessities of a high-volume CSE law practice, that members were familiar with the operations of law firms necessary to carry out that kind of practice, or that members understood the experience and needs in their region. The members of the Department's CSE staff on the Evaluation Committee do not have knowledge of how to operate a CSE law office under state contract. In the past, when proposals for CSE legal services have been solicited, attorneys have been included on the evaluation committees. The Department gave no guidance to the Evaluation Committee on how to evaluate the proposals for "attorney experience" or for their "Plan." The Evaluation Committee members gave Thomas & Associates high scores for its Plan even though some of the representations in it are not feasible in a high-volume CSE practice of law. The lack of guidance resulted in the Evaluation Committee giving high scores for Thomas & Associates' Plan, notwithstanding Thomas & Associates' obvious lack of understanding of CSE legal practice under state contract. For example, Thomas & Associates' Plan indicated that depositions would be taken in every paternity and support action. Because a very limited amount of money is available under the contract for expenses, it would not be possible to take depositions in all of those cases. Thomas & Associates' Plan also inaccurately describes the use of temporary relief hearings when no such hearings are utilized by the judicial hearing officers in Martin and Okeechobee Counties. That Plan also inaccurately suggested that a temporary relief hearing would be used when a respondent acknowledges paternity, since no temporary relief hearing is necessary in such a circumstance. Instead, the case would be scheduled on the next available docket for final hearing. The Plan also inaccurately indicates there is a need for a temporary relief hearing when the issue of support has already been resolved through a stipulation for support. Thomas & Associates' Plan also inaccurately suggests all support cases can be brought to hearing within 45 days of referral from the Department. Given the time necessary for a case to be processed by the court clerk's office and for the sheriff to serve the summons, together with the 20 days the respondent is given to respond after service, it would not be possible to meet this schedule in every case. Moreover, the sheriff is unable to obtain service on the non-custodial parent in approximately 35 percent of support cases. Such cases are not set for hearing because the court has no jurisdiction over the non-custodial parent. Instead, these cases are sent back to the Department so a correct address for the non-custodial parent can be found, if possible. Anyone familiar with a high-volume CSE practice of law under state contract would know that the above-described components of Thomas & Associates' Plan are impossible, impractical, or simply make no sense. Similarly, an experienced attorney would know that the time frames suggested for service of process and obtaining discovery were unrealistic and that it is inappropriate to seek a temporary relief hearing when a case is ready to be set for final hearing. All family law does not constitute child support enforcement law. The Evaluation Committee members' lack of qualifications is evidenced by their inability to distinguish among family law, child support, enforcement and collection, and trial and appellate areas of practice even though the Evaluation Sheet required a separate score for each of these practice areas for evaluating attorney experience. The Evaluation Committee members did not have specialized computer knowledge. Their lack of experience in computers is evidenced by the high scores awarded the Thomas & Associates proposal based on the computerized handling of the contract, notwithstanding the proposal's failure to mention any hard drive, failure to describe the random access memory (RAM) its computers contain, and failure to indicate whether its software can handle the number of files necessary to perform under the Department's contract. Without knowing the computers' hard drive capacity and the RAM of the computer, the Evaluation Committee could not judge the capability of the computers to handle the volume of files under the contract. The Evaluation Sheet utilized by the Evaluation Committee is not the same as the Evaluation Sheet which was included in the Solicitation Package. In the evaluation scheme specified in the Solicitation Package, the area that provided the largest single award of points was "attorney experience." In this area, the Solicitation Package indicated that points would be awarded for attorney experience on a "per attorney" basis. The Solicitation Package does not contain any indication that for multi-attorney firms the attorneys' years of experience will be totalled and then averaged before points are assigned. Unlike the Solicitation Package which was provided to potential proposers, the Instructions given the Evaluation Committee contained contradictory provisions, some providing for attorney experience points to be awarded on a per attorney basis and others providing for points to be awarded based on the average years of experience of all attorneys designated to work on the contract. For multiple-practitioner law firms such as Thomas & Associates, the attorney experience points differ significantly if they are computed on a "per attorney" basis and then averaged, rather than on the basis of "average years" of experience of all attorneys designated to work on the contract. When attorney experience scores are calculated on a per attorney basis, each attorney assigned to the contract must have a minimum of five years experience in an area of law for the firm to receive the maximum points for that area. When attorney experience scores are calculated on the basis of "average years" of experience of all attorneys designated to work on the contract, a multiple-practitioner firm such as Thomas & Associates can receive the maximum number of points even if some of the attorneys have no experience. Thomas & Associates received the maximum number of attorney experience points even though one of the attorneys assigned to work on the contract, Charles Willoughby, graduated from law school in 1994 and became licensed to practice law some time thereafter. The proposal admits that Willoughby has "little experience in family law matters." Conversely, the proposal does not assert that he has any experience in family law matters, any experience in child support, any experience in enforcement and collections, or any experience in trial and/or appellate work. Further, his resume does not indicate that he has any experience in the practice of law. Interestingly, not all members of the Evaluation Committee evaluated the same attorneys when computing the points to be awarded to Thomas & Associates for attorney experience. One Evaluation Committee member's Evaluation Sheet reflects that Mary Thomas was evaluated along with Jeffrey Thomas and Charles Willoughby in some areas of practice but that Mary Thomas along with Jeffrey Thomas and Denise Coffman were evaluated as to other areas of practice. In calculating Thomas & Associates' attorney experience score, the Evaluation Committee members did not consider the two additional attorneys who are unidentified but would be hired if Thomas & Associates receives more than one contract. The only way to take into account those additional attorneys would be to award each of them zero points for experience. Basing attorney experience points on the "average years" of experience of all attorneys designated to work on the contract, or on the years of experience of a single attorney in a multiple-practitioner firm, as was done by some members of the Evaluation Committee, is inconsistent with the Department's stated goal of obtaining the highest possible level of legal representation through this solicitation process. Similarly, utilizing a formula which gives the same credit for experience to an attorney practicing in the general area of family law as to an attorney practicing high-volume CSE legal services, a concept the Evaluation Committee members found to be unfair, is also inconsistent with the Department's stated goal of obtaining the highest possible level of legal representation. The maximum score Thomas & Associates could have received for attorney experience based on the per attorney scoring procedure specified in the Solicitation Package is substantially less than the number of points awarded by the Evaluation Committee. Further, if the Evaluation Committee had properly scored Thomas & Associates' attorney experience, that proposal would have received an overall average score lower than the Reymore proposal received. The Evaluation Committee awarded an average of 4.9 of the available 5 points for references to Thomas & Associates based solely on the one reference for Jeffrey Thomas it was able to contact. However, the Evaluation Committee interviewed two of the Reymore references. The Department's Tallahassee office specifically instructed the Evaluation Committee not to interview the third person listed in the Reymore proposal as a reference since she was also a member of the Evaluation Committee, something Reymore could not have known when he prepared his proposal since the names of the persons on the Evaluation Committee were not disclosed in the Department's Solicitation Package. To insure that the evaluation of the proposals was fair and equal, the Evaluation Committee had been instructed to interview an equal number of references for each proposer. By basing Thomas & Associates' score on a single interview, the Evaluation Committee members did not follow the appropriate procedure in awarding points for references. One member of the Evaluation Committee did not participate in the interviews of references. Instead, that member used another member's notes from the references' interviews to award points for references. By awarding points for references based solely on the notes of another Evaluation Committee member, that Committee member did not follow the appropriate procedure in awarding points. Despite the absence of any effort by the Department to assure that its members were qualified to evaluate a high-volume CSE practice, the Evaluation Committee was given wide discretion to evaluate the proposals using whatever criteria its individual members chose. The evaluation scheme developed for this solicitation differed from those used previously in order to give the Department's regions more flexibility. The only substantive instructions given the members of the Evaluation Committee on how to evaluate the proposals for CSE legal services were those in the Solicitation Package and the Instructions. Members of the Evaluation Committee found the Instructions inadequate, and the ranges of points with no criteria confusing. In prior solicitations for CSE legal services, evaluation committees were given a scoring matrix which set guidelines on how to score each section of a proposal. The Department's departure from the past practice of providing a scoring matrix to assist the evaluation committee in evaluating the proposals in order to give the regions more flexibility is illogical since there is no basis for the premise that the practice of law varies from region to region in the state or that different regions require different legal services. The difference in the average scores given Thomas & Associates' proposal over the Reymore proposal was 11.8 points. Had the Thomas & Associates' proposal been properly scored, the Reymore proposal would have been the highest-scoring proposal. Moreover, Reymore would have submitted the highest-scoring responsive proposal if the Thomas & Associates' proposal had been disqualified due to the failure of Thomas & Associates to include all of the Mandatory Requirements in its proposal. Thomas & Associates has not challenged the responsiveness of Reymore's proposal or the accuracy of the Evaluation Committee's scoring of the Reymore proposal.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered determining the Thomas & Associates proposal to be nonresponsive and awarding to Petitioner Reymore the contract to provide child support enforcement legal services for Martin and Okeechobee Counties. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of September, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-20, 22-45, 48-82, 85- 95, 99-101, 106, 107, 114, 116-147, 149, 150, and 152-173 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 21 has been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 46, 47, and 96 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 98, 102-105, 108-113, and 115 have been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 83, 84, 148 and 151 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-12, 15, 16, 18, 37, 76, 77, 83, 84, 87, 101, 109-111, 115, 118, 120, 123, 165, and 178 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 13, 14, 21-23, 25, 26, 31-34, 38, 40, 46, 57, 61-65, 71, 90, 91, 96, 99, 117, 130-132, 158, 160, 162, 163, and 168-173 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 17, 19, 20, 24, 42, 45, 48, 51, 58-60, 66, 72-75, 79, 85, 86, 88, 89, 92, 97, 98, 112, 113, 116, 121, 127, 133, 166, 167, 176, 177, 179, 181, and 182 have rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 27, 30, 35, 39, 41, 43, 44, 47, 50, 52-56, 67-70, 80-82, 100, 102-107, 114, 124-126, 128, 129, 137, 142- 146, 148-153, 174, and 180 have rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 28, 29, 36, 49, 78, 108, 119, 122, 138-141, 147, 154, 155, 157, 159, 161, 164, 175, and 183 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 93-95, 134-136, and 156 have been rejected as being unintelligible. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 5, and 11 have adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 7, 10, and 20 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 6, 8, 9, 14, 16, and 18 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 13 has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 15, 17, 19, and 21 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas Reymore, Esquire Suite 420 10 Central Parkway Stuart, Florida 34994 Gary P. Sams, Esquire Carolyn S. Raepple, Esquire Hopping Green Sams & Smith P.A. 123 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Thomas Barnhart, Esquire Patrick Loebig, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Jeffrey F. Thomas, Esquire Thomas & Associates Treasure Coast Bank Building Suite 209 789 South Federal Highway Stuart, Florida 34991 Noel A. Bobko, Esquire McCarthy, Summers, Bobko, et al. Suite 2-A 2081 East Ocean Boulevard Stuart, Florida 34996 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68287.057
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VISIONQUEST NATIONAL, LTD. vs DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 02-002825BID (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 17, 2002 Number: 02-002825BID Latest Update: Jan. 15, 2003

The Issue In its formal written protest, Petitioner VisionQuest National, Ltd. (VisionQuest), through paragraph 6.d. and e., challenged the manner in which Respondent Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) assigned and weighed points in accordance with specifications set forth in RFP I5J01 (the RFP). The first issue to be resolved concerns the timeliness of that challenge to the specifications. The aspects of the RFP specifications challenged in the formal written protest are related to the assignment of points for past performance in carrying out contracts with DJJ for non-residential programs which can total 250 out of 1000 possible points in the competition. Section 120.57(3)(b), Florida Statutes. The second issue to be resolved concerns the appropriate disposition in the case where DJJ has conceded that the actions of some of its evaluators in considering responses to the RFP materially deviated from agency policy and the expectations in the RFP, thus compromising the evaluation process. Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact STIPULATED FACTS On or about April 12, 2002, DJJ issued an RFP under Solicitation Number I5J01 for "84 Community-based Conditional Release Slots in Orange and Osceola Counties." DJJ appointed one of its employees, Diana Blue, as the Contract Administrator for this RFP. As a Contract Administrator, she had the duties and obligations of the Source Selection Evaluation Team Chairperson. On or about April 10, 2002, Deborah H. Dickerson, DJJ's Chief Probation Officer for the 9th Circuit, appointed Shelley Maxwell, Nathan Marcou and Marcus Freeman as the evaluation team for RFP I5J01. The evaluation team was to review the responses to the RFP and subjectively evaluate the categories labeled "C.2 - Management Capability" and "C-4 - Program Services." These two criteria combine for a possible 550 points out of a possible 1000. Each category is further broken down into subcategories: C.2 - Management Approach and Organizational Structure and C.4 - Soundness of Approach and Comply with Retirements. The RFP also provides for an objective review of the responses in some respect. The RFP provides for up to 250 points, out of the possible 1000, to be awarded in the area of past performance. One way these points are earned is by a provider having operated a DJJ Program(s) within the last three years and the program(s) having earned a "commendable or higher recognition." Such a program(s) would receive 20 points for each year, thereby allowing a single program to earn multiple scores, or multiple programs to earn multiple scores. A second way these points are earned is by a provider having operated a DJJ Program(s) within the last two years and the program(s) having met or exceeded DJJ's approved Performanced Based Budgeting performance measure for recidivism rates. Such a program(s) would receive 20 points for each year, thereby allowing the single program to earn multiple scores, or multiple programs to earn multiple scores. VisionQuest, Eckerd Youth Alternatives (Eckerd) and Children's Comprehensive Services (CCS) submitted timely responses to the RFP which were due no later than May 14, 2002. On May 14, 2002, the evaluation team was contacted and provided addresses so they could receive the RFP and the responses. This was the first contact the evaluation team had with anyone regarding their role on the evaluation team since the date of their appointment, April 10, 2002. Some of the evaluation team received their packages on Friday, May 17, 2002 and were to have their evaluations back on Tuesday, May 21, 2002. At least one of the evaluation team members did not receive their packages until Monday, May 20, 2002. The date to return the evaluations was extended to Wednesday, May 22, 2002. In this package was the RFP, the responses to the RFP, a score sheet, the Briefing for Source Selection Evaluation (SSET) Team Members and Advisors Form, and Conflict of Interest Questionnaire. Shelley Maxwell, evaluator number 3 for this RFP, is a DJJ probation officer for Osceola County. Part of Ms. Maxwell's responsibilities are to oversee the youth assigned to the current contract provider of community based conditional release slots in Osceola County, VisionQuest. Ms. Maxwell has no experience with RFPs, the evaluation of responses to RFPs nor has she received any training with regards to an RFP. Ms. Maxwell was not told what she would be doing or given any instruction between the time of being appointed to the evaluation team and receiving her materials. Ms. Maxwell reviewed her packet of materials on Friday, May 17, 2002, and was still unclear on what was expected of her. She then contacted a DJJ supervisor who informed her to review the responses and evaluate them. Upon learning that VisionQuest had submitted one of the responses she was to review, Ms. Maxwell thought that she and Nathan Marcou had been appointed to the evaluation team because they worked with VisionQuest on a daily basis. This allowed them to compare VisionQuest's written response with the daily activities of the current program. On Monday, May 20, 2002, Ms. Maxwell met with Nathan Marcou. Ms. Maxwell was told to get together with the other team members and perform the evaluations. Ms. Maxwell and Mr. Marcou discussed the proposal they were reviewing during this meeting, which was Eckerd's. Ms. Maxwell later reviewed the proposals from CCS and VisionQuest at home during the evening of Monday, May 20, 2002. In evaluating the response to the RFP filed by VisionQuest, Ms. Maxwell used her knowledge obtained through her day-to-day contact with VisionQuest. Her knowledge further affected the scores she awarded to VisionQuest. Ms. Maxwell signed her Briefing for Source Selection Evaluation (SSET) Team Members and Advisors Form, Conflict of Interest Questionnaire, and score sheets for CCS and VisionQuest on May 20, 2002. Her score sheet for Eckerd's response is not signed. Ms. Maxwell submitted her paperwork to go to the main office in Orlando, and then on to Tallahassee via courier. Based on the evaluations, DJJ issued a notice of intent to award a contract to Eckerd posted June 4, 2002. VisionQuest timely filed its Notice of Intent to Protest and its Formal Protest Petition and Request for Hearing. During the pendency of this action, DJJ has admitted that the evaluation process of RFP I5J01 was flawed and contrary to DJJ's policies and practices. In an attempt to remedy the flaws, DJJ desires to conduct a new evaluation of the RFP responses with a new evaluation team. VisionQuest desires to have the RFP rebid.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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