The Issue The issue is whether the site plan for the Evergreens project should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this land use dispute, Petitioners, Meadowbrook Neighborhood Association, Inc.; Lynn Hill; A.A. Sulkes; Philip Bennett; Vera Harper; and Carlos McDonald (Petitioners), have contested a decision by the Developmental Review Committee (DRC) of Respondent, City of Tallahassee (City), to approve a Type B site review application for a project known as Evergreens at Mahan (Evergreens). In its decision, the DRC exempted the project from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan based upon a 1991 agreement by the City and the property owner which conferred vested rights on the property. Thus, the project was never reviewed for compliance with the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan. If the application is approved, the applicant will be authorized to commence the process for constructing 416 apartment units in ten three-story buildings on approximately 24.56 acres of land located just south of the intersection at East Mahan Drive and Riggins Road in Tallahassee, Florida. The apartment complex will be one of the largest in the City. The application was filed by Respondent, Genesis Group (Genesis), acting as an agent for the owner of the property, Respondent, George K. Walker, Trustee (Walker). After the application is approved, Walker is contractually obligated to sell the property to Respondent, TTK, L.L.C. (TTK), a New Hampshire developer, who will actually construct the complex. In response to the DRC's decision, on August 9, 2000, Petitioners filed a Notice of Intent to File Petition for Formal Proceedings. On August 28, 2000, Petitioners filed their Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings. As grounds for denying the application, Petitioners contended that a Stipulation and Final Settlement Agreement (Settlement Agreement) entered into by Walker and the City on August 6, 1991, in DOAH Case No. 91-4109VR determining that the property was presumptively vested violated in a number of respects the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance (Ordinance); that any vested rights acquired on the property have expired under Section 18-104(1)(c), Code of Ordinances; and the site plan is inconsistent with the City's Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Code. As to the latter ground, the parties have agreed that this issue need not be addressed now, but rather it can be considered by the DRC in the event Petitioners prevail on the merits of this action. Other than the vesting status, no issues have been raised regarding the site plan itself. On September 11, 2000, the Commission entered its Determination of Standing. Pursuant to the Bylaws of the Commission, the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on September 20, 2000, for an evidentiary hearing. The parties Meadowbrook Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Association) is a not-for-profit corporation organized on February 18, 2000, and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. The Association represents approximately 200 of the 279 homeowners who reside in the Meadowbrook neighborhood. The Meadowbrook neighborhood is zoned for Residential Preservation-1 and has a residential density of less than three units per acre. A portion of the Meadowbrook neigborhood is adjacent to the proposed project. Lynn Hill, A.A. Sulkes, Philip Bennett, Vera Harper, and Carlos McDonald reside and own property in the Meadowbrook neighborhood. Their property either abuts, or is close to, the location of the proposed Evergreens project. All are members of the Association and bring this action in their individual capacity and as a member of the Association. During the course of the hearing, Respondents stipulated to the standing of all Petitioners. The City is a municipal corporation of the State of Florida. It has authority to review proposed site plans for real property located within the City's geographic boundaries. Genesis is a Tallahassee consulting firm which prepared the application for Walker and acted as his agent in seeking approval of the site plan for the Evergreens project. TTK, a New Hampshire limited liability corporation, is a developer and builder of real property, and has a contract to purchase the site of the Evergreens project pending final approval of the site plan by the City. Walker is the owner of the approximately 30-acre parcel (the subject property) which is at issue in this proceeding, and is the applicant for the Evergreens site plan. The Evergreens project will be located on 24.56 acres of this 30-acre parcel. The property and its history The subject property has been owned by the Walker family, either as a part of a consortium of investors or in trust, for more than 70 years. Since the mid-1960's, Walker has controlled the property as trustee for himself and his brother. The site of the apartment complex lies a few hundred feet south of the intersection of East Mahan Drive (U.S. 90) and Riggins Road. Approximately 11.738 acres of the land sit on the eastern side of Riggins Road while the remaining 12.821 acres sit on the western side. The remainder of the property, which consists of around 7 or 8 acres, is situated just north of the apartment site, fronts on East Mahan Drive, and is currently zoned commercial. The Meadowbrook neighborhood begins approximately 1,250 feet or so south of Mahan Drive and sits on around 100 acres. The boundaries of the neighborhood abut the southern and southeastern ends of the project site. The relevant history of the property goes back to January 9, 1926, when the original plat of Glenwood Estates was recorded in Leon County (County). The property was located in the County, but not within the City, and was owned by a group that included Walker's father. The subject property was identified in the plat as Blocks L and M. The Glenwood Estates plat did not contain any statements establishing use or density for the subject property. On April 7, 1943, Glenwood Estates was replatted for taxation purposes. Walker's mother, a widow and the heir of Walker's father, was among the owners of the property. The 1943 replat reconfigured the subject property as a single, large acre parcel. The replat does not contain any statements establishing uses or densities for the platted parcels. Prior to 1967, Glenwood Estates became the sole property of Walker's mother. Upon her death, the property was placed in trust for the benefit of Walker and his brother. George K. Walker is the named trustee of the property. On March 22, 1989, the remaining property owned by Walker was subdivided into three parcels; two of the small parcels on the southwestern corner of Riggins Road and Mahan Drive were sold, thereby reducing the size of the subject property by approximately 1.56 acres. By 1991, the 1943 replat of Glenwood Estates had been resubdivided a minimum of seven times which changed the replat substantially from its original configuration. Five of the resubdivisions involved the Meadowbrook tract. Since 1989, the subject property has been configured as a large parcel of approximately 30 acres. Since 1991, the subject property is the only property in the replat that Walker has owned. In addition to his ownership of the subject property, until 1971 Walker owned approximately 69 acres of land that presently constitute a large part of the Meadowbrook neighborhood. On October 6, 1971, Walker entered into a contract for the sale of that land. Among the conditions of the sale was a requirement that the property consisting of the Meadowbrook neighborhood be rezoned R-3; that the property that is the proposed apartment site be rezoned RM-2; and that the property fronting Mahan Drive be rezoned C-1. Costs of the rezoning were to be shared equally by the buyer and seller. At the time of this sale, the subject property and the Meadowbrook tract were undeveloped. In 1972, the County rezoned the property consisting of the Meadowbrook neighborhood as R-2 for single-family residential development; rezoned the approximately 25-acre portion of the subject property north of the Meadowbrook tract as RM-2, for multi-family residential development; and rezoned the property fronting Mahan Drive as C-1 for commercial development. The multi-family zoning on the property that is the proposed location for the Evergreen project authorized a range of dwelling units from single-family to two-family to multi-family up to a maximum of 17.4 units per acre. One of the conditions of the 1971 sale was the granting of an easement by Walker to the buyer (Collins Brothers) to extend Riggins Road south from Mahan Drive to the northern boundary of the Meadowbrook tract. At the time of the sale, there was no direct access from the Meadowbrook tract north to Mahan Drive. On an undisclosed date, Collins Brothers was forced into receivership. Therefore, between 1971 and 1980, there was no development on the Meadowbrook tract or the subject property, other than the roughing-out of the location of what was to become Riggins Road. In 1980, Guardian Mortgage Investors (Guardian) took over the previous buyer's interest. At that time, Walker entered into a road construction agreement with Guardian in which he agreed to pay one-half of the road construction costs to extend Riggins Road south from Mahan Drive to the Meadowbrook subdivision. Guardian agreed to pay one-half of the road construction costs as well as all of the cost for the installation of the main water and sewer trunk lines, except for laterals which were to be installed at Walker's expense. In 1981, the construction of Riggins Road and the main water and sewer trunk lines were completed. The minimum allowable width of Riggins Road from Mahan Drive to the northern boundary of the Meadowbrook tract was 30 feet. However, it was constructed 36 feet wide so that it could serve not only the Meadowbrooks neighborhood, but also Walker's future development. For the same reason, even though the minimum right-of-way for this section of Riggins Road was 60 feet, an extra 20 feet (or 80 feet in all) were dedicated for the right-of-way. No development has occurred on the subject property since this dedication. The sewer main serving the Meadowbrook neighborhood is a gravity feed system flowing into a pump station within the Meadowbrook neighborhood. From there, it is pumped into a force main to a point under or adjacent to Riggins Road approximately 50 feet into the property that is zoned RM-2. From there, the system is again a gravity feed system flowing north under Mahan Drive to another pump station. If the sewer system had been installed to serve only the Meadowbrook neighborhood, it could have consisted only of a forced main system between the two pump stations. However, because further development was anticipated, the developer installed a gravity feed system that flowed through the RM-2 property, through the C-1 property, and under Mahan Drive at considerably more expense than a forced main system. Both the water and sewer systems have the capacity to serve 670 domestic equivalent units in the RM-2 and C-1 portions of the subject property. Following their completion, the water and sewer facilities, and Riggins Road, were dedicated to the City. Since 1983 or 1984, the City has owned, operated, and maintained Riggins Road and the water and sewer lines from Mahan to the Meadowbrook neighborhood. On April 14, 1983, Walker petitioned the City to annex his property. By Ordinance No. 83-0-2185 adopted on December 30, 1983, the Walker property, the Meadowbrook neighborhood, and considerable other properties were annexed into the City. Prior to annexation, Walker received assurance from the City that the annexation would not affect his ability to develop the RM-2 and C-1 portions of his property. The City's vesting process On July 16, 1990, the City adopted its 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Concurrent with its adoption, the City adopted a Vested Development Rights Review Ordinance (Ordinance), which established "the sole administrative procedures and standards by which a property owner" could assert that he had acquired certain property rights and obtain a vested rights determination from the City. The Ordinance is codified as Article VII of Chapter 18 of the City's Code of Ordinances. The Ordinance established the administrative procedures and standards for common law or statutory vesting. A property that was determined to be vested under the Ordinance was exempt from the application of the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Once a property is found to be exempt, or vested, it retains that status in perpetuity. In order to claim vested development rights under the Ordinance, a property owner was required to apply for a vested rights determination with the City's Planning Department within 120 days of July 16, 1990. A failure to timely file an application constituted a waiver of any vested rights claim. However, a property owner whose property was located within a recorded subdivision, or unrecorded subdivision which the City determined had satisfied the City's infrastructure requirements, did not have to submit an application for a vested rights determination. In those cases, vested rights were "presumed," based upon the infrastructure requirements being satisfied, and the property was "presumptively" vested from the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Section III.1.a. of the Ordinance. The right of a property owner to assert that his property is presumptively vested can be made at any time, even today. After reviewing its land development records, on July 25, 1990, the City published in the Tallahassee Democrat a lengthy list of recorded and unrecorded subdivisions it had determined were presumptively vested from the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan. The subject property, identified on the City's tax rolls by Tax I.D. #11-28-20-071-000-0, was included within the City's list of presumptively vested recorded subdivisions. The notice stated that it was the City's intent to only exempt subdivisions for which streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for development had been completed by July 16, 1990. Recorded subdivisions included on the list of exempt subdivisions were presumed to have satisfied the infrastructure requirements. The City did not inspect recorded subdivisions to ensure compliance with the infrastructure requirements, but presumed the existence of the requisite infrastructure. Any recorded subdivision subsequently determined not to be in compliance with the infrastructure requirements could be removed from the exempt list. Unrecorded subdivisions were not included on the exempt list unless they had first been physically inspected to ensure compliance with the infrastructure requirements. Walker's application for vested rights On October 17, 1990, the City's Director of Growth Management instructed that Walker's property be removed from the list of exempt subdivisions due to the resubdivision of the original plat and because all of the infrastructure was not in place. At that time, however, there was no provision in the Ordinance that made resubdivision a factor in the determination of an exemption or vesting. On the other hand, the issue of infrastructure was a valid consideration. On November 13, 1990, Walker timely submitted an application for a vested rights determination on the basis that his property was entitled to vesting under the common law. The City assigned Number V.R.0195T to the application. On January 8, 1991, in accordance with Section III.3.b. of the Ordinance, the City Planning Department determined that the subject property was not vested and notified Walker that Application Number V.R. 0195T was denied. No reason was given. The letter of denial advised him of his rights to contest the planning staff's denial of his vested rights. On January 22, 1991, Walker notified the City of his decision to challenge planning staff's denial of his vested rights application. He elected to waive his right to a hearing before the City Staff Committee, and he requested a hearing before DOAH pursuant to Section III.3.c. of the Ordinance. On July 3, 1991, the City referred Walker's request for an administrative hearing to DOAH on the planning staff's denial of Application Number V.R.0195T. The request was assigned DOAH Case Number 91-004109VR. On July 9, 1991, the case was scheduled for a hearing on August 29, 1991. During the pendency of the DOAH case, and at the request of the City, Walker and his counsel met with representatives of the City, including a Planning Department staffer and an assistant city attorney. Before the meeting, Walker reconfirmed with City officials that his property had been rezoned to C-1, RM-2, and R-2 in 1972, and that the necessary water and sewer lines were in place to serve his property. After learning at the meeting that infrastructure for the property had already been built, the City agreed to find Walker's property vested to the extent that the infrastructure was in place. In other words, Walker would be allowed to develop as many units as the existing infrastructure would accommodate. After the meeting, Walker secured an affidavit from Wayne Colony, the engineer who designed the water and sewer system for the property and the southern extension of Riggins Road. In his affidavit dated August 6, 1991, Coloney attested that the sewer line between Mahan Drive and the Meadowbrook neighborhood was designed to serve the single-family residences, the RM-2 property and the C-1 property; that the sewer line had the capacity to serve 670 residential equivalent units in the RM-2 and C-1 portions of that property; and that the sewer had sufficient capacity for the maximum density of development on the RM-2 and C-1 portions of the property. A letter from the City's Water and Sewer Department dated August 1, 1991, also confirmed that the City had "the necessary water and sewer lines to serve the property." Finally, Riggins Road and the stormwater drain to serve the property had been completed in the early 1980's. With this information in hand, counsel for the City agreed that the property was presumptively vested. On August 6, 1991, or just prior to the scheduled administrative hearing, counsel for Walker and the City executed the Settlement Agreement which declared the subject property an exempt subdivision based upon Section III.1.a.1. of the Ordinance, and presumptively vested the property from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The Settlement Agreement authorized the development of the subject property for up to 670 residential equivalent units. The Settlement Agreement also stated that there was no time frame in which the Walker property was required to commence or complete development, and that the property was vested in perpetuity. On August 7, 1991, the Settlement Agreement was filed with DOAH. On August 8, 1991, an Order Approving Stipulation and Final Settlement Agreement was entered. Therefore, an administrative hearing was never held on Application V.R.0195T. Walker's application was one of hundreds of vested rights applications being processed by the City at that time. Although many of the specific details underlying the City's decision to approve the settlement are not known now because of the passage of time, the subsequent loss by the City of Walker's application file, and the sheer number of applications then being processed, the City Attorney is certain that he would have known about the petition and the underlying facts before he authorized the Assistant City Attorney to execute the agreement. Based on the information then available, the City Attorney now says that Walker clearly qualified for either common law or presumptive vesting. Petitioners contend that the Assistant City Attorney (and/or City Attorney) lacked authority to settle the case without obtaining specific prior authority from the City Commission; however, the more credible and persuasive evidence shows otherwise. This is true even though the Ordinance does not specifically address the settlement of vested rights cases. The City Attorney's policy is and has been to involve the affected City staff in settlement negotiations rather than negotiating without the consent of his client. Moreover, the present City Attorney, and his two predecessors, have always considered it a part of their inherent authority to settle litigation on the City's behalf when it is in the best interest of the City to do so. The only exception to this inherent authority is when there is a budgetary impact; in those cases, prior approval must be obtained before committing the City to spending money. Here, however, there was no fiscal impact resulting from the Walker settlement. Further, at no time after the Settlement Agreement was signed has the City Commission ever expressed its disagreement with the City Attorney's interpretation of the Ordinance, taken steps to curtail his inherent authority, or acted to vacate the Settlement Agreement. Therefore, in the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, it is found that the Assistant City Attorney, after consultation with the City Attorney and appropriate City staff, had the authority to execute the Settlement Agreement on behalf of the City without prior City Commission approval. Petitioners also contend that based upon the language in Section III.3.e.7. of the Ordinance, there was no authority for the hearing officer to approve the Settlement Agreement until a substantive review of the information which formed the basis for the agreement had been made. The cited provision sets forth the criteria upon which the decision of the hearing officer in a vested rights case must be based. They include an evidentiary presentation by the parties at a formal hearing, adherence to certain land use guidelines and relevant case law, and a recommended order at the conclusion of the proceeding. The City points out, however, that under its interpretation of the Ordinance, once the parties learned that the property was exempt and the dispute had been settled, the criteria in Section III.3.e.7. did not apply. In those situations, no useful purpose would be served in requiring the parties to go through the formality of a de novo hearing. Otherwise, the parties (including the taxpayers) would be required to expend time, resources, and energy to litigate a matter in which no material facts were in issue. Accordingly, the City's interpretation of the Ordinance is found to be the most logical and reasonable, and it is found that the DOAH hearing officer had the authority to accept the parties' settlement without conducting a hearing. Petitioners next contend that when the Settlement Agreement was executed, the City lacked sufficient evidence to show that Walker had installed the infrastructure necessary for presumptive vesting. More specifically, they assert that except for Wayne Colony's affidavit, and the letter from the City, there was no evidence to support that determination. Petitioners go on to contend that not only must the primary roadways and water and sewer lines be built before the vesting cut-off date, but the "on-site" water and sewer lines, stormwater facilities, and other facilities necessary to begin vertical construction on each apartment building must also be in place. This contention is based on Section III.1.a.1. of the Ordinance which requires that in order for a subdivision to attain exempt status, the "streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for the development must have been completed as of July 16, 1990." The City Attorney's testimony on this issue is found to be the most persuasive. According to his interpretation of the Ordinance, only that infrastructure necessary to serve the subdivision must be completed in order to qualify for vesting. Conversely, on-site or private infrastructure does not have to be completed in order to satisfy the terms of the Ordinance. Therefore, on-site infrastructure is not a factor in determining whether a property qualifies for an exempt status. Indeed, as the City Attorney points out, if Petitioners' interpretation of the Ordinance were accepted, there would be "no vested lots in the City" since infrastructure is never extended from the public street to the lot prior to its development. Finally, Petitioners contend that the Settlement Agreement is invalid because Walker's application in DOAH Case No. 91-4109VR was for common law vesting while the Settlement Agreement made a determination that the property was presumptively vested. As a practical matter, there is no difference between property being exempt or being vested. Under either category, the property would not have to meet the requirements of the Comprehensive Plan. Here, the evidence shows that Walker's property qualified for both common law and presumptive vesting. Since the two types of vesting have the same practical effect, the validity of the Settlement Agreement has not been impaired. Expiration of vested rights Sections II.5.a., d., and i. of the Ordinance provide, respectively, that for purposes of a vested rights determination, an "[e]xempt subdivision," "[f]inal subdivision plat approval," or "[a]ny other development order which approved the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use and which allowed development activity on the land for which the development order was issued" shall be deemed a final development order. Section IV.1.c. of the Ordinance provides that "[a]ll final development orders shall expire in one year or such shorter time as may be adopted unless it is determined that substantial development has occurred and is continuing in good faith." Petitioners argue that the Settlement Agreement constitutes a "development order" within the meaning of the foregoing provisions of the Ordinance, and because no activity has occurred on the land since the Settlement Agreement was approved in 1991, the development order has expired by operation of the law. For the following reasons, this contention has been rejected. The Settlement Agreement did not approve "the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use" and did not allow "development activity on the land." Further, it did not allow the owner to pull building permits and commence development on his land. Rather, it simply determined which set of rules and regulations (pre-1990 or post-1990) Walker had to comply with in order to develop his property. Therefore, it cannot be "[a]ny other development order which approved the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use and which allowed development activity on the land for which the development order was issued." At the same time, a recorded subdivision such as Glenwood Estates is "complete" since all necessary infrastructure is in place. It has no expiration date, and no further development remains to be done to show "continuing good faith," as that term is used in the Ordinance. Therefore, even if the Walker property technically meets the definitions of an "exempt subdivision" or a "final subdivision plat approval," the expiration provisions of the Ordinance still do not apply. Finally, the City has never applied the expiration provisions of the cited provision to terminate the exempt status of a recorded subdivision, nor has it construed a vested rights determination as being a "final development order" within the meaning of the Ordinance. This interpretation of the Ordinance is found to be reasonable, and it is hereby accepted. Equitable estoppel As noted earlier, when Walker sold the Meadowbrook tract (69 acres) to Collins Brothers in 1972, he made the sale contingent on his obtaining not only residential zoning for the Meadowbrook tract, but also upon obtaining commercial and multi-family zoning on the remainder of the tract. Thus, he sold the site in reliance on his ability to develop the remainder of the tract in conformance with his master plan. As a part of that sale, Walker gave the purchasers credit towards the purchase price to defray one-half of the cost of installing the infrastructure for the entire 100-acre parcel, again in reliance on his ability to develop the property. When Collins Brothers defaulted, he paid the successor developer (Guardian) the money necessary to defray one-half of the cost of the communal infrastructure, and he paid additional funds for water and sewer taps and a storm drain, again in reliance on his ability to develop the property. Walker also petitioned the City to annex his property in the early 1980's based on a representation by the City that the annexation would not affect his ability to develop his property. After the annexation, Walker has continued to pay property taxes to the City based upon the value of the property to be developed under the property's C-1 and RM-2 zoning. In addition, Walker encumbered his property to secure loans in reliance on his ability to develop it in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. After the Settlement Agreement was approved, the City adopted a site-specific zoning plan which impacted Walker's property. Walker agreed to reduce the maximum density he might otherwise have obtained through litigation in reliance upon the City's representation that the Settlement Agreement remained in effect and that his rights under that Agreement would survive in perpetuity. Finally, Walker has entered into an option contract for the sale of his property to TTK based upon the validity of the Settlement Agreement. He has also expended substantial monies to further that sale and to develop his site plan. Other contentions Petitioners have also contended in their Proposed Recommended Order that "[t]he creation of new lots through the re-subdivision of the parent parcel [in 1989] subjects the property under review to the consistency and concurrency provisions in the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan." Because this contention was not raised in the initial pleading or in the parties' Joint Pretrial Statement, it has been disregarded. Finally, the Association points out that multiple three-story apartment buildings will be constructed immediately adjacent to single-family homes in the Association with only an 8-foot fence and a 30-foot setback dividing the two areas. In addition, its members logically fear that the project will generate additional traffic, crime, and pollution and result in the lowering of property values in the neighborhood. It also asserts that the developer has never been willing to sit down with neighborhood members and attempt to compromise on any design aspect of the apartment complex. While these concerns are obviously legitimate and well- intended, they are not relevant to the narrow issues raised in this appeal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission enter a final order granting the Type B site plan review application filed by George K. Walker which determined that his property is presumptively vested. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth D. Goldberg, Esquire 1725 Mahan Drive, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5201 Linda R. Hurst, Esquire City Hall, Second Floor 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731 Jay Adams, Esquire Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1804 Jean Gregory, Clerk Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission City Hall 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding consists of approximately 92 acres of land located in Clay County, Florida. The subject property is known as "Ranch Acres." Ranch Acres was subdivided into 49 lots by an unrecorded subdivision plat. The lots range in size from approximately 1.1 to 2.9 acres. Roads, which are unpaved, and drainage for Ranch Acres are privately owned. A boundary survey of Ranch Acres was prepared and contains a surveyor's certification of April 20, 1982. Pre-1985 Subdivision Regulations of Clay County. Prior to September of 1985 Clay County did not require platting of subdivisions such as Ranch Acres. In September of 1985, Clay County adopted Ordinance 85-68 creating three types of subdivisions and providing regulations thereof. An exception to these requirements, however, was included in Ordinance 85-68: subdivisions shown on a certified survey prior to September of 1985 with lots and roads laid out would continue to not be subject to regulation so long as the lots continue to comport with the survey. Government Action Relied Upon Before the Applicant's Sale of the Property. The Applicant was aware that it could develop Ranch Acres as an unrecorded subdivision in Clay County. The development of Ranch Acres comes within the exception to Ordinance 85-58. In a letter dated December 19, 1988 the Administrator of the Clay County Planning & Zoning Department informed the Applicant that Ranch Acres' "appears to be a valid unrecorded subdivision." The Administrator went on to state, in relevant part, the following: As a result of this "loophole" the subdivision does not have to meet the minimum general design standards set forth in the county ordinance. In addition it does not have to meet other guarantees and criteria established in the ordinance. . . . . The land use and the size of the lots do conform with county regulations. . . . A similar letter was sent to the Applicant by the Director of Engineering of Clay County on or about June 18, 1990. The Applicant's Detrimental Reliance. The Applicant provided dirt roads and drainage to Ranch Acres. The roads were constructed during the early 1980's and the drainage was constructed in approximately 1986. The costs of improvements to Ranch Acres incurred by the Applicant was approximately $30,000.00. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. If the Applicant must comply with the Clay County comprehensive plan it will be required to pave the roads of the subdivision and improve drainage. The Applicant will not be able to continue to develop the property under the Clay County comprehensive plan because the plan allows development of land such as Ranch Acres on a minimum of ten acre lots. The Applicant cannot subdivide the remaining lots of Ranch Acres that have not been sold into ten acre lots. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, the Charles J. Harris Trust, has demonstrated, pursuant to the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, Florida, that a vested rights certificate to undertake development of certain real property located in Clay County should be issued by Clay County, notwithstanding the fact that part of such development will not be in accordance with the requirements of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property. The Applicant, Charles J. Harris Trust, is the owner of real property located in Clay County, Florida. The Applicant's property (hereinafter referred to as the "Property") is more fully described in Exhibit "A" of the documentation offered in support of the Applicant's application. The Property consists of approximately 29 acres located on Lake Geneva. The Property was purchased by Charles J. Harris and Bonnie Lee Harris, husband and wife, on January 14, 1970. On May 4, 1972, the Property was transferred by the Harris' to the Charles J. Harris Trust. The beneficiaries of the Applicant are the three adult children of the Harris'. One of those children, Becky Harris, is profoundly retarded and requires constant care. While room and board are provided for Becky, the Harris provide funds for other needs. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied Upon. On January 14, 1970, the Harris' entered into an contract to purchase the Property. See Exhibit B of the documentation in support of the Applicant's application for the specific terms of the purchase agreement. Prior to entering into the purchase contract, Winfred Crawford, a registered real estate broker, wrote a letter dated January 12, 1970, on behalf of the Harris' to George A. Gnann of the Zoning Board for Clay County, Florida. Ms. Crawford informed Mr. Gnann of the following: The property is being purchased with the thought of subdividing and the buyer has requested that we obtain for him the Clay County requirements, as to lot sizes, road sizes and etc., also please advise the zoning now on this property and what the requirements would be to change the zoning necessary to meet the County Requirements. All information that would be informative will be appreciated. By letter of January 14, 1970, Ms. Crawford wrote another letter to Mr. Gnann memorializing information provided by Mr. Gnann verbally in response to Ms. Crawford's letter of January 12, 1970. A copy of this letter was provided to the Harris' on January 14, 1970, prior to their purchase of the Property. In part, Ms. Crawford wrote the following: I understood the requirements and procedure as follows: The Clay County required lot size- 15,000 square feet, no lot to be less than 70 feet in width. The set back line from any street would be 25 feet, and set back from side lot lines 10 feet. . . . Proposed Plat would be submitted to you for your approval and signature. (This would be for approval of lot sizes and set back lines). Proposed Plat then would be submitted Louis McKee, Clay County Engineer, Orange Park, Florida, for his approval of width and location of streets. Proposed Plat would require his signature. Proposed Plat then would be submitted to Mr. Harry Riggs, County Health Department, Green Cove Springs, Florida, for his approval for sewerage disposal. Proposed Plat would require his signature. Proposed Plat would then be submitted for the approval and acceptance of the County Commissioners, requiring the Chairmans [sic] signature of acceptance before the Plat could be recorded. Based upon the foregoing, Clay County represented to the Harris' how the Property could be developed according to zoning and Clay County laws governing development of property in existence in 1970. Clay County also informed the Harris' of the steps that they needed to follow in order to plat the Property according to Clay County law in 1970. Detrimental Reliance. In reliance upon Clay County's representations, the Harris' purchased the Property. The Harris' paid $35,000.00 for the Property. The Harris' also paid interest of $29,380.00 to finance the purchase price for the Property. On July 18, 1972, the Clay County Zoning Commission gave notice that it would hold a public hearing on Thursday, August 3, 1972, to consider rezoning certain properties in Clay County. Among other things, the Clay County Zoning Commission gave notice that it planned to consider rezoning the Property from Agricultural, "A", to Single-Family Residential, "RA". The RA zoning category changed the minimum residential lot size allowed for the Property from 15,000 square feet to 20,000 square feet. Prior to the Harris' purchase of the Property, the shoreline of the Property had been modified. A natural cove along the shoreline of the Property was closed in with a spoil dike and island. After purchasing the Property the Harris' began seeking approval from the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (now the Department of Environmental Protection)(hereinafter referred to as the "Department") of a permit to restore the shoreline to its original condition. In connection with the restoration of the Property's shoreline, costs were incurred by the Applicant for the services of engineers and surveyors. A "Study of Proposed Reconnection of Pond to Lake Geneva" was prepared by Barry A. Benedict, Ph.D., and plans for the restoration of the shoreline were prepared. On March 26, 1982, the Department approved a permit for the restoration of the shoreline. The evidence failed to prove that Clay County made any representations to the Applicant as a result of the process of obtaining the permit. The restoration of the shoreline of the Property was completed by the Applicant in 1982. The costs of the restoration project incurred by the Applicant was approximately $11,940.00. During the early 1980's the Applicant incurred costs of $22,319.00 to clear a dirt road from the western boundary of the Property to most of the lots along the shoreline, including four lots subsequently sold by the Applicant. The four lots sold by the Applicant were sold Between approximately 1983 and 1984. The lots were sold to unrelated third parties. Non-exclusive easements of ingress and egress were also conveyed to the owners of the sold lots. All of the sold lots are located along the shoreline of the Property. One of the sold lots, Lot 1-L (1.163 acres), is located along the northern boundary of the Property and has ingress/egress along the northern boundary of the Property. Another of the sold lots, Lot F (0.823 acres), requires ingress/egress along the cleared road that was cut through unsold lots. The other two sold lots, Lots C (0.681 acres) and D (0.731 acres), are contiguous and require ingress/egress along the cleared road that was cut through unsold lots. Lots C and D are separated by Lot E, a 0.691-acre unsold portion of the Property. In 1985, after selling the four lots, the Applicant had a Boundary Survey of the Property prepared by Joseph G. Knapp, Registered Land Surveyor. The Boundary Survey was completed June 22, 1985. The Boundary Survey identifies how the Applicant intends to subdivide the Property into 34 lots. Three of the lots are just over one acre. The rest of the lots are between 0.6 acres and just under one acre. The Boundary Survey prepared for the Applicant could have served as a recorded plat but was not recorded with Clay County by the Applicant. Steps 3 through 6 outlined in Ms. Crawford's letter of January 14, 1970, setting out the representations from Clay County concerning the laws governing development of the Property in 1970, and in particular, recording a plat of the Property, were not followed by the Applicant. At the time of the formal hearing of this case, approximately 23 acres of the Property remain unsold. Rights that will be Destroyed. Clay County adopted a comprehensive growth management plan in January 1992. Pursuant to the plan, the land use for he Property was designated as "Agriculture." Land designated with a land use of "Agriculture" pursuant to the plan may be developed at a density of one residential unit per 20 acres. The land use designation was modified in 1994 to "RA 2" but not in any material respect. Property designated "Agriculture" or "RA 2" may also be used for agricultural purposes as long as they are "bona fide" agricultural purposes, or "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land." Prior to the adoption of the Clay County comprehensive plan, the Applicants could have sold the remaining 23.7 acres of the Property as the remaining 30 unsold lots designated in the Boundary Survey prepared for the Applicant. As a result of the land use designation for the Property adopted in Clay County's comprehensive plan, the remaining 23.7 acres of the Property with easements for ingress and egress to sold lots may be developed with one residential unit only. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.
The Issue The issue is whether two map changes on the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) of the Comprehensive Plan (Plan) adopted by Taylor County (County) by Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17 on December 15, 2009, are in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties The Department is the state planning agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing and approving amendments to comprehensive plans adopted by local governments. The County is a local government that administers a Plan. It adopted the two plan amendments that are the subject of this proceeding. It is considered a "rural" county with a current population of around 20,000 residents. Dr. Hutchins owns property in the County. Although his initial pleading alleges, and his Proposed Recommended Order states, that he "submitted oral comments regarding the subject amendments at transmittal and prior to adoption of the amendment," no evidence was presented at hearing that Dr. Hutchins did so during the adoption process. Ms. Redding and Mr. Wood are siblings and along with three other members of the Wood family jointly own property in the County. Like Dr. Hutchins, no evidence was presented at the hearing that either Intervenor submitted written or oral comments to the County during the adoption process. History Preceding the Amendments The process for adopting the County's first Plan, including the FLUM, began around 1988. For the purpose of drafting a FLUM, a Planning Board (Board) was created consisting of seven individuals, all of whom were volunteers with no formal planning experience. However, they received advice and assistance from two outside consultants, who also advised the County concerning the appropriate text to be used in the new Plan. Four members of the Board, including its former Chairman, testified at the final hearing. Over the next two years, the Board conducted meetings, spoke with numerous property owners, and collected information in order to assign each parcel an appropriate land use category. The collective efforts of the Board culminated in a large, hand- colored FLUM (consisting of numerous sections of aerial maps patched together) that was affixed to the wall of what is now the courtroom on the second floor in the County Courthouse. Testimony by former members of the Board established that the Hutchins parcel (then owned by Colin and Lucille Kelly) and the Bird Island parcel (owned by Wood, Redding, and other family members) were assigned a classification of Mixed Use-Urban Development. Because the County does not have a zoning code, the properties were never assigned a zoning classification consistent with that land use category. This classification was based upon the fact that at least two different businesses were being conducted on each parcel at the time, and the owners requested that they be given that classification. In the case of the Hutchins (then Kelly) property, it was being used to conduct a commercial fishing operation as well as a small construction company (with dump trucks, bulldozers, and front end loaders) that had a contract with Proctor & Gamble (now known as Buckeye Technologies, Inc.) to maintain roads. An office for the construction company was located in a separate mobile home placed on the property. Mr. Bird was a commercial fisherman and operated a wholesale fish business on Bird Island. Also, both he and his mother had separate homes on the property, another structure was used to store fish nets, and docking facilities for other commercial fisherman were maintained. Many of these structures were blown away during the so-called Storm of the Century on March 13, 1993, and never replaced. Except for property within the small communities of Keaton Beach, Dekle Beach, Denzel Beach, and Steinhatchee, and a few other small parcels, such as Dark Island, Cedar Island, and Intervenors' property, all of the remaining land along the coastline was placed in either Conservation or Agriculture. An unusual feature of the County is that it has one of the longest coastlines in the State (58 miles), stretching on the Gulf of Mexico from Jefferson County to Dixie County. Because around 88 percent of the coastline is owned by the State, very little waterfront land is left for development. In fact, Dr. Hutchins pointed out that except for his property and Bird Island, no other vacant, upland Gulf-front property within the County is in private ownership at this time. The FLUM, with the foregoing classifications, was adopted by the County by Ordinance No. 90-4 on June 19, 1990. Before it was submitted to the Department for its review, the County was advised by the Department that it would not accept the large, hand-colored FLUM in that format. Rather, the Department required that the map be reduced in size and digitized. To comply with this request, the original FLUM was dismantled into smaller sections and hand-carried to a firm in Crystal River that had the capability of reducing the large map into digital form. The original FLUM was then returned to the County Courthouse. When the larger map was reduced in size and converted to a digital format, it was not parcel-specific and failed to pick up the Hutchins parcel and Bird Island. Instead, except for larger tracts of land, especially in the small communities noted in Finding of Fact 8, the entire coastline was shown as being Conservation or Agriculture. This error was not detected by County officials or the affected property owners since they continued to rely upon the designations shown on the large, hand-colored FLUM in the Courthouse. The Department reviewed the FLUM, as digitized, assumed that the Hutchins and Bird Island property were Agriculture and Conservation, and found those parts of the FLUM to be in compliance. This agency action occurred on or about October 1, 1990. Thus, the Department never undertook a compliance review for either parcel with the intended higher density/intensity land use. In 1995, the room in which the original FLUM was mounted was taken over by another occupant of the Courthouse, and the original FLUM was moved to a different floor. During or after the moving process, it was lost or accidentally destroyed and its whereabouts have been unknown since that time. In 1993, Dr. Hutchins purchased his property from Colin and Lucille Kelly. Based on a conversation with a County employee, he purchased the property with the understanding that it was classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development. Although he had no specific plans to develop the property at that time, and still has none, the Mixed Use-Urban Development land use category was the major inducement for him to purchase the property. In 2005, Dr. Hutchins was approached by an investor who wished to develop the property at a later time. When the investor contacted the County to confirm its land use designation, Dr. Hutchins learned for the first time that the digitized map approved by the Department reflected the property carried an Agriculture/Rural Residential land use. Because of this, the agreement with the potential investor was never consummated. In a similar vein, Mr. Wood, who served on the Board that assigned land use designations to property on the original FLUM, and knew that the Board had designated his property as Mixed Use-Urban Development, placed the Bird Island property on the market in 2005 representing that it was classified in that category. A prospective purchaser checked with the County to verify its land use and learned that it was Conservation. Mr. Wood was unaware of this error until that time. Because of this, the sale was never consummated. After 2005, the County and Department held numerous meetings in an attempt to resolve this dispute. The Department refused to allow the FLUM to be changed to reflect the original land use designations. This led to the County adopting the two challenged amendments to correct what it characterizes as a "scrivener's error." Besides the two parcels that are in dispute here, on an undisclosed date, two other parcels (in the interior part of the County) were discovered by the County to have the wrong land use category as a result of the digitizing process. Both should have been placed in the Industrial land use category, and after a review, the Department had no objection to those errors being corrected by an amendment. The Plan Amendments On December 15, 2009, the County adopted Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17, also known as CPA 08-1 and CPA 08-3. The first amendment changed the land use on the 14-acre Hutchins parcel from Agriculture/Rural Residential to Mixed Use-Urban Development. The present land use allows one dwelling unit per 5 acres while the new land use designation allows up to 12 dwelling units per acre and a 60 percent impervious surface ratio for nonresidential development. See Department Exhibit 1, Future Land Use Policy I.3.2. Thus, up to 126 residential units and 96,476 square feet of non-residential development could be built on the Hutchins site. The second amendment changed the land use on the 3.36-acre Bird Island parcel from Agriculture-2 and Conservation to Mixed Use-Urban Development. The former land use allows one dwelling unit per 40 acres while the new land use would permit the same density/intensity as the Hutchins parcel. The new category would allow up to 30 residential units and 21,954 square feet of non-residential development. The amendments were transmitted by the County to the Department for its review in early April 2009. On June 5, 2009, the Department issued its Objections, Recommendations and Comments (ORC) report. The Department lodged objections to both amendments generally on the grounds the sites are not environmentally suitable for the proposed density and intensity increases; the amendments authorize an improper increase in density within the Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA) without proper mitigation; the amendments failed to discourage urban sprawl; and they are internally inconsistent with existing provisions within the Plan. The ORC recommended that the County not adopt the amendments. Besides the Department, DEP and the Regional Planning Council also provided written comments on the amendments. By letter dated May 8, 2009, DEP generally noted that it had concerns regarding development adjacent to the Big Bend Seagrasses Aquatic Preserve (the Preserve) where the parcels are located, and that careful planning strategies should be used for any development on the land. See Department Exhibit 4. The Regional Planning Council issued a staff report on February 25, 2010, generally concluding that the amendments were consistent with the applicable Strategic Regional Policy Plan goals and objectives. See Department Exhibit 15; County Exhibit 1. The County did not respond in writing to the ORC. On December 15, 2009, it adopted the amendments without change. On March 10, 2010, the Department published its Notice of Intent to find the amendments not in compliance in the Taco Times. On March 16, 2010, the Department filed its Petition with DOAH raising the same grounds that are in its Notice of Intent. The Property The Hutchins parcel is located in the southwest part of the County, a few miles south of Keaton Beach, with around 500 to 600 feet fronting on the Gulf of Mexico. The 14 upland acres that are the subject of this case are a sub-site of a larger 25-acre parcel owned by Dr. Hutchins, with the remaining 11 acres being adjoining wetlands on the north and south sides. Dr. Hutchins has built a home on pilings on his property along with a smaller ancillary structure. Photographs indicate that except for trees, the remainder of the upland property is vacant. Bird Island also lies on the Gulf of Mexico just northwest of the Hutchins parcel and is surrounded by water on three sides. Photographs reflect one residence and a dock still on the property. The two parcels are separated by "marsh grass and a little water." Both parcels of property are easily accessible to, and just west of, County Road 361, a paved two- lane highway that begins south of the subject properties and runs adjacent to, or near, the coastline, eventually turning northeast and terminating on U.S. Highway 19 south of Perry. Both properties abut portions of the Gulf of Mexico that have been designated as an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW). The waters are a part of the Preserve, which was established in 1985 and is managed by DEP. The Preserve has exceptional biological, aesthetic, and scientific value. The two parcels are located in the Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA). That is to say, they are in "the area below the elevation of the category 1 storm surge line as established by a Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) computerized storm surge model." § 163.3178(2)(h), Fla. Stat. In order to increase density within the CHHA, the County must meet certain criteria set forth in Section 163.3178(9)(a), Florida Statutes. The Department's Objections As summarized in its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department contends that the two plan amendments are not in compliance because the sites are not environmentally suitable for the proposed density and intensity increases; there is an improper increase in density within the CHHA without proper mitigation; and the amendments fail to discourage urban sprawl. Although the Notice of Intent also raised the issue of whether the amendments are internally inconsistent with other provisions in the County's existing Plan, the Proposed Recommended Order does not address any specific internal inconsistencies, and the evidence focuses on the first three concerns. Therefore, the undersigned has assumed that those objections have been withdrawn or abandoned. Environmental Suitability With the exception of an area in the middle part of the County's coastline (where the Fenholloway River flows into the Gulf), the Preserve extends along the County's entire coastline, including the area in which the two parcels are located. The Preserve, designated as an OFW, contains various types of seagrasses, whose function is to provide habitat for a number of species, improve water quality, and reduce currents or wave energy in the event of a storm. It is undisputed that the seagrass beds near the amendment sites are high-quality, healthy, and of high environmental value. Coastal marshes are prevalent in the area of the County where the amendment sites are located. They serve many functions, including cleaning water flowing into The Preserve, functioning as a habitat for a number of species, and acting as a coastal barrier against storm surge during large storm events. Section 163.3177(6)(d), Florida Statutes, requires that local governments protect and conserve natural resources through the conservation element of the local plan. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.006(3)(b)4. A Department rule also requires local governments to limit the specific impacts and cumulative impacts of development or redevelopment upon water quality and living marine resources. See Rule 9J-5.012(3)(c)1. High-density development (up to 12 units per acre) on the parcels clearly has the potential to negatively impact coastal marshes and seagrasses adjacent to and near the subject sites. Although Dr. Hutchins indicated that he would develop his property only to the extent allowed by DEP so that the marshes and seagrasses would be safeguarded, the Department's practice for many years has been to assume that the property will be developed at its maximum allowable density and intensity. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Lee Cty, et al., Case No. 90- 7791 (DOAH Jan. 27, 1992; DCA June 28, 1993; Admin. Comm. Feb. 15, 1994)(compliance determination must be made based on maximum impacts authorized by the amendment terms, not speculation of a lesser impact). Mr. Wood's development intentions are not known. In any event, the two parcels potentially authorize 156 residential units and 113,430 square feet of non-residential uses adjacent to an OFW. Even so, the Mixed Use-Urban Development land use designation may still be permissible if specific conditions limiting the density/intensity on the parcels are incorporated into the Plan by asterisk or text language in conjunction with a new amendment. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, this planning practice has been used in other cases. Without any limitations, though, the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the maximum allowable density/intensity contravenes the cited statute and rules. CHHA Both parcels are located within the CHHA of the County. Section 163.3178(2)(h), Florida Statutes, requires that the County establish mitigation criteria for plan amendments located in the CHHA. Probably because of its small size in terms of population, and the lack of development (or ability to do so) along the coastline, the County has no goals, objectives, or policies addressing criteria for mitigation. Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)6. requires that a plan "direct population concentrations away from known or predicted coastal high-hazard areas." Also, Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)7. requires that a plan "maintain or reduce evacuation times." Prior to 2006, the Department would allow a local government to comply with the foregoing rules by allowing density increases in the CHHA if the local government decreased a similar type of density elsewhere. This practice was known as "offsets." In 2006, however, the Legislature amended the statute to include criteria for compliance with the two rules. Due to the change in the law, the Department no longer engages in the practice of offsets for land use changes in the CHHA. Instead, it requires a local government that proposes to increase density within the CHHA to meet the requirements of Section 163.3178(9)(a)1.-3., Florida Statutes. Under the statute, if the County can demonstrate a 16-hour out-of-county evacuation time for a category 5 storm event as measured on the Saffir-Simpson scale and a 12-hour evacuation time to shelter within the County for a category 5 storm event, an increase in density within the CHHA may be allowed. See § 163.3178(9)(a)1. and 2., Fla. Stat. Alternatively, the County may use one of the mitigation measures described in Section 163.3178(9)(a)3., Florida Statutes. Except for Coastal Element Objective IX-7 of the Plan, which provides that the County maintain a hurricane evacuation time of 9 hours for a category 1 storm, see County Exhibit 7, no data and analysis, such as a hurricane evacuation study for a category 5 storm event, was presented to demonstrate compliance with these requirements. Dr. Hutchins' submission during the mediation process of an evacuation plan for a category 3 storm does not satisfy this criterion. Typically, a local government will have an adopted plan for a category 5 storm, as well as an evacuation model. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the mitigation measures in Section 163.3178(9)(a), Florida Statutes, have not been satisfied. At hearing, the County and Dr. Hutchins contended that offsets should still be used in this case to satisfy the mitigation requirements. They point out that the County has recently purchased property (totaling 51.7 acres) that is designated Mixed Use-Urban Development and more than compensates for any potential increase of residents needing to evacuate if the two amendments are found to be in compliance. As noted above, however, the practice of offsets was discontinued in 2006 with the passage of the new law. Notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, there was no legal requirement that the Department notify every affected local government and property owner that it was discontinuing that practice to comply with the new law.2 Urban Sprawl Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g)1.-13. identifies thirteen "primary" indicators of urban sprawl. The Department contends that eight indicators are "tripped" or "triggered" by the new amendments and collectively they indicate that the proliferation of urban sprawl is not discouraged. No evidence was presented regarding five indicators. According to the rule, "[t]he presence and potential effects of multiple indicators shall be considered to determine whether they collectively reflect a failure to discourage urban sprawl." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J- 5.006(5)(d). Indicator 1 is tripped if the amendments allow uses in excess of demonstrated need. In this case no need analysis for additional land in the Mixed Use-Urban Development category was submitted by the County. The absence of a study is sufficient to trigger this indicator. Indicator 2 is tripped if the amendments allow "significant" amounts of urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas. The only true existing "urban" area in the County, as that term is commonly understood, is the City of Perry. Other residential and some commercial development (but to a much lesser degree) is found mainly in a few small communities on the coastline such as Steinhatchee, an unincorporated community perhaps 15 miles south of the subject parcels with probably around 1,500 residents, and Keaton Beach and Dekle Beach, both having no more than a few hundred residents each. (Official recognition has been taken of the population data.) Keaton Beach is around 2 or 3 miles north of the subject property and has condominiums and other limited residential/commercial development. In addition, Dark Island is located a short distance north of Bird Island and is classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development, which authorizes the higher density/intensity development. Given this lack of "urban areas" in the County, virtually any development outside of Perry could arguably be considered "urban development . . . in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while leaping over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.006(5)(g)2. Notwithstanding this unique (and perhaps unfair) situation, it is fair to characterize the potential addition of 12 units per acre as urban development and a total of around 150 residential units with associated commercial development as "substantial" when considering the County's size and existing development. Therefore, the second indicator has been triggered. Indicator 3 is triggered if the amendments allow urban development in "radial, strip, isolated or ribbon patterns generally emanating from existing urban development." Because urban development will occur in a rural, isolated area, this indicator is triggered. Indicator 4 is triggered if there is premature development of rural land that fails to adequately protect and conserve natural resources. The evidence supports a finding that this indicator is triggered. Indicators 6, 7, and 8 are related to the orderly and efficient provision of existing and future public services and facilities. The evidence shows that the area is not currently served by central sewer and is not near any fire or police stations. While no public facilities are planned for that area in the five year capital improvement schedule, at a meeting in March 2010 the Taylor County Coastal Water & Sewer District indicated that a request for partial federal funding to extend central sewer services to Fish Creek, which lies beyond and to the south of the subject parcels, would be placed on the April agenda. See County Exhibit 7. Whether a request was actually made at that meeting is not of record. In any event, Coastal Element Policy IX.6.5 provides that where central sewer is not available in an area classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development, septic tanks may be used within the CHHA. See Department Exhibit 1. As to fire and law enforcement support, there is insufficient evidence to establish that these services cannot be provided in an efficient manner. Given these circumstances, there is less than a preponderance of the evidence to support a finding that indicators 6 through 8 are triggered. Indicator 9 is triggered if the plan amendments fail to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that this indicator is triggered. Collectively, the presence of four indicators is sufficient to support a finding that the County has failed to discourage urban sprawl. E. Scrivener's Error The County and Intervenors rely heavily upon the fact that the plan amendments are in compliance because the amendments simply correct an error that occurred when, at the Department's direction in 1990, the original FLUM was reduced in size and digitized. While at first blush this argument is appealing, it assumes that the Department would have approved the new land use classifications in 1990 when it performed a compliance review of the original FLUM. But this never occurred, and the new amendments give the Department its first opportunity to determine if the new land uses are in compliance. It is undisputed that on an undisclosed date the Department approved an amendment based on the same type of error. While the record is somewhat confusing, it appears that in that case, the two properties were Industrial, they were not located in the CHHA, and on-going business concerns were operating on the properties. Intervenor Hutchins also cited several instances where mapping errors were allowed to be corrected by subsequent plan amendments. Where final agency action in those matters is of record, however, it shows that approval was given only after a compliance review was made by the Department.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that Plan Amendments CPA 08-1 and CPA 08-3 adopted by Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17 are not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2010.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Environmental Coalition of Broward County, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Coalition"), is a Florida corporation. The Coalition has offices located in Broward County. The Coalition has approximately 500 members, most of whom reside in Broward County. A substantial number of the Coalition's members own property in Broward County and/or operate businesses within Broward County. The Coalition is a not-for-profit corporation, chartered for educational and scientific purposes. The primary purpose of the Coalition is to present objections and recommendations to local governments concerning planning issues on behalf of its membership. The Coalition is authorized to participate in actions of this type and to represent its membership in administrative proceedings. The Coalition presented oral and written objections to Broward County during the review and adoption process concerning the plan amendment at issue in this proceeding. Respondent, the Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of implementing the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Among other things, the Department is required to review local government comprehensive plans and amendments thereto for compliance with the Act. Respondent, Broward County (hereinafter referred to as the "County"), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County is the local government with the authority pursuant to the Act and the Broward County Charter to adopt and amend a comprehensive plan. The County has adopted the 1989 Broward County Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"). The Broward County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the "County Commission"), is the local planning agency for the County. The County Commission is advised on land use planning issues by the Broward County Planning Council (hereinafter referred to as the "Planning Council"). The Planning Council was created by the County Charter. Intervenors, Miramar Lakes, Inc., d/b/a Miramar Rock, Robert A. Whitcombe, Trustee, and the South Broward Trust own or have under contract virtually all of the property affected by the Plan amendment which is the subject of this proceeding. These Intervenors have entered into a joint venture agreement with Intervenor Atlantic Gulf Communities Corporation to develop the subject property. Intervenors applied for the amendment that is the subject of this proceeding and presented oral or written comments, recommendations and objections during the period of time between the transmittal hearing and adoption of the subject Plan amendment. The County's Plan. The County adopted a comprehensive plan as required by the Act in 1989. The planning horizon of the plan is 2010. The Plan includes two volumes of text, two volumes of support documents and associated maps. See Petitioner's exhibit 8. Volume One is text and is effective countywide. Volume Three contains support documents for the Plan. The Plan also includes the 1989 Broward County Future Land Use Plan Map (Series) (hereinafter referred to as the "FLUM"). The FLUM depicts the proposed distribution, extent and location of categories of land uses allowed under the Plan. Among others, those land uses include "residential" at various densities and "agricultural". Pursuant to the Plan, the eastern approximately one-third of the County may be developed. The developable area consists of approximately 400 square miles of land area. The western approximately two-thirds of the County are designated as water conservation areas and are separated by a levee from the developable one- third. Future land use elements of municipal comprehensive plans in the County must be in substantial conformity to the Plan. The Subject Property. The property which is the subject of the Plan amendment at issue in this case consists of 1,280 acres of a total of 1,965 acres (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"). The Property is located in the City of Miramar, in southwest Broward County, Florida, Sections 25, 26, 27 and 36, Township 51 South, Range 39 East. The Property is located in the southwestern portion of the developable one-third of the County. See Map 1 of Broward County exhibit 1. The Property is bounded on the east by S.W. 184th Avenue and on the north by Honey Hill Road. It is east of U.S. Highway 27. Part of the Property is vacant. Part of the Property is being used as cattle pasture and for a rock mining, batching, mixing and crushing operation. Existing land uses in the vicinity of the Property include vacant land, rock mining and some development to the north, single-family residential development to the east, rock mining and vacant land to the south, in Dade County, Florida. Residential development immediately to the east in a development known as "Silverlakes" is being developed at a density of three dwelling units per acre. Further to the west of the Property is the eastern boundary of the water conservation areas of the Everglades. These areas are separated from the rest of Broward County by a levee. The land use designation of the Property and other property in the surrounding area is "agricultural". Under the Plan, the land use designation allows agricultural uses and residential development of one dwelling per 2.5 acres. Under its current land use designation, a total of 786 dwelling units may be developed on the Property. The First Amendment Requested by the Intervenors. In early 1994 Intervenors filed an application with the County seeking an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Low (2) Residential". "Low (2) Residential" allows the development of two dwelling units per acre. The Planning Council conducted a review of the proposed amendment. The Broward County Department of Natural Resource Protection raised objections to the proposed amendment because the Property is located in an area of water recharge and wetlands. The area is identified as within a general wetlands area on the "Southwestern Generalized Wetlands Map" of the Plan. 30 Based upon the objections of the County Department of Natural Resource Protection, the staff of the Planning Council recommended denial of the proposed amendment. The South Florida Water Management District (hereinafter referred to as the "SFWMD"), an agency with broad regional responsibility for water management in southeast Florida, raised objections with the Planning Council concerning the location of the property in an area which was being considered for use as part of a project to restore the Everglades. The SFWMD was concerned that the Property is located within an area which has come to be known as the "East Coast Buffer". In early 1994, at the time of the initial review of the proposed amendment, the East Coast Buffer was a study area abutting the eastern water conservation areas of southeast Florida. The SFWMD was studying the East Coast Buffer for use in water conservation efforts in southeast Florida. At the time of the first review of the proposed amendment, the portion of the East Coast Buffer in which the Property is located was being considered for preservation as a reservoir site. The Planning Council transmitted the proposed amendment to the County Commission without recommendation. The County Commission decided not to transmit the proposed amendment to the Department for its review, ending review of the initial application. The Initial Review of the Subject Amendment. A second application on the Property was resubmitted by the Intervenors in March of 1994. The application was designated Application PC 94- 15. Application PC 94-15 sought an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". "Irregular 1.5 Residential" allows 1.5 dwelling units per acre. The amendment sought by Intervenors would have allowed an increase from 786 dwelling units to 2,947 dwelling units on the Property. An increase of 2,161 units. Application PC 94-15 was again reviewed. The same comments about, and objections to, the proposed amendment were raised concerning groundwater and aquifer recharge. The staff of the Planning Council again recommended denial of the proposed amendment. 41 The Planning Council recommended transmittal of the application, subject to the Intervenors satisfying the concerns raised by the SFWMD. On August 17, 1994, the County Commission transmitted Application PC 94-15 to the Department, conditioned upon the Intervenors satisfying the concerns of the SFWMD. The SFWMD objected to Application PC 94-15 because of its conclusion that the proposed future land use designation was not compatible with the East Coast Buffer then under evaluation by the SFWMD. SFWMD had developed data and conducted computer modeling concerning the utilization of a buffer for a variety of purposes, including reducing seepage of water from the Everglades, increasing groundwater recharge into aquifers and creating a natural buffer to protect the Everglades from the impacts of development. The SFWMD had commissioned a worldwide engineering firm, CH2M Hill to prepare a report on the East Coast Buffer. The SFWMD recommended that Application PC 94-15 not be approved until it had completed its study of the East Coast Buffer because the land use designation being sought might be incompatible with the conclusions reached from the SFWMD's and CH2M Hill's evaluation. The Department reviewed Application PC 94-15 and, based upon comments from the SFWMD similar to those raised before the County Commission, issued an Objections, Recommendations and Comments report concerning Application PC 94-15. The Department raised objections consistent with the adverse comments from the SFWMD. Modification of the Proposed Amendment. Parts of southwestern Broward County and northwestern Dade County were designated "Management Unit 5" by the SFWMD. Management Unit 5 was being considered, as recommended by CH2M Hill, as a reservoir area. Development of the Property was, therefore, not considered to be a use comparable with the concept of the East Coast Buffer being considered by the SFWMD at the time of the County's and Department's decision to reject Application PC 94-15. Intervenors worked with the SFWMD in an effort to find a way of modifying Application PC 94-15 to satisfy the SFWMD's concerns. SFWMD utilized computer modeling to simulate groundwater and surface water flows in Management Unit 5 to determine the impact of allowing development of the Property. The SFWMD concluded that Management Unit 5 was more suitable as a recharge area rather than as a reservoir. This conclusion was based, in part, of the transmissibility of the soil and other site conditions which were not conducive to storing water above ground for long periods of time. Use of Management Unit 5 as a recharge area and not a reservoir requires less surface area. Therefore, it was concluded that development in the area might be compatible with the SFWMD's East Coast Buffer concept. The SFWMD modeled four development alternatives for Management Unit 5 and analyzed the impact of each alternative on the efforts to retard seepage, provide groundwater recharge and enhance wetland benefits: (a) retaining the Property as a recharge area and allowing no development; (b) retaining the entire western two-thirds as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern one-third; (c) retaining the western one-third as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern two-thirds; and (d) allowing development of the entire management unit. Alternatives (b) and (c) assumed that a berm would be constructed between the recharge area and the developed area. After meeting with Intervenors and discussing the results of the modeling, Intervenors indicated willingness to remove the western portion of the Property from the proposed development. The SFWMD then conducted a more detailed, computer analysis of the following alternatives: (a) continuing existing conditions; (b) constructing a berm around Management Unit 5 and utilizing the entire area as a recharge area; (c) constructing a berm between the eastern and western sections of the Management Unit 5 and utilizing the western section for recharge with no development in the eastern section; and (d) alternative "(c)" with development of the eastern section. As a result of computer modeling of the alternatives, it was concluded that alternatives (b), (c) and (d) could significantly reduce seepage from the Everglades and increase groundwater recharge in to the aquifers when compared to development under the agricultural land use designation of alternative (a). As a result of the more detailed analysis, the SFWMD concluded that essentially all of its goals could be achieved for Management Unit 5 if the western section of Management Unit 5 is preserved even if development is allowed in the eastern section. The SFWMD concluded that the eastern two-thirds of the Property, consisting of approximately 1,280 acres, could be developed as "Irregular 1.5 Residential" if the western one-third, consisting of approximately 685 acres, was utilized as a recharge area. Intervenors agreed to preserve the western third of the Property (685 acres) and grant the SFWMD a flowage easement, consistent with the East Coast Buffer and at a savings of $43 million. On December 14, 1994, the staff of the SFWMD presented the results of the computer modeling to the SFWMD. On December 15, 1994, the SFWMD withdrew its objection to Application PC 94-15, conditioned upon the deletion of the 685 acres from the application and the granting of a flowage easement. The County and the Department were informed of the decision of the SFWMD. Approval of Application 94-15. On December 20, 1994, the County Commission adopted by Ordinance 94-55 an amendment to the Plan, Amendment PC 94-15 (hereinafter referred to as the "Amendment"), subject to the conditions suggested by the SFWMD, which resolved the SFWMD's objections. The Amendment included modifications to the FLUM and text amendments. The Amendment, in relevant part, modifies the future land use designation of approximately 1,280 acres of the Property from "Agricultural" to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". This will allow the construction of a total of 1,920 dwelling units on the Property, or an increase of 1,408 dwelling units over the number of dwelling that may be constructed under the current future land use designation for the Property. In light of Intervenor's modifications of the application, the removal of the SFWMD's objections and the approval of the application by the County, the Department found the Amendment to be in compliance with the Act. On February 14, 1995, the Department issued a notice of intent to find the Amendment in compliance. The County and the Department accepted and relied upon the data and methodology employed by the SFWMD and the conditions for removal of the SFWMD's objections. Petitioner's Challenge. On or about March 8, 1995, Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Department challenging the Amendment. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on April 25, 1995. At the commencement of the final hearing, Petitioner withdrew all issues it had raised in the Amended Petition except the issues of: (a) whether the data and analysis available supports a conclusion that there is a need for additional residential development; and (b) whether the Amendment is supported by data and analysis in light of an ongoing study of the East Coast Buffer. Residential Housing Need. The Plan includes the following Goal and Objective concerning the provision of adequate areas for residential use: Goal 01.00.00 Provide residential areas with a variety of housing types and densities offering convenient and affordable housing opportunities to all segments of Broward County's population while maintaining a desired quality of life and adequate public services and facilities. Objective 01.01.00 Accommodate the projected population of Broward County by providing adequate areas on the Future Broward County Land Use Plan Map (Series) intended primarily for residential development, but which also permit those non-residential uses that are compatible with and necessary to support residential neighborhoods. The Plan, including the methodology utilized to determine residential need, was found to be in compliance by the Department. The residential need methodology of the Plan utilized the Broward County Population Forecasting Model to project the population of southwest Broward County in 1994 to be 225,489 people. This projected population formed the basis for the allocation of residential housing units for Subregion 5 under the Plan. The Property is located in an area of southwest Broward County designated as Subregion 5 in the Plan. In reviewing the Amendment, the County conducted an analysis of the need for additional residential development in southwest Broward County. This analysis utilized, and was consistent with, the residential need methodology of the Plan. A summary of the data and analysis utilized by the County was provided to the Department. The County's analysis indicated that the population of Subregion 5 has exceeded the population projections for the Subregion of the Plan. By 1994, there were 284,361 people living in Subregion 5 or 17,872 more than projected in the Plan. The increased population rate of growth in Subregion 5 was projected to represent an increase in projected demand for approximately 6,847 residential units in excess of the projected demand expected under the Plan. The analysis also took into account amendments to the Plan which have resulted in a reduction of 1,087 residential units for Subregion 5. When combined with the increased population, the data and analysis supports a conclusion that there is a need for 7,934 additional residential units in Subregion 5. The Amendment increases residential housing in Subregion 5 by 1,134 dwelling units (1,920 units allowed under the Amendment, less 786 dwelling units allowed under the current agriculture classification), well below the projected need for additional residential units for Subregion 5. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and submitted to the Department supports the conclusion of the County that there is need for the proposed additional residential development approved by the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was professionally acceptable and adequate to support the Amendment. The evidence presented by Petitioner failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was not professionally acceptable and adequate. Rather than attempting to prove that the County's methodology was not professionally acceptable or was flawed, Petitioner utilized a methodology based upon an annualized population growth rate for Subregion 5. Petitioner offered evidence that there is sufficient residential housing approved under the Plan to meet the projected population for 15.6 years, beyond the remaining life of the Plan. The methodology utilized by Petitioner was, by the admission of the Petitioner's own witness, not a professionally acceptable methodology. The evidence failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County does not support its conclusion that there is sufficient need for the additional residential housing authorized for the County by the Amendment. The East Coast Buffer Zone. Efforts to restore the Everglades have been initiated and are ongoing. As a part of these efforts a group of technical and scientific staff members of various federal agencies involved in the restoration efforts were formed as the "Science Sub Group." The Science Sub Group was formed as an advisory group to provide guidance towards ecosystem restoration efforts. The Science Sub Group had no implementing authority. It issued at least one report in late 1993 which included an East Coast Buffer concept. The East Coast Buffer identified by the Science Sub Group included the area in which the Property is located. The Science Sub Group relied upon data obtained from the SFWMD and various computer models developed by the SFWMD, and SFWMD personnel contributed to the preparation of the report. The East Coast Buffer concept generally includes a series of interconnected water flow-ways along the eastern edge of the water conservation areas necessary to restore the Everglades. The federal government has also instituted a study known as the "Central & South Florida Project: Comprehensive Review Study" (hereinafter referred to as the "Restudy"). The United States Corps of Engineers is the lead agency of the Restudy. The first phase of the Restudy's efforts has resulted in a "Reconnaissance Report", also known as the "Recon Study". The second phase of the Restudy's efforts will be the feasibility phase. The feasibility phase will begin in the summer of 1995 and will be completed several years later. The purpose of the Restudy is to bring together the interested federal agencies to review the current management of the Everglades and identify strategies for altering management practices and systems to improve the Everglades. The Recon Study was completed in late 1994. It describes various conceptual strategies for restoring the Everglades. The determination of the feasibility of the strategies has not, however, been started, much less completed. Therefore, although the East Coast Buffer concept is considered in the Recon Study, the actual identification of the area which will constitute the Buffer has not been identified. Nor has the area which should constitute the East Coast Buffer been recommended in the Recon Study. The Recon Study identifies problems and opportunities, formulates alternative plans, evaluates conceptual alternative plans and recommends further study. The Recon Study is advisory. It does not identify, recommend or implement a plan of action. The Coalition presented evidence concerning the ongoing analysis of Everglades restoration efforts. That evidence proved that the Property is located within a very large area, which completely surrounds the Everglades, which is being considered as part of the Everglades restoration effort because of the impact of this large area on restoration efforts. The evidence presented by the Coalition, however, failed to prove that the Property has been, or will be, determined to be essential or even necessary for future Everglades restoration efforts. At the time of the approval of the Amendment and, even at the time of the final hearing of this case, no such determination had been made. Nor had any determination been made as to what will be necessary for the restoration of the Everglades or whether decisions will be made to carry out the necessary restoration efforts. As recognized by the Coalition in its proposed order: 52. The study necessary to make [a determination of the water levels needed] for the areas which are implicated by this amendment will be done in the next two years or three years. * * * 55. There is no way of telling, based on the data and analysis available at this point, how much water will be necessary in order to fully restore the Everglades. . . . Coalition proposed findings of fact 52 and 55. The Coalition also recognized the following: The Reconnaissance study has not reached the point where conclusions can be drawn about parcel specific uses. The next step is the feasibility planning phase, which is a much more detailed phase which will run for several years. . . . Coalition proposed finding of fact 107. Instead of attempting to prove that the data and analysis at the time of adoption of the Amendment indicated that development of the Property authorized by the Amendment would be detrimental to restoration efforts, the Coalition attempted to prove that development of the Property should be delayed until data and analysis is available indicating conclusively what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts. The Act does not require such delay. In addition to failing to prove what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts, the evidence presented by the Coalition also failed to prove that the conclusions reached by the Science Sub Group and the Restudy will even be implemented. The evidence presented by the Coalition failed to prove that the conclusions of the SFWMD with regard to the impact of the Amendment are not supported by data and analysis or were not arrived at by professionally acceptable methods. While the evidence proved that there will be some reduction in the amount of groundwater recharge function and seepage control function as a result of the Amendment, the evidence failed to prove what ultimate impact the reductions in recharge and seepage control will be or that the SFWMD's conclusions are not reasonable. While the Coalition proved that the SFWMD's conclusions were not based upon a consideration of what should be done to restore the Everglades, the evidence failed to prove that the information available was sufficiently conclusive that the SFWMD should have objected to the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County in approving the Amendment was collected and applied in a professionally acceptable manner. None of those agencies charged with responsibility to review the Amendment raised objections to its approval. The evidence failed to prove that the state of the data and analysis available to the County from the Science Sub Group and the Restudy or any other source concerning the area referred to as the East Coast Buffer and the Property is such that it proved that the data that was relied by the County upon was inadequate.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department dismissing finding the Amendment "in compliance" and dismissing the petition in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Coalition's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1-2. Accepted in 2. 3-4 Accepted in 3. Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5 Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5. Accepted in 4-6. Accepted in 5-6. Accepted in 6. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12 14-15 Not relevant. 16-18 Not relevant. See 81-84. 19-25 Not relevant and not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 81-84. Accepted in 29. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 26 and hereby accepted. 30-31 See 24. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 36 and 62. Accepted in 62. 35-41 Hereby accepted. 42-48 These proposed findings are generally correct. They are not, however, relevant to the ultimate determination in this case. 49-50 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is hereby accepted. The last sentence is not relevant. See 96. Not supported by the weight of the evidence and not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted in 96. The last sentence is not relevant. Hereby accepted. 57-63 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 64-65 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 89 and 91 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90 and 92. See 86 and 92. Hereby accepted. Although generally true, the evidence failed to prove that this finding specifically applies to the Property. Except for the first sentence, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31-33. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 76-87 Although generally correct, these findings were too broad and the evidence failed to prove that they specifically apply to the Property. 88-90 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 94-97 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 98 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 99-100 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 104-105 Not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 97. Accepted in 90. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 111-114 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The County's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 Accepted in 1. 2 Accepted in 7. 3 Accepted in 8. 4 Accepted in 11. 5 Hereby accepted. 6 Accepted in 12. 7 Accepted in 13. 8 Accepted in 14. 9 Accepted in 15. 10 Accepted in 9-10. 11 Accepted in 18. 12 Accepted in 16. 13 Accepted in 17. 14 Accepted in 61. 15 Accepted in 60. 16 Accepted in 19-20, 26 and 62. 17 Accepted in 23. 18 Accepted in 21-22 19-20 Accepted in 24. 21 Hereby accepted. 22 Accepted in 37. 23-24 Hereby accepted. 25 Accepted in 68. 26 Accepted in 65-67. 27-28 Accepted in 67. 29-30 Hereby accepted. 31-32 Accepted in 28. 33 Accepted in 29. 34 Accepted in 30. 35 Accepted in 34. 36 Accepted in 31 and hereby accepted. 37 Accepted in 32-33. 38 Accepted in 31. 39 Accepted in 33. 40 Accepted in 35. 41 Accepted in 316. 42 Accepted in 37. 43 Accepted in 39. 44 Accepted in 40. 45 Accepted in 41. 46 Accepted in 42. 47 Accepted in 72. 48-49 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 73-77 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 76-77. Accepted in 38. Accepted in 79-80 Accepted 58 and 62. 55-57 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 82. Hereby accepted. 60-61 Accepted in 81-84. 62 Hereby accepted. 63-65 Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 43 and 45. Accepted in 88. Accepted in 89-90. 69-70 Accepted in 85-86. 71 Accepted in 90 and 92-93. 72-77 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 32 and 44. Hereby accepted. None proposed. Accepted in 33. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 49 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. 87-88 Accepted in 52. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 53 and 58 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 54. Accepted in 56. Accepted in 58. 95-96 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 60. Accepted in 61. The Department's and Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 7. Accepted in 8. Accepted in 11. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12. Accepted in 13. Accepted in 14. Accepted in 15. Accepted in 9-10. Accepted in 18. Accepted in 16. Accepted in 17. Accepted in 61. Accepted in 11 and 19-20. Accepted in 20. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 24-25. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 27. Accepted in 36-38. 22-37 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 43. Accepted in 88. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31. 42-43 Accepted in 44. Accepted in 43 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 42. Accepted in 42 and 46. Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 46. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 46. 52-53 Accepted in 48. Accepted 49. Accepted in 49, 52 and 54. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 54 and 57. 59-60 Accepted 54. 61-63 Accepted in 54 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 55. Accepted in 56-57. 66-67 Accepted in 58. 68-70 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 64. Accepted in 58 and 62. Accepted in 60 and 62. Accepted in 63. Accepted in 67. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 67 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 37 and hereby accepted. Not relevant. Accepted in 86. Hereby accepted. 82-83 Accepted in 86. Accepted in 87. Accepted in 89 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90. Accepted in 90 and 92-93. Accepted in 93. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 72-78. Accepted in 69-71. Accepted in 70. Accepted in 73-74 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 75. Accepted in 76. Accepted in 77. Accepted in 78. Accepted in 79-80. 101-102 Accepted in 82. Accepted in 83. Accepted in 83-84. Accepted in 81 and 84. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dan Stengle, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Brion Blackwelder, Esquire Jack Milbery, Esquire 8751 West Broward Boulevard, #206 Plantation, Florida 33324 Sherry A. Spiers Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Tracy Lautenschlager, Esquire Broward County Attorney's Office 115 South Andrews Avenue Suite 423 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Glenn Smith, Esquire Michael A. Cohn, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. 200 East Broward Boulevard Post Office Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Honorable Gerald F. Thompson Chairman, Broward County Board of County Commissioners Governmental Center 115 South Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue The issue in Case 08-1144GM is whether Martin County Comprehensive Growth Management Plan (CGMP or Plan) Amendment 7-20, called the "Land Protection Incentives" (LPI) Amendment (LPIA), which was adopted by Ordinance 777 on December 11, 2007, and amended by Ordinance 795 on April 29, 2008, is "in compliance," as defined by Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.1 The issue in Case 08-1465GM is whether Martin County's Comprehensive Plan Amendment 7-22, called the "Secondary Urban Service District" (SUSD) Amendment (SUSDA), which was adopted by Ordinance 781 on December 11, 2007, is "in compliance," as defined by Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners' Standing FOF and MCCA objected to the LPIA and the SUSDA during the time period from transmittal to adoption of those amendments.3 FOF FOF is a non-profit organization incorporated in 1986, shortly after Florida’s Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation (Growth Management) Act was enacted to monitor the Act's implementation. FOF engages in legislative, legal, and grassroots advocacy for sustainable comprehensive land use planning in Florida. It conducts membership meetings, sends newsletters to members and others, hosts meetings open to the general public, and initiates or participates in litigation or administrative proceedings concerning amendments to local comprehensive plans. Its main office is in Tallahassee, where several employees work. It also has a branch office in Lake Worth, Palm Beach County, where one employee works. It has no office or employees in Martin County. There was no evidence that FOF has applied for or obtained any license or permit to operate a business in Martin County; nor was there any evidence as to the requirements for obtaining such a license or permit. FOF has approximately 3,500 members; approximately 550 members live or own property in Martin County. FOF does not have a continuous presence in Martin County, other than its members who live and own property there, but it continuously monitors comprehensive planning and related growth management issues in Martin County and from time to time engages in activities in Martin County. Since 1990, FOF was involved in the Loxahatchee Greenways project, a major river corridor running through Martin County; was involved in the protection of Jonathan Dickinson State Park, which is in Martin County; undertook its Palm Beach and Martin County Green Initiative (which addressed housing, legal, transportation, and other planning issues in Martin County and resulted in the distribution of educational materials on Martin County planning issues); opposed specific local development proposals; supported a sales tax referendum to buy and preserve environmentally- sensitive lands; collaborated with the County planning department to update the housing element of the County Comprehensive Plan; assisted with a local affordable housing initiative; published a booklet on comprehensive planning in the County; and conducted a public survey of County residents assessing attitudes about planning. FOF staff members speak at and participate in annual growth management forums in Martin County, which are attended by a substantial number of its members. FOF has regularly commented in person and in writing to the Martin County Commission on proposed CGMP changes. FOF also has previously participated as a party in administrative hearings conducted in the County concerning the CGMP, during which its president has testified as an expert planner. The relief requested by FOF in this case is germane to its goals and appropriate to request on behalf of its members. MCCA MCCA is a Florida not-for-profit corporation created in 1997. It is a membership-based organization of 120 individuals and 14 other organizations. MCCA itself does not own real property in Martin County. However, at least 38 individual members reside and own real property in the County, and at least one organizational member (Audubon of Martin County) owns real property in the County. MCCA does not maintain an office or have paid employees. It operates through its members, who volunteer. MCCA's Articles of Incorporation state that it was formed "to conserve the natural resources of Martin County, to protect the native flora and fauna of Martin County, [and] to maintain and improve the quality of life for all of the residents of Martin County." It engages in various forms of lobbying and advocacy for or against amendments to Martin County's Comprehensive Plan, including initiation or participation in litigation and administrative proceedings. It conducts membership meetings in the County, sends newsletters to members and others, hosts meetings in the County that are open to the general public (including an annual growth management meeting with FOF and an annual awards luncheon with local conservation groups), and works with member organizations on issues relating to the Indian River Lagoon (IRL), including petition drives. The relief requested by MCCA in this case is germane to its goals and appropriate to request on behalf of its members. Martin County Comprehensive Growth Management Plan The CGMP establishes two "urban service districts" in the County, a Primary Urban Service District (PUSD) and a Secondary Urban Service District (SUSD). See CGMP, § 4.4.G. The PUSD has been part of the Plan since it was first adopted in 1982, while the SUSD was added during the major revision of the Plan in 1990. Approximately 65,702 acres (101 square miles) are located within the PUSD. The PUSD encompasses most of the eastern coastal area of the County surrounding four incorporated municipalities, (Stuart, Sewall's Point, Jupiter Island, and Ocean Breeze Park), plus an isolated inland area known as Indiantown. Approximately 9,621 acres (14 square miles) are located within the SUSD. All land within the SUSD is immediately adjacent to land within the PUSD, but is split into several discontinuous sections so that some of the land along the western border of the PUSD abuts land outside the urban service districts. The County's purpose for having urban service districts is to "regulate urban sprawl tendencies by directing growth in a timely and efficient manner to those areas where urban public facilities and services are available, or are programmed to be available at the levels of service adopted in [the Plan]." CGMP, § 4.4.G. The Plan further provides: Objective: Martin County shall concentrate higher densities and intensities of development within the strategically located [PUSDs], as delineated, including commercial or industrial uses as well as residential development exceeding a density of two units per acre . . . . * * * b. Policy: Martin County shall require that new residential development containing one-half acre or smaller lots, commercial uses, and industrial uses shall be located within the [PUSD]. * * * Objective 2. Martin County shall concentrate rural and estate densities not exceeding one unit per gross acre within the [SUSDs] where a reduced level of public facility needs are programmed to be available at the base level of service adopted in the Capital Improvements Element. a. Policy: Martin County shall designate land uses within the [SUSD] in order to provide for the use and extension of urban services in an efficient and economical manner, and consistent with the reduced intensity of urban services normally associated with densities of one unit per gross acre (Estate Density RE-1A) and one unit per two gross acres (Rural Density). . . . * * * f. Policy: In areas designated as [SUSD], where development is proposed that would contain one- half acre lots, or commercial and industrial uses, a change to a [PUSD] designation must be approved by the Board of County Commissioners as part of a land use amendment . . . . The Plan thus generally establishes residential density for land within the PUSD at 2 or more dwelling units per acre, and for land within the SUSD at 1 dwelling unit per acre to 1 dwelling unit per 2 acres. The remaining land within the County that is not within the PUSD or SUSD is generally referred to as "outside" the urban service districts. There are approximately 269,034 acres of such land. The vast majority of such land (approximately 210,379 acres) is designated in the Plan for "agricultural" use. Most of the other land outside the urban service districts is designated for either "public conservation" or "public utilities" See CGMP, § 4.4.L., § 4.4.M.1.a., i., and j. The Plan currently allows residential use of land outside the urban service boundaries that is designated for agricultural use but limits it to either 1 dwelling unit per 5 acres, known as "agricultural ranchette," or 1 dwelling unit per 20 acres. See CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.a.& c. The Plan further specifies for the latter that: Residential development in the agricultural area is restricted to one-single family residence per gross 20-acre tract. [N]o development shall be permitted which divides landholdings into lots, parcels or other units of less than 20 gross acres. Acreage may be split for bona fide agricultural uses into parcels no smaller than 20 gross acres. . . . Residential subdivisions at a density or intensity or greater than one single- family dwelling unit per 20 gross acre lot shall not be allowed. (CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.a.) Throughout the Plan, residential development on lots of 2 acres or more is consistently referred to as "rural" development (even within the SUSD), while residential development on smaller lots is consistently referred to as "urban" and must be in either the PUSD or SUSD. It was undisputed that the County's adoption of such a distinction between urban and rural residential lots was a professionally acceptable planning practice. Preservation of the County's agricultural lands is a goal of the Plan. See CGMP, § 4.4.L.1. It is also later stated in a policy related to the allocation of land: Through its planning, capital improvements, cooperative extension, regulatory and intergovernmental coordination activities, Martin County shall continue to protect agriculture as a viable economic use of land. (CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.b.) Preservation of conservation and open space areas within the County is the subject of an entire element of the Plan. See CGMP, Chap. 9.4 The County's goal is "to effectively manage, conserve, and preserve the natural resources of Martin County, giving consideration to an equitable balance of public and private property rights. These resources include air, water, soils, habitat, fisheries, and wildlife, with special emphasis on restoring the St. Lucie Estuary and the Indian River Lagoon." CGMP, § 9.4.A. Preservation of conservation and open space areas is also addressed in numerous other objectives and policies throughout the several elements of the Plan and is a predominant theme of the entire Plan. The provision of "urban public facilities and services" is expressly limited by a policy to the County's urban service districts "in order to preserve agricultural lands and provide maximum protection to the farmer from encroachment by urban uses." CGMP, § 4.4.L.1.a. The Plan defines the term "public urban facilities and services" as "regional water supply and wastewater treatment/disposal systems, solid waste collection services, acceptable response times for sheriff and emergency services, reasonably accessible community park and related recreational facilities, schools and the transportation network." CGMP, § 4.1.B.4. However, the term is often used in the Plan in a rearranged or abbreviated manner, such as "urban public facilities and services" (§ 4.4.G.1.f.(7)), "public facilities and services" (§ 4.4.G and § 4.4.G.1.f.), "public services and facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.i.), "public urban facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.c.), "public urban facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.i.), or merely "public facilities (§ 4.4.G.1.) or "urban services " (§ 4.4.G.2.a.). LPIA Provisions The LPIA adds a new objective and new policies under the Future Land Use Element goal addressing "natural resource protection," which provides: Martin County shall protect all the natural resource systems of the County from the adverse impacts of development, provide for continued growth in population and economy and recognize the inter-relationship between the maintenance of urban support infrastructure in waste management, air and water quality, and the coastal zone environmental quality. (CGMP, § 4.4.E.) To the existing 6 objectives under that goal, the LPIA adds a seventh which states: Martin County shall create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses while maintaining residential capacity as it existed on January 1, 2007. For the purposes of Section 4.4.E.7., and supporting paragraphs, the definition of open space, found in Section 9.4.A.11., CGMP, shall not include roads, highways and their median strips and berms. This objective is intended to encourage the conveyance of fee simple title of land listed for public acquisition by state, regional or local environmental or governmental agencies or land trusts. Lands listed for acquisition include, but are not be limited to [sic], land designated for public acquisition under the Save Our Rivers program, the Indian River Lagoon, North Palm Beach, and the Lake Okeechobee portions of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), as well as Northern Everglades and Estuaries Protection Program. The overall purpose of the LPIA is to encourage the owners of tracts of land outside the urban service districts that are at least 500 acres to choose a different pattern of development than the Plan now allows, by allowing a substantial reduction in the minimum lot size so that the development may be "clustered" on a smaller "footprint" within the overall tract of land, but only if at least 50% of the entire tract is "set aside" permanently for conservation, open space, or agricultural use and stripped of its potential for future development. This approach, it is hoped, will make it easier and cheaper for the County and other governmental entities to acquire the large tracts of land they desire to use for the CERP and other conservation projects. The LPIA does not allow for more development than is allowed under the Plan currently. It allows the same amount of development to be arranged on a tract of land in a different pattern than is currently allowed. It accomplishes this primarily through the combination of a change in the minimum lot size from "20 acres" to "over 2 acres" with a new allowance for "clustering" the smaller lots on a portion of an overall tract of land rather than having an equal number of larger lots spread throughout the entire tract of land. The LPIA adopts six policies to accomplish the new objective: Policy (7)a. provides for the protection of the land "set aside" to be conveyed or subject to an easement in favor of a combination of the County, the South Florida Water Management District, and a third entity, chosen from among the other governmental or not-for-profit conservation- oriented organizational entities listed in the policy. Policy (7)b. requires that a combination of a comprehensive plan amendment and a PUD agreement be used for the change in the development characteristics of the land. The PUD agreement would address the portion of the tract subject to development and not "set aside," while the plan amendment would address (at a minimum) the remaining portion of the tract which is permanently "set aside" for conservation, open space, or agricultural use and would no longer have any potential for residential development. Policy (7)c. provides additional specificity concerning the subject matters that would be addressed by the comprehensive plan amendment, such as any required change in land use designation for the set-aside portion of the tract of land, and if it remains designated for agricultural use, the removal of any potential for development. Policy (7)d. primarily provides additional specificity concerning the subject matters that would be addressed by the PUD agreement, setting minimum requirements to be met such as the tract having to be a minimum of 500 acres in size; the development being "fiscally neutral to existing taxpayers"; the lots having to be more than 2 acres in size; the inability to develop in environmentally sensitive areas on the tract; and the acknowledgment of a permanent restriction against any future increase of density on the tract. The policy also essentially repeats some of the requirements enunciated in the second and third policies regarding the conveyance of title or easement and the required comprehensive plan amendment, and addresses who pays the closing costs for the set-aside portion of the tract. Policy (7)e. establishes additional requirements specifically applicable to land that has been "listed for acquisition by state, regional, or local agencies as part of an established conservation program." Policy (7)f. enumerates the "site specific benefits" that the second policy states the County must consider when deciding whether to approve an application for development under the optional pattern allowed by the LPIA, such as whether more than the minimum 50% of the tract will be "set aside" permanently, whether the location fills "gaps in natural systems, wildlife corridors, greenways and trails," or whether buffers are provided along roads "to limit access and to protect vistas." The LPIA requirement for at least 50% of an entire tract being set aside for one of the three public purposes, when coupled with other requirements of the Plan such as establishment of construction setback distances, preservation of wetlands and creation of buffers around wetlands, preservation of certain uplands, would result in more than 50% of an undeveloped tract of land remaining in an undeveloped state and at least 50% of agricultural land remaining in agricultural use. Meaning and Predictability of LPIA Standards Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to establish meaningful and predictable standards in numerous respects. No Guide to Location and Pattern of Development Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to establish meaningful and predictable standards essentially because it does not identify the lands to be preserved and developed, leaving the results up to the choice of landowners to make proposals and Martin County's case-by-case decisions on future development proposals. See PPRO, ¶¶52-53. However, the goals of the LPIA are quite clear, and there is no basis to speculate that Martin County will make decisions contrary to those goals--for example, by approving PUDs or agricultural uses on the most environmentally-sensitive part of tract, ignoring the importance of environmentally-sensitive and agricultural lands and the impact of development patterns on them, and ignoring the impact of the pattern of development under the LPIA on rural character. Petitioners also criticize the LPIA for not being clear "whether a subject property must be in single ownership." (PPRO, ¶61.) However, it is not clear why that omission would be pertinent. Undefined Increase in Maximum Density Petitioners contend that, in four ways, the LPIA increases maximum density in the Agricultural category without defining the amount of the increase. Waiver of Density Limits Clearly, the LPIA exempts the PUD option from "the agricultural land use policies in Section 4.4.M.1.a. pertaining to the 20 acre lot size . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(8). Contrary to Petitioners' contention, that does not eliminate density standards. Residential lots must be greater than two acres. See LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(3). Maintenance of Residential Capacity Petitioners contend the LPIA increases density because its objective is to "create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses while maintaining residential capacity as it existed on January 1, 2007." LPIA § 4.4.E.7. (Emphasis added.) Petitioners complain that County-wide residential capacity on that date is not identified and that the objective requires residential capacity in Agricultural lands to increase as it decreases elsewhere in the County. This interpretation is unreasonable. The County's interpretation, that residential units lost by preservation are to be maintained by clustering on the remaining Agricultural lands, is more reasonable. Transfer of Wetland Density Petitioners contend that the LPIA increases density by allowing transfer of wetland density in the Agricultural future land use category. See LPIA § 4.4E.7.d.(7). Under the Plan before the LPIA, up to half of wetland density can be transferred to uplands in a PUD. See CGMP § 9.4A7.b.(8). PUDs were not allowed in Agricultural lands before the LPIA. But Petitioners did not prove that allowing the transfer and clustering of residential units into a PUD on Agricultural lands under the LPIA would change the total number of residential units already allowed in Agricultural lands (at one unit per 20 acres). Alleged Failure to Remove Density from All Non-PUD Land Petitioners contend that the LPIA increases density by not stripping residential units from all so-called non-PUD land. Contrary to this contention, the more reasonable interpretation is that land not set aside for permanent preservation in a proposal made under the LPIA must be part of the proposed PUD. In any event, even if an LPIA proposal could include land that is neither set aside for preservation nor part of the PUD land, no residential units is such land would be transferred to the PUD, and failure to strip such land of its residential units would not affect the total number of units associated with the LPIA proposal. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA allows text amendments to increase density on land set aside for preservation under the LPIA because it specifies that such land must be changed on the FLUM and will not be eligible for "any additional [FLUM] amendment which increases residential density or intensity of use . . . ." LPIA § 4.4E.7.d.(7). The negative implication Petitioners draw from this language is contrary to the intent of the LPIA and is not warranted. Even if text amendments are not prohibited, they would apply to all land in a particular land use category, not just to land set aside under the LPIA. Subsequent Plan Amendments Not Required for PUD Petitioners contend that the LPIA "is unclear as to whether a PUD can be approved without a subsequent plan amendment specifically authorizing the two-acre lot subdivision site plan." PPRO, ¶80. This contention supposedly arises from the language of LPIA § 4.4.E.7.c.: "The Comprehensive Plan amendment that is part of a joint Plan Amendment and concurrent PUD application submitted under this objective must address the land use designation on the land set aside in perpetuity as contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and/or agricultural land uses in the following manner: . . . ." (Emphasis added in PPRO, ¶82.) The negative implication Petitioners draw from this language is contrary to the intent of the LPIA and is not warranted. It ignores LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(7): "The Comprehensive Plan amendment filed concurrently with the PUD application shall allow the site-specific clustering of density in one portion of the total subject site, including the transfer of full density of any wetlands on the site, at a density that shall not exceed one unit per twenty acres for the total site prior to conveyance. . . . The Plan amendment shall further specify that neither the land conveyed nor the land controlled by the PUD agreement shall be eligible for any additional [FLUM] amendment which increases residential density or intensity of use . . . ." While LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(7) discusses land that is conveyed, it is reasonably clear that a Plan amendment addressing the PUD also would be required for lands that are set aside using one of the other mechanisms specified in the LPIA. Public Benefit Criteria Petitioners contend that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.b. and f. gives the County "unfettered discretion to reject or approve a PUD 'for any reason.'" PPRO, ¶90. Those sections provide that approval of a PUD will be based on consideration of "significant site-specific public benefits," some of which are listed. While it is true that the LPIA gives the County discretion to grant or approve a PUD based on its consideration of those factors, Petitioners did not prove "unfettered discretion." First, minimum requirements under the LPIA first must be met. Second, the list of public benefits gives some guidance as to the kinds of additional public benefits that will justify approval of a PUD. Petitioners did not prove that a comprehensive plan provision allowing for PUD zoning need be any more specific to be implemented in a consistent manner. Protection of Land Set Aside Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to protect land set aside under the LPIA because it does not identify the land most appropriate for preservation or require that it be set aside. This contention ignores the objective to encourage conveyance of "land listed for public acquisition by state, regional or local agencies as part of established conservation programs" which "include, but are not be [sic] limited to land designated for public acquisition under" several named public acquisition programs. LPIA § 4.4.E.7. It also ignores the policy: "No development in the PUD shall be allowed on unique, threatened or rare habitat, or other environmentally sensitive lands that are critical to the support of listed plant or animal species . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(4). It also ignores the policy that "PUDs that include land listed for acquisition by state, regional or local agencies as part of an established conservation program shall be subject to . . . additional requirements": including fee simple conveyance of at least half of such land; and no development in the PUD on such land "unless the land has been previously impacted by agricultural activities and the proposed development is determined to be inconsequential to the implementation and success of the conservation program . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.e.(1)-(2). In addition, various means of protecting such lands are several of the listed "additional significant site-specific benefits" of a PUD proposal to be considered in the approval process. See LPIA § 4.4.E.7.f. Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to "require set-aside lands to be contiguous to other farmland, open space, or natural lands" and "contiguous, functional, and connected to adjacent and regional systems." PPRO, ¶¶102-98 [sic]. These contentions ignore the objective to "create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses. . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7. They also ignore that land in public acquisition programs ideally is contiguous to other open space and natural lands. Petitioners did not prove their contention in PPRO ¶97 [sic] that it is necessary to specify the public acquisition programs for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to define the "perpetual easement" mechanism allowed in LPIA Section 4.E.7.a. for setting aside land in lieu of fee simple conveyance. See PPRO, ¶103. This contention ignores the policy in LPIA Section 4.E.7.d.(5) to use perpetual easements as a means of enforcing the prohibition against increasing residential density or intensity of use by FLUM amendments, as well as the policy in LPIA Section 4.E.7.d.(6) to use perpetual easements "to restrict future uses and ensure the government agencies or other entities holding fee simple title do not sell or develop the property inconsistent with this policy or the approved uses within the PUD Agreement." Petitioners did not prove their contention in PPRO ¶103 that it is necessary to further define "perpetual easement" for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend in PPRO ¶¶105 and 107 that the LPIA fails to define the "agricultural uses" to be preserved in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(3) and allows the County to "specify allowed uses" without limitation and with "no certainty that farmland will be protected as farmland by easement." (Emphasis in PPRO ¶105.) Petitioners contend that everything allowed in the Agricultural category under the Plan will be allowed. See PPRO ¶107. Contrary to Petitioners' contention, it is reasonably clear that, while the language of LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(3) contains a typographical error, the policy clearly is to maintain existing agricultural uses, not to allow intensification of agricultural use or expansion into "non-farm" uses that might be allowed in the Agricultural category. Alleged Threat to IRL and CERP Lands Petitioners contend that, by making development under its PUD option more marketable, the LPIA will encourage PUDs that do not protect and that fragment IRL and CERP lands. Petitioners did not prove that such a result is likely. Petitioners contend that the adverse impacts on IRL and CERP lands is more than speculation in part because of the wording of the policy in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(2), which is misstated in PPRO ¶114 and actually states: "If the land to be protected and maintained in perpetuity is land that is part of the North Palm Beach, and the Lake Okeechobee portions of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), as well as Northern Everglades and Estuaries Protection Program, the plan amendment must include a future land use amendment to change the Future Land Use Designation to Institutional-Public Conservation." The language used in the policy is poor. But Petitioners' interpretation--that only land set aside for protection that is part of all of the described CERP projects will be protected--is absurd since no such land exists. That interpretation and Petitioners' interpretation that no IRL lands are protected under the LPIA ignore and are contrary to the language and intent of the objective stated in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7. and of the policies stated in Section 4.4.E.7.a., c.(1), and d.(5). The County's interpretation, that CERP and IRL lands are eligible for protection, is more reasonable. Definition of Critical Habitat Petitioners contend that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4) does not provide a meaningful or predictable standard because the term "critical to the support of listed plant or animal species" is not better defined. Actually, PUD development is prohibited "on unique, threatened or rare habitat, or other environmentally sensitive lands that are critical to the support of listed plant or animal species." While the policy could have been better defined, Petitioners did not prove that a better definition is necessary for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend that, regardless of the "critical habitat" definition, the policy language in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.e.(2) "guts" Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4) by prohibiting PUD development "on land listed for acquisition . . . unless the land has been previously impacted by agricultural activities " Actually, the policy continues to state that the exception only applies if "the proposed development is determined to be inconsequential to the implementation and success of the conservation program . . . ." Petitioners' interpretation, that the policy allows PUD development on virtually all Agricultural lands, is unreasonable and contrary to the language and intent of the LPIA. The County's interpretation is more reasonable and is reasonably clear. It allows for distinctions among the various kinds of agricultural activities, which the Plan already recognizes. See, e.g., CGMP § 4.2.A.6.b.(8) ("Many low intensity agricultural uses such as range (pasture) land can be compatible with environmentally significant resource areas.") For these reasons, Petitioners did not prove that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.e.(2) "guts" Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4), or that the LPIA cannot be implemented in a consistent manner. LPIA and Urban Sprawl In part based on unreasonable interpretations of the LPIA's objective and policy language, Petitioners contend that Martin County's Comprehensive Plan as amended by the LPIA no longer discourages urban sprawl and that the LPIA encourages urban sprawl. In part because the interpretations were unreasonable, Petitioners' urban sprawl contentions were not proven. Even if the LPIA results in a proliferation of PUDs with clusters of residences on lots slightly larger than two acres, which is the minimum lot size, it would not equate to urban (or suburban) sprawl. Assuming PUDs based on 500-acre tracts, it would result in a cluster of 25 homes within a 500-acre rural area. The LPIA does not plan for the extension of urban services to those homes and does not provide for or allow any new commercial or industrial development. Both the LPIA and the rest of the CGMP include provisions, most notably those related to the urban service districts, to reasonably ensure that urban sprawl will not result. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the first primary indicator of urban sprawl in Florida Administrative Code Rule5 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("designates for development substantial areas of the jurisdiction for low-intensity, low density or single use development or uses in excess of demonstrated need"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the second primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[p]romotes, allows or designates significant amounts of urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while leaping over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development"). The development promoted, allowed, or designated by the LPIA is not "urban" and does not "leap over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development." It allowed for development already promoted, allowed, and designated to arrange itself differently in a rural area. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the third primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (designation of urban development in "radial, strip, isolated or ribbon patterns generally emanating from existing urban development"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the fourth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (promotes premature conversion of rural land to other uses, thereby failing to adequately protect and conserve natural resources). To the contrary, its primary purpose is to protect and conserve natural resources and rural land. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the fifth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (fails to adequately protect "adjacent agricultural areas" as well as "passive agricultural activities and dormant, unique and prime farmlands and soils"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers either the sixth or seventh primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (fails to maximize use of existing and future public facilities and services). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the eighth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[a]llows for land use patterns or timing which disproportionately increase the cost in time, money and energy, of providing and maintaining facilities and services"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the ninth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[f]ails to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the tenth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[d]iscourages or inhibits infill development or redevelopment of existing neighborhoods and communities"). Although LPIA PUDs obviously would not be infill or redevelopment, it was not proven that they will discourage or inhibit infill and redevelopment. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the eleventh primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[f]ails to encourage an attractive and functional mix of uses"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the twelfth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[r]esults in poor accessibility among linked or related uses"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the thirteenth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J- 5.006(5)(g) ("[r]esults in the loss of significant amounts of functional open space"). The LPIA does not exacerbate the two already-existing indicators of urban sprawl, but Petitioners still contend that the indicators are triggered by the LPIA essentially because development will proceed more quickly under the LPIA. This contention was not proven. Even if it were, Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA encourages the proliferation of urban sprawl or that the CGMP, as amended by the LPIA, fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. LPIA Data and Analysis Petitioners contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis because the County explained it as a necessary response to the proliferation of 20-acre ranchette developments whereas only 75 have been built and only 15 have certificates of occupancy. Actually, the ranchette developments were only one reason for the LPIA, and the data and analysis showed 13 approved developments as of mid-September 2007, and three more approvals plus two pending applications for approval a year later. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA implements some but not all of the recommendations in the various reports and studies cited by the County as part of the data and analysis. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA does not conform to some recommendations in the various reports and studies cited by the County as part of the data and analysis. However, Petitioners base their contentions largely on unreasonable interpretations of the language of the objective and policies of the LPIA. In addition, the data and analysis they point to essentially reflect merely that planners disagree on the best plan for the Agricultural lands. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA is not identical to the Atlantic Ridge project amendment. While all agree that the Atlantic Ridge project is a resounding success story, it is unique. The obvious and understandable inability to instantaneously duplicate Atlantic Ridge to the greatest extent possible in the Agricultural lands should not prevent the County from taking any action in its direction, such as the LPIA. Taken together, the data and analysis are adequate to support the LPIA. LPIA and TCRPC Regional Policy Plan Petitioners contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's Strategic Regional Policy Plan (SRPP). The TCRPC's SRPP was not introduced in evidence, but the TCRPC's Executive Director testified and sponsored the TCRPC's report on the LPIA and the SUSDA. The TCRPC's findings on consistency with its SRPP were not contradicted. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's Strategic Regional Policy Plan (SRPP) Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2, which are to determine areas that are environmentally significant and to map, acquire, and manage them. The LPIA does not do this. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP Goal 1.1, which requires sustainable countryside development in urban enclaves, such as towns and villages, with mixed-use and appropriate densities between 4-10 units per acre, on strategically selected locations while preserving contiguous, targeted land identified through SRPP Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2. The LPIA does not do this. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP Policy 15.1.3.1, which is to increase the clarity of local land use plans so that preferred forms of development can be pre-approved. Instead, the LPIA uses the case-by-case PUD approval process to determine the ultimate development patterns for the Agricultural lands. The inconsistency with SRPP Policy 15.1.3.1 is the only LPIA inconsistency not already equally present in the existing CGMP. The TCRPC's concern as to the other inconsistencies is that the LPIA will make residential development in the Agricultural lands more marketable and increase the rate of residential growth in a manner inconsistent with SRPP Goal 1.1 and Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2. Internal Consistency of the LPIA Petitioners contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Sections 1.6 and 1.11.A. for being inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP. CGMP Section 1.6 states that "elements of the [CGMP] shall be consistent and coordinated with policies of [various entities, including the TCRPC]. Petitioners did not prove that the County does not interpret that provision to require internal consistency and coordination with the other entities' policies, or that such an interpretation would be incorrect. CGMP Section 1.11.A. refers to amendment procedures. Essentially, it states that plan amendments must be "in compliance." There was no evidence that the County intended it to require strict and absolute consistency with the TCRPC's SRPP, or any evidence to prove that it would be incorrect for the County to interpret it not to. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Section 1.11.K., which also refers to amendment procedure. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Section 1.11.K. for not having concurrently-processed land development regulations (LDRs) since concurrently-processed LDRs are only required "[t]o the extent necessary to implement a proposed amendment," and Petitioners did not prove that concurrently-processed LDRs are necessary. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with numerous other provisions of the CGMP. These contentions were not proven. Most, if not all, were based on unreasonable interpretations of the LPIA. SUSDA Provisions The SUSDA amends the text of the future land use element, the sanitary sewer services element, and the potable water services element of the Plan. As amended, the Plan would allow owners of real property within the SUSD to apply for connection to regional water and sewer service rather than be limited to using individual potable water wells and individual septic tanks, provided all costs of connection to the public services would be paid by the owner. The policy of SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.g. expressly states: The County Commission has determined that it is in the best interest of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Martin County that regional water and sewer services be made available to properties within the [SUSD], in order to: (1) Protect our natural resources . . . from the negative impacts of onsite sewage disposal (septic) systems and private wells to serve individual residential units; (2) Provide fire protection; [and] (3) Provide safe drinking water. The policy of SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.h. requires that the extension of any such services to properties within the SUSD must have Board approval, which cannot occur unless the Board finds that certain enumerated criteria have been met, including: Regional utility services may be provided to properties within the [SUSD] upon the request of the affected property owner, and upon payment of the required costs for connection to the regional system. Such services may only be provided by a regional utility, public or private, within a service area shown on Figure 11-2. Package plants for the provision of utility service are prohibited except under the provisions of the [CGMP]. The regional utility must demonstrate the treatment facility has capacity for the proposed connection and priority has been given to projects within the [PUSD]. Extension of utility services shall not be construed to imply support for any increase in the residential density of the property inside the [SUSD]. Property lying outside the Urban Service Districts . . . shall not receive utility service from a regional wastewater system. Extension of utility service outside the Urban Service Districts shall be prohibited. Development within the [SUSD] shall maintain lot sizes that exceed one-half acres. The SUSDA also contains new charts added to both the sanitary sewer services element and the potable water services element that display the numerical capacity of the regional water and sewer systems to handle additional customers upon extension of lines to the SUSD. See SUSDA Tables 10-3 through 10-6 and 11- 12 through 11-15. There was no credible evidence of any likelihood that the adoption of the SUSDA would allow the further extensions of water and sewer lines from the SUSD to properties outside the urban service districts. The testimony offered by Petitioners was speculative at best and depended upon an unproven assumption that the County would violate the explicit provisions of the SUSDA prohibiting such extension of services. See SUSDA §§ 4.4.G.2.h.(6)-(7) and 4.5.H. Meaning and Predictability of SUSDA Standards Petitioners contend that the SUSDA's standards are not meaningful or predictable because of the undefined term "central water and sewer" in the policy in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a. Petitioners contend that "central water and sewer" can be interpreted to mean something other than a regional utility, and that the SUSDA can be interpreted to allow regional utility, package plant, and other similar types of utility systems serving two or more houses outside the urban services districts. Petitioners' interpretations are unreasonable and contrary to the language and intent of the SUSDA. Petitioners' evidence was speculative and depended on an unproven assumption that the County would violate the explicit provisions of the SUSDA prohibiting package treatment plants in the SUSD. See SUSDA § 4.4.G.2.h.(3) and § 4.5.H. In addition, the evidence was that package treatment plants may no longer be economically feasible. The County's interpretation is more reasonable--"central water and sewer," as used in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a., means the provision of regional utility services by Martin County in the SUSD, and no such facilities may be provided outside the urban service districts. SUSDA Data and Analysis Petitioners contend that the data and analysis do not support the SUSDA essentially because they do not establish "any actual health, safety, or welfare problems." PPRO, ¶208. The absence of proof of actual health, safety, or welfare problems is not fatal in view of the rest of the data and analysis supporting the SUSDA. Since the creation of the SUSD in 1992, development in the PUSD has resulted in the extension of water and sewer lines up to the border between the PUSD and the SUSD. In effect, the intended SUSD transition area has transitioned. Meanwhile, the regional water and sewer utilities serving the County now have the necessary capacity to serve the PUSD and the SUSD. Improved fire protection in the SUSD is a benefit of regional water service, allowing installation of community fire hydrants. Without it, developers in the SUSD must rely on installed sprinklers and emergency generators and water drawn from nearby lakes or installed water tanks. While regional water service can fail temporarily in major storms, and the data and analysis did not include actual instances of fire damage cause by the lack of regional water service in the SUSD, regional water service generally provides more reliable and less costly fire protection. While the data and analysis do not establish that developers and property owners in the SUSD have not been able to permit potable water wells, regional water service generally is better, more reliable, and less costly. The data and analysis did include actual instances of home owners having to install expensive water treatment systems due to increasing chloride levels in their potable water wells. Connection to regional water service would eliminate those costs and concerns. While the data and analysis do not establish that developers and property owners in the SUSD have not been able to permit septic tanks systems for onsite sewage treatment (i.e., systems that meet environmental and health standards), such systems can fail if improperly installed, maintained, and repaired. If they fail, nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus can leach into and harm the groundwater and nearby surface waters. The North Fork of the Loxahatchee River, which is nutrient-impaired, probably would benefit from elimination of septic tanks. Regional sewer service generally is better for the environmental and public health. The data and analysis suggest that allowing regional water and sewer service in the SUSD, with the SUSDA's requirement for developers to pay the cost of installation, probably will save the County money in the long run. It will be a significant cost to the County if it has to install water and sewer lines post-development. Petitioners attack the credibility of the data and analysis supporting the SUSDA because regional water and sewer service is optional in the SUSD. But there were data and analysis that, even if regional water and sewer service in the SUSD is preferable, there are valid reasons to make it optional at this time. Alleged Environmental Impact of the SUSDA Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will have negative environmental impacts in part from a proliferation of package treatment plants in the SUSD, which is discouraged in CGMP Section 4.4. See PPRO, ¶¶221, 223. This contention is based on Petitioners' unreasonable interpretations of two sentences of the SUSDA. SUSDA Section 4.5.G. prohibits interim water systems outside the urban service districts and allows them, with conditions, in the PUSD where connection to a regional utility is not feasible. Petitioners interpret these two sentences to mean that interim water systems are allowed, without conditions, in the SUSD. The County's interpretation is more reasonable. Since the SUSDA makes connection to the regional utilities optional, there is no need for interim water systems in the SUSDA, and the SUSDA should not be construed to allow them there. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will have negative environmental impacts in part essentially because increased development results in increased pollution. See PPRO, ¶228. To the extent true, it would be equally or more true of similar development without regional water and sewer services. SUSDA and Urban Sprawl Petitioners contend, in part due to their unreasonable interpretations of the objective in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a., that Martin County's Comprehensive Plan as amended by the SUSDA, no longer discourages urban sprawl and that the SUSDA encourages urban sprawl. In part due to the unreasonableness of Petitioners' interpretation of the SUSDA, Petitioners' urban sprawl contentions were not proven. It is unlikely that the SUSDA will encourage urban sprawl. Petitioners also contend that the SUSDA will encourage urban sprawl simply by allowing denser development in the 5,000- 6,000 acres of the SUSDA not yet developed. This contention is contrary to the SUSDA policy: "Extension of utility services shall not be construed to imply support for any increase in residential density of the property inside the [SUSD]." SUSDA § 4.4.G.2.h.(5). Even if the SUSDA increased density in the SUSDA, increase in density itself does not promote urban sprawl. To the contrary, it is possible for increased density to discourage urban sprawl. Petitioners did not prove that increasing density in the SUSDA itself encourages urban sprawl or that, with the SUSDA, the CGMP will discourage urban sprawl less. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will create pressures to develop areas that border the SUSD, leaping over areas suitable for urban development. See PPRO, ¶¶236-237. This contention actually devalues the very urban service district concept Petitioners seek to defend and can be said about any urban district boundary. Currently, there are many places where the PUSD borders the Agricultural lands. The pressures created by the SUSDA will be no greater than the pressures that have existed in those places all along. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will increase costs to the County essentially because, notwithstanding SUSDA's requirement that developers pay the cost of connection, development will not pay for itself in the long run (taking into account costs of operations, maintenance, and repair.) To the extent true, it can be said of all development and does not prove that the SUSDA encourages urban sprawl. Petitioners did not prove that the SUSDA triggers any of the indicators of urban sprawl; did not prove that the SUSDA encourages the proliferation of urban sprawl; and did not prove that the CGMP, as amended by the SUSDA, fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Internal Consistency of the SUSDA Petitioners contend that the SUSDA is internally inconsistent with CGMP Section 4.4.G.1.i., which gives priority in the provision and funding of water and sewer services to the PUSD, essentially because the data and analysis ensure that water demands in the PUSD can be met through 2025. The lack of data and analysis at present to ensure that water demands in the PUSD can be met beyond 2025 does not prove that priority will not be given to the needs of the PUSD.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the LPIA and the SUSDA are "in compliance." DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2009.
The Issue Whether the proposed amendment to the St. Johns County 2015 Future Land Use Map (FLUM), adopted by Ordinance No. 2002-31, is "in compliance" with the relevant provisions of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Chapter 163, Part, II, Florida Statutes. A second issue raised by St. Johns County (County) and The Estuaries Limited Liability Company (Estuaries) is whether, if the proposed amendment is not "in compliance," it is nevertheless valid and authorized pursuant to Chapter 70, Florida Statutes, the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Julie Parker, resides in St. Augustine, Florida, less than one and one-half miles from the proposed project site. Parker also owns other property in St. Johns County. Parker submitted oral comments to the County at the adoption hearing on May 28, 2002, regarding the FLUM Amendment and Ordinance No. 2002-31. The parties agreed that Parker has standing in this proceeding. The County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County adopted its Comprehensive Plan in 1990. The County proceeded with the evaluation and appraisal report process in 1997 and 1998. This process ultimately resulted in the adoption of the 2015 Comprehensive Plan Amendment, Goals, Objectives, and Policies, and Adopted EAR-Based Comprehensive Plan Amendment in May 2000 (May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment), which was subjected to a sufficiency review by the Department and found "in compliance." Estuaries owns the 9.99 acres (the Property) that is the subject of the FLUM Amendment. Estuaries also owns approximately 8.5 acres outside, adjacent to, and west of the Property. The 8.5 acres are subject to a Conservation Easement, which prohibits any development activity thereon. (The total contiguous land owned by Estuaries is approximately 18.5 acres.) The parties stipulated that the legal description of the Property attached to Ordinance No. 2002-31 contains less than 10 acres. Estuaries submitted comments to the County at the adoption hearing on May 28, 2002, regarding the FLUM amendment. Estuaries has standing to participate as a party in this proceeding. The Property The Property is part of a larger tract owned by Estuaries, i.e., approximately 9.9 acres out of a total tract of approximately 18.5 acres. The entire 18.5 acre tract is located on Anastasia Island, a barrier island, which extends from the St. Augustine Inlet to the Matanzas Inlet. According to the 2000 Census, there are approximately 12,000 dwelling units on Anastasia Island. This includes condominium units and single-family units. The approximately 18.5-acre site is also located in the Coastal High Hazard Area under the County May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment. The Property is part of Butler Beach (bordering the Atlantic Ocean), which is an historic area because it was settled in the early 1900's by black citizens and provided them with access to the beach, which was previously unavailable. However, no historic structures or uses have occurred on the Property. The entire 18.5 acre tract is located on the south side of Riverside Boulevard. The Property is located approximately 300 feet west of Highway A1A South (A1A runs north and south). The Intracoastal Waterway and the Matanzas River are west and adjacent to the 18.5 acres. The Estuaries site is also located adjacent to the Guana Tolomato Matanzas National Estuarine Research Reserve (NERR). The Property is vacant, partially wooded, and also consists of undeveloped wetlands. Of the 9.99 acres, approximately 6.7 acres are uplands and developable, and 3.29 acres are wetlands. As noted, the remaining approximately 8.5 acres of the Estuaries' property, and to the west of the Property, is subject to a Conservation Easement in favor of the County. The properties adjacent to the Property include the following: Single-family residential units are located along and on the north side Riverside Boulevard. The existing FLUM designations for this area are Residential Coastal Density A and C, with the existing zoning of open rural (OR). (Residential Coastal Density C permits 2.0 to 4.0 units per acre.) The Intracoastal portion of Butler State Park is to the south of the Property, with a FLUM designation of parks and open space and existing zoning of OR and is not in a conservation area. To the east of the Property is a utility substation site, Butler Avenue, various commercial uses, Island House Rentals or Condominiums (three-story oceanfront condominiums), and the Mary Street Runway. There is another condominium called Creston House, directly south of the Butler Park (ocean portion) area (distinguished from the Butler State Park), consisting of three stories. (Butler Park and Creston House are located east of A1A and southeast of the Estuaries property.) The existing FLUM designations are Coastal Residential Coastal Density A and C, and have existing zoning designations of Residential General (RG)-1 and Commercial General (CG). There are no Residential Density D FLUM land use designations in the contiguous area. In short, the Property is proximate to a state park, a densely developed area comprised of small residential lots of 25 by 100 feet lots, and the two three-story condominiums, which were built prior to the adoption of the County's 1990 Comprehensive Plan. The County's Comprehensive Plan and EAR-Based Amendments On September 14, 1990, the County adopted a Comprehensive Plan-1990-2005, with amendments (the 1990 Plan). Under the 1990 Plan, the Property was assigned a Residential Coastal-A land use designation under the existing FLUM, which meant that residential development was restricted to no more than one residential unit per upland (non-wetland jurisdictional) acre. Under this designation, approximately seven units could have been built on the Property. The zoning on the Property was and is RG-1. According to the County, at least as of a June 11, 1999, letter from the County's principal planner, Timothy W. Brown, A.I.C.P., to Kevin M. Davenport, P.E., the total units which would be allowed on the Property were 116 multi-family units, derived after making a detailed density calculation based in part on using 40 percent of the wetlands used for the density calculation. In May 2000, the County adopted the EAR-Based Plan Amendment, with supporting data and analysis, which the Department of Community Affairs found to be "in compliance." As required by Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, this would have included data and analysis for the Future Land Use Element (FLUE), which was adopted as part of these plan amendments. This is part of the data and analysis which supports the FLUM Amendment at issue in this proceeding. The May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment continued the Residential Coastal A land use designation of the Property, which allows 0.4 to 1.0 units per acre. (Residential Coastal B allows 2.0 units per acre; Residential Coastal C allows 2.0 to 4.0 units per acre; and Residential Coastal D allows 4.0 to 8.0 units per acre.) The Residential Coastal A designation authorizes residential and non-residential uses, such as schools, public service facilities, police, fire, and neighborhood commercial. Restaurants and banks without drive-thru facilities, gasoline pumps, and professional office buildings are examples of neighborhood commercial uses. The May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment does not limit the lot size, subject to limitations on, for example, impervious surface ratios, which do not change regardless of whether the land use designation is Residential Coastal A or D. Also, any development would also have to comply with the textural provisions of the May 2000 EAR- Based Plan Amendment, including the coastal and conservation elements. The Circuit Court Litigation There are many documents in this case which pertain to the litigation between Estuaries and the County. The civil action was filed in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida, and styled The Estuaries Limited Liability Company v. St. Johns County, Florida, Case No. CA-00271. On February 11, 2000, Estuaries filed a Complaint against the County "relating to certain representations made by the County in connection with the development of certain real property located south of St. Augustine Beach in St. Johns County, Florida." A Second Amended Complaint was filed on or about May 30, 2001. Estuaries claimed that County staff made representations to Estuaries, which resulted in Estuaries having a vested right to develop its Property up to a maximum of 116 multi-family residential units. (The County took the position that Estuaries could build no more than 25 units on the Property.) Estuaries claimed that it had vested rights based upon a claim of equitable estoppel against the County. (One of Estuaries' claims was brought pursuant to the Bert Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, Chapter 70, Florida Statutes.)1 After discovery and the denial of motions for summary judgment, the parties entered into a "Settlement Agreement and Complete Release" (Settlement Agreement). The "General Terms of Settlement" in the Settlement Agreement provided in part: Estuaries shall prepare and file an application to amend the future land use map of the St. Johns County Comprehensive Plan to amend the designation of only that portion of the Property such that Estuaries may build 56 multi-family residential units on the Property and such that the amendment be a "Small-scale Amendment" as defined by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act. Estuaries agrees on behalf of itself, its successors and assigns to build not more than 56 units on the Property. County will waive or pay the application fee and will expedite its processing. The parties will forthwith prepare and submit to the Court a joint motion for the approval of this Agreement pursuant to the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, §70.001(4)(d)2. During the review and consideration of the amendment application, the County will expeditiously process the Estuaries' revised construction plans and, in connection therewith, the construction codes in effect as of November 13, 2001 (to the extent the County may do so without violating county, state or federal law), the existing certificate of concurrency and the terms of the vesting letter as it relates to the Land Development Code, of Sonya Doerr dated September 27, 1999, shall continue to apply. In all other respects, the revised construction plans shall comply with all other Comprehensive Plan and County ordinances and regulations. On or about November 16, 2001, counsel for the parties signed a Joint Motion, requesting the circuit court to approve the Settlement Agreement pursuant to Section 70.001(4)(d)2., Florida Statutes. On November 16, 2001, Circuit Judge John Michael Traynor, entered an "Order Approving Settlement Agreement pursuant to Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act." Judge Traynor stated in part: The central issue in this litigation has been the number of dwelling units that would be permitted on the Property. The issues in the case are legally complex and, although the credibility of the testimony and authenticity of the exhibits expected to be introduced was not expected to be substantially in dispute or challenged, the meaning of the testimony and the meaning and inferences to be drawn from such evidence was very much in dispute. The issues included the extent of vested rights, the extent to which estoppel may be applied to the County, contractual liability, and potential liability under the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act . . . and the relief requested included the request for a declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to build up to 116 dwelling units on the Property and damages against the County. Judge Traynor also "Ordered and Adjudged," in part: Pursuant to Florida Statute § 70.001(4)(a) & (c) and applicable law, this Court finds that proper notice of a Bert Harris Act claim was timely provided to the County, and other governmental entities, and the County did make a written settlement offer to the Plaintiff, in accordance with the Bert Harris Act, that was accepted by Plaintiff. Florida Statute § 70.001(4)(c) permits, inter alia, for an adjustment of land development provisions controlling the development of a plaintiff's property; increases or modifications in the density, intensity, or use of areas of development; the transfer of development rights; conditioning the amount of development or use permitted; issuance of a development order, a variance, special exceptions, or other extraordinary relief; and such other actions specified in the statute. While the parties may dispute whether an amendment is necessary to the County's Comprehensive Plan, the parties have agreed that the Plaintiff shall submit a small-scale amendment to the County for consideration and approval pursuant to the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act. . .; without waiver of either party's rights to contest and defend the necessity of submitting such an amendment, in light of this Court's approval of the settlement agreement pursuant to the Bert Harris Act and applicable law. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement and Complete Release is fair, reasonable and adequate; is in the best interests of the parties and protects the public interest served by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act. . .; and is the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the County's regulatory efforts from inordinately burdening the Property with regard to density, impact on public services, the environment and the public health, safety and welfare of the community and the rights of individuals to reasonably utilize their property and to rely on the representations of government, taking into consideration the risks that both parties had in this litigation. This litigation has been ongoing for more than 18 months, and substantial discovery and record has been presented to the Court that provides ample basis for this Court's approval of this settlement as being fair, reasonable and adequate and appropriate under the Bert Harris Act. There is no evidence before the Court that would suggest that the proposed settlement is the result of any collusion among the parties or their counsel. In fact, the record is to the contrary, whereby counsel on both sides have aggressively and zealously pursued the interests of their respective clients. . . . Judge Traynor directed the parties to implement the terms of the Settlement Agreement, "subject to the right of the public to comment at an appropriate public hearing pertaining to the above referenced small scale amendment to the County's Comprehensive Plan, and shall cooperate to accomplish in good faith the responsibilities under the Settlement Agreement and Complete Release." There is no evidence that Judge Traynor's Order has been rescinded or otherwise modified. There is no statutory authority to collaterally attack Judge Traynor's Order in this proceeding nor is there any authority which provides that this Order can be ignored. Also, this is not the appropriate proceeding to determine whether Estuaries has, in fact, vested rights. Accordingly, Judge Traynor's Order, approving the Settlement Agreement, is accepted as binding authority. The Small Scale Development Application In compliance with Judge Traynor's Order and the Settlement Agreement, on March 26, 2002, Estuaries filed a "Small Scale Amendment Comprehensive Plan Amendment Application Form" with the County. Estuaries requested a change in the Property's FLUM designation from Residential Coastal A, Zoning RG-1 to Residential Coastal D, Zoning RG-1. Estuaries represented, in part, that the Property consisted of 9.99 acres of vacant land, including 3.2 acres of wetlands and approximately 6.7 acres of developable land (uplands) "which will be developed into a 56 unit Multi-Family Condominium." County staff reviewed the application and recommended approval. As part of the agenda item for consideration by the St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners, County staff, in light of the criterion of "Consistency with the Goals, Objectives and Policies of the Comprehensive Plan, State Comprehensive Plan and the Northeast Florida Regional Policy Plan," stated: "[t]he approved Settlement Agreement was filed pursuant to Chapter 70.001." With respect to "Impacts on Public Facilities and Services," County staff stated: "The project has received a Certificate of Concurrency addressing the impacts on transportation, water, sewer, recreation, drainage, solid waste and mass transit. The Certificate of Concurrency is based on impacts of 84 multi-family dwelling units. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the project contains 56 multi-family dwelling units. St. Johns County provides central water and sewer." With respect to "Compatibility with Surrounding Area," County staff stated: "The area is developed with a mixture of residential, commercial, park (Butler Park), and vacant land of various zoning." According to Mr. Scott Clem, the County's Director of Growth Management Services, County staff felt that there were adequate public facilities for a 56-unit project, because Estuaries had previously demonstrated that facilities were available for an 84-unit project. However, County staff expressly noted in the Planning Department Staff Report submitted to the Planning and Zoning Agency that "[t]here are no development plans included in the Application. However, all site engineering, drainage and required infrastructure improvements will be reviewed pursuant to the Development Review Process to ensure that the development complies with all applicable federal, state and local regulations and permitting requirements. No permits shall authorize development prior to compliance with all applicable regulations." At this point in time, County staff were "analyzing the potential for 56 units to be on the property. It was a site specific analysis at that point." On April 18, 2002, the Planning and Zoning Agency unanimously recommended approval of the FLUM amendment. After a properly noticed public hearing, on May 28, 2002, the County approved the FLUM Amendment in Ordinance 2002- 31. In Ordinance 2002-31, the County approved the FLUM Amendment at issue, which changed the FLUM land use classification of the Property from Residential Coastal A to Residential Coastal D. Ordinance 2002-31 also provided: "The Land Uses allowed by this Small Scale Comprehensive Plan Amendment shall be limited to not more than 56 residential units, built in not more than four buildings with residential uses, not more than 35 feet in height." The Challenge Parker filed an Amended Petition challenging the lack of data and analysis to support the FLUM Amendment; challenging the increase in density of the Property located in a Coastal High Hazard Area; challenging the internal consistency of the FLUM Amendment with the May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment; challenging the decision by the County to process the application as a small scale development amendment; and challenging the failure to provide Parker with adequate notice of a clear point of entry to challenge Ordinance No. 2002-31. Notice The County provided notice, by newspaper, of the Board of County Commissioners' meeting of May 28, 2002. Before this meeting, a sign was placed on the Property, providing notice of the meeting. Parker personally attended the May 28, 2002, meeting and addressed the Commission regarding the FLUM Amendment. Ordinance No. 2002-31 provided: "This ordinance shall take effect 31 days after adoption. If challenged within 30 days after adoption, this ordinance shall not become effective until the state land planning agency or the Administration Commission issues a final order determining the adopted small scale amendment is in compliance." This Ordinance does not advise a person of the right to challenge the Ordinance pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the Uniform Rules of Procedure, or Section 163.3187(3)(a), Florida Statutes. This type of notice is not required for the reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law. Does the FLUM Amendment, covering 9.99 acres, involve a "use" of 10 acres or fewer, pursuant to Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes? "A small scale development amendment may be adopted only [if] [t]he proposed amendment involves a use of 10 acres or fewer." Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes.2 In the Amended Petition and in her Prehearing Stipulation, Parker contends that the "use," which is the subject of the FLUM Amendment, relates to more than the 9.99 acre parcel and, therefore, the FLUM Amendment is not a small scale development amendment defined in Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes. Parker contended that because the FLUM Amendment authorizes a maximum of 56 residential units to be developed on the Property, and the maximum density under the Residential Coastal D and RG-1 zoning designations is 42.12 units, using the on-site wetlands density bonus, that Estuaries "must be using the off-site wetlands that are contained within the 18.5 acre parcel to obtain the density credit necessary to reach 56 units for the site under" the FLUM Amendment. The 56 residential unit maximum was the product of the circuit court litigation and Settlement Agreement, as approved by Judge Traynor, which resolved the differences between the County and Estuaries regarding the maximum residential density which could be authorized on the Property. Parker also contended that because Estuaries may use a proposed lift station owned by the County off-site, that this causes the proposed "use" of the Property to exceed 10 acres. It appears that at some prior time in the "vesting rights" chronology of events, Magnolia S Corporation, in order to downscale the project, agreed to sell a 40' by 80' parcel to the County, located adjacent to the Property and in the northeast portion, to expand the existing County lift station on Riverside Boulevard. There is a lift station adjacent to the Property that serves as "a repump station that serves the development along Riverside [Boulevard] west of the lift station and serves all the development in St. Johns County on the island south of Riverside Boulevard." It is proposed that sewage effluent from development on the Property would be deposited on site and then pumped into an adjacent force main which eventually ends up in the station. According to Mr. Kevin Davenport, Estuaries' civil engineer, "56 units added to that pump station would be extremely miniscule in the overall amount of sewage that goes through it." Thus, Estuaries anticipates having their own on-site lift station, which "would be pumped through a pipe to the Riverside right-of- way, where it would connect to an existing county-owned pipe which currently goes to the lift station." Mr. Clem stated that "[u]tilities are very commonly done off site where water or sewer distribution or transmission lines are constructed to the site." This would include the use of off- site lift stations. However, the proposed use of the lift station does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the FLUM Amendment exceeds 9.99 acres. If this were so, any proposed use of any off-site utilities would cause a pro rata calculation and increase of the size of the site providing the service, then be added to the 9.99 acres. This is not a reasonable construction of Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes. Parker also claimed that when the Estuaries granted the County a Conservation Easement for the approximately 8.5 acres (out of 18.5 acres) of wetlands adjacent to the Property, Estuaries "used" this property to secure the FLUM Amendment, and therefore, exceeded the 9.99 acres. The Conservation Easement precludes development activity on the approximately 8.51 acres. ("The purpose of this Conservation Easement is to assure that the Property will be retained forever in its existing natural condition and to prevent any use of the Property that will impair or interfere with the environmental value of the property." Prohibited uses include "[a]ctivities detrimental to drainage, flood control, water conservation, erosion control, soil conservation, or fish and wildlife habitat preservation.") The "use" of the 8.51 acres as a potential visual amenity for potential residents on the Property is not a "use" within a reasonable reading of Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes. Parker also suggested that Estuaries will need to improve Riverside Boulevard (paving and drainage) and the public right-of-way consisting of approximately 1.51 acres, which is not owned by Estuaries. It appears that Riverside Boulevard is already open, improved, and paved. Also, Mr. Clem stated that it is common to have off-site improvements associated with a project, which might include intersection or roadway improvements that are not on or within the project site. Mr. Clem opined that while these improvements would be required for the project, they would have been off-site. Some improvements, such as improvements to Riverside Boulevard, would most likely benefit the general public, and not be limited to the future residents on the Property. It is common for local governments to require improvements to public infrastructure as a condition of development. These off-site improvements do not necessarily make the "development activity" larger than the size of the landowner's site, here the Property. Data and Analysis Parker contended that the FLUM Amendment is not supported by appropriate data and analysis. As noted herein, Estuaries sought approval of a FLUM Amendment for its Property, i.e., a land use change to the FLUM. No text (goals, objectives, and policies) changes to the May 2000 EAR-Based Amendment were requested nor made. This is normal for a "site-specific small scale development activity." Section 163.3187(1)(c)1.d., Florida Statutes. Consideration of the FLUM Amendment in this proceeding is unusual for several reasons. First, the necessity for the FLUM change arose as a result of the Settlement Agreement, approved by Judge Traynor, which resolved the differences existing between the County and Estuaries regarding the number of units which could, as a maximum number, be developed on the Property. Second, the data and analysis, which normally is presented to the local government, here the County, at the time the plan amendment is adopted, is not in its traditional format here, largely, it appears, because of the manner in which consideration of the FLUM Amendment arose. Nevertheless, this situation is not fatal for, under existing precedent, see, e.g., Conclusion of Law 96, data, which was in existence at the time the FLUM Amendment was adopted by the County, may be considered in determining whether there is, in fact, adequate data supporting the FLUM Amendment. The data relied on by the County and Estuaries to support the FLUM Amendment was compiled and initially presented to the County on or about July 6, 1999, when Estuaries sought authorization from the County for a proposed project to construct 84 multi-family residential units on the same general area as the Property. This started the County's development review process. Estuaries began the process at this time, believing that it had "vested rights" to develop the Property. Mr. Clem explained that the development review process is "extremely detailed. It involves 11 or 12 different programs within the [C]ounty, looking at everything from the actual site plan itself, water and sewer provision, for all the things that would go into site construction, roadway design, the environmental considerations. We basically look at how this site will be developed in accordance with the land development code and any other regulations. We ensure that the water management district permits are obtained, if applicable, or other state agencies." This record contains County Department comments which pertain to a host of issues, including but not limited to, drainage, traffic, fire services, urban forestry (trees and landscape on-site), utilities, zoning (e.g., buffers, setbacks), concurrency requirements, etc. County staff raised questions (identified as submittals) on at least four separate occasions followed by written responses by the applicant on at least three occasions. However, not all issues were resolved. A July 1999, Land Development Traffic Assessment, prepared by Beachside Consulting Engineers, Inc., was submitted to the County as part of the request for a concurrency determination. The analysis "indicates that the roadway segments within the impact area will continue to operate at an acceptable LOS through the construction of this project." The "Summary" of the assessment states: "This project meets traffic concurrency standards, as defined by the St. Johns County Concurrency Management Ordinance, for all roads within the traffic area." "Stormwater Calculations" for the 84-unit, multi-family housing development were also provided in a report dated July 7, 1999. The applicant also furnished the County with a "geotechnical report," which analyzed the soil conditions related to storm water ponds and to the placement of the buildings and the support of the buildings on the site. Soil borings and other testing revealed the capabilities of the soil for, for example, percolation rates for the storm water ponds. There is no evidence that there are any specific historic buildings or geological or archeological features on the Property. In July 1999, the applicant submitted an application for concurrency. At that time, County staff analyzed this information to ensure that public facilities and services were in place to serve the project. This application was reviewed in relation to the County's concurrency management provisions of the County's Land Development Code. On September 3, 1999, the County's Planning Department prepared a report regarding this application and recommended "approval of a Final Certificate of Concurrency with Conditions for the development of 84 residential condominium units." (Staff made findings of fact, which included a discussion of traffic, potable water/sanitary sewer, drainage, solid waste, and mass transit.) On September 8, 1999, the Concurrency Review Committee met and adopted the Staff's Findings of Fact with conditions, including but not limited to, the applicant providing a copy of the Department of Environmental Protection permits "necessary for connection to central water and wastewater service prior to Construction Plan approval," and "[t]he applicant receiving approval of construction/drainage plans from the Development Services Department prior to commencement of construction." The Final Certificate of Concurrency with Conditions was issued on October 1, 1999, and was due to expire on September 8, 2001. However, the Settlement Agreement provided, in part, that "the existing certificate of concurrency and the terms of the vesting letter as it relates to the Land development Code, of Sonya Doerr dated September 27, 1999, shall continue to apply." (Emphasis added.) (Ms. Teresa Bishop's (County Planning Director) November 7, 2001, letter indicated, in part, that Estuaries' request for "tolling [of the Final Certificate of Concurrency] cannot be reviewed until the outcome of the pending litigation is known. . . . After the litigation is concluded, your request for tolling may be resubmitted for review." The Settlement Agreement post-dates this letter.) In evaluating a small scale plan amendment, County staff evaluates the availability of public services which, according to Mr. Clem, is "one of the major components," and County staff "is looking at virtually the same issues that [the County] would look at in concurrency to evaluate and make recommendations on small scale amendments." Mr. Clem also advised that the County's analysis of the 84-unit project did not involve, and was not based on, "a specific site plan with buildings at a certain location or parking in a certain location. It was more an 84- unit project with certain data and analysis associated with that site or project." By letter dated October 4, 1999, the Department of Environmental Protection indicated that it had received a "Notification for Use of the General Permit for Construction of an Extension to a Drinking Water Distribution System" submitted for the Estuaries project. The Department stated further: "After reviewing the notice, it appears that your project will have minimal adverse environmental effect and apparently can be constructed pursuant to a general permit as described in Chapter 62-555, F.A.C." The permit expires on October 4, 2004. This permit allows the applicant to demonstrate that it will offer a central water service, available to be served through the County's utility department. This would ensure that there is sufficient potable water available. By letter dated October 6, 1999, the Department of Environmental Protection also issued a permit for the construction of a sewage collection/transmission system (domestic waste). By letter dated November 11, 1999, the St. Johns Water Management District issued a "formal permit for construction and operation of stormwater management system." This permit authorized "[a] new stormwater system with stormwater treatment by wet detention to serve Estuaries Multi-family Development, a 5.88 acre project to be constructed as per plans received by the District on 7/12/1999." This permit did not relieve the applicant "from the responsibility for obtaining permits from any federal, state, and/or local agencies asserting concurrent jurisdiction over this work." Mr. Clem believed that this permit was evidence that "the state agencies ha[d] considered the environmental issues relating to storm water and all the issues that they deal with in issuing a permit." The Property is located in a "development area boundary" as indicated on the FLUM, which means that these areas allow "development potential." Other areas, such as rural silviculture and agricultural lands, are outside the development area and only limited and low density development is allowed. Conservation areas are also designated on the FLUM. Given the location of the Property within the development area boundary, the County thereby eliminated the necessity of producing some of the data normally required.3 Mr. Clem explained: So by being within a development area boundary it's in essence already had rights to develop, depending on the classification what those rights are, whether it's residential, commercial, industrial. So by virtue of the fact that this site [the Property] was already in the developmental boundary, we didn't deal with issues such as need, which is a big issue in the county when we add developmental boundary. Is there need for additional residential units, and so forth. So that is one part of the answer. The other part is when we're looking at changing from one residential classification to another, we're not dealing with the same issues we might have if it was going from residential to commercial or residential to industrial. So in the context of a plan amendment like this, we're looking at what can this land support in terms of density and are there public facilities available? Is it generally compatible with the surrounding area? What are the potential impacts to natural resources? So those things are still analyzed, but they're done in a probably more confined context. And then the other factor is this being a small scale amendment further reduces the amount of data that is typically done. And if it was a major amendment, there's a whole new range of issues when we deal with major amendments. By definition, they can cause more of an impact. For Mr. Clem, the data and analysis which was generated during the concurrency process for the proposed 84-unit project was significant and would be applicable to a proposed 56-unit project. Mr. Clem opined that the data for this small scale amendment was "[f]ar in excess of anything [he had] seen in the county." Environmental Impacts of the FLUM Amendment The area on and around the Estuaries' property is an area of tidal marsh intermixed with upland scrub. Many wildlife species have been seen utilizing the wetlands on and adjacent to the Estuaries' site (the 18.5 acre parcel). These include woodstorks, snowy egrets, roseate spoonbills, little blue herons, tri-colored herons, white ibis, and ospreys. Owls, foxes, raccoons, opossums, fiddler crabs, clams, fish, shrimp, and turtles also frequent the area. Parker's environmental scientist and ecologist, Mr. Robert Burks, testified to the environmental effects of any development of the Property subject to the FLUM Amendment. Mr. Burks has worked with American Institute of Certified Planners (A.I.C.P.) designated planners, providing them with opinions with respect to environmental issues. But he is not an expert in land use planning. The National Estuarine Research Reserve (NERR) is a program of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, a federal program administered by the Department of Environmental Protection. It is a program to do research and education on estuarine systems. The estuarine ecosystem composed of the Guana, Tolomato, and Matanzas Rivers has been designated as a NERR. There is testimony that development and increases in population in the area, in general, have been responsible for, for example, the decline and closure of shell-fishing and decline of water quality in the area. Conservation Goal E.2 provides: The County shall conserve, utilize, and protect the natural resources of the area, including air, water, wetlands, water wells, estuaries, water bodies, soils, minerals, vegetative communities, wildlife, wildlife habitat, groundwater recharge areas and other natural and environmental resources, insuring that resources are available for existing and future generations. Objective E.2.2 provides: Native Forests, Floodplains, Wetlands, Upland Communities, and Surface Water The County shall protect native forests, floodplains, wetlands, upland communities, and surface waters within the County from development impacts to provide for maintenance of environmental quality and wildlife habitats. Policy E.2.2.5.(a)(1)(b) provides: The County shall protect Environmentally Sensitive lands (ESLs) through the establishment of Land Development Regulations (LDRs) which address the alternate types of protection for each type of Environmentally Sensitive Land. Adoption and implementation of the Land Development Regulations shall, at a minimum, address the following issues: For Wetlands, Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW), and Estuaries: establish and modify buffers between the wetlands/ OFW/ estuaries and upland development as stated in the County's Land Development Regulations (LDRs), and as follows: * * * Except a minimum of a 50 ft. natural vegetative upland buffer shall be required and maintained between the development areas and the St. Johns, Matanzas, Guana and Tolomato Rivers and their associated tributaries, streams and other interconnecting water bodies. Policy E.2.2.13(b)(6) provides: By December 1999, the County shall develop and adopt guidelines and standards for the preservation and conservation of uplands through various land development techniques as follows: (b) The County shall recognize the following vegetative natural communities as Significant Natural Communities Habitat. Due to the rarity of these vegetative communities, a minimum of 10 percent of the total acreage of the Significant Natural Communities Habitat (excluding bona fide agriculture and/or silviculture operations) shall be preserved and maintained by the development. * * * (6) Scrub. Where on-site preservation of the native upland communities are not feasible, the County as an alternative shall accept a fee in lieu of preservation or off-site mitigation in accordance with the County Land Development Regulations. Mr. Burks opined that "generally," and if Goal E.2 is read "literally", the FLUM Amendment did not meet this Goal and afford protection for wetlands, vegetative communities, estuaries, wildlife and wildlife habitat. He perceives that "[a]nytime there's a development there will be impacts to the estuarine--the water bodies because of surficial runoff from the parking lots, from the impervious surfaces, and it will carry pollutants into those areas. And that includes soils also. . . . As far as upland habitat, when you develop an area like this, unless you leave certain parts, the upland habitat will be negatively impacted obviously. There won't be the trees there, the vegetation that was normally there before the development." For Mr. Burks, any development of the Property would generally be inconsistent with the Plan provisions recited above. But, his opinion is specifically based on how each system or plan for the site, or here, the Property, is actually designed--"it would depend on the design of the housing structures themselves and where they were placed. If you design anything in a manner which is going to protect that buffer and literally protect the water quality and the runoff in that area, then you may--it may not violate it." For example, if the Property were developed with 25-foot buffers instead of 50-foot buffers, Mr. Burks says that, from an ecology standpoint, there would be insufficient protection for wildlife, including threatened and endangered species. He offered the same opinion if the FLUM Amendment did not require a minimum ten percent set aside of the total acreage for significant natural communities habitat on the Property, such as, scrub of approximately 6.7 acres, a protected vegetative community existing on the upland portion of the Property. Furthermore, Parker introduced into evidence proposed site plans for the Property dated May 24, 2002, which show, in part, a 25-foot buffer, not a 50-foot buffer.4 Parker contends that these site plans are the best available data and analysis regarding whether the FLUM Amendment is "in compliance." However, the purpose of this proceeding is to determine whether the FLUM Amendment is "in compliance," not whether specific draft, and not approved, site plans are "in compliance" with the May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment or the LDRs. If site plans are approved and a development order issued by the County, Parker, and any other aggrieved or adversely affected party may file a challenge pursuant to Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. But, this is not the appropriate proceeding to challenge proposed site plans. This is not to say that proposed site plans cannot be considered data and analysis; only that they are not incorporated in the FLUM Amendment and are not subject to challenge here. See The Sierra Club, et al. v. St. John County, et al., Case Nos. 01- 1851GM and 01-1852GM (Recommended Order May 20, 2002; Final Order July 30, 2002). Internal Consistency Parker contended that the FLUM Amendment is inconsistent with several provisions of the May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment. Some of these issues have been discussed above in Findings of Fact 68 to 80, pertaining to environmental considerations. Another issue is whether the FLUM Amendment, which changes the maximum density on the Property, is inconsistent with Policy E.1.3.11 which provides: "The County shall not approve Comprehensive Plan Amendments that increase the residential density on the Future Land Use Map within the Coastal High Hazard Area." See also Policy A.1.5.6 which offers almost identical language. The FLUM Amendment changes the land use designation of the Property, and allows a land use "limited to not more than 56 residential units, built in not more than four buildings with residential uses, not more than 35 feet in height," and thus allows a potential increase in the density of the Property, located in the Coastal High Hazard Area. This resulted from the Settlement Agreement. In Policy A.1.11.6, [t]he County recognizes that the Plan's Objectives and Policies sometime serve to support competing interests. Accordingly, in such instances, and in the absence of a mandatory prohibition of the activity at issue, it is the County's intent that the Plan be construed as a whole and that potentially competing Objectives and Policies be construed together so as to render a balanced interpretation of the Plan. It is the further intent that the County interpretation of the Plan, whether by County staff, the Planning & Zoning Agency, or the Board of County Commissioners, shall be afforded appropriate deference. County interpretations of the Plan which balance potentially competing Objectives and Policies shall not be overturned in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the County interpretation has misapplied the Plan construed as a whole. The May 2000 EAR-Based Plan Amendment Goals, Objectives, and Policies must be read in their entirety and individual provisions cannot be read in isolation. Objective E.1.3 requires the County to engage in "post disaster planning, coastal area redevelopment, and hurricane preparedness. The County shall prepare post-disaster redevelopment plans which reduce or eliminate the exposure of human life and public and private property to natural hazards." Mr. Clem opined that Policy E.1.3.11, see Finding of Fact 81, expressed "the general intent of limiting population increases that would result in adverse impacts to hurricane evacuation of the coastal areas," and, in particular, the "barrier islands." (Policy E.1.9.5, under Objective E.1.9 Hurricane Evacuation Time, provides: "St. Johns County shall attempt to limit the density within the Coastal High Hazard Area as allowed by law.") Mr. Clem further stated that the FLUM Amendment, which restricted the Property to a maximum of 56 residential units, from a possible 116 unit maximum, was consistent with the Policy which restricts density within the coastal hazard zone. In rendering his opinions, Mr. Clem balanced the above- referenced Policies with Objective A.1.16, pertaining to "private property rights." When these May 2002 EAR-Based Plan Amendment provisions are read together, it appears that Mr. Clem's interpretations are not unreasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Department of Community Affairs concluding that the FLUM Amendment adopted by St. Johns County in Ordinance No. 2002-31 is "in compliance" as defined in Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2002.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the land development regulations (LDRs) adopted by Respondent, City of Sunny Isles Beach (City), by Ordinance No. 2002-165 on December 10, 2002, as amended, are in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record presented by the parties, the following undisputed findings of fact are determined: The City sits between the Intracoastal Waterway and the Atlantic Ocean in northern Dade County just south of the Town of Golden Beach (Town) and just north of the City of Bal Harbour. It was incorporated in 1997. As required by Section 163.3161, Florida Statutes, on October 5, 2000, the City adopted its first Comprehensive Plan. See Exhibit E. The Plan was amended by Ordinance No. 2002-147 on January 17, 2002. See Exhibit B. The Plan's Future Land Use Map contains a land use category known as Mixed Use-Resort/High Density (MU-R), which is "designed to encourage development and redevelopment within the area east of Collins Avenue for resort style developments catering to tourists and seasonal residents (hotel, hotel/ apartments, vacation resorts and resort style apartments) as well as high quality residential apartments." The category also allows associated retail uses such as restaurants and conference facilities that are internal and accessory to hotel/resort development. Pertinent to this dispute is Policy 15B of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE), which establishes density and intensity standards for the MU-R land use category. More specifically, the policy provides the following standards: This category allows an as-of-right density of a maximum one hundred (100) hotel- apartment units per acre and fifty (50) dwelling units per acre for apartments and a floor area ratio (FAR) intensity of 2.5. The allowable number of hotel rooms is controlled by floor area ratio. Additional residential density and FAR intensity may be permitted for developments that comply with bonus program requirements. Residential densities with bonuses may not exceed eighty (80) units per acre for solely apartments and one hundred twenty five (125) units per acre for hotel- apartments, exclusive of lockout units. (Emphasis added) Under the foregoing policy, a maximum density of 100 units per acre is allowed for hotel-apartment units, a maximum density of 50 units per acre is allowed for apartments, and a floor area ratio (FAR) intensity of 2.5 has been established. However, the underscored portion of the policy authorizes a bonus density and intensity program which allows a developer to exceed the prescribed density and intensity standards for developments "that comply with bonus program requirements." If the bonus density program requirements are satisfied, the policy establishes a cap for the density bonus at 125 hotel-apartment units per acre and 80 residential units per acre. While the policy does not establish a similar cap for the intensity bonus, it essentially defers the amount of the intensity cap and the details of the bonus program to the LDRs, which are to be adopted at a later time. Objective 8 of the Plan provides that the City "shall adopt, maintain, update and enhance development regulations and procedures to ensure that future land use and development in the City of Sunny Isles Beach is consistent with the Comprehensive Plan." Objective 15 of the Plan provides that the "land use densities, intensities and approaches [contained in Policy 15B] shall be incorporated in the Land Development Regulations." Finally, Section 163.3202(1), Florida Statutes, requires that local governments, within one year after submission of their comprehensive plans, "adopt or amend and enforce land development regulations that are consistent with and implement their comprehensive plan." On December 10, 2002, the City approved Ordinance No. 2002-165, which adopted a comprehensive set of LDRs to implement the Plan. See Exhibit C. In 2003, the LDRs were further amended in minor respects by Ordinance Nos. 2003-167, 2003-171, 2003-173, and 2003-178. See Exhibit D. In sum, the LDRs consist of more than one hundred pages of regulations, and except for one of these, Section 703.8.4(i)3, none of the other LDRs directly relates to this dispute. Section 703.8.4(i)3 implements Policy 15B by outlining the criteria and requirements necessary to qualify for additional intensity or FAR through the bonus program. It also establishes a cap on FAR intensity. If the bonus program requirements are satisfied,3 the regulation allows a maximum intensity bonus of 1.5 FAR, or a potential total FAR of 4.0, which exceeds the 2.5 FAR contained in Policy 15B. (Intensity bonuses to increase the FAR can also be obtained through the transfer of development rights under Section 515 of the LDRs. However, those bonuses are not in issue here.) Petitioners include a group of twelve City residents; the Town, which lies adjacent to, and just north of, the City; and two Town residents. There is no dispute that Petitioners will be substantially affected by the LDRs and thus they have standing to bring this challenge. In their Cross-Motion, which essentially tracks the allegations in their Amended Request for Hearing, Petitioners assert that they, and not the City, are entitled to a summary final order in their favor for three reasons. First, they argue that it is beyond fair debate that all of the LDRs, including Section 703.8.4(i)3, are inconsistent with Policies 4A and 4C of the Intergovernmental Coordination Element of the Plan because the City failed to solicit comments from the Town prior to the adoption of the LDRs. Second, they argue that it is beyond fair debate that the City violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(2)(g) when it adopted Section 703.8.4(i)3. Finally, they contend that it is beyond fair debate that in order to achieve consistency with the Plan, the LDR must not establish a FAR that is beyond the intensity standard (2.5) established in the Plan. Policies 4A and 4C of the Intergovernmental Coordination Element provide as follows: 4A. The City will notify and solicit comments from adjacent jurisdictions and the School Board of any requests for land use amendments, variances, conditional uses or site plan approvals which impact property within 500 feet of a public school or within 500 feet of the boundaries of an adjacent jurisdiction. 4C. The City will notify and solicit comments from adjacent jurisdictions and the School Board of its existing standards or proposed regulations being considered for problematic or incompatible land uses. Nothing in the two policies requires that the City solicit comments from adjacent jurisdictions when adopting the LDRs being challenged here. Rather, these policies specifically address notice and comments as to "land use" changes, not the adoption of LDRs, or to "regulations being considered for problematic or incompatible land uses." Even assuming arguendo that the two policies require some type of prior notice, Petitioners do not dispute the fact (as set forth in the Department's Determination) that prior to the adoption of the LDRs, "the City notified the Town both in writing and orally". (Determination, Finding of Fact 6). Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(2) contains general data and analyses requirements for comprehensive plans. Paragraph (2)(g), which Petitioners assert was violated by the City when it adopted Section 703.8.4(i)3, provides as follows: (g) A local government may include, as part of its adopted plan, documents adopted by reference but not incorporated verbatim into the plan. The adoption by reference must identify the title and author of the document and indicate clearly what provisions and edition of the document is being adopted. The adoption by reference may not include future amendments to the document because this would violate the statutory procedure for plan amendments and frustrate public participation on those amendments. A local government may include a provision in its plan stating that all documents adopted by reference are as they existed on a date certain. Documents adopted by reference that are revised subsequent to plan adoption will need to have their reference updated within the plan through the amendment process. Unless documents adopted by reference comply with paragraph 9J-5.005(2)(g), F.A.C., or are in the F.S., the F.A.C., or the Code of Federal Regulations, copies or summaries of the documents shall be submitted as support documents for the adopted portions of the plan amendment. This rule sets forth the manner in which local governments may adopt and incorporate by reference documents into their comprehensive plans. If they choose to do so, they must identify the title and author of the document being incorporated by reference, the edition of the document, and the specific portion of the document relied upon. Whenever an amendment or change to the incorporated document occurs at a future time, the local government must readopt those changes in order for them to be valid and effective. On its face, the rule applies exclusively to the use of incorporated documents in comprehensive plans, or plan amendments, and has no application to LDRs. In the case of Town of Golden Beach et al. v. City of Sunny Isles Beach et al., No. 03-472AP (Fla. 11th Cir.Ct., Appellate Division, June 15, 2004), a copy of which has been submitted as Exhibit G, Petitioners unsuccessfully sought by petitions for writ of certiorari to quash a City Resolution which granted Intervenor's application to construct a condominium at 19505 Collins Avenue, Sunny Isles Beach. The application sought approval of a site plan for the condominium and approval of the use of the property as a receiver site for the transfer of 38,847 square feet of transfer development rights in accordance with the City's LDRs. In that proceeding, Petitioners contended that they were denied due process because the City failed to provide proper notice to neighboring property owners under Section 515.7 of the LDRs; and that the City violated the essential requirements of the law by improperly transferring development rights and additional floor area ratio through bonuses to the developer, in excess of the 2.5 FAR expressly permitted by the City's Plan and LDRs. The court ruled in favor of the City on both issues. The parties agree, however, that a motion for rehearing of that decision has been filed by Petitioners, and the decision is not yet final. Further, the decision does not clearly indicate whether the same consistency arguments raised here were adjudicated in that matter. The notice issue is not the same.
The Issue Whether the Appellant, Edward M. Mitchell, has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property he owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property at Issue. On or about September 23, 1980, Mr. Mitchell entered into an agreement to purchase 6.141 acres of property (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), located just north of Interstate 10, on the east side of North Meridian Road, Leon County, Florida. The Property was to be purchased from Textron Petroleum Products, Inc. The following "additional provision" was included in the agreement entered into for the purchase of the Property: Buyer to have 30 days from date hereof within which to obtain such permits as he deems necessary. If Buyer cannot obtain the same, he shall give written notice thereof within said time limit and the contract shall be null and void. If such written notice is not given within such period, this contingency shall be deemed waived. In 1980, the Property was zoned C-1, neighborhood commercial. Under C- 1 zoning, neighborhood commercial, up to 69,000 square feet of commercial space could be placed on the Property based upon a restriction of 85% impervious surface. Mr. Mitchell wanted to insure that he could obtain the permits necessary to develop the Property consistent with C-1 zoning before he purchased the Property. On or about November 3, 1980, the real estate broker involved in the purchase of the Property, sent a letter to Bob Speidel of Environmental Services of Leon County. In the letter Leon County was informed of the pending sale of the Property and the contingency of "Mr. Mitchell being able to obtain a permit to develop the tract by clearing the land, constructing a retention pond and filling the remaining land to a usable elevation." On or about November 7, 1980, an Application for Permit for Clearing and Development was filed on behalf of Mr. Mitchell. This permit was the only permit required in 1980 to develop the Property. The evidence failed to prove, however, that it was the only permit required to develop the Property immediately before the adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. On or about November 14, 1980, a Clearing and Development Permit, number 1113 (hereinafter referred to as "Permit 1113"), was issued on the Property by the Leon County Department of Public Works, Division of Environmental Services. Permit 1113 specifically provided that Mr. Mitchell was authorized by the permit "to make changes in this land proposed to be subdivided, developed or changed in use by grading, excavating, removal, alteration or destruction of the natural top soil, as hereinafter located and described." The specific use Mr. Mitchell planned to put the Property to and the manner of developing the Property were not specified in Permit 1113 or the application therefore. On or about December 23, 1980, Mr. Mitchell purchased the Property for $44,211.92. Mr. Mitchell would not have purchased the Property for the price paid if it had not been zoned C-1 or if he had not obtained Permit 1113 or a similar permit. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Mitchell informed Leon County prior to his purchase of the Property what specific use the Property would be put to or that Leon County ever approved any specific type of development of the Property. Development of the Property. Sometime between 1980 and 1985, Mr. Mitchell cleared the Property. In June, 1985, Mr. Mitchell applied with the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation for a General Permit for New Stormwater Discharge Facility Construction. In October, 1985, the permit was approved. When the Property was cleared some of trees were removed which should not have been removed. Therefore, in July, 1985, Mr. Mitchell agreed to replant trees on the Property. In August, 1985, Mr. Mitchell was issued a Tree Removal Permit for the trees that had already been removed. Mr. Mitchell brought fill (approximately five feet) onto the Property and did substantial grading of the Property. The elevation of the Property was increased from 108 feet to 112-113 feet. Storm water drainage was designed and installed on the Property. The storm water pond was built to accommodate 65,000 to 70,000 square feet of construction. Leon County was aware of this fact. In order to maximize use of the Property a Leon County employee informed Mr. Mitchell that he could place the retention pond on an abutting parcel of property. Consequently, Mr. Mitchell purchased an adjoining parcel of real estate. Mr. Mitchell has not obtained a storm water permit, a building permit or site plan review or approval for the Property. Mr. Mitchell has worked closely with officials of Leon County before and after his purchase of the Property. Mr. Mitchell retained an engineer to prepare a site plan for the Property. The site plan was prepared consistent with C-1, neighborhood commercial zoning, 85% impervious surface and off-site retention. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Leon County was made aware of the site plan. Mr. Mitchell would not have done the site work or purchased the abutting parcel of property except for the C-1, neighborhood commercial zoning of the Property and the issuance of Permit 1113. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Mitchell informed Leon County after his purchase of the Property what specific use the Property would be put to or that Leon County ever approved any specific type of development of the Property. Change in Position or Obligations and Expenses Incurred by Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell spent $44,211.92 to purchase the Property based upon the zoning on the Property and the issuance of Permit 1113. The work performed on the Property after it was purchased by Mr. Mitchell was performed primarily by Mitchell Brothers, Inc., a company owned by Mr. Mitchell. The "value" of the work performed by Mr. Mitchell was in excess of $250,000.00. The evidence failed to prove what the actual cost of the work performed was to Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell acquired the abutting parcel of property in reliance on the zoning on the Property, Permit 1113 and a suggestion of an official of Leon County. The abutting property costs several thousand dollars. The evidence failed to prove, however, that the suggestion of the Leon County official concerning the purchase of the abutting property constituted a representation of Leon County that the Property could be developed in a particular manner. It was merely a solution offered to a problem of Mr. Mitchell which Mr. Mitchell was free to reject or accept. The suggestion also only confirmed that the Property could be developed under the current zoning. Development of the Property under the 2010 Plan. Under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the Property is located in an area designated as "lake protection." Only minor commercial uses would be permitted in such an area. Under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the Property may be developed with a maximum of 20,000 square feet of retail (non-office) space. Additionally, one dwelling unit per two acres of property could also be used for residential purposes. Therefore, the Property could be developed by building three residences on the Property in addition to the 20,000 square feet of retail space. Only approximately one-third of the site work that has been performed on the Property would be needed to develop only 20,000 square feet of commercial space on the Property and the purchase of the abutting property would not have necessary. Procedure. On or about November 2, 1990, Edward M. Mitchell filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), with Leon County. By letter dated January 2, 1991, Mr. Mitchell was informed that his Application was incomplete. By letter dated January 18, 1991, Mr. Mitchell provided the additional information requested. By letter dated January 25, 1991, Mr. Mitchell was informed that Leon County intended to deny his Application. Mr. Mitchell requested a hearing before the Staff Committee of Leon County by letter dated January 30, 1991. On February 11, 1991, a hearing was held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee. By letter dated February 13, 1991, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department informed Mr. Mitchell that the Application had been denied. On February 22, 1991, a Notice of Appeal was filed by Mr. Mitchell appealing the decision to deny the Application. By letter dated March 1, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to review this matter. By agreement of the parties, the undersigned allowed the parties to supplement the record in this matter on May 24, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the pleadings and evidence, including the stipulation by counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Marion County (County), is a local governmental unit subject to the land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive growth management plans and amendments thereto. In this case, the County has adopted an amendment to its comprehensive plan, which is the subject of the dispute. Petitioners, Henry and Betty Prominski, are residents of Marion County and own a 16.5 acre tract of land on the southeast bank of Lake Weir in the southeastern portion of the County. The property is more commonly known as Orangewood Shores Subdivision. Until April 1994, the land was classified in the urban expansion category, which allows up to four residential units per acre. The County adopted its comprehensive plan in January 1992. After the plan was determined by the DCA to be not in compliance, the County eventually adopted certain remedial amendments on April 7, 1994, one of which changed the land use designation on petitioners' property from urban expansion to urban reserve. Under the new classification, only one residential unit per ten acres is allowed. A cumulative notice of intent to find the plan and remedial amendments in compliance was issued by the DCA on May 30, 1994. During the foregoing process, petitioners timely submitted oral or written objections to the County concerning the plan amendment, and thus they are affected persons within the meaning of the law. On September 14, 1994, the County, through its Staff Vesting Committee, issued Vesting Order No. 94-14, which granted petitioners' application for vesting determination on Orangewood Shores Subdivision. Among other things, the order determined that "the applicant has vested rights to complete the development (known as Orangewood Shores Subdivision) without aggregation of lots providing the applicant continues development activity in good faith." In this regard, petitioners have represented that they intend to "continue development activity in good faith," and they do not intend to vacate their plat. They also recognize that their land is vested from the plan amendment. Despite the lack of any viable issues regarding the development of their property, for the sake of "principle" only, they still wish to contest the de facto reclassification of their property. The foregoing language in the Vesting Order means that petitioners have vested rights to complete the development of their land notwithstanding the change of land use designation from urban expansion to urban reserve. The parties also agree that the effect of the Vesting Order is to vest the property from the comprehensive plan and the restrictions of the urban reserve area. Therefore, within the narrow context of the petition, the thrust of which is that the plan amendment prevents the subdivision's development, the issues raised therein are no longer viable, and petitioners do not have a cognizable interest in the outcome of this proceeding. The controversy is accordingly deemed to be moot.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the petition in this case on the ground the issues raised therein are moot. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry J. Prominski, Esquire Post Office Box 540 Weirsdale, Florida 32195-0540 Sherry A. Spiers, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 315 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Thomas D. MacNamara, Esquire 601 Southeast 25th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34471-2690 James F. Murley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Stephanie M. Gehres, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
