The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a software engineer with almost 30 years of experience in the industry. From 2001 until August of 2006, Petitioner was employed by ITT Industries (ITT). Petitioner's employment with ITT came to an end when he was involuntarily terminated. Following his termination, Petitioner filed an employment discrimination complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that ITT had discriminated against him because he suffered from Tourette's syndrome (which caused him to have vocal tics and to stutter). Petitioner did not take any action to pursue these allegations of employment discrimination beyond filing this complaint against ITT with the EEOC. Petitioner has been unable to obtain a "permanent job" as a software engineer since his termination by ITT. Respondent is a defense contractor that "make[s] [military] simulation and training equipment." In early 2008, Respondent was looking to fill a temporary software engineer position. Edge Dynamics was one of the outside employment agencies that Respondent used to assist it in the hiring process. On January 9, 2008, Edge Dynamics provided Petitioner's resume to Edward Kaprocki, a senior principal software engineer with Respondent. Mr. Kaprocki was responsible for interviewing applicants for the position and making hiring/rejection recommendations. After reviewing Petitioner's resume, Mr. Kaprocki "thought [it] looked interesting enough where it would worth talking to [Petitioner]," and he so advised Sandra Asavedo, his "point of contact" at Edge Dynamics. Ms. Asavedo made the necessary arrangements to set up a face-to-face interview between Mr. Kaprocki and Petitioner. The interview took place in Mr. Kaprocki's office on January 14, 2008. It lasted about 45 minutes to an hour. Petitioner seemed to Mr. Kaprocki to be "a little bit nervous," but Petitioner did not do or say anything to cause Mr. Kaprocki to believe that Petitioner suffered from any disability. During the course of the interview, Petitioner showed Mr. Kaprocki his personal website, which contained information about and pictures of "some of the projects that [Petitioner] had worked on." Based on the interview, Mr. Kaprocki determined that Petitioner did not have the skill-set that was needed for the position Respondent was seeking to fill. Immediately following the interview, Mr. Kaprocki went to his supervisor, Steve Preston, whose office was "right down the hall," and recommended that Petitioner not be hired to fill the position. Mr. Kaprocki then telephoned Ms. Asavedo to let her know that Petitioner was not going to be hired so that she could inform Petitioner. Mr. Kaprocki's decision to recommend against hiring Petitioner had nothing to do with Petitioner's suffering from Tourette's syndrome or his having filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Indeed, at the time he made his decision, Mr. Kaprocki did not even know that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Mr. Kaprocki first learned of these matters only after Petitioner had filed his Complaint in the instant case. After being told that he would not be hired for the position, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Kaprocki several times, pleading with Mr. Kaprocki to "reconsider hiring him." Mr. Kaprocki told Petitioner "that the decision had been made" and would not be reconsidered. Mr. Kaprocki felt that Petitioner, by making these telephone calls, was "badgering and harassing him." To satisfy his own personal curiosity (and for no other reason), Mr. Kaprocki looked online to find out more about the person who was subjecting him to this "badgering and harass[ment]."2 Mr. Kaprocki did not discover, as a result of his online search, that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or that Petitioner had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. His search, however, did reveal certain comments Petitioner had made in an online forum that Mr. Kaprocki considered to be "extremely unprofessional." After reading these comments, Mr. Kaprocki was even more confident than he had been before he began his search that he had made the right decision in not recommending Petitioner for employment. Petitioner was never offered a position with Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding Respondent not guilty of any unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2009.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was terminated from her position with the Respondent as a Certified Nurses Assistant (CNA) on or about July 1, 1995, on the basis of her race (white), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer as that term is defined under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a CNA at Park Lake Nursing and Rehabilitation Center during the relevant period of time from April through July, 1995. Petitioner is a white female and a licensed CNA. Kay Vermette (“Vermette”), a white female, was the Director of Nursing at Park Lake and the department head over the entire nursing staff during Petitioner’s tenure. Vermette hired Petitioner as a CNA on April 18, 1995. Petitioner worked as a CNA at Park Lake for less than ninety (90) days when she was terminated by Vermette for verbal abuse of a resident on July 1, 1995. Joyce Donahue (“Donahue”), Assistant Director of Nursing at Lake Park during Petitioner’s tenure, was the second in charge of the entire nursing staff. Donahue, a white female, has been a Registered Nurse (RN) since April, 1990. On June 29, 1995, Mary Taylor (“Taylor”), a Licensed Practical Nurse, reported to Donahue she heard a loud voice and crying coming from the room of resident Matteye Samuels (“Samuels”). Taylor is black. Samuels was a black female and an elderly resident at Park Lake who needed assistance to perform all normal activities of daily living (ADL) and could not walk without assistance. As Donahue and Taylor approached Samuels’ room, they overheard a loud voice which they recognized as Petitioner’s and loud crying coming from another person. When Donahue and Taylor entered the room, they heard the resident crying in the bathroom area, where she sat on the toilet with only a robe draped over her, crying and trembling. Petitioner was very excited and pacing and was talking in a rapid, jarring, and incoherent fashion. Donahue and Taylor dressed Samuels and took her to the nurses’ station. Petitioner told Donahue that Samuels had thrown her around the room. Petitioner yelled at Samuels, “[y]ou are not a Nigger. I am not a Honky. Those aren’t really Jews. Those aren’t irate Indians,” while in Samuels’ room. When Donahue entered, Petitioner was pacing back and forth by the bed saying, “Nigger, Honky, Jews . . . this is enough of this.” Donahue told Petitioner to leave the room and wait in the employee break room. Donahue reported this incident to her superior, Vermette. Due to the severe nature of the incident, it was investigated immediately. Petitioner was placed on administrative leave, pending the investigation’s outcome. During the investigation, several witnesses came forward with information confirming the verbal abuse. Each witness provided a statement concerning her recollection. As an eyewitness to the verbal abuse of Samuels by Petitioner, Taylor and Sterling Brown, CNA, provided a written statement detailing her knowledge of the events. Donahue reported her findings to her supervisor, Vermette, both verbally and in writing. Vermette prepared a three-page, hand-written report which included the findings of her investigation, all of which confirmed the verbal abuse of Samuels by Petitioner. Verbal harassment of a resident is a Category I violation of Respondent’s disciplinary code. It subjects an employee to immediate suspension, followed by investigation. When an investigation confirms that a Beverly employee commits a Category I offense, the employee is subject to immediate termination. Petitioner received and signed the June 29, 1995, Associate Memorandum, which reflects that she was suspended while Respondent investigated the verbal abuse claims. The allegations of verbal abuse were investigated by Donahue, a white female, among others. The findings of the investigation and the proposed discipline (termination) were approved by Malley, the white female administrator. Petitioner was terminated by Vermette, a white female, who was the person who had, in fact, hired her. The three individuals who investigated the allegations of verbal abuse are white, as Petitioner. Petitioner’s statement regarding her treatment prior to the incident on June 29, 1995, and her version of the events that occurred on June 29, 1995, are not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 COPIES FURNISHED: Jayne E. Griffith, pro se 2018 Gairloch Street Orlando, Florida 32817 Deborah Gibson, Esquire Jackson Lewis 390 North Orange Avenue Suite 1285 Orlando, Florida 32801 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1997. Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether just cause exists to terminate the employment of Respondent, John B. Sculley (“Sculley”). Petitioner, DeSoto County School Board (the “Board”), alleges that Sculley violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-5.056(2), i.e., that he was incompetent in the performance of his duties as a school psychologist.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral testimony and documentary evidence presented at final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Board is responsible for hiring, firing, and overseeing all employees within the DeSoto County school system. At all times relevant hereto, Sculley was employed by the Board as a school psychologist. Sculley has apparently served for 30 years as a licensed psychologist. He worked as a school psychologist for about ten years in DeSoto County. (Sculley did not testify or appear at the final hearing. Information concerning his experience and background can only be derivatively ascertained through the testimony and evidence presented by other witnesses.) By all accounts, Sculley did excellent work for the Board for the majority of his tenure. Much of Sculley’s job duties centered on students in the ESE program within the school district. Sculley performed psychological evaluations for students which were then used by the ESE department to assign the students to appropriate programs and classes, apply for state-funded services, and promote sufficient educational opportunities for the students. In December 2011, the ESE director for DeSoto County schools suffered a stroke and was forced to retire. At about the same time, the assistant ESE director also chose to retire. Robert Hrstka was selected to act as the interim ESE director pending the hiring of a new ESE director. Hrstka had some experience with ESE students and was familiar with ESE programs. Hrstka became the interim director on December 8, 2011. Terry Cassels became his interim assistant ESE director. When Hrstka took over his duties as interim director, he soon learned that his assistant, Cassels, harbored some concerns about Sculley’s work performance. According to reports Cassels made to Hrstka, Sculley was providing incorrect reports to ESE, he was not administering required tests to students, and his scoring of tests was deficient. Cassels did not testify at final hearing, so her stated concerns were not corroborated by competent, non-hearsay evidence. However, as a result of Cassel’s stated concerns, Hrstka began to pay attention to Sculley’s work product. Hrstka also received additional information from Cissy Quave about the poor quality of Sculley’s work. To address the concerns that had been raised by others, Hrstka talked with the superintendent of schools about bringing in a trained psychologist to audit the work of Sculley and Quave – the only two members of the school’s psychological team. Quave worked half-time as a school psychologist and the other half-time as a staffing specialist or staffing coordinator. Before the audit of Sculley and Quave’s work began, Hrstka met with Sculley and discussed some of his concerns and some of the concerns that had been raised by Cassels. Following a meeting with Sculley on or about December 13, 2011 – just a week after assuming his duties as interim ESE director – Hrstka issued a letter of reprimand to Sculley. The bases for the reprimand were that Sculley: Had asked teachers what tests he should give students; Was not giving students the proper tests; Had submitted reports that were incomplete; and Had inquired of teachers as to the meaning of a test ceiling. These fundamental shortcomings by Sculley caused Hrstka to be concerned about whether Sculley could properly and competently perform his required duties without further assistance. Initially, Hrstka was not looking to terminate Sculley’s employment; rather, he was concerned with making sure the psychological assessments and other important tasks were being completed correctly. Hrstka intended to wait for the results of the independent, outside expert’s evaluations before taking any further action concerning Sculley’s employment status. To help alleviate the perceived problems with Sculley’s work, Hrstka first initiated a plan (set forth in the letter of reprimand) that would essentially require Sculley to have his work reviewed by Sculley’s subordinate, Quave. Quave was a certified school psychologist, but she only worked half-time in that position for the Board and Sculley had supervised Quave during her internship. Sculley initially approved of the monitoring plan and it was put into place for a short time. As will be discussed below, Sculley ultimately filed a discrimination complaint against the Board, primarily based upon alleged comments made by Quave during the time she was “overseeing” Sculley’s work. Meanwhile, on January 21, 2012, Debra Giacolone was hired as the permanent ESE director, relieving Hrstka of his interim duties. Giacolone was an experienced administrator, having served as assistant principal and dean of students at local schools. She had not previously served as an ESE director, but was qualified to do so. When Giacolone took over as ESE director, the decision to audit Sculley’s work had already been made. Giacolone was made aware of Hrstka’s concerns about Sculley, so she investigated the situation independently. Giacolone reviewed psychological reports that had been signed and certified by Sculley, finding a number of errors, including: Sculley had not timely completed psychological evaluations of several students. Sculley had been assigned the task of developing a plan for conducting functional behavior assessments; he did not complete the plan timely. Sculley’s comprehensive assessments of students were fairly short and often did not include background information or the reason for the student’s referral. It was reported to Giacolone that Sculley failed to include all pertinent information provided by parents in his assessments, but even though Giacolone verified that certain information was not included in the assessment, as no competent testimony was presented at final hearing to prove that the information had been provided by the parents. Thereafter, the aforementioned audit was performed. The person hired to conduct the audit of Sculley and Quave’s work was Kathy Haugan, a licensed school psychologist who was working for the Manatee County school system at that time. Haugan had previously met Sculley and Quave at meetings or conventions for professional associations, but she did not know them well. Hrstka, pursuant to Haugan’s directions, pulled a number of randomly selected files from Sculley and Quave’s pending case files. Haugan reviewed the selected files using a File Review Checklist which outlined the various protocols utilized in performing student psychological assessments. Reviews of the test protocols are a good means of measuring whether the person performing the assessments is performing in accordance with professional standards. The audit of Sculley’s files was completed in accordance with generally accepted standards for such a review. The review of each file addressed the following criteria: Whether items were scored correctly on subtests; Whether scores were added correctly; Whether the scores were transferred correctly to the front page of the record form; Whether the scores were transferred to scaled scores; Whether the scaled scores were added correctly; Whether composite, percentile, and confidence interval items were recorded accurately; Whether scores and information was interpreted accurately; Whether the recommendation was in sync with the interpretation; Whether, based on previous data, the evaluation was valid; and Whether the report considered data required by state and federal guidelines. Haugan determined from her review of the test protocols that Sculley had only a 27 percent accuracy rate in his testing results, compared to a 94 percent accuracy rate for Quave. While many of the errors made by Sculley were mathematical, i.e., he simply added up scores on his scoring sheets incorrectly, Haugan found other errors to be more substantive in nature. The errors made Sculley’s work “at best suspect and at worst invalid” according to Haugan. The work product was bad enough that Haugan recommended that students who had been evaluated by Sculley should be reevaluated to determine if they were properly placed and/or receiving appropriate services. Haugan’s substantive testimony was credible and did not seem biased or unfair towards Sculley. Haugan’s report recommended that Sculley should pay much closer attention to the protocols used in the evaluation process. It is important that school psychologist in general – and Sculley in particular - be provided with professional development opportunities and consultation to help them maintain accuracy and proficiency. Haugan offered her services for developing and providing supervision of Sculley in order to provide such consultation and assistance. The Board did not further utilize her services, however. (Sculley did not ultimately receive any consultation or professional help, because he was terminated from employment.) When Giacolone reviewed Haugan’s report, she became very concerned about Sculley’s competency. Giacolone met with Sculley on a number of occasions to discuss some of her perceived shortcomings with his work, which included: not finishing work timely; not responding appropriately to parents; omitting or misstating parents’ input in evaluation forms; and dating tests incorrectly. During the meetings, Sculley appeared to act “aloof” toward Giacolone. Sculley also seemed unable to provide credible reasons or explanations for the mistakes in his work. Giacolone and Sculley met to discuss these matters on February 2, 6, and 14, 2012. There were also other brief conversations between the two on a regular basis during that month. When Giacolone began looking into Sculley’s work issues, she was not aware that Sculley and Quave were having a dispute. Quave had written a long email to Hrstka and Cassels outlining her concerns about Sculley. The email was forwarded to Giacolone on February 1, 2012, i.e., after she was already conducting meetings with Sculley about his work. The Quave email was not the impetus for Giacolone’s investigation into Sculley’s performance. Giacolone found Sculley to be distracted or confused when discussing his work. In addition to the areas of deficiency discussed above, Giacolone also said Sculley seemed cognitively impaired during their conversations. Giacolone was concerned about Sculley, but was not predisposed toward terminating his employment. In order to help Sculley retain his position with the Board, Giacolone offered him the opportunity to take some on-line training courses. Sculley said he could not navigate the computer sufficiently well to do on-line courses, so Giacolone provided assistance in that regard as well. Ultimately, Sculley did not access the on-line training because, allegedly, he felt it would not be beneficial to him. According to Giacolone, Sculley apparently did not believe his performance was subpar. After their meeting on February 14, Giacolone was so concerned that she decided to restrict Sculley from doing any further student evaluations until such time as she could become comfortable that he was not doing harm to the students. On March 22, 2012, Giacolone directed Sculley to return all student files in his possession to her office until further notice. Sometime later, on or about March 27, 2012, Giacolone discovered that Sculley had retained at least one file. A student’s file was missing, so an office employee began searching for it. The file was found on Sculley’s desk. Sculley allegedly told Giacolone he did not remember the directive to return all of the student files. Sculley did not testify to explain the discrepancy of delivering all his files to Giacolone but not remembering the directive as it applied to one file. Even though he was restricted from doing so, Sculley continued working on an evaluation for at least one student. Again, when confronted about this, Sculley reportedly feigned no knowledge of the prohibition against continuing to do evaluations. Absent testimony from Sculley, it is impossible to determine whether he had a legitimate reason for his actions. Meanwhile, Raymond Klejmont determined that because Quave had initially suggested using Haughan to review Sculley’s files, it would be best to have the files reviewed by someone else as well. Anthony Bobo (Bobo) - who later became a school psychologist for the Board via contract – was chosen to do the review. Bobo also found errors and “items of concern” regarding Schulley’s work. Bobo found the errors to be substantial. Ultimately, Giacolone submitted a written recommendation to Superintendent Cline that Sculley’s employment should be terminated. Klejmont, as human resources director, concurred with the recommendation. Cline, who had met with Sculley and found him to be less than cogent during their meeting, accepted the recommendation for termination of employment. By letter dated June 4, 2012, Cline advised Sculley that he would be recommending termination of Sculley’s employment at the upcoming Board meeting. On June 26, 2012, the Board -– in accordance to Cline’s recommendation -- terminated Sculley’s employment. Sculley did not testify at the final hearing to contradict or rebut the allegations about his abilities. Dr. Robinson’s testimony on Sculley’s behalf, while credible, fell short of addressing the specific concerns raised by Hrstka, Cline, and Giacolone. Dr. Robinson was unaware of the reasons for Sculley’s employment termination; he had not read the Haugan or Bobo reports, because he had retired by the time they were issued; he only gave Sculley a satisfactory performance approval for an unspecified period of time. Dr. Robinson established only that Sculley had been a good employee in previous years. The Discrimination Claim Sculley raised, as a defense to the allegations of incompetence against him, that he was being discriminated against by co-workers, especially Quave. There was no testimony by Sculley to explain how the purported discrimination affected a review of his competency, the stated reason for termination of his employment. No competent, substantial evidence exists which suggests that there is a correlation between the alleged discrimination claimed by Sculley and the allegations of incompetency. None of the alleged discriminatory acts was substantiated by competent testimony. So, even if it might arguably be shown to relate to Sculley’s work issues, no facts can be made on the record, except the fact that Sculley complained of discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Desoto County School Board, upholding the termination of the employment of Respondent, John B. Sculley's, for the reasons set forth above. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2013.
The Issue The issue is whether the claim of employment discrimination contained in the Petition for Relief must be dismissed due to Petitioner's execution of a release at the time of his termination from employment.
Findings Of Fact Effective August 15, 2011, Petitioner's employment with Respondent was terminated. Two days later, Petitioner signed and delivered the Release. In the Release, Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner "severance pay" of about $5,000, net several items, provided Petitioner did not exercise his right to revoke the agreement within the seven days following execution, as provided by the Release. Petitioner did not revoke the agreement, and Respondent discharged its obligations under the Release. In exchange, Petitioner agreed to release Respondent from any and all charges, complaints, claims, liabilities, obligations, promises, sums of money, agreements, controversies, damages, actions, suits, rights, demands, sanctions, costs . . ., losses, debts, and expenses of any nature whatsoever, existing on, or at any time prior to, the date hereof, in law, in equity or otherwise, which [Petitioner] . . . had or [has] by reason of any fact, matter, cause or thing whatsoever. This Release includes . . . a release of all claims or causes of action arising out of or related to [Petitioner]'s employment and/or separation from employment with [Respondent] and . . . claims or causes of action arising under any federal, state or local law, including . . . Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 " Even taken as true, the above-quoted statement is not, on its face, evidence of discrimination based on national origin because it does not reveal that the speaker acted on his hatred of Petitioner; it merely describes hatred, the national origin or religion of the speaker, and the national origin of Petitioner. However, for the purpose of ruling on Respondent's Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, it is assumed that a Jewish supervisor fired Petitioner on the ground of national origin. More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that, after concluding that his termination had constituted unlawful discrimination, Petitioner has not tendered back to Respondent the severance payment, nor has he offered to do so.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Albert B. Balzanti 4857 Northwest 93rd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33351 Holly A. Dincman, Esquire Melissa F. Sale, Esquire Coppins, Monroe, Adkins, and Dincman, P.A. 1319 Thomaswood Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether The Hertz Corporation (Hertz) committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the employment discrimination charge filed by Petitioner and, if so, what relief should he be granted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Black male who was employed by Hertz from 2001 until April 29, 2004, when his employment was terminated. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner worked as a courtesy bus driver. His basic job duties included picking up Hertz rental car customers at the West Palm Beach airport and driving them to the Hertz station where they could pick up their rental cars, as well as driving Hertz customers from the Hertz station back to the airport after they turned in their rental cars. The events which precipitated Petitioner's termination of employment occurred during the night shift that began at 6:00 p.m. on April 16, 2004, and was scheduled to end at 4:00 a.m. on April 17, 2004. Events proceeded normally on that shift until about 2:00 a.m. on April 17, 2004. At that hour of the morning, Petitioner was the only courtesy bus driver on duty. At that hour the manager for the Hertz station at the West Palm Beach airport was Michael Thebner. At approximately 2:00 a.m. Petitioner dropped off some passengers at check-in who had just arrived on Jet Blue. After dropping off those passengers, Petitioner looked around to see if there were any passengers waiting to be taken back to the airport. Seeing no such passengers and believing that there were no other passengers at the airport waiting to be picked up by a Hertz courtesy bus, Petitioner parked the bus and decided to take a break. Petitioner left the outside lights of the bus turned on and left the bus motor on. He turned off the lights inside the bus, turned off the air-conditioning inside the bus, closed the bus doors, and walked to the back of the bus to take a break. While taking a break in the back of the bus, Petitioner fell asleep and remained asleep for several minutes. In the meantime, a few minutes after Petitioner parked the bus and began his break, the station manager, Thebner, received two telephone calls from Hertz customers who were waiting at the airport for the Hertz courtesy bus. Thebner immediately tried to contact Petitioner on the Nextel radio on the bus channel, but Petitioner did not respond. Thebner then paged Petitioner on the public address system, again with no response. Thebner next walked over to the bus Petitioner was operating that night and knocked first on the bus window and then on a bus door. There was no response to those knocks. Thebner tried unsuccessfully to page Petitioner on the intercom and searched for Petitioner in various places on the station premises, including the mens' room, the employee break room, and the security hut. When the search for Petitioner was unsuccessful, Thebner went back to the bus and pounded louder on the bus. This time he observed Petitioner waking up from sleeping in one of the passenger seats in the bus. Thebner told Petitioner that Petitioner was not supposed to be sleeping and Petitioner denied sleeping. Thebner then told Petitioner to drive to the airport and pick up the two waiting Hertz customers. Petitioner promptly complied and went to pick up the waiting Hertz customers. Before the end of the shift, Thebner wrote a report about the incident in which customers had to wait because Petitioner was asleep and could not be found. Thebner wrote the report because of Petitioner's conduct, which was contrary to company work rules. Thebner's decision to write the report had nothing to do with Petitioner's race. At all times material to this case, Michael Badders was the City Manager for the Hertz station at the West Palm Beach airport. Badders was the person to whom Thebner reported. On April 19, 2005, Badders received Thebner's report about the incident in which customers had to wait because Petitioner was asleep and could not be found. On April 20, 2005, Badders held a meeting with Petitioner and with a shop steward from Petitioner's union. During that meeting Petitioner denied being asleep during the incident described above. Petitioner also denied hearing the radio calls telling him there were customers waiting to be picked up. On April 20, 2004, Badders delivered a memorandum to Petitioner advising Petitioner that he was being suspended pending investigation. The substance of the memorandum read as follows: "You are hear [sic] by suspended pending investigation of violation of Company Rules and Regulations. Understand that based on the results of the investigation a determination will be made as to the status of your employment. Disciplinary action up to and including termination may result." By letter dated April 23, 2004, Badders advised Petitioner as follows: "Your employment with the Hertz Corporation has been terminated effective immediately for violation of rules and regulations. Please return your uniforms when you pick up your last check." Prior to the events in the early morning hours of April 17, 2004, Petitioner had already been through several steps of the Hertz progressive discipline policy as a result of several instances of prior breaches of Hertz work rules and policies. The termination of Petitioner's employment was consistent with established Hertz disciplinary policies applicable to all employees. Hertz has previously terminated the employment of another courtesy bus driver at its West Palm Beach facility who was discovered sleeping while he was supposed to be on duty.1 On one or more occasions Petitioner, in his capacity as Alternate Shop Steward of Teamsters Local Union #390, engaged in activity that was probably protected activity under the National Labor Relations Act, but there is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner engaged in any activity protected by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.2 Specifically, there is no persuasive evidence that, as asserted in his original charge, Petitioner "had to bring to the company's attention its discriminatory practices toward Black employees."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order in this case finding that Hertz is not guilty of any of the "unlawful employment practices" alleged by Petitioner and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 2005.
The Issue The basic issues in this case are whether Petitioner, Michael Addicott, is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs from Complainant/Respondent, Robert Nieman, as provided in Section 112.317(8) Florida Statutes, and, if so, the amount of such attorney's fees and costs.
Findings Of Fact Nieman's ethics complaints against Addicott On or about June 14, 2002, Robert Nieman ("Nieman") filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Ethics ("Ethics Commission") against Michael Addicott ("Addicott"). At that time Nieman was a police officer of the Town of Golden Beach who was in a work status of suspended with pay, pending investigation of allegations that Nieman had engaged in some form of misconduct. At the time the subject complaint was filed, Addicott was the Mayor of the Town of Golden Beach. At all times material to this case, Addicott has been the Mayor of the Town of Golden Beach or has been a candidate for the office of Mayor. Nieman's June 14 complaint to the Ethics Commission contained four numbered paragraphs. Each numbered paragraph described a separate incident involving alleged conduct by Addicott that Nieman believed was inappropriate and that Nieman believed should be investigated by the Ethics Commission. The only one of those paragraphs that appears to be relevant and material to the issues in this case is paragraph 2, in which Nieman alleged the following: Mayor Addicott's son had a hit and run accident within the Town's jurisdiction; hitting and knocking down a concrete light pole. When the criminal accident was being investigated and the son approached about the crime, the Mayor's wife, who was a Councilperson at the time, badgered and tried to intimidate the officers (myself included. I was a sergeant at the time), raising her voice and stating that we were "picking on her son." She interfered with our investigation of the vehicle. The son later admitted to the incident and after discussions with the then Chief by Mr. and Mrs. Addicott, no further action was taken by the Golden Beach Police Department. On or about September 20, 2002, Nieman filed an amendment to his original Ethics Commission complaint against Addicott. The amendment appears to have been in response to a request by the Ethics Commission for additional information about the allegations in Nieman's June 14 complaint. The amendment to the complaint was also arranged in four separate numbered paragraphs, each providing additional information about essentially the same four events that were described in the original complaint of June 14. Two of the numbered paragraphs in the amended complaint appear to be relevant and material to the issues in this case. The primary subject matter of paragraph 1 concerns allegations that one of Addicott's sons, Aaron Addicott, received special treatment by being paid for hours when he did not report to work as a lifeguard. However, the last sentence of paragraph 1 of the amended complaint alleges the following new event not alleged in Nieman's original complaint: "The lifeguard [Addicott's son] was hired when the Mayor [Addicott] was in office." And paragraph 2 of Nieman's amended Ethics Commission complaint added the following allegations about the automobile accident episode. With regard to the auto accident, both the Mayor and the former Councilperson, his wife, used their position to have the accident ignored, Mrs. Addicott responded to the scene of the accident and Mrs. Addicott directly told the police department not to take any action and that they better let up on her son. Both the Mayor and Mrs. Addicott discussed the matter with the former Police Chief and told him not to interfere. The Chief was later forced to resign. As the Mayor was running for election at the time, it benefited him by his son not being arrested for leaving the scene of an accident. This is the same son who is the absentee lifeguard. Also, no reimbursement was received from the Mayor, his wife or son for the damage to the Town's property. The subject matter scope of the fee petition The Fee Petition in this case asserts, in general terms, that Nieman acted with malice by filing complaints against Addicott with knowledge that the complaints contained one or more false allegations, or with reckless disregard as to whether the complaints contained false allegations. The Fee Petition does not assert that all of the allegations in Nieman's complaints against Addicott were known to be false or were made with a reckless disregard as to whether the allegations were false. Rather, only two of the events alleged in Nieman's complaints are specified in the fee petition as being events about which Nieman knowingly made false allegations or about which Nieman made statements with a reckless disregard as to whether the allegations were false. The paragraphs of the Fee Petition which describe those two specific events appear at paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the Fee Petition, which read as follows: One of the factual underpinnings of Nieman's Complaint is that Petitioner [Addicott] interfered with a police investigation into an automobile accident involving Aaron Addicott, Petitioner's son. Nieman admitted that he had no personal knowledge regarding this allegation, and that he was not personally involved in the investigation. Incredibly, Nieman admitted that the accident took place before Addicott was elected Mayor! *** This is certainly a reckless, if not knowing, false allegation which is material to a violation of the Florida Ethics Code. At the time of the alleged incident, Nieman was the Police Chief of the Town of Golden Beach, and certainly had access to all the necessary records to verify his allegations, and therefore knew or should have known that his allegations were false. Nieman also alleged that Mayor Addicott hired his son, Aaron Addicott, to be a Town of Golden Beach part-time lifeguard, which was in violation of the Florida Ethics Code. However, Nieman admitted that he had no personal knowledge regarding the Petitioner's involvement in the hiring of his son. *** In fact, Addicott had NO involvement in hiring his son, nor does the Golden Beach Town Charter recognize that the town Mayor need have any involvement in hiring lower level town employees, such as part-time life guards. At the time of the filing of the Complaint [with the Ethics Commission], Nieman's allegation that Petitioner hired his son was made with the knowledge that it was false, or at the very least with reckless disregard as to whether it was true, as is evidenced by Nieman's own admission that he had no personal knowledge of the alleged violation. Aaron's employment as a lifeguard Section 4.01 of Article IV of the charter of the Town of Golden Beach sets forth the powers and duties of the mayor. Subsection (b) of that section describes the "administrative duties" of the mayor, which include: The mayor shall nominate a town manager who shall be appointed by resolution of the council. The mayor, together with the town manager, shall carry out all administrative duties as provided by the charter, ordinance or resolution of the council. The mayor shall approve all written orders, administrative policies and acts of the town manager. The mayor shall upon recommendation of the manager appoint and when deemed necessary, discipline, suspend or remove town employees. (Emphasis added.) The mayor shall upon the recommendation of the manager appoint department heads to administer the government of Golden Beach. Appointments and terms of employment shall be approved by resolution of the council. Department heads shall carry out the administrative orders of the manager and the mayor and may be disciplined, suspended or removed by the mayor as may be recommended from time to time by the manager. A department head may appeal the decision of the mayor to the personnel board in the same manner as an employee. Prior to the date on which Addicott became mayor of the Town of Golden Beach, two of his sons (Benjamin and Aaron) sometimes worked for the Town in the capacity of "fill-in" lifeguards. During that same time period, a number of other people, most of whom had regular jobs as lifeguards in nearby communities, would also work for the Town of Golden Beach in the capacity of "fill-in" lifeguards. Although all of the people who worked for the Town as "fill-in" lifeguards were paid for the time they worked, none of those people were regular employees of the Town with regular scheduled work hours. Rather, all of the people who worked as "fill-in" lifeguards worked on an "as needed" basis. At some time in March of 1999, shortly after Addicott became the mayor of the Town, Aaron Addicott, was placed on the Town payroll in some sort of regular weekend part-time lifeguard position, in which his work as a lifeguard was primarily on Saturday and Sunday. This was a change in the terms and conditions under which Aaron Addicott performed lifeguard services for the Town. The specific nature of the change in March of 1999 is not contained in the record of this case, but it appears that following that change, Aaron Addicott was, essentially, the Town's weekend lifeguard, and another lifeguard worked the other five days of the week. Following the change in Aaron Addicott's terms and conditions of employment in March of 1999, Aaron Addicott's work as a lifeguard continued to be on Saturday and Sunday, with the exception of occasional days when he filled-in for the regular lifeguard when the regular lifeguard was unable to work. On or about August 26, 1999, at a time when Michael Addicott was serving as mayor of the Town of Golden Beach, an interoffice memo reading as follows was sent to him by Rosemary Wascura, who was then the Interim Town Manager: To: Mayor Michael Addicott From: Rosemary J. Wascura, Interim Town Manager Date: August 26, 1999 Re: Appointment of Lifeguards 102-99 Following our recent conversation regarding the appointment of Lifeguards, please see below the following recommendation: That effective September 1, 1999 John Fialowsky be hired as the Town's full-time Lifeguard. Compensation is $13.00 per hour and his hours are Monday and Tuesday 7:00 am. - 7:00 pm., and Wednesday, Thursday and Friday 7:00 am. - 2:00 pm. That effective September 1, 1999 Aaron Addicott be hired as the Town's part-time Lifeguard. Compensation is $9.25 per hour and his hours are Saturday and Sunday 7:00 am. - 7:00 pm., and Wednesday, Thursday and Friday 2:00 pm. - 7:00 pm. [_] APPROVED [_] NOT APPROVED Michael Addicott Mayor Mayor Addicott placed a check mark in the "approved" box and then signed the interoffice memo quoted above and returned it to Ms. Wascura on or before the effective date mentioned in the memo. By approving and signing the recommendation, Mayor Addicott hired his son as "the Town's part-time Lifeguard," which was a new position of employment that had not previously existed at the Town of Golden Beach. Notwithstanding the job title of "part-time lifeguard," the position Aaron Addicott was hired to fill in August of 1999 was a full-time position of employment in which he was scheduled to work a total of five days per week for a total of 39 hours per week. In both March of 1999 and in August of 1999, the effective hiring authority was vested in the mayor of the Town of Golden Beach. Such being the case, the final decision to hire Aaron Addicott on both of the occasions in 1999 described above was made by Mayor Addicott. Aaron's motor vehicle accident Very shortly before the election at which Addicott was elected mayor of the Town of Golden Beach, Aaron Addicott was involved in a one-vehicle motor vehicle accident in which the vehicle driven by Aaron Addicott struck a light pole and knocked the light pole down. The location of the accident was a block or less from the Addicott home. Shortly after the accident, Aaron Addicott left the scene of the accident and drove the short distance to the Addicott home. Nieman saw the accident happen, and shortly thereafter, police officers of the Town of Golden Beach, including Sergeant Nieman, arrived at the Addicott home and attempted to conduct an investigation of the accident that Aaron Addicott had just been involved in. Mrs. Addicott, the wife of the soon-to-be mayor and the mother of Aaron, refused to cooperate with the efforts of the police officers to investigate the accident and ordered the police officers to leave the premises of the Addicott home. Mrs. Addicott also chastised the police officers for picking on her son and demanded that they leave her son alone. Although Aaron Addicott at first denied involvement in the motor vehicle accident, a few days after the accident he went to the police station in the Town of Golden Beach and acknowledged his involvement in the accident. Aaron Addicott was never charged with any civil or criminal violation arising from the accident or from his act of leaving the scene of the accident. Another police officer told Nieman that Mr. and Mrs. Addicott (Aaron's parents) had met with the Chief of Police of the Town of Golden Beach shortly after the accident. Nieman does not appear to have conducted any further inquiry to confirm the information that Mr. and Mrs. Addicott had met with the Chief. Nieman believed that Aaron should at least have been charged with the violation of leaving the scene of an accident. When no charges were forthcoming, Nieman formed the opinion that Mr. and Mrs. Addicott, during the meeting he believed they had with the Chief, had "used their position[s] to have the accident ignored" and had told the Chief "not to interfere." The Town of Golden Beach did not receive any reimbursement for the damage to the light pole caused by Aaron's motor vehicle accident from Aaron Addicott or from either of Aaron's parents.1 From time to time when Aaron Addicott was scheduled to be working as a Town lifeguard, he would be absent from work and the town manager would receive complaints that Aaron was not working when he should be working. This is the same Aaron Addicott who was involved in the motor vehicle accident described above. The actual knowledge issue With regard to the factual allegations at issue here, at the time of making those allegations Nieman did not have actual knowledge that any of those allegations were false.2 The reckless disregard issues With regard to the factual allegations at issue here, at the time of making those allegations Nieman did not make any of the subject allegations with a "reckless disregard" as to whether they were true or false. Quite to the contrary, Nieman did not at any time entertain any "serious doubts as to the truth" of his allegations. Similarly, Nieman did not at any time have any "high degree of awareness" of the "probable falsity" of the subject allegations.3 Attorney's fees and costs The real party in interest; i.e., the entity that will be the beneficiary of any award of attorney's fees and costs in this proceeding, is the Town of Golden Beach. That is because it is the Town that retained and agree to pay for legal representation of Mayor Addicott in both the defense of the underlying Ethics Commission complaint and in the prosecution of this fee petition. The Town retained the law offices of Stuart R. Michelson. As of June 17, 2004, the date on which the final hearing in this case began, Mr. Michelson's law offices had submitted three bills to the Town. Those bills cover costs and attorney's fees incurred from July 2, 2002, through June 4, 2004. Those bills itemize a total of 59.70 hours of attorney's services, for which the Town was billed $10,650.00. The three bills discussed immediately above also itemize a total of 5.60 hours of law clerk services, for which the Town was billed $420.00. The three bills discussed immediately above also itemize a total of $1,402.54 of costs. The types of costs itemized include such things as in-house photocopy costs, Fed-Ex and similar express mail charges, facsimile charges, postage charges, long distance telephone charges, and some miscellaneous travel-related charges such as car rental, parking, air fare, and gasoline. The itemized costs also include at least one "miscellaneous services charges/fee" in the amount of $12.50 and one in-house photocopying charge in the amount of $447.50. With regard to the three bills discussed above, there was no testimony under oath that any of the services itemized in the bills had actually been performed. There was no testimony under oath that the bills were accurate. There was no testimony under oath explaining any details about the nature of the services performed or explaining why, or whether, the services were reasonable, necessary, or appropriate. There was no testimony under oath stating whether all of the services and costs itemized in the three subject bills relate only to the fee petition and the underlying ethics complaint in this proceeding, or whether some of the itemized services and costs relate to other similar litigation matters in which the Town has a beneficial interest that were pending at the same time.4 An expert witness was retained to express legal opinions on two basic issues: (1) an opinion as to the issue of whether Addicott is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs against Nieman pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes, and, if entitled, (2) an opinion as to the reasonable amount of such an award. The Town agreed to pay the expert witness for his services in this case on an hourly basis. The agreed upon hourly rate for the services of the expert witness is either $200.00 per hour or $225.00 per hour.5 The expert witness does not know how many hours he spent preparing for and presenting his expert opinions in this case.6 The expert witness reviewed and testified about a few details of the costs itemized on the three bills discussed above, but he never clearly expressed any opinion as to whether the costs itemized on the three bills are reasonable or unreasonable.7 The expert witness testified to several expert legal opinions regarding the manner in which the present language of Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes, should be construed, interpreted, and applied. He also opined as to the extent to which cases decided under the old language of Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes, were useful in determining entitlement to attorney's fees and costs under the current version of Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes.8 The expert witness also testified about how many hours it would have been reasonable for the attorneys for Addicott to have worked from June 4, 2004, through the end of the first day of the final hearing in this case, which was June 17, 2004. There is not, however, any testimony as to how many hours of attorney services were actually performed during the period from June 4 through June 17, 2004. In both the defense of the underlying ethics complaints against Addicott and in the preparation and the prosecution of the fee petition in this case, services billed at an hourly rate have been performed by three lawyers in the law firm representing Addicott; specifically, Mr. Michelson (a partner), Mrs. Michelson (a partner), and Mr. Birch (an associate attorney). Reasonable and typical hourly rates that are charged for the types of attorney services that were performed in the course of the subject cases are as follows: Mr. Michelson $200.00 per hour Mrs. Michelson $200.00 per hour Mr. Birch $135.00 per hour In both the defense of the underlying ethics complaints against Addicott and in the preparation and the prosecution of the fee petition in this case, services billed at an hourly rate also have been performed by law clerks employed by the law firm representing Addicott. A reasonable and typical hourly rate that is charged for services of a legal nature performed by law clerks in cases of this nature is $75.00 per hour.9 Following the conclusion of the administrative hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings in this case, in the normal course of events, the attorneys representing Addicott will need to spend a number of additional hours before their work on this matter is finished. Post-hearing tasks include such matters as preparation of proposed recommended orders, preparation of exceptions to the recommended order or preparation of responses to exceptions filed by an opposing party, preparation of memorandums related to exceptions, and perhaps an appearance before the Ethics Commission to present oral argument prior to issuance of the Final Order.10
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition in this case and denying all relief sought by the fee Petitioner, Michael Addicott. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2004.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's termination from employment by Respondent on June 15, 2005, was discriminatory in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2005), due to Petitioner's race (African American).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a Black female, was employed by Respondent from November 23, 1998, until her termination on June 14, 2005. Petitioner had performed her duties as a housekeeper adequately during her employment period and had no major disciplinary reports in her record. Her annual reviews indicate she was a fair employee. She had a history of tardiness, but seemed to be getting better in her last years of employment. Petitioner had received a verbal warning notice on March 8, 2005, relating to an altercation with another employee, Katrina Stevens. It appears Petitioner did not instigate the confrontation nor did she actively participate in the argument between Stevens and another employee. She simply happened to be standing nearby when it occurred. A verbal warning notice is preliminary to a reprimand. The other employee, Martine Lane, received a reprimand for the incident. On June 8, 2005, Petitioner received another verbal warning notice, this time for instigating negative remarks toward her supervisor. The gravamen of her complaint about the supervisor was that a certain co-worker had been named Employee of the Month instead of Petitioner. Petitioner became more defiant towards her supervisors and management toward the end of her employment. She would not help out other employees when asked, preferring to tend to her own work area, even when her work was completed. She also made derogatory comments to the co-worker who had won Employee of the Month. When Petitioner's behavior did not change, a decision was made to terminate her employment. It was a difficult decision because good housekeepers were hard to find and Petitioner's work product had always been acceptable. Petitioner had always been well-liked and respected by fellow employees. Both co-workers and management had encouraged Petitioner to apply for supervisory positions when they opened. Her supervisors indicated that, with some training, she could handle a supervisory position. The decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made by the Executive Housekeeper, Steve Jensen. He relied upon input from other management. On June 18, 2005, Petitioner was stopped from clocking in when she came to work. She was told to report to Jensen's office, which she did. At that time Jensen asked her whether she was still happy with her job, then told her she was being terminated. The reasons given were that she was not supportive, not a team player, and had become more belligerent to management. No mention of race was made as a basis for her termination and none seems to have existed. Petitioner was advised she would be entitled to vacation pay, but it was later discovered she had already used up her available vacation time. Respondent subsequently called Petitioner to offer her a different job, but Petitioner had no interest in returning to work for the company. Respondent has anti-discrimination policies in place, is an equal opportunity employer, and employs minorities in supervisory positions. Interestingly, however, there were no other Black housekeepers employed while Petitioner was working. When a supervisory position opened, Respondent would attempt to fill the position from within its existing employee pool. Two such positions opened when Petitioner was employed. Seven then-current employees applied for those positions, including Petitioner. Of the seven, four had prior supervisory experience; Petitioner did not. Two of the applicants had been with the company longer than Petitioner. Five of the seven applicants had computer knowledge and skills; Petitioner did not. Petitioner is the only candidate who admitted a fear of heights, a minor consideration for the position. Petitioner is the only candidate who stated she could not work on weekends. Petitioner was clearly not the best applicant for the job based on comparison to other candidates. Petitioner did not provide any evidence that her race was a basis for her termination from employment. None of her witnesses provided credible statements concerning discrimination. In fact, her witnesses by and large did not see any discrimination by management.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Diane Hawkins 1556 University Lane, Number 407 Cocoa, Florida 32922 Theodore L. Shinkle, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 1800 West Hibiscus Boulevard, Suite 138 Melbourne, Florida 32901 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
