Findings Of Fact The Applicants acquired in 1960 for approximately $40,000 a 38 acre parcel of real property located adjacent to Governors Creek just outside the corporate limits of the City of Green Cove Springs in Clay County, Florida. The applicants created an unrecorded subdivision by subdividing the parcel into lots approximately one-half acre in size in accordance with a map dated July 19, 1961 which shows 50 numbered lots, access roads to these lots, and three parcels designated as not being included in the subdivision. The map of the subdivision was never recorded in the office of the Clerk of the Court of Clay County, but the tract has been referred to variously as the Bradley-Triplett Subdivision and Governor's Creek Subdivision. The Applicants began to develop the tract in 1961 for the purpose of selling the lots therein as single family home sites. Their activities included clearing and grading all the roads shown on the map and installing storm drainage structures. Shortly after the initial work was done, the Applicants approached the County Supervisor of Roads, James Knowles, and the County undertook maintenance of the roads. At the time development began, Clay County had no subdivision regulations, and there was no requirement to record the plat of the subdivision. A map of the subdivision was given to the County at the time it began to maintain the roads in 1961. Sales of lots in the subdivision began in 1961, and several lots were sold in the subdivision over the next few years. However, sales efforts were discontinued in 1965 because of the poor market. At the request of the Applicants, the County ceased to maintain a portion of the roads in 1975 in an effort to prevent dumping of garbage in the area. Initially, the subdivision was zoned agricultural. In June 1976, Mr. Bradley appeared before the Clay County Zoning Commission and requested the zoning of 30 acres of the tract be changed from BB to RB which permitted one single family dwelling per one-half acre. This request was granted. In June 1976, Mr. Bradley wrote Mr. John Bowles, Public Works Director of Clay County, requesting permission to install water lines within the graded road rights-of-way as shown on a map submitted by the Applicants which depicted all the lots which are the subject of the instant Petition for vested rights. This permission was granted by Bowles, and the Applicants paid $8,000 for the installation of water lines and fire hydrants in the subdivision. Water service is provided by the City of Green Cover Springs. In August 1976, the Applicants presented to the County a Warranty Deed for the roads shown in the Map. The County accepted the roads and agreed to continue to maintain the roads if certain improvements were made. Subsequently, the Applicants worked on making the improvements requested by the County, and the County continued to maintain the roads. The subdivision has appeared on maps used by various County departments for many years. In June 1978, Mr. Bradley appeared before the Clay County Planning, Zoning and Building Commission and requested that the remainder of the subdivision be re-zoned from agricultural to RB. This request was granted. In September 1978, the Public Works Department of Clay County requested the Applicants perform additional work on the road network in the subdivision to include creating a 20 foot drainage easement, construction of a drainage ditch, installation of street signs, and other improvements regarding grading and drainage. The drainage easement was granted to the County, and the drainage ditch was apparently constructed together with some of the other requested improvements; however, not all of the requested improvements were completed to the County's satisfaction. In March 1980, Mr. Bradley wrote Mr. Bowles a letter granting the County access to the roads within the subdivision for the purpose of maintaining them. In 1983, the County adopted new standards for the acceptance of roads not located within platted subdivisions. At this time, the Applicants became concerned about the status of the roads, and appeared before the County Commission. In November 1983, they contacted Mr. Bowles regarding their concerns. The status of County-requested improvements was a subject of continuing correspondence between the County and the Applicants. As a result thereof, the Applicants again undertook to satisfy the County regarding the list of requested improvements to the roads, and expended additional money on these improvements. The Applicants have spent over the years $20,000 on the roads, $15,000 on the water system and fire hydrants, and $4,000 on the drainage system within the subdivision. In 1984, the County Commission determined that it would not accept responsibility for maintenance of the roads, but that it would not re-convey title to the roads to the Applicants. The County has not altered its position since that determination. There are 50 numbered lots in the subdivision, and three unnumbered outparcels, some of which have been subsequently subdivided by sales. The unnumbered outparcel located in the northeast corner of the subdivision will be designated in this order as the unnumbered northeast parcel. The remaining unnumbered lots will be designated in this order as Lots A through G, which are located as follows: Lot A, located to the west of Lot 33; Lot B, located to the north of Lot A; Lot C, located to the north of Lot B; Lot C, located to the north of Lot B; Lot D, located to the north of Lot C; Lot E, located to the north of Lot D; Lot F, located to the north of Lot E, and Lot G, located to the north of Lot F. The County concedes there are 19 lots of record in the subdivision: Lots numbered lots 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42 and 43 plus the lots designated above as Lots A, D and F. The Hearing Officer includes Lot E as one of the recorded lots because it was subdivided from Lots D and F, which the County recognizes as lots of record, after the parcel from which the three lots were created was sold as one lot. Lots 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, and unnumbered Lots A, D, E, and F meet the Plan's criteria for development, and are not at issue in these proceedings. The Plan requires that over 70 percent of the total number of lots in a subdivision created between 1959 and 1970 be sold for the remaining lots to statutorily vest. The Applicants' subdivision does not meet the criteria in the Plan for statutory vesting because the requisite percentage of lots have not been sold. The lots at issue in the Applicant's request for equitable vesting are the remaining numbered lots ( 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 38, 39, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 50), the unnumbered northeasterly parcel, and the lots designated in this order as Lots B, C, and G. On January 23, 1992, the Board of County Commissioners of Clay County formally adopted the 2001 Comprehensive Plan pursuant to and in compliance with Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. On November 23, 1993, the zoning of the subdivision was administratively changed to AR-2 which permits the building of single family residences at a density of one per five acres. None of the lots at issue are five acres in size and qualify for further development. A total of 12 homes have been built in the subdivision, each having an average size of 1,800 square feet and occupying lots approximately 1/2 acre in size. The existing layout of the roads does not permit consolidation of the unsold existing lots into five acre lots. Even if they could be consolidated, the increased costs of a five acre lot would dictate the construction of a house larger than 1,800 square feet. In sum, enforcement of the current plan's provisions will prevent any further development of a valuable piece of property conveniently located adjacent to the City of Green Cove Springs in a subdivision which has been recognized and considered in the County's development plans and maps for thirty years.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Sumter County comprehensive plan amendment 94D1 adopted on September 20, 1994, by Ordinance No. 94-6 is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact have been determined: Background The parties Respondent, Sumter County (County), is a local government subject to the comprehensive land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered and enforced by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive land use plans and amendments made thereto. Petitioners, T. D. Farnsworth and James E. Boyd, own property and reside within the northern part of unincorporated Sumter County. Petitioner, Sumter Citizens Against Irresponsible Development (SCAID), is an organization founded by a small group of citizens for the purposes of preserving the "rural lifestyle" of the County, preventing urban sprawl, and ensuring "that development will not be a burden to the taxpayers" of the County. Farnsworth is president of the group while Boyd serves as its treasurer. By stipulation of the parties, petitioners are affected persons within the meaning of the law and have standing to bring this action. Intervenor, Villages of Lake Sumter, Inc. (Villages), is a Florida corporation and the owner and developer of the Tri-County Villages development of regional impact, which is the subject property of this proceeding. Villages submitted oral and written comments during the plan amendment review and adoption proceeding and thus has standing as an affected person to participate in this proceeding. Tri-County Villages To place this dispute in proper perspective, it is necessary to trace the history of the development which has occurred in and around the subject property. As noted earlier, intervenor is the owner and developer of the Tri- County Villages development located in unincorporated Sumter County. Development which predated the existing Tri-County Villages development commenced in approximately 1968 with Orange Blossom Garden North (OBGN). OBGN was an approximately 1,000-acre project owned and operated by Orange Blossom Hills, Inc. as a mobile home retirement community located mostly in the Town of Lady Lake, Florida. That community lies in the northwestern corner of Lake County, which adjoins the northeastern corner of Sumter County. Because the development of OBGN commenced prior to July of 1973, it is vested for purposes of development of regional impact (DRI) review pursuant to Section 380.06(20), Florida Statutes. In 1987, Orange Blossom Hills, Inc. submitted an Application for Development Approval (ADA) with the Town of Lady Lake which requested authorization to develop Orange Blossom Gardens South (OBGS). The OBGS development was an approximately 595-acre extension of the vested OBGN retirement community and was determined by the DCA and Town of Lady Lake to be a DRI. On January 18, 1988, the Town of Lady Lake approved the proposed OBGS development. In 1989, Orange Blossom Hills, Inc. submitted to the Town of Lady Lake and the County an ADA requesting a substantial deviation from the OBGS DRI. The substantial deviation request sought authorization to develop Orange Blossom Gardens West (OBGW). OBGW was planned as an approximately 1,700-acre extension to the OBGS DRI. The Town of Lady Lake approved the substantial deviation request through the issuance of an Amended Development Order on May 7, 1990. The County approved the development within its jurisdiction on May 29, 1990. In September 1993, intervenor, as successor to Orange Blossom Hills, Inc., submitted an ADA to the County which requested a substantial deviation from the OBGS and OBGW DRI's. By submitting this latest development, intervenor sought to add approximately 1,960 acres to the existing OBGS and OBGW DRI's and modify the development already approved by adding a total of 6,250 residential units and 910,000 square feet of commercial square footage. The overall development was renamed Tri-County Villages. The development order approving the substantial deviation for Tri-County Villages was adopted by the County on September 20, 1994. The Challenged Amendment On September 20, 1994, or prior to approval of the Tri-County Villages development substantial deviation, but in conjunction with it, the County adopted plan amendment 94D1 by Ordinance No. 94-6. On November 10, 1994, the DCA determined the amendment to be in compliance. That amendment amended the plan's Future Land Use Map (FLUM) to revise the land use designations on approximately 1,960 acres of land. Specifically, the plan amendment designated as Planned Unit Development (PUD) all areas of the approved OBGW DRI and the additional 1,960 acres referred to in Exhibit 1 of 94D1 as parcels 5 and 8. Prior to the amendment, parcels 5 and 8 had been designated predominantly as agricultural, with small pockets of rural residential. The plan amendment also revised the FLUM by extending the urban expansion area to include all of parcels 5 and 8. Prior to the amendment, only a small section of parcel 8 was included in the urban expansion area. The plan amendment further included several textual revisions to the Future Land Use Element (FLUE), including a revision to FLUE Policy 1.5.7 concerning the ratio of commercial square footage to residential units and the addition of FLUE Objective 1.14 and Policies 1.14.1 - 1.14.6, which essentially incorporated the concept of sector planning into the plan. Finally, the plan amendment revised Policy 2.1.5 of the Sanitary Sewer Element which, subject to submission of appropriate data and analysis, and Department of Environmental Protection approval, reduced the established level of service for sanitary sewer throughout the Tri-County Villages development. The Tri-County Villages DRI and ADA and plan amendment are related in that Section 380.06(6), Florida Statutes, requires that the local government's review of the DRI and corresponding comprehensive plan amendment be initiated and concluded at the same time. In the instant case, the Tri-County Villages ADA served as much of the background data and analysis for the plan amendment. The Tri-County Villages DRI also served as the sector plan for the area covered by the amendment. In addition to the voluminous data and analysis included in the Tri- County Villages ADA, the plan amendment also included detailed data and analysis. The data and analysis accompanying the amendment included a compatibility and land use suitability analysis, a soils analysis, an evaluation of urban sprawl related issues, an analysis of environmental considerations, a population and housing analysis, a concurrency analysis, and an analysis to ensure that the amendment was consistent with the adopted comprehensive plan. The data and analysis collectively demonstrated that the urban development proposed by the amendment was appropriate for the designated area. C. Is the Plan Amendment in Compliance? In their proposed recommended order, petitioners summarize their objections to the plan amendment as follows: (a) the amendment fails to protect agricultural lands, (b) the amendment encourages urban sprawl, (c) the future land use map is internally inconsistent, (d) there is no demonstrated need for 1,960 acres of PUD land use, (e) PUD is not a valid land use category, (f) the amendment does not ensure adequate fire and emergency medical services, (g) the County failed to coordinate with the local school board, (h) there is no reasonable protection from flooding, (i) the amendment does not provide adequate parks and recreational facilities, (j) affordable housing needs are not met, and there is no requirement that the developer install water and sewer facilities at its own expense. These contentions will be discussed separately below. Protection of agricultural lands Under the amendment, 1,960 acres of agricultural land will be converted to urban type uses. Petitioners contend that the amendment fails to protect agricultural land as required by FLUE objective 7.1.2 and Rule 9J- 5.006(5)(g)5., Florida Administrative Code. The cited objective "establishes agriculture as the primary use outside of the urban expansion area" and "insures retention of agricultural activities." If the plan amendment fails to "adequately protect adjacent agricultural areas," the cited rule considers this failure to be a prime indicator that the amendment does not discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. The rule and objective do not prohibit the conversion of agricultural lands to urban uses. Indeed, FLUE objective 1.2 and the corresponding policies allow for the conversion of suitable agricultural lands as the need for additional urban land is demonstrated. The policies also require that the conversion be done in a well planned, orderly and logical fashion based on need and suitability. The agricultural lands being converted as a result of the plan amendment are appropriate for conversion. The plans, FLUE data and analysis demonstrate that one of the best areas for urban development in the County is the northeast portion of the County which covers the agricultural lands in the plan amendment. This determination was based on an extensive analysis of various factors including soil suitability, environmental constraints, and other planning criteria such as proximity to existing urbanized areas. The evidence establishes that the conversion of agricultural land contemplated by the plan amendment was justifiable because of the extent of urban development already existing in the area and the urban infrastructure currently in place. In addition, future populations will be directed away from the remaining agricultural lands throughout the County and to the development proposed by the plan amendment. The open space required by the PUD and Tri- County Villages amended development order sector plan will also serve to buffer and ensure compatibility of land covered by the plan amendment and the adjacent agricultural and rural lands. In view of the above, it is found that petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment fails to protect agricultural land. Urban sprawl In the same vein, petitioners contend that the amendment fails to discourage urban sprawl because of the conversion of 1,960 acres of agricultural land to urban uses. In support of this contention, they cite a number of provisions within Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code, all dealing with urban sprawl, and which have allegedly been violated. They also point to the fact that large portions of the existing development have not been sold or built out, only 2 percent of the 1,960 acres will be devoted to commercial land use, the multiplier for the plan amendment is in excess of 1.25, which is an indicator of urban sprawl, and no future public facilities and services are planned for the lands covered by the amendment prior to its adoption. The plan amendment includes an evaluation of urban sprawl. That evaluation references FLUE policy 1.2.5.(a), which was adopted by the County specifically as a mechanism for discouraging urban sprawl. A review of that policy indicates that, for a PUD to be allowed in an agricultural area, it must score approximately 50 points based on factors including, but not limited to, proximity to the urban expansion area, proximity to urban services, including water, sewer, and roads, and proximity to other services such as fire protection and emergency medical services. If a proposed amendment or PUD failed to score 50 points, it was deemed to encourage urban sprawl and would not be approved by the County. The plan amendment scored 130 points, well in excess of the 50 point threshold. In addition to satisfying FLUE policy 1.2.5.(a), the plan amendment is consistent with FLUM maps VII-18A and VII-18C, which are the future land use constrained area overlay and urban sprawl evaluation overlay, respectively. As the FLUE data and analysis indicate, these maps were prepared for the purpose of directing urban development into areas most suitable for such development. Map VII-18A demonstrates that the land included in the plan amendment has only slight limitations for urban development. Similarly, Map VII-18C indicates that the land has only slight limitations in regard to urban sprawl. In fact, portions of land covered by the plan amendment are already within an established urban expansion area which is the OBGW DRI. Finally, the PUD mixed land use category and sector plan concept adopted by the plan amendment are planning methods specifically recognized and encouraged by prior DCA policy as reflected in the DCA's Technical Memo Special Edition 4-4 and the urban sprawl provisions incorporated into Rule 9J- 5.006(5)(l), Florida Administrative Code, effective May 18, 1994, as methods of discouraging urban sprawl. Indeed, the rule provides in part that mixed use development and sector planning . . . will be recognized as methods of discouraging urban sprawl and will be determined consistent with the provisions of the state comprehensive plan, regional policy plans, Chapter 163, Part II, and this chapter regarding discouraging the proliferation of urban sprawl. Given the above, it is found that petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment encourages urban sprawl. The consistency of the future land Petitioners next argue in general terms that the FLUM does not "reflect policies which call for maintaining agricultural lands, discouraging urban sprawl, promoting land use compatibility, protection from flooding, providing for adequate public recreation facilities, and other objectives," and thus it is internally inconsistent. The FLUM series in the plan as well as the FLUM series as amended by the plan amendment is a pictorial representation of the goals, objectives, and policies of the comprehensive plan. In the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, it is found that petitioners have failed to show to the exclusion of fair debate that the FLUM is internally inconsistent as alleged in their petition. Demonstrated need Petitioners next allege that the plan amendment "is premature in time and fails to provide demonstrated need" as required by various provisions within Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code. They further allege that the FLUM "is not based upon adequate surveys, studies, or data regarding the amount of land needed to accommodate anticipated growth." Initially, it is noted that the data and analysis in the plan are not subject to the compliance review process. Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, authorizes the DCA in a compliance review to determine only if the plan or plan amendment is based on appropriate data and analysis and whether the data was collected in a professionally acceptable manner. Planning methodologies used in analysis of the data, such as the calculation of a multiplier, must also be prepared in a professionally acceptable manner. In addition, the DCA may not choose one methodology over another. At hearing, petitioners raised issues concerning the methodology used in calculating the County's residential land use allocation multiplier and contended that other factors such as mortality rates and resale figures should have been used in calculating the multiplier. The preparation of the multiplier in issue came as a result of the DCA's Objections, Recommendations and Comments report. That report recommended that the County provide an analysis which demonstrated that the land use change requested in the plan amendment was based on the amount of additional land needed to accommodate the projected population during the planning time frame (the year 2014) established by the Tri-County Villages Amended Development Order sector plan. Based on historic data, the County calculated a multiplier which depicted the allocation of residential land countywide. The multiplier was 1.87, which means that the County allocated residential land uses approximately 87 percent above its demonstrated need for the planning period. The evidence shows that, in order to allow some degree of development flexibility, a local government will routinely allocate more land than is actually needed. Indeed, a multiplier of 1.87 is low when compared to the other multipliers found in compliance in adjacent local governments as well as in other local governments statewide. In actuality, a 1.87 multiplier is not really the most accurate depiction of the allocation of residential land county-wide because the population for OBGW and the other PUD in the County was not included in the calculation. In an effort to provide a more accurate multiplier, the County added to the equation the projected population for OBGW and the PUD. The resulting revised multiplier equalled 1.46. Petitioners developed a multiplier of their own of 1.88. However, they failed to show that the County's multiplier was not developed in a professionally acceptable manner. Moreover, petitioners' methodology was unacceptable because it did not project its population over the correct planning horizon. Petitioners failed to consider the 2014 planning horizon established by the Tri-County Villages Amended Development Order sector plan which controls the development of land covered by the plan amendment. Instead, petitioners multiplier incorrectly used the 2001 planning horizon established by the plan. In addressing the need for additional residential allocation, the amount of residential land allocated must be a reflection of the population expected through the end of the Tri-County Villages sector plan 2014 planning horizon. The type of development contemplated by the plan amendment and the additional population has not previously occurred in the County. Since development of OBGW commenced in 1992, the building permits issued in the County have increased by 94 percent. Much of this increase can be attributed to OBGW. The number of yearly certificates of occupancy for OBGW has stayed relatively constant and is expected to remain constant throughout the planning horizon. Intervenor's marketing scheme for OBGW seeks to attract retirees predominately from the northeastern part of the United States. The residents are not generally County residents prior to moving to Tri-County Villages. This same marketing scheme will be used for the future development of the Tri-County Villages. Thus, the future Tri-County Villages residents are not expected to be from the County. Tri-County Villages is a new type of development for the County. This new population was not taken into account in the original comprehensive plan which also had a low multiplier. Therefore, the need for residential allocation for this new population was not addressed. Because this new population is a reality which was not comtemplated by the plan, and the plan does not have an excess of allocated residential land, the need for the increased residential densities has been demonstrated. Petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment was premature or not based on a demonstrated need. PUD as a land use category Because a planned unit development (PUD) is not "recognized" as a land use category in Rule 9J-5.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, petitioners contend that the use of that category in the plan amendment renders it not in compliance. For purposes of its compliance review, the DCA used the version of chapter 9J-5 which was in effect at the time of the submittal of the plan amendment. Then existing Rule 9J-5.006(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, which was effective on March 23, 1994, established the generalized land uses which must be shown on the Existing Land Use Map (ELUM). Rule 9J-5.006(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, requires that these same generalized land uses must be depicted on the FLUM as well. While it is true that PUD is not one of the generalized land uses listed in chapter 9J-5, the two rules cited above both allow a local government to depict other land use categories on the ELUM and FLUM. Because the plan references PUD as a mixed land use category, the County has properly depicted that category on both the ELUM and FLUM. Petitioners have failed to show that PUD as a mixed land use category is not recognized under the rules in existence when the plan amendment was reviewed. Compatibility with adjacent agricultural lands Petitioners have also alleged that the County has "not demonstrated compatibility with adjacent agricultural and rural residential land uses." They point to the fact that the area adjacent to and near the development is a "friendly rural community," and they allege that the development will harm this wholesome atmosphere. The plan allows for the well planned conversion of agricultural lands in the County. One of the requirements of the plan's PUD provisions is that PUD development be buffered from adjacent lands and contain open space. The purpose of this provision is to ensure compatibility. A review of the PUD application and DRI Master Development Plan, both incorporated into the plan amendment, shows that the Tri-County Villages development will provide approximately 1,100 acres of open space. Much of this open space will act as a buffer between the development and the adjacent agricultural and rural land uses. The project will also cluster its development which serves to separate the more urban development from the adjacent agricultural and rural uses. Another mechanism which ensures compatibility is the phased method of development proposed for the project. Under the phasing approach, only contiguous portions of the property will be developed at any given time during the planning period. In addition, existing agricultural uses on the property will continue until such time as the proposed development reaches that property. Given these considerations, it is found that petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment is incompatible with adjacent land uses. Levels of service In their amended petition, petitioners assert that the plan amendment is in violation of FLUE objective 7.1.6 and FLUE policy 7.1.6.1, objective 1.1 and policy 1.1.1 of the Capital Improvements Element, Rules 9J-5.005(3), 9J- 5.011(2)2., 9J-5.015(3)(b)1., and 9J-5.016(3)(a) and (b)4., Florida Administrative Code, and Section 187.201(16)(b)6., Florida Statutes, all pertaining specifically or generally to levels of service for recreational facilities, schools, fire protection, emergency medical services and flooding. Policy 1.1.1 of the Capital Improvements Element adopts a recreational facility level of service for such facilities as softball fields, baseball fields, basketball courts, boat ramps and the like. The amount of facilities required is based on population. Under the plan, the County must take the necessary steps to insure that the availability of these facilities is addressed during the concurrency review process and not at the compliance review stage. In other words, when a proposed development reaches the stage of requesting a building permit, the County may require as a condition of the issuance of that building permit that a developer provide a certain facility. In this regard, it is noted that Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, requires that any development comply with concurrency requirements while the Tri-County DRI Amended Development Order requires that the developer provide for adequate public facilities. Both the plan amendment and the development authorized therein generally address the recreational level of service. However, if no additional facilities are constructed in the future, the plan amendment does not provide adequate baseball fields, softball fields, boat ramps or handball courts consistent with policy 1.1.1. In addressing these potential deficiencies, intervenor represented to the County that as a retirement community, the development would not generate a demand for these types of facilities. That is to say, the retiree population inhabiting the development would be less likely to participate in activities such as baseball or softball. The population would, however, generate a need for other recreational facilities such as golf courses, swimming pools, shuffleboard courts and bocci ball facilities, all of which the development has a surplus. In response to this concern, the County concluded that it was not appropriate to require the construction of certain facilities when the project would not generate a need for them. The County indicated that, during the plan evaluation and appraisal stage required in 1998, an amendment to the plan would be transmitted which would revise the plan to take into account such situations. If such an amendment is not adopted, intervenor will need to provide additional facilities necessary to meet concurrency requirements. There is no established level of service in the plan for fire protection or emergency medical services. Intervenor has, however, addressed these services in the Amended Development Order for the development. As reflected in that order, intervenor donated a five-acre parcel and constructed a fire station adjacent to the development. The station may also be used to house emergency medical services, if needed, although an existing emergency medical service provider is located in close proximity. Intervenor also donated to the County $80,000 for the purchase of fire fighting equipment, and each household pays the County a $30 annual fee for fire protection. Therefore, fire protection and emergency medical services have been addressed. The plan establishes no level of service standard for schools. Because the development is a retirement community, children under age 19 are prohibited. As a consequence, it was determined that impacts to school facilities would be minimal. Intervenor contacted and advised the school board of its retirement community development plans and projected student impacts. In response, the school board concluded that minimal impact was expected as a result of the development. To the extent that the development in the future allows school age children to reside therein, the Amended Development Order specifically calls for a substantial deviation determination pursuant to Section 380.06(19), Florida Statutes, to evaluate the potential impacts to school facilities. As a result of further review, intervenor may be required to provide additional school facilities. The plan establishes a level of service for stormwater drainage in terms of quantity and quality. Based on flooding which has occurred in the existing OBGW development, petitioners suggest that flooding will occur in the development proposed in conjunction with the plan amendment. While such flooding has occurred in the OBGW development, there is no evidence that the flooding was caused by a reduction or violation of the stormwater drainage level of service. Indeed, the evidence shows that the flooding was caused by an unusually heavy period of rainfall in combination with debris clogging the inlets of the stormwater system. The actual stormwater system for OBGW, which was reviewed and approved in the OBGW DRI review process, was designed for and required to meet the plan's drainage level of service. As a concurrency matter, any system designed for the future development contemplated in the plan amendment will also be required to meet the stormwater drainage level of service. Accordingly, it is found that petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment violates the plan's level of services standard for stormwater drainage. Affordable housing Petitioners further allege that the plan amendment "fails to provide for affordable housing as required by Objective 3.5 of the Housing Element of the (plan)" in violation of various rules and the state comprehensive plan. The rule alleged to have been violated requires a local government to analyze the affordable housing stock within the local government. The local government must then adopt comprehensive plan goals, objectives, and policies which establish programs to ensure an adequate supply of affordable housing for the present and future residents. Housing Element objective 3.5 and the implementing policies which follow provide one of the mechanisms, coordination with the private sector, which the County uses to address the provision of affordable housing countywide. The provisions of objective 3.5 and the implementing policies place no specific requirements on the private sector. These plan provisions only require that, in addressing the provision of affordable housing, the County work with the private sector. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, neither the plan provisions nor chapter 9J-5 require the plan amendment to address the affordable housing deficiencies countywide. As a DRI requirement, however, the plan amendment does address the provision of affordable housing. A detailed housing analysis was provided in the Tri-County Villages ADA. The analysis included a review of the affordable housing stock pursuant to the East Central Florida Regional Planning Council's housing demand, supply and need methodology. The analysis further concluded that after phase 3, additional affordable housing may be necessary. To address this deficiency, the ADA for the development requires intervenor to reanalyze the available affordable housing consistent with objective 3.5 of the Housing Element. Thus, it is found that petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment fails to provide affordable housing. i. Infrastructure funding Finally, petitioners allege that the plan amendment is inconsistent with FLUE policy 1.5.4. That policy provides as follows: All PUDS shall provide for central potable water and sanitary sewer facilities at the developer's expense and provide for fire hydrants and fire flow within the development in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association Standards. Intervenor has created community development districts as a mechanism to fund the development infrastructure. Intervenor is able to raise funds by the sale of bonds through these districts. The residents of the development will ultimately repay the bonds. Even so, petitioners allege that this funding mechanism is inconsistent with the cited policy because the infrastructure is not funded "at the developer's expense." The purpose and intent of the policy was to insure that the County not be obligated to fund infrastructure related to the PUD development. The developer, and ultimately the residents, of the project will fund the infrastructure through the community development districts. The County will not be obligated. This funding mechanism is consistent with policy 1.5.4. in that the County is not responsible for the funding of the PUD-related infrastructure. Accordingly, petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment is inconsistent with the cited policy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that Sumter County's comprehensive plan amendment 94D1 is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11 day of July, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-6974GM Petitioners: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4-5. Rejected as being unnecessary. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 40. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 34. 8-9. Rejected as being unnecessary. 10. Partially accepted in findings of fact 7-9. 11-14. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 19-21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 22-23. Covered in procedural statement. 24-29. Partially accepted in findings of fact 16-20. 30-41. Partially accepted in findings of fact 21-25. 42. Rejected as being unnecessary. 43-77. Partially accepted in findings of fact 28-36. 78-85. Partially accepted in findings of fact 37-39. 86-95. Partially accepted in findings of fact 40-42. 96-148. Partially accepted in findings of fact 43-49. 149-162. Partially accepted in findings of fact 50-53. 163-166. Partially accepted in findings of fact 54-56. Respondents/Intervenor: With certain changes, the substance of proposed findings 1-53 has been generally incorporated into this recommended order. Note: Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, irrelevant, not supported by the more credible, persuasive evidence, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Dan R. Stengle, Esquire General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Mr. T. D. Farnsworth 12364 County Road 223 Oxford, Florida 34484 Felix M. Adams, Esquire 236 North Main Street Bushnell, Florida 33513-5928 David L. Jordan, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Nancy G. Linnan, Esquire Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 R. Dewey Burnsed, Esquire Post Office Box 491357 Leesburg, Florida 34749-1357
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Environmental Coalition of Broward County, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Coalition"), is a Florida corporation. The Coalition has offices located in Broward County. The Coalition has approximately 500 members, most of whom reside in Broward County. A substantial number of the Coalition's members own property in Broward County and/or operate businesses within Broward County. The Coalition is a not-for-profit corporation, chartered for educational and scientific purposes. The primary purpose of the Coalition is to present objections and recommendations to local governments concerning planning issues on behalf of its membership. The Coalition is authorized to participate in actions of this type and to represent its membership in administrative proceedings. The Coalition presented oral and written objections to Broward County during the review and adoption process concerning the plan amendment at issue in this proceeding. Respondent, the Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of implementing the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Among other things, the Department is required to review local government comprehensive plans and amendments thereto for compliance with the Act. Respondent, Broward County (hereinafter referred to as the "County"), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County is the local government with the authority pursuant to the Act and the Broward County Charter to adopt and amend a comprehensive plan. The County has adopted the 1989 Broward County Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"). The Broward County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the "County Commission"), is the local planning agency for the County. The County Commission is advised on land use planning issues by the Broward County Planning Council (hereinafter referred to as the "Planning Council"). The Planning Council was created by the County Charter. Intervenors, Miramar Lakes, Inc., d/b/a Miramar Rock, Robert A. Whitcombe, Trustee, and the South Broward Trust own or have under contract virtually all of the property affected by the Plan amendment which is the subject of this proceeding. These Intervenors have entered into a joint venture agreement with Intervenor Atlantic Gulf Communities Corporation to develop the subject property. Intervenors applied for the amendment that is the subject of this proceeding and presented oral or written comments, recommendations and objections during the period of time between the transmittal hearing and adoption of the subject Plan amendment. The County's Plan. The County adopted a comprehensive plan as required by the Act in 1989. The planning horizon of the plan is 2010. The Plan includes two volumes of text, two volumes of support documents and associated maps. See Petitioner's exhibit 8. Volume One is text and is effective countywide. Volume Three contains support documents for the Plan. The Plan also includes the 1989 Broward County Future Land Use Plan Map (Series) (hereinafter referred to as the "FLUM"). The FLUM depicts the proposed distribution, extent and location of categories of land uses allowed under the Plan. Among others, those land uses include "residential" at various densities and "agricultural". Pursuant to the Plan, the eastern approximately one-third of the County may be developed. The developable area consists of approximately 400 square miles of land area. The western approximately two-thirds of the County are designated as water conservation areas and are separated by a levee from the developable one- third. Future land use elements of municipal comprehensive plans in the County must be in substantial conformity to the Plan. The Subject Property. The property which is the subject of the Plan amendment at issue in this case consists of 1,280 acres of a total of 1,965 acres (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"). The Property is located in the City of Miramar, in southwest Broward County, Florida, Sections 25, 26, 27 and 36, Township 51 South, Range 39 East. The Property is located in the southwestern portion of the developable one-third of the County. See Map 1 of Broward County exhibit 1. The Property is bounded on the east by S.W. 184th Avenue and on the north by Honey Hill Road. It is east of U.S. Highway 27. Part of the Property is vacant. Part of the Property is being used as cattle pasture and for a rock mining, batching, mixing and crushing operation. Existing land uses in the vicinity of the Property include vacant land, rock mining and some development to the north, single-family residential development to the east, rock mining and vacant land to the south, in Dade County, Florida. Residential development immediately to the east in a development known as "Silverlakes" is being developed at a density of three dwelling units per acre. Further to the west of the Property is the eastern boundary of the water conservation areas of the Everglades. These areas are separated from the rest of Broward County by a levee. The land use designation of the Property and other property in the surrounding area is "agricultural". Under the Plan, the land use designation allows agricultural uses and residential development of one dwelling per 2.5 acres. Under its current land use designation, a total of 786 dwelling units may be developed on the Property. The First Amendment Requested by the Intervenors. In early 1994 Intervenors filed an application with the County seeking an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Low (2) Residential". "Low (2) Residential" allows the development of two dwelling units per acre. The Planning Council conducted a review of the proposed amendment. The Broward County Department of Natural Resource Protection raised objections to the proposed amendment because the Property is located in an area of water recharge and wetlands. The area is identified as within a general wetlands area on the "Southwestern Generalized Wetlands Map" of the Plan. 30 Based upon the objections of the County Department of Natural Resource Protection, the staff of the Planning Council recommended denial of the proposed amendment. The South Florida Water Management District (hereinafter referred to as the "SFWMD"), an agency with broad regional responsibility for water management in southeast Florida, raised objections with the Planning Council concerning the location of the property in an area which was being considered for use as part of a project to restore the Everglades. The SFWMD was concerned that the Property is located within an area which has come to be known as the "East Coast Buffer". In early 1994, at the time of the initial review of the proposed amendment, the East Coast Buffer was a study area abutting the eastern water conservation areas of southeast Florida. The SFWMD was studying the East Coast Buffer for use in water conservation efforts in southeast Florida. At the time of the first review of the proposed amendment, the portion of the East Coast Buffer in which the Property is located was being considered for preservation as a reservoir site. The Planning Council transmitted the proposed amendment to the County Commission without recommendation. The County Commission decided not to transmit the proposed amendment to the Department for its review, ending review of the initial application. The Initial Review of the Subject Amendment. A second application on the Property was resubmitted by the Intervenors in March of 1994. The application was designated Application PC 94- 15. Application PC 94-15 sought an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". "Irregular 1.5 Residential" allows 1.5 dwelling units per acre. The amendment sought by Intervenors would have allowed an increase from 786 dwelling units to 2,947 dwelling units on the Property. An increase of 2,161 units. Application PC 94-15 was again reviewed. The same comments about, and objections to, the proposed amendment were raised concerning groundwater and aquifer recharge. The staff of the Planning Council again recommended denial of the proposed amendment. 41 The Planning Council recommended transmittal of the application, subject to the Intervenors satisfying the concerns raised by the SFWMD. On August 17, 1994, the County Commission transmitted Application PC 94-15 to the Department, conditioned upon the Intervenors satisfying the concerns of the SFWMD. The SFWMD objected to Application PC 94-15 because of its conclusion that the proposed future land use designation was not compatible with the East Coast Buffer then under evaluation by the SFWMD. SFWMD had developed data and conducted computer modeling concerning the utilization of a buffer for a variety of purposes, including reducing seepage of water from the Everglades, increasing groundwater recharge into aquifers and creating a natural buffer to protect the Everglades from the impacts of development. The SFWMD had commissioned a worldwide engineering firm, CH2M Hill to prepare a report on the East Coast Buffer. The SFWMD recommended that Application PC 94-15 not be approved until it had completed its study of the East Coast Buffer because the land use designation being sought might be incompatible with the conclusions reached from the SFWMD's and CH2M Hill's evaluation. The Department reviewed Application PC 94-15 and, based upon comments from the SFWMD similar to those raised before the County Commission, issued an Objections, Recommendations and Comments report concerning Application PC 94-15. The Department raised objections consistent with the adverse comments from the SFWMD. Modification of the Proposed Amendment. Parts of southwestern Broward County and northwestern Dade County were designated "Management Unit 5" by the SFWMD. Management Unit 5 was being considered, as recommended by CH2M Hill, as a reservoir area. Development of the Property was, therefore, not considered to be a use comparable with the concept of the East Coast Buffer being considered by the SFWMD at the time of the County's and Department's decision to reject Application PC 94-15. Intervenors worked with the SFWMD in an effort to find a way of modifying Application PC 94-15 to satisfy the SFWMD's concerns. SFWMD utilized computer modeling to simulate groundwater and surface water flows in Management Unit 5 to determine the impact of allowing development of the Property. The SFWMD concluded that Management Unit 5 was more suitable as a recharge area rather than as a reservoir. This conclusion was based, in part, of the transmissibility of the soil and other site conditions which were not conducive to storing water above ground for long periods of time. Use of Management Unit 5 as a recharge area and not a reservoir requires less surface area. Therefore, it was concluded that development in the area might be compatible with the SFWMD's East Coast Buffer concept. The SFWMD modeled four development alternatives for Management Unit 5 and analyzed the impact of each alternative on the efforts to retard seepage, provide groundwater recharge and enhance wetland benefits: (a) retaining the Property as a recharge area and allowing no development; (b) retaining the entire western two-thirds as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern one-third; (c) retaining the western one-third as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern two-thirds; and (d) allowing development of the entire management unit. Alternatives (b) and (c) assumed that a berm would be constructed between the recharge area and the developed area. After meeting with Intervenors and discussing the results of the modeling, Intervenors indicated willingness to remove the western portion of the Property from the proposed development. The SFWMD then conducted a more detailed, computer analysis of the following alternatives: (a) continuing existing conditions; (b) constructing a berm around Management Unit 5 and utilizing the entire area as a recharge area; (c) constructing a berm between the eastern and western sections of the Management Unit 5 and utilizing the western section for recharge with no development in the eastern section; and (d) alternative "(c)" with development of the eastern section. As a result of computer modeling of the alternatives, it was concluded that alternatives (b), (c) and (d) could significantly reduce seepage from the Everglades and increase groundwater recharge in to the aquifers when compared to development under the agricultural land use designation of alternative (a). As a result of the more detailed analysis, the SFWMD concluded that essentially all of its goals could be achieved for Management Unit 5 if the western section of Management Unit 5 is preserved even if development is allowed in the eastern section. The SFWMD concluded that the eastern two-thirds of the Property, consisting of approximately 1,280 acres, could be developed as "Irregular 1.5 Residential" if the western one-third, consisting of approximately 685 acres, was utilized as a recharge area. Intervenors agreed to preserve the western third of the Property (685 acres) and grant the SFWMD a flowage easement, consistent with the East Coast Buffer and at a savings of $43 million. On December 14, 1994, the staff of the SFWMD presented the results of the computer modeling to the SFWMD. On December 15, 1994, the SFWMD withdrew its objection to Application PC 94-15, conditioned upon the deletion of the 685 acres from the application and the granting of a flowage easement. The County and the Department were informed of the decision of the SFWMD. Approval of Application 94-15. On December 20, 1994, the County Commission adopted by Ordinance 94-55 an amendment to the Plan, Amendment PC 94-15 (hereinafter referred to as the "Amendment"), subject to the conditions suggested by the SFWMD, which resolved the SFWMD's objections. The Amendment included modifications to the FLUM and text amendments. The Amendment, in relevant part, modifies the future land use designation of approximately 1,280 acres of the Property from "Agricultural" to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". This will allow the construction of a total of 1,920 dwelling units on the Property, or an increase of 1,408 dwelling units over the number of dwelling that may be constructed under the current future land use designation for the Property. In light of Intervenor's modifications of the application, the removal of the SFWMD's objections and the approval of the application by the County, the Department found the Amendment to be in compliance with the Act. On February 14, 1995, the Department issued a notice of intent to find the Amendment in compliance. The County and the Department accepted and relied upon the data and methodology employed by the SFWMD and the conditions for removal of the SFWMD's objections. Petitioner's Challenge. On or about March 8, 1995, Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Department challenging the Amendment. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on April 25, 1995. At the commencement of the final hearing, Petitioner withdrew all issues it had raised in the Amended Petition except the issues of: (a) whether the data and analysis available supports a conclusion that there is a need for additional residential development; and (b) whether the Amendment is supported by data and analysis in light of an ongoing study of the East Coast Buffer. Residential Housing Need. The Plan includes the following Goal and Objective concerning the provision of adequate areas for residential use: Goal 01.00.00 Provide residential areas with a variety of housing types and densities offering convenient and affordable housing opportunities to all segments of Broward County's population while maintaining a desired quality of life and adequate public services and facilities. Objective 01.01.00 Accommodate the projected population of Broward County by providing adequate areas on the Future Broward County Land Use Plan Map (Series) intended primarily for residential development, but which also permit those non-residential uses that are compatible with and necessary to support residential neighborhoods. The Plan, including the methodology utilized to determine residential need, was found to be in compliance by the Department. The residential need methodology of the Plan utilized the Broward County Population Forecasting Model to project the population of southwest Broward County in 1994 to be 225,489 people. This projected population formed the basis for the allocation of residential housing units for Subregion 5 under the Plan. The Property is located in an area of southwest Broward County designated as Subregion 5 in the Plan. In reviewing the Amendment, the County conducted an analysis of the need for additional residential development in southwest Broward County. This analysis utilized, and was consistent with, the residential need methodology of the Plan. A summary of the data and analysis utilized by the County was provided to the Department. The County's analysis indicated that the population of Subregion 5 has exceeded the population projections for the Subregion of the Plan. By 1994, there were 284,361 people living in Subregion 5 or 17,872 more than projected in the Plan. The increased population rate of growth in Subregion 5 was projected to represent an increase in projected demand for approximately 6,847 residential units in excess of the projected demand expected under the Plan. The analysis also took into account amendments to the Plan which have resulted in a reduction of 1,087 residential units for Subregion 5. When combined with the increased population, the data and analysis supports a conclusion that there is a need for 7,934 additional residential units in Subregion 5. The Amendment increases residential housing in Subregion 5 by 1,134 dwelling units (1,920 units allowed under the Amendment, less 786 dwelling units allowed under the current agriculture classification), well below the projected need for additional residential units for Subregion 5. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and submitted to the Department supports the conclusion of the County that there is need for the proposed additional residential development approved by the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was professionally acceptable and adequate to support the Amendment. The evidence presented by Petitioner failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was not professionally acceptable and adequate. Rather than attempting to prove that the County's methodology was not professionally acceptable or was flawed, Petitioner utilized a methodology based upon an annualized population growth rate for Subregion 5. Petitioner offered evidence that there is sufficient residential housing approved under the Plan to meet the projected population for 15.6 years, beyond the remaining life of the Plan. The methodology utilized by Petitioner was, by the admission of the Petitioner's own witness, not a professionally acceptable methodology. The evidence failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County does not support its conclusion that there is sufficient need for the additional residential housing authorized for the County by the Amendment. The East Coast Buffer Zone. Efforts to restore the Everglades have been initiated and are ongoing. As a part of these efforts a group of technical and scientific staff members of various federal agencies involved in the restoration efforts were formed as the "Science Sub Group." The Science Sub Group was formed as an advisory group to provide guidance towards ecosystem restoration efforts. The Science Sub Group had no implementing authority. It issued at least one report in late 1993 which included an East Coast Buffer concept. The East Coast Buffer identified by the Science Sub Group included the area in which the Property is located. The Science Sub Group relied upon data obtained from the SFWMD and various computer models developed by the SFWMD, and SFWMD personnel contributed to the preparation of the report. The East Coast Buffer concept generally includes a series of interconnected water flow-ways along the eastern edge of the water conservation areas necessary to restore the Everglades. The federal government has also instituted a study known as the "Central & South Florida Project: Comprehensive Review Study" (hereinafter referred to as the "Restudy"). The United States Corps of Engineers is the lead agency of the Restudy. The first phase of the Restudy's efforts has resulted in a "Reconnaissance Report", also known as the "Recon Study". The second phase of the Restudy's efforts will be the feasibility phase. The feasibility phase will begin in the summer of 1995 and will be completed several years later. The purpose of the Restudy is to bring together the interested federal agencies to review the current management of the Everglades and identify strategies for altering management practices and systems to improve the Everglades. The Recon Study was completed in late 1994. It describes various conceptual strategies for restoring the Everglades. The determination of the feasibility of the strategies has not, however, been started, much less completed. Therefore, although the East Coast Buffer concept is considered in the Recon Study, the actual identification of the area which will constitute the Buffer has not been identified. Nor has the area which should constitute the East Coast Buffer been recommended in the Recon Study. The Recon Study identifies problems and opportunities, formulates alternative plans, evaluates conceptual alternative plans and recommends further study. The Recon Study is advisory. It does not identify, recommend or implement a plan of action. The Coalition presented evidence concerning the ongoing analysis of Everglades restoration efforts. That evidence proved that the Property is located within a very large area, which completely surrounds the Everglades, which is being considered as part of the Everglades restoration effort because of the impact of this large area on restoration efforts. The evidence presented by the Coalition, however, failed to prove that the Property has been, or will be, determined to be essential or even necessary for future Everglades restoration efforts. At the time of the approval of the Amendment and, even at the time of the final hearing of this case, no such determination had been made. Nor had any determination been made as to what will be necessary for the restoration of the Everglades or whether decisions will be made to carry out the necessary restoration efforts. As recognized by the Coalition in its proposed order: 52. The study necessary to make [a determination of the water levels needed] for the areas which are implicated by this amendment will be done in the next two years or three years. * * * 55. There is no way of telling, based on the data and analysis available at this point, how much water will be necessary in order to fully restore the Everglades. . . . Coalition proposed findings of fact 52 and 55. The Coalition also recognized the following: The Reconnaissance study has not reached the point where conclusions can be drawn about parcel specific uses. The next step is the feasibility planning phase, which is a much more detailed phase which will run for several years. . . . Coalition proposed finding of fact 107. Instead of attempting to prove that the data and analysis at the time of adoption of the Amendment indicated that development of the Property authorized by the Amendment would be detrimental to restoration efforts, the Coalition attempted to prove that development of the Property should be delayed until data and analysis is available indicating conclusively what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts. The Act does not require such delay. In addition to failing to prove what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts, the evidence presented by the Coalition also failed to prove that the conclusions reached by the Science Sub Group and the Restudy will even be implemented. The evidence presented by the Coalition failed to prove that the conclusions of the SFWMD with regard to the impact of the Amendment are not supported by data and analysis or were not arrived at by professionally acceptable methods. While the evidence proved that there will be some reduction in the amount of groundwater recharge function and seepage control function as a result of the Amendment, the evidence failed to prove what ultimate impact the reductions in recharge and seepage control will be or that the SFWMD's conclusions are not reasonable. While the Coalition proved that the SFWMD's conclusions were not based upon a consideration of what should be done to restore the Everglades, the evidence failed to prove that the information available was sufficiently conclusive that the SFWMD should have objected to the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County in approving the Amendment was collected and applied in a professionally acceptable manner. None of those agencies charged with responsibility to review the Amendment raised objections to its approval. The evidence failed to prove that the state of the data and analysis available to the County from the Science Sub Group and the Restudy or any other source concerning the area referred to as the East Coast Buffer and the Property is such that it proved that the data that was relied by the County upon was inadequate.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department dismissing finding the Amendment "in compliance" and dismissing the petition in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Coalition's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1-2. Accepted in 2. 3-4 Accepted in 3. Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5 Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5. Accepted in 4-6. Accepted in 5-6. Accepted in 6. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12 14-15 Not relevant. 16-18 Not relevant. See 81-84. 19-25 Not relevant and not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 81-84. Accepted in 29. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 26 and hereby accepted. 30-31 See 24. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 36 and 62. Accepted in 62. 35-41 Hereby accepted. 42-48 These proposed findings are generally correct. They are not, however, relevant to the ultimate determination in this case. 49-50 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is hereby accepted. The last sentence is not relevant. See 96. Not supported by the weight of the evidence and not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted in 96. The last sentence is not relevant. Hereby accepted. 57-63 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 64-65 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 89 and 91 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90 and 92. See 86 and 92. Hereby accepted. Although generally true, the evidence failed to prove that this finding specifically applies to the Property. Except for the first sentence, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31-33. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 76-87 Although generally correct, these findings were too broad and the evidence failed to prove that they specifically apply to the Property. 88-90 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 94-97 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 98 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 99-100 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 104-105 Not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 97. Accepted in 90. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 111-114 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The County's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 Accepted in 1. 2 Accepted in 7. 3 Accepted in 8. 4 Accepted in 11. 5 Hereby accepted. 6 Accepted in 12. 7 Accepted in 13. 8 Accepted in 14. 9 Accepted in 15. 10 Accepted in 9-10. 11 Accepted in 18. 12 Accepted in 16. 13 Accepted in 17. 14 Accepted in 61. 15 Accepted in 60. 16 Accepted in 19-20, 26 and 62. 17 Accepted in 23. 18 Accepted in 21-22 19-20 Accepted in 24. 21 Hereby accepted. 22 Accepted in 37. 23-24 Hereby accepted. 25 Accepted in 68. 26 Accepted in 65-67. 27-28 Accepted in 67. 29-30 Hereby accepted. 31-32 Accepted in 28. 33 Accepted in 29. 34 Accepted in 30. 35 Accepted in 34. 36 Accepted in 31 and hereby accepted. 37 Accepted in 32-33. 38 Accepted in 31. 39 Accepted in 33. 40 Accepted in 35. 41 Accepted in 316. 42 Accepted in 37. 43 Accepted in 39. 44 Accepted in 40. 45 Accepted in 41. 46 Accepted in 42. 47 Accepted in 72. 48-49 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 73-77 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 76-77. Accepted in 38. Accepted in 79-80 Accepted 58 and 62. 55-57 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 82. Hereby accepted. 60-61 Accepted in 81-84. 62 Hereby accepted. 63-65 Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 43 and 45. Accepted in 88. Accepted in 89-90. 69-70 Accepted in 85-86. 71 Accepted in 90 and 92-93. 72-77 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 32 and 44. Hereby accepted. None proposed. Accepted in 33. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 49 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. 87-88 Accepted in 52. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 53 and 58 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 54. Accepted in 56. Accepted in 58. 95-96 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 60. Accepted in 61. The Department's and Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 7. Accepted in 8. Accepted in 11. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12. Accepted in 13. Accepted in 14. Accepted in 15. Accepted in 9-10. Accepted in 18. Accepted in 16. Accepted in 17. Accepted in 61. Accepted in 11 and 19-20. Accepted in 20. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 24-25. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 27. Accepted in 36-38. 22-37 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 43. Accepted in 88. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31. 42-43 Accepted in 44. Accepted in 43 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 42. Accepted in 42 and 46. Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 46. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 46. 52-53 Accepted in 48. Accepted 49. Accepted in 49, 52 and 54. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 54 and 57. 59-60 Accepted 54. 61-63 Accepted in 54 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 55. Accepted in 56-57. 66-67 Accepted in 58. 68-70 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 64. Accepted in 58 and 62. Accepted in 60 and 62. Accepted in 63. Accepted in 67. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 67 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 37 and hereby accepted. Not relevant. Accepted in 86. Hereby accepted. 82-83 Accepted in 86. Accepted in 87. Accepted in 89 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90. Accepted in 90 and 92-93. Accepted in 93. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 72-78. Accepted in 69-71. Accepted in 70. Accepted in 73-74 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 75. Accepted in 76. Accepted in 77. Accepted in 78. Accepted in 79-80. 101-102 Accepted in 82. Accepted in 83. Accepted in 83-84. Accepted in 81 and 84. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dan Stengle, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Brion Blackwelder, Esquire Jack Milbery, Esquire 8751 West Broward Boulevard, #206 Plantation, Florida 33324 Sherry A. Spiers Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Tracy Lautenschlager, Esquire Broward County Attorney's Office 115 South Andrews Avenue Suite 423 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Glenn Smith, Esquire Michael A. Cohn, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. 200 East Broward Boulevard Post Office Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Honorable Gerald F. Thompson Chairman, Broward County Board of County Commissioners Governmental Center 115 South Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue The issue in Case 08-1144GM is whether Martin County Comprehensive Growth Management Plan (CGMP or Plan) Amendment 7-20, called the "Land Protection Incentives" (LPI) Amendment (LPIA), which was adopted by Ordinance 777 on December 11, 2007, and amended by Ordinance 795 on April 29, 2008, is "in compliance," as defined by Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.1 The issue in Case 08-1465GM is whether Martin County's Comprehensive Plan Amendment 7-22, called the "Secondary Urban Service District" (SUSD) Amendment (SUSDA), which was adopted by Ordinance 781 on December 11, 2007, is "in compliance," as defined by Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners' Standing FOF and MCCA objected to the LPIA and the SUSDA during the time period from transmittal to adoption of those amendments.3 FOF FOF is a non-profit organization incorporated in 1986, shortly after Florida’s Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation (Growth Management) Act was enacted to monitor the Act's implementation. FOF engages in legislative, legal, and grassroots advocacy for sustainable comprehensive land use planning in Florida. It conducts membership meetings, sends newsletters to members and others, hosts meetings open to the general public, and initiates or participates in litigation or administrative proceedings concerning amendments to local comprehensive plans. Its main office is in Tallahassee, where several employees work. It also has a branch office in Lake Worth, Palm Beach County, where one employee works. It has no office or employees in Martin County. There was no evidence that FOF has applied for or obtained any license or permit to operate a business in Martin County; nor was there any evidence as to the requirements for obtaining such a license or permit. FOF has approximately 3,500 members; approximately 550 members live or own property in Martin County. FOF does not have a continuous presence in Martin County, other than its members who live and own property there, but it continuously monitors comprehensive planning and related growth management issues in Martin County and from time to time engages in activities in Martin County. Since 1990, FOF was involved in the Loxahatchee Greenways project, a major river corridor running through Martin County; was involved in the protection of Jonathan Dickinson State Park, which is in Martin County; undertook its Palm Beach and Martin County Green Initiative (which addressed housing, legal, transportation, and other planning issues in Martin County and resulted in the distribution of educational materials on Martin County planning issues); opposed specific local development proposals; supported a sales tax referendum to buy and preserve environmentally- sensitive lands; collaborated with the County planning department to update the housing element of the County Comprehensive Plan; assisted with a local affordable housing initiative; published a booklet on comprehensive planning in the County; and conducted a public survey of County residents assessing attitudes about planning. FOF staff members speak at and participate in annual growth management forums in Martin County, which are attended by a substantial number of its members. FOF has regularly commented in person and in writing to the Martin County Commission on proposed CGMP changes. FOF also has previously participated as a party in administrative hearings conducted in the County concerning the CGMP, during which its president has testified as an expert planner. The relief requested by FOF in this case is germane to its goals and appropriate to request on behalf of its members. MCCA MCCA is a Florida not-for-profit corporation created in 1997. It is a membership-based organization of 120 individuals and 14 other organizations. MCCA itself does not own real property in Martin County. However, at least 38 individual members reside and own real property in the County, and at least one organizational member (Audubon of Martin County) owns real property in the County. MCCA does not maintain an office or have paid employees. It operates through its members, who volunteer. MCCA's Articles of Incorporation state that it was formed "to conserve the natural resources of Martin County, to protect the native flora and fauna of Martin County, [and] to maintain and improve the quality of life for all of the residents of Martin County." It engages in various forms of lobbying and advocacy for or against amendments to Martin County's Comprehensive Plan, including initiation or participation in litigation and administrative proceedings. It conducts membership meetings in the County, sends newsletters to members and others, hosts meetings in the County that are open to the general public (including an annual growth management meeting with FOF and an annual awards luncheon with local conservation groups), and works with member organizations on issues relating to the Indian River Lagoon (IRL), including petition drives. The relief requested by MCCA in this case is germane to its goals and appropriate to request on behalf of its members. Martin County Comprehensive Growth Management Plan The CGMP establishes two "urban service districts" in the County, a Primary Urban Service District (PUSD) and a Secondary Urban Service District (SUSD). See CGMP, § 4.4.G. The PUSD has been part of the Plan since it was first adopted in 1982, while the SUSD was added during the major revision of the Plan in 1990. Approximately 65,702 acres (101 square miles) are located within the PUSD. The PUSD encompasses most of the eastern coastal area of the County surrounding four incorporated municipalities, (Stuart, Sewall's Point, Jupiter Island, and Ocean Breeze Park), plus an isolated inland area known as Indiantown. Approximately 9,621 acres (14 square miles) are located within the SUSD. All land within the SUSD is immediately adjacent to land within the PUSD, but is split into several discontinuous sections so that some of the land along the western border of the PUSD abuts land outside the urban service districts. The County's purpose for having urban service districts is to "regulate urban sprawl tendencies by directing growth in a timely and efficient manner to those areas where urban public facilities and services are available, or are programmed to be available at the levels of service adopted in [the Plan]." CGMP, § 4.4.G. The Plan further provides: Objective: Martin County shall concentrate higher densities and intensities of development within the strategically located [PUSDs], as delineated, including commercial or industrial uses as well as residential development exceeding a density of two units per acre . . . . * * * b. Policy: Martin County shall require that new residential development containing one-half acre or smaller lots, commercial uses, and industrial uses shall be located within the [PUSD]. * * * Objective 2. Martin County shall concentrate rural and estate densities not exceeding one unit per gross acre within the [SUSDs] where a reduced level of public facility needs are programmed to be available at the base level of service adopted in the Capital Improvements Element. a. Policy: Martin County shall designate land uses within the [SUSD] in order to provide for the use and extension of urban services in an efficient and economical manner, and consistent with the reduced intensity of urban services normally associated with densities of one unit per gross acre (Estate Density RE-1A) and one unit per two gross acres (Rural Density). . . . * * * f. Policy: In areas designated as [SUSD], where development is proposed that would contain one- half acre lots, or commercial and industrial uses, a change to a [PUSD] designation must be approved by the Board of County Commissioners as part of a land use amendment . . . . The Plan thus generally establishes residential density for land within the PUSD at 2 or more dwelling units per acre, and for land within the SUSD at 1 dwelling unit per acre to 1 dwelling unit per 2 acres. The remaining land within the County that is not within the PUSD or SUSD is generally referred to as "outside" the urban service districts. There are approximately 269,034 acres of such land. The vast majority of such land (approximately 210,379 acres) is designated in the Plan for "agricultural" use. Most of the other land outside the urban service districts is designated for either "public conservation" or "public utilities" See CGMP, § 4.4.L., § 4.4.M.1.a., i., and j. The Plan currently allows residential use of land outside the urban service boundaries that is designated for agricultural use but limits it to either 1 dwelling unit per 5 acres, known as "agricultural ranchette," or 1 dwelling unit per 20 acres. See CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.a.& c. The Plan further specifies for the latter that: Residential development in the agricultural area is restricted to one-single family residence per gross 20-acre tract. [N]o development shall be permitted which divides landholdings into lots, parcels or other units of less than 20 gross acres. Acreage may be split for bona fide agricultural uses into parcels no smaller than 20 gross acres. . . . Residential subdivisions at a density or intensity or greater than one single- family dwelling unit per 20 gross acre lot shall not be allowed. (CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.a.) Throughout the Plan, residential development on lots of 2 acres or more is consistently referred to as "rural" development (even within the SUSD), while residential development on smaller lots is consistently referred to as "urban" and must be in either the PUSD or SUSD. It was undisputed that the County's adoption of such a distinction between urban and rural residential lots was a professionally acceptable planning practice. Preservation of the County's agricultural lands is a goal of the Plan. See CGMP, § 4.4.L.1. It is also later stated in a policy related to the allocation of land: Through its planning, capital improvements, cooperative extension, regulatory and intergovernmental coordination activities, Martin County shall continue to protect agriculture as a viable economic use of land. (CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.b.) Preservation of conservation and open space areas within the County is the subject of an entire element of the Plan. See CGMP, Chap. 9.4 The County's goal is "to effectively manage, conserve, and preserve the natural resources of Martin County, giving consideration to an equitable balance of public and private property rights. These resources include air, water, soils, habitat, fisheries, and wildlife, with special emphasis on restoring the St. Lucie Estuary and the Indian River Lagoon." CGMP, § 9.4.A. Preservation of conservation and open space areas is also addressed in numerous other objectives and policies throughout the several elements of the Plan and is a predominant theme of the entire Plan. The provision of "urban public facilities and services" is expressly limited by a policy to the County's urban service districts "in order to preserve agricultural lands and provide maximum protection to the farmer from encroachment by urban uses." CGMP, § 4.4.L.1.a. The Plan defines the term "public urban facilities and services" as "regional water supply and wastewater treatment/disposal systems, solid waste collection services, acceptable response times for sheriff and emergency services, reasonably accessible community park and related recreational facilities, schools and the transportation network." CGMP, § 4.1.B.4. However, the term is often used in the Plan in a rearranged or abbreviated manner, such as "urban public facilities and services" (§ 4.4.G.1.f.(7)), "public facilities and services" (§ 4.4.G and § 4.4.G.1.f.), "public services and facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.i.), "public urban facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.c.), "public urban facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.i.), or merely "public facilities (§ 4.4.G.1.) or "urban services " (§ 4.4.G.2.a.). LPIA Provisions The LPIA adds a new objective and new policies under the Future Land Use Element goal addressing "natural resource protection," which provides: Martin County shall protect all the natural resource systems of the County from the adverse impacts of development, provide for continued growth in population and economy and recognize the inter-relationship between the maintenance of urban support infrastructure in waste management, air and water quality, and the coastal zone environmental quality. (CGMP, § 4.4.E.) To the existing 6 objectives under that goal, the LPIA adds a seventh which states: Martin County shall create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses while maintaining residential capacity as it existed on January 1, 2007. For the purposes of Section 4.4.E.7., and supporting paragraphs, the definition of open space, found in Section 9.4.A.11., CGMP, shall not include roads, highways and their median strips and berms. This objective is intended to encourage the conveyance of fee simple title of land listed for public acquisition by state, regional or local environmental or governmental agencies or land trusts. Lands listed for acquisition include, but are not be limited to [sic], land designated for public acquisition under the Save Our Rivers program, the Indian River Lagoon, North Palm Beach, and the Lake Okeechobee portions of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), as well as Northern Everglades and Estuaries Protection Program. The overall purpose of the LPIA is to encourage the owners of tracts of land outside the urban service districts that are at least 500 acres to choose a different pattern of development than the Plan now allows, by allowing a substantial reduction in the minimum lot size so that the development may be "clustered" on a smaller "footprint" within the overall tract of land, but only if at least 50% of the entire tract is "set aside" permanently for conservation, open space, or agricultural use and stripped of its potential for future development. This approach, it is hoped, will make it easier and cheaper for the County and other governmental entities to acquire the large tracts of land they desire to use for the CERP and other conservation projects. The LPIA does not allow for more development than is allowed under the Plan currently. It allows the same amount of development to be arranged on a tract of land in a different pattern than is currently allowed. It accomplishes this primarily through the combination of a change in the minimum lot size from "20 acres" to "over 2 acres" with a new allowance for "clustering" the smaller lots on a portion of an overall tract of land rather than having an equal number of larger lots spread throughout the entire tract of land. The LPIA adopts six policies to accomplish the new objective: Policy (7)a. provides for the protection of the land "set aside" to be conveyed or subject to an easement in favor of a combination of the County, the South Florida Water Management District, and a third entity, chosen from among the other governmental or not-for-profit conservation- oriented organizational entities listed in the policy. Policy (7)b. requires that a combination of a comprehensive plan amendment and a PUD agreement be used for the change in the development characteristics of the land. The PUD agreement would address the portion of the tract subject to development and not "set aside," while the plan amendment would address (at a minimum) the remaining portion of the tract which is permanently "set aside" for conservation, open space, or agricultural use and would no longer have any potential for residential development. Policy (7)c. provides additional specificity concerning the subject matters that would be addressed by the comprehensive plan amendment, such as any required change in land use designation for the set-aside portion of the tract of land, and if it remains designated for agricultural use, the removal of any potential for development. Policy (7)d. primarily provides additional specificity concerning the subject matters that would be addressed by the PUD agreement, setting minimum requirements to be met such as the tract having to be a minimum of 500 acres in size; the development being "fiscally neutral to existing taxpayers"; the lots having to be more than 2 acres in size; the inability to develop in environmentally sensitive areas on the tract; and the acknowledgment of a permanent restriction against any future increase of density on the tract. The policy also essentially repeats some of the requirements enunciated in the second and third policies regarding the conveyance of title or easement and the required comprehensive plan amendment, and addresses who pays the closing costs for the set-aside portion of the tract. Policy (7)e. establishes additional requirements specifically applicable to land that has been "listed for acquisition by state, regional, or local agencies as part of an established conservation program." Policy (7)f. enumerates the "site specific benefits" that the second policy states the County must consider when deciding whether to approve an application for development under the optional pattern allowed by the LPIA, such as whether more than the minimum 50% of the tract will be "set aside" permanently, whether the location fills "gaps in natural systems, wildlife corridors, greenways and trails," or whether buffers are provided along roads "to limit access and to protect vistas." The LPIA requirement for at least 50% of an entire tract being set aside for one of the three public purposes, when coupled with other requirements of the Plan such as establishment of construction setback distances, preservation of wetlands and creation of buffers around wetlands, preservation of certain uplands, would result in more than 50% of an undeveloped tract of land remaining in an undeveloped state and at least 50% of agricultural land remaining in agricultural use. Meaning and Predictability of LPIA Standards Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to establish meaningful and predictable standards in numerous respects. No Guide to Location and Pattern of Development Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to establish meaningful and predictable standards essentially because it does not identify the lands to be preserved and developed, leaving the results up to the choice of landowners to make proposals and Martin County's case-by-case decisions on future development proposals. See PPRO, ¶¶52-53. However, the goals of the LPIA are quite clear, and there is no basis to speculate that Martin County will make decisions contrary to those goals--for example, by approving PUDs or agricultural uses on the most environmentally-sensitive part of tract, ignoring the importance of environmentally-sensitive and agricultural lands and the impact of development patterns on them, and ignoring the impact of the pattern of development under the LPIA on rural character. Petitioners also criticize the LPIA for not being clear "whether a subject property must be in single ownership." (PPRO, ¶61.) However, it is not clear why that omission would be pertinent. Undefined Increase in Maximum Density Petitioners contend that, in four ways, the LPIA increases maximum density in the Agricultural category without defining the amount of the increase. Waiver of Density Limits Clearly, the LPIA exempts the PUD option from "the agricultural land use policies in Section 4.4.M.1.a. pertaining to the 20 acre lot size . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(8). Contrary to Petitioners' contention, that does not eliminate density standards. Residential lots must be greater than two acres. See LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(3). Maintenance of Residential Capacity Petitioners contend the LPIA increases density because its objective is to "create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses while maintaining residential capacity as it existed on January 1, 2007." LPIA § 4.4.E.7. (Emphasis added.) Petitioners complain that County-wide residential capacity on that date is not identified and that the objective requires residential capacity in Agricultural lands to increase as it decreases elsewhere in the County. This interpretation is unreasonable. The County's interpretation, that residential units lost by preservation are to be maintained by clustering on the remaining Agricultural lands, is more reasonable. Transfer of Wetland Density Petitioners contend that the LPIA increases density by allowing transfer of wetland density in the Agricultural future land use category. See LPIA § 4.4E.7.d.(7). Under the Plan before the LPIA, up to half of wetland density can be transferred to uplands in a PUD. See CGMP § 9.4A7.b.(8). PUDs were not allowed in Agricultural lands before the LPIA. But Petitioners did not prove that allowing the transfer and clustering of residential units into a PUD on Agricultural lands under the LPIA would change the total number of residential units already allowed in Agricultural lands (at one unit per 20 acres). Alleged Failure to Remove Density from All Non-PUD Land Petitioners contend that the LPIA increases density by not stripping residential units from all so-called non-PUD land. Contrary to this contention, the more reasonable interpretation is that land not set aside for permanent preservation in a proposal made under the LPIA must be part of the proposed PUD. In any event, even if an LPIA proposal could include land that is neither set aside for preservation nor part of the PUD land, no residential units is such land would be transferred to the PUD, and failure to strip such land of its residential units would not affect the total number of units associated with the LPIA proposal. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA allows text amendments to increase density on land set aside for preservation under the LPIA because it specifies that such land must be changed on the FLUM and will not be eligible for "any additional [FLUM] amendment which increases residential density or intensity of use . . . ." LPIA § 4.4E.7.d.(7). The negative implication Petitioners draw from this language is contrary to the intent of the LPIA and is not warranted. Even if text amendments are not prohibited, they would apply to all land in a particular land use category, not just to land set aside under the LPIA. Subsequent Plan Amendments Not Required for PUD Petitioners contend that the LPIA "is unclear as to whether a PUD can be approved without a subsequent plan amendment specifically authorizing the two-acre lot subdivision site plan." PPRO, ¶80. This contention supposedly arises from the language of LPIA § 4.4.E.7.c.: "The Comprehensive Plan amendment that is part of a joint Plan Amendment and concurrent PUD application submitted under this objective must address the land use designation on the land set aside in perpetuity as contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and/or agricultural land uses in the following manner: . . . ." (Emphasis added in PPRO, ¶82.) The negative implication Petitioners draw from this language is contrary to the intent of the LPIA and is not warranted. It ignores LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(7): "The Comprehensive Plan amendment filed concurrently with the PUD application shall allow the site-specific clustering of density in one portion of the total subject site, including the transfer of full density of any wetlands on the site, at a density that shall not exceed one unit per twenty acres for the total site prior to conveyance. . . . The Plan amendment shall further specify that neither the land conveyed nor the land controlled by the PUD agreement shall be eligible for any additional [FLUM] amendment which increases residential density or intensity of use . . . ." While LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(7) discusses land that is conveyed, it is reasonably clear that a Plan amendment addressing the PUD also would be required for lands that are set aside using one of the other mechanisms specified in the LPIA. Public Benefit Criteria Petitioners contend that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.b. and f. gives the County "unfettered discretion to reject or approve a PUD 'for any reason.'" PPRO, ¶90. Those sections provide that approval of a PUD will be based on consideration of "significant site-specific public benefits," some of which are listed. While it is true that the LPIA gives the County discretion to grant or approve a PUD based on its consideration of those factors, Petitioners did not prove "unfettered discretion." First, minimum requirements under the LPIA first must be met. Second, the list of public benefits gives some guidance as to the kinds of additional public benefits that will justify approval of a PUD. Petitioners did not prove that a comprehensive plan provision allowing for PUD zoning need be any more specific to be implemented in a consistent manner. Protection of Land Set Aside Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to protect land set aside under the LPIA because it does not identify the land most appropriate for preservation or require that it be set aside. This contention ignores the objective to encourage conveyance of "land listed for public acquisition by state, regional or local agencies as part of established conservation programs" which "include, but are not be [sic] limited to land designated for public acquisition under" several named public acquisition programs. LPIA § 4.4.E.7. It also ignores the policy: "No development in the PUD shall be allowed on unique, threatened or rare habitat, or other environmentally sensitive lands that are critical to the support of listed plant or animal species . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(4). It also ignores the policy that "PUDs that include land listed for acquisition by state, regional or local agencies as part of an established conservation program shall be subject to . . . additional requirements": including fee simple conveyance of at least half of such land; and no development in the PUD on such land "unless the land has been previously impacted by agricultural activities and the proposed development is determined to be inconsequential to the implementation and success of the conservation program . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.e.(1)-(2). In addition, various means of protecting such lands are several of the listed "additional significant site-specific benefits" of a PUD proposal to be considered in the approval process. See LPIA § 4.4.E.7.f. Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to "require set-aside lands to be contiguous to other farmland, open space, or natural lands" and "contiguous, functional, and connected to adjacent and regional systems." PPRO, ¶¶102-98 [sic]. These contentions ignore the objective to "create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses. . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7. They also ignore that land in public acquisition programs ideally is contiguous to other open space and natural lands. Petitioners did not prove their contention in PPRO ¶97 [sic] that it is necessary to specify the public acquisition programs for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to define the "perpetual easement" mechanism allowed in LPIA Section 4.E.7.a. for setting aside land in lieu of fee simple conveyance. See PPRO, ¶103. This contention ignores the policy in LPIA Section 4.E.7.d.(5) to use perpetual easements as a means of enforcing the prohibition against increasing residential density or intensity of use by FLUM amendments, as well as the policy in LPIA Section 4.E.7.d.(6) to use perpetual easements "to restrict future uses and ensure the government agencies or other entities holding fee simple title do not sell or develop the property inconsistent with this policy or the approved uses within the PUD Agreement." Petitioners did not prove their contention in PPRO ¶103 that it is necessary to further define "perpetual easement" for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend in PPRO ¶¶105 and 107 that the LPIA fails to define the "agricultural uses" to be preserved in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(3) and allows the County to "specify allowed uses" without limitation and with "no certainty that farmland will be protected as farmland by easement." (Emphasis in PPRO ¶105.) Petitioners contend that everything allowed in the Agricultural category under the Plan will be allowed. See PPRO ¶107. Contrary to Petitioners' contention, it is reasonably clear that, while the language of LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(3) contains a typographical error, the policy clearly is to maintain existing agricultural uses, not to allow intensification of agricultural use or expansion into "non-farm" uses that might be allowed in the Agricultural category. Alleged Threat to IRL and CERP Lands Petitioners contend that, by making development under its PUD option more marketable, the LPIA will encourage PUDs that do not protect and that fragment IRL and CERP lands. Petitioners did not prove that such a result is likely. Petitioners contend that the adverse impacts on IRL and CERP lands is more than speculation in part because of the wording of the policy in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(2), which is misstated in PPRO ¶114 and actually states: "If the land to be protected and maintained in perpetuity is land that is part of the North Palm Beach, and the Lake Okeechobee portions of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), as well as Northern Everglades and Estuaries Protection Program, the plan amendment must include a future land use amendment to change the Future Land Use Designation to Institutional-Public Conservation." The language used in the policy is poor. But Petitioners' interpretation--that only land set aside for protection that is part of all of the described CERP projects will be protected--is absurd since no such land exists. That interpretation and Petitioners' interpretation that no IRL lands are protected under the LPIA ignore and are contrary to the language and intent of the objective stated in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7. and of the policies stated in Section 4.4.E.7.a., c.(1), and d.(5). The County's interpretation, that CERP and IRL lands are eligible for protection, is more reasonable. Definition of Critical Habitat Petitioners contend that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4) does not provide a meaningful or predictable standard because the term "critical to the support of listed plant or animal species" is not better defined. Actually, PUD development is prohibited "on unique, threatened or rare habitat, or other environmentally sensitive lands that are critical to the support of listed plant or animal species." While the policy could have been better defined, Petitioners did not prove that a better definition is necessary for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend that, regardless of the "critical habitat" definition, the policy language in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.e.(2) "guts" Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4) by prohibiting PUD development "on land listed for acquisition . . . unless the land has been previously impacted by agricultural activities " Actually, the policy continues to state that the exception only applies if "the proposed development is determined to be inconsequential to the implementation and success of the conservation program . . . ." Petitioners' interpretation, that the policy allows PUD development on virtually all Agricultural lands, is unreasonable and contrary to the language and intent of the LPIA. The County's interpretation is more reasonable and is reasonably clear. It allows for distinctions among the various kinds of agricultural activities, which the Plan already recognizes. See, e.g., CGMP § 4.2.A.6.b.(8) ("Many low intensity agricultural uses such as range (pasture) land can be compatible with environmentally significant resource areas.") For these reasons, Petitioners did not prove that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.e.(2) "guts" Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4), or that the LPIA cannot be implemented in a consistent manner. LPIA and Urban Sprawl In part based on unreasonable interpretations of the LPIA's objective and policy language, Petitioners contend that Martin County's Comprehensive Plan as amended by the LPIA no longer discourages urban sprawl and that the LPIA encourages urban sprawl. In part because the interpretations were unreasonable, Petitioners' urban sprawl contentions were not proven. Even if the LPIA results in a proliferation of PUDs with clusters of residences on lots slightly larger than two acres, which is the minimum lot size, it would not equate to urban (or suburban) sprawl. Assuming PUDs based on 500-acre tracts, it would result in a cluster of 25 homes within a 500-acre rural area. The LPIA does not plan for the extension of urban services to those homes and does not provide for or allow any new commercial or industrial development. Both the LPIA and the rest of the CGMP include provisions, most notably those related to the urban service districts, to reasonably ensure that urban sprawl will not result. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the first primary indicator of urban sprawl in Florida Administrative Code Rule5 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("designates for development substantial areas of the jurisdiction for low-intensity, low density or single use development or uses in excess of demonstrated need"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the second primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[p]romotes, allows or designates significant amounts of urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while leaping over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development"). The development promoted, allowed, or designated by the LPIA is not "urban" and does not "leap over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development." It allowed for development already promoted, allowed, and designated to arrange itself differently in a rural area. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the third primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (designation of urban development in "radial, strip, isolated or ribbon patterns generally emanating from existing urban development"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the fourth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (promotes premature conversion of rural land to other uses, thereby failing to adequately protect and conserve natural resources). To the contrary, its primary purpose is to protect and conserve natural resources and rural land. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the fifth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (fails to adequately protect "adjacent agricultural areas" as well as "passive agricultural activities and dormant, unique and prime farmlands and soils"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers either the sixth or seventh primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (fails to maximize use of existing and future public facilities and services). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the eighth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[a]llows for land use patterns or timing which disproportionately increase the cost in time, money and energy, of providing and maintaining facilities and services"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the ninth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[f]ails to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the tenth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[d]iscourages or inhibits infill development or redevelopment of existing neighborhoods and communities"). Although LPIA PUDs obviously would not be infill or redevelopment, it was not proven that they will discourage or inhibit infill and redevelopment. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the eleventh primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[f]ails to encourage an attractive and functional mix of uses"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the twelfth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[r]esults in poor accessibility among linked or related uses"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the thirteenth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J- 5.006(5)(g) ("[r]esults in the loss of significant amounts of functional open space"). The LPIA does not exacerbate the two already-existing indicators of urban sprawl, but Petitioners still contend that the indicators are triggered by the LPIA essentially because development will proceed more quickly under the LPIA. This contention was not proven. Even if it were, Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA encourages the proliferation of urban sprawl or that the CGMP, as amended by the LPIA, fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. LPIA Data and Analysis Petitioners contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis because the County explained it as a necessary response to the proliferation of 20-acre ranchette developments whereas only 75 have been built and only 15 have certificates of occupancy. Actually, the ranchette developments were only one reason for the LPIA, and the data and analysis showed 13 approved developments as of mid-September 2007, and three more approvals plus two pending applications for approval a year later. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA implements some but not all of the recommendations in the various reports and studies cited by the County as part of the data and analysis. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA does not conform to some recommendations in the various reports and studies cited by the County as part of the data and analysis. However, Petitioners base their contentions largely on unreasonable interpretations of the language of the objective and policies of the LPIA. In addition, the data and analysis they point to essentially reflect merely that planners disagree on the best plan for the Agricultural lands. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA is not identical to the Atlantic Ridge project amendment. While all agree that the Atlantic Ridge project is a resounding success story, it is unique. The obvious and understandable inability to instantaneously duplicate Atlantic Ridge to the greatest extent possible in the Agricultural lands should not prevent the County from taking any action in its direction, such as the LPIA. Taken together, the data and analysis are adequate to support the LPIA. LPIA and TCRPC Regional Policy Plan Petitioners contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's Strategic Regional Policy Plan (SRPP). The TCRPC's SRPP was not introduced in evidence, but the TCRPC's Executive Director testified and sponsored the TCRPC's report on the LPIA and the SUSDA. The TCRPC's findings on consistency with its SRPP were not contradicted. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's Strategic Regional Policy Plan (SRPP) Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2, which are to determine areas that are environmentally significant and to map, acquire, and manage them. The LPIA does not do this. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP Goal 1.1, which requires sustainable countryside development in urban enclaves, such as towns and villages, with mixed-use and appropriate densities between 4-10 units per acre, on strategically selected locations while preserving contiguous, targeted land identified through SRPP Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2. The LPIA does not do this. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP Policy 15.1.3.1, which is to increase the clarity of local land use plans so that preferred forms of development can be pre-approved. Instead, the LPIA uses the case-by-case PUD approval process to determine the ultimate development patterns for the Agricultural lands. The inconsistency with SRPP Policy 15.1.3.1 is the only LPIA inconsistency not already equally present in the existing CGMP. The TCRPC's concern as to the other inconsistencies is that the LPIA will make residential development in the Agricultural lands more marketable and increase the rate of residential growth in a manner inconsistent with SRPP Goal 1.1 and Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2. Internal Consistency of the LPIA Petitioners contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Sections 1.6 and 1.11.A. for being inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP. CGMP Section 1.6 states that "elements of the [CGMP] shall be consistent and coordinated with policies of [various entities, including the TCRPC]. Petitioners did not prove that the County does not interpret that provision to require internal consistency and coordination with the other entities' policies, or that such an interpretation would be incorrect. CGMP Section 1.11.A. refers to amendment procedures. Essentially, it states that plan amendments must be "in compliance." There was no evidence that the County intended it to require strict and absolute consistency with the TCRPC's SRPP, or any evidence to prove that it would be incorrect for the County to interpret it not to. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Section 1.11.K., which also refers to amendment procedure. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Section 1.11.K. for not having concurrently-processed land development regulations (LDRs) since concurrently-processed LDRs are only required "[t]o the extent necessary to implement a proposed amendment," and Petitioners did not prove that concurrently-processed LDRs are necessary. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with numerous other provisions of the CGMP. These contentions were not proven. Most, if not all, were based on unreasonable interpretations of the LPIA. SUSDA Provisions The SUSDA amends the text of the future land use element, the sanitary sewer services element, and the potable water services element of the Plan. As amended, the Plan would allow owners of real property within the SUSD to apply for connection to regional water and sewer service rather than be limited to using individual potable water wells and individual septic tanks, provided all costs of connection to the public services would be paid by the owner. The policy of SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.g. expressly states: The County Commission has determined that it is in the best interest of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Martin County that regional water and sewer services be made available to properties within the [SUSD], in order to: (1) Protect our natural resources . . . from the negative impacts of onsite sewage disposal (septic) systems and private wells to serve individual residential units; (2) Provide fire protection; [and] (3) Provide safe drinking water. The policy of SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.h. requires that the extension of any such services to properties within the SUSD must have Board approval, which cannot occur unless the Board finds that certain enumerated criteria have been met, including: Regional utility services may be provided to properties within the [SUSD] upon the request of the affected property owner, and upon payment of the required costs for connection to the regional system. Such services may only be provided by a regional utility, public or private, within a service area shown on Figure 11-2. Package plants for the provision of utility service are prohibited except under the provisions of the [CGMP]. The regional utility must demonstrate the treatment facility has capacity for the proposed connection and priority has been given to projects within the [PUSD]. Extension of utility services shall not be construed to imply support for any increase in the residential density of the property inside the [SUSD]. Property lying outside the Urban Service Districts . . . shall not receive utility service from a regional wastewater system. Extension of utility service outside the Urban Service Districts shall be prohibited. Development within the [SUSD] shall maintain lot sizes that exceed one-half acres. The SUSDA also contains new charts added to both the sanitary sewer services element and the potable water services element that display the numerical capacity of the regional water and sewer systems to handle additional customers upon extension of lines to the SUSD. See SUSDA Tables 10-3 through 10-6 and 11- 12 through 11-15. There was no credible evidence of any likelihood that the adoption of the SUSDA would allow the further extensions of water and sewer lines from the SUSD to properties outside the urban service districts. The testimony offered by Petitioners was speculative at best and depended upon an unproven assumption that the County would violate the explicit provisions of the SUSDA prohibiting such extension of services. See SUSDA §§ 4.4.G.2.h.(6)-(7) and 4.5.H. Meaning and Predictability of SUSDA Standards Petitioners contend that the SUSDA's standards are not meaningful or predictable because of the undefined term "central water and sewer" in the policy in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a. Petitioners contend that "central water and sewer" can be interpreted to mean something other than a regional utility, and that the SUSDA can be interpreted to allow regional utility, package plant, and other similar types of utility systems serving two or more houses outside the urban services districts. Petitioners' interpretations are unreasonable and contrary to the language and intent of the SUSDA. Petitioners' evidence was speculative and depended on an unproven assumption that the County would violate the explicit provisions of the SUSDA prohibiting package treatment plants in the SUSD. See SUSDA § 4.4.G.2.h.(3) and § 4.5.H. In addition, the evidence was that package treatment plants may no longer be economically feasible. The County's interpretation is more reasonable--"central water and sewer," as used in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a., means the provision of regional utility services by Martin County in the SUSD, and no such facilities may be provided outside the urban service districts. SUSDA Data and Analysis Petitioners contend that the data and analysis do not support the SUSDA essentially because they do not establish "any actual health, safety, or welfare problems." PPRO, ¶208. The absence of proof of actual health, safety, or welfare problems is not fatal in view of the rest of the data and analysis supporting the SUSDA. Since the creation of the SUSD in 1992, development in the PUSD has resulted in the extension of water and sewer lines up to the border between the PUSD and the SUSD. In effect, the intended SUSD transition area has transitioned. Meanwhile, the regional water and sewer utilities serving the County now have the necessary capacity to serve the PUSD and the SUSD. Improved fire protection in the SUSD is a benefit of regional water service, allowing installation of community fire hydrants. Without it, developers in the SUSD must rely on installed sprinklers and emergency generators and water drawn from nearby lakes or installed water tanks. While regional water service can fail temporarily in major storms, and the data and analysis did not include actual instances of fire damage cause by the lack of regional water service in the SUSD, regional water service generally provides more reliable and less costly fire protection. While the data and analysis do not establish that developers and property owners in the SUSD have not been able to permit potable water wells, regional water service generally is better, more reliable, and less costly. The data and analysis did include actual instances of home owners having to install expensive water treatment systems due to increasing chloride levels in their potable water wells. Connection to regional water service would eliminate those costs and concerns. While the data and analysis do not establish that developers and property owners in the SUSD have not been able to permit septic tanks systems for onsite sewage treatment (i.e., systems that meet environmental and health standards), such systems can fail if improperly installed, maintained, and repaired. If they fail, nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus can leach into and harm the groundwater and nearby surface waters. The North Fork of the Loxahatchee River, which is nutrient-impaired, probably would benefit from elimination of septic tanks. Regional sewer service generally is better for the environmental and public health. The data and analysis suggest that allowing regional water and sewer service in the SUSD, with the SUSDA's requirement for developers to pay the cost of installation, probably will save the County money in the long run. It will be a significant cost to the County if it has to install water and sewer lines post-development. Petitioners attack the credibility of the data and analysis supporting the SUSDA because regional water and sewer service is optional in the SUSD. But there were data and analysis that, even if regional water and sewer service in the SUSD is preferable, there are valid reasons to make it optional at this time. Alleged Environmental Impact of the SUSDA Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will have negative environmental impacts in part from a proliferation of package treatment plants in the SUSD, which is discouraged in CGMP Section 4.4. See PPRO, ¶¶221, 223. This contention is based on Petitioners' unreasonable interpretations of two sentences of the SUSDA. SUSDA Section 4.5.G. prohibits interim water systems outside the urban service districts and allows them, with conditions, in the PUSD where connection to a regional utility is not feasible. Petitioners interpret these two sentences to mean that interim water systems are allowed, without conditions, in the SUSD. The County's interpretation is more reasonable. Since the SUSDA makes connection to the regional utilities optional, there is no need for interim water systems in the SUSDA, and the SUSDA should not be construed to allow them there. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will have negative environmental impacts in part essentially because increased development results in increased pollution. See PPRO, ¶228. To the extent true, it would be equally or more true of similar development without regional water and sewer services. SUSDA and Urban Sprawl Petitioners contend, in part due to their unreasonable interpretations of the objective in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a., that Martin County's Comprehensive Plan as amended by the SUSDA, no longer discourages urban sprawl and that the SUSDA encourages urban sprawl. In part due to the unreasonableness of Petitioners' interpretation of the SUSDA, Petitioners' urban sprawl contentions were not proven. It is unlikely that the SUSDA will encourage urban sprawl. Petitioners also contend that the SUSDA will encourage urban sprawl simply by allowing denser development in the 5,000- 6,000 acres of the SUSDA not yet developed. This contention is contrary to the SUSDA policy: "Extension of utility services shall not be construed to imply support for any increase in residential density of the property inside the [SUSD]." SUSDA § 4.4.G.2.h.(5). Even if the SUSDA increased density in the SUSDA, increase in density itself does not promote urban sprawl. To the contrary, it is possible for increased density to discourage urban sprawl. Petitioners did not prove that increasing density in the SUSDA itself encourages urban sprawl or that, with the SUSDA, the CGMP will discourage urban sprawl less. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will create pressures to develop areas that border the SUSD, leaping over areas suitable for urban development. See PPRO, ¶¶236-237. This contention actually devalues the very urban service district concept Petitioners seek to defend and can be said about any urban district boundary. Currently, there are many places where the PUSD borders the Agricultural lands. The pressures created by the SUSDA will be no greater than the pressures that have existed in those places all along. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will increase costs to the County essentially because, notwithstanding SUSDA's requirement that developers pay the cost of connection, development will not pay for itself in the long run (taking into account costs of operations, maintenance, and repair.) To the extent true, it can be said of all development and does not prove that the SUSDA encourages urban sprawl. Petitioners did not prove that the SUSDA triggers any of the indicators of urban sprawl; did not prove that the SUSDA encourages the proliferation of urban sprawl; and did not prove that the CGMP, as amended by the SUSDA, fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Internal Consistency of the SUSDA Petitioners contend that the SUSDA is internally inconsistent with CGMP Section 4.4.G.1.i., which gives priority in the provision and funding of water and sewer services to the PUSD, essentially because the data and analysis ensure that water demands in the PUSD can be met through 2025. The lack of data and analysis at present to ensure that water demands in the PUSD can be met beyond 2025 does not prove that priority will not be given to the needs of the PUSD.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the LPIA and the SUSDA are "in compliance." DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2009.
The Issue Whether the subject site is within Petitioner's permitting jurisdiction and whether an earthen dam constructed at the subject site required a permit? Whether Respondent should be required to remove the earthen dam and/or be required to pay Petitioner's investigative costs?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida that regulates dredge and fill activities conducted in wetlands within its statutory jurisdiction as set forth in Chapters 373 and 403, Florida Statutes. Respondent owns the subject property, which is located in the 200 block of Jan Drive in Section 18, Township 4 South, Range 13 West, Bay County, Florida. On July 22, 1999, Mr. Keisker met informally with Respondent at Respondent’s request and made a field visit to the subject property. Mr. Keisker told Respondent that he thought the subject property was within Petitioner’s permitting jurisdiction. Although Mr. Keisker took soil samples, surveyed the plant life of the area, and observed the hydrology of the area, his visit was not intended to be an official determination that the subject property was within Petitioner's permitting jurisdiction. There is no dispute that an earthen dam was constructed across the unnamed creek, described in findings of fact paragraph 5, in late 1999 or early January 2000. The central issue in dispute is whether the site of the earthen dam is within Petitioner’s permitting jurisdiction. Respondent asserts that the area at issue is a drainage ditch that did not naturally occur and is not within the permitting jurisdiction of Petitioner. Petitioner asserts that the area is an unnamed creek in a historical, natural wetland that is within its permitting jurisdiction. The greater weight of the credible, competent evidence established that Respondent’s property contains an unnamed creek that is located in an area of historically natural wetlands that was likely excavated in the 1970's by the local Mosquito Control District. This area of natural wetlands drains and connects into Rogers Pond and Calloway Bayou, which are Class III waters of the State of Florida. The site is within the permitting jurisdiction of Petitioner. 2/ Respondent did not receive a permit prior to the construction of the earthen dam. Construction of the earthen dam constitutes unpermitted fill activity in a wetland within Petitioner's regulatory jurisdiction. Shortly after Petitioner received a complaint in January 2000 that it had been constructed, the dam was partially breached as the result of a heavy rain event. To prevent further pollution of the unnamed creek, the remaining portion of the earthen dam should be removed by non- mechanical means. Mr. Keisker testified that he calculated Petitioner’s investigative costs based on the amount of time he expended in investigating this matter multiplied by his hourly rate of pay. In calculating his hourly rate of pay, he took his annual salary and added to that 52 percent of his annual salary for fringe benefits. He then divided that sum by 2000, which represents 50 work weeks of 40 hours per week. He used 50 weeks to calculate the hourly rate to adjust for two weeks of paid vacation. Based on his calculations, Mr. Keisker testified that Petitioner incurred costs and expenses in excess of $750.00 during its investigation of this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings and conclusions contained herein and requiring Respondent to remove the remaining portions of the earthen dam by non-mechanical means. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2001.
Findings Of Fact In 1984, the Petitioners, a married couple, purchased a parcel of real property zoned agricultural located in Clay County. The Petitioners' parcel, which is the subject of the application for vested rights, is a fraction over twenty-two acres and is bounded on the east side by the St. John's River, on the west side by County Road 209, and by other private property on the north and south which is not subject to the application under consideration. An abandoned rail road right of way runs northwest to southeast across the parcel approximately half way between the paved road on the western boundary of the property and the river which forms the eastern boundary. A sand road has been constructed between the paved road and the abandoned railroad right of way. The land uses for agricultural property included single family residential development with one single family residence per acre until the enactment of the comprehensive plan discussed in detail below. The Petitioners purchased the parcel for the purpose of constructing a single family, and subdividing and selling the remaining portions of the parcel as home sites. The Petitioners obtained two mobile home permits (move-on permits) in 1986 and a building permit for the construction of a barn in 1989 from Respondent. In addition, the Petitioners obtained a permit for the construction of a dock from the Corps of Engineers. The Petitioners had a road constructed to access the interior of the property prior to 1990. The Petitioners later purchased equipment including a back hoe, grader, and dump trucks in 1990 for improving the road and improving drainage. The Petitioner, Robert I. Moore, completed improvements to the sand road with his own labor incurring costs for fill, fuel, and equipment repairs. The Petitioners ordered a survey which was completed in 1991. They then conveyed property between themselves via quit claim deeds to subdivide the property into nine lots, A through I. Three lots were created along the river, Lot I (3.59 acres), Lost H (3.16 acres), and Lot G (2.97 acres). Three lots were created along the paved road: Lot C running from the paved road to the rail road right of way containing 2.87 acres; Lot B running east from the paved road approximately 140 feet containing 1.11 acres; and Lot A running east from the paved road approximately 150 feet containing 1.09 acres. Lot F is located east of Lot A, and runs east approximately 800 feet containing 4.60 acres. Lot D is located east of Lot B and runs east approximately 300 feet containing 1.42 acres. Lot E is located east of Lot D, runs east approximately 200 feet to the rail road right of way, and contains approximately 1.42 acres. The surveyed subdivision of the parcel was recorded on December 31, 1991, together with private road maintenance agreement and quit claim deeds. The mobile homes were located on lots B and D, and barn had been built on Lot F. The amended application combined Lots A and F, and Lots D and E. The Petitioners spent money and expended energy to make improvements to the property in pursuit of their objective of developing the parcel. Their efforts included developing a graded, sand road through the property, improving the drainage, having a survey of the property conducted, and engaging an attorney to advise them. In June 1991, the Respondent adopted a comprehensive land use plan which was submitted to the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) of the State of Florida. The DCA is charged by statute to determine if county comprehensive planning ordinances conform to state requirements. Those counties whose plans did not conform could amend them to conform; however, if the county failed to bring its plan into compliance, sanctions could be invoked by the state against the county. The Respondent's initial plan as adopted retained agricultural zoning for the parcel owned by Petitioners, and the Petitioners were aware of this having obtained several planning maps reflecting the proposed land uses for various areas of the county including their parcel. The Petitioners' subdivision complied with all existing requirements of the county to include those contained in the county's original comprehensive land use plan. The county's comprehensive land use plan provided that a lot of record included "a non-platted piece, parcel, lot, or tract of land described by metes and bounds or other similar means in a legally recorded deed as of July 1, 1991." The Petitioners' subdivision was not recorded until December 31, 1991. The county's comprehensive land use plan was not accepted by the DCA which received written objections, recommendations and comments (ORC Report) of the DCA. These objections included the density allowed in rural residential land use classification. On December 5, 1991, the Respondent and its Planning Commission held a joint workshop, advertised and open to the public, at which a modification to the density provisions of the comprehensive land use plan was considered for the purpose of addressing the objections by the DCA. The DCA's recommendation to reduce density in rural areas from one single family residence per acre to one to every five acres based upon a point system was specifically considered. On January 23, 1992, following a public hearing as required by statute, the Respondent adopted the amended plan containing the reduced density for rural areas based upon the point system. This changed the density of the Petitioners' parcel to one single family residence per five acres. This amended plan retained the definition of "lot of record" first discussed in March 1991; later considered at the public hearing on the plan in May 1991; and adopted in the original comprehensive plan. The assessed value of the parcel in 1994 was $274,200; in 1993 it was $158,462; and in 1992 it was $96,921. The expenditures for fill, labor, and repairs to construct and improve the road cost $23,425. The purchase price of the heavy equipment used by Mr. Moore to improve the road was $26,200 including $4,595 for repair of the loader/backhoe which is considered part of "purchase price." Although some of the heavy equipment was purchased used, and would have a lower rate of depreciation, the equipment lost value being used. This depreciation was part of the costs of doing the work. A declining depreciation rate of 15 percent in 1989, 12 percent in 1990, and 10 percent in 1991 was used to arrive at the depreciation costs, which were approximately $8,500. The capital costs of building the dock were excluded; however, the taxes paid to Clay County for the past two years, $5,023, were included. The total developmental costs would be approximately $37,000 as of the end of 1991. Expenditures after adoption of the plan are not considered.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the findings of facts and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the amended application for equitable vested rights be approved in part, and denied in part as follows: That Petitioner be granted equitable relief to subdivide their 22-acre parcel into 4 lots each containing approximately 5 acres using the existing road which they constructed as a boundary between the lots, but that they not be permitted to exceed the plan's density requirements. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Findings Recommended Order Paragraphs 1-4 Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,7 Paragraph 5,6 Paragraphs 6,5 Paragraph 7 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 8 It is the hearing officer's under-standing that the ordinances were adopted prior to submission to DCA, which could state objections to the county's ordinance. Mr. Moore was aware of the plan and its impact upon his property. Paragraph 9 Paragraphs 11,12,14 Paragraph 10 Paragraphs 15,16 Paragraph 11 Paragraphs 17,18 Paragraph 12 Paragraph 13 Paragraph 13 Paragraphs 11,12 Respondent's Findings Recommended Order Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 1-4 Paragraphs 4-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 5-10 Paragraphs 9-12 Subsumed in Paragraphs 11-14 Paragraph 13 Irrelevant. Paragraph 14 Paragraphs 14,18 Paragraph 15 Discussed in Conclusions Paragraphs 16-19 Paragraphs 15-18 Paragraph 20 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 21 Subsumed in Paragraph 7 Paragraph 22 Paragraph 9
The Issue Whether Petitioner, K. S. Ravines Corporation, has demonstrated, pursuant to the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, Florida, that a vested rights certificate to undertake development of certain real property located in Clay County should be issued by Clay County, notwithstanding the fact that part of such development will not be in accordance with the requirements of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property. The Applicant, K. S. Ravines Corporation, is the owner of real property located in Middleburg, Clay County, Florida. The Applicant's property, known as the "The Ravines," is being developed as a 435-acre residential and golf course development. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied upon by Silver Sands. On or about June 1, 1990, the Applicant entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement agreeing to purchase The Ravines. Subsequent to the execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Applicant pursued a due diligence effort. In particular, the Applicant contacted Clay County to confirm that The Ravines had been zoned as a Planned Unit Developed as represented by the seller of The Ravines. The Applicant also sought to confirm that the property possessed the development capabilities associated with the zoning. In response to the Applicant's inquiries, Keith I. Hadden, then Director of Development for Clay County, informed the Applicant of the following in a letter dated August 7, 1990: The property commonly known as The Ravines, as shown on that certain map of J. M. Ard & Associates, Inc., dated May 30, 1990, (Job No. 3751B), together with a parcel commonly referred to as the McCumber Contracting Parcel as shown on said map, and the access road from County Road 218 to the main property of The Ravines commonly known as Ravines Road (all hereinafter "The Ravines") is currently zoned "PUD" Planned Unit Development. . . . Mr. Hadden also confirmed that The Ravines was approved for development of 261 single family lots, 49 condominiums, 107 hotel units, and 60 patio homes; a total of 477 units. Silver Sands' Detrimental Reliance. In reliance upon Mr. Hadden's representations as Clay County Director of Planning, the Applicant purchased The Ravines for $10,709,423.00. At the time of the purchase the golf course was valued at $6,900,000.00. The Applicant purchased 168 single-family lots (44 developed and 124 undeveloped) and 60 undeveloped patio home lots. The undeveloped lots and the existing developed single- family lots purchased by the Applicant were valued at $3,943,000.00. The Applicant also spent $495,115.00 to make capital improvements to The Ravines after it purchased The Ravines. Rights that will be Destroyed. In January 1992 Clay County adopted a comprehensive plan pursuant to Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The Ravines was designated with a land use designation in the plan of "Rural Residential." The "Rural Residential" land use classification of the Clay County Comprehensive Plan allows development of one residential unit per one acre of land. As a result, The Ravines may be developed at a total of 435 units instead of the 477 units that Clay County informed the Applicant The Ravines could be developed for in the August 7, 1990, letter from Mr. Hadden. As a result of the "Rural Residential" land use classification, the total developable lots at The Ravines would be reduced from 228 lots to 186 lots, or a reduction of 42 lots. This reduction represents a reduction of 18.4% of the total lots purchased by the Applicant. It is possible that this reduction could result in an 18.4% loss of the $3,943,000.00 paid for the lots, or approximately $496,000.00. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.
The Issue The issues are whether the City of Jacksonville's (City's) Ordinance No. 2008-628-E adopted on September 9, 2008, which remediates Ordinance No. 2007-383-E, is in compliance, and whether Chapter 2009-96, Laws of Florida, renders this proceeding moot, as alleged by Petitioner, Dunn Creek, LLC (Dunn or Petitioner).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties Petitioner is the owner of a vacant 89.52-acre parcel of property in Council District 11, which is located in the northern reaches of the City. More specifically, the property lies around four or five miles east of the airport and Interstate 95, just south of Starratt Road between Dunn Creek Road and Saddlewood Parkway, and within a "couple of miles of Main Street," a major north-south State roadway. Dunn submitted oral and written comments to the City during the plan amendment process. As such, it is an affected person and has standing to participate in this proceeding. The City is a local government that is subject to the requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. It adopted the amendments being challenged by Dunn. Except for the challenged plan amendment, the City's current Plan is in compliance. Intervenor Britt owns property and resides within the City. The parties have stipulated to the facts necessary to establish that she is an affected person and therefore has standing to participate in this matter. The Department is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility for reviewing plan amendments of local governments, including the City. Background On May 14, 2007, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2007- 383-E, which amended the FLUM by changing the land use category on Dunn's property from LDR to RPI, which would allow an increase in the density and intensity of use on the property. (The LDR land use allows up to seven dwelling units per acre, while RPI is a mixed-use category that allows up to twenty dwelling units per acre if built to the maximum development potential.) On July 9, 2007, the Department issued its Notice and Statement of Intent finding that the Ordinance was not in compliance on the ground the map change was not supported by adequate data and analysis to demonstrate that the City would achieve and maintain the adopted LOS standards for the roadways within its jurisdiction. The Department further determined that the traffic study submitted by the City was not based on the maximum development allowed under the RPI category. On August 1, 2007, the Department initiated this case by filing a Petition, which tracked the objections described in its Notice and Statement of Intent. The City, Dunn, Department, and Britt later entered into settlement discussions. As part of the settlement discussions, Dunn submitted a revised traffic study and coordinated with other applicants for map changes to perform cumulative traffic impact studies. The parties eventually entered into a proposed settlement agreement which would limit development of the property to 672 condominiums/townhomes and 128,000 square feet of non-residential uses through an asterisk to the Plan. See Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 25. Also, the proposed settlement agreement noted that the data and analysis confirmed that certain future road improvements in the Capital Improvement Element (CIE) of the Plan would offset the traffic impacts of the new RPI land use. These were improvements to the East-West Connector (U.S. Highway 17 to New Berlin Road) and Starratt Road. Id. Finally, Dunn agreed to pay $4.3 million in "fair share money" to the City to offset the proportionate share of the development's traffic impacts. See Petitioner's Exhibit 6. The proportionate share agreement was intended to match the trip count anticipated from the RPI development. On September 3, 2008, the proposed settlement agreement and remedial amendment were presented to the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee (Committee) for approval as Ordinance Nos. 2008-627 and 2008-628, respectively.3 At that meeting, the Committee heard comments from several members of the public who opposed the amendment, a Dunn attorney, and the City's Director of Planning and Development, William B. Killingsworth. The City Council member who represents District 11 and is a member of the Committee also spoke in opposition to the proposal. Based primarily upon data in a new traffic study prepared on August 28, 2008, by a member of Mr. Killingsworth's staff, and the opposition of the District 11 Council member, the Committee voted unanimously to revise the proposed settlement agreement and remedial amendment by changing the land use designation on the property back to LDR, its original classification. The revised settlement agreement was approved by Ordinance No. 2008- 627-E, while the remedial amendment changing the land use was approved by Ordinance No. 2008-628-E. The two Ordinances were then forwarded to the full City Council, which approved them on September 9, 2008. The revised settlement agreement was later executed by the City, Department, and Britt, but not by Dunn, and is known as the Sixteenth Partial Stipulated Settlement Agreement. See Petitioner's Exhibit 2. The essence of the revised agreement was that by changing the land use back to its original designation, the potential adverse impacts to transportation facilities would be resolved. Id. The remedial amendment package was transmitted by the City to the Department for its review. On December 18, 2008, the Department issued a Cumulative Notice of Intent to Find Ordinance Nos. 2007-383-E and 2008-628-E in compliance. On January 8, 2009, Dunn filed a Motion to Amend Petition to Intervene pursuant to Section 163.3184(16)(f)1., Florida Statutes. Because Dunn objected to the revised settlement agreement and challenged the remedial amendment, the parties were realigned, as reflected in the style of this case. On June 1, 2009, Senate Bill 360, engrossed as Chapter 2009-96, Laws of Florida, became effective. That legislation amends Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, in several respects. Among other things, it designates the City as a Transportation Concurrency Exception Area (TCEA).4 See § 163.3180(5), Fla. Stat. The new law also provides that plan amendments for land uses of a local government with a TCEA are deemed to meet the LOS standards for transportation. See § 163.3177(3)(f), Fla. Stat. Therefore, after a TCEA becomes effective, the Department no longer has the authority to review FLUM amendments in the TCEA for compliance with state-mandated transportation concurrency requirements. However, Senate Bill 360 contains a savings clause, which provides that "this subsection does not affect any contract or agreement entered into or development order rendered before the creation of the [TCEA] except as provided in s. 380.06(29)(e)." See § 163.3180(5)(f), Fla. Stat. The City, Department, and Britt contend that this provision "saves" the Sixteenth Partial Stipulated Settlement Agreement executed by them in November 2008, and that the Department still retains jurisdiction to consider the remedial amendment. Conversely, Dunn contends that the savings clause does not apply to the revised agreement, that the Department no longer has jurisdiction to review the challenged amendment, that the remedial amendment was not authorized, and that because the remedial amendment never became effective, the Department's Petition should be dismissed as moot. Objections to the Remedial Amendment Besides the contention that the proceeding is moot, Dunn raises three issues in its challenge to the amendment. First, it contends that the amendment is not supported by relevant and appropriate data and analysis related to traffic impacts and therefore is not in compliance. Second, Dunn contends that the amendment does not address the concerns raised in the Department's original Notice and Statement of Intent regarding the City's achieving and maintaining the adopted LOS of affected roadways. See § 163.3184(16)(f)2., Fla. Stat. Third, Dunn contends that due to procedural errors in the amendment adoption process, it was unduly prejudiced. Data and analysis Because almost all of the unresolved FLUM amendments in this case involved "traffic issues," on September 4, 2007, a Department employee, Melissa Hall, sent an email to counsel for a number of applicants, including Dunn, describing "what the department would be looking for in terms of traffic analysis." See Petitioner's Exhibit 12, p. 1. The email required those applicants to submit revised traffic studies. Id. Among other things, the applicants were advised that the revised traffic impact analysis for each amendment had to use "a professionally acceptable traffic impact methodology." Id. Dunn followed the requirements of the email in preparing its revised traffic study. At the time Ordinance No. 2007-383-E was adopted, based on total background traffic, which includes existing traffic plus reserve trips for approved but not-yet-built developments, eight road segments in the study area already failed to meet LOS standards. (LOS E is the adopted passing standard on those roadways.) The study area includes affected roadways within a two-mile radius of the boundaries of the proposed project site where project traffic consumes more than one percent of the service volume. If the Dunn project is built, six segments impacted by the development will continue to fail. According to the City's expert, as a general rule, an applicant for a land use amendment is not required to bring a failing segment back up to its adopted LOS. Rather, it is only required to pay its proportionate share of the improvements for bringing it up to compliance. The unique aspect of this case is that the City has simply reclassified the property back to what it was, LDR, when Ordinance No. 2007-383-E was adopted. At that time, the Plan was in compliance. In response to Dunn's contention that Ordinance No. 2008-628-E is not supported by relevant and appropriate data and analysis, the City, joined by the Department and Britt, first contends that, given the unique circumstances presented here, no data and analysis were required. Alternatively, it contends that there are sufficient relevant and appropriate data and analysis to support maintaining the LDR land use designation. The data and analysis include the traffic study prepared by Dunn's consultant in October 2007, the additional traffic analysis performed by the City staff just before the Committee meeting, and the testimony provided at the Committee meeting on September 3, 2008. At hearing, the City first pointed out that the RPI designation was never determined to be in compliance, Ordinance No. 2007-383-E never became effective, and the property has remained LDR throughout this proceeding. See § 163.3189(2)(a), Fla. Stat. ("[p]lan amendments shall not become effective until the [Department] issues a final order determining the adopted amendment to be in compliance in accordance with s. 163.3184(9), or until the Administration Commission issues a final order determining the adopted amendment to be in compliance"). Therefore, the City takes the position that Ordinance No. 2008- 628-E did not need to be supported by data and analysis because the LDR category was the land use designation on the property at the time of the adoption of Ordinance No. 2008-628-E. In the same vein, it argues that the remedial amendment is the equivalent of a repeal of the prior ordinance (2007-383-E), which would not require any data and analysis support. While at first blush these arguments appear to be plausible, the City could not cite any provision in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, or Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 9J-55 that relieves a local government from the requirement that a plan amendment be supported by data and analysis. The City also argues that even if Ordinance No. 2008- 628-E is deemed to be a change in the land use (from LDR to LDR), the net impact of the change would be zero. This argument is based on the accepted testimony of Mr. Killingsworth, who stated that the City, Department, and Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) agreed upon a methodology which entitled the City to give "credit" for uses permitted under the existing land use category.6 Under that methodology, the City subtracts the number of trips that the existing land use (LDR) generates from the additional trips generated by the proposed land use (LDR). Therefore, the net transportation impact of a change from LDR to LDR, in effect, would be zero. The methodology is described in Petitioner's Exhibit 15, a memorandum authored by Mr. Killingsworth and sent on October 4, 2007, to Dunn and other parties seeking map changes in this case. The memorandum stated that the methodology described therein was "developed in coordination [with] FDOT District 2" and "is the suggested methodology for use in determining traffic impacts of proposed land uses for the City." See Petitioner's Exhibit 15, p. 1. Mr. Killingsworth could not cite any provision in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, or Chapter 9J-5 allowing for such a credit for traffic generated by a prior permitted land use in the data and analysis required for a FLUM amendment. At the same time, however, Petitioner could not cite any rule or statute that prohibits the Department from allowing this type of methodology when deemed to be appropriate. Even though it differed from the methodology described in Ms. Hall's earlier email by allowing credit for the existing land use, it was nonetheless "a professionally acceptable traffic impact methodology" approved by the Department and FDOT and could be used as data and analysis to support a change back to the property's original land use classification. Therefore, it constitutes relevant and appropriate data and analysis to demonstrate that the net traffic impact of the change in land use from LDR to LDR is zero. The City further argues that if it was required to provide other data and analysis, the traffic impacts of the new ordinance are offset by the two roadway improvements negotiated with the Department in the proposed settlement agreement for Ordinance No. 2008-627. See Finding 7, supra. Based upon the City staff's analysis, which is found in City Exhibit 3, the LDR land use generates less trips than the RPI land use. (This study was prepared a few days before the Committee meeting in response to an inquiry from a Committee member.) More specifically, page 3 of that exhibit reflects that there are 169 less afternoon peak hour trips for LDR than RPI with the development cap of 672 dwelling units and 128,000 square feet of non-residential uses. It is fair to infer, then, that if the proposed mitigation in the original settlement agreement offsets the impacts of the more intense RPI land use, the mitigation also offsets the impacts of the less intense LDR land use. City Exhibit 3 is a comparative calculation of the difference in vehicle trips generated by development of the property under the LDR category approved by Ordinance No. 2008- 628-E and the development of the property under the RPI category approved by Ordinance No. 2007-383-E. Dunn points out, however, that the exhibit does not show how the trips generated are distributed on affected roadways or how those trips, as they may be distributed, affect LOS of any roadways. Despite the fact that the data in Exhibit 3 are limited to trip generation data, and establish no facts relating to the LOS of affected roadways, they support a finding that more trips will be generated under the RPI designation than the existing LDR designation. Also, they provide further support for a finding that if the proposed road improvements offset the impacts of the RPI use, the mitigation will offset the impacts, if any, of the original LDR use. For data and analysis relating to the LOS of affected roadways, the City, joined by the Department and Britt, rely upon a traffic study performed by Dunn's traffic consultant, King Engineering Associates, Inc. (King). That firm prepared a transportation analysis dated November 19, 2007, for the purpose of supporting a mixed-use development on the property under the RPI category. See Petitioner's Exhibit 8. This study, however, does not apply to development of the property under the LDR category because it was based upon a mixed-use project which would allow for credit based upon the internal capture of some trips. (In other words, a portion of the new trips will be internal to the site, that is, trips between the residential and commercial land uses on the property.) Because of this, any reference to the King study and proposed mitigation therein was deleted from the revised settlement agreement. In this respect, the study does not support the amendment. The King study addresses impacted roadway segments, existing and background traffic, proposed traffic generated by the development, and LOS for the impacted roadways, as suggested by Ms. Hall in her email. Dunn's traffic engineer established that in the impacted study area, six out of eight roadway links will continue to fall below adopted LOS standards based upon existing traffic and that generated by the RPI development (segments 174, 372, 373, 374, 377, and 543). See Table 4, Petitioner's Exhibit 8. The study also identifies proposed roadway improvements in the vicinity of the project site that are intended to help cure or mitigate the failing standards. See Petitioner's Exhibit 8, p. 12. These improvements are listed in the CIE and will cost around $85 million. A "fair share" agreement has also been executed by the City and Dunn, which requires Dunn to pay more than $4.3 million to offset impacts of the RPI development. Those monies would be applied to improvements in Sector 6.1 (the North Planning District), which includes Starratt Road and the East-West Connector. The agreement notes that this contribution would offset the proportionate share of traffic impacts of the proposed RPI development. Notably, the City has already funded both the widening of Starratt Road and the improvements to the East-West Connector, U.S. Highway 17 to Berlin Road, through the Better Jacksonville Plan. Therefore, even if the Dunn fair share agreement is not implemented, the two improvements will still be made. According to Dunn's engineer, the completion of the four projects listed on page 12 of his traffic study, which are labeled as "mitigation," will not restore or cure any of the LOS failures that now exist on the six impacted segments in Table 4 of the study. However, two of the failing segments (373 and 543) may be "helped" by the projects listed on that page. Dunn's engineer also analyzed City Exhibit 3 and concluded that if the Dunn property is developed as LDR, rather than RPI, there would be potentially one less roadway segment (374) impacted by development, while five other segments would continue to fail. When the proposed mitigation in the King study is factored in, he opined that the East-West Connector may help two other failing segments. He further opined that if LDR development on the property occurs, probably three of the six impacted segments will continue to fail adopted LOS standards. Even so, the improvements identified in the CIE, including those already funded by the Better Jacksonville Plan, should offset the proportionate share of traffic impacts associated with any future LDR development.7 The foregoing data and analysis establish that the LDR land use category generates less traffic impacts than the originally-proposed RPI use; that a change from LDR to LDR should have zero effect in terms of traffic impacts; that even if there are impacts caused by a change back to LDR, the proposed mitigation in the CIE will offset the proportionate share of the impacts associated with any LDR use; that while it differed from other studies, a professionally acceptable traffic impact analysis was used by the City to support the remedial amendment; and that the proposed road improvements are fully funded without having to implement the fair share agreement. Finally, in adopting the amendment, the City has reacted to the data and analysis in an appropriate manner. Does the Remedial Amendment Resolve All Issues? Dunn also asserts that the amendment does not resolve the issues raised by the Department in its Notice and Statement of Intent dated July 9, 2007. Under Section 163.3184(16)(f)2., Florida Statutes, an affected party may assert that a compliance agreement does not resolve all issues raised by the Department in its original notice of intent. The statute allows an affected party to then address those unresolved issues in the realigned proceeding. In this case, Petitioner asserts that the Department's original objection that the change in land use would result in a lowering of the LOS in the study area was not addressed by the remedial amendment. In its Notice and Statement of Intent to find the amendment not in compliance, the Department cited the following rules and statutes as being contravened: Sections 163.3164(32) and 163.3177(3)(b),(6)(a), (8), and (10), Florida Statutes, and Rules 9J-5.005(2)(a) and (c), 9J-5.006(2)(a), (3)(b)1. and 3., 9J-5.016(4)(a)1. and 2., and 9J-5.019(3)(a) through (h) and (4)(b)2. Although these sources of authority were cited in a single generic notice of intent as a basis for objecting to all seventeen map changes, it is assumed that they have equal application to this proceeding. The cited statutes relate to funding of transportation projects and concurrency issues, while the rules relate to data and analysis requirements, concurrency issues, the capital improvement element, and required transportation analyses, all subjects addressed by Dunn at the final hearing. Assuming arguendo that the remedial amendment does not address all of the issues raised in the original notice of intent, Dunn was given the opportunity to fully litigate those matters in the realigned proceeding. Procedural Irregularities Rule 9J-5.004 requires that the City "adopt procedures to provide for and encourage public participation in the planning process." See also § 163.3181(1), Fla. Stat. ("it is the intent of the Legislature that the public participate in the comprehensive planning process to the fullest extent possible"). Dunn does not contend that the City failed to adopt the required procedures. Rather, it contends that the City did not follow those procedures during the adoption of the remedial amendment. More specifically, prior to the Committee meeting, Dunn says it spent "hundreds of thousands of dollars on top of the millions that [it] had spent previously, working for fourteen months in conjunction with the City and [Department]" so that the parties could resolve the Department's objections. Dunn argues that it was unduly prejudiced by the last-minute revisions made by the Committee and City Council, and that it did not have an adequate opportunity to respond. Dunn points out that a City Planning Commission meeting was conducted before the Committee meeting, and that body unanimously recommended that Ordinance Nos. 2008-627 and 628 be approved. It further points out that when the Committee met on September 3, 2008, the proposed revisions to the settlement agreement, the accompanying remedial amendment, and the new traffic data were not discussed until after the public comment portion of the meeting was closed. (The transcript of that meeting reflects, however, that after the new revisions and traffic study were raised, Dunn's counsel was briefly questioned about Dunn's traffic study and the density/intensity of the project. Also, according to Mr. Coe, a copy of the City's newly-prepared traffic study was given to a Dunn representative just before the Committee meeting.) For both public meetings, the City's published notices indicated that the purpose of the meetings was to consider the proposed revised settlement agreement and remedial amendment allowing a cap on the development of the RPI property through the use of an asterisk, as reflected in Ordinance Nos. 2008-627 and 2008-628. See Petitioner's Exhibits 16 and 17. Dunn contends that it had insufficient time between the Committee meeting on September 3, 2008, and the final City Council meeting on September 9, 2008, in which to review and evaluate the new traffic information and respond to the comments of the Committee member who supported the revisions. It also points out that, like other members of the public, Dunn's attorney was only given three minutes to present comments in opposition to the revised agreement at the City Council meeting on September 9, 2009. Notwithstanding any procedural errors that may have occurred during the City's adoption process, Dunn received notice and attended both the Committee and City Council meetings, it presented written and oral objections to the revised plan amendment prior to and at the City Council meeting on September 9, 2008, and it was given the opportunity to file a petition to challenge the City's decision and present evidence on the revisions at the hearing in this case. Savings Clause in Senate Bill 360 In support of its position that the matter is now moot, and that the savings clause in Senate Bill 360 does not "save" the revised settlement agreement executed by the City, Department, and Britt, on November 10, 2008, Dunn submitted extrinsic evidence to show the Legislature's intent in crafting a savings clause, which include four separate analyses by the Legislative staff (Appendices A-D); an article authored by the Bill's Senate sponsor (Senator Bennett) and published in the St. Petersburg Times on May 23, 2009 (Appendix E); a similar article authored by the same Senator and published in the Sarasota Harold-Tribune on June 11, 2009 (Appendix F); a seven-page letter from Secretary Pelham to Senator Bennett and Representative Murzin dated July 23, 2009, concerning the new law and a two and one-half page summary of the bill prepared by the Department (Appendix G); a power point presentation for the Senate Community Affairs Committee on October 6, 2009 (Appendix H); and an article published in the October 2009 edition of The Florida Bar Journal (Appendix I). The Florida Senate Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact contained in Appendix A was prepared on February 17, 2009, and does not reference the relevant savings clause. A second Senate Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact contained in Appendix B and prepared on March 19, 2009, merely acknowledges that the legislation includes a savings clause but provides no further explication. See App. B, p. 9. Appendix C is the Florida House of Representatives 2009 Session Summary prepared in May 2009, while Appendix D is a Summary of Passed Legislation prepared by the House of Representatives Economic Development and Community Affairs Policy Council on an undisclosed date. Neither document addresses the issue of what types of agreements were intended to be saved. Appendices E through I are guest newspaper columns, correspondence, a power point presentation, and an article in a professional journal. None are authoritative sources of legislative intent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2008-628-E, which remediates Ordinance No. 2007- 383-E, is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2009.
The Issue The Appellants raise several issues on appeal, including: whether Ordinance 003-2015 did not comply with the constitutional single subject rule and did the County’s application of the Ordinance violate the Florida Constitution; whether the County exceeded its police power in enacting Ordinance 003-2015 and failed to follow the essential requirements of the law when it applied the ordinance to the Appellants’ property; (3) whether the Planning Commission’s decision violated its obligations to support, protect, and defend the Unites States and Florida Constitutions; and (4) whether the Appellants were deprived of their fundamental due process rights during the Commission hearing.
Conclusions On March 10, 2010, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of the Division of Administrative Hearings entered an Order Closing File in the above captioned case.
Other Judicial Opinions OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL - CALDWELL BUILDING, 107 EAST MADISON STREET, MSC 110, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-4128, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS 2 Final Order No. DEO11-0006 FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE THEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Economic Opportunity, and that true and correct copies have been furnished to the persons listed below in the manner described, on this fopllriay of October 2011. : Miriam Snipes, Agency Clerk DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 107 East Madison Street, MSC 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 By U.S. Mail: Alfred J. Malefatto, Esquire Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 777 South Flagler Drive, Suite 300E West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 R. Max Lohman, Esquire Corbett and White, P.A; 1111 Hypoluxo Road, Suite 207 Lantana, Florida 33462 Brian Joslyn, Esquire Gregory S. Kino, Esquire Boose, Casey, Cikin, Lubitz, Martens, McBane & O*Connell Northbridge Center, 19th Floor 515 North Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-4626 By Hand Delivery: David L. Jordan, Assistant General Counsel Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street, MSC 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 By Filing with DOAH: The Honorable D. R. Alexander Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Final Order No. DEO11-0006
