Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner's business records for the period July 1, 1985, through June 30, 1990. Respondent determined a deficiency in sales tax of $174,823.96, including penalty and interest through August 22, 1990. Petitioner objected to the deficiency. Respondent reviewed the audit, and made audit changes that are the subject of this proceeding. The audit changes determined a deficiency in use tax of $76,035.60, including tax ($47,910.10), penalty ($11,977.68), and interest through March 12, 1991 ($16,147.60). Interest accrues daily in the amount of $15.75. A First Revised Notice Of Intent To Make Sales Tax Changes, for the reduced assessment of $76,035.60, was issued on March 21, 1991. A Notice Of Proposed Assessment was issued on July 2, 1991. The Notice Of Proposed Assessment became a Final Assessment on August 31, 1991. Respondent made a prima facie showing of the factual and legal basis for the use tax assessment. Section 120.575(2), Florida Statutes. 1/ The audit and assessment are procedurally correct. Tax, interest, and penalty are correctly computed. Formation Petitioner was incorporated in Florida, in January, 1983, by Mr. B. Theodore Troy, president and sole shareholder. Petitioner's principal place of business is 101 Wymore Road, Suite 224, Altamonte Springs, Florida. Petitioner conducted business as American Advertising Distributors of Central Florida. Mr. Troy and his wife operated the business until liquidating Petitioner's assets in 1992. Operation Petitioner sold direct mail advertising to Florida businesses. Petitioner operated pursuant to a franchise agreement with American Advertising Distributors, Inc., of Mesa, Arizona ("AAD"). AAD was Petitioner's franchisor until AAD filed for bankruptcy in 1990. Petitioner solicited orders from Florida businesses 2/ for advertising coupons designed and printed by AAD in Arizona. AAD mailed the advertising coupons to addressees in Florida who were potential customers for Florida businesses. Florida businesses placed orders with Petitioner on written contracts, or sales agreements, labeled "advertising orders." AAD was not a party to advertising orders. Advertising orders identified "AAD" as American Advertising Distributors of Central Florida, and were imprinted with the name and address of "AAD" in Central Florida. Advertising orders specified the total charges, color and stock of paper, number of addressees, and areas of distribution. Petitioner assisted businesses with rough layout for art work. The rough layout was forwarded to AAD. AAD prepared finished art work and sent copies back to Petitioner for approval by Florida businesses. AAD then printed, collated, and mailed advertising coupons to addressees in Florida, without charge to addressees. Florida businesses paid non-refundable deposits when placing advertising orders. The remaining balance was paid upon approval of final art work. AAD did not submit invoices to Florida businesses. AAD submitted invoices to Petitioner for the amount due from Petitioner. 3/ Petitioner paid AAD 10 days before advertising coupons were mailed. Some advertising coupons were produced by Laberge Printers, Inc., in Orlando, Florida ("Laberge"). Coupons from Laberge were designed, printed, and distributed in the same manner as coupons from AAD. Two types of advertising coupons were provided by AAD and Laberge. The majority of coupons were distributed in coop mailings, or "bonus express" envelopes, containing coupons for up to 20 businesses. Bonus express envelopes were mailed approximately eight times a year. Advertising coupons were also distributed in "solo" mailings. A solo mailing was an individualized, custom printed coupon, or flyer, mailed to individual addressees. The total charges stated in advertising orders included the cost of services provided by Petitioner, AAD, and Laberge. Services included typesetting, art work, printing, inserting envelopes, and mailing. Florida imposed a tax on services, from July 1, 1987, through December 31, 1987. Petitioner collected and remitted tax imposed on the cost of services included in the total charges stated on advertising orders. Except for the services tax, neither Petitioner, AAD, nor Laberge collected and remitted sales or use tax to Florida or to Arizona. Petitioner never utilized resale certificates for any tax other than the tax on services. Collectibility Petitioner was financially able to pay the use tax assessment during 1990 and 1991. No later than August 22, 1990, Mr. Troy knew of the sales tax deficiency of $174,823.96. By March 21, 1991, Mr. Troy knew of the reduced use tax assessment of $76,035.60. During 1990 and 1991, Petitioner made discretionary payments to Mr. Troy of $110,389. Petitioner reported federal taxable income of $58,279 in 1990 and 1991. 4/ In arriving at taxable income, Petitioner deducted payments to Mr. Troy of $59,430 for compensation to officers, management fees, and salary. 5/ From taxable income of $58,279, Petitioner paid approximately $50,959 to Mr. Troy in nondeductible shareholder loans. 6/ Discretionary payments of $110,389, 7/ made to Mr. Troy in 1990 and 1991, were more than adequate to pay the use tax assessment of $76,036.60. At the end of 1991, Petitioner reported fixed assets with a book value of $14,933, a customer list valued at $104,447.72, and retained earnings of $102,605. The book value of intangible assets was $82,943, comprised primarily of the franchise, valued at $35,000, and goodwill of $45,000. Termination Of Operations But Continued Existence AAD petitioned for bankruptcy in 1990. Petitioner subsequently determined that its franchise and goodwill were worthless. In 1992, Petitioner reported a loss of $99,726 for federal tax purposes. All of Petitioner's assets, including its customer lists, were sold or transferred for $1,330 to Florida Mail, Inc. ("Florida Mail"). Florida Mail is a Florida corporation wholly owned by Mr. Troy. Florida Mail sells direct mail advertising; and shares Petitioner's principal place of business. Since 1992, Petitioner has been a shell corporation with $579 in assets.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order upholding the assessment of tax and interest and waive all of the penalty included in the assessment. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of June, 1994. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1994.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioner owes sales, use, intangible taxes, penalties and interest; and, if so, the amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Allor, Inc., performs accounting services through the individual, Allan Steinberg. Subsequent to an audit of one of Mr. Steinberg's clients, the Department directed Curt Horton, a tax auditor, to perform an audit of Allor, Inc. In furtherance of the audit, Mr. Horton requested records necessary to complete the review. He discussed the audit with Mr. Steinberg and advised him of all records needed. When Mr. Steinberg produced no records the audit was estimated based on the federal tax return. Later, Mr. Horton adjusted the estimate based on actual deposits for sales. For purchases, a one year period was selected and, again, the federal tax return was reviewed. The audit was performed in this manner as the records offered by the taxpayer were insufficient to perform the audit in the more conventional format. Mr. Horton made numerous requests to the taxpayer for documentation. Mr. Horton extended the time to provide records so that the taxpayer had additional opportunity to document the audit. Credit was given for invoices that the taxpayer was able to produce and, for the remainder of the period, the amounts were averaged to determine the tax amount owed. The sales and use tax audit covered the period December 1, 1985, through November 30, 1990. The amount of the tax owed was calculated at $4,933.35. The amount of the penalty was $1,099.92. The interest owed through October 11, 1991, was $2,026.61. Based upon the foregoing, the total assessment for this audit was $8,059.88 with interest continuing to accrue at the rate of $1.62 per day. With regard to the intangible tax assessment for the period 1984 through 1991, Mr. Horton computed the accounts receivable and estimated that $2,000.00 per year would be the amount for this category. Since this taxpayer filed no intangible tax returns at all, the penalty owed was high relative to the tax amount owed. Based upon the foregoing computation, the intangible tax owed calculated to be $33.33 whereas the penalty for not filing was $2,763.55. The interest through September 20, 1991, was $14.76. Based upon the foregoing, the total assessment for the intangible tax owed was $2,811.64 with interest continuing to accrue at the rate of $.01 per day. Following the audit, the results of which were made available to the taxpayer on or about March 20, 1992, the Department issued a notice of decision on April 23, 1993, which responded to a protest letter filed by Petitioner on May 15, 1992. In substance, that notice sustained the results of the audit and noted that the taxpayer had not presented any additional documentation to support a conclusion to the contrary. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed another letter of protest and the Department issued a notice of reconsideration on February 7, 1994. That notice provided that upon further review, the proposed sustained amount for the sales and use tax was $6,945.63 and the amount owed for the intangible audit assessment was $48.09. This latter amount was reduced because the Department proposed to compromise the penalty in full. All of the acts of the auditor in this case were in keeping with the standard audit practices of the Department. None of the documents marked for identification as Petitioner's composite 2, which have not been received into evidence, were made available to the Department at any time during the audit. The Department afforded the Petitioner approximately three years after the audit to produce relevant documentation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the proposed sustained amounts set forth in the notice of reconsideration dated February 7, 1994. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 28th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1892 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: 1. None submitted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 11 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Allan D. Steinberg Tax Accountant Allor, Inc. Suite 14-B 4953 North University Drive Lauderhill, Florida 33351 Mark T. Aliff Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, Richard Ruble, is entitled to renewal of his loan originator license, pursuant to chapter 494, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Richard Ruble, holds a loan originator license, National Mortgage Licensing System Identification Number 209981 ("LO License"), which was issued by Respondent, Office of Financial Regulation, and is the subject of this proceeding. Respondent is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing chapter 494, including part II of that statute, which regulates loan originators. Background and Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing Petitioner has held his LO License since approximately 2004. As required by section 494.00312(7), Florida Statutes, loan originator licenses must be annually renewed.2/ In 2005 and 2006, Petitioner earned a substantial income from his business as a loan originator for real estate mortgage loans. As a result, he incurred a substantial federal income tax liability. When the real estate market took a dramatic downturn starting in 2007, Petitioner's income also dramatically dropped. He suffered significant loss of income starting in 2007. As a consequence, he has been unable to pay his federal income taxes since 2006. As a result of Petitioner's federal income tax liability for the years of 2005 and 2006, on February 12, 2013, the Internal Revenue Service(“IRS”) recorded a Notice of Federal Tax Lien ("Tax Lien") against Petitioner's real property located at 3801 South Ocean Drive, Unit 6Z, Hollywood, Florida,3/ and in Leon County, Florida. As a consequence of the creation of the Tax Lien, information constituting "adverse credit history information," as defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69-40.0113(2), has been included in his credit report. The inclusion of adverse credit history in Petitioner's credit report prompted Respondent to contact Petitioner sometime after February 12, 2013, and before June 8, 2013, and request him to provide specified information about release or payment of the Tax Lien by a June 8, 2013, deadline. Petitioner, through his counsel, contacted Respondent by correspondence dated June 7, 2013, explaining the circumstances under which the Tax Lien had been created and stating that Petitioner would provide the requested information, and notifying Respondent that Petitioner's accountant would need additional time beyond the June 8, 2013, deadline to gather and provide the requested information. On July 30, 2013, Respondent proposed to deny renewal of Petitioner's LO on the basis of the Tax Lien. On August 13, 2013, Petitioner provided to Respondent the requested additional information explaining the circumstances under which the Tax Lien was created. On August 15, 2013, Respondent withdrew its notice of denial of renewal of Petitioner's LO License; this withdrawal document expressly stated: "Please consider the Notice of Denial previously issued as withdrawn and of no force and effect." Respondent renewed Petitioner's LO, effective August 15, 2013. On December 30, 2013, Petitioner applied to renew his LO license for the year 2014. On June 30, 2014, Respondent issued a notice of denial of renewal of Petitioner's LO. Petitioner timely requested a hearing challenging the proposed denial of the renewal of his LO License. However, before the final hearing in that proceeding, the parties settled the matter by executing a Settlement Stipulation, a condition of which was that Petitioner provide, by December 31, 2014, all information required by Respondent to complete review of the renewal application for his LO. To comply with this condition, on December 22, 2014, Petitioner submitted Respondent's4/ Response Pursuant to Settlement Stipulation ("Response"), consisting of an explanation of his adverse credit history due to the Tax Lien and two lines of credit he had taken out to cover his business and personal expenses after the 2007 economic downturn and his consequent loss of income. The Response was supported by extensive documentation consisting of Petitioner's personal and business federal income tax returns; correspondence from Petitioner's counsel to Respondent addressing the Tax Lien and the status of Petitioner's efforts to resolve the Tax Lien matter with the IRS; and correspondence from the IRS dated September 8, 2014, stating that due to information Petitioner had provided, it (the IRS) had refunded some taxes paid and applied them to Petitioner's 2005 tax liability, which had, in part, given rise to the Tax Lien. On December 24, 2014, a Final Order incorporating the Settlement Stipulation was issued, and the file was closed on December 29, 2014. On December 31, 2014, Petitioner filed, and Respondent deemed received, Petitioner's application to renew his LO License for the year 2015. Sometime before October 19, 2015——over nine months later——Respondent informed Petitioner that the information that he had provided was not substantively adequate to support renewal of his LO License for 2015. Thereafter, on October 19 and December 14, 2015, Petitioner, through his counsel, submitted information consisting of copies of his income tax returns filed with the IRS for years 2005 through 2010, as well as copies of his 2011, 2012, and 2013 income tax returns that were filed with the IRS by his accountant, Chris Bagnall. The last three years of tax returns (for years 2011, 2012, and 2013) were offered by Petitioner as evidence that he was working diligently with the IRS to become current with respect to his filed income tax returns. On December 28, 2015, Petitioner applied to renew his LO License for the year 2016. On February 15, 2016, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Renewal Application for Loan Originator License Pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes (hereafter, "Notice of Intent to Deny"), proposing to deny Petitioner's application to renew his LO License for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016.5/ The Notice of Intent to Deny cited three grounds, two of which remain pertinent to this proceeding: (1) Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he possessed the general fitness and responsibility necessary to command the confidence of the community and warrant a determination that he, as the applicant, would operate honestly, fairly, and efficiently, as required by section 494.00312(4)(b) and rule 69V-40.113; and (2) a background check revealed that Petitioner's credit history contained adverse credit history information——specifically, that the IRS holds an outstanding federal income tax lien on property owned by Petitioner. At the final hearing, Respondent expressly abandoned the third ground for its proposed denial—— specifically, that Petitioner had failed to provide certain information as required under the terms of a final order of settlement (discussed in greater detail below); accordingly, that ground is no longer at issue in this proceeding.6/ At the final hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of his accountant, Chris Bagnall, who was retained in 2013 to assist Petitioner in preparing and submitting his overdue tax returns for years 2005 through 2015, and negotiating a plan for paying his past due income taxes for these years. Bagnall explained that it is the IRS's preference to have the taxpayer make payments toward the outstanding liability, and then to issue refunds if the taxpayer has overpaid. Alternatively, if the taxpayer is not able to make payments toward resolving the outstanding tax liability, the IRS will negotiate payment plans applying the carryback rules, which allow income gains and losses to be "netted out" for purposes of determining overall tax liability. Under this approach, the IRS will not negotiate payment plans until all past due tax returns have been filed. In the meantime, interest and penalties continue to accrue on the outstanding income tax liability. Bagnall testified, credibly, that after the real estate market crash in 2008, Petitioner did not have the money to pay the income tax he owed, and he used what little money he did have to try to keep his business afloat. Because Petitioner was not in a position to make a payment toward his tax liability due to his drastically diminished income, and due to not having timely filed income tax returns for several years, he was not in a position to negotiate a plan with the IRS to pay the income taxes he owes. In the meantime, interest and penalties on Petitioner's past due taxes continued to accrue. As of the date of the final hearing, Petitioner's total liability was approximately $366,000, a significant portion of which was attributable to penalties and interest accruing on the outstanding tax liability.7/ Bagnall testified that since Petitioner retained him in 2013, he has been preparing and filing Petitioner's past due income tax returns in batches, as Petitioner has been able to garner the funds to pay for Bagnall's accounting services. As of the date of the final hearing, Bagnall recently had filed Petitioner's income tax return for 2014, and he testified, credibly, that he would be filing Petitioner's 2015 income tax return within a few days after the final hearing. Once Petitioner's 2015 return was filed, he would be current regarding the filing status of his income tax returns, so finally would be in a position to negotiate with the IRS to develop a plan to pay off his tax liability, with the ultimate aim of dissolving the Tax Lien. Petitioner acknowledged that as of the date of the final hearing, he had not voluntarily made any payments toward addressing his income tax liability. Additionally, Petitioner's tax returns show gambling losses of $8,782 in 2011, $2,100 in 2012, and $18,546 in 2013. However, as discussed above, the evidence shows that Petitioner, through Bagnall, is taking a comprehensive approach to resolving his income tax liability based in part on the use of the carryback rules to net out his overall tax liability. The evidence does not show that it would have been feasible for Petitioner to have made individual payments toward his outstanding tax liability until all of his returns had been filed and he was in a position to negotiate a repayment plan. Respondent elicited testimony from Petitioner that in the application for renewal of his LO License filed in December 2013 for the year 2014, he had failed to disclose the existence of the Tax Lien until Respondent brought to his attention that they were aware of the existence of the Tax Lien. Respondent also elicited testimony that until brought to his attention by Respondent, Petitioner had failed to disclose, in his LO License renewal application filed in December 2015 for the year 2016, that he had filed for personal bankruptcy in September 2015. Respondent elicited this testimony to establish that Petitioner exhibited a pattern of being untruthful and incomplete in his responses to the application questions, and, thus, lacks the character to warrant a determination that he would operate honestly, fairly, and efficiently, as required by rule 69V-40.0113(3)(b), for purposes of entitlement to renewal of his LO License.8/ However, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly show that Petitioner intended to be untruthful in his application responses or to hide the existence of the Tax Lien or his personal bankruptcy from Respondent. It is as plausible that Petitioner omitted this information in error. With respect to the Tax Lien, the evidence shows that Petitioner had previously disclosed the creation of the Tax Lien to Respondent in correspondence dated June 13, 2013, and had, at that time, provided an explanation regarding the events leading to its creation. It would simply be nonsensical for Petitioner to intentionally falsely deny the existence of the Tax Lien on his application when he had previously submitted that very information to Respondent. Similarly, with respect to disclosure of his personal bankruptcy, Petitioner credibly testified that the matter had been a topic of discussion with Respondent's staff for a period of months. Although Petitioner amended his 2016 LO License renewal application only shortly before the final hearing to correctly reflect that he had filed a personal bankruptcy petition within the past 10 years, the credible evidence indicates that Petitioner believed that Respondent was aware of his personal bankruptcy through previous discussions with Respondent's staff, so would have had no motivation to intentionally provide false information regarding that matter on his renewal application. No evidence was presented at the hearing showing that Petitioner has ever engaged, in the course of conducting his mortgage loan originator business, in any fraudulent, dishonest, or other conduct harmful to the consuming public. Findings of Ultimate Fact The undersigned found Petitioner to be credible and forthright in his explanation of the creation and status of the Tax Lien, his personal bankruptcy, the filing of his tax returns, and his ongoing efforts to resolve his adverse credit history issues that have affected renewal of his LO License.9/ As discussed in detail above, Petitioner's adverse credit history information is, at least in some significant measure, a result of circumstances largely beyond Petitioner's control. When the real estate market collapsed in 2008, Petitioner suffered an immediate, dramatic drop in income; at that point, he incurred the large tax liabilities with which he has been burdened ever since. As discussed above, due to Petitioner's lack of income during and after the real estate market crash, it took some time for him to obtain the accounting services he needed in order to file his overdue tax returns——an essential step in negotiating a tax payment plan with the IRS. Although Petitioner's efforts to resolve the Tax Lien with the IRS have taken some time, Petitioner finally is, or soon will be, in a position to negotiate a payment plan with the IRS to pay his tax liability and, ultimately, resolve the Tax Lien. Before now, Petitioner has not been in a position to comprehensively and systematically pay down his tax liability pursuant to a negotiated plan. Thus, at this juncture, Petitioner's lack of voluntary payments toward resolving his Tax Lien and his gambling losses have not been determined a basis for finding that Petitioner lacks the character, general fitness, and financial responsibility to entitle him to renewal of his LO License.10/ The persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner is making steady progress toward getting himself in the position, through bringing himself current in his income tax returns filings, to negotiate a payment plan with the IRS in order to comprehensively and systematically pay down his tax liability with the aim of dissolving the Tax Lien. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has shown that he possesses the character, general fitness, and financial responsibility to warrant a determination that he will operate honestly, fairly, and efficiently such that his LO License should be renewed for the year 2016.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order approving renewal of Petitioner's loan originator license for the year 2016. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2017
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner owes State of Florida use tax and local government infrastructure tax on the alleged use of three airplanes.
Findings Of Fact Charles and Dorothy Tolbert own and operate American Aircraft International, Inc. (American). American is in the business primarily of selling and brokering aircraft sales. Most of American's business involves brokering in which American earns a commission or fee for putting together a seller and buyer and bringing the transaction to a conclusion. On a much less frequent basis, American will purchase an airplane for resale. American advertises the availability of its airplanes, both brokered and American-owned, for either sale or lease. However, American has not had occasion to lease one of its own aircraft except as part of a lease-purchase agreement. American does not make any other use of airplanes it offers for sale or lease, except as necessary for maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers or lessees. Such use would be cost-prohibitive. Fuel, crew, and insurance costs would be well in excess of the cost of a ticket on a commercial airline. American's insurance policy only covers the use of the planes for demonstration and maintenance purposes. On February 6, 1990, American traded for a King Air 200, N56GR, serial number 059, at an acquisition value of $650,000. The King Air 200 was delivered to American from Carlisle, Kentucky, and held by American for resale purposes only and was flown only for purposes of maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers. When it was sold in 1991 to an English company, BC Aviation, Ltd., American had flown the aircraft only 7 hours. The aircraft was delivered out-of- state in May 1991. In July 1991, American bought a kit for a home-built aircraft called the Renegade, serial number 445. The kit was manufactured and sold by a company in British Columbia, Canada. American's intent in purchasing the kit was to build the airplane and decide whether to become a dealer. It took a year and a half to build, and by the time it was completed, American decided not to pursue the dealership. In September of 1991, American sold the Renegage to the Tolberts. The Tolberts registered the Renegade in September 1994, under N493CT. At first, the Tolberts did not pay sales tax on their purchase of the Renegade. They thought that, since they owned American, no sales tax was due. When the Department audited American and pointed out that sales tax was due, the Tolberts paid the tax in December 1994. In 1991, American also purchased a King Air B90, N988SL, serial number LJ438, for $175,000. The King Air B90 was held by American for resale purposes only and was flown only for purposes of maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers. In July 1991, American sold the aircraft to Deal Aviation of Chicago, Illinois. However, Deal could not qualify for its own financing, so American agreed to lease-sell the aircraft to Deal. Under the lease-purchase agreement entered into on July 21, 1991, the purchase price was $269,000, payable $4,747.85 a month until paid in full. (The agreement actually said payments would be made for 84 months, but that would amount to total payments well in excess of the purchase price; the evidence did not explain this discrepancy.) American continued to hold title to the aircraft and continued to make payments due to the bank on American's financing for the aircraft. The lease- purchase agreement must have been modified, or payments accelerated, because American transferred title to the aircraft in April 1993. The Department asserted that a Dolphin Aviation ramp rental invoice on the King Air B90 issued in August for the month of September 1991 reflected that the aircraft was parked at the Sarasota-Bradenton Airport at the time of the invoice, which would have been inconsistent with American's testimony and evidence. But the invoice contained the handwritten notation of Dorothy Tolbert that the airplane was "gone," and her testimony was uncontradicted that she telephoned Dolphin when she got the invoice and to inform Dolphin that the invoice was in error since the plane had not been at the ramp since Deal removed it to Illinois on July 21, 1991. As a result, no ramp rent was paid after July 1991. Indeed, the Department's own audit schedules reflect that no ramp rent was paid on the King Air B90 after July 1991. The Department also presented an invoice dated September 16, 1991, in the amount of $3400 for engine repairs done on the King Air B90 by Hangar One Aviation in Tampa, Florida. The invoice reflects that the repairs were done for American and that they were paid in full on September 19, 1991, including Florida sales tax. The Department contended that the invoice was inconsistent with American's testimony and evidence. But although American paid for these repairs, together with Florida sales tax, Mrs. Tolbert explained that the repairs were made under warranty after the lease-purchase of the airplane by Deal. A minor engine problem arose soon after Deal removed the airplane to Illinois. Deal agreed to fly the plane to Hangar One for the repairs, and American agreed to pay for the repairs. After the repairs were made, Hangar One telephoned Mrs. Tolbert with the total, and she gave Hangar One American's credit card number in payment. She did not receive American's copy of the invoice until later. She does not recall if she: noticed the Florida sales tax and did not think to question it; noticed it and decided it was not enough money ($179) to be worth disputing; or just did not notice the Florida sales tax. When American's certified public accountant (CPA), Allan Shaw, prepared American's federal income tax return for 1990, he included the King Air 200 as a fixed capital asset on the company's book depreciation schedule and booked $26,146 of depreciation on the aircraft for 1990 on a cost basis of $650,000. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the aircraft ($92,857) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. The next year, 1991, Shaw included the both the King Air B90 and the Renegade as fixed capital assets on the company's book depreciation schedule. He booked $9,378 of depreciation on the B90 on a cost basis of $175,000 and $1,872 on the Renegade on a cost basis of $25,922 for part of the year 1991. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the B90 ($12,507) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. This depreciation was subtracted from the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the return in the amount of $22,796, which represented the payments from Deal under the lease-purchase agreement. The Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. The next year, 1992, Shaw again included the both the King Air B90 and the Renegade as fixed capital assets on the company's book depreciation schedule. He booked $35,613 of depreciation on the B90 and $5,555 on the Renegade. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the B90 ($25,014) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. This depreciation was subtracted from the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the return in the amount of $51,737, which again represented the payments from Deal under the lease-purchase agreement. The Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. It is not clear from the evidence why American's CPA decided American was entitled to claim depreciation on the three aircraft in question. (Shaw also depreciated another airplane in 1989 which was before the period covered by the Department's audit.) Shaw's final hearing and deposition testimony was confusing as to whether he recalled discussing the question with the Tolberts. He may have; if he did, he probably discussed it with Mrs. Tolbert. Meanwhile, Mrs. Tolbert does not recall ever discussing the question of depreciation with Shaw. In all likelihood, Shaw probably made his own decision that American could depreciate the airplanes to minimize income taxes by claiming that they were fixed capital assets used in the business and not just inventory items being held for resale. For the King Air B90, there were lease payments Shaw could use to justify his decision; but there were no lease payments for the King Air 200 or the Renegade. The evidence was not clear whether there were lease payments for the airplane Shaw depreciated in 1989. For the next year, 1993, Shaw included the Renegade as a fixed capital asset on the company's book depreciation schedule and booked $7,712 of depreciation on the Renegade. For federal tax purposes, the Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. When the Department audited American starting in July 1994, tax auditor William Berger saw the depreciation schedules and tax returns, both of which indicated to him that the three airplanes in question were used by the company, but no sales or use tax was paid on them. (He also pointed out the Tolberts' failure to pay sales tax on the purchase of the Renegade from American, and the Tolberts later paid the tax, as previously mentioned.) As a result, on July 26, 1995, the Department issued two notices of intent. One was to make sales and use tax audit changes which sought to assess American $56,097.77 in use taxes, together with delinquent penalties of $14,657.36 and interest through July 26, 1995, in the amount of $31,752.61, for a total of $102,507.74, with subsequent interest accruing at the rate of $18.44 per day. The second was to make local government infrastructure surtax audit changes which sought to assess American $609.99 in the surtax, together with delinquent penalties of $163.14 and interest through July 26, 1995, in the amount of $256.33, for a total of $1,029.46, with subsequent interest accruing at the rate of $.20 per day. It is not clear from the record how the Department arrived at the use tax and surtax figures. The alleged use tax assessment should have been calculated as $51,061.32 (six percent of the acquisition costs of the airplanes), and the alleged surtax assessment should have been calculated at the statutory maximum of $50 per item, for a total of $150. On August 28, 1995, American made a partial payment of $5,496.44 on the Department's use tax and surtax audit change assessments, intending to leave a disputed assessed amount of $51,061.32 in use tax and $150 in surtax. It is not clear from the record what American intended the $5,496.44 to apply towards. American filed an Informal Protest of the use tax and surtax audit change assessments on February 26, 1996. The Informal Protest contended that the use tax and surtax were not due and that the federal income tax depreciation schedules were "not determinative." On October 6, 1996, the Department issued a Notice of Decision denying American's protest primarily on the ground that the depreciation of the aircraft for federal income tax purposes constituted using them for use tax purposes. After receiving the Notice of Decision, on November 4, 1996, American filed amended tax returns to remove the depreciation of the airplanes (together with the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the 1991 return). (Although CPA Shaw refused to admit it, it is clear that American's federal income tax returns were amended in order to improve its defense against the Department's use tax and surtax assessments.) As a result of the amended returns, American had to pay an additional $15,878 in federal income tax on the 1990 return; there was no change in the tax owed on any of the other returns. On November 6, 1996, American filed a Petition for Reconsideration on the ground that the returns had been amended and the additional federal income tax paid. On January 10, 1997, the Department issued a Notice of Reconsideration denying American's Petition for Reconsideration on the ground that "subsequent modifications made to the federal income tax returns will have no affect [sic] upon" the use tax and surtax assessments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order withdrawing the assessment of use tax and local government infrastructure surtax, delinquent penalties, and interest against American. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of October, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Albert J. Wollermann, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact In 1962, the Corporation decided to relocate its corporate offices from Newark, New Jersey, to the State of Florida. Implementing this decision, the Corporation secured a twenty year leasehold interest of an entire floor in the Universal Marion Building in Jacksonville, Florida, under which it was obligated to pay an annual rental of $52,000.00. Within a few months during the year 1962, the decision to relocate was rescinded. During the tax year in question, the Corporation retained a part-time employee in Florida for the sole purpose of attempting to either locate a purchaser of the leasehold interest or to avoid further obligations under the lease by negotiations and settlement with the landlord. This part-time employee received his directions from the corporate offices in Newark, New Jersey. Other than these efforts to relieve the burden of the unused leased premises, the Corporation conducted no commercial activities in the State of Florida during the tax year 1973. Although the Corporation's headquarters were ultimately moved to Jacksonville, in January 1976, the Corporation has never occupied the leased premises in question. In fact, in 1974, the Corporation entered into a sublease with the State of Florida for the duration of the lease. Pursuant to audit, DOR assessed the Corporation an additional $12,616.89 in income tax for the year ended December 31, 1973, using the three-factor formula method of apportionment.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the pleadings, stipulations and oral representations of the parties, the following facts are found: During the years in question, petitioner was a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware and was duly qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Florida. Petitioner is the parent corporation of a consolidated group of corporations, two of which (including petitioner) had Florida transactions or were otherwise separately subject to the Florida corporate income tax code. None of the other members of the consolidated group were subject to taxation in Florida. For the fiscal and calendar years 1972 through 1974, Petitioner filed federal and Florida income tax returns on behalf of the parent corporation, which included the returns for the consolidated group of corporations -- both the Florida and non- Florida members. Each member of the group consented to such consolidated filing and the component members of the Florida return group were identical to the members of the federal return group. Respondent issued its proposed deficiencies for the 1972 and 1973 tax years, ruling that for a parent corporation to include all of its subsidiary corporations for the purposes of consolidating its taxable income, it must be incorporated in Florida. For the years 1972, 1973 and 1974, respondent's Rule 12C-1.131(1), F.A.C., contained a definition of a "Florida parent company" as the term is used in the second sentence of Florida Statutes 220.131(1). This rule was amended on August 4, 1975, to delete said sentence defining the term "Florida parent company."
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that: petitioner pay the assessment of $3,786.33 for the year 1972, with interest, as stipulated by petitioner, the proposed assessment for the year 1973 in the amount of $112,281.06 be dismissed and set aside, and the petitioner's method of computing its corporate income tax for the year 1974 be upheld. Respectfully submitted and entered this 21st day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: M. Lewis Hall, Jr. Hall and Hedrick Greater Miami Federal Building 200 Southeast First Street Miami, Florida E. Wilson Crump, II Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue At issue herein is whether or not the Respondent's certificate to practice as a certified public accountant in the State of Florida should be revoked based on conduct which will be set forth hereinafter in detail for alleged violations of Chapter 473, Florida Statutes, and the rules and regulations promulgated and adopted thereunder in Chapter 21A, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence introduced at the hearing, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Mark Finkel, Respondent, is the holder of certificate No. 2327 as a certified public accountant in the State of Florida. As such, the Respondent is subject to the provisions of Chapter 473, Florida Statutes, and the rules and regulations promulgated in Chapter 21A, Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent has been so registered as a certified public accountant since 1968. During early 1973, Respondent was engaged by David E. Wells, M.D., P.A., to prepare and file individual and corporate tax returns for the entity, David E. Wells, M.D., P.A., for the three years ending June 30, 1975. Respondent's engagement stamped from a referral of Dr. Wells' former C.P.A., Tom Williams, who relocated from Florida during late 1972. At the outset of his engagement by Dr. Wells, Respondent was briefed on the nuances of Dr. Wells' cardiology practice by Tom Williams. Respondent, according to Dr. Wells, was told that his duties would include those of filing corporate and individual tax returns and proper accounting for the administration and payment of pension plan taxes. During 1973, Respondent made quarterly visits to Dr. Wells' office to review records and billing information. The record reveals that Respondent filed quarterly payroll tax returns through September of 1976 and individual income tax returns for the years ending 1973 and 1974. Respondent failed to file individual income tax returns for the year ending December, 1975, or corporate returns for the years ending June 30, 1973, through 1976, and pension tax returns for the years ending 1973 through 1976. However, Respondent represented to Dr. Wells that all necessary returns were filed with the Internal Revenue Service and the other governmental agencies charged with the collection of taxes. For the years 1973 through 1976, Dr. Wells received inquiries from the Internal Revenue Service requesting information as to why corporate tax returns had not been filed for his corporation for the three years ending June 30, 1975. Based on the correspondence received from the Internal Revenue Service, Dr. Wells attempted to communicate with Respondent to either get the necessary forms filed or to request a return of Respondent's working papers which would assist another C.P.A. in preparing and filing the pertinent returns, to no avail. In this regard, after repeated calls, Dr. Wells obtained what records Respondent had which were of little use to his newly retained accountant, Myron Kahn, a certified public accountant who, since 1959, has been licensed in Florida and North Carolina. Messr. Kahn was retained by Dr. Wells in December of 1976 and established that the Respondent had only filed an individual income tax return for Dr. Wells for the calendar year 1973, plus quarterly payroll tax returns filed which were current. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2.) Based on the available records, Messr. Kahn reconstructed the necessary accounting data based on cash receivables and disbursement vouchers for the prior four-year period. Messr. Kahn, after diligent search, found no control sheets, financial summaries, analyses, etc., which would have been kept if the pertinent income tax returns had been filed as required. Because Messr. Kahn had to reconstruct the necessary accounting data, he spent an inordinate amount of time compiling the returns he needed to file. Evidence reveals that due to Dr. Wells' late filing of tax returns for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, he incurred an additional penalty of $12,600, plus approximately $2,700 in interest and for his state corporate return, a penalty of $1,700 was assessed, plus $325 for interest. For the year ending June 30, 1975, Dr. Wells paid a Federal penalty of $5,618, plus $878 in interest, and a state penalty of $1,052, plus $132 in interest. Douglas H. Thompson, Jr., the Board's Executive Director, has been a certified public accountant since April, 1968. Director Thompson is the Board's chief administrative officer and custodian of records. On approximately December 16, 1976, Director Thompson received a complaint from David E. Wells, M.D., based on Respondent's "failure to file requested corporate returns and to return certain documents."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and in the absence of any effort on Respondent's part to refute or otherwise mitigate the evidence presented, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's license to practice as a certified public accountant (certificate No. 2327) be REVOKED. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Finding no record that Taxpayer had filed or paid intangible taxes for the years 1979 and 1980, on June 17, 1982, DOR notified Taxpayer they were reviewing Taxpayer's intangible personal property tax account for the years 1979 through 1982 (Exhibit 16). During the audit which followed Taxpayer presented copies of the 1981 and 1982 tax returns and cancelled checks evidencing payment. The audit disclosed small discrepancies in these returns and those discrepancies were satisfied by the Taxpayer and are not an issue in these proceedings. On December 15, 1982, Gateway Hospital sold its assets to Humana Corporation and in December 1983 the corporation was dissolved and a liquidating trust was established to settle accounts and distribute proceeds to the stockholders. After this date none of Taxpayer's employees were located at the Gateway Hospital address, 5115 - 58th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida. One of Taxpayer's contentions on the timeliness issue is that all notices from DOR were sent to the 58th Street address and were either not received or not timely received by Taxpayer. No special notification to DOR of a change of address was submitted by Taxpayer. The 1983 intangible tax return showed Taxpayer's address as 5800 49th Street, Suite 201, St. Petersburg, Florida. However, in the petition for hearing dated March 21, 1985, Petitioner's address is shown as 5115 58th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida 33709. On April 2, 1984, DOR sent Taxpayer Notice of Proposed Assessment (Exhibit 6) for tax years 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983 in the amount of $19,786.36 with interest through February 23, 1984. This notice advised Taxpayer that this was final agency action and of its right to petition for an administrative hearing within 60 days or file an action in circuit court within 60 days, and that failure to so petition or file would render the proposed assessment final and no action could thereafter be brought to contest the assessment. This notice was sent certified mail and receipted for at the 58th Avenue North address. Alan Steinbach, the chief operating officer of the liquidating trust, testified he never received Exhibit 6. Subsequent to June 19, 1984, DOR sent Notice of Demand for Payment (Exhibit 7) to Taxpayer to the 58th Avenue North address. This document, the top part of which is identical to Exhibit 6 except interest has been computed to 6/19/84, was received by Steinbach. Steinbach contacted DOR and told Randy Miller, Executive Director, that this was the first notice of a delinquency he had received from DOR and needed additional time to show the taxes had been paid. Miller agreed to allow Taxpayer more time and communicated this to Steven J. Barger, Jr., Chief, Bureau of Audit Selection. By letter dated August 13, 1984 (Exhibit 8), Barger advised Steinbach that the collection procedure would be delayed 30 days to permit Taxpayer time to submit the information necessary to set aside the assessment. By letters dated September 11, 1984 (Exhibit 9) and October 17, 1984 (Exhibit 12), the collection procedures were further stayed until December 12, 1984. During this period Taxpayer presented evidence that the 1982 and 1983 intangible personal property taxes had been paid and all errors in those returns were corrected and the correct taxes paid. By Notice of Proposed Assessment dated 1/9/85 (Exhibit 14) an audit assessment for the tax years 1979-1983 was forwarded to Taxpayer showing the tax, penalties and interest for the tax years 1979 and 1980 through 1/3/85 in the amount of $12,296.30 were due and no taxes were due for the other years. The explanation of appeal rights attached to this audit assessment advised the Taxpayer had 60 days from the date of assessment to contest the assessment in an administrative proceeding or a judicial proceeding. On March 21, 1985, the instant petition was filed. During the period prior to January 9, 1985, Petitioner was unable to locate tax returns or cancelled checks showing payment for 1979 and 1980 although Taxpayer produced returns and cancelled checks for all of the other years from 1977 through 1983. DOR also located evidence showing intangible personal property taxes paid by Taxpayer before and after 1979 and 1980, but could find no record of returns being filed or taxes paid for the years 1979 and 1980. Upon receipt of a tax return and payment DOR photographs the return and payment check on microfilm, enters the data from the return in the computer, and forwards the tax return to the archives in the Department of State. An index for a tax year is compiled after the close of that tax year. Until this index is prepared, DOR cannot readily locate any tax return. As a result, whether or not a tax return was filed by a particular taxpayer cannot be ascertained by DOR until six to nine months after the close of the tax year. At the time Exhibit 7 was forwarded to Taxpayer, DOR could not have located the Taxpayer's 1983 return which, in fact, had been filed, as had the 1981 and 1982 returns. Taxpayer could not locate the returns or cancelled checks representing payment for the years 1979 and 1980. When asked why Taxpayer did not obtain bank records to establish payment, Steinbach responded that the corporation wrote 1000- 1500 checks per month and too many check would have to be screened. Since all payments by Taxpayer for the five years for which returns were produced were made in June, except for one year, 1983, which was paid in July, that does not appear to be an onerous task to avoid a tax liability of more than $12,000.
