Findings Of Fact At all times material to this matter, Thomas E. Kehoe, d/b/a Kehoe on the Bay, Respondent, was licensed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Petitioner, to operate the adult congregate living facility (ACLF), Kehoe on the Bay. Kehoe on the Bay serves young adult clients who suffer from drug overdose, mental retardation or alcohol abuse. On November 30, 1988, Richard Brickman, a fire safety specialist for Petitioner, performed a general inspection of Kehoe on the Bay for purposes of re-licensure. Mr. Brickman identified eighteen operating deficiencies which he discussed with Mr. Kehoe and Mr. Lindsey Smith, administrator of Kehoe on the Bay. On December 16, 1988, the Department issued a letter confirming the findings of the re-licensure survey conducted by Mr. Brickman. Enclosed with the letter was a form "Classification of Deficiencies for ACLF Licensure Requirements", which noted the deficiencies, the deadlines for correction, and citations to the administrative rules allegedly violated by the deficiencies. The deficiencies cited by Mr. Brickman appear on pages four through seven of the form and are under the headings ACLF 107-2, ACLF 107-3 and ACLF 107-4. Each of the deficiencies was classified as a class III violation with a civil penalty of $250 each and were to be corrected by December 30, 1988. On December 19, 1988, Mr. Kehoe requested a thirty day extension of the compliance date. The extension was granted on December 21, 1988. On January 31, 1989, Mr. Brickman made a return visit to Kehoe on the Bay and determined that each of the deficiencies, except for the four at issue had been corrected. These deficiencies form the basis of the administrative complaint and are indicated on the administrative complaint as follows: Quarterly fire alarm tests were not conducted and/or documented as required. Quarterly smoke detector inspections and tests were not conducted and/or documented as required. Resident room door closers did not close and latch as required. Seven resident room doors were not self closing. As to deficiencies one and two, existent law, as reasonably interpreted, by the Department requires that the fire alarm and smoke detectors in an ACLF be tested quarterly; that each test be documented in writing; and that the written documentation be made available for inspection. Kehoe on the Bay has a more than acceptable fire detection and alarm system which was installed by Mr. Issac Rodriguez of Quality Services Contractors. For approximately five years, Mr. Rodriguez has been performing annual inspections of the system. At the conclusion of each inspection, Mr. Rodriguez places a sticker on the control panel for the system. The control panel is located immediately outside the administrative office at Kehoe on the Bay. In addition to Mr. Rodriguez's tests, Kehoe on the Bay had followed the internal policy of testing the fire detection and alarm system at least once a month. The tests were performed by Mr. Smith or Mr. Carl Anderson, chief of staff at Kehoe on the Bay, but were not documented in written form. If a malfunction occurred and they could not fix it on site, Mr. Rodriguez was called to repair the system. On Mr. Brickman's first visit in November 1988, he requested and did not receive written documentation of the quarterly tests, although Mr. Smith verbally informed him that they had been done. After Mr. Brickman's review, Mr. Smith called Mr. Rodriguez to request an inspection and repair of a malfunction which Mr. Brickman had noted. The malfunction was corrected, and on January 4, 1989, Mr. Rodriguez performed the inspection and placed his sticker on the control panel. When Mr. Brickman returned on January 31, 1989, he again was not provided with documentation of tests performed on either the smoke detectors or the fire alarm. Mr. Brickman is an experienced fire safety inspector, having been employed by the Department for over three years and having worked with the New York City Fire Department for twenty-three years prior to moving to Florida. He is familiar with the inspection stickers used by commercial fire inspecting companies such as Quality Services Contractors. However, Mr. Brickman did not remember seeing the sticker on the panel, even though he had checked the panel during his investigation, and he had passed the panel on his way to the office in which he discussed his observations with Mr. Smith, nor was he shown the sticker on the panel. The sticker, if made available to Mr. Brickman, would have been sufficient to meet the requirement of written documentation of fire alarm and detection devices. In addition, Mr. Brickman would have accepted a copy of an invoice from Mr. Rodriguez as meeting the requirement for written documentation. Mr. Rodriguez is typically late in mailing his invoices. Although he did, in fact, bill Mr. Kehoe for the January 4, 1989 test, the invoice did not arrive until after Mr. Brickman's visit on January 31, 1989. Subsequent to Mr. Rodriguez's inspection of January 4, 1989, Kehoe on the Bay has implemented the documentation procedure suggested by Mr. Brickman at his November 30, 1988 visit and has made quarterly, documented inspections. Mr. Rodriguez inspected the fire detection and alarm devices on January 4, 1989 and placed the sticker on the panel at that time, making the sticker available to Mr. Brickman on his inspection. The oversight of the sticker by Mr. Brickman did not make the sticker unavailable to him. In fact, the first quarterly tests were performed, documented and made available for inspection within the time given for correction of the deficiencies noted on November 30, 1988. As to deficiencies three and four relating to alleged faulty door closures or lack of door closures, the deficiencies noted on the November 30, 1988 visit by Mr. Brickman were repaired prior to Mr. Brickman's return visit. Mr. Kehoe purchased new door closures for the errant doors, and they were installed by Mr. Anderson and Mr. Charles Woods, carpenter at Kehoe on the Bay. When Mr. Brickman returned on January 31, 1989, some of the closures would not latch as required by the Department and some were not operational. However, the clients at Kehoe on the Bay frequently break the door closures. Also, the closures which were installed require adjustment during the first six months of operation. Mr. Smith and Mr. Anderson walk the halls daily and fix the items which they note as broken, including adjusting the door closures. Mr. Brickman's visit was unannounced and, by chance, some of the closures ware not operational when he did his inspection. Kehoe on the Bay has been previously cited by the Department for deficiencies. However, the instant administrative complaint is the first action taken by the Department against the facility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order dismissing the administrative complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 9th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1990.
The Issue Whether or not Respondents improperly serviced portable fire extinguishers and pre-engineered fire suppression systems as specifically alleged in the administrative complaints filed herein on October 8 and November 4, 1992.
Findings Of Fact During times material herein, Respondent Polk Fire Extinguisher Service, Inc. and its owner, Ira Devon Canady, was a licensed dealer for portable extinguishers and pre-engineered systems for fire protection and prevention. During times material hereto, Respondent Floyd E. Nicks, was a permittee for the servicing of portable extinguishers and pre-engineered systems. On or about January 29, 1992, Respondent Polk caused its licensed permittee, James G. Boykin, an employee under Respondent Polk's direct supervision and control, to service a pre-engineered fire suppression system at the Highway 27 truck stop in Lake Wales, Florida. On March 14, 1992, a fire started in the kitchen area of the truck stop. On March 17, 1992, Investigator Phillip J. Gruda, an employee in the fire sprinkler industry in excess of 26 years, was summoned to investigate the fire which occurred in the restaurant (kitchen area) of the truck stop wherein the fire suppression system failed to function as designed. Investigator Gruda immediately initiated his investigation. He noted that a fire started in the kitchen. The fire origin was in the area of the range hood which became completely engulfed in flames and the suppression system did not activate. The fire suppression system which was installed in the hood of the oven utilizes a fusible link which melts when exposed to intense heat. The melted link sets off an ignitor which lets the fire retardant powder from the system extinguish the fire. An examination of the system revealed that the control head was twisted and the cable which connects the fusible link and the remote pull station was twisted preventing the system from discharging. Investigator Gruda also discovered that the cable had dislodged from the pulley extending from the control head which further prevented the system from firing. On approximately January 29, 1992, Respondent Polk used its agent/permittee, Boykin, to also service two portable extinguishers at the truck stop in Lake Wales. Permittee Boykin failed to perform the required six-year maintenance on portable fire extinguisher No. 873430; failed to discover that the gauge on said extinguisher indicated it had discharged; failed to discover that the extinguisher had leaked and to remove the old label from the extinguisher; failed to perform the hydrostatic test on the extinguisher and placed an incorrect serial number on the service tag. Also, Boykin did not leak test the extinguisher. The above-referenced extinguisher failed to discharge during the fire on March 14, 1992 at the truck stop. On or about December 19, 1990, Respondent Polk caused its agent/permittee, Floyd E. Nicks, an employee under Respondent Polk's direct supervision and control, to service a pre-engineered system at the truck stop in Lake Wales. Respondent Nicks was dispatched to perform a six-year service maintenance on the system and at Respondent Polk's direction, used a generic BC powder instead of the required safety first specified powder thereby invalidating the underwriter's laboratory (UL) listing. During December, 1990, Respondent Nicks also failed to perform the required hydrostatic test for cylinder No. 24991 which was part of the pre- engineered system at the truck stop. Respondent, by its agent and employee Boykin, during December, 1991, serviced a pre-engineered system at the Lone Palm Country Club in Lakeland. Agent Boykin failed to properly service the system and investigations by Gruda subsequently revealed the following violations: S-4 Venturi was missing over the char- broiler appliance tee. Incorrect duct nozzles and plenum nozzles. Six elbows were used to connect the yoke instead of the specified five. The pipeline limits did not meet specifi- cation. The system was not piped in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. The duct nozzle was not centered. The filters were not baffled and "range guard" corner pulleys were used instead of "safety first" as specified. Based on these violations, the gas charbroiler was not properly protected by the fire suppression system. On or about July 31, 1991, the parties entered a consent order against Respondent Polk wherein Respondent was placed on probation for one year. One condition of probation set forth in the Consent Order was that Respondent Polk would strictly adhere to all provisions of Chapter 633, Florida Statutes and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a final order revoking the licenses and permits of Respondents Polk Fire Extinguisher Service, Inc., Ira Devon Canady and Floyd E. Nicks. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-6551 and 92-0023 Ruling on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 8, rejected as being a conclusion. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Gallagher, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ira Devon Canady, Owner Polk Fire Extinguisher Services, Inc. Post Office Box 384 Lakeland, Florida 33801 Floyd E. Nicks, pro se 1137 Carlton Lake Wales, Florida 33853
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated October 22, 2001, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Office of the State Fire Marshall is the governmental entity responsible for regulating fire safety in Florida, including the installation, maintenance, and inspection of fire protection systems. Section 633.01, Florida Statutes (2000). Mr. Cabrera is currently licensed by the State Fire Marshall as a Class C and D fire equipment dealer (Class 0703 and 0704) and as a fire extinguisher and preengineered systems permittee (Class 0903 and 0904).2 At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Cabrera was issued preengineered systems permit number 435249000198. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Cabrera was the qualifier for A Fire Prevention Company, was authorized to act for the business organization in all matters connected with the business, and was required to supervise all activities undertaken by A Fire Prevention Company. A Fire Prevention Company has been in business since 1998. Prior to this time, a company referred to as "South Florida Fire" employed Mr. Cabrera. Mr. Cabrera currently holds, and, at the times material to this proceeding, held jointly with A Fire Prevention Company, a certificate qualifying A Fire Prevention Company to engage in business as a fire equipment dealer. At the times material to this proceeding, A Fire Prevention Company and Mr. Cabrera engaged in the business of servicing, repairing, recharging, testing, inspecting, and installing fire extinguishers and preengineered fire suppression systems. At the times material to this proceeding, Banner Beef and Seafood operated an industrial food processing facility in Miami, Florida. In the facility, meat and seafood moved through an industrial deep fat fryer on a conveyor belt and were then frozen, packaged, and sold for resale. An oil-heating unit, located in an alcove off the room containing the deep fryer, was attached to but separate from the deep fryer, and hot oil moved from the oil-heating unit through a filter into the deep fryer. The oil-heating unit held 200 gallons of oil, which was heated to 460 degrees Fahrenheit before flowing into the deep fryer. The oil-heating unit was made of stainless steel, with a stainless steel lid. The oil-heating unit was protected by a Kidde Sentinel HDR 25DC, DOT E-7042-360-K, Serial #33996, ("Kidde HDR 25DC") preengineered dry chemical fire protection system. On June 19, 2000, approximately three months after Mr. Cabrera performed a semi-annual inspection and maintenance of the Kidde HDR 25DC system, a fire originating in the oil- heating unit destroyed much of the Banner Beef facility. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was probably installed at Banner Beef in or around 1981. Mr. Cabrera was not involved in the installation of the system, but he began inspecting and maintaining the system approximately ten years before the fire. He occasionally performed the semi-annual inspection and maintenance of the Banner Beef system when he was employed by South Florida Fire, and he performed all of the semi-annual inspections and maintenance subsequent to March or July 1998, after he left South Florida Fire and established A Fire Prevention Company. Mr. Cabrera completed an inspection report and an invoice each time he inspected the Kidde HDR 25DC system. Mr. Cabrera was, however, able to produce to the State Fire Marshall only an invoice for a semi-annual inspection on October 5, 1998; an invoice and "Range Hood Inspection Report" for a semi-annual inspection on April 12, 1999; an invoice and "Range Hood Inspection Report" for a semi-annual inspection on September 27, 1999; and an invoice for a "semi-annual inspection and maintenance" on March 15, 2000. The Kidde HDR 25DC is a preengineered system, which means that components manufactured by Kidde were put together into a system designed to protect against a particular hazard. Kidde publishes a manual, bulletins, and memoranda that specify how the Kidde HDR 25DC system is to be installed, serviced, repaired, maintained, tested, and inspected. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was submitted to the Underwriters Laboratory ("UL") for testing. The system was found to be effective and to operate as specified, and the system and the manual for the system received UL approval. Once the system and manual received UL approval, the components of the system could not be changed except in accordance with the UL listing and the approved manufacturer's specifications. The Kidde HDR 25DC system uses a dry chemical as a fire suppressant. The NFPA Standard 17 contains requirements for the installation, maintenance, operation, and care of dry chemical fire suppression systems. The Kidde HDR 25DC system is approved by the UL to protect commercial cooking installations, specifically hoods, ducts, and cooking appliances. Cooking appliances are classified into two categories in the manufacturer's specifications, surface appliances and broilers; deep fryers are considered surface appliances. Commercial cooking installations are used in food preparation areas of restaurants. The oil-heating unit and deep fryer used by Banner Beef are considered industrial appliances because they were designed to process a high volume of food to be sold for resale rather than to be consumed on the premises. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was composed of several components, including a cylinder containing dry chemical fire suppressant under 360 pounds of pressure; a valve assembly attached to the cylinder; a manual release mechanism; an elbow mounting bracket that connected the cylinder to discharge piping; a nozzle attached to the discharge piping through which the dry chemical fire suppressant would be discharged on the hazard protected by the system; a fusible link designed to melt at a specified temperature; a control head, with a control head cover, that was attached to the cylinder valve assembly; cables running from the fusible link to the control head; electrical metal tubing protecting the cables; and corner pulleys that allowed the cables to change direction at a 90-degree angle. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was designed so that, when the fusible link melted, the cables would release, causing the system to actuate and discharge the dry chemical fire suppressant. Banner Beef's 200-gallon oil-heating unit protected by the Kidde HDR 25DC system was located in an alcove opening off of a larger room that housed the deep fryer. The cylinder containing the dry chemical fire suppressant was mounted on the outside wall of oil-heating unit, at the far end of the alcove, only a few inches away from oil that was maintained at 460 degrees Fahrenheit when the oil-heating unit was in operation. The oil-heating unit was turned off at the end of each workday, and the cylinder was regularly exposed to a cycle of high temperatures when the unit was in operation and cooler temperatures when it was not. Because it was attached to the hazard it was intended to protect, the cylinder would be exposed to any fire that originated in the oil-heating unit, and, in fact, the exterior of the cylinder at Banner Beef was damaged by the fire and covered in grease when it was inspected after the fire. NFPA Standard 17-8, Section 3-8.3, 1994 edition,3 specifies that "[t]he dry chemical container and expellant gas shall be located near the hazard or hazards protected, but not where they will be exposed to a fire or explosion in those areas." NFPA Standard 17-8, Section 3-8.3.1, provides that "[t]he dry chemical container and expellant gas assemblies shall be located so as not to be subjected to severe weather conditions or to mechanical, chemical, or other damage." The location of the cylinder at Banner Beef was not consistent with these NFPA requirements. A manual release handle, or manual pull station, is used to manually actuate the Kidde HDR 25DC system. At Banner Beef, the manual release handle was located on the far end of the oil-heating unit, at the top of the dry chemical cylinder and next to the controls used to operate the oil-heating unit. The means of exiting the alcove containing the oil-heating unit was through the room containing the deep fryer, although Banner Beef advised Mr. Cabrera that someone was always standing at the controls of the oil-heating unit whenever the unit was in operation. NFPA Standard 17-8 provides in pertinent part: 3-7 Operation and Control of Systems 3-7.1 Methods of Actuation. Systems shall be provided with both automatic and manual means of operation. 3-7.1.1 Operation of any manual actuator shall be all that is required to bring about the full operation of the system. At least one manual actuator shall be provided for each system. * * * 3-7.1.3 At least one manual actuator shall be located no more than 5 ft (1.5 m) above the floor and shall be convenient and easily accessible at all times, including the time of fire. Although only one manual actuator was required, the location of the manual release handle was not consistent with NFPA Standard 17-8, Section 3-7.1.3. The date of manufacture was stamped into the metal of the cylinder containing the dry chemical fire suppressant. The system's serial number and a United States Department of Transportation exemption code, DOT-7042, were also stamped into the metal of the cylinder. The Kidde Guidelines for Hydrostatic Retest & Qualification of Kidde Models HDR, IND, WHDR, and DRS- 700 System Cylinders provides that "[d]ry chemical and wet chemical agents, when super-pressurized with nitrogen, are classified as hazardous materials and must be shipped in DOT approved cylinders (containers). The United States Department of Transportation has jurisdiction during cylinder manufacturer, testing, marking, retest and shipment." According to the information contained in the Guidelines, Kidde cylinders manufactured under the DOT E-7042 exemption must be hydrostatically tested, using "the water jacket volumetric expansion method or the direct expansion method," at least every 12 years by a retester authorized by the United States Department of Transportation. According to the Guidelines, after the hydrostatic retest, the federal Department of Transportation requires that the cylinder must be stamped, "'plainly and permanently,'" with a marking that includes the date of the retest and the designation "3AL"; such a stamp is usually imprinted into the metal of the cylinder. The Guidelines include a warning, identified as such and set off from the rest of the text, that provides: "Use of pressure sensitive hydrostatic test labels, in lieu of stamping the cylinder, DOES NOT comply with the DOT requirements." (Emphasis in original.) Because the cylinder installed with the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef was manufactured in 1981, the cylinder should have been hydrostatically tested in 1993. The cylinder did not, however, bear a permanent stamp with the "3AL" designation and the date of a hydrostatic test. Mr. Cabrera nonetheless reported on the Range Hood System Report dated April 12, 1999, that the system had been hydrostatically tested in April 1998, and he reported on the Range Hood System Report dated September 27, 1999, that the system had been hydrostatically tested and recharged in 1998. Mr. Cabrera obtained this information from labels carrying the name of South Florida Fire that were affixed to the outside of the cylinder; a few remnants of the labels remained on the outside of the cylinder after the fire. Pursuant to the federal DOT requirements and the manufacturer's specifications, Mr. Cabrera could not rely on these labels as proof that the cylinder had been subjected to hydrostatic testing. An examination of the cylinder after the fire revealed that the outlet valve on the cylinder and the elbow mounting bracket attached to the valve were completely blocked by a caked, rock-hard white substance, and the area around the cylinder's relief valve was also coated with white powder. In addition, there were chunks of hardened white powder loose in the discharge piping that connected the cylinder to the nozzle inside the oil-heating unit, although the discharge piping was not blocked. The white powder was identified as dry chemical fire suppressant, which had discharged from the cylinder but had not been discharged through the nozzle into the oil-heating unit because of the complete blockage of the valve outlet and elbow mounting bracket. Finally, there was a residue of what appeared to be grease in the discharge piping connected to the elbow mounting bracket. The manufacturer's specifications require that, at the semi-annual inspection of the Kidde HDR 25DC system, the person providing the maintenance should "[c]heck the discharge piping for obstructions. Remove cylinder and valve. Blow out piping with clean dry air or nitrogen." Mr. Cabrera blew out the piping with nitrogen to clear obstructions each time he performed a semi-annual inspection of the Banner Beef system. The discharge piping was clear when he completed the semi-annual inspection and maintenance on March 15, 2000. In the Banner Beef system, approximately six inches of discharge piping ran from the elbow mounting bracket through the exterior wall of the oil-heating unit, where it emerged just above the level of the oil when the oil-heating unit was full. The discharge nozzle for the system was attached to a portion of the pipe that extended a few inches into the oil-heating unit, where it would be exposed to grease splatter. The male coupling on the discharge nozzle should have threaded into a female coupling in the pipe. However, the inside of the pipe was not threaded to receive the nozzle, and it appeared that the person installing the system had "screwed" the nozzle into a smooth pipe. Because the seal was not tight, grease had accumulated on the threads of the nozzle, and the nozzle might have blown off if the system had actually discharged. There are four nozzle configurations available for the Kidde HDR 25DC system, two of which are relevant to this proceeding: The SP-2 nozzle is designed to protect the plenum4 and exhaust duct of a commercial cooking installation; the SW-2 nozzle is designed to protect surface cooking appliances. One SP-2 nozzle was used with the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef, which was inconsistent with NFPA Standard 17-6, Section 2- 3.1, which requires that "[d]ischarge nozzles shall be listed for their intended use," and with the manufacturer's specifications for the system. First, there is no recognized nozzle configuration for the system using only one SP-2 nozzle. Second, the SP-2 nozzle was not appropriate for the Banner Beef system: Deep fryers are classified in the manufacturer's specifications as surface appliances, and the proper nozzle was the SW-2 nozzle. The discharge pattern of the SP-2 nozzle is horizontal, and, had the dry chemical fire suppressant actually been discharged through the nozzle into the oil-heating unit, the dry chemical would have blown across the surface of the hot grease; the SW-2 nozzle is designed to be installed above the appliance, so that its discharge pattern is vertical, with the spray distributed over the surface of the oil. Protective grease covers are required by the manufacturer's specifications and by NFPA Standard 17-6, Section 2-3.1.4, which provides: "Discharge nozzles shall be provided with blowoff caps or other suitable devices or material to prevent the entrance of moisture or other environmental materials into the piping. The protective device shall blow off, open, or blow out upon agent discharge." When Mr. Cabrera inspected the Banner Beef system in March 2000, a grease cover protected the discharge nozzle, but, after the fire, no grease cover for the nozzle could be located. In addition, an examination of the nozzle and discharge piping after the fire revealed grease build-up on the inside of the nozzle and in the discharge piping. Protective nozzle covers are easily lost; Mr. Cabrera had advised Banner Beef to call him if they needed a replacement cover, but he was never asked for a replacement cover. To the best of Mr. Cabrera's recollection, there was always a grease cover on the nozzle whenever he conducted his inspections of the system. A fusible link is designed to melt at a specific temperature, releasing cables that run from the fusible link to a control head attached to the dry chemical cylinder; this is the means by which the system is actuated. The fusible link of the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef was located in the duct venting the oil-heating unit to the roof. The invoice for the September 27, 1999, semi-annual inspection at Banner Beef reflects that Mr. Cabrera replaced the 500-degree fusible link in the Kidde HDR 25DC system. He used the 500-degree link because the oil-heating unit heated the oil to 460 degrees Fahrenheit. The manufacturer's specifications provide that "[t]he fusible link assembly . . . is used to detect excessive temperatures in the area above cooking appliances and in the duct. The actuation temperature is 360ºF (182ºC). For higher temperatures use a 500ºF quartzoid bulb, or fusible link." The manufacturer's specifications also provide: The exposure temperature is the maximum temperature to which a fusible link may be exposed for any period of time, no matter how short. After reaching the exposure temperature, the link will eventually release even though it may never reach the rating temperature. WARNING: To avoid accidental system discharge, a temperature survey must be made of all locations where the fusible link will be installed. Links must have an exposure temperature rating above the maximum peak survey temperature. The maximum exposure temperature for any fusible link is 300ºF. If the peak survey temperature is above 300º F, use a quartzoid bulb link. (Emphasis in original.) Only two fusible links were available for the Kidde HDR 25DC system, a fusible link with a rating temperature of 350 degrees Fahrenheit and a maximum exposure temperature of 300 degrees Fahrenheit and a quartzoid bulb, also referred to as a fusible link, with a rating temperature of 500 degrees Fahrenheit and a maximum exposure temperature of 475 degrees Fahrenheit. The exposure temperature at the location of the fusible link is not known, but the convected heat in the duct over the oil-heating unit, where the fusible link was installed, would not have reached the 460-degree temperature of the oil. However, the fusible link was installed only six inches above the maximum level of the oil in the oil-heating unit, and, had the 350-degree fusible link been used, it would have continually actuated the system. Pursuant to the manufacturer's specifications, the fusible link on the system should have been mounted using Kidde fusible-link brackets. The fusible link installed on the Banner Beef system was housed in a welded metal bracket fabricated by whoever installed the system. The fusible link is connected to the system's control head by a system of cables. The manufacturer's specifications require that the fusible link be attached to the cables using Kidde cable crimps crimped with a Kidde crimping tool. Mr. Cabrera did not use either a Kidde cable crimp or a Kidde crimping tool when he installed the new fusible link on the Banner Beef system during the September 27, 1999, inspection. The manufacturer's specifications require that the cables connecting the control head to the fusible link be "housed and protected by 1/2-inch electrical metal tubing." The portion of the cable running on the outside of the oil-heating unit, from the control head mounted near the cylinder into the exterior wall of the oil-heating unit was housed in electrical metal tubing; that portion of the cable running inside the oil- heating unit, from the fusible link to the exterior wall of the oil-heating unit, was not housed in electrical metal tubing but was left bare. According to the manufacturer's specification, all cable in the Kidde HDR 25DC system must run either horizontally or vertically. Consequently, corner pulleys are used to make 90-degree changes in direction. Three corner pulleys were used in the Banner Beef system; one was manufactured by Kidde, but two were manufactured by Pyro-Chem. In addition, the first corner pulley was clogged with grease, indicating that the system was not properly maintained. The cables leading from the fusible link are attached to a control head, and the system actuates when the fusible link melts and the cables are released. A cover plate protects the control head, and is attached to the control head with five screws. Kidde Field Memo #84-8, provides as follows: When installing the cover plate on any preengineered system control head, remember to install all five cover screws. The fifth screw that attaches to the hex post just above the local manual release handle is important for the stability of the cover plate when operating the handle. Leaving out the fifth screw could cause movement of the cover plate and render the local manual release handle inoperative. . . . Three of the five screw holes on the control head cover plate recovered from Banner Beef were covered with grease; only two of the five screw holes were clean. This indicates that the cover plate was attached to the control head by only two screws at the time of the fire. Mr. Cabrera did not note any discrepancies or deficiencies in the Kidde HDR 25DC system installed at Banner Beef in the inspection reports that he completed after his April 12, 1999, and September 27, 1999, inspections, which were the only reports provided to the State Fire Marshall and introduced into evidence at the final hearing. In these two reports, Mr. Cabrera checked the "Yes" boxes for the following items, among others: All appliances properly covered w/ correct nozzles System installed in accordance w/ MFG UL listing Inspect cylinder and mount Clean nozzles Check fuse links and clean Piping and conduit securely bracketed System operational & seals in place Clean cylinder and mount Mr. Cabrera signed the two reports, thereby certifying that "[o]n this date, the above system was tested and inspected in accordance with procedures of the presently adopted editions of NFPA Standard 17, 17A, 96 and the manufacturer's manual and was operated according to these procedures with results indicated above." The licensure files maintained by the State Fire Marshall for A Fire Prevention Company indicated that the company's insurance policy with Frontier Insurance Company expired on March 25, 2000. Mr. Cabrera testified, however, that the company did have insurance at the time of the fire, and this testimony is unrefuted. Summary The State Fire Marshall's expert witnesses disagreed as to whether the system could have controlled the fire had it functioned properly. They each conceded, however, that all components of the system functioned perfectly and actuated the system. They attributed the sole cause of the system's failure to the blockage in the valve outlet and elbow mounting bracket that prevented the dry chemical fire suppressant from discharging out of the cylinder. The State Fire Marshall's experts and Mr. Cabrera agreed that the cause of the blockage was dry chemical in the cylinder valve assembly and elbow mounting bracket that had hardened into a rock-hard substance. All of the State Fire Marshall's experts and Mr. Cabrera agreed that the chemical hardened as a result of its coming into contact with a significant amount of moisture and/or grease. No one, however, provided a satisfactory explanation of the time within which the chemical would have hardened after it came into contact with the moisture and/or grease. In Mr. Cabrera's opinion, the blockage was caused when grease and/or moisture entered the system at the time of the fire and caused the dry chemical to immediately harden. On the other hand, the State Fire Marshall's expert witnesses opined that the moisture and/or grease causing the blockage of the cylinder valve outlet and elbow mounting bracket did not necessarily accumulate in the system over an extended period of time but, rather, could have been introduced into the system all at once. They also agreed that the dry chemical would harden gradually over time and that the blockage was probably present at the time Mr. Cabrera performed the March 2000 inspection. However, none of the State Fire Marshall's experts provided a persuasive basis to support a finding that the blockage had been present in the system at the time Mr. Cabrera inspected the system in March 2000, and the evidence is, therefore, insufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Mr. Cabrera should have discovered the blockage when he performed the inspection and maintenance in March 2000. The evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is likewise not sufficient to establish that Mr. Cabrera deviated from the requirements of the manufacturer's specifications by installing a 500-degree fusible link in the system in September 1999. The evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is, however, sufficient to establish clearly and convincingly that the Kidde HDR 25DC preengineered fire protection system installed at Banner Beef was not designed to protect an industrial oil-heating unit containing approximately 200 gallons of hot oil, that the system was not installed in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications, that the system contained parts that were not manufactured by Kidde, that the system was not properly maintained with respect to the build-up of grease in and around the discharge nozzle and in the corner pulleys, and that Mr. Cabrera did not use the appropriate crimp and crimping tool when he replaced the fusible link in September 1997. The evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is also sufficient to establish clearly and convincingly that Mr. Cabrera did not provide the State Fire Marshall with proof of insurance subsequent to March 25, 2000, although the evidence is insufficient to establish that he did not, in fact, have insurance coverage subsequent to that time. Finally, the evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that the reports Mr. Cabrera prepared following his semi-annual inspections in April and September 1999 did not accurately reflect the condition of the system and did not include a statement of the system's deficiencies. In addition, Mr. Cabrera's failure to provide the State Fire Marshall with copies of the inspection reports for the semi-annual inspections he performed on the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef for the three years prior to the fire supports the inference that he failed to retain copies of the inspection reports in his records. However, Mr. Cabrera's testimony that he always prepared the necessary reports is uncontroverted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Fire Marshall enter a final order: Finding Hector Cabrera and A Fire Prevention Company guilty of having violated Sections 633.061(9), 633.065(1)(c), 633.065(2), 633.071(1), and 633.162(4)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes (2000), as well as Rules 4A-21.302 and 4A-21.304(1) and (2), Florida Administrative Code; and Suspending the licenses and permits of Hector Cabrera and A Fire Prevention Company for a period of two years, pursuant to Section 633.162(1) and (4), Florida Statutes (2000). DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2002.
The Issue Whether Petitioner meets the criteria to sit for the Alarm Contractor I licensure examination.
Findings Of Fact The Electrical Contractor's Licensing Board is the agency of the State of Florida responsible for licensing alarm system contractors. Section 489.505, Florida Statutes, contains the following definitions pertaining to this proceeding: As used in this part: "Alarm system" means any electrical device or combination of electrical devices used to detect a situation which causes an alarm in the event of a burglary, fire, robbery, medical emergency, or equipment failure. "Alarm system contractor" means a person whose business includes the execution of contracts requiring the ability, experience, science, knowledge, and skill to lay out, fabricate, install, maintain, alter, repair, monitor, inspect, replace, or service alarm systems for compensation, including, but not limited to, all types of alarm systems for all purposes. "Alarm system contractor I" means an alarm system contractor whose business includes all types of alarm systems for all purposes. . . . Petitioner applied to sit for the alarm system contractor I examination pursuant to the provisions of Section 489.511(2)(a)3.c., Florida Statutes, which provides that a person can sit for the licensure examination if that person: c. Has, within the 12 years immediately preceding the filing of the application, at least 6 years of comprehensive training, technical education, or broad experience associated with an electrical or alarm system installation or servicing endeavor; or Rule 61G6-5.003(1)(c)2., Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Any person desiring to take the certification examination must establish that he or she meets eligibility requirements according to one of the following criteria: * * * (c) Has, within 12 years immediately preceding the filing of the application, at least 6 years of comprehensive training, technical education, or broad experience associated with an electrical or an alarm system installation or servicing endeavor. The experience required must include: * * * 2. For an alarm contractor I, at least 40% of work that is in fire alarm systems. By letter dated June 16, 1998, Respondent denied Petitioner's application on the ground that the application failed to demonstrate compliance with Rule 61G6-5.003(1)(c)2., Florida Administrative Code. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner worked full-time for Florida Power and Light in the capacity of a connect and disconnect man. Petitioner described this position as installing electric meters or disconnecting electric meters when there has been an initiation, change, or termination of service. Petitioner's employment with Florida Power and Light does not require him to work directly with any type of alarm system. The application form provided by Respondent required Petitioner to submit a representative list of his experience. He was to provide a detailed description of the work performed, the job location and address, the general contractor's name, and the name and telephone number of the contractor who pulled the permit. Petitioner provided information pertaining to five jobs in his application and at the formal hearing. Petitioner claimed to have worked on the burglar and fire alarm system during the construction of the First Baptist Church of Brownsville, 4600 Northwest 23rd Avenue, Miami, Florida, between March 29, 1997, and February 9, 1998. Petitioner claimed that he designed the fire alarm system and drew the plans for that system on the blueprint that was used for the construction of the building. Petitioner also claimed to have participated in the installation of the fire and burglar alarm systems. Petitioner testified that the alarm system had 99 devices and was a Fire Light 5210 U.D. system. Petitioner testified that he kept a computer generated time ticket for each job. These computer records were not offered into evidence. Petitioner testified that he spent approximately 2300 hours on the job involving the church. 1/ The second job identified by Petitioner was a joint project with West Kendall Electric for the installation of a NAPCO 2600 model fire alarm system in a residence between March and October 1993. Petitioner estimated that he spent approximately twenty hours on this job. The third job identified by Petitioner was the installation of a residential fire alarm system, security system, burglar alarm system, intercom system, television antenna system, and telephone system at a residence located at 199905 Southwest 135th Avenue, Miami, Florida. The dates of the job were between December 19, 1990, and July 15, 1991. The fire and burglar alarm system was a NAPCO 2600 model. Petitioner did not estimate the amount of time he expended on that job. The fourth job identified by Petitioner was the installation of a NAPCO 3000 model system at 14911 Southwest 144th Terrace, Miami, Florida. Petitioner described this system as an industrial fire and burglar alarm panel with automation and approximately 35 sensors. The dates of the job were between January 6, 1995, and October 20, 1996. Petitioner testified that he expended approximately 90 hours on this project, with forty to forty-five percent of the job being devoted to the fire alarm system. The fifth job identified by Petitioner was the installation of a NAPCO 2600 model fire and burglar alarm system at 14460 Southwest 152nd Court, Miami, Florida. This was another joint project with West Kendall Electric. Petitioner estimated that he expended 80 hours on that job with forty to forty-five percent of the job being devoted to the fire alarm system. This job lasted between December 14, 1993, and March 27, 1994. Petitioner testified that he spent 2,358 hours on the five jobs he identified. He also stated that he had devoted 1,414 of those hours to burglar alarm systems, "according to the ratio." 2/ Petitioner testified that he had been a member of the National Fire Protection Association since 1994. There are no standards for admission to that association, other than the payment of a membership fee. Petitioner has attended various fire alarm seminars over the years sponsored either by system manufactures or associations, such as the National Fire Protection Association. He attended a seminar consisting of 16 hours sponsored by the National Fire Protection Association in May of 1994. He attended an alarm installers seminar sponsored by a manufacturer in February 1990 consisting of 24 hours over a three-day period. He attended another seminar sponsored by a manufacturer for eight hours on October 29, 1992. Petitioner attended a fire alarm training seminar on May 19, 1998.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order that denies Petitioner's application to sit for the certification examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1999.
