The Issue The issue is whether proposed rules 9J-5.026(3)(d), (7)(b), (7)(c)4. and 6., (8)(a), (9)(a)3., 6., 18., and 19., and 9J- 11.023(2), (4), and (5), and existing Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.003(80) are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority for the reasons alleged in the Petition for Administrative Hearing to Challenge Proposed Amendments to Chapters 9J-5 and 9J-11, F.A.C. and to Challenge Existing Rule 9J-5.003(80) (Petition).1
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the following findings are made: The Parties Petitioners are not-for-profit organizations whose members own real property throughout the State. A substantial number of their respective members own real property which could be amassed as one or more areas in the RLSA program. Some members of these organizations have taken steps in an effort to have their land designated as an RLSA. On behalf of their respective members, each Petitioner has a substantial interest in public policy relating to land use planning, growth management, and the protection of agricultural, rural, and conservation lands. Respondent, Department of Community Affairs (Department), has stipulated to the facts necessary to establish standing for each Petitioner. The Department is the state agency charged with implementing the review provisions of the Local Government Planning and Land Development Regulation Act codified in Sections 163.3164, et seq., Florida Statutes. The Original Statute Creating the RLSA Program Because of the complexity of the subject matter, a recitation of the RLSA program's history is appropriate. In 2001, the Legislature enacted Chapter 2001-279, Laws of Florida, codified as Section 163.3177(11)(d), Florida Statutes, which created the RLSA pilot program. The law became effective on July 1, 2001, and stated: It is the intent of the Legislature that rural land stewardship areas be used to further the following broad principles of rural sustainability: restoration and maintenance of the economic value of rural land; control of urban sprawl; identification and protection of ecosystems, habitats, and natural resources; promotion of rural economic activity; maintenance of the viability of Florida's agriculture economy; and protection of the character of the rural areas of Florida. § 163.3177(11)(d)2., Fla. Stat. (2001). While the eligibility criteria and substantive requirements of the RLSA program have been amended several times, the foregoing principles have remained the same. The statute provides an option, not an exception, under the State's growth management laws for local governments to implement innovative planning and development strategies for large, rural parcels. While having many of the attributes of a traditional "transfer of development rights" program, the RLSA planning process provides additional planning and economic incentives as well as flexibility for the local government to implement this program. The program was best summarized by Secretary Pelham at hearing as follows: The RLSA process is an optional planning process which local governments may elect to use in rural and agricultural areas of the state. Essentially it provides incentives to landowners to preserve or conserve environmental and natural resources and agricultural lands by giving them stewardship credits that may be assigned to those lands to be preserved, but which can be used on other lands through a transfer of those credits to the receiving areas. Tr. at 182. The first step in the RLSA planning process is for the local government to "apply to the Department in writing requesting consideration for authorization to designate a [RLSA]." § 163.3177(11)(d)3., Fla. Stat. (2001). Under the original statute, if the Department chose to authorize a local government to designate an RLSA, it would do so by written agreement with the local government. See § 163.3177(11)(d)4. and (5), Fla. Stat. (2001). Because the original statute was a pilot program, the Department could authorize only five local governments to designate RLSAs. See § 163.3177(11)(d)6., Fla. Stat. (2001). To be eligible for designation as an RLSA under this pilot program, a parcel of land had to be larger than 50,000 acres but not over 250,000 acres; it had to be designated as rural or a substantial equivalent on the future land use map (FLUM); and it had to be located outside the municipal and established urban growth boundaries. See § 163.3177(11)(d)6., Fla. Stat. (2001). For this reason, only counties (and not cities) were eligible to participate in the program. Once it received Department authorization to designate an RLSA, the county was to then propose and adopt a plan amendment designating the RLSA. See § 163.3177(11)(d)6., Fla. Stat. (2001). This plan amendment was to be subject to full review under Section 163.3184, Florida Statutes, for a compliance determination. Also, the plan amendment was required to specifically address the following: Criteria for the designation of receiving areas within rural land stewardship areas in which innovative planning and development strategies may be applied. Criteria shall at a minimum provide for the following adequacy of suitable land to accommodate development so as to avoid conflict with environmentally sensitive areas, resources, and habitats; compatibility between and transition from higher density uses to lower intensity rural uses; the establishment of receiving area service boundaries which provide for a separation between receiving areas and other land uses within the rural land stewardship area through limitations on the extension of services; and connection of receiving areas with the rest of the rural land stewardship area using rural design and rural road corridors. Goals, objectives, and policies setting forth the innovative planning and development strategies to be applied within rural land stewardship areas pursuant to the provisions of this section. A process for the implementation of innovative planning and development strategies within the rural land stewardship area, including those described in this subsection and s. 9J-5.006(5)(l), Florida Administrative Code, which provide for a functional mix of land uses and which are applied through the adoption by the local government of zoning and land development regulations applicable to the rural land stewardship area. A process which encourages visioning pursuant to s. 163.3167(11) to ensure that innovative planning and development strategies comply with the provisions of this section. The control of sprawl through the use of innovative strategies and creative land use techniques consistent with the provisions of this subsection and rule 9J-5.006(5)(l), Florida Administrative Code. Once the plan amendment was in place, the county was then to implement it through land development regulations. Under the original statute, the county by ordinance was to "assign to the [RLSA] a certain number of credits, to be known as 'transferable rural land use credits' . . . ." These credits would then be transferred to designated receiving areas "solely for the purpose of implementing innovative planning and development strategies and creative land use planning techniques adopted by the local government pursuant to this section." See § 163.3177(11)(d)8.b., Fla. Stat. (2001). Once transferable rural land use credits were transferred from a parcel, the underlying land uses would be extinguished, the parcel would be limited to agriculture or conservation, and the transfer would be memorialized as a restrictive covenant running with the land. See § 163.3177(11)(d)8.k., Fla. Stat. (2001). The Department was granted the authority to implement this section by rule in the original statute. However, the Department did not adopt rules. No county applied to participate in this pilot program. Amendments to the RLSA Statute The Legislature substantially amended the statute in 2004. See Ch. 2004-372, Laws of Fla. Although the program had no participants as of that time, the Legislature removed the pilot status of the program and the limitation on the number of local governments that may be authorized to designate an RLSA. See § 163.3177(11)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (2004). Although the requirement for a written agreement between the county and the Department was deleted, the requirement for the county's application and Department's authorization prior to the designation of an RLSA remained. See § 163.3177(11)(d)1. and 4., Fla. Stat. (2004). The minimum acreage for an RLSA was reduced to 10,000 acres and the maximum was removed. § 163.3177(11)(d)4., Fla. Stat. (2004). The statute also explicitly recognized that RLSAs could be multi-county. § 163.3177(11)(d)2., Fla. Stat. (2004). In 2005, the Legislature again amended the statute in several respects, one of which was directed to the stewardship credit methodology. See Ch. 2005-290, Laws of Fla. However, the statute still requires that the total amount of credits is to be tied to the "25-year or greater projected population of the rural land stewardship area." Although the statute was amended again in 2006, those amendments have no bearing on the issues in this case. See Ch. 2006-220, Laws of Fla. Designating an RLSA Under the Statute Collier County has been frequently mentioned as a local government with an RLSA program. However, that County's comprehensive plan provisions regarding rural development were not adopted under the RLSA statute; rather, they were adopted by the County in 1999 as conventional plan amendments that were later approved in 2002 by a final order issued by the Administration Commission. Collier County's rural planning program does, however, have some of the same core attributes found in the RLSA program, including the creation of transferable land use credits to enable development in designated receiving areas. The Department closely examined the Collier County program as part of its "Rural Land Stewardship Area Program 2007 Annual Report to the Legislature" (2007 Annual Report). See Joint Exhibit 4. See also § 163.3177(11)(d)8., Fla. Stat. ("[t]he department shall report to the Legislature on an annual basis on the results of implementation of [RLSAs] authorized by the department"). This examination revealed several substantial flaws in the program. First, the Collier County program is extremely complex, with over twenty general attributes that must be examined for every acre of land assigned stewardship credits. This would make it difficult and expensive for small rural counties with limited resources. The Collier County program also assigns the highest stewardship credits to environmentally sensitive lands and appreciably lower values to agricultural land. The result is that development is directed to agricultural areas. For example, eighty-seven percent of the footprint of one receiving area that is currently being developed, known as Ave Maria, was in active agriculture prior to its designation for development. In this respect, the Collier County system is directing development to agricultural lands and not protecting and conserving those lands, which the Department contends contravenes the principles of rural sustainability. Another major concern with the Collier County program is the extent and distribution of receiving areas. The Collier County program does not have any requirements that the receiving area be clustered, thus allowing for the possibility of scattered, sprawling receiving areas throughout eastern Collier County. Also, there appears to be no limit on the footprint of these receiving areas. The original Collier County program envisioned development on only nine to ten percent of the entire area, for a total of approximately 16,800 acres. However, due to the complexity and "flexibility" within the Collier County stewardship credit system, "the maximum development footprint cannot be determined." On September 12, 2006, St. Lucie County adopted plan amendments under the RLSA statute. Later that year, the Department reviewed the amendments and found them to be in compliance. In preparing the 2007 Annual Report, the Department undertook a detailed analysis of the St. Lucie RLSA amendments. Even though the amendments had been previously found to be in compliance, the new analysis revealed several shortcomings in the amendments, including their failure to discuss, analyze, or demonstrate how they further the principles of rural sustainability, a primary focus of the program. Also, the amendments were not supported by an analysis of land use need. Instead of projecting population and need, the RLSA adopted an arbitrary cap of 13,248 dwelling units with "no known planning basis." The St. Lucie RLSA is similar to the Collier County program in two respects: it is very complex, and it places no spacial limits on the footprint of the development area. Due to these shortcomings, the Department has placed little, if any, reliance on the St. Lucie County RLSA amendments as an example of proper planning under the RLSA statute. There is no evidence that any development has occurred under the St. Lucie program, and its most recent Evaluation and Appraisal Report dated October 2008 indicated that none may ever occur. In 2007, Highlands and Osceola Counties both applied for and were granted authorization by the Department to designate RLSAs. However, both counties later notified the Department that they would no longer pursue the RLSAs, and the authorizations were withdrawn by the Department. The Rule Development Process In early 2007, the Department became aware of assertions by some landowners that the RLSA program provides for unlimited development within a stewardship area; that RLSA plan amendments were not subject to the growth management provisions in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes; and that RLSAs were not subject to a needs analysis, as required by the law. At the same time, the Department received numerous inquiries from large landowners and/or their representatives regarding RLSA proposals, some as large as 750,000 acres, and for two "new towns" with 100,000 and 60,000 dwelling units, respectively. It also became aware of concerns and criticisms leveled against the one adopted RLSA program in St. Lucie County and rural planning efforts in Collier County. The main criticism was that the system being used for RLSA planning was too complex, which resulted in an expensive, consultant- intensive process that lacked transparency and was largely incomprehensible. Based on the above concerns and criticisms, the Department began gathering information in early 2007 in preparation for rulemaking. On July 19, 2007, it conducted its first workshop. Two other workshops were held, and the first draft of proposed rule 9J-5.026 was issued in January 2008. That proposed rule set forth the minimum substantive requirements for RLSA planning. In September 2008, the Department issued its first draft of proposed rule 9J-11.023, which sets forth the procedural requirements for a local government to seek authorization from the Department to designate an RLSA. After receiving comments from interested parties, the Department noticed the rules for adoption and conducted a rule adoption hearing. On January 7, 2009, Petitioners filed a Petition challenging most of the provisions in the proposed rules. See DOAH Case No. 09-0048RP. Based upon that challenge, which raised new issues not previously brought to the attention of the Department, the Department withdrew the rules and made substantial revisions to address these concerns. This rendered moot Petitioners' earlier challenge. After the revised rules were noticed for adoption, Petitioners filed their Petition challenging numerous provisions within the proposed rules as well as one existing rule. The Objections As summarized in their Proposed Final Order, Petitioners contend (a) that proposed rules 9J-11.023(2), (4), and (5) are invalid because they exceed the Department's grant of rulemaking authority;4 (b) that proposed rules 9J-5.026(7)(b), (7)(c)4., 6., (8)(a), and (9)(a)3., 6., 18., and 19. enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented; (c) that proposed rule 9J-5.026(3) is vague and fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions; (d) that proposed rule 9J-5.026(9)(a)18. is arbitrary; and (e) that existing Rule 9J-5.003(80) contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. The remaining allegations have been voluntarily dismissed. a. Does proposed rule 9J-11.023 exceed the grant of legislative authority? Petitioners first contend that subsections (2) and (4) in their entirety and the words "If authorized to proceed" in the first sentence of subsection (5) of proposed rule 9J-11.023 are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because they exceed the Department's specific grant of legislative authority. The challenged subsections of the proposed rule read as follows: 9J-11.023 Procedure for the Designation of a Rural Land Stewardship Area. * * * (2) Pre-Notification Actions. Prior to giving official notification of intent to designate a RLSA to the Department, the county(ies) shall conduct at least one noticed public workshop to discuss and evaluate the appropriateness of establishing a RLSA. The county(ies) shall invite the Department of Community Affairs, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Affairs, Department of Environmental Protection, Department of Transportation, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, affected regional planning council(s), and affected water management district(s) (collectively referred to as the "RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team") to participate in the workshop. Potentially affected landowners and other interested parties shall be given notice and invited to participate in the workshop. The workshop shall address: the statutory process for designating a RLSA; the planning issues that are likely to arise; and the technical assistance that will be available from state and regional agencies if the county(ies) proceed to designate a RLSA. The county(ies) shall provide opportunities for broad public participation in the RLSA process, which may include a series of public meetings or workshops. The county(ies), in coordination with the affected landowners, shall host a site visit of the RLSA for the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team in conjunction with the workshop or after the notification of intent to designate pursuant to paragraph (4)(b). * * * Review of Notification of Intent to Designate. The Department will provide members of the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team with a copy of the notification of intent to designate within five days after receipt of the notification. If a site visit was not made prior to the notification of intent to designate, the Department will contact the county(ies) within ten days after receipt of the notification of intent to arrange a site visit of the proposed RLSA and surrounding lands. The county(ies) shall ensure proper coordination with the affected landowners. The Department will coordinate the scheduling of the site visit with the members of the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team and request their participation in the site visit. Members of the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team shall be asked to provide the Department oral and/or written comments on the proposed RLSA within 30 days of the receipt of the notification of intent to designate or the site visit, if it occurs after the notification. The Department may also request meetings with the members of the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team to discuss and evaluate the notification and site visit. The Department may also request a conference with the county's(ies') staff(s) to discuss issues and questions that have arisen as a result of the site visit, comments from members of the Interagency Technical Advisory Team and other stakeholders, and the Department's evaluation of the RLSA proposal. Not later than 60 days following the receipt of the notification of intent to designate or the site visit, whichever is later, the Department shall issue a written notification to the county(ies). The Department's notification shall authorize the county(ies) to proceed with a plan amendment to designate the RLSA or inform the county(ies) of the Department's decision not to authorize. The decision shall be based on the information contained in or gained from the notification, site visit, other agency comments, and other information received. The Department shall authorize the county(ies) to proceed if it determines that the proposed RLSA meets the threshold eligibility requirements of subsection 9J-5.026(4), F.A.C. and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the RLSA will further the principles of rural sustainability. If the Department decides to authorize the county(ies) to proceed with a plan amendment to designate a RLSA, the notification will set forth the facts on which the authorization is based, and may include recommendations to the county(ies) regarding the RLSA. The notification will not guarantee that a comprehensive plan amendment(s) to designate a RLSA will be found in compliance by the Department. It will only constitute the Department's authorization to designate a RLSA if the necessary comprehensive plan amendment(s) are adopted and found in compliance pursuant to Section 163.3184, F.S. If the Department decides not to authorize the county(ies) to proceed with a plan amendment to designate a RLSA, the agency's notification will explain the reasons for the decision. Amendment to the Comprehensive Plan: If authorized to proceed, the county(ies) may prepare and process a plan amendment(s) that will be reviewed by the Department pursuant to Section 163.3184, F.S. The county(ies) may, in preparing the plan amendment(s), establish a local visioning process to facilitate the development of a RLSA plan amendment. The Department encourages the county(ies) to seek and utilize technical assistance from the members of the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team in preparing a RLSA plan amendment. 33. Sections 120.52(8)(b) and 120.54(3)(a)1., Florida Statutes, require that the agency list in the rulemaking notice the purported rulemaking authority for the proposed rule. To comply with this requirement, the Department's rulemaking notice cites Sections 163.3177(9) and (11)(h), Florida Statutes, as the specific authority for adopting the rule and Section 163.3177(11)(d)1., Florida Statutes, as the law being implemented. In its Proposed Final Order, the Department relies on Section 163.3177(11)(h) as the specific statutory authority for rulemaking. It provides that the Department "may adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of [subsection 163.3177(11)]," including the RLSA provisions found in Section 163.3177(11)(d). On the other hand, the law being implemented is quite lengthy and reads as follows: (11)(d)1. The department, in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, the Department of Environmental Protection, water management districts, and regional planning councils, shall provide assistance to local governments in the implementation of this paragraph and rule 9J-5.006(5)(l), Florida Administrative Code. Implementation of those provisions shall include a process by which the department may authorize local governments to designate all or portions of lands classified in the future land use element as predominately agriculture, rural, open, open-rural, or a substantively equivalent land use, as a rural land stewardship area within which planning and economic incentives are applied to encourage the implementation of innovative and flexible planning techniques, including those contained herein and in rule 9J- 5.006(5)(l), Florida Administrative Code. Assistance may include, but is not limited to: Assistance from the Department of Environmental Protection and water management districts in creating the geographic information systems land cover database and aerial photogrammetry needed to prepare for a [RLSA]; Support for local government implementation of rural land stewardship concepts by providing information and assistance to local governments regarding land acquisition and assistance to local governments regarding land acquisition programs that may be used by the local government programs that may be used by the local government or landowners to leverage the protection of greater acreage and maximize the effectiveness of rural land stewardship areas; and Expansion of the role of the Department of Community Affairs as a resource agency to facilitate establishment of [RLSAs] in smaller rural counties that do not have the staff or planning budgets to create a [RLSA]. Proposed rule 9J-11.023 describes in detail the process by which a local government is to request Department authorization to designate a RLSA. At issue here are provisions in subsections (2), (4), and (5) of the rule that require a local government wishing to designate an RLSA to conduct a public workshop; cover particular topics during the workshop; host a site visit with designated agencies; and based on the information gathered from this process to then allow the Department, in its discretion, to either authorize or not authorize the local government to begin to prepare and process an RLSA amendment. The latter decision is based on whether the local government has shown "a reasonable likelihood that the RLSA will further the principles of rural sustainability." Petitioners contend that there is no specific grant of rulemaking authority that authorizes the Department to mandate these procedures in the rule or to prevent a local government from proposing and processing an RLSA plan amendment. Instead, they contend that the enabling statute only allows the Department to promulgate rules that are "necessary" to implement the RLSA program, those being a requirement that the county provide notice to the Department that it intends to propose a RLSA plan amendment and a description of the subsequent review process by the Department to determine whether the amendment is in compliance. Section 163.3177(11)(d)1., Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to provide "assistance to local governments in the implementation of this paragraph and rule 9J- 5.006(5)(l)." (The cited rule, among other things, encourages "innovative and flexible planning and development strategies" that allow conversion of rural and agricultural lands to other uses.) The statute also includes specific authority to establish a "process by which the department may authorize local governments to designate all or portions of lands classified in the future land use element (FLUE] as predominately agricultural, rural, open, open-rural, or a substantively equivalent land use, as a [RLSA] . . . ." The rule accomplishes this purpose by requiring state agency technical assistance, establishing the process for a workshop and site visit, requiring that the county's notification describe the basis for the designation, requiring broad public participation, and assuring, by approval or disapproval of the county's preliminary proposal, that the proposed RLSA will promote the principles of rural sustainability. Notably, had the Legislature intended this authorization process to be the same as the existing compliance review process for conventional plan amendments, there would be no need for this statutory language. The proposed rule does not exceed the Department's grant of rulemaking authority. b. Do certain provisions within proposed rule 9J-5.026(7) and (9) enlarge, modify, or contravene the law implemented? Petitioners further contend that proposed rules 9J- 5.026(7)(b), (7)(c)4., 6., (8)(a), and (9)(a)3., 6., 18., and enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented. The challenged rules read as follows: 9J-5.026 Rural Land Stewardship Area (RLSA) * * * Data and Analysis Requirements. * * * Population Projections and Analysis of Land Use Need. Population projections and analysis of land use need shall be prepared in accordance with Rule 9J-5.006, F.A.C., with the following modifications: The amount and extent of allowable development in the RLSA must be based on the 25-year or greater projected population of the RLSA; the anticipated effect of the proposed RLSA must receiving areas, including any committed catalyst projects, infrastructure improvements, or other projects that would attract and support development; the furtherance of the statutory principles of rural sustainability; and the goals, objectives, and policies of the RLSA plan amendment. * * * 4. Land development and other conversion threats whereby rural resources under threat require more incentives via stewardship credits and less threatened resources require lesser incentives. This includes the future threat of low-density sprawl on lands within and surrounding Eligible Receiving Areas; and * * * 6. Values shall be assigned to all of the land in the RLSA. The highest values shall be assigned to the most environmentally valuable land, and to open space and agricultural land where the retention of such lands is a priority. The assignment of values shall be submitted with the RLSA plan amendment as part of the supporting data and analysis. * * * Stewardship Credit System Criteria. (a) Each credit shall represent a defined number of residential units or a defined amount of non-residential square footage. The credit transferee may decide whether to use the credit for a residential or non- residential use in accordance with the land use standards established for the Designated Receiving Area. * * * Goals, Objectives, Policies, and Map. * * * (a) The goals, objectives, and policies shall include the following: * * * 3. Identification of the innovative planning and development strategies to be used within the RLSA, and a process for implementing the strategies, including the adoption of implementing plan amendments, land development regulations, and the issuance of development orders. The process shall include provision for the Department's review of a proposed land development regulation to designate a receiving area for consistency with the RLSA plan amendment. * * * 6. A requirement that Eligible Receiving Areas shall be located on land that is suitable for development and have the lowest land values based on the land values analysis conducted pursuant to paragraph (7)(c). * * * Policies for new towns which comply with the following: As required by subsection 9J-5.003(80) and paragraph 9J-5.006(5)(1), F.A.C., a new town shall be designated on the future land use map. A new town shall be located within a Designated Receiving Area. The plan amendment designating a new town shall include a master development plan that establishes the size of the new town, the amount, location, type, density and intensity of development, and the design standards to be utilized in the new town. Any increase in the density or intensity of land use required to achieve the proposed new town may occur only through the use of stewardship credits assigned or transferred to the Designated Receiving Area either prior to or subsequent to the designation of the new town on the future land use map. New towns shall be surrounded by greenbelts, except for any connecting rural road corridors and to the extent that new towns are adjacent to existing or planned urban development or incorporated areas. A future land use map amendment to designate a new town shall be internally consistent with RLSA provisions of the comprehensive plan. A future land use map amendment to designate a new town shall be accompanied by an amendment to the capital improvements element to incorporate a financially feasible five-year capital improvements schedule for the public facilities necessary to serve the new town and an amendment to the transportation or traffic circulation element to designate any new rural road corridors required to connect the new town with the rest of the RLSA. Provisions to ensure that any use of the underlying densities and intensities of land uses assigned to parcels of land by the county comprehensive plan prior to designation of the RLSA furthers the principles of rural sustainability. * * * The grant of authority for this rule is cited as Sections 163.3177(9) and (11)(h), Florida Statutes, while Sections 163.3177(2), (3), (6)(a), (8), (10)(e), (11)(a), (b), and (d)1., 2., 4., 5., and 6., Florida Statutes, are cited as the laws being implemented. Subsection (2) of the law being implemented provides that "[c]oordination of the several elements of the local comprehensive plan shall be a major objective of the planning process"; subsection (3) is a lengthy provision requiring that a comprehensive plan include a capital improvements element; paragraph (6)(a) describes in detail the matters that must be contained in the FLUE; subsection (8) requires that all elements of the comprehensive plan be based on data appropriate to the element involved; paragraph (10)(e) generally provides that support data and analysis shall not be subject to the compliance review process, but they must be based on appropriate data; paragraph (11)(a) describes the Legislature's recognition of using innovative planning and development strategies; paragraph (11)(b) expresses the intent of the Legislature to allow the conversion of rural lands to other uses, where appropriate, including urban villages, new towns, satellite communities, area-based allocations, clustering, and open space provisions, mixed-use development, and sector planning; and subparagraphs (11)(d)1., 2., 4., 5., and 6. describe the statutory process for creating an RLSA. Subsection (7) of the proposed rule sets forth the data and analysis requirements that apply to all RLSA plan amendments, including data and analysis of existing conditions (subparagraphs (7)(a)1. through 10.); population projections and analysis of land use (paragraph (7)(b)); and a land values analysis (subparagraphs (7)(c)1. through 6.). A land use needs analysis is an integral part of the planning process. Paragraph (7)(b) requires that an RLSA amendment be supported by population projections and an analysis of land use need such that the amount and extent of allowable development must be based on the 25-year or greater projected population of the RLSA, other items, and the anticipated effect of proposed RLSA receiving areas. Petitioners contend that this language contravenes Section 163.3177(11)(d)6., Florida Statutes, amended in 2005, which provides in part that the total amount of development "must enable the realization of the long- term vision and goals for the 25-year or greater projected population of the [RLSA], which may take into consideration the anticipated effect of the proposed receiving areas." See Ch. 2005-290, Laws of Fla. Paragraph (7)(b) does not contravene the terms of the statute. As expressed in the law being implemented, the rule directs that the need analysis shall be based upon, among other things, "the anticipated effect of the proposed RLSA receiving areas " As a part of the data and analysis to be supplied, paragraph (7)(c) requires that an RLSA amendment be supported by a land values analysis that considers six components described in subparagraphs 1. through 6. This in turn requires a comprehensive analysis of rural resources that exist within the RLSA. Subparagraph 4. requires that the analysis include the development threats to rural resources and that resources under threat of conversion receive more incentives from stewardship credits than resources under less of a threat. Petitioners contend that the rule contravenes Section 163.3177(11)(d)6.j., Florida Statutes, because it requires a greater value to be assigned to resources under threat of conversion and would result in other rural and natural and agricultural resources which may have a higher intrinsic value being assigned fewer credits. Specifically, the cited statute requires that "the highest number of credits per acre" should be "assigned to the most environmentally valuable land, or, in locations where the retention of open space and agricultural land is a priority, to such lands." The purpose of the rule is straightforward: to protect those resources that are under the greatest threat and those that are most susceptible to harm over time through land development or other changes, including urban sprawl. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the overall analysis does in fact consider all forms of rural resources in determining how the credits will be assigned. The rule implements the statutory directive of attaining the principles of rural sustainability. Subparagraph (7)(c)6. requires, among other things, that the local government submit as a part of the data and analysis supporting the plan amendment "the assignment of values" of all lands in the RLSA. Petitioners contend that assigning values at the time of the amendment "locks in these values" and would require a subsequent plan amendment in contravention of Section 163.3177(11)(d)6., Florida Statutes, which Petitioners argue contemplates the creation of credits after the adoption of the plan amendment. At hearing, however, the Department explained that because conditions will obviously change over time, the land values analysis will be periodically updated and can be changed without a new plan amendment. In their Proposed Final Order, Petitioners concede that given this interpretation of the rule, it "would not be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority." See Petitioners' Proposed Final Order, par. 73. Paragraph (8)(a) of the proposed rule requires each stewardship credit to represent either a defined number of residential units or non-residential square footage. Once the credits are created in sending areas, they can be transferred to designated receiving areas to be used to enable development that is consistent with the RLSA goals, objectives, and policies. Petitioners contend that the rule will prohibit mixed-use development in contravention of Section 163.3177(11)(d)4.c., Florida Statutes, which requires that the RLSA goals, policies, and objective provide for a "functional mix of land uses." There is no prohibition of a mix of land uses. In fact, the opposite is true. As clarified by a Department witness, "a mix is essentially required, as you can see from [sub]paragraph (9)(a)17., which describes that a mix of use must be addressed." Tr. at 273. The rule does not contravene the statute. Subsection (9) of the proposed rule generally requires that the RLSA plan amendment contain goals, objectives, policies, and a map. Subparagraphs (9)(a)1. through 21. require that the goals, objectives, and policies identify the innovative planning and development strategies to be used in the RLSA process, including the adoption of implementing plan amendments, land development regulations, and the issuance of development orders. Petitioners allege that subparagraphs 3., 6., 18., and enlarge, modify, or contravene the law implemented. Subparagraph 3. requires "implementing plan amendments" because the Department recognized the fact that the RLSA planning process will consume years or even decades and will require implementing plan amendments to accomplish its purpose. This is especially true here as the RLSA process involves the development of large tracts of land (as much as 100,000 acres or more) that will take years or decades to fully implement and build out. At a minimum, under current law, the "implementing plan amendments" will include a capital improvements element annual update; water supply planning, and the designation of new towns. Except for the requirement that an implementing plan amendment designate a new town pursuant to existing Rule 9J-5.003(80), Petitioners agree that the proposed rule is valid. Because the cited existing rule has been determined to be valid, Petitioners' contention is rejected. See Findings 62-65, infra. Subparagraph 6. provides that the goals, policies, and objectives shall contain "a requirement that the Eligible Receiving Areas shall be located on land that is suitable for development and have the lowest land values on the land values analysis conducted pursuant to paragraph (7)(c)." Petitioners contend that this provision limits the flexibility of local governments to determine the best location for Eligible Receiving Areas and therefore contravenes the provisions in various parts of Section 163.3177, Florida Statutes, that emphasize flexibility. The rule implements the principles of rural sustainability contained in Section 163.3177(11)(d)2., Florida Statutes. Only by directing development to land with the lowest environmental, agricultural, and rural resource value will an RLSA protect ecosystems, habitat, natural resources, and the agricultural economy. The rule does not contravene this statute. Subparagraph 18. requires an RLSA plan amendment to include policies for "new towns," including a requirement that a new town be designated on the FLUM. Petitioners contend that the requirement to designate a new town on the FLUM contravenes Section 163.3177(11)(4)(d)4., Florida Statutes, which provides for the implementation of the innovative planning and development strategies included in existing Rule 9J-5.006(5)(l) through zoning and land development regulations. At hearing, Petitioners narrowed their argument to this one feature in the rule. Because the Department may lawfully require that new towns be designated on the FLUM, subparagraph 18. is consistent with the statute implemented. See Findings 62-65, infra. Subparagraph 19. requires that RLSA plan amendments contain goals, objectives, and policies "to ensure that any use of the underlying densities and intensities of land uses assigned to parcels of land by the county comprehensive plan prior to designation of the RLSA furthers the principles of rural sustainability." Petitioners contend this provision contravenes Section 163.3177(11)(d)6., Florida Statutes, because it "impinges on existing land use rights which is contrary to one of the statutory principles of rural sustainability, namely the 'restoration and maintenance of the economic value associated with rural lands.'" The rule, however, furthers the principles of rural sustainability, as required by Section 163.3177(11)(d)1., Florida Statutes, since it requires that all lands within an RLSA, whether or not in a Designated Receiving Area, be developed in a manner that furthers those principles. It does not contravene the cited statute. Petitioners also contend that subparagraph 19. contravenes Section 163.3161(9), Florida Statutes, which requires, among other things, that all programs be applied "with sensitivity for private property rights and not be unduly restrictive." Petitioners surmise that the rule may operate to displace underlying density within the RSLA regardless of the use of the RLSA credit system. However, the rule does not displace any underlying density; it only requires that underlying rights be exercised consistent with the RLSA. More specifically, existing densities may be used in any manner that furthers the principles without displacing any of those densities. The rule does not contravene either statute. Is proposed rule 9J-5.026(3) vague and does it have inadequate standards for agency decisions? Petitioners next contend that subsection (3) of proposed rule 9J-5.026, and specifically certain words within the definition of the term "greenbelt," are vague and fail to establish adequate standards for agency decisions. That provision reads as follows: 9J-5.026 Rural Land Stewardship Area (RSLA) * * * (3) Definitions * * * (d) "Greenbelt" means a border of permanently undeveloped land sufficient in size to effectively preclude the expansion of urban development into the surrounding rural lands and to provide an effective buffer to protect the surrounding rural resources from development impacts. A greenbelt is an undeveloped area that surrounds an urban area, a new town, or other urban development and is meant to separate the urban developed area from the surrounding area to provide a border that protects surrounding rural lands from urban development. Petitioners contend that the use of the adjectives "sufficient," "effectively," and "effective" to describe the greenbelt buffer are vague and lack standards to guide agency determinations. In common usage, the word "sufficient" means that the greenbelt is sufficient in size to accomplish its purpose of precluding the expansion of urban development into the surrounding rural lands. Similarly, the word "effectively" means that the use or creation of a buffer to protect urban encroachment on rural lands will be accomplished in an effective manner. Likewise, the word "effective" simply means that the greenbelt achieves the purpose of creating a buffer. These phrases are easily understood by persons of ordinary intelligence, particularly when read in context with other provisions of the rule. See, e.g., Cole Vision Corp., et al. v. Dept. of Bus. and Prof. Reg., 688 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Petitioners contend, however, that the rule fails to explicitly include the standard that site-specific data would be considered in determining the "sufficiency" of a buffer. However, this level of detail is not needed since site-specific information is typically considered and applied by the local government and Department through the planning process and might include, for example, the nature of the urban area, the potential impacts if the urban area is extended, the nature of the surrounding land, and other similar factors. The rule is not so vague or lacks sufficient standards as to be invalid. Is proposed rule 9J-5.026(9)(a)18. arbitrary? Petitioners further contend that subparagraph (9)(a)18. of proposed rule 9J-5.026 is arbitrary. That rule reads as follows: 18. Policies for new towns which comply with the following: As required by subsection 9J-5.003(80) and paragraph 9J-5.006(5)(1), F.A.C., a new town shall be designated on the future land use map. A new town shall be located within a Designated Receiving Area. The plan amendment designating a new town shall include a master development plan that establishes the size of the new town, the amount, location, type, density and intensity of development, and the design standards to be utilized in the new town. Any increase in the density or intensity of land use required to achieve the proposed new town may occur only through the use of stewardship credits assigned or transferred to the Designated Receiving Area either prior to or subsequent to the designation of the new town on the future land use map. New towns shall be surrounded by greenbelts, except for any connecting rural road corridors and to the extent that new towns are adjacent to existing or planned urban development or incorporated areas. A future land use map amendment to designate a new town shall be internally consistent with RLSA provisions of the comprehensive plan. A future land use map amendment to designate a new town shall be accompanied by an amendment to the capital improvements element to incorporate a financially feasible five-year capital improvements schedule for the public facilities necessary to serve the new town and an amendment to the transportation or traffic circulation element to designate any new rural road corridors required to connect the new town with the rest of the RSLA. As noted earlier, this rule sets forth the requirements for policies in the RLSA plan amendment that are applicable to new towns. Petitioners contend that the rule is arbitrary because it "selectively emphasizes" a new town as only one of several innovative and flexible planning strategies set forth in existing Rule 9J-5.006(5)(l). To be arbitrary, a rule must not be supported by logic or the necessary facts. See § 120.52(8)(e), Fla. Stat. Here, the more persuasive evidence shows that new towns are much larger development types; they are more intense than other development forms; and they will likely generate greater impacts. In an RLSA, they take on even more significance since the planning goal is to further the principles of rural sustainability. Collectively, these factors form a sufficient basis and rationale for giving new towns different treatment than other development forms that are smaller, have fewer uses, are less intense, and are more likely to have lesser impacts. The proposed rule is not arbitrary. e. Does existing Rule 9J-5.003(80) contravene the specific provisions of law implemented? Finally, Petitioners have challenged existing Rule 9J- 5.003(80), which became effective in 1994, on the ground that it contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. That rule defines the term "new town" as follows: (80) "New town" means a new urban activity center designated on the future land use map and located within a rural area, distinct and geographically separated from existing urban areas and other new towns. A new town is of sufficient size, population and land use composition to support a variety of economic and social activities consistent with an urban area designation. New towns include basic economic activities; all major land use categories; and a centrally provided full range of public facilities and services. New towns are based on a master development plan. The specific authority for the rule, when adopted, was Section 163.3177(9) and (10), while the law being implemented was identified as Sections 163.3177 and 163.3178, Florida Statutes. Because Section 163.3178 involves coastal management, and a new town would probably not be located in a coastal zone, it has marginal relevance to this proceeding. The Department relies principally on Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes, which requires, among other things, that "various categories of land use shall be shown on a land use map or map series."6 The existing definition provides, in part, that a new town will include "all major land use categories, with the possible exception of agricultural and industrial." Because they include numerous land use categories, new towns are by definition a mixed-use land use category. See Fla. Admin. Code 9J-5.006(4)(c). Mixed-use land use categories must be designated on the FLUM. See § 163.3177(6)(a), Fla. Stat.("The future land use plan may designate areas for future planned development use involving combinations of types of uses"). As noted above, a new town is recognized in existing Rule 9J-5.006(5)(l) as an innovative and flexible planning option. Because the Legislature referenced this rule provision with approval four times in the RLSA statute, it must be presumed that the Legislature was expressing approval of the existing definition with the mapping requirement. See §§ 163.3177(11)(d)1. (two separate references); 163.3177(11)(d)4.c.; and 163.3177(11)(d)4.e. The rule does not contravene the statute being implemented.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following Findings of Fact: The Respondent, St. Lucie County Expressway Authority, was created by the Florida legislature in 1983, and is governed by Chapter 348, Florida Statutes. The Authority is composed of two members from the Board of County Commissioners of St. Lucie County, two members from the City Commission of Ft. Pierce, two members from the City Council of Port St. Lucie and three members appointed by the governor. Based on the anticipated future growth of St. Lucie County, there is a need for additional East-West traffic arteries in the southern portion of the county to ease expected traffic conditions. The St. Lucie County Expressway Authority employed consultants and conducted public hearings to determine the best location for such a roadway. Prior to selecting the location for the proposed East-West Expressway, the St. Lucie County Expressway Authority examined feasibility studies, traffic count reports and engineering and road design proposals on alternative alignments and found the proposed corridor to be the best choice from both an economic and environmental standpoint. The proposed expressway route connects Interstate 95 to U.S. Highway 1. Phase 1 of the project would begin in the southern portion of St. Lucie County at U.S. Highway 1 and continue east, following existing transmission lines owned by Florida Power and Light Company and extend to a point which is now called East Torino Parkway. The total length of Phase One of the project is approximately 2.6 miles. Phase Two would extend the project to Interstate 95. The St. Lucie County Expressway Authority expects to obtain funding for construction of the East-West Expressway from various sources including the State of Florida's Toll Facilities Revolving Trust Fund, the Florida Department of Transportation and state-backed revenue bonds. The use of state-backed revenue bonds would require St. Lucie County to pledge a certain portion of its gas tax revenue as security to cover the bonds in the event that the expressway did not generate enough money from tolls to pay back the bonds. A public hearing is scheduled for January, 1988 at which the St. Lucie County Commission will review updated feasibility studies and traffic count estimates to determine whether to pledge the necessary funds to support the bonds. Assuming that approval is obtained for state-backed revenue bonds, the letting of a contract to construct the East-West Expressway could be accomplished by July 1, 1989. The time period for construction of a project such as the East-West Expressway is approximately two (2) years from the date that the contract for construction is executed. Thus, under the most optimistic outlook and projections, the proposed East-West Expressway could be completed by July of 1991. However, difficulties in obtaining funding and/or necessary environmental permits could delay completion of the expressway for ten (10) years, or until 1997. In conjunction with the preparation of plans for construction of the East-West Expressway, the St. Lucie County Expressway Authority filed "right-of- way reservation maps" on October 13, 1986, in accordance with Section 337.241, Florida Statutes. The reservation maps were filed and approved by the St. Lucie County Expressway Authority in compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations. The purpose of filing the right-of-way reservation maps by the St. Lucie County Expressway Authority is to preclude development of properties within the proposed corridor of the East-West Expressway while final construction and engineering plans are being prepared, thereby preventing an increase in cost of acquisition of those properties pending eventual eminent domain proceedings. The right-of-way reservation maps will prohibit the granting of development permits, as defined in Section 380.031(4), Florida Statutes, by any governmental entity for a period of five (5) years from the date of recording of the reservation maps. This period may be extended for an additional five years at the option of the Expressway Authority pursuant to Section 337.241(2), Florida Statutes. The reservation maps do not prohibit sale, continued use of the property by its owners nor is any use prohibited which does not require a development permit as defined in Section 380.031(4), Florida Statutes. The engineering construction plans for the East-West Expressway encompass less area than the reservation maps. However, the larger reserved area will be utilized to facilitate construction of the project and for water retention on site. Thus, less private property will ultimately be taken than that which is included in the right-of-way reservation area. The property owned by Petitioners, T. L. Sloan, James Taylor and Bill Stewart (hereinafter referred to as the "Sloan property") consists of a front and rear parcel. The front parcel consists of 6.54 acres of which 2.28 are within the right-of-way reservation area. The rear parcel is physically separated from the front parcel by a drainage canal and consists of approximately 4.25 acres. The rear parcel is not within the reservation map area, but access to this parcel can only be gained by U.S. Highway 1 through the front property. The property owned by Petitioners Mark C. Walters and David J. Gonzalez (hereinafter referred to as the "Walters' property") measures approximately 55,450 square feet of which approximately 46,000 square feet are within the right-of-way reservation area. The Sloan and Walters' properties are located at the easternmost end of the proposed East-West Expressway and front the east side of U.S. Highway 1 in Ft. Pierce, Florida. Both properties were purchased in 1984 as investment property and are presently vacant, unimproved acreage. The front parcel of the Sloan property is zoned commercial general and the rear parcel is zoned multifamily residential at five units per acre. The Walters' property is zoned commercial general and is adjacent to the Florida Power and Light transmission lines. The St. Lucie County Expressway Authority intends to use the property within the reserved area for the construction of the entrance and exit ramps of the proposed expressway. The engineering design of the East-West Expressway was done with as little intrusion upon Petitioner's properties as practical and only that property absolutely necessary for construction will ultimately be taken. Pursuant to the right-of-way reservation maps, all of the highway frontage on U.S. Highway 1 for both properties has been reserved for the expressway construction. Because of existing regulations, the St. Lucie County zoning office will not issue any development permits for property which has no access to a public highway. Therefore, the local zoning office will not issue any development permits for any portion of the Petitioners' properties, whether included in the reservation area or not. Thus, all of the property owned by Petitioners has been affected by the right-of-way reservation maps. The Sloan property was listed for sale prior to the recording of the right-of-way reservation maps. The Walters' property was purchased with the intent to build a gun shop which is now operated by the present owners at another location. After the recording of the reservation maps, the Walters' property was actively listed for sale. After the recording of the reservation maps, purchase inquiries regarding the Sloan property began to rapidly decrease. Inquiries regarding the Walters' property have also been extremely slow. No written offers to purchase the subject properties have been submitted to any of the Petitioners. David Fuller, a real property appraiser called as a witness by Petitioners, prepared an appraisal estimating the effects of recording the right-of-way reservation maps on the Sloan and Walters' property. The testimony of Mr. Fuller is accepted as more credible and pertinent to the issues involved in this cause than the testimony presented by Mr. Davis, the Respondent's expert appraiser. Mr. Davis admitted that the purpose of his appraisal was to estimate the fair market value of the property in fee simple, the part "taken" and damages to the remainder for the purpose of eminent domain. Mr. Davis' analysis is more appropriate for an action sounding in eminent domain. Mr. Fuller used the Sales Comparison or Market Approach combined with a discounted cash flow method of appraisal in determining the difference in the value of the properties before the recording of the right-of-way reservation maps, and the market value of the properties immediately after recording of the reservation maps. The value of real property is directly related to the use to which it can be put. Thus, a particular parcel may have several different value levels under alternative uses. In determining what, if any, substantial impact the record of the right-of-way reservation maps had on the market value of the Sloan and Walters' property, Fuller evaluated the difference in the value of the properties utilizing their highest and best use before the filing of the right- of-way reservation maps and the highest and best use after the recording of the maps. The highest and best use for the Sloan property without the encumbrance of the right-of-way maps would be to improve the front commercial zoned parcel with a commercial use consistent with neighborhood use trends (i.e., strip shopping centers, rental storage buildings and/or automobile dealerships) and improve the rear multifamily zoned parcel with a support use for the front commercial property. The highest and best use of the Sloan property after filing of the right-of-way reservation maps would be to hold the property as vacant until the right-of-way reservation map filing expires. Although the Sloan property could be sold with the right-of-way reservation, a majority of the potential market would be eliminated and the remaining market would require a discount to purchase the property knowing that the restrictions exist. The potential market in the neighborhood consists of generally three types of investors; (1) the owner occupant; (2) the real estate investor seeking income from an improved property; and (3), the short term land speculator. The owner occupant seeking to immediately build would not consider the property in question because the potential to immediately construct a new improvement is not available. Likewise, the investor seeking to build an income producing improvement, either immediately or in the next three years, would not be interested in the property. The short term land speculator would not be interested because there is no certainty that the property would be able to be developed to its highest potential market value within the next two to three years. The highest and best use for the Walters' property without the encumbrance of the right-of-way reservation maps would be to improve the parcel in approximately one to two years with a commercial use consistent with the neighborhood trends (i.e., owner occupied small business and/or mini-storage property). Improved uses such as an automobile dealership or shopping center could not be physically constructed on a site the size and shape of the Walters' property. The highest and best use of the Walters' property after filing of the right-of-way reservation maps would be to hold the parcel vacant until the reservation filing expires. As with the Sloan property, although the parcel could be sold, a majority of the potential market would be eliminated and the remaining market would require a discount to purchase the property knowing that the restrictions exist. Mr. Fuller stated that in his opinion, using the discounted cash flow model of appraisal, the Sloan properties suffered a total loss in value of approximately $441,450.00 on the date the reservation maps were filed. As to the Walters' property, the loss was calculated at $78,480.00. Mr. Fuller's financial calculations as to loss are misleading and not very useful because they were specifically calculated for a period of time of ten years. In other words, Mr. Fuller's total loss of value calculations are based on the assumption that the reservation map restrictions would exist for the full initial five (5) year period and that they would be extended for an additional five (5) year period. The ability to develop vacant and unimproved commercial property and to put the land to its highest and best use is a substantial beneficial ownership interest arising out of the ownership of commercial property. Both of the properties owned by Petitioners are fully capable of development and no other impediments to development exist except for the reservation maps. Substantial payments on the mortgages for the properties are being made by Petitioners each year totalling over $58,000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the St. Lucie County Expressway Authority enter a Final Order in favor of Petitioners after which the Authority shall have 180 days from the date of said order to acquire the Petitioners property or initiate appropriate acquisition proceedings pursuant to the requirements of Section 337.241, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-2279, 87-2517 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 12 and 13. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 12, 13 and 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 17 and 18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23, 25 and 27. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 26. Matters not contained therein are rejected as misleading and/or argument. Adopted in substance inn Finding of Fact 27. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13 and 14. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13 and 14. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 10. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Matters not contained therein are rejected as misleading and/or not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as misleading. The Petitioners' expert projected that "completion" and not "construction" could possibly take 10 years. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 9. COPIES FURNISHED: John T. Brennan, Esquire Post Office Box 3779 Ft. Pierce, Florida 33448-3779 Frank J. Lynch, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 4027 Ft. Pierce, Florida 33448-4027 David Stuart Chairman St. Lucie County Expressway Authority Post Office Box 4027 Ft. Pierce, Florida 33448-4027
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, H.A.P. Partnership, has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property at Issue. The Petitioner, H.A.P. is a general partnership. The partners of the Petitioner are Billy G. and Jeanette Smith, Earl and Marie Womble, Mr. W. H. Sharp, Larry and Hilda Strom and Charles and Margaret Fulton. The Petitioner's address is 5174 Maddox Road, Tallahassee, Florida. In May, 1985, the Petitioner purchased approximately 3.1 acres of land, Tax Identification No. 21-04-20-409 (hereinafter referred to as "Parcel 1"). Parcel 1 is located at 4015 North Monroe Street, Leon County, Florida. At the time of purchase by the Petitioner, Parcel 1 was zoned R-3, single and two-family residential. Under R-3 zoning, a maximum of 7.2 units per acre of land could be constructed. Parcel 1 was purchased by the Petitioner from Billy Hatcher. In December, 1986, the Petitioner purchased an adjoining parcel of property consisting of approximately 3.5 acres, Tax Identification No. 21-04-20- 408 (hereinafter referred to as "Parcel 2"). Parcel 2 is located at 3969 North Monroe Street, Leon County, Florida. Parcel 2 was zoned R-3 at the time of its purchase by the Petitioner. Parcel 2 was purchased by the Petitioner from Marie Bannerman. Development of the Property; Prior to the Petitioner's Purchase. The previous owner of Parcel 1, Billy Hatcher, had retained Poole Engineering to develop plans for site location on Parcel 1, of multi-family dwellings. A stormwater management permit, number 4241, was issued by Leon County to Mr. Hatcher on June 25, 1984. Mr. Hatcher also obtained a permit from the State of Florida Department of Transportation for a driveway onto Parcel 1 from North Monroe Street. The permit was approved June 12, 1984. No permits were obtained from Leon County or any other entity for Parcel 2 prior to the Petitioner's purchase of Parcel 2. The Petitioner relied upon the zoning on Parcel 1 and 2 and the permits that had been issued with regard to Parcel 1 at the time that the Petitioner purchased Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. Parcel 1 and 2 would not have been purchased otherwise. Development of the Property; Subsequent to the Petitioner's Purchase. In November, 1987, the Petitioner retained PVC Corporation to plan the development of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), and to provide project management services for the development of multi-family residences on the Property. Consistent with R-3 zoning, PVC Corporation proposed a development consisting of 42 units on the 6.6 acres of the Property. In the Summer of 1989, the Petitioner sought a change in zoning for the Property. The Petitioner's request to have the Property zoned commercial was denied by Leon County. No permits were obtained from Leon County or any other entity for the Property subsequent to the Petitioner's purchase of the Property. Except for the stormwater management permit, no other permits were obtained from Leon County by the Petitioner and no request for building permits, plots or site plans were submitted to Leon County. Development of the Property was not commenced by the Petitioner. Alleged Change in Position or Obligations and Expenses Incurred. The total purchase price for Parcel 1 was $156,000.00. The total purchase price for Parcel 2 was $110,000.00. The Petitioner paid a total of $106,572.87 in interest on the Property, $15,109.67 in real property taxes and $2,300.00 in engineering fees. Vadden Shadden, M.A.I., appraised the Property on January 18, 1988, prior to the effective date of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, at a value of $417,500.00. On November 3, 1990, Mr. Shadden appraised to value of the Property to be $41,750.00, taking into account compliance with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Development of the Property under the 2010 Plan. Under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the Property is located in an area designated as Lake Protection Land Use. Property in the Lake Protection Land Use category may be developed by the construction of one dwelling unit for residential purposes per two acres, plus minor commercial uses (retail but not office uses) of up to 20,000 gross square feet. Site plan approval for all commercial property over five acres is required by the Leon County Subdivision Regulations. Procedure. On or about November 12, 1990, the Petitioner filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), with Leon County. By letter dated February 26, 1991, from Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, the Petitioner was informed that the staff of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department had recommended that the Application be denied. Mr. Gumula also informed the Petitioner that a hearing before a Staff Committee could be requested. Charles Fulton, general partner of the Petitioner, informed Leon County that the Petitioner waived its right to a hearing before the Staff Committee and requested a formal hearing before a Hearing Officer. By letter dated March 19, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to conduct a formal hearing in this case.
The Issue The issue is whether a development order adopted by Respondent City of Marathon by Resolution PC00-09-04 is consistent with the comprehensive plan, land development regulations, and statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent City of Marathon (Marathon) was incorporated on November 30, 1999. It adopted as its land development regulations (LDR) the LDRs of Monroe County in effect at the time of Marathon's incorporation. Marathon is within The Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. This case involves a development order that Marathon issued to Respondent Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc. (BB). As Planning Commission Resolution 00-09-04, the development order authorizes BB to add 12 motel rooms to an existing motel in return for imposing certain restrictions on the use of wet slips at its adjacent marina that is part of the same motel/marina development. The restrictions require the removal of cable television connections from 12 slips and limitation upon vessels using these 12 slips to those without plumbing facilities. For the remaining wet slips at the marina, the development order requires BB to limit their use to no more than 18 vessels at one time and to provide mandatory sewage pumpout for these vessels. At various points in the record and this recommended order, references to a "transfer" of 12 marina slips for 12 motel rooms refer to the conditions set forth in this paragraph. BB owns 7.39 acres of upland and 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom in Marathon at mile marker 49.5 (Subject Property or, as developed, Banana Bay). The Subject Property runs from U.S. Route 1 to the water. The Subject Property contains 60 motel rooms in two buildings, a conference room, a motel office, support buildings, three apartments suitable for employee use, and a marina. The marina includes 40-50 slips, depending upon the size of the moored vessels. The Subject Property is zoned Suburban Commercial (SC) and Mixed Use (MU). About 2.4 acres (104,544 square feet) running about 350 feet from U.S. Route 1 is SC. About 4.99 acres (217,364 square feet) is zoned MU. The additional 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom are also zoned MU, although the submerged acreage is unimportant for reasons discussed below. Twenty-five of the motel rooms are in SC, and 35 of the motel rooms are in MU, although the distinction between zoning districts is also unimportant for reasons discussed below. LDR Code Section 9.5-267 authorizes ten "rooms" per ”acre" as "allocated density" for motel uses in SC and MU and 15 "rooms" per "buildable acre" as "maximum net density" for motel uses in SC and MU. (There is no difference between "hotels" and "motels" in this case; all references to "motels" include "hotels.") Three fundamental questions emerge concerning the application of these two density limitations to this case. The first is whether BB must satisfy both the "allocated density" and "maximum net density" limitation. This is not a difficult issue; BB's proposal must satisfy each of these density limitations. The second question is what is included in the areas under each of these density limitations. Notwithstanding the use of "gross acres" in the "allocated density" formula, it is necessary to net out certain areas--just less than is netted out in the "maximum net density" formula. The third question is what constitutes a "room." When applied to marine-based units, the definition of a "room" presents a difficult and important issue. As a whole, the LDRs imply that no marine-based dwelling units should count as "rooms," but one provision specifically requires the inclusion of "live-aboard" units in density calculations. The first question requires little analysis. As noted below in the discussion of the two types of areas, "allocated density" and "maximum net density" provide two separate measures of the intensity of use of land. The allowable density for "maximum net density" is never less than the allowable density for "allocated density" because "maximum net density" is a safeguard to ensure that, after netting out from the parcel those areas reserved for open space, setbacks, and buffers, the intensity of use will not be excessive. Nothing whatsoever in the LDRs suggests that Marathon may issue a development order for a proposal that satisfies the "maximum net density," but not the "allocated density." These two densities limitations operate in tandem, not in the alternative. The calculation of the "allocated density" requires consideration of the second and third questions identified above. The issue of area seems straightforward. LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-3) defines "density or allocated density" as "the number of dwelling units or rooms allocated per gross acre of land by the plan." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-4) defines "maximum net density" as "the maximum density permitted to be developed per unit of land on the net buildable area of a site, as measured in dwelling units or rooms per acre." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(G-4) defines "gross area" as "the total acreage of a site less submerged lands and any dedicated public rights-of-way." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(N-4) defines "net buildable area" as "that portion of a parcel of land which is developable and is not open space required by section 9.5-262 or 9.5-343 or required minimum bufferyard under article VII division 11 or required setbacks under section 9.5-281." The area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is greater than the area of land involved in determining "maximum net density." But the area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is itself a net amount. The LDRs expressly require reducing the gross areas by any submerged land and dedicated public rights-of-way. However, any reasonable application of the LDRs also requires reducing the gross areas used for the motel "allocated density" calculation by the minimum areas required to support other uses on the Subject Property. If the only use of the Subject Property were motel rooms, the "allocated density" limit of ten units per acre (10:1) would allow 73.9 rooms. But the Marathon Planning Commission Staff Report dated September 18, 2000, correctly netted from the Subject Property the land areas required to support the commercial aspects of the hotel and the commercial apartments. These reductions leave a total of 5.86 acres available to support the motel rooms. At a density of 10:1, the Subject Property could therefore support a total of 58 motel rooms. The Planning Commission incorrectly used the 15:1 ratio for "maximum net density" in concluding that the Subject Property could support a total of 67.65 motel rooms. Evidently, the Planning Commission used the "maximum net density" because it was not using "gross area" or "gross acres" (the terms are synonymous under the Code) in calculating the area. The netting reduction necessary to calculate whether BB's proposal satisfies the "maximum net density" limitation would require the calculation of the area of the Subject Property that must be devoted to open space, setbacks, and buffers. The Planning Commission probably undertook this step in calculating the "maximum net density" for the Subject Property, as its figures seem to include unstated deductions for the 20 percent open space plus another factor, probably for setbacks and buffers--all of which are discussed in its report. However, the Planning Commission erroneously neglected to apply the "allocated density" limitation to the "gross acres," exclusive of submerged land, public rights-of-way, and the minimum land required to support the other upland uses. As noted above, doing so would have yielded no more than 58 motel rooms. At present, the Subject Property contains 60 hotel or motel rooms. The Subject Property therefore cannot support the addition of another 12 hotel or motel rooms, given its "allocated density" of only 58 rooms. In general, BB justifies the addition of 12 rooms to the front motel by arguing that it is only transferring these units from the 12 existing wet slips. It is unnecessary to determine whether a transfer under these facts is lawful when, if these 12 slips count as units, the Subject Property is already 14 units over its "allocated density." The resolution of the third question--what constitutes a "room"--dispenses with this argument. Thirty of the existing 40-50 boat slips in the marina have water, electric, and cable hook-ups and are presently used for some form of habitation. Most vessels berth at the marina for two or three days, although the average stay is slightly over one month. The average stay at the 30 slips offering utilities, though, is two to three months. Typically, two persons use a vessel berthed at the marina for more than a couple of days. BB seals the discharge ports of all vessels mooring at the marina for any appreciable period of time. BB provides a sewage pumpout service for these and other vessels. The wastewater from the marina operations goes to a septic tank, in contrast to the wastewater from the motel operations, which goes to an onsite package plant. Persons mooring at the marina for at least two months normally obtain telephone service and may obtain cable television service, in addition to the potable water and electrical services provided by BB. The marina also provides rest rooms, laundry facilities, showers, a bar, limited food service, and a mail box. However, BB rules require that all persons berthing at the marina register a permanent address because the slips are "not considered permanent housing." At the request of the Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority and the Monroe County Planning Department, BB has limited rental agreements at the marina to a maximum of one month, although some persons enter into back-to-back rental agreements. Persons staying more than one week often have cars. Contrary to BB's contentions, none of these slips provides additional density for the Subject Property, and therefore the 12 slips are not available for transfer to the motel. For the same reason, as discussed below, the proposed transfer of the 12 units would also violate the Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO). In two respects, the record reveals that the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland residential uses might facilitate the achievement of important land use planning objectives. First, the wastewater collected from the marina is directed to a septic tank, and the wastewater collected from the motel is directed to a package plant. Absent a significantly reduced flow from the marine-based residential use, the upland residential use would therefore impact the adjacent waters to a lesser extent. Second, marine-based residential users may be more reluctant to evacuate for an approaching hurricane than upland residential users. Absent a significantly greater number of visitors during hurricane season if the 12 units were taken from the marina slips and added to the motel, the upland residential use might therefore facilitate timely hurricane evacuation of the vulnerable Keys. However, the record was relatively undeveloped on these two points, and these possible advantages to the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland-based residential uses do not override the LDRs. The LDRs may treat the more intense residential use associated with "live-aboards" differently than the less intense residential use associated with other moored vessels. Although the LDRs' treatment of "live-aboards" may not be entirely consistent, any inconsistency is irrelevant in this case because the moored vessels at the Banana Bay marina do not qualify as "live-aboards." As stipulated for the purpose of this case, LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-4) defines a "transient residential unit" as "a dwelling unit used for transient housing such as a hotel or motel room, or space for parking a recreational vehicle or travel trailer." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-31) defines a "dwelling unit" as "one (1) or more rooms physically arranged to create a housekeeping establishment for occupancy by one (1) family with separate toilet facilities." LDR Code Sections 9.5-4(D-23) through 9.5-4(D-30) identify the various types of dwellings that may contain "dwelling units.” These dwellings are, respectively, detached zero-lot-line dwellings, multifamily apartment dwellings, attached dwellings, detached individual dwellings, duplex dwellings, commercial apartment dwellings, rooftop dwellings, and townhouse dwellings. The frequent references to "open yards" in these definitions precludes the application of these definitions to moored vessels, even "live- aboards." The exclusion of all moored vessels, including "live-aboards," from density calculations is also suggested by two other portions of the LDRs. As is typical, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 provides that the mechanism for enforcing density limitations is in the issuance of building permits, but this enforcement mechanism is of doubtful use in regulating vessel moorings, which do not typically involve the issuance of a building permit. Also, the density definitions discussed above both refer to the development of various types of residential uses on "land." Moreover, none of the zoning districts established in Marathon's LDRs measures the intensity of marina uses, including vessels moored for extended periods as live-aboards, by imposing some sort of marine density limitation, either by including the moored dwelling units or the submerged acreage. Because the LDRs did not intend to include such marine-based uses in density calculations, LDR Code Section 9.5-267, which is a table setting forth "allocated densities" and "maximum net densities," covers only upland-based uses, including recreational vehicle or campground spaces per acre, and does not extent to marine-based uses, such as live-aboard marina slips. However, two provisions in the LDRs require density calculations to include "live-aboards." LDR Code Section 9.5-308, which seems to be an older provision in the LDRs, provides that "each live-aboard shall count as a dwelling unit for the purpose of calculating density limitations in the district in which it is permitted." Better incorporated into the present regulatory scheme of the LDRs, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 defines a "residential dwelling unit" as a "dwelling unit," including a "transient rental unit," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-3), and "live-aboard vessels," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(L-6). However, LDR Code Section 9.5-4((L-6) states that a "live-aboard vessel" is "any vessel used solely as a residence or any vessel represented as a place of business, a professional or other commercial enterprise, or a legal residence." The record does not suggest that any of the moored vessels were used "solely" as a residence, as distinguished, for instance, from a vessel used for residential and recreational purposes, or that any of the mixed-use vessels served as the occupants' legal residence. Absent a finding that the moored vessels constitute "transient residential units," ROGO does not support this proposed transfer of residential uses from marine-based to upland-based. LDR Code Section 9.5-123(f)(3) authorizes the transfer of an existing "residential dwelling unit" from one site to another within the same subarea. However, LDR Code Section 9.5-122 defines a "residential dwelling unit" to extend only to "live-aboards." For the reasons already discussed, the less intense residential uses associated with the vessels moored at Banana Bay's marina preclude their treatment as "residential dwelling units" eligible for transfer to the motel. Petitioner has proved that the development order is materially inconsistent with the LDRs. LDR provisions governing the density and intensity of residential development go to the heart of effective land use planning, especially in an area as sensitive as the Keys. For these reason, it is unnecessary to consider the consistency of the development order with the more general provisions of Marathon's comprehensive plan, on which Marathon's LDRs are based.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order denying the request of Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc., to approve the transfer of 12 slips to 12 rooms in a motel on the Subject Property. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara L. Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Charles Canaday, General Counsel Office of the Governor Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1001 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Mitchell A. Bierman Weiss Serota 2665 South Bayshore Drive Suite 420 Miami, Florida 33133 James S. Mattson James S. Mattson, P.A. Post Office Box 586 Key Largo, Florida 33037
The Issue The issue is whether that portion of Plan Amendment 98-1ER known as LU-97-02 is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact have been determined: Background In this land use dispute, Petitioners, Janet Bollum (Bollum) and Glenn and Mary Brewer (the Brewers), who are property owners within or near the City of Deland, contend that a portion of Plan Amendment 98-1ER adopted by Respondent, City of Deland (City), is not in compliance. The portion of the amendment under challenge, known as Plan Amendment LU-97-02, changes the land use on 39.56 acres of land owned by Intervenor, Marcia Berman, Trustee (Berman), to Highway Commercial. The property is currently under contract to be sold to Intervenor, Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. (Wal-Mart), who intends to construct a Wal-Mart super store on a part of the site. Respondent, Department of Community Affairs (Department), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive land use plans and amendments. Until 1997, the Berman property was located in the unincorporated area of Volusia County (County). Prior to 1994, it carried an Urban Medium Intensity land use designation. That year, the County redesignated the property as Industrial. In 1997, the City annexed the Berman property and revised its Future Land Use Map the following year to change the land use to Highway Commercial. This change was accomplished through the plan amendment under challenge. On May 1, 1998, the Department issued its Statement of Intent to Find Portions of Plan Amendment Not in Compliance. More specifically, it found that the new land use designation would "generate traffic which causes the projected operating conditions of roadways to fall below adopted level of service standards and exacerbates projected roadway deficiencies." The Department also found that the amendment was "not supported by or based on, and does not react in an appropriate way to, the best available data and analyses." In making these findings, the Department relied in part upon a traffic study prepared by "TEI" in 1998 which reflected that the City's traffic system did not have sufficient capacity to accommodate the new land use. The Department determination triggered this action. On May 27, 1998, Petitioners, and 82 other property owners, filed a paper styled "Petition for Administrative Hearing and Petition to Intervene" challenging the change of land use on the Berman property in numerous respects. The paper was treated as a petition to intervene and was later granted. After the case was temporarily abated in August 1998 pending efforts to settle the matter, in January 1999, a new traffic study was prepared for the City by Ghyabi, Lassiter & Associates (GLA study), which determined that the existing and planned City transportation network could accommodate the impacts from the development allowed under the amendment. All parties except Petitioners then executed a Stipulated Settlement Agreement in February and March 2000, which resolved all issues originally raised by the Department. Thereafter, the Department issued an Amended Notice of Intent to find the plan amendment in compliance. As required by Section 163.3184(16)(f), Florida Statutes (1999), the parties were realigned consistent with their respective positions. Through an Amended Petition filed by Petitioners on July 19, 2000, all original Petitioners except Bollum and the Brewers have been dismissed, and the factual issues in this case narrowed to two: (a) whether the recent traffic studies "demonstrate a transportation concurrency failure, and a failure to fall within a lawful transportation concurrency exception under F.S. 163.3180(5)(c) and (d)"; and (b) whether the "plan amendment data and analyses continue a failure to show demand for additional 'highway commercial' land, as originally asserted by the Department's Notice of Intent." Standing of the Parties Bollum owns property, resides within, and owns and operates a business within the City. She also submitted written and oral comments to the City while the amendment was being adopted. The parties have stipulated that she is an affected person and thus has standing to participate. The Brewers own property and reside in an unincorporated area of the County in the immediate vicinity of the proposed plan amendment. They also reside within what is known as the "Greater Deland Area," as defined by Chapter 73-441, Laws of Florida. However, they do not own property, reside within, or own and operate a business within the corporate limits of the City, and thus they lack standing to participate. The parties have stipulated that Intervenors Berman and Wal-Mart have standing to participate in this proceeding. The Amendment The Berman property lies on the eastern side of U.S. Highway 17 just north of the intersection of U.S. Highways 17 and 92, approximately three miles north of the City's central business district. The land is currently undeveloped. Prior to being annexed by the City, the property was located within the unicorporated area of the County, just north of the City limits. The earliest County land use designation was Urban Medium Intensity, a primarily residential land use classification which also allowed some commercial development, including small neighborhood shopping centers. In 1993, the County began a comprehensive examination of land use and zoning restrictions in the vicinity of the Berman property. In May 1994, it redesignated the Berman property from Urban Medium Intensity to Industrial. This use allowed not only industrial development, but also some commercial development. Before the Berman property was annexed by the City, it was depicted on the City's Urban Reserve Area Map (map). That map established advisory designations for unincorporated County land abutting the City, and was meant to be a guide for City land use decisions when property was annexed. The property was designated on the map as approximately one-half Commercial and one-half Industrial. In 1997, the Berman property was annexed by the City. Because the City was then required to place a land use designation on the property, on May 16, 1998, it adopted Amendment 98-1ER, which redesignated the property from Volusia County Industrial to City Highway Commercial. The new mixed-use designation allows "a wide range of retail and service and office uses," as well as up to twenty percent residential land uses, including multi-family manufactured housing developments. Thus, the Highway Commercial land use designation is meant to accommodate major shopping centers like the one proposed by Wal-Mart. Transportation issue In their Amended Petition, Petitioners allege that accepting as fact the "most recent traffic studies," those studies still "demonstrate a transportation concurrency failure, and a failure to fall within a lawful transportation concurrency exception under F.S. 163.3180(5)(c) and (d)." The "most recent traffic studies" are the GLA study, and it shows that the existing and planned City transportation network can accommodate the traffic impacts arising from development allowed under the plan amendment. Some of the transportation impacts from the expected development on the Berman property will affect roadways within an area of the City that was formally designated in May 1992 as a Special Transportation Area (STA) or road segments with specialized level of service (LOS) standards. The STA includes the central business district and certain outlying areas essentially bounded by Minnesota Avenue, Amelia Avenue, the rear property lines of properties along the north side of New York Avenue (State Road 44), South Hill Avenue, Beresford Avenue, Boundary Avenue, and Clara Avenue, which extend to approximately one mile from the Berman property. None of the roadways within the STA are on the Florida Intrastate Highway System. Rule 9J-5.0055(2), Florida Administrative Code, requires that the City adopt LOS standards on roadways within its planning jurisdiction (which are not on the Florida Intrastate Highway System), including the disputed portion of U.S. Highways 17 and 92. The applicable LOS standards and STA provisions are found in Policies 3.1.7 and 3.1.10, respectively, of the Transportation Circulation Element of the plan. They read as follows: 3.1.7 For those roadways listed in Policy 3.1.6 [which include U.S. Highways 17 and 92], the City of Deland may permit development to occur until the peak hour traffic volumes exceed a 20% increase over the peak traffic counts published in the FDOT's 1989 Traffic Data Report. 3.1.10 As a result of FDOT's approval of the STA designation for US 17/92 (Woodland Boulevard), from Beresford Avenue to Michigan Avenue, and SR 44 (New York Avenue), from SR 15A to Hill Avenue, the following maximum LOS and/or traffic volumes shall be permitted. ROADWAY SEGMENT US 17/92, from Beresford to Michigan = 22,028 SR 44, from SR 15A to US 17/92 = LOS E SR 44, from US 17/92 to Hill = LOS E *The proposed maximum traffic volume is compatible with the maximum LOS for this section of roadway, as stated in Policy 3.1.7. These two policies have been found to be in compliance and are not subject to challenge in this proceeding. Although the STA is identified as a specific area, the City's Comprehensive Plan anticipates that development from outside of this area will impact the STA. As noted above, however, the undisputed GLA study demonstrates that the plan amendment will not allow development which would cause these adopted LOS standards to be exceeded. The STA was approved in May 1992, or prior to the enactment of Section 163.3180, Florida Statutes (1993), which allows certain exceptions from the otherwise blanket requirement to adopt and enforce a transportation LOS standard for roadways. Two planning tools made available to local governments by Section 163.3180(5), Florida Statutes (1993), are a Transportation Concurrency Exception Area (TCEA) and a Transportation Concurrency Management Area, both of which allow exceptions to transportation concurrency requirements. The practical effect of a TCEA is to allow development to proceed without having to comply with transportation concurrency. Petitioners essentially contend that the STA created by the City for the central business district and certain outlying areas is "the substantial equivalent of a TCEA," and thus it should be treated as one for purposes of this proceeding. They go on to argue that while the City may grant an exception to concurrency requirements for transportation facilities for projects located within a TCEA, those benefits cannot be extended to any other area, including the Berman property. Based on this premise, Petitioners conclude that without the benefit of the TCEA exception, the anticipated traffic from the new development on the Berman property will cause a "continuation of a [LOS] failure on the constrained segments of US 17/92 and on the unconstrained segment from SR44 to Wisconsin Avenue," in violation of the law. Petitioners' contention is based on an erroneous assumption. The evidence shows that the City has never adopted a TCEA. Neither has the STA "transformed" into a TCEA, as Petitioners suggest. Moreover, as noted above, the undisputed GLA study shows rather clearly that the plan amendment will not allow development which would cause the adopted LOS standards to be exceeded. Petitioners further contend that the plan amendment is somehow inconsistent with the transportation exception requirements in Section 163.3180(5)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (2000). However, these provisions apply to developments "which pose only special part-time demands on the transportation system[,]" that is, "one that does not have more than 200 scheduled events during the calendar year and does not affect the 100 highest traffic volumes." The evidence shows that the Highway Commercial land use category is not designed for such developments and, in fact, encourages far more intense uses. Is There a Need for Additional Commercial Land? Petitioners next contend that "the plan amendment data and analyses continue a failure to show demand for additional 'highway commercial' land, as originally asserted by the Department's Notice of Intent and not resolved by the Compliance Agreement." In the immediate vicinity of the Berman property, near the intersection of U.S. Highways 17 and 92 north of the City, "there is an emerging trend of 'regional-type' commercial developments." This area is already partially developed with commercial uses, and it has additional areas depicted for future commercial and industrial use. There are no other parcels in the City, especially in this area, of a sufficient size to accommodate this type of regional commercial development. There are numerous ways to project the raw, numerical need for commercial land in the City. The City's Comprehensive Plan, its Evaluation and Appraisal Report, and the GLA study all contain statements regarding projected population and employment, each portraying a slightly different result. In fact, Petitioners' own expert criticized the numbers used in these documents as being unreliable and suspect. The need calculus basically involves projecting population over a ten-year planning period and then allocating commercial, residential, and other land uses in an amount to match that projection. For the reasons set forth below, this process is imprecise, and it must be tempered by other factors. First, the planner must project population over the ten-year planning timeframe. Any mistake in this projection will skew the numbers. Second, employment ratios used in the calculus can change from year to year, especially in a smaller community. Also, other planning objectives are inherently subject to change year by year. Given this imprecision and changing market demands, it is appropriate for professional planners to overallocate land uses. An excess allocation of twenty-five percent (or an allocation factor of one hundred and twenty-five percent) is recognized by professional planners as being appropriate. The evidence supports a finding that this amount is reasonable under the circumstances present here. There are numerous professionally acceptable ways in which to allocate land uses. The City has not adopted a particular methodology in its Comprehensive Plan. The specifics of the plan amendment and the City's Comprehensive Plan make application of a strict numerical calculus even more difficult. The prior designation of the property was Industrial, which is not a pure industrial category, but actually allowed up to thirty percent of commercial uses. The amendment here simply changes the land use from Industrial, with some commercial uses allowed, to a mixed-use Highway Commercial designation. As noted earlier, the City's Comprehensive Plan anticipates regional commercial uses in the area of the Berman property. Finally, the parcel is relatively small (less than 40 acres) and is embedded within an urban area. Given the uncertainty of a numerical calculation of commercial need in the City, the size and location of the property, the property's inclusion in an urban area, and the surrounding commercial land uses, the evidence supports a finding that either Industrial or Commercial would be an appropriate land use for the property. The evidence further supports a finding that the need question is not a compliance issue here and does not support a finding that the plan amendment is not in compliance.
Recommendation Based on the Foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining Plan Amendment 98-1ER adopted by the City of Deland by Ordinance Number 98-07 on March 16, 1998, to be in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven M. Siebert, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 C. Allen Watts, Esquire Cobb, Cole & Bell Post Office Box 2491 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 Shaw P. Stiller, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 315 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 F. Alex Ford, Jr., Esquire Landis, Graham, French, Husfeld, Sherman & Ford, P.A. Post Office Box 48 Deland, Florida 32721-0048 Mark A. Zimmerman, Esquire James, Zimmerman, Paul & Huddleston Post Office Drawer 2087 Deland, Florida 32721-2087 David L. Powell, Esquire Hopping, Green, Sams & Smith, P.A. Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Margaret E. Bowles, Esquire Margaret E. Bowles, P.A. 205 South Hoover Street Suite 402 Tampa, Florida 33609 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
Findings Of Fact Purchase of the Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding consists of approximately fifty-two acres (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"). The Subject Property was acquired by Charles L. Parham in 1988 from Forest Hills, Inc. The Subject Property is located in a rural, undeveloped portion of southern Clay County (hereinafter referred to as the "County"). The Subject Property was part of a larger tract of undeveloped, real property known as "Forest Hills." The southwestern corner of Forest Hills is bounded by State Road 100. At the time the Subject Property was purchased it was zoned Agriculture. This classification allowed use of the Subject Property for single-family residential development at a density of one unit per acre. The Subject Property was purchased by the Applicants for development as single-family sites which they intended to sell or rent and to use for their own residential purposes. Access to the Subject Property was obtained through easements (Forest Hills Road and Lone Pine Trail) from State Road 100. It is approximately one and three-quarters of a mile from State Road 100 to the Subject Property. At the time of purchase of the Subject Property by Mr. Parham, Mr. Parham was provided with a certified Boundary Survey map by Forest Hills, Inc. The Boundary Survey was certified by a land surveyor and was dated November 2, 1978. The Boundary Survey provided to Mr. Parham represented the Subject Property as consisting of forty-four tracts of approximately one acre each and four lots of approximately two acres each. Neither the Subject Property nor Forest Hills has ever been platted. That is, there is no plat of record in the Official Records of Clay County, Florida. The Applicants made the erroneous assumption that the Subject Property was platted. They made this assumption because of the Boundary Survey they were provided by Forest Hills, Inc., which depicted the division of the Subject Property into lots. The Applicants also believed that the Subject Property was platted because no one at County offices where they showed the Boundary Map told them differently. The evidence failed to prove, however, that any employee of the County told them that the Subject Property was in fact platted. The evidence also failed to prove that the County was responsible for the assumption of the Parhams that the Subject Property was platted. Development Activities on the Subject Property. The Applicants cleared and graded roads through the easements to the Subject Property. Applicants also maintained two other roads located in Forest Hills: Cactus Hill Road and Lone Pine Trail. The Applicants also cleared and graded two interior roads which dissect Forest Hills. Applicants named the interior roads "Viking Street" and "Valhalla Street". The clearing and grading of roads was performed by Applicants in order to gain access to the Subject Property for themselves and potential renters. The Applicants also cleared part of the Subject Property for their own use. Mr. Parham purchased a bulldozer prior to the purchase of the Subject Property. The bulldozer was purchased for use in developing the Subject Property for use by the Applicants as a residence, for use in developing the Subject Property for rental and for use in Mr. Parham's business. All labor in developing the roads to and on the Subject Property has been provided by Applicants. Expenses for maintenance, repair and use of the bulldozer were incurred by Applicants. Applicants purchased fill dirt and clay which was used in clearing and grading access and interior roads. Prior to the enactment of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"), Applicants sold two two-acre tracts to Inger Robertson and to Julian Wood. Although the deeds on the sale of these lots mentioned the tract numbers, they also described the property sold by metes and bounds. The property would not have been described in this manner if the property were part of a platted subdivision. Applicants were left with forty- eight tracts. Inger Robertson applied for and received a mobile home permit for her two-acre parcel in 1990. Applicants also applied for and received mobile home permits for two one-acre tracts. One mobile home was used as their residence. The three mobile home permits issued for part of the Subject Property were issued prior to enactment of the Plan. They were also issued consistent with then existing law allowing single family units on one acre parcels. Petitioners' Alleged Detrimental Reliance. At the time the Applicants obtained their two permits, the Boundary Survey showing the lot division of the Subject Property was shown to County staff and the Applicants' plans with regard to development of the Subject Property were disclosed. At the time of the acquisition of the permits from the County, the Applicants' intended use of, and development plans for, the Subject Property were consistent with County laws. No approval or other permits were required by County law in order for the Applicants to utilize and develope the Subject Property in the manner they intended. They were only required to comply with existing zoning requirements, which restricted residential use of property to one residence per acre. This the Applicants did with regard to their residence and two other tracts. They failed to obtain permits, however, for the other tracts on the Subject Property. The evidence failed to prove that the Applicants' were informed by the County that their proposed use and development of the Subject Property was "approved" or otherwise "authorized." The Applicants have not asserted that the County took any affirmative action which led them to believe that their planned development of the Subject Property was "approved". Instead, the Applicants have asserted that the County was under an obligation to tell them that the Subject Property was not, in fact, platted, and they were required to take certain actions to insure that they could develop the Subject Property as planned. The evidence failed to prove that the County was under any such obligation. The evidence also failed to prove that the Applicants asked County staff what steps they were required to take in order to insure the immediate development of the Subject Property. In 1988, the Applicants informed the County of the naming of the two roads created on the Subject Property and were given street addresses for each of the tracts identified on the Boundary Survey. The Boundary Survey was left with County staff to make a copy of for the County's records. Each of the tracts was identified for the County's 911 emergency telephone service. The assignment of names to the interior streets and street numbers to the lots was consistent with then existing law. These County actions are not the type of actions which would justify a conclusion that density limitations with regard to the Subject Property would not change. Rights That Allegedly Will Be Destroyed. On January 23, 1992, the County's Board of County Commissioners adopted the Plan. Included in the Plan is a Future Land Use Element, including Future Land Use Maps (hereinafter referred to as the "FLUM"). The Subject Property (and all of Forest Hills) is located in an area classified on the FLUM for "Agriculture/Residential Land Use". This designation allows the use of the Subject Property for single-family residential development. Density, however, is limited to one unit per ten acres. As a result of the Plan and the designated land use classification of the Subject Property, the Subject Property may not be developed as one-acre single-family residences. The result of this restricted land use, the number of individual, developable lots on the Subject Property has been reduced. This reduction in developable lots adversely impacts financing of the Subject Property. The Applicants learned of the adoption of the Plan and its impact on the Subject Property in November of 1992 when they attempted to obtain additional permits for the Subject Property.
The Issue Whether the small-scale amendment to the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) of the City of St. Petersburg's (the City) Comprehensive Plan (Comprehensive Plan), adopted by Ordinance 739-L (Ordinance) on August 13, 2020, is "in compliance" as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2020).1
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Property Petitioner, PGSP, is a membership organization, with 118 members. It is registered with the State of Florida as a not-for-profit corporation located in St. Petersburg, Florida. PGSP's stated mission is to promote healthy urban development throughout St. Petersburg; it was formed to promote development and growth compatible with surrounding neighborhoods. It works with the City and residents to ensure new development is cohesive with existing and planned environmental and infrastructural demands. Respondent, City of St. Petersburg, is a political subdivision of the State of Florida that is subject to the requirements of chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. The subject property is located at 635 64th Street South, St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida (Property). It is owned by Grace Connection of Tampa Bay, Inc., operating as Grace Connection Church (Church). The Church was the applicant for the Amendment at issue but is not a party to this action. The Property is triangular in shape with a total of 4.66 acres. To the north and west, the Property is bounded by Bear Creek, a natural water feature. To the east, the Property is bounded by 64th Street South, a "Collector, City Road." To the south, the Property is bounded by an undeveloped 40-foot right-of-way. A portion of the Property that abuts Bear Creek is located in a Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA).3 Respondent has not sought changes to the portion of the Property that is within the CHHA. 3 The Property is also within the projected storm surge in Hurricane Evacuation Level "D," which is a Pinellas County emergency management designation, and not a part of the City's Comprehensive Plan. The Property is currently categorized for Neighborhood Suburban (NS-1) zoning (which is separate from its Future Land Use Category). A substantial number of PGSP members live within the City, in close proximity to the Property and allege they will be adversely affected by the concomitant impacts of increased densities in the community as addressed in these proceedings. The Ordinance The Church's application sought to amend the FLUM of the Comprehensive Plan. The application divided the non-portion of the CHHA into three portions and sought to make the following changes to the Future Land Use categories: A PORTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY (APPROX. 4.33 ACRES), FROM I (INSTITUTIONAL) TO RM (RESIDENTIAL MEDIUM); A PORTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY (APPROX. 0.21 ACRES), FROM I (INSTITUTIONAL) TO RU (RESIDENTIAL URBAN); AND A PORTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY (APPROX. 0.04 ACRES), FROM RU (RESIDENTIAL URBAN) TO RESIDENTIAL MEDIUM (RM). On August 13, 2020, the City Council had a public hearing on the Church's appeal of the denial of its application by the Planning Commission. At this hearing, PGSP members submitted oral or written comments, recommendations, or objections to the City. At the August 13 meeting, the City Council adopted the Ordinance. This had the effect of adopting the Amendment and changing the Future Land Use categories to the Property. The Ordinance instituted a small-scale amendment to the FLUM, as defined by section 163.3187(2). Maximum Density Petitioner argues the Ordinance is not "in compliance," as defined in sections 163.3184(1)(b) and 163.3187(4). Specifically, PGSP attacks the Amendment because it does not (1) direct "population concentrations" away from areas designated as a CCHA; (2) provide for compatible land use transitions; and (3) preserve the existing character of the surrounding areas. Each of these claims are either partially or wholly dependent on the increased maximum density for the Property after the Amendment. As such, the threshold issue of density must be addressed. This dispute involves the 4.37 acre that are changed from the Residential Urban (RU) and Institutional land use categories to Residential Medium (RM) made up of approximately 4.33 acres from Institutional to RM and approximately 0.04 acres from RU to RM. The "Institutional" designation allows a density of 12 dwelling units per acre but limits residential use as an accessory to the primary institutional use, which in this case is a church.4 The Church submitted the application for the FLUM amendment because it ultimately seeks to sell the Property for multi-family housing development, which would not be a proper use in an area designated "Institutional." The Future Land Use categories for the area to the north and east of the Property are RU, which have a density of 7.5 units per acre. See Comprehensive Plan Policy LU 3.1A.2. This area is primarily made up of single-family homes. The southern boundary of the property is also the municipal border between St. Petersburg and an unincorporated portion of Pinellas County. This area is governed by the Pinellas County FLUM and Pinellas County Comprehensive Plan. The adjacent property to the south is a mobile home park development which has a residential density of 20.4 units per acre. 4 Pursuant to section 16.10.020.2 of the City's Code, Institutional uses include, "government buildings and grounds, and cemeteries, hospitals, houses of worship and schools." In between the RU and RM categories is a category labeled "Residential Low Medium" (RLM). The RLM category allows low to moderately intensive residential development with a density not to exceed ten dwelling units per acre. See Comprehensive Plan Policy LU 3.1A.3. As stated above, the Ordinance would categorize the portion of the Property at issue as RM. The RM category allows medium density residential development and has a maximum density of 15 dwelling units per acre, with a possible maximum density of 30 dwelling units per acre with the qualification of a density bonus. See Comprehensive Plan Policy LU 3.1A.4. PGSP argues the density of the areas designated as RM by the Ordinance will have a maximum possible density of 30 dwelling units per acre. The City argues the maximum density is calculated using the actual density that can be built in the RM areas. As explained below, the practical allowable density of 15 dwelling units per acre with a Workforce Housing Bonus of six, or 21 dwelling units per acre. Petitioner relies on a "Missing Middle Housing" density bonus allowable in Neighborhood Traditional Mixed Residential (NTM) zoning category. This bonus allows up to 30 units per acre as an incentive to develop housing that is lacking in the area. While NTM is an available zoning category for RM, the Plan specifically states that 30 dwelling units per acre is only "permitted in accordance with the Land Development Regulations [LDRs]." Per the LDRs, the NTM designation could not be placed over this parcel because the designation is used as a transitional zoning category in St. Petersburg's traditional neighborhoods. While PGSP's planning expert considered the neighborhood surrounding the Property to be traditional, he admitted his opinion was not based on standards in the Comprehensive Plan or LDR definitions regarding what is considered a traditional or suburban neighborhood. In contrast, Derek Kilborn, a manager in the City's Planning Department, testified about the different characteristics of traditional versus suburban neighborhoods and opined that the neighborhood surrounding the Property is "suburban" according to the terms in the Comprehensive Plan. This determination is bolstered by the existing zoning of the surrounding neighborhood being largely NS-1. The City established it would be impossible for the Property to qualify for the Missing Middle Housing bonus, because the parcel at issue is not in the NTM zoning category. Rather, as explained by Mr. Kilborn's testimony and based on the LDRs and the Comprehensive Code, the RM category only allows a maximum of 15 dwelling units per acre. The Church has not applied to rezone the Property. The Planning Department's director testified, however, that if the Church had applied for a rezoning for the Property to NTM, the maximum number of dwelling units would be less than the numbers asserted by Petitioner due to the requirements for spacing, alleyways, and height restrictions required in NTM zones. The Property is eligible for a Workforce Housing density bonus. This bonus would increase the maximum density by six dwelling units for workforce housing. The City's final density calculation incorporated the Workforce Housing bonus and determined the maximum density for the RM portion of the Property to be 21 dwelling units per acre. PSGP did not prove beyond fair debate that the actual density of 21 units per acre is an erroneous calculation or contrary to the Comprehensive Plan. Consistency with Objective CM 10B and Policy CM 10.65 Comprehensive Plan Objective CM 10B states: The City shall direct population concentrations away from known or predicted coastal high hazard areas consistent with the goals, objectives and policies of the Future Land Use Element. The phrase "Population concentrations" is not defined by the Comprehensive Plan. The only policy referring to "directing" related to Objective CM 10B is Policy CM 10.6, which states: The City shall direct population concentrations away from known or predicted coastal high hazard areas by not locating water line extensions in the coastal high hazard area, beyond that which is necessary to service planned zoning densities as identified on the Future Land Use Map. The remaining policies related to this Objective involve the placement of transportation and infrastructure, expenditures for flood control, and the operation of roads in a CHHA; none of these issues were raised in these proceedings. In fact, other than the reference to placement of water line extensions in Policy CM 10.6, there is no provision establishing standards for what would constitute direction away from a CHHA. The only area on the Property designated a CHHA is near Bear Creek.6 The Ordinance does not increase density in any part of the CHHA portion of the Property. PGSP's planning expert, Charles Gauthier, equated a population concentration as an area with high density. He argued the Ordinance 5 "CM" means Coastal Management in the Comprehensive Plan. 6 Mr. Kilborn testified that in reviewing the property for compliance with the Plan related to CHHA, there was no study or analysis provided to the City by Petitioner or others showing flooding or hazard impacts for the non-CHHA portion of the Property. violated Policy 10.6 because it increased the density of the area on the Property adjacent to the CHHA. At one point, Mr. Gauthier seemed to say this policy encourages higher density future land use categories only in the "central core or spine of the City." Mr. Gauthier maintained the increase in density on the non-CHHA portion of the Property frustrated this policy because only land in the central part of St. Petersburg should experience density increases. PGSP's reasoning would imply any increase in density near any CHHA and not near the "central core" would violate Policy CM 10.6. Elizabeth Abernethy, Director of the Planning Department, testified that "population concentrations" as contemplated by the Comprehensive Plan are not simply increases in density. Rather, the City core had a concentration of high-density categories yielding approximate 80 to 120 dwelling units per acre; she would not characterize 15 or even 30 units per acre as a "high density" much less a "population concentration." Although she concurred that there are "population concentrations" in St. Petersburg centered in its urban core, she disagreed with Petitioner's expert that increased density on the Property created a "population concentration" near the CHHA or Bear Creek area. There was no competent evidence as to where any water line extensions would be located if the Property's Future Land Use Category were to change from RU and Industrial to RM. The City's interpretation of "population concentration" as used in CM 10.6 is reasonable, and therefore, the City's determination that the Ordinance is in compliance with CM 10.6 is fairly debatable. Consistency with LU 3.47 Comprehensive Plan Policy LU 3.4 states: The Land Use Plan shall provide for compatible land use transition through an orderly land use arrangement, proper buffering, and the use of physical and natural separators. 7 "LU" refers to Future Land Use Element in the Comprehensive Plan. Petitioner focuses on compatible land use transition as only a function of density. PGSP argues a parcel categorized as RM (15 unity density) cannot abut an RU (7.5 unit density) categorized parcel because it violates Policy LU 3.4. Rather, it argues the RLM (10 unit density) category should have been used instead. It claims the City "leap-frogged" categories instead of using a "one step" up or down approach. PGSP's expert admits that a direct step down between plan categories is not explicitly required under the Comprehensive Plan language but argues other language related to "limited variation" required the single step. The plain language of Policy LU 3.4, however, simply requires an "orderly land use arrangement." It does not explicitly or implicitly state that the City must use a "step up" approach when determining the appropriate Future Land Use category. Furthermore, PGSP relied on its density calculation of 30 dwelling units per acre to argue that with the surrounding adjacent land density of 7.5 units per acre, there would be a 400% increase in planned residential density. As stated above, the maximum possible density under the Amendment is 21 dwelling units per acre. Moreover, the City points out that that the mobile home park to the south of the Property has an actual density of approximately 20 dwelling units per acre. Thus, the transition from 20 to 21 is an orderly land use arrangement as contemplated by Policy LU 3.4. The FLUM also does not reflect a perfect one up or down transition pattern throughout St. Petersburg. Rather, it shows areas categorized RM abutting areas categorized RU and RLM. In fact, there is an area designated RM which abuts RU parcels within 800 feet of the Property. The City presented adequate evidence establishing the change from Institutional to a residential category fits with surrounding residential use. Moreover, it established that natural and physical barriers on the Property, including creeks and right of ways, provide transition as contemplated by Policy LU 3.4. PGSP does not explain why these barriers are inadequate. Petitioner did not prove beyond fair debate that the Ordinance is inconsistent with Policy LU 3.4. Consistency with Objective Policy LU 3.6 Policy LU 3.6 states: Land use planning decisions shall weigh heavily the established character of predominately developed areas where changes of use or intensity of development are contemplated. PGSP argues the increase in density as a result of the change in categories from RU to RM is inconsistent with the "character" of the surrounding neighborhood, which is made up of single-family homes. Again, PGSP's argument relies heavily on the density calculation of 30 units per acre. As stated above, this density is only available with a change to the underlying zoning to NTM, which was not sought by the Church in its application. The maximum density applicable to the RM portions of the Property is 21 dwelling units per acre. As stated above, the City established there are other instances of RM abutting RU in the same neighborhood, approximately 800 feet from the Property. Ms. Abernathy testified that, based on the City's historic development pattern, RM is the appropriate transitional category next to RU on a major street (such as 64th Street South) under the Comprehensive Plan. Ms. Abernethy further testified that residential single-family use adjoining either residential multi-family or commercial uses in the City is a "very common development pattern." Therefore, the RM designation is not inconsistent with Policy LU 3.6. Moreover, the RM designation provides for a primary residential use, which the Institutional designation does not. Although PGSP focused solely on density as the grounds for evaluating the "established character of the neighborhood," the City established that several other considerations go into its analysis related to Policy LU 3.6. Beyond looking at existing and proposed densities of the Future Land Use categories, City staff considers the occurrences and relationships between the uses of the property (i.e., residential versus institutional; or residential versus residential) and the existence of similar patterns in the surrounding neighborhood. In this case, the surrounding areas included other areas designated RM and the mobile home park. Determination of the character of the neighborhood was also based on a study of the existing road network and the potential impacts on traffic due to the Amendment. The street classification of 64th Street South as a Future Major was a key consideration in determining whether the changes in the Property were consistent with the character of the surrounding area because that street is the Property's frontage and only access point. Petitioner did not prove beyond fair debate that the Ordinance is inconsistent with Policy LU 3.6. Data and Analysis PGSP also claims the City did not rely on relevant and appropriate data and analysis in adopting the Ordinance and Amendment. PGSP, however, did not conduct or provide the City with any studies.8 Daniel Porter, PGSP's expert in real estate, did not provide a comparative market analysis of the neighborhood or any other industry- recognized report. He proffered only opinion testimony based on email responses from four nearby residents, only one of which alluded to any issues with selling a home in the area. 8 PGSP retained Mr. Gauthier for this administrative proceeding; he did not testify or prepare a report to the Planning Commission or the City Council. Petitioner's members presented no opposing reports or studies beyond lay opinion testimony during the public hearing. Mr. Gauthier testified that in calculating his density and formulating his opinions, he used the City's map set and GIS data from the City's website.9 In contrast, the City relied on several data sources in reaching its conclusions regarding compliance in the Staff Report, in the presentations at the City Council meeting, and at the final hearing. These sources include the Comprehensive Plan and maps; LDRs; GIS aerials and maps; application materials; a narrative from the property owner; plat records; the Pinellas Countywide Plan Rules; and an outside Traffic Impact Statement by a traffic engineering firm, Kimley-Horn. In addition to the Kimley-Horn report, Tom Whalen, the City's transportation planning expert, performed an analysis related to 64th Street South, which was included in the Staff Report. He also testified at the final hearing regarding his sources for that data, including a City-conducted traffic count, use of the Florida Department of Transportation's level of service tables, and the Forward Pinellas Countywide Rules. At the final hearing, the City also presented demonstrative exhibits in the form of enlarged maps illustrating the surrounding neighborhood, the Property, and similar development patterns of RM and RU designations across the City. Regarding the density calculation, the City introduced and explained the reasons and sources supporting its maximum density figure of 21 dwelling units per acre. This included the Pinellas Countywide Plan Rules, the Comprehensive Plan, and LDRs.10 The City established the Ordinance and Amendment are based upon surveys, studies, and data regarding the character of the land. 9 "GIS" is Geographic Information Systems. 10 Moreover, Mr. Kilborn explained that exact density calculations would be finalized during the site plan review process, which involves further surveys and engineering measurements. Petitioner failed to prove beyond fair debate that the Ordinance was not supported by data and analysis, and/or that the City's response to that data and analysis was not appropriate. Ultimate Findings PGSP did not prove beyond fair debate that the Ordinance is not in compliance. All other contentions not specifically discussed have been considered and rejected. The City has provided a preponderance of the evidence, which is both competent and substantial, which supports the findings in the Staff Report and the City Council's adoption of the Ordinance. The City's determination that the Ordinance is in compliance is fairly debatable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order determining the City of St. Petersburg Comprehensive Plan Amendment, Ordinance 739-L, is "in compliance" as that term is defined by section 163.3184(1)(b). DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert N. Hartsell, Esquire Robert N. Hartsell, P.A. 61 Northeast 1st Street, Suite C Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 Jacqueline Kovilaritch, Esquire City of St. Petersburg Florida One 4th Street North, 10th Floor St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-2842 Michael J. Dema, Esquire City of St. Petersburg Post Office Box 2842 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Tom Thomas, General Counsel Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building, MSC 110 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 Janay Lovett, Agency Clerk Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 Sarah M. Hayter, Esquire Robert N. Hartsell, P.A. 61 Northeast 1st Street, Suite C Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 Shai Ozery, Esquire Robert N. Hartsell P.A. 61 Northeast 1st Street, Suite C Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 Heather Judd, Esquire City of St. Petersburg Post Office Box 2842 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Dane Eagle, Executive Director Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128
The Issue Whether the subject site is within Petitioner's permitting jurisdiction and whether an earthen dam constructed at the subject site required a permit? Whether Respondent should be required to remove the earthen dam and/or be required to pay Petitioner's investigative costs?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida that regulates dredge and fill activities conducted in wetlands within its statutory jurisdiction as set forth in Chapters 373 and 403, Florida Statutes. Respondent owns the subject property, which is located in the 200 block of Jan Drive in Section 18, Township 4 South, Range 13 West, Bay County, Florida. On July 22, 1999, Mr. Keisker met informally with Respondent at Respondent’s request and made a field visit to the subject property. Mr. Keisker told Respondent that he thought the subject property was within Petitioner’s permitting jurisdiction. Although Mr. Keisker took soil samples, surveyed the plant life of the area, and observed the hydrology of the area, his visit was not intended to be an official determination that the subject property was within Petitioner's permitting jurisdiction. There is no dispute that an earthen dam was constructed across the unnamed creek, described in findings of fact paragraph 5, in late 1999 or early January 2000. The central issue in dispute is whether the site of the earthen dam is within Petitioner’s permitting jurisdiction. Respondent asserts that the area at issue is a drainage ditch that did not naturally occur and is not within the permitting jurisdiction of Petitioner. Petitioner asserts that the area is an unnamed creek in a historical, natural wetland that is within its permitting jurisdiction. The greater weight of the credible, competent evidence established that Respondent’s property contains an unnamed creek that is located in an area of historically natural wetlands that was likely excavated in the 1970's by the local Mosquito Control District. This area of natural wetlands drains and connects into Rogers Pond and Calloway Bayou, which are Class III waters of the State of Florida. The site is within the permitting jurisdiction of Petitioner. 2/ Respondent did not receive a permit prior to the construction of the earthen dam. Construction of the earthen dam constitutes unpermitted fill activity in a wetland within Petitioner's regulatory jurisdiction. Shortly after Petitioner received a complaint in January 2000 that it had been constructed, the dam was partially breached as the result of a heavy rain event. To prevent further pollution of the unnamed creek, the remaining portion of the earthen dam should be removed by non- mechanical means. Mr. Keisker testified that he calculated Petitioner’s investigative costs based on the amount of time he expended in investigating this matter multiplied by his hourly rate of pay. In calculating his hourly rate of pay, he took his annual salary and added to that 52 percent of his annual salary for fringe benefits. He then divided that sum by 2000, which represents 50 work weeks of 40 hours per week. He used 50 weeks to calculate the hourly rate to adjust for two weeks of paid vacation. Based on his calculations, Mr. Keisker testified that Petitioner incurred costs and expenses in excess of $750.00 during its investigation of this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings and conclusions contained herein and requiring Respondent to remove the remaining portions of the earthen dam by non-mechanical means. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2001.
Findings Of Fact In 1984, the Petitioners, a married couple, purchased a parcel of real property zoned agricultural located in Clay County. The Petitioners' parcel, which is the subject of the application for vested rights, is a fraction over twenty-two acres and is bounded on the east side by the St. John's River, on the west side by County Road 209, and by other private property on the north and south which is not subject to the application under consideration. An abandoned rail road right of way runs northwest to southeast across the parcel approximately half way between the paved road on the western boundary of the property and the river which forms the eastern boundary. A sand road has been constructed between the paved road and the abandoned railroad right of way. The land uses for agricultural property included single family residential development with one single family residence per acre until the enactment of the comprehensive plan discussed in detail below. The Petitioners purchased the parcel for the purpose of constructing a single family, and subdividing and selling the remaining portions of the parcel as home sites. The Petitioners obtained two mobile home permits (move-on permits) in 1986 and a building permit for the construction of a barn in 1989 from Respondent. In addition, the Petitioners obtained a permit for the construction of a dock from the Corps of Engineers. The Petitioners had a road constructed to access the interior of the property prior to 1990. The Petitioners later purchased equipment including a back hoe, grader, and dump trucks in 1990 for improving the road and improving drainage. The Petitioner, Robert I. Moore, completed improvements to the sand road with his own labor incurring costs for fill, fuel, and equipment repairs. The Petitioners ordered a survey which was completed in 1991. They then conveyed property between themselves via quit claim deeds to subdivide the property into nine lots, A through I. Three lots were created along the river, Lot I (3.59 acres), Lost H (3.16 acres), and Lot G (2.97 acres). Three lots were created along the paved road: Lot C running from the paved road to the rail road right of way containing 2.87 acres; Lot B running east from the paved road approximately 140 feet containing 1.11 acres; and Lot A running east from the paved road approximately 150 feet containing 1.09 acres. Lot F is located east of Lot A, and runs east approximately 800 feet containing 4.60 acres. Lot D is located east of Lot B and runs east approximately 300 feet containing 1.42 acres. Lot E is located east of Lot D, runs east approximately 200 feet to the rail road right of way, and contains approximately 1.42 acres. The surveyed subdivision of the parcel was recorded on December 31, 1991, together with private road maintenance agreement and quit claim deeds. The mobile homes were located on lots B and D, and barn had been built on Lot F. The amended application combined Lots A and F, and Lots D and E. The Petitioners spent money and expended energy to make improvements to the property in pursuit of their objective of developing the parcel. Their efforts included developing a graded, sand road through the property, improving the drainage, having a survey of the property conducted, and engaging an attorney to advise them. In June 1991, the Respondent adopted a comprehensive land use plan which was submitted to the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) of the State of Florida. The DCA is charged by statute to determine if county comprehensive planning ordinances conform to state requirements. Those counties whose plans did not conform could amend them to conform; however, if the county failed to bring its plan into compliance, sanctions could be invoked by the state against the county. The Respondent's initial plan as adopted retained agricultural zoning for the parcel owned by Petitioners, and the Petitioners were aware of this having obtained several planning maps reflecting the proposed land uses for various areas of the county including their parcel. The Petitioners' subdivision complied with all existing requirements of the county to include those contained in the county's original comprehensive land use plan. The county's comprehensive land use plan provided that a lot of record included "a non-platted piece, parcel, lot, or tract of land described by metes and bounds or other similar means in a legally recorded deed as of July 1, 1991." The Petitioners' subdivision was not recorded until December 31, 1991. The county's comprehensive land use plan was not accepted by the DCA which received written objections, recommendations and comments (ORC Report) of the DCA. These objections included the density allowed in rural residential land use classification. On December 5, 1991, the Respondent and its Planning Commission held a joint workshop, advertised and open to the public, at which a modification to the density provisions of the comprehensive land use plan was considered for the purpose of addressing the objections by the DCA. The DCA's recommendation to reduce density in rural areas from one single family residence per acre to one to every five acres based upon a point system was specifically considered. On January 23, 1992, following a public hearing as required by statute, the Respondent adopted the amended plan containing the reduced density for rural areas based upon the point system. This changed the density of the Petitioners' parcel to one single family residence per five acres. This amended plan retained the definition of "lot of record" first discussed in March 1991; later considered at the public hearing on the plan in May 1991; and adopted in the original comprehensive plan. The assessed value of the parcel in 1994 was $274,200; in 1993 it was $158,462; and in 1992 it was $96,921. The expenditures for fill, labor, and repairs to construct and improve the road cost $23,425. The purchase price of the heavy equipment used by Mr. Moore to improve the road was $26,200 including $4,595 for repair of the loader/backhoe which is considered part of "purchase price." Although some of the heavy equipment was purchased used, and would have a lower rate of depreciation, the equipment lost value being used. This depreciation was part of the costs of doing the work. A declining depreciation rate of 15 percent in 1989, 12 percent in 1990, and 10 percent in 1991 was used to arrive at the depreciation costs, which were approximately $8,500. The capital costs of building the dock were excluded; however, the taxes paid to Clay County for the past two years, $5,023, were included. The total developmental costs would be approximately $37,000 as of the end of 1991. Expenditures after adoption of the plan are not considered.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the findings of facts and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the amended application for equitable vested rights be approved in part, and denied in part as follows: That Petitioner be granted equitable relief to subdivide their 22-acre parcel into 4 lots each containing approximately 5 acres using the existing road which they constructed as a boundary between the lots, but that they not be permitted to exceed the plan's density requirements. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Findings Recommended Order Paragraphs 1-4 Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,7 Paragraph 5,6 Paragraphs 6,5 Paragraph 7 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 8 It is the hearing officer's under-standing that the ordinances were adopted prior to submission to DCA, which could state objections to the county's ordinance. Mr. Moore was aware of the plan and its impact upon his property. Paragraph 9 Paragraphs 11,12,14 Paragraph 10 Paragraphs 15,16 Paragraph 11 Paragraphs 17,18 Paragraph 12 Paragraph 13 Paragraph 13 Paragraphs 11,12 Respondent's Findings Recommended Order Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 1-4 Paragraphs 4-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 5-10 Paragraphs 9-12 Subsumed in Paragraphs 11-14 Paragraph 13 Irrelevant. Paragraph 14 Paragraphs 14,18 Paragraph 15 Discussed in Conclusions Paragraphs 16-19 Paragraphs 15-18 Paragraph 20 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 21 Subsumed in Paragraph 7 Paragraph 22 Paragraph 9
The Issue Whether Petitioners have standing to initiate formal proceedings under the City of Tallahassee Code of Ordinances. Whether the Planning Commission has jurisdiction to consider a challenge to the City's vested rights determination. Whether the Respondents Barnette W. Allen and Sally P. Allen's (Allens) proposed development, known as the Allenwoods Apartments project, is exempt from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City of Tallahassee's (City) Comprehensive Plan.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner Downtown Park Avenue Neighborhood Association (Neighborhood Association), Inc., is not-for-profit corporation organized on August 18, 1997, and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. The Neighborhood Association's principal office is located at 858 East Call Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The purpose of the Neighborhood Association is to preserve the residential nature and stability of the members' neighborhood. The members of the Neighborhood Association reside in close proximity to the property upon which the Allenwoods Apartments project is proposed to be constructed. Some members of the Neighborhood Association own property within 500 feet or less of the subject property. Petitioner Dana Plummer resides at 133-9 Oak Street, Tallahassee, Florida, which is in close proximity to the property upon which the Allenwoods Apartments project is proposed to be constructed. Mr. Plummer owns property less than 300 feet from the subject property. Plummer is the President of the Neighborhood Association. Respondent City of Tallahassee is a municipal corporation of the State of Florida. The City's DRC approved a Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. Respondents Allens are the owners of the property on which the proposed Allenwoods Apartments are to be located, and which property is designated as Blocks D and F in the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division. Allenwoods Apartments The Allenwoods Apartments is proposed to be constructed in approximately 8.64 acres, and is located on the north side of Call Street. The Allenwoods Apartments is proposed to consist of 88 apartment units. The apartments will be located within three three-story buildings and one two-story building, with a total of 202 parking spaces. The density of the proposed Allenwoods Apartments project is approximately ten units per acre. On October 24, 1996, the Planning Department issued Land Use Compliance Certificate No. CC960429 which stated that: This site is eligible for development of 110 multi-family dwelling units developed at the RM-1 standards in Hays Subdivision, an exempt subdivision. Type B review required in proximity with existing low density residential uses. Notice of the Planning Department's decision to issue Land Use Compliance Certificate No. CC960429 was not provided to any members of the Neighborhood Association nor to Plummer. In May 1997, the Allens submitted a Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. In mid-June 1997, during the City's review of the proposed project, the City determined that the Allens' two lots qualified as lots located within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, and all infrastructure required for the development of the property was completed prior to that date. Accordingly, the City staff determined that, pursuant to Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) of the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance, the proposed Allenwoods Apartments project did not have to comply with the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Consequently, the City staff did not review the Allenwoods Apartments project for consistency with the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan, nor did the City review the project for concurrency. On August 11, 1997, the City's Development Review Committee approved the Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. Single-family residences are the primary use of the properties immediately adjacent to the Allens property. All existing multi-family units that have been constructed in the neighborhood were constructed prior to the adoption of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. History of the Subject Property On May 1, 1910, J. L. Hays recorded a subdivision known as the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division. The plat for the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division is recorded at Deed Book "KK," page 600, of the Public Records of Leon County. The plat depicted a street running between Blocks F and G. The plat also depicted a street between Blocks D and F. These streets were never constructed. On January 15, 1946, H. H. Wells acquired certain Blocks of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division, including all of Blocks D and F, and a portion of Block E. On March 11, 1946, H. H. Wells and Susye Bell Wells replated all of Block C and a portion of B, D, E, F, and G. The new subdivision was named "Magnolia Manor," and is recorded at Plat Book 3, page 6, of the Public records of Leon County. On January 6, 1948, H. H. Wells and Susye Bell Wells sold all of Blocks F and G, and Lots 9, 10, and 11 in Block D, of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to the Glover Construction Company. On July 22, 1948, the Glover Construction sold its portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Willie Mae Hampton. On November 1, 1963, Glover Construction Company sold a portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Harlem J. Allen, Clyde P. Allen, Barnette W. Allen, and Sally Procter Allen. On February 13, 1964, Willie Mae Hampton sold her portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Canal Timber Corporation. On December 2, 1964, Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen entered into an agreement to purchase that portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division owned by the Canal Timber Corporation. On November 20, 1972, Canal Timber Corporation sold its portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Grace H. Gibson. On December 26, 1974, Grace H. Gibson transferred her portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen. On December 15, 1976, Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen acquired whatever property interests that Harlem J. Allen and Clyde P. Allen possessed by virtue of the acquisition that occurred on November 1, 1963. The City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance The City adopted its 2010 Comprehensive Plan on July 16, 1990. Concurrently with the adoption of its 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the City adopted its Vested Rights Review Ordinance, Ordinance No. 90-O-0043AA. This ordinance was codified as Article VII of Chapter 18 of the Code of Ordinances. Article VII (Sections 18-101 through 18-106) of the Tallahassee Code of Ordinances establishes the standards by which a property owner may demonstrate that private property rights have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Section 18-101 of the Code is a statement of intent in regard to the Vested Rights Ordinance, which reads: This article establishes the sole administrative procedures and standards by which a property owner may demonstrate that private property rights have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Said administrative procedures shall provide determinations of consistency of development with the densities and intensities set forth in the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and that development is not subject to the concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The City established three categories for which property owners could apply to establish their vested rights to continue development of their property without complying with the consistency and concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. These categories are contained in Sections 18-104(1) and (2), Code of Ordinances. The three categories were denominated as "common-law vesting," "statutory vesting," and developments of regional impact, which were approved pursuant to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 18-103(2), property owners who contended that they had vested rights pursuant to one of these three categories were required to request a determination of vested rights by filing an application with the Planning Department within 120 calendar days of July 16, 1990. The failure to timely file an application for a vested rights determination within the prescribed time limits constituted a waiver of any vested rights claims. The city's Vested Rights Review Ordinance also expressly states that a property owner cannot receive vested rights based upon a zoning classification. In addition to the three categories for which property owners could apply to establish vested property rights, the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance included a provision by which certain property owners were presumptively vested and, therefore, were not required to file an application for a vested rights determination. Section 18-103(1) reads, as follows: The following categories shall be presumptively vested for the purposes of consistency with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and concurrency as specified in the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and shall not be required to file an application to preserve their vested rights status: All lots within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, or lots in approved subdivisions for which streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for the development have been completed as of July 16, 1990. The Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department shall maintain a listing of such exempt subdivisions. All active and valid building permits issued prior to July 17, 1990. All technically complete building permit applications received by the building inspection department on or before July 2, 1990, and subsequently issued, shall be vested under the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, regardless of date of issuance. Any structure on which construction has been completed and a certificate of occupancy issued if a certificate of occupancy was required at time of permitting. All lots of record as of July 1, 1984, not located within a subdivision, but only to the extent of one (1) single-family residence per lot. If a property qualifies as an exempt or vested property pursuant to the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance, the property owner does not have to comply with the consistency and concurrency provisions of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Such properties are allowed to be developed pursuant to the 1971 zoning code that was in effect until the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan was adopted. The City staff and DRC determined that the subject property was vested because it fulfilled the requirements of Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) as a lot "within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990." The basis for this determination was that the property was located within the plat for the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division which was recorded in 1910. The plat does not contain any statements as to use or density, however. The subdivision, known as Magnolia Manor, plated in 1946, has its own separate subdivision number, and consists of a portion of property that was originally part of the Magnolia Heights Addition to the Hays Division. A small portion of the Allens' property is located within the Magnolia Manor subdivision. Although from 1948 to 1974, Blocks D and F were both divided and transferred in a manner differently than that depicted on the 1910 Plat, all conveyances of the property subject to the Site Plan have been by reference to the lot and block of Magnolia Heights Addition. Subsequent purchasers of the property conveyed the lots subject to the Site Plan to the Allens, and described the lots as part of the original subdivision rather than by any reference to "Magnolia Manor." The replatting of certain lots within the subdivision to create "Magnolia Manor" did not affect or otherwise change any of the property subject to the Site Plan. On August 20, 1990, the City determined that the Magnolia Heights Addition was an exempt subdivision pursuant to the provisions of Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) of City Code of Ordinances, and was placed on the Planning Department list of exempt subdivisions. As such, the subdivision was exempt from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the Comprehensive Plan. The subdivision is one of more than 300-350 subdivisions determined to be exempt as recorded subdivisions. The exemption was based upon the fact the project was located in a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, and all infrastructure required for the subdivision and for development of the property was in place and complete as of that date. The City staff has been guided in its interpretation and application of the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance by a memorandum dated August 27, 1990, written by then Assistant City Attorney John Systma. The August 27 memorandum states, in pertinent part, that: This memo is in response to your questions about the proper procedure to follow in determining if a subdivision recorded in 1906 should be declared exempt under the provisions of the Vested Rights Review Ordinance. The critical element that must exist for the subdivision to be exempt is that the current subdivision must be identical to the plat that was created when the subdivision was initially recorded. Any resubdivision, replatting or other changes made to the original recorded plat invalidates that plat. An excellent example of an invalid plat is the original plat recorded for the Pecan Endowment, which has subsequently been changed many times, thereby invalidating it. The subdivision was recorded as of July 16, 1990. The resubdivision of a part of an exempt recorded subdivision, which does not affect the property under review and subject to development approval, has never been the basis of denial of the recorded subdivision exemption provisions of the Vested Rights Ordinance. City staff have never denied the exemption or vesting based upon a replatting of other lots in a subdivision which were not included in the proposed exempt development. Respondents clearly established that such replatting has not been a basis for denial of the exemption by City staff in applying the Vested Rights Ordinance since its adoption in 1990. The development approvals for the Allenwoods Apartments are valid if it is determined that the project is exempt or vested under the Vested Rights Ordinance. The property, at the time of adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, was zoned RM-1, and allowed development of a multifamily project at the density approved for the Allens. The current zoning of the property is MR1 and would permit the development of the property as a multifamily project at the density approved for the Allens.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of RECOMMENDED that the Planning Commission find that Respondents Allens' lots are vested for the purposes of consistency and concurrency with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, and, it is further RECOMMENDED that the Planning Commission approve the Site Plan for the Allenwoods Apartment Project, as consistent with the requirements of Chapter 27, Article XXI, Section 21.4.G.8. of the Code of Ordinances. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles A. Francis, Esquire Francis & Sweet, P.A. Post Office Box 10551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 David A. Theriaque, Esquire 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda R. Hurst Assistant City Attorney City Hall 300 South Adams Street Second Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Gumula Director of Planning Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jean Gregory Clerk of the Planning Commission Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department 300 South Adams Street, City Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert B. Inzer City Treasurer-Clerk 300 South Adams Street, City Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32301
