The Issue Whether Respondents violated various provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent The Administrators Corporation (hereinafter "TAC") has been an authorized administrator, and Respondent Charles N. Zalis (hereinafter "Zalis") has been licensed or eligible for licensure as a life insurance agent, a life and health insurance agent, and a legal expense insurance sales representative in the State of Florida. Zalis is the chief executive officer of TAC. TAC is not licensed in Florida as an insurer. An authorized administrator in Florida may engage in the solicitation, negotiation, transaction and/or sale of insurance in Florida if such activity takes place pursuant to an agreement between the authorized administrator and an authorized insurer. Life and Health Insurance Company of America (hereinafter "Life & Health"), which is not a party to this administrative proceeding, is an authorized insurer in Florida. On April 13, 1988, TAC entered into a contract with Life & Health to market and service group health insurance. The term of that contract was for four years and one month. Life & Health attempted to terminate its Administrator Agreement with TAC by letter dated March 16, 1989, effective immediately. The date on which the responsibilities under that Administrator Agreement terminated, if ever, is an issue in dispute between Life & Health and TAC. The Department takes no position on that issue. That issue is the subject of a civil lawsuit filed in Broward County, between Life & Health and TAC, which is currently being litigated. Although Life & Health's original position was that the contract between it and TAC terminated as of March 16, 1989, that position apparently changed because Life & Health continued paying claims up to July 1, 1989. TAC's position was that Life & Health's responsibilities under that contract did not terminate until September 26, 1989, when George Washington, an authorized group health insurance carrier in Florida, agreed to assume the risk for the block of business retroactive to July 1, 1989. TAC could have obtained a replacement carrier earlier than September 26, 1989, if the Department had advised TAC and Zalis as to the procedure involved to allow Summit Homes, an authorized property and casualty insurer, to broaden the scope of its certificate of authority to include group health insurance. The simple procedure could have been accomplished in as little as 24 to 48 hours. A group health insurance carrier remains on the risk to its policyholders until there has been a valid cancellation or termination of that coverage. In the pending Circuit Court litigation between Life & Health and TAC, the validity of the termination or cancellation and the date of same are ultimate issues in that law suit and have not yet been determined by the Court. On March 27, 1989, Life & Health sent a letter to agents informing them of its termination of its relationship with TAC and that it would not accept any new business written after March 16, 1989. The evidence in this cause, however, indicates that Life & Health did continue to accept new business after that date. The Department became aware of the dispute between Life & Health and TAC on June 8, 1989. The Department knew as of July 12, 1989, that TAC was continuing to write business on Life & Health "paper." At some point after the attempted March 16, 1989, termination of the contract by Life & Health, TAC and Life & Health informally agreed to a July 1, 1989, date after which Life & Health would no longer be responsible for any claims and TAC would have a replacement insurer in place to take over the block of business. That agreement was based upon TAC and Life & Health each agreeing to cooperate with each other and to take certain actions to facilitate the transfer of the book of business. Both the Department and the Circuit Court were aware of the informal agreement whereby Life & Health agreed to remain on the risk for the block of business at least through July 1, 1989, and Zalis and TAC would issue no further policies on Life & Health "paper" and would not remain involved in the processing or payment of claims after July 1, 1989. Prior to July 12, 1989, those matters required to take place in connection with the July 1, 1989, "cutoff" date had not been accomplished, and Zalis and TAC continued writing new business on Life & Health "paper" believing that Life & Health was still legally responsible. Zalis informed the Department's investigator on July 12, 1989, that he was writing and that he intended to continue to write new business on Life & Health "paper." No evidence was presented to show that the Department notified Zalis or TAC that they could not do so, and the Department took no action to stop that activity. Additionally, Life & Health took no action to enjoin TAC or Zalis from writing new business on Life & Health "paper." The evidence does suggest that Life & Health may have continued to accept the benefits and liabilities. The premiums for policies written by TAC on Life & Health "paper" after July 1, 1989, were not forwarded to Life & Health; rather, they were retained by TAC in a trust account. Zalis and TAC offered to deposit those monies with the Circuit Court in which the litigation between TAC and Life & Health was pending or to transmit those monies to the Department to insure that the monies would be available for the payment of claims. Pursuant to an agreement with the Department, the monies representing those premium payments were transmitted to the Department On September 26, 1989, George Washington Insurance Company, an authorized health insurance company in the State of Florida, agreed to take over the block of business from Life & Health, retroactive to July 1, 1989. Life & Health, however, had not yet signed the assumption agreement to transfer its responsibility to George Washington Insurance Company as of the time of the final hearing in this cause. TAC and Zalis did not place any Florida insurance business with any companies not authorized to do business in Florida. Respondent Zalis has been in the insurance business for 26 years and enjoys a good reputation for honesty and integrity. Zalis and TAC have never had prior administrative action taken against them. As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, there had been no Circuit Court determination of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of Life & Health's termination of the Administrators Agreement nor of the date of that termination, if any.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents not guilty of the allegations contained in the Order to Show Cause and dismissing the Order to Show Cause filed against them. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-5981 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 6-9, 14-17, 20, 21, and 25-27 have been adopted either in substance or verbatim in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4 and 5 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or argument of counsel. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 10, 11, 13, and 22 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 12 and 19 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 18, 23, and 24 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 1-17 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter D. Ostreich, Esquire Office of Treasurer and Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Jerome H. Shevin, Esquire Wallace, Engels, Pertnoy, Martin, & Solowsky, P.A. CenTrust Financial Center 21st Floor 100 Southeast 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Davis, Marks & Rutledge, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Dale Joseph Dyer, was eligible for licensure and licensed as a Health Insurance Agent in Florida, and the Petitioner, Department of Insurance, (Department), was the State agency responsible for the regulation of the insurance industry in this state. At some time prior to the months of February, 1988, Harry L. Laws, a retired auctioneer, and his wife, Nina, had held Medicare Supplement health insurance policies issued by National States Insurance Company, (National States). For the most part, they had been satisfied with their policies and the service they received on claims filed thereunder, but because of the company's failure to pay one claim, they had terminated their previous relationship with it, and had taken a similar policy from United American Insurance Company, (United American). In February, 1988, when he still had not received the payment he thought he should have received from National States, Mr. Laws called the local Tampa agent, Diversified Health Services, to complain. In response, Respondent's supervisor, Mr. Slott, sent Respondent and an associate, Mr. Chappuis, to the Laws home in an effort to solve the claims problem and to get the Laws to come back as policy holders of National States. When Respondent and Mr. Chappuis arrived at the Laws home, they went over the disputed claim and the former policy with the clients. Ultimately, Respondent agreed to take the disputed bills back to the office with him and he represented that he would see they were paid. However, Respondent and Mr. Chappuis worked hard to sell Mr. and Mrs. Laws new coverage with National States. At first Mr. Laws was not interested as he was satisfied with the coverage he had with United American. However, Respondent and Chappuis, working in tandem, represented that their National States policy would provide better coverage for less money, and that United American would be raising its rates in the near future. As a result of these claims, Mr. Laws purchased from them a Medicare Supplement policy for himself and also for his wife. The premium for both policies, together, was between $2,000.00 and $2,100.00. One of the important features of the new National States policies was a provision providing vision, hearing and dental coverage which was not provided under either Medicare or the United American policy. This was a major selling point of the policy in issue. Both Mr. and Mrs. Laws contend, though both Respondent and Mr. Chappuis deny it, that she advised Respondent she already wore a hearing aid but it was giving her trouble and she needed to have two new ones, one for each ear. Notwithstanding that the policy application signed by Mrs. Laws reflects a statement to the effect she did not wear a hearing aid, she claims she did not see that entry which was made by Respondent. In addition, on the day she and her husband were visited by the Respondent and Mr. Chappuis, she was not wearing her hearing aid because it bothered her. Though Respondent denies knowing Mrs. Laws already wore a hearing aid, considering the evidence as a whole, it is found that disclosure of that fact was clearly made by both Mr. and Mrs. Laws, and Respondent knew it. The Laws contend, and it is so found, that either Respondent or Mr. Chappuis advised Mrs. Laws to purchase only one aid at a time, one each year, so the new insurance would cover their cost. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Laws can be sure as to which agent made the statement, but they recall that both were present at the time and one confirmed what the other said. When the claim for the first new hearing aid was submitted by the Laws, it was denied because coverage applied only to an "initial purchase". Since Mrs. Laws already used a hearing aid, the new one purchased was not covered. Another selling point utilized by Respondent and his associate was their representation that Medicare supplemental coverage under the new National States policy would not be effective until six months after issuance of the policy. Respondent urged that since the existing United American policy had six more months to go, if Mr. Laws signed up that day, he would have continuing coverage when that existing policy expired. In actuality, the six month delay under the terms of the National States policy pertained only to existing conditions. Coverage for new conditions would be immediate and would duplicate coverage provided under the United American policy. Mr. Laws claims, and it is so found, that he was satisfied with his United American policy and really didn't want to change. He did not want or need two Medicare Supplement policies and did not believe both would pay for the same illness. He bought the new National States policy only because of the Respondent's representations and the urging of both Respondent and Mr. Chappuis. They told him he could recover under both policies, and, it would appear, he could though this practice was not recommended. On the day of that first visit, Respondent and Mr. Chappuis also discussed with Mr. laws a nursing home policy. This policy was expensive and Mr. Laws wanted to think about it before deciding. When Respondent came back the next day, and brought a copy of the policy, it looked good to Mr. Laws and he bought one for both himself and his wife at a premium of $679.30 each. When the new policies arrived, Respondent and Mr. Chappuis went to the Laws home and went over them with them. At this time, Mr. Laws indicated he still had not received payment on the prior policy claim he had discussed with them on their first visit. Respondent and Mr. Chappuis told Mr. Laws a story about processing problems and procedures, and when Mr. Laws threatened to cancel the new National States policies, they again promised to check on his claim. He tried several times thereafter to contact his agent by phone without success. By the time he finally decided to take some action, the 30 day "cancellation with refund" period on the new policies was up. He filed a complaint with the Department of Insurance and only then was he reimbursed the premium he had paid, less the amount paid by the company on a dental claim under the new policy. He still has not received payment for the claim submitted under the old National States policy. On or about August 30, 1988, Respondent went to the home of Dorothy T. Hendryx, an 82 year old widow, in Neptune Beach, Florida. Mrs. Hendryx does not remember if she called Mr. Dyer to come, if she sent in a response card which prompted his visit, or if he just showed up at the door. In fact, he was sent there by his company to see why her prior policies with National States had been allowed to lapse. According to Respondent, Mrs. Hendryx indicated she had not intended to let her policies lapse. As a result of their discussion, the details of which she does not remember, Mrs. Hendryx purchased from National States, through Respondent, a Medicare Supplement policy with riders to (1) increase the supplement to Medicare, Part B, (2) provide dental, vision and hearing care, and (3) provide coverage for extended care facility confinement, with a total annual premium of $1,246.00. She also purchased a nursing home policy with an annual premium of $1,388.00. Mrs. Hendryx paid both premiums in full at the time she signed the applications on August 30, 1988. Respondent contends that during the visit Mrs. Hendryx showed him her existing recently purchased Pioneer policy which he compared with the product he was selling. Not surprisingly, he found his product to be better. At the time she purchased the two above-described policies from Mr. Dyer, Mrs. Hendryx also had a Major Medicare Supplement Policy issued by United American, through its agent, Mr. Proffit, on May 20, 1988, which was due to expire on May 20, 1989. Mrs. Hendryx cannot recall if, at the time she spoke with the Respondent, she told him she had the Pioneer and the United American policies. At hearing he denied that she did or that he knew of their existence. However, he admitted comparing the Pioneer policy to the one he was selling, so he must have known of its existence. Further, the United American policy bears several handwritten and hand printed notations on the cover. Those that are written in cursive were identified by Mrs. Hendryx as being in her handwriting. The hand printed notation, "Do Not Renew on 5-89," though at first identified by Mrs. Hendryx as hers, was determined by an expert questioned document examiner, contrary to the denials of the Respondent, to be in his handwriting. Therefore, in light of this expert opinion and Respondent's admission at the hearing to the sale of a National States policy to Mr. Law with knowledge of a preexisting United American policy, it is found that Respondent was also aware, at the time he sold the National States Medicare Supplement policy to Mrs. Hendryx, of the existence of a Medicare Supplement policy issued to her by United American in May, 1988. In addition, On or about October 1, 1988, Mr. Dyer again went to Ms. Hendryx's home and on this occasion sold her two additional medical-surgical expense policies with National States, with a total additional premium of $1,336.00. Though Mrs. Hendryx recalls little of the substance of the conversation she had with Respondent, she is sure that at no time did he force her to buy the policies or harass or threaten her, nor was he mean to her. She purchased the policies from him because she felt she needed them. Neither United American nor Pioneer Life Insurance Company received a replacement letter from the Respondent on behalf of National States as a result of the sales he made to the Laws and to Mrs. Hendryx. Replacement letters are required to be filled out and sent by an agent who sells to a client a new policy which he believes may replace an existing policy. In the instant case, the National States policy sold to Mr. Laws did not replace the existing United American policy but was in addition to it. The policies sold to Mrs. Hendryx did, however, replace the United American policy she had. In the opinion of Ms. Ferrell, the Department's Administrator of the Health Section and an individual with 42 years of experience in the insurance field, much of the coverage sold to both the Laws and Mrs. Hendryx duplicated coverage they already had through Medicare or through policies they owned at the time Respondent sold them the National States policies. In her opinion, the United American policies held by both were good supplements which did not duplicate the coverage provided under Medicare. Specifically, as to the National States policies sold to the Laws: The Medicare Supplement policy duplicated the Part A coverage provided through their United American policy except that the United American policy paid somewhat larger benefits for a longer period. The Part B coverage duplicates but exceeds the benefits paid under the United American policy, depending upon the size of the claim, but pays the $75.00 deductible which the other policy does not. The vision, dental and hearing coverage pays 100% of the "initial" cost of a hearing aid and pays for dental and vision care, neither of which is covered by Medicare or the United American policy. With regard to the term "initial", the Department uses that definition found in the Webster dictionary which means the first device of that kind owned by the insured. Here, it would not have covered Mrs. Laws' replacement hearing aid. The National States Nursing Home Policy duplicates Medicare coverage for the first one hundred days. After the first one hundred days and the co- payment, the National States coverage does not duplicate anything. Medicare requires a three day hospital stay prior to entry into a nursing home before the home cost is covered. Further, Medicare pays for only skilled and intermediary care homes. The United American policy covers care in skilled homes only. Therefore the National States coverage for immediate entry into intermediate and custodial care homes is not duplicative of either Medicare or the United American coverage. With regard to the National States policy sold to Mrs. Hendryx: The National States Medicare Supplement policy duplicates the breadth of the preexisting United American coverage, though it pays somewhat less as to Medicare, Part A. It may duplicate the United American Part B coverage but the rider to increase Part B medical payments to 40% of Medicare eligible expense is reasonable and an extra benefit. The National States Nursing Home policy duplicates the coverage with regard to nursing homes contained in the other National States policies she had, in the Pioneer and United American policies, and to a large degree, by Medicare. That portion of the policy providing payment for home health care is unnecessary since Medicare pays 100% of all costs by a Medicare approved provider for an unlimited number of days. The National States Limited Medical Surgical coverage, relating to Part B, ( Medical Services), is usually sold to fill the gap between the amount paid under Major Medical contracts and the doctors' usual charges. It was not designed for use by Medicare patients since it will not do anything more than Medicare and a Medicare Supplement policy does. The National States Medical Treatment policy, relating to Part B, to a great degree duplicates the prior described medical/surgical policy, and taken together, they duplicate the coverage of Medicare and a Medicare Supplement policy. They are clearly not needed. All together, Mrs. Hendryx was sold a number of policies which will pay her far more than is needed to meet her medical care needs. The supplemental policies were designed to provide financial coverage of those expenses not covered by Medicare. They were not designed as an investment to provide duplicate payments over and above the uncovered area. To use them as they were used here by the Respondent results in an overcompensation to the insured which has the effect of raising premiums to all policy holders. A qualified insurance agent, as Respondent holds himself out to be, should know this. A recommendation not to use policies in this manner is contained in a pamphlet published for insured by National States, the Respondent's company. Both Respondent and Mr. Chappuis deny in any way exerting pressure on Mr. Laws. When they went to his home to see about the claim complaint, they determined that though the Laws had good coverage, they could provide them better coverage by selling them a new policy. No replacement letter was sent because they did not feel it was required since the United American policy in effect was not being cancelled. This is true. The effect of the sale, however, was to largely duplicate existing coverage, except for the dental, vision and hearing coverage in the new policy, and there is a showing of some misrepresentation regarding that. Mr. Chappuis, who has visited between twenty and thirty clients with the Respondent, believes that at no time did Respondent misrepresent to or mislead the Laws. In Chappuis' opinion, Respondent has the technical competence to properly sell insurance and knows his product. Mr. Chappuis' credibility is somewhat suspect, however and his testimony in this regard must be weighed on the scale of his own self interest. Both Chappuis and the Respondent agree that Mr. Laws' dissatisfaction with National States, and the reason for his complaint, was not the sale of these policies but the failure by the company to pay the claim from the prior policy. For the most part, Mr. Laws agrees, and it is so found. As to Mrs. Hendryx, Respondent did not fill out a replacement form regarding the sale to her because he did not feel she was replacing anything. He claims not to have known of any existing policy except the Pioneer policy. This has already been determined not to be so. To the time of the hearing, he claims no coverage he sold duplicates any coverage Mrs. Hendryx had either by policy or by Medicare. While there were some additions, there was, nonetheless, extensive duplication of Medicare coverage in addition to coverage not pertinent to an individual in Mrs. Hendryx's situation. The vision, dental and hearing coverage would be of limited benefit to her in light of her preexisting use of dentures and glasses and a hearing aid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a health insurance agent in Florida be suspended for a period of six months and that he pay an administrative fine of $5,000.00, but that in lieu of implementation of the suspension, Respondent be placed on probation for a period of two years under such terms and conditions as may be specified by the Department of Insurance. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constituted my specific rulings pursuant to S120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER - 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. 4. & 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8. - 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. - 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. 18. Accepted. 19. Accepted. 20. & 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. & 25. Accepted and incorporated herein. 26. & 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. 28. - 30. Accepted and incorporated herein. 31. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. 34. & 35. Accepted and incorporated herein. 36. - 38. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT A1. - A5. Accepted and incorporated herein. A6. & A7. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. B1. Accepted and incorporated herein. B2. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein. Second sentence rejected as contra to the evidence. B3. Accepted and incorporated herein. B4. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the last sentence which is rejected. BS. Not a Finding of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Kelli Hanley Crabb, Esquire Battaglia, Ross, Hastings and Dicus 980 Tyrone Blvd. P.O. Box 41100 St. Petersburg, Florida 33743 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund from the State of Florida Group Health Self Insurance Plan of pre-tax supplemental insurance premiums in the amount of $47.46 or $47.45 a month that were deducted from his pay for the 2007 and 2008 insurance plan years.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Detrick Murray ("Petitioner" or "Mr. Murray") was, at all times relevant to this proceeding, employed by the Florida Department of Corrections. As a state employee, he was given the option to participate in a pre-tax supplemental accident/disability insurance plan. Benefits, including insurance plans, are administered by a private contractor, Convergys, through a project called "People First," operated on behalf of Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance ("Respondent or the Division"). During the 2005 open enrollment period for the 2006 plan year, Mr. Murray elected to participate in a state- sponsored supplemental/accidental policy offered by Colonial Insurance Company ("Colonial"). The reverse side of the enrollment provided the following information and instructions: The enrollment form must be used to enroll in or change coverages. No changes will be accepted by e-mail or letter. Enrolling in a supplemental insurance plan, or changing options, does not automatically stop other coverages you currently have. To stop an existing coverage, you must place an "S" in the box provided for that Plan on the front of this form (Part 1). Only complete Part 2 on the front of this form if you wish to stop plans currently not offered. The Supplemental Enrollment Form must be submitted to the People First Service Center. Enrollment changes will not occur if forms and/or applications and the Supplemental Company Application are submitted directly to the supplemental insurance company. If you cancel or do not enroll in supplemental insurance, you will not be able to enroll again until the next annual open enrollment period, unless you experience a Qualifying Status Change. Supplemental premiums are deducted on a pre- tax basis. It is your responsibility to ensure that your enrollment selections are in effect. Check your payroll warrants to ensure that your deductions properly reflect your selections. Contact the People First Service Center immediately if these deductions are not correct. I understand my enrollment and/or changes will be effective the first of the month following a full payroll deduction. I also understand my elections are IRREVOCABLE until the next annual open enrollment period, unless I have a Qualifying Status Change as defined by the Federal Internal Revenue Code and/or the Florida Administrative Code. I understand that I must request such changes within thirty-one (31) calendar days of the Qualifying Status Change. The open enrollment period for the next year, the 2007 plan year, began on September 19, 2006, and ended on October 18, 2006. On October 14, 2006, Mr. Murray notified Colonial that he wanted to cancel the supplemental insurance for the 2007 plan year. He used a Colonial Request for Services form and sent it to the Colonial Processing Center in Columbia, South Carolina. In a letter dated February 14, 2007, Colonial acknowledged receiving Mr. Murray's request to cancel the insurance during the 2006 enrollment period, and informed him of its receipt of an "overpayment" of $47.46 monthly beginning January 1, 2007. Colonial directed Mr. Murray to contact his personnel officer "which will then work through the Division to issue your refund." After the open enrollment period ended, Mr. Murray had also contacted People First on November 14, 2006, and gave notice of his attempt to cancel with Colonial. He was informed that Colonial had not informed People First of the cancellation. Mr. Murray contacted People First again on January 29, 2007, questioning the continued payroll deductions and requesting a refund, as Colonial had suggested. He was told that he would have to cancel with People First during the open enrollment period, but he could send a letter of appeal to try to get a refund of premiums and try to cancel sooner. Despite repeated contacts, requests for refunds, and appeals to People First during 2007, Mr. Murray continued to have premiums for supplemental insurance deducted from his pay check. Ultimately, the Division denied his appeal. Although Mr. Murray was trying to get a refund for 2007 payroll deductions, he again failed to notify People First to cancel the insurance during the open enrollment period between September 17, 2007, and October 19, 2007, for the 2008 plan year. There is no evidence that Mr. Murray had a qualifying status change, as required by federal and state law, that would have permitted him to cancel the insurance at any time other than during open enrollment periods for the 2007 and 2008 plan years. The enrollment period for the 2009 plan year began on September 22, 2008, and ended on October 17, 2008. On September 24, 2008, Mr. Murray cancelled the supplemental insurance for the 2009 plan year by making a telephone call to a People First representative. In a late-filed exhibit produced by a manager for Convergys at the request of Petitioner, the Division showed that payments were made to Colonial to insure Mr. Murray through November 24, 2008. Sandi Wade, the Division's benefits administrator, noted that Colonial should not have canceled Mr. Murray's insurance policy. Colonial had no authority to send the letter of February 14, 2007, incorrectly telling Mr. Murray he was entitled to a refund. Ms. Wade's observations prompted Mr. Murray to question what, if any, remedies he might have with regard to Colonial's error. That issue is not and cannot be considered in this proceeding. In the absence of evidence that the Division or its agents were notified to cancel the supplemental insurance during open enrollment periods for 2007 and 2008, or based on a qualifying status change, Petitioner's request for a refund of premiums must be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurnace, enter a final order denying Petitioner, Detrick Murray, a refund of his accident/disability insurance coverage premiums paid in 2007 and 2008. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Detrick Murray 4370 Northwest 187th Street Miami, Florida 33055 John Brenneis, General Counsel Division of State Group Insurance Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Aurelio Durana has been employed with the Department of Administration continuously since 1979. He enrolled in the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self-Insurance Plan before the period in dispute and had maintained individual coverage until August 1, 1980. Alina Durana, Petitioner's spouse, was employed by the Department of State from 1977 until her resignation on March 9, 1981. From September 9, 1980, through March 9, 1981, Alina Durana was on maternity leave without pay from her position at the Department of State. This maternity leave expired March 9, 1981 (Exhibit 2). Alina Durana had enrolled in the Group Health Insurance Plan from the beginning of her employment and maintained individual coverage until August 1, 1980. Effective August 1, 1980, Petitioner and his spouse elected family coverage, entitling them to a State contribution covering the entire premium. On Application for Multiple Contributions dated 1 July 1980 (Exhibit 8), Petitioner agreed to be responsible for any underpayment of premium resulting from his wife's ineligibility for a State contribution and agreed that any such underpayment should be deducted from any salary due him. Under the State Health Insurance program the agency for whom the employee worked contributes one-half of the family premium of $69.96 per month. Since both Petitioner and his wife were working for the State, each agency contributed $34.98 per month, thereby covering the entire premium. The agencies contribute this sum to the trust fund from which medical claims of employees are paid. When an employee ceases to be on the agency's payroll the agency stops this contribution to the fund and is supposed to notify the Department of Administration so pay adjustments to employees' pay can be made if necessary. When Mrs. Durana commenced her leave without pay on September 9, 1980, the Department of State failed to notify the Department of Administration that they were no longer contributing $34.98 per month to the Durana family health plan. Had they done so, the Department of Administration would have notified Durana that he would have $34.98 deducted from his pay each month if he desired to remain in the program. In September 1981 Petitioner notified the Department of Administration Personnel Office that health insurance premiums were not being deducted from his pay. Thereafter, Respondent learned of the departure of Mrs. Durana from the Department of State payroll in September 1980 and made claim against Durana for $316.14 for underpayment of premiums from the period the Department of State had not contributed to the fund and no premiums were paid by Petitioner. During the period Mrs. Durana was not on the payroll and the Department of State was contributing nothing to the trust fund, no claims were submitted by Durana for medical costs. However, during this period Petitioner was included in the list of beneficiaries of the State Health Insurance Plan and medical bills submitted by him would have been paid by the administrator of the trust fund.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Insurance should discipline the Respondent on charges contained in the Administrative Complaint filed June 1, 1994. The Administrative Complaint charges that the Respondent failed to accurately disclose certain aspects of the true physical condition of two applicants for health insurance and failed to disclose to the applicants the existence of certain deductibles and a six-month waiting period for preexisting conditions.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Blair John Reuther, is eligible for licensure and is licensed in Florida as an insurance agent. At the times referred to in this case, the Respondent was licensed to solicit health insurance on behalf of National States Insurance Company (National States). Some time prior to April, 1993, National States solicited health insurance from Earl and Jessie Lane, an elderly couple who lived in Ft. Pierce, Florida, and invited them to return a postcard in order to express their interest in more information about health insurance policies National States had to offer. They sent in the postcard, and their names were referred to the Respondent. Without an additional contact with the Lanes, the Respondent went to their home during the week preceding April 3, 1993, and asked to be permitted to talk with them about National States health insurance policies in which they had expressed an interest. The Lanes invited him in, and the Respondent discussed their existing coverage. At the time, the Lanes had a Level A Medicare Supplement policy, which carried the standard deductibles for such a policy. After some additional discussion, the Respondent promised to return with his proposals and with applications. On Saturday, April 3, 1993, the Respondent returned to the Lane home and proposed to sell each of them a National States Level A Medicare Supplement policy and a limited benefit medical expense policy. It is found, contrary to the Lanes' testimony, that the Respondent did not tell the Lanes that the National States policies would "cover everything," that the Respondent told the Lanes that the National States Medicare Supplement policies had deductibles (just like their previous Level A Medicare Supplement policies), and that there was a six-month waiting period for preexisting conditions under the National States limited benefit medical expense policies. (There was no waiting period for preexisting conditions under any of the Medicare Supplement policies.) After discussing the proposal, the Lanes decided to apply for the National States policies being proposed by the Respondent. It is found that the Respondent went over the applications for the National States policies with the Lanes and filled out the applications in accordance with the information given to him by the Lanes. As to the medical questions on the applications, it is found that the Respondent read the questions aloud and recorded the answers given to him by the Lanes. Specifically, question 5 on the Medicare Supplement applications asked, in pertinent part: Does the Applicant have or had within the past 5 years any of the following: (Underline condition) Tumor, cancer, malignancy or growth of any kind? * * * c. High or low blood pressure, varicose veins or disorder of the heart or circulatory system? * * * Amputation, because of sickness, paraplegia, disease of the back or spine? Disease of the rectum or intestine, stomach, kidney, prostate, urinary bladder, liver, gall bladder? Question 6.b. asked, "Has the Applicant been confined in a hospital in the last five years? The Lanes answered, "no," to all of the questions set out in the preceding paragraph. They also signed the applications, which state in part: "I agree that all answers above are true and complete to the best of my knowledge." Effective April 14, 1993, National States issued the limited benefit medical expense policies for which the Lanes had applied; the Medicare Supplement policies were issued with effective dates of April 18, 1993. All four policies were delivered on April 22, 1993. The Respondent returned to the Lane home on April 30, 1993, to go over the policies with the Lanes and answer any questions they had. During the review of the policies after delivery, the Lanes never expressed to the Respondent any dissatisfaction with any of the policies. To the contrary, they both signed a statement that they had reviewed their policies with the Respondent, who had explained them in full. Jessie Lane contends that she told the Respondent that she "had had a heart problem, a small heart problem." She testified that, at the time of her deposition, she had a pace maker but that, at the time of the application, she "wasn't that bad . . . I was just having--missing heart beats." She also testified that she has: "a light case of arthritis. . . . Not bad." She also testified that she had been hospitalized during the five years preceding the applications: "That's when I had my heart problem too." Earl Lane contends that he told the Respondent that he had a back injury that required hospitalization several times, but he did not testify that he told the Respondent that he was hospitalized, or that he continued to have back problems, within the five years preceding the application. He testified that he had a swollen prostate that required surgery, but he did not testify that the surgery was within the five years preceding the application. He testified that he had skin cancer "at one time," but that it "was successfully treated" and "didn't amount to nothing." He did not testify that the cancer or the treatment was within the five years preceding the application. He contended for the first time in his deposition testimony that he had a "rupture," but not that he had it within the five years preceding the application. He testified during his deposition: "I've been in the hospital in the last five years." Later during his deposition, he was asked: "How many times have you been in the hospital in the last five years?" He answered: "Just once, I guess, before he was here." He did not clearly testify that he had been hospitalized within the five years preceding the application. Earl Lane also contended for the first time in his deposition testimony that he told the Respondent that he had varicose veins, but he did not testify that they were not surgically removed or that he still had them within the five years preceding the application. The Lanes also filed a complaint listing other alleged violations by the Respondent: (1) that the Respondent misrepresented that the National States policies covered dental and eyeglasses; (2) that these coverages duplicated policies the Lanes already had; (3) that the National States policies were more expensive than policies the Lanes already had; (4) that the National States policies did not pay skilled nursing; and (5) that the Respondent tricked the Lanes into signing a bank draft agreement. The Department chose not to charge those alleged violations, presumably either because there was insufficient evidence that they were true or because they were not violations. It appears that someone helped the Lanes draft their requests for refunds from National States and their initial list of complaints against the Respondent. Although the evidence was not clear who helped, it may well have been the insurance agent whose Medicare Supplement policies were replaced by National States and who was trying to recover the business. In response to the Lanes' request, dated May 7, 1993, to cancel the policies, National States cancelled the Medicare Supplement policies as if the request had been made within the 30 day cancellation period and refunded all but 5 percent of the premium, which was retained as a processing fee. In their cancellation request, the Lanes' alleged: "Our health conditions were not accurately written on the applications by agent Blair Reuther and we will not take any chances on not being paid on future medical bills for misrepresentations by this agent." Nonetheless, National States refused to cancel the limited benefit medical expense policies. They remained in full force and effect until they lapsed a year later for failure to pay the premium when next due. There is no evidence that National States investigated the Lanes' true health status. During the year that the National States limited benefit medical expense policies were in effect, National States paid out more in claims under the policies than the Lanes paid in premiums.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in this case. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the Department's proposed findings of fact (the Respondent not having filed any): 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated; however, the Respondent was responding to a "lead" given to him by his employer after the Lanes returned a postcard expressing interest. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. (It was not clear from the evidence what the Respondent was told.) Accepted and incorporated; however, it is not clear from the evidence whether the Respondent should have answered the medical history questions on the application differently based on the information given to him by the applicants. First sentence, rejected as not proven. Second sentence, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected as not proven that there were health conditions that should have been disclosed; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Last sentence, accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Blair John Reuther 8535 Blind Pass Drive, #202 Treasure Island, Florida 33706 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner correctly imposed sanctions on Respondent for violation of applicable statutory, rule, and compliance criteria and standards as set forth in Chapter 641, Florida Statutes, Chapter 59A-12, Florida Administrative Code, and the 1994-1995 Medicaid Prepaid Health Plan Contract.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (AHCA), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty and responsibility of administering the provisions of the Florida Medicaid program pursuant to Chapter 641, Florida Statutes, relating to health care services. In 1992 statutory authority to regulate health maintenance organizations (HMO's) was transferred from the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to AHCA. Respondent, UNIVERSAL HEALTH PLAN OF FLORIDA, INC. (UNIVERSAL), is a commercially licensed health maintenance organization under Chapter 641, Florida Statutes, with offices located in Dade County, Florida. In July of 1994, UNIVERSAL entered into a valid, enforceable, one-year Medicaid Prepaid Health Plan Contract (1994-1995 Contract) with AHCA. UNIVERSAL had specific knowledge of, and agreed to each of the requirements of the 1994- 1995 Contract. The 1994-1995 Contract required UNIVERSAL to provide Medicaid managed health care services to Florida Medicaid recipients in accordance with specified minimum standards, including standards for quality care assurance. The 1994- 1995 Contract also provided for an annual medical audit, and provided for the imposition of penalties for failure to comply with the contract. In December of 1994, as a result of negative press accounts, AHCA initiated a comprehensive review of each of the 29 Florida prepaid health plans to determine whether such plans were in compliance with their contractual requirements. By letter dated December 20, 1994, AHCA notified UNIVERSAL of the agency's intention to undertake a comprehensive review of UNIVERSAL. In accordance with the notification of December 20, 1994, AHCA, by letter dated January 10, 1995, informed UNIVERSAL that a comprehensive survey of UNIVERSAL's compliance with the conditions of the 1994-1995 Contract would begin on January 24, 1995. The January 10, 1995 letter specified the manner in which the survey would be conducted and itemized the information required of UNIVERSAL. AHCA also informed UNIVERSAL that the survey would review only those items required by the 1994-1995 Contract. The survey instrument developed by AHCA contained 145 specific program requirements which were derived directly from the 1994-1995 Contract. Seventy of the requirements pertained to quality of care review, and included such requirements as the providing of early periodic screening diagnosis and treatment (EPSDT); establishing an accurate and comprehensive medical records system; ensuring peer review of medical facilities and services; verification and examination of the credentials of health care providers; coordination of the overall health care of each member; and assuring that services provided to members through referral sources were reported to the HMO or a designated health care provider. In January of 1995, at the time of the AHCA survey, UNIVERSAL was undergoing major administrative changes including the replacement of its Chief Executive Officer. These changes were made in response to problems previously identified by UNIVERSAL which related to the operation of the plan, including problems relating to compliance with certain requirements of the 1994-1995 Contract. The AHCA survey of UNIVERSAL was conducted from January 24-26, 1995. The survey team was composed of five staff members including medical personnel, a Medicaid monitor, a staff member from the Bureau of Managed Care, and a manager or supervisor from the agency. In order to ensure consistency in the application of the survey standards, all team members participating in the comprehensive review of the 29 Florida prepaid Medicaid health plans were trained by AHCA prior to conducting the survey. The AHCA team members who conducted the comprehensive review of UNIVERSAL received such training. At the conclusion of the on-site survey, the AHCA survey team did not make representations to UNIVERSAL which indicated that the team had found UNIVERSAL to be in such substantial noncompliance with the 1994-1995 Contract that sanctions would be imposed. After all on-site surveys were completed, each AHCA review team compiled a detailed deficiency report for each plan listing those contract requirements with which the team had determined the plan was out of compliance. The deficiency report which the AHCA survey team completed for UNIVERSAL determined that UNIVERSAL complied with only 68 percent of the quality of care standards required by the 1994-1995 Contract, and with only 76 percent of the overall standards required by the 1994-1995 Contract. UNIVERSAL did not contest the contract deficiencies as determined by the AHCA survey team. AHCA sent each health plan, including UNIVERSAL, a copy of the deficiency report for their plan, and requested each health plan to develop and submit to AHCA a corrective action proposal for the deficiencies cited by the report. UNIVERSAL acknowledged the deficiencies cited in the AHCA report, and developed a corrective action proposal addressing these deficiencies. AHCA accepted and approved UNIVERSAL's corrective action proposal on April 8, 1995. As a result of the contract deficiencies determined during the comprehensive review of the prepaid Medicaid health plans, AHCA imposed sanctions against those plans which AHCA determined were not in substantial compliance with the requirements of the 1994-1995 Contract. For commercially licensed health plans, including UNIVERSAL, AHCA developed a graduated schedule of quality of care fines which were imposed based on each plan's performance as related to the seventy quality of care standards reviewed during the comprehensive survey. The fines imposed by AHCA ranged from $20,000 to $100,000, depending on the number of quality of care deficiencies cited for each plan. Commercial plans with contractual compliance rates above 90 percent were found to be in substantial compliance and no fines were imposed. Commercial plans with contractual compliance rates between 80 percent and 89 percent were fined $20,000. Those commercial plans between 70 percent and 79 percent were fined $60,000, and those commercial plans below 70 percent were fined $100,000. In developing its graduated schedule for quality of care fines, AHCA weighed each quality of care deficiency equally. UNIVERSAL was the only commercially licensed plan with a quality of care contractual compliance rate below 70 percent. The contractual quality of care requirements with which UNIVERSAL failed to comply included: 1) failure to provide EPSDT or to arrange for health risk and prevention measures; 2) failure to ensure a readily accessible, accurate and comprehensive medical records system; 3) failure to ensure peer review of its medical facilities and services; 4) failure to verify and examine the credentials of each of its providers; 5) failure to coordinate the overall health care of each member; and 6) failure to assure that services provided members through referral sources were reported to the HMO or a designated health care professional. By letter dated March 30, 1995, AHCA notified UNIVERSAL that because of the deficiencies found during the comprehensive review, UNIVERSAL was not in substantial compliance with the quality of care requirements of the 1994-1995 Contract. In accordance with the graduated schedule set forth above, AHCA assessed a fine against UNIVERSAL in the amount of $100,000. AHCA further notified UNIVERSAL that it was out of compliance with the overall requirements of the contract and imposed a moratorium on expansion and enrollment on UNIVERSAL. AHCA conducted a follow-up survey of UNIVERSAL from July 18-20, 1995. At that time AHCA determined that the corrective action plan submitted by UNIVERSAL had not been met, and contractual deficiencies remained. As a result of the follow-up survey, AHCA by letter dated August 15, 1995, notified UNIVERSAL that AHCA would be terminating UNIVERSAL's Medicaid Prepaid Health Contract, and revoking UNIVERSAL's certificate of authority effective October 1, 1995. On September 15, 1995, a separate administrative action was instituted by UNIVERSAL with the Division of Administrative Hearings, (Case No. 95-4569), relating to AHCA's termination of its contract and revocation of its certificate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The sanctions imposed by AHCA on UNIVERSAL be UPHELD. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of October, 1995. RICHARD HIXSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 1995. APPENDIX As to Petitioner AHCA's proposed findings. 1 - 8. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected in part as a conclusion of law. Accepted and incorporated. 13-14. Rejected in part as a conclusion of law. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as irrelevant. 17 - 18. Accepted and incorporated. 19 - 28. Accepted and incorporated. 29. Rejected as irrelevant. 30 - 32. Accepted and incorporated. As to Respondent UNIVERSAL's proposed findings. 1- 10. Accepted and incorporated. 11 - 12. Rejected. 13. Accepted and incorporated. 14 - 16. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted and incorporated. 20 - 23. Accepted and incorporated. 24 - 31. Rejected as irrelevant. 32. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Heidi Garwood, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox - Building 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Ellen Leibovitch, Esquire Lori Lovgren, Esquire ADORNO & ZEDER, P.A. 2255 Glades Road, Suite 342W Boca Raton, Florida 33431 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Jerome Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox - Building 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Respondents, by refusing to allow consumers to cancel their individual health insurance policies subsequent to the "free-look" period and thereby failing to refund premiums paid, engaged in conduct violative of Subsection 627.6043, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that the Petitioner has jurisdiction over Respondents, National States and Penn Treaty, during times material. On June 24, 1993, Petitioner filed a five count administrative complaint against National States alleging that 20 consumers had purchased various types of health insurance policies and that such policy holders requested cancellation of those policies before the expiration date of their policy. The policy holders prepaid the premiums on such policies. National States refused to honor those requests for cancellation and did not refund the unearned premiums remaining on those policies. National States, by its assistant vice president, William O'Connor, advised those policy holders that they were not entitled to cancellation after the "free-look" period and therefore refused to refund any unearned premiums. Policy holders who were denied premium refunds include the following: Alexandrine Austin, Henry M. and Mary Lou Butler, Madeline Goding, William O. and Rowena Haisten, Sebastian N. and Jane E. Imme, Teresa Karl, John F. Killinger, J. Robert Merriman, Nell I. Mooney, Ralph Motta, Kathryn Patterson, Alene R. Smith, and Bernadine Weiss. On June 17, 1993, Petitioner filed a three count administrative complaint against Penn Treaty alleging that certain consumers had purchased various health insurance policies, that the policy holders requested cancellation of those policies prior to the expiration and Penn Treaty refused to honor those requests for cancellation and to refund any unearned premium remaining. Penn Treaty advised those policy holders, by letter, that they could not cancel their policies after the "free-look" period. The policy holders who were denied cancellation and/or a refund by Penn Treaty were Adelbert Gronvold, George and Marie Hutnyak and George F. and Elizabeth M. MacVicar. Health insurance policies do not contain a provision granting the policy holder the right to cancel. Ms. Kitterman, a former employee of Petitioner who has reviewed health insurance policies for over sixteen (16) years, was familiar with such policy forms. She has not seen a provision in an individual health insurance policy which specifically granted an insured the right to cancel a policy midterm. Dr. Solomon, an expert with extensive knowledge concerning health insurance policy provisions or the absence thereof, opined that health insurance policies do not contain a provision dealing with the ability or the right of the insured to cancel or not to cancel their health insurance policy. Finally, Ms. Andrews, the assistant bureau chief of life and health forms for approximately eight (8) years, has also personally reviewed health insurance policy forms. Ms. Andrews supervised the insurance analysts who reviewed such forms and corroborate the testimony of Kitterman and Solomon that such policy forms do not contain a provision addressing the insured's right to cancel. Petitioner has never required an individual health policy form to contain a provision regarding an insured's right to cancel. Although Petitioner does not require such a provision, it does insist that companies refund unearned premiums once an insured files a request to cancel pursuant to Section 627.6043, Florida Statutes. A discussion of the "free-look" period is contained in Rule 4-154.003, Florida Administrative Code, entitled "Insured's Right to Return Policy; Notice". That rule states: It is the opinion of the insurance commissioner that it will be in the public interest and of benefit to all if the person to whom the policy is issued has the opportunity to return the policy if he is not satisfied with it, provided such return is made within a reasonable length of time after receipt of the policy; therefore, each and every company issuing for delivery a disability policy in this state is requested to have printed or stamped thereon, or attached thereto a notice in a prominent place stating in substance that the person to whom the policy or contract is issued shall be permitted to return the policy or contract within ten (10) days of its delivery to said purchaser and to have the premium paid refunded if, after examination of the policy or contract, the purchaser is not satisfied with it for any reason. The notice may provide that if the insured or purchaser pursuant to such notice returns the policy or contract to the insurer at its home office or branch office or to the agent through whom it was purchased, it shall be void from the beginning and the parties shall be in the same position as if no policy or contract had been issued. This rule shall not apply to either single premium non-renewal policies or contracts or travel accident policies or contracts. Notices in this Rule 4-154.003 and in Rule 4.154.001 may be combined. (emphasis added) Thus, if a policy is returned during the "free look" period, the company is required to return the entire premium paid. The "free-look" period allows the consumer an opportunity to review the contract for the designated period of time. It allows them to make sure that it was the type of contract they intended to purchase and to review the application that was submitted to the company to verify that the information on it is correct. "Guaranteed renewable" is defined in Rule 4-154.004, Florida Administrative Code, titled "Non-cancellable or non-cancellable and guaranteed renewable policy; Use of Terms." That rule states: The terms "non-cancellable" or "non-cancellable and guaranteed renewable" may be used only in a policy which the insured has the right to continue in force by the timely payment of premiums set forth in the policy until at least age 50, or in the case of a policy issued after age 44, for at least five years from its date of issue, during which period the insurer has no right to make unilaterally any change in any provision of the policy while the policy is in force. Except as provided above, the term "guaranteed renewable" may be used only in a policy in which the insured has the right to continue in force by the timely payment of premiums until at least age 50, or in the case of a policy issued after age 44, for at least five years from its date of issue, during which period the insurer has no right to make unilaterally any change in any provision of the policy while the policy is in force, except that the insurer may make changes in premium rates by classes. The foregoing limitation on use of the term "non-cancellable" shall also apply to any synonymous term such as "not cancellable" and the limitation on use of the term "guaranteed renewable" shall also apply to any synonymous term such as "guaranteed continuable". Nothing herein contained is intended to restrict the development of policies having other guarantees of renewability, or to prevent the accurate description of their terms of renewability or the classification of such policies as guaranteed renewable or non-cancellable for any period during which there may be actually be such, provided the terms used to describe them in policy contracts and advertising are not such as may readily be confused with the above terms. Thus, the term "guaranteed renewable" as defined by Petitioner's rule notably does not contain any prohibitions against an insured's ability to cancel. Both Dr. Solomon and National States expert, E. Paul Barnhart, agreed that the industry meaning of "guaranteed renewable" is that companies guarantee renewability of a health or accident policy but do not guarantee that the rate will remain constant. Guaranteed renewable policies may be cancelled by the company only for nonpayment of premium or for false statements made by the insured in the application. Guaranteed renewable policies can also be cancelled by the company at the terminal point which, for most of National States policy holders, is when the insured dies but, in a few cases, at age 65. Whether a policy is marketed by the company as "guaranteed renewable" is a business decision made by the insurer generally to meet competition. Thus, the insurer, in making the decision to market an insurance policy as guaranteed renewable, waives any right that might otherwise be available to the insurer to cancel or non-renew except those authorized by statute which are, as noted, nonpayment of premium and material misrepresentation. Nowhere in any of the expert's opinions or Petitioner's witnesses is the term guaranteed renewable construed to mean that an insured has also waived the right to cancel a health insurance policy. All health insurance policies are cancellable by the insurer unless the company has chosen to market the policy as non-cancellable or guaranteed renewable which, as noted, may be only cancelled for nonpayment of premium and material misrepresentation. Dr. Solomon's opinion is based on the equitable theory that an insurance company, when it writes a health policy, does not immediately earn all of the premium collected, and the insured is therefore entitled to the unearned premium if he cancels midterm. Mr. Barnhart confirmed that a premium is not totally earned the moment it is collected but that "it's earned over the period of time for which the premium has been paid . . . if someone pays an annual premium, say on July 1, 1993, that annual premium would become earned at a steady rate over the year that follows and become fully earned as of June 30, 1994." When a premium is received for health and accident policies, the company will establish an unearned premium reserve, which is a basic reserve set up as a result of the payment of premiums and represents, at any given point in time, that portion of the premium that remains unearned. Insurance companies are required by law to maintain unearned premium reserves because they have not earned the premium. Unearned premium reserve is typically a section in the balance sheet of a company that is reserved for that purpose of paying back premiums that are not earned, or holding premiums in that account, as a segregated item, until such time as they are earned. Refunds of premiums are made on the basis of either a short-rate or a pro-rata table. Short-rate refunds are for the purpose of returning a portion of the insured's premium in the event that the insured elects to cancel midterm. The insured is penalized for cancelling the policy midterm under the short-term rate table by absorbing some of the company's expenses of underwriting the policy and administrative costs. That is, if the insured cancels an annual policy within one month after which an annual premium has been paid, the insured will receive less than 11/12ths of the advance premium. Pro-rata refunds mean equal distribution which is the refund procedure used when the insurer makes the decision to cancel. Thus, if the insurer cancels an insured's policy that is so cancellable by the insurer in the annual policy example, the insurer would be liable to make a pro-rata refund of premium to the insured which will be 11/12ths of the premium paid. Thus, an insured is not penalized when it is the insurer who exercises its right to cancel any policies which are so cancellable by the insurer. Section 627.6043(2), Florida Statutes, states: In the event of a cancellation, the insurer will return promptly the unearned portion of any premium paid. If the insured cancels, the earned premium shall be computed by the use of the short- rate table last filed with the state official having supervision of insurance with the state where the insured resided when the policy was issued. If the insurer cancels, the earned premium shall be computed pro-rata. Cancellation shall be without prejudice to any claim originating prior to the effective date of cancellation. (emphasis added) Ellen Andrews, the Department's former assistant bureau chief for life and health insurance forms several years prior to 1989, and in 1989 when the statute at issue was initially rewritten by the Legislature and as it is currently written, was familiar with the development of Petitioner's position as the statute went through renumberings in 1990 and 1992. It was part of Ms. Andrews' duties and responsibilities to assist Petitioner in the interpretation of that statute. It was her ultimate responsibility to be in charge of implementation of that statute. Petitioner's initial interpretation has remained unchanged since the statute was initially reworded in 1989 and moved to its various sections of part 6 of Chapter 627, Florida Statutes. The Department's opinion and decision on the meaning of what is currently Section 627.6043(2), Florida Statutes, is that if the insured cancels a policy midterm, the insured would be entitled to a return of premium pursuant to the short-rate table if one was filed with the Department. The Department further interprets the statute to mean that the insurer has a right to cancel, unless the insurer has waived that right by selling a guaranteed renewable or non-cancellable policy and if an insurer exercises that right, the insurer must make a refund to the insured on a pro-rata basis. Petitioner's position is based on the statutory provision that the insured shall receive a return of premium if the insured cancels and that if the insured didn't have a right to cancel, then the insured wouldn't have a right to receive a refund of premium. In 1989, Petitioner took the initiative to obtain statutory authority for its position by submitting a proposed draft to the Legislature revising the statute in order to provide insureds, by statute, the right to receive a return of the unearned premium upon notifying the insurer of their decision to cancel the individual health insurance policies. Mr. Barnhart verified that there would be no claims incurred once a policy ceases to be in force; that National States refund a portion of the premium when a policy is rescinded or terminated and that National States refunds unearned premiums when an insured dies midterm of the policy period whether required by statute or not. Penn Treaty refunds unearned premiums upon death and has a provision in its individual health and accidental insurance policies which provides that the insured shall receive a refund of unearned premiums upon death. From an actuarial perspective, there is no difference between either death or cancellation in midterm of a policy period by an insured. Penn Treaty sells, in Florida, long term care, home health care and medicare supplement insurance policies. National States generally sells guaranteed renewable policies in Florida. National States' position is that health and accident policies are not cancellable by the insured in Florida and that only medicare supplement policies are cancellable by the insured because there is a provision in the policy that allows an insured to cancel and because there is statutory authority for the insured to cancel that policy. Its position is that Section 627.6043, Florida Statutes, does not provide for cancellation by the insured. However, National States allows that the statutes regarding cancellation under the medicare supplement law, Section 627.6741(4), Florida Statutes, mandates refunds to insureds who request cancellation of their medicare supplement policies. National States allow cancellations by insureds and refunds unearned premiums on health insurance policies in those other states which have statutes requiring such refunds. Likewise, Penn Treaty's position is that home health care and long term care policies are not cancellable by the insured because there is no provision in the contract to allow cancellation and because they are guaranteed renewable policies. Its position also is that the insured does not have the right to cancel, either contractually or statutorily. Respondents relied on legal opinions from their counsel (in Florida) and an opinion from Petitioner dated June 12, 1991 to deny refunds. Florida law addressing an insured's right to cancel a medicare supplement policy is at Section 627.6741(4), Florida Statutes. That section provides, in pertinent part, that: If a policy is cancelled, the insurer must return promptly the unearned portion of any premium paid. If the insured cancels the policy, the earned premium shall be computed by the use of the short-rate table last filed with the state official having supervision of insurance in the state where the insured resided when the policy was issued. If the insurer cancels, the earned premium shall be computed pro-rata. Cancellation shall be without prejudice to any claim originating prior to the effective date of the cancellation period. (emphasis added) The above statute is the only Florida law which addresses an insured's right to cancel his medicare supplement policy. Florida law requires that medicare supplement policies be guaranteed renewable. That law is found at Section 627.6741(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides: For both individual and group medicare supplement policies: an insurer shall neither cancel nor non-renew a medicare supplement policy or certificate for any reason other than non payment of premium or material misrepresentation. Respondents' position is that in Florida, insureds who purchase their policies are elderly and are easily led. If allowed to cancel, Respondents contend that they would lose out on a number of protections that they would be entitled to if they were required to keep their policies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a final order requiring Respondents to make refunds of premiums to all policy holders who request the cancellation of their health insurance policies after October 1, 1989, with 12 percent interest from the date cancellation was requested and further that Respondents' certificates of authority be placed on suspension for a period of twelve (12) months. It is further recommended that the suspension be suspended upon Respondents, payment of the unearned premiums to the above-referenced consumers. 1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1995.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Richard Sidney Cole, is currently eligible for licensure and licensed in this state as a Health Insurance Agent, and was so licensed at all times relevant to these proceedings. The Respondent, at all times relevant to these proceedings, was licensed in this state to solicit health insurance on behalf of National States Insurance Company (National States). Count I -- Edith Kastel. On or about June 24, 1988, the Respondent visited the home of Edith Kastel of St. Petersburg, Florida, for the purpose of soliciting health insurance. She had responded to a "lead card" National States had sent to her, and her request for follow- up information was referred to the Respondent. Since Kastel was not yet eligible for Medicare, and could not purchase a Medicare supplement policy, the Respondent showed her the National States Limited Medical-Surgical Expense policy. This policy pays 40% of doctors' charges, outpatient hospital charges and outpatient charges for diagnostic laboratory and x- ray examinations and ambulance charges. During the application process, Kastel disclosed to the Respondent that she had suffered from diverticulitis in the past. The Respondent took this opportunity to explain to Kastel that the policy would not pay on preexisting conditions (i.e., according to the policy, loss "which results from sickness or disease for which treatment was advised or received, or medical advice given by a doctor, during the 180 day period just before the Policy Date") until after the expiration of a six-month waiting period. Kastel fully understood this provision of the policy. Kastel did not disclose to the Respondent during the application process any other preexisting conditions to which the waiting period would apply. She did tell him that she had an eye examination appointment that she had just scheduled for July 6, 1988, but she gave no indication that she knew there was something wrong with her eyes or that the appointment was for anything other than a routine vision check. She continued to maintain at the hearing that she did not know, at the time she applied for coverage through the Respondent, that she had cataracts. She did vaguely ask whether she would be covered if the examination revealed that something was wrong with her eyes, and the Respondent assured her that she would be covered and that she should submit any bills she might get with a claim on the policy. Kastel bought the policy, effective July 1, 1988. At her eye examination on July 6, 1988, Kastel was diagnosed with cataracts and was advised that elective cataract surgery would be beneficial. Kastel scheduled the surgery and had it performed in October, 1988. When she submitted her bills with a claim on the policy, National States rejected the claim as a preexisting condition for which claim was made within the policy's six_month waiting period. When the claim was rejected, Kastel complained to the Respondent, who made a written request to National States that the claim be paid. He reasoned that the claim should be covered because Kastel maintained that she did not know of the condition at the time she applied for coverage. Kastel and the Respondent were not able to change National States' position, and the claim still has not been paid. It was not proven that the Respondent misrepresented to Kastel that the policy paid 40% of all charges (as opposed to 40% of only doctors' charges, outpatient hospital charges and outpatient charges for diagnostic laboratory and x-ray examinations and ambulance charges) or that Kastel would not have purchased the policy if the Respondent had communicated to her exactly what kinds of charges it covered. Up to the time of the hearing, there is no indication that Kastel had any complaint against National States or the Respondent except that her cataract surgery claim was rejected as a preexisting condition. 2/ (All other claims Kastel has made under the policy have been paid.) Kastel's testimony elicited at the hearing, that the Respondent told her only that the policy covered 40% of all expenses, was not persuasive. Count II -- The Ogletrees. Like Kastel, Jack and Margaret Ogletree of Palm Bay, Florida, responded to National States advertising by sending in a "lead card" that was referred to the Respondent. The Respondent visited the Ogletrees on or about August 11, 1988. Margaret Ogletree was not yet eligible for Medicare, and the Respondent sold both her and her husband a National States Limited Medical-Surgical Expense Policy. These were not Medicare supplement policies, and the policies themselves state in bold print: "THIS POLICY IS NOT A MEDICARE SUPPLEMENT POLICY." The Respondent explained that the policy was totally unrelated to Medicare and would pay under its terms regardless of Medicare coverage. The evidence did not prove that the Respondent said or did anything to lead the Ogletrees to believe that they were buying a Medicare supplement policy, except perhaps to say that the policy would pay for some things that Medicare would not pay for. It was not proven that Jack Ogletree had a Medicare supplement policy in force at the time or whether he planned to, or did, replace a Medicare supplement policy with the policy the Respondent sold him. It was not proven that the Respondent was required to submit a replacement form or indicate on the application that the policy was "intended to replace any accident or sickness insurance, health service or health maintenance contract." The evidence proved that the Ogletrees told the Respondent during the application process that Jack Ogletree had successful open heart surgery for an aortic valve replacement in April, 1984, and remained on medication for his heart condition. The Respondent led the Ogletrees to believe that losses resulting from the heart condition would be covered after the six-month waiting period for preexisting conditions. In completing Jack Ogletree's application, the Respondent wrote "no" in answer to: question 6.c., asking whether he had or ever had "high or low blood pressure, varicose veins or disorder of the heart or circulatory system; question 7.a., asking whether he had consulted or been treated by any physician or practitioner in the last five years; and question 7.b., asking whether he had been confined in a hospital in the last five years. The evidence is that, under National States' underwriting policies, a successful aortic valve replacement performed over four years before an application would not mean automatic rejection of the application. Had questions 6.c., 7.a. and 7.b. on Jack Ogletree's application been answered correctly, National States typically would have investigated and may or may not have rejected the application, depending on the results of the investigation. Likewise, it is not clear from the evidence whether National States would consider the misrepresentation on the Jack Ogletree application to be a material misrepresentation that would require rejection if Jack Ogletree were to make a claim based on his heart disorder. To the date of the hearing, no such claim had been made. (Claims that have been made have been paid.) Count III -- Gunnar Sundstrom. Like Edith Kastel and the Ogletrees, Gunnar Sundstrom sent in a "lead card" that was referred to the Respondent. The Respondent visited Sundstrom on or about December 9, 1987. At the time, Sundstrom had in force an Old Southern Life Insurance Company (Old Southern) Medicare supplement policy. Sundstrom wanted to replace the Old Southern policy with a National States policy which the Respondent sold him. He wanted a minimum of overlap between the effective date of the new National States policy and the lapse of the Old Southern policy, but he also wanted to be sure that there would be no gap in coverage of any preexisting conditions. He and the Respondent discussed this thoroughly, but the Respondent could not answer all of Sundstrom's questions because he was not sure at the time whether National States was going to increase the waiting period for preexisting conditions from three to six months. It was decided that Sundstrom would apply for the policy, review it upon receipt, and cancel it and ask for a full refund within 30 days, as he had a right to do under the policy, if the waiting period for preexisting conditions turned out to be six months. On the Sundstrom application, the Respondent answered "no" to the question whether the National States policy for which Sundstrom was applying was "intended to replace any accident or sickness insurance, health service or health maintenance contract." The Respondent did not submit any replacement forms as required by F.A.C. Rule 4-51.007 when a Medicare supplement policy is being replaced. 3/ The Respondent explained that he thought the "no" answer on the Sundstrom application was appropriate and that no replacement form was necessary because Sundstrom was not cancelling the Old Southern policy, only perhaps allowing it to lapse. He now concedes that perhaps he was wrong. All claims Sundstrom made under the National States policy through the date of the hearing were paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance, enter a final order suspending the license, and eligiblity for licensure, of the Respondent, Richard Sidney Cole, for four (4) months. RECOMMENDED this 28th Tallahassee, Florida. day of August, 1990, in J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1990.
The Issue The ultimate issue in this case is whether Respondent's proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-149.022(3), which would incorporate by reference Form OIR-B2-2112, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Before that issue may be reached, however, it is necessary to determine whether Petitioners have standing to challenge the proposed rule.
Findings Of Fact The Financial Services Commission ("Commission") is a four-member collegial body consisting of the governor and cabinet. The Office of Insurance Regulation ("Office") is a structural unit of the Commission. Giving rise to this case, the Office initiated rulemaking and made recommendations to the Commission concerning an amendment to rule 69O-149.022, which would incorporate by reference Form OIR-B2-2112, titled "Consumer Notice [Regarding] The Impact of Federal Health Care Reform on Health Plan Costs" ("Form 2112"). Whenever the Commission or the Office engages in rulemaking, the members of the Commission serve as the agency head. The Commission thus has the ultimate responsibility for approving and adopting the proposed rule. CHAIN is a nonprofit corporation which operates solely within the state of Florida. CHAIN is subject to the oversight of a voluntary board of directors. As a health-care advocacy organization, CHAIN is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and derives its income primarily from grants and contributions. CHAIN provides services to low- and moderate-income individuals who lack health insurance coverage or perceive their coverage to be unaffordable or inadequate. CHAIN provides health insurance purchased through Florida's small-group health insurance market to each of its five full-time employees. Greg Mellowe is a full-time employee of CHAIN who receives health insurance coverage through such employment. During the 2013 regular session, the Florida Legislature passed a bill, which the governor approved, enacting section 627.410(9), Florida Statutes. This section requires that insurers provide to policyholders of individual and small-group nongrandfathered plans a notice that describes the estimated impact of the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA")——popularly and more commonly known as Obamacare——on monthly premiums.1/ An insurer that issues a nongrandfathered plan must give this notice one time——when the policy is issued or renewed on or after January 1, 2014——on a form established by rule of the Commission. (A "nongrandfathered" plan is a health insurance plan that must comply with all of Obamacare's requirements. For ease of reference, such plans will be referred to as "compliant plans.") Having been directed to act, the Office commenced rulemaking to establish the form of the notice to be sent to persons insured under compliant, individual and small-group plans, eventually proposing to adopt Form 2112. The Commission approved this form at a hearing on August 6, 2013. Form 2112 fills a single, one-sided page2/ and looks like this: CHAIN will receive the Obamacare notice when it renews its small-group health insurance plan, or purchases a new plan, on or after January 1, 2014.
