The Issue Whether Respondent's licenses to operate two group homes should be renewed, or whether renewal should be denied for the reasons charged in the administrative complaints issued by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact APD is the state agency charged with licensing and regulating group home facilities. The statewide headquarters, or "central office," is in Tallahassee. Regional offices carry out the licensing and regulatory functions within their designated regions, or "areas," in coordination with the central office. APD Area 14 covers Polk, Hardee, and Highlands Counties. Beginning in 2007 and at all times material to this proceeding, HIOTW has been a provider of various residential and non-residential services to developmentally disabled persons in Lakeland, Polk County, Florida, within APD Area 14. In 2007, HIOTW was licensed by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to provide non-residential homemaker and companion care services. In November 2008, HIOTW became licensed by the APD Area 14 office to operate Paces Trail Group Home to provide residential habilitation services to developmentally disabled adults. Shortly thereafter, HIOTW was licensed by the APD Area 14 office to operate its second group home, Hampton Group Home. HIOTW was licensed by the APD Area 14 office to operate Timbergreen in May 2009. In February 2010, the APD Area 14 office issued a license to HIOTW to operate its fourth group home in Lakeland--Lake Miriam. The group home license renewal of these two group homes, each with a capacity to serve six adult male residents with developmental disabilities, is at issue in this proceeding. After initial licensure of a group home, the license must be renewed annually. All of HIOTW's group homes successfully have gone through the license renewal process one or more times, except for Lake Miriam, which is seeking its first license renewal. On November 12, 2010, HIOTW submitted an application to the APD Area 14 office to renew its license to operate Lake Miriam. On March 3, 2011, HIOTW submitted an application to renew its license to operate Timbergreen. By letter dated March 25, 2011, Petitioner denied the Lake Miriam license renewal application (March 25 Denial Letter). Petitioner relies on the following charges alleged in the March 25 Denial Letter as the basis for Petitioner's decision: On or about April 14, 2010, an employee of the applicant left two vulnerable adult group home residents alone in a car for at least ten minutes while that employee conducted business inside a bank. One of the adult residents who was left unsupervised in the car had a history of sexually molesting children and other vulnerable adults. The other resident who was left unsupervised in the car was non-verbal. This instance threatened the health, safety, and well being of the applicant's residents in violation of page A-8 of the Developmental Disabilities Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook and Rule 65G-2.012(15)(b), F.A.C. On or about September 29, 2010, an employee of the applicant was transporting group home residents when one of the residents left the vehicle without the driver's knowledge. The vulnerable adult resident was later located at a neighborhood store. This instance threatened the health, safety, and well being of the applicant's residents in violation of page A-8 of the Developmental Disabilities Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook and Rule 65G- 2.012(15)(b), F.A.C. The March 25 Denial Letter also alleged that HIOTW failed to submit a current approved emergency management plan as a third reason to deny the license renewal application. However, Petitioner abandoned the third charge at the outset of the final hearing. Petitioner sought to support its proposed denial of the Lake Miriam license renewal application solely as a penal measure based on the two alleged incidents quoted above. As such, but for these two alleged incidents, Petitioner acknowledges that Lake Miriam's license renewal application is otherwise entitled to approval. By letter dated April 29, 2011, Petitioner denied the Timbergreen license renewal application (April 29 Denial Letter). The April 29 Denial Letter set forth the same two charges that were alleged in the March 25 Denial Letter as the basis for Petitioner's decision. In other words, the same two incidents were asserted as grounds for denying both the Lake Miriam license renewal application and the Timbergreen license renewal application. But for these two incidents, Timbergreen's license renewal application, like Lake Miriam's application, is otherwise entitled to approval. First Alleged Incident (on or about April 14, 2010) The credible evidence established the following facts relevant to the first charged incident. In early April 2010, an employee of HIOTW's licensed companion care service, Frank Davis, was providing companion care to R.O., a developmentally disabled adult. R.O. was not a resident of any HIOTW group home. Instead, R.O. received only non-residential companion services through HIOTW from its employee Frank Davis. As previously noted, companion care services are licensed and regulated by a different agency, AHCA. R.O. was classified as developmentally disabled due to mild mental retardation and behavioral problems. R.O. had a history of sexually abusing children and vulnerable adults. R.O. also had a known tendency of "telling big whoppers," i.e., he was known to be a habitual liar. R.O. apparently told someone two stories of alleged incidents involving his companion, HIOTW employee Frank Davis. On April 14, 2010, the person to whom R.O. told the stories reported the two alleged incidents to the hotline operated by the Department of Children and Families (DCF), which fields reports of possible abuse or neglect.2/ One story told by R.O., as reported to DCF, was that Mr. Davis had left R.O. alone with Mr. Davis's three-year-old daughter. The other story told by R.O., as reported to DCF, was that Mr. Davis had left R.O. alone in a car with a non-verbal vulnerable adult for a period of time while Mr. Davis went into a bank to conduct some business. If true, these allegations of R.O. allegedly being left alone with a child in one instance and with a non-verbal vulnerable adult in the other instance would be of great concern. Both the child and the non-verbal vulnerable adult with whom R.O. was allegedly left alone would have to be considered at great risk of abuse by R.O., given R.O.'s known history of sexually abusing both children and vulnerable adults. With regard to R.O.'s first story, involving Mr. Davis's three-year-old daughter, a DCF adult protective investigator (API) was able to quickly determine that the allegation was completely baseless. In screening this allegation to determine if a formal investigation was warranted, the API spoke with R.O. and then with Samuel Cooper, one of the owners of HIOTW, on April 15, 2010, the day after the hotline call. Mr. Cooper provided a detailed description of the physical appearance of Frank Davis's daughter. When Mr. Cooper's description of Mr. Davis's daughter was compared to R.O.'s description of the girl with whom he was supposedly left alone, the two descriptions were so vastly different that the API was able to, and did, immediately determine that R.O. had fabricated the story, and the matter was closed without a formal investigation. The same API conducted an investigation of R.O.'s second story that he was left in Mr. Davis's car with a non-verbal vulnerable adult while Mr. Davis went into a bank. However, the API did not mention this story when he spoke with Mr. Cooper, nor did the API inform anyone from HIOTW that he was conducting a formal investigation. In conducting his investigation, the API spoke with R.O., twice with Mr. Davis, and with O.J. Bennett, another owner of HIOTW. HIOTW initially learned of R.O.'s story about the bank trip by a phone call from R.O.'s waiver support coordinator. Mr. Bennett immediately investigated the matter, speaking with Mr. Davis and also with the bank manager who was present and had personally observed the events that day. Mr. Bennett's report from his investigation was that when Mr. Davis drove up to the bank with R.O., he left R.O. in the car only to walk about nine feet from the car to the bank's glass entrance area. Mr. Davis signaled to a bank employee who came to the door. Mr. Davis told the employee he wanted to set up an account to make direct deposits of his paycheck. When Mr. Davis was told he would have to come into the bank and it would take a few minutes, Mr. Davis went back to the car for R.O. and brought him into the bank to wait while Mr. Davis set up the account. R.O. remained in Mr. Davis's sight at all times. Based on Mr. Bennett's report, which he reviewed with Mr. Cooper, HIOTW determined an unusual incident report (UIR) was not required, because there was no reason to suspect neglect of R.O. Several weeks later, when HIOTW learned from an APD employee that DCF was conducting a formal investigation, HIOTW submitted a UIR that set forth the details of Mr. Bennett's investigation and concluded that R.O. had been in Mr. Davis's sight and adequately supervised at all times. The APD Area 14 administrator confirmed in her testimony that if the facts were as Mr. Bennett found them to be in his investigation, there would not have been inadequate supervision, and there would have been no reason to submit a UIR. Of greatest significance with regard to R.O.'s story about the bank incident, the API determined that R.O. had lied about being left with a non-verbal vulnerable adult. Instead, the API found that Mr. Davis drove to a bank with R.O., and no one else, in the car. The DCF investigator's report summarized the differing versions of events told to him by R.O. and by Mr. Davis. R.O.'s version was that Mr. Davis left him in the car for the whole time that he went into the bank. Of course, R.O. also said that he was left with another adult, and that was not true. Therefore, R.O.'s statement to the DCF investigator could not be considered credible or reliable. According to the DCF investigator, Mr. Davis told him that he left R.O. alone in the car to go into the bank, but came back out of the bank to get R.O., who he then brought into the bank to wait while he conducted his business. However, Mr. Davis testified that he only told the DCF investigator that he walked up to the bank while R.O. was in the car. Mr. Davis's version of what happened and what he told the DCF investigator is more credible than the DCF investigator's report of what Mr. Davis told him. Mr. Davis's version was corroborated by the hearsay account of the bank manager, who told Mr. Bennett that Mr. Davis brought R.O. in the bank with him, only having left R.O. alone to walk up to the bank entrance. The bank manager confirmed Mr. Davis's testimony that R.O. was in Mr. Davis's sight at all times. In crediting Mr. Davis's version of events, corroborated by the bank manager, the undersigned finds it significant that Mr. Bennett told the DCF investigator about the bank manager eyewitness, and Mr. Bennett was under the impression that the DCF investigator would follow up by calling the bank manager. But the DCF investigator did not attempt to interview anyone at the bank, despite the fact that persons at the bank would have been the only other eyewitnesses besides Mr. Davis, who had a self-interest in the incident, and R.O., the habitual liar whose other story about Mr. Davis had been proven false. Petitioner did not undertake its own investigation of the facts, either at the time of the incident or at the time it was considering whether to rely on the incident as grounds to, in effect, revoke two of HIOTW's group home licenses. Instead, according to the area administrator for APD Area 14, Petitioner simply relied on the DCF investigation report. Indeed, the area administrator did not even seem to understand the DCF report, because at the hearing, she was adamant in her belief that DCF confirmed the allegation that Mr. Davis left R.O. in a car with a vulnerable non-verbal adult group home resident. The area administrator conveyed her misimpression to the central office in discussions to consider whether to non-renew two HIOTW group home licenses based on this incident. Ultimately at hearing, the area administrator conceded that she was improperly interpreting the DCF report, thinking that the allegation portion of the report contained the actual DCF findings. Even so, she steadfastly (and erroneously) asserted that she did not give any false information to the central office regarding HIOTW.3/ In addition to the misimpression conveyed about the R.O. incident, the area administrator testified that she had an employee convey numerous reports of allegations or suspicions of HIOTW improprieties to the central office in a single packet for the purpose of a decision on whether to renew the two HIOTW group home licenses. The area administrator explained other information about allegations and suspicions were sent in the same package so that the central office could also consider whether to terminate HIOTW's Medicaid waiver provider agreement at the same time. However, she admitted that the whole packet of material was sent for the purpose of review and a decision on whether to non-renew HIOTW's two group home licenses. As such, it would be difficult to ignore the extraneous allegations when making decisions regarding the license renewal applications, "[o]f course, you have all of that in your mind[.]" The actual transmittal package to the central office was not produced, apparently because it was sent by electronic mail, and there were some APD email system problems that got in the way of producing the email transmittal package. Nonetheless, the area administrator's description of what she believes was sent in a single package to the central office was sufficient to paint the picture of a litany of negative missives regarding HIOTW, intended, in part, to support the area administrator's recommendation to deny license renewal.4/ Petitioner did not allege in the administrative complaints and did not prove at the hearing that HIOTW itself was blameworthy for the R.O. incident. The APD Area 14 administrator testified that in recommending non-renewal of the two HIOTW group home licenses, a significant factor that she took into account was that HIOTW failed to promptly submit a UIR to report the R.O. incident. The facts found with respect to the R.O. incident do not demonstrate that a UIR was required. Moreover, HIOTW was not charged, in either administrative complaint, with a violation of its UIR reporting obligations. The DCF incident report concluded with a verified finding of inadequate supervision. The DCF investigator testified that it was his finding that "[p]rimarily, Mr. Davis was responsible for the inadequate supervision" of R.O. When asked whether HIOTW was also responsible as Mr. Davis's employer, the investigator said, "being his employer, and trainer, yes." However, neither the DCF investigator, nor Petitioner, presented any evidence to suggest that HIOTW was negligent in its hiring, training, or supervision of its companion care employees, generally, or Mr. Davis, in particular. Nor was there any evidence that HIOTW failed to appropriately respond to the R.O. incident once it was made aware of the incident. The DCF incident report found that Mr. Davis was an appropriately screened employee with no adverse history. Petitioner presented no evidence to the contrary. Both the DCF investigator and the area administrator for APD Area 14 concluded that HIOTW took appropriate action regarding the R.O. incident, by removing Mr. Davis from serving as R.O.'s companion and by putting Mr. Davis through additional "zero-tolerance" training. Mr. Davis's employment was terminated shortly thereafter for reasons unrelated to the R.O. incident. Although the DCF incident report verified a finding of inadequate supervision, the report concluded that the overall risk associated with the finding was low because of appropriate corrective action taken by HIOTW.5/ The area administrator for APD Area 14 candidly admitted at the final hearing that HIOTW handled the R.O. incident appropriately and took corrective action that was deemed sufficient by APD and alleviated any health and safety concerns. Inexplicably, she continued to support the charges in the two denial letters, which alleged that the R.O. incident "threatened the health, safety, and well being of the applicant's residents," because R.O., with his history of being sexually abusive, had allegedly been left alone with a vulnerable, non-verbal adult group home resident. Since the R.O. incident did not involve any HIOTW group home residents, but rather, involved non-residential services provided under HIOTW's companion care license, one would expect that if licensure disciplinary action was warranted against HIOTW at all for this incident, it would have been initiated by AHCA as the licensing agency for companion care services. No evidence was presented that AHCA took any disciplinary action against HIOTW's companion care license. Instead, the evidence established that HIOTW's companion care license remained in good standing as of the final hearing, more than one and one-half years after the R.O. incident. Notwithstanding APD's knowledge in June 2010 of the DCF report and findings regarding the R.O. incident, APD proceeded to renew annual licenses for the period of October 1, 2010, through September 30, 2011, for two other HIOTW group homes--Pace's Trail Group Home and Hampton Group Home. The license certificates state that the facilities comply with the licensure rules of APD. No evidence was presented that APD issued administrative complaints seeking to revoke these group homes' licenses; however, the area administrator made clear that she did not intend to renew any licenses for any HIOTW group homes in the future. Second Alleged Incident (on or about September 29, 2010) The facts regarding the second alleged incident involving HIOTW employee Donyell Goodman, were not disputed. At the time of the incident, Ms. Goodman had been employed by HIOTW for three years, with a very good, unblemished employee record. On the day in question, she was serving as a van driver to transport several HIOTW companion care clients to various sites within the local community. E.K. was one of those clients receiving companion care services that day; E.K. also was a resident of HIOTW's Lake Miriam Group Home. E.K. is developmentally disabled due to his diagnosis of mental retardation. Ms. Goodman stopped to let off one client, and she watched the client walk to the appropriate destination and go inside. She then resumed driving. When she had driven for about five minutes, she glanced in her rear view mirror and realized that E.K. was not there. Ms. Goodman immediately called LaDonna Bennett, the third owner of HIOTW, to report that E.K. must have snuck out of the van at her last stop, and she was going back to find him. Ms. Bennett also headed over to where Ms. Goodman said she had stopped, to assist. When Ms. Goodman returned to the site of her last stop, she found E.K. there, inside the corner store. E.K. was fine and returned to the van without incident. E.K. apparently admitted to sneaking out of the van, saying he just wanted some fresh air. The entire incident spanned about ten minutes. Ms. Bennett and Ms. Goodman both immediately prepared and submitted UIRs to report the incident. Ms. Goodman received a written reprimand in her HIOTW personnel file and was suspended for several days. When she resumed work, she underwent additional training, was removed from the van driver position, and reassigned to the "third shift" with no direct interaction with residents. The UIR reports triggered a DCF investigation. The AIP who conducted the investigation confirmed the facts that were set forth in the two UIRs. The AIP's investigation included an assessment of E.K. at the Lake Miriam Group Home where E.K. was a resident. The DCF incident report concluded as follows: Victim Safety Factors Implications: No implications for the [victim's] safety. [Perpetrator] Factors Implications: Based on the informaiton [sic] rec'd, API has determined the [adult perpetrator] to pose no threat to the [victim]. No implication [sic] for the [victim's] safety. Facility Factors Implications: Based on the [victim] to the grouphome [sic], API has determined the [victim] to not be at any risk. The API found that the overall safety assessment was low; however, based on the UIRs and interviews with Ms. Goodman and Ms. Bennett, the incident report concluded with a verified finding of inadequate supervision. The API who conducted the investigation testified at hearing and confirmed that the inadequate supervision finding was directed to Ms. Goodman. When asked if HIOTW was also responsible because it was Ms. Goodman's employer, the API said he did not know and could not answer that question. Petitioner did not allege in the administrative complaints, and did not prove at the hearing, that HIOTW itself was blameworthy for the E.K. incident. Neither the DCF investigator, nor Petitioner, offered any evidence that HIOTW had negligently hired, trained, or supervised its employees, including Ms. Goodman in particular. Both the DCF investigator and the APD Area 14 area administrator agreed that HIOTW acted appropriately in response to the E.K. incident to alleviate any concerns about health and safety, by imposing appropriate discipline against Ms. Goodman for her lapse that caused the incident, and by taking steps to ensure no reoccurrence of the incident. In 2011, well after APD had knowledge of the DCF reports and findings on both the R.O. and E.K. incidents, APD issued a series of temporary or conditional licenses to both Lake Miriam and Timbergreen during the license renewal process to give HIOTW time to respond to certain identified omissions in the renewal applications, such as dental records, fire inspection reports, and the like. The temporary and conditional license certificates issued in February and March 2011 state on their face that the facilities comply with the licensure rules of APD. According to the APD Area 14 administrator, each of the DCF reports on the R.O. and E.K. incidents resulted in "a verified abuse finding." The area administrator testified that any DCF report resulting in a verified abuse finding is classified as a Class I offense, which is the most serious class of offenses and is sufficient, without more, to give APD legal authority to deny licensure or renewal of a license to a licensed applicant named in the report. Yet, despite the verified finding regarding the R.O. incident, Petitioner did not deny license renewal applications for other HIOTW group homes. Despite the verified findings in both the R.O. and E.K. incidents, Petitioner issued temporary and conditional licenses to Timbergreen and Lake Miriam during the license renewal process. Thus, Petitioner has not exercised its discretion consistently in dealing with HIOTW. Petitioner has not exercised its discretion consistently in contexts far more egregious than the two incidents charged here. For example, Petitioner acknowledged that a recent incident of abuse and neglect, resulting in the death of a group home resident, did not trigger action by Petitioner to take away all of the group home licenses held by the licensee. Instead, Petitioner only acted to suspend the license of the specific group home where the deceased resident had resided. Petitioner did not attribute this very serious incident to all facilities licensed by the same entity. It would be unreasonable for APD to automatically, without discretion, equate all verified findings--whether of abuse or neglect, whether deemed low risk or high risk, whether risk of death or imminent bodily injury was found or not found. A protracted period of abuse or neglect that actually causes death of a group home resident is on a different plane, in terms of seriousness, from a brief employee lapse in which an individual is not caught when he sneaks away, but is recovered without harm or incident ten minutes later. No explanation was offered by Petitioner as to why, in the more serious situation where a verified incident resulted in death, action was not taken to revoke all group home licenses held by the licensee, whereas here, two incidents verified as low risk situations by DCF (one of which was not proven at the hearing), would cause Petitioner to act more harshly.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, approving Respondent's applications to renew its annual licenses to operate Lake Miriam Group Home and Timbergreen Group Home and issuing standard licenses for one-year terms to those facilities. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 2012.
Findings Of Fact In April, 1993, Respondent took over operation of a residential facility known as the Linton Group Home. From that date until May 31, 1995, Respondent and her staff cared for developmentally disabled children in that facility on a permanent basis. The facility was located in Marion County, Florida. The facility operated in accordance with Chapter 393, Florida Statutes and in Chapter 10F-6, Florida Administrative Code. Historically, Respondent had assisted her mother in running the group home in the years 1987 and 1988 on a part-time basis. Respondent's involvement with the group home became permanent in 1989. The group home was opened by Respondent's mother in 1985. Respondent began operating the group home when her mother died. Respondent and two or three employees routinely worked at the group home. Respondent's principle income in the time period at issue was derived from the operation of the group home facility. Following a facility inspection by Petitioner's employee conducted on May 8, 1995, to consider license renewal, the group home was granted a conditional license for the period June 1, 1995 through June 30, 1995. The license was not renewed beyond June 30 based upon the allegations previously described. The decision not to renew the facility license for the annual period was made on June 29, 1995 and notice was provided to Respondent. As of June 30, 1995, seven boys were in residence in the group home ages 13 to 18, with varying levels of disability concerning their level of function both physically and mentally. The clients residing in the facility required and had been given constant supervision. However, they were not a threat to run away from the home. At relevant times, in the event that a client was home from school someone was available to supervise the client. At relevant times Respondent's personal residence was one and a half miles from the group home. Respondent lived there with her children and husband, Willie Smith. The children were not those of Respondent and Mr. Smith. When Respondent took over ownership and operation of the group home she and other existing employees at the facility had been qualified to provide direct services to the clients through a background screening process. To successfully complete the background screening a prospective direct service provider must submit a fingerprint card, and affidavit on good moral character, undergo screening by local law enforcement, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the FBI through use of the fingerprint card and prior to October 1, 1995 scrutiny by the Petitioner concerning the State child abuse registry. At relevant times Respondent understood that she was responsible for securing all the necessary information to do a background screening. She further understood that she had seven days from the time at which a person was employed at the group home to submit the background screening information for assessment. For a time she did not realize that the operator was responsible for paying a fee for processing the fingerprint card. When the May 8, 1995 inspection was made Respondent became aware that a fee was assessed for that process. At relevant times Respondent was aware that appropriate background screening was necessary to maintain the group home license to operate the facility in Florida. Respondent understood that if background screening information was not submitted that an existing license to operate the facility could be revoked or the license could be denied upon the annual request for renewal. In relevant times to the proceeding Hilda Spotts worked in the Petitioner's Developmental Services Program Office. That office serves developmentally disabled children ages 3 to adult and is involved with group homes in which those children reside. Ms. Spotts was involved with the licensure of group homes in District 13, to include Respondent's group home. In June, 1994, Respondent called Ms. Spotts to inform Ms. Spotts that Respondent had married Mr. Smith. In that conversation Ms. Spotts asked Respondent for information to perform a background assessment on the husband to include a fingerprint card and a completed HRS Form 1651 which is associated with the screening process. Ms. Spotts did not receive the information to perform the background screening in 1994. Instead, there was a second conversation in which Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the husband would not be involved in the daily activities of the group home as an employee of the home. On that occasion Ms. Spotts gave a packet to the Respondent that would be needed to perform the background assessment. However, Ms. Spotts told the Respondent that Ms. Spotts would check with another employee of Petitioner to see if the husband needed to complete those forms. The conversation was concluded on the basis that Ms. Spotts would inform the Respondent concerning the necessity for Mr. Smith to undergo background screening. Within the first six months of the marriage between Respondent and Mr. Smith, the husband did not work at the group home. His employment began before the May 8, 1995 survey at which the Respondent stated that the husband was doing lawn work and maintenance at the group home. At that time Respondent held to the opinion that the situation with her husband was no different than other maintenance people who worked at the group home and who were not required to have background screening conducted. Later Ms. Spotts called the Respondent to tell her that the husband did not need screening but Ms. Spotts reminded the Respondent that the husband needed to be listed for purposes of the annual license review. The next annual review beyond that point in time was performed on May 8, 1995. Ms. Spotts had made the determination that the husband did not need screening at that time based upon her analysis and conversations with personnel at Petitioner's District 3 office in Gainesville, Florida. Ms. Spotts had further stated that if the husband began working in the home he would need to be screened. Respondent added Mr. Smith to the list of employee names on Form 1651 in the annual renewal application dated April 20, 1995 and signed by Respondent. This was consistent with the request by Ms. Spotts that Respondent report Mr. Smith's name on the annual renewal request. Beyond those persons who were working at the group home when Respondent became the owner/operator, Respondent submitted three additional names for background screening. Among the persons who were screened was Brenda Wilson whose screening information was submitted to Pat Joyner an employee of Petitioner at District 3 who is responsible for background screening compliance in that district and District 13. Ms. Wilson was qualified and there exists no dispute concerning her background. Ms. Joyner performs background screens based upon the availability of the person's name, date of birth, social security number and fingerprints. Another employee for whom Respondent submitted background screening information was Sam Graham. This information was sent to Ms. Spotts. Mr. Graham worked for only one week at the facility. No response was received concerning his background screening. Before information was submitted for background screening on Mr. Graham Respondent was told by Ms. Spotts that the Petitioner's Districts had been separated. That referred to Districts 3 and 13. In fact in approximately the spring of 1994 five counties were separated from District 3 and placed within District 13. Marion County was among those counties. After the District separation, Ms. Spotts told Respondent that in the future that the Linton Group Home would not have any dealings with District 3 and that Respondent should deal with District 13. At that time Ms. Spotts did not tell the Respondent where to send screening requests. Respondent assumed that the screening requests should be forwarded through Ms. Spotts in that Ms. Spotts, had provided Respondent with forms needed to perform the background screening. Another employee for whom information on background screening was submitted was Michael Ivey. The information for Michael Ivey was sent to District 13. Before that information was sent Respondent did not call Ms. Spotts to ask where to send the information. Respondent again operated on the assumption that the Linton Group Home was no longer under the regulatory auspices of District 3 in Gainesville as Ms. Spotts had indicated. Therefore Respondent thought that the information for Mr. Ivey should be sent to Ms. Spotts in Belleview, Florida, where Ms. Spotts had her office. Ms. Spotts has no record of receiving the background screening information on Mr. Ivey, nor does the Petitioner. Prior to the submission in the Ivey case requests for background screening had been sent to the District 3 office in Gainesville, Florida, responsible for background screening. Mr. Ivey worked at the Linton Group Home as a direct service provider from late December, 1994 until mid May, 1995. The record of submission of materials to perform the background screening on Mr. Ivey are as reflected in the files maintained by the group home and examined by Ms. Spotts in the May 8, 1995 inspection for license renewal. In that file there is a copy of a document referred to as a law enforcement check which establishes that Mr. Ivey's record was cleared by the Alachua County Sheriff's Office. Mr. Ivey had also executed an affidavit contained in his personnel file at the group home related to his good moral character. In the group home the files is a copy of the Form 1651 shows that Michael Ivey signed as a applicant for the background screening check and included his name, date of birth and social security number together with his present address. The second part of Form 1651 that is "to be completed by employer, HRS representative or facility requesting background check" and characterizes the nature of the employment was not executed nor signed. Moreover, the requestors name, telephone number, street address, county in which the requester is located and the date upon which the applicant had been employed was not executed. There are occasions in which Petitioner's employees and counselors submit requests for background screens as opposed to that information being requested by the employer. However, it was necessary for Respondent to execute the Ivey documents as the requesting employer in that no prior arrangement had been made to have Ms. Spotts or some other employee for the Petitioner execute the form as a requesting entity. Although it may have been appropriate to assume that the proper place to transmit the request for background screening for Mr. Ivey was through Ms. Spotts, it would be inappropriate to assume that Ms. Spotts would understand or be expected to complete Form 1651 to include information as the requestor for background screening. The practice of not executing Part II to Form 1651 which calls for the employer or an HRS representative or the facility to request the background screening check and sign that request was a practice that Respondent had learned from her mother who formerly operated the Linton Group Home. That practice was carried forward in the submission of the Ivey request for background screening. Respondent did not believe that she needed to indicate that she was requesting the background screening for Mr. Ivey by indicating that Respondent was the employer. Notwithstanding the fact that Part II to Form 1651 was not routinely executed, it was the custom by the Linton Group Home to send other information with the request for background screening to indicate that the screening request related to employment with the Linton Group Home. Related to the request for background screening Respondent acknowledges that the expectation was that information would be returned from Petitioner indicating whether the employee had cleared screening. Within the group home files inspected on May 8, 1995, was found a copy of Mr. Ivey's fingerprints. The law enforcement check made by Alachua County bore an address for Petitioner in Wildwood, Florida. The fingerprint card bore an address for Petitioner in Gainesville, Florida. Both addresses were affixed to forms provided by Petitioner. Although information for Mr. Ivey's background screening had Petitioner's address at Wildwood, Florida, and Gainesville, Florida, on the forms provided by the Petitioner, Respondent recognized that the information for background screening on Mr. Ivey was to be sent to one location. She chose to send it to Ms. Spotts. Respondent was aware that compliance information concerning the background screening request was customarily received from the background agencies notifying the Respondent whether an employee had a "cleared" background. Nonetheless, Respondent did not receive information concerning clearance for Mr. Ivey beyond the clearance by the Alachua County Sheriff's Office which was received on December 7, 1994, the same date that the law enforcement check form provided to that department was signed by Mr. Ivey. In the May 8, 1995 inspection the information that was found concerning background screening for Mr. Ivey did not indicate that he had been cleared by appropriate authorities by placing a stamp on all pertinent requests with the word "clear". The exception being the return from Alachua County Sheriff's Office. When Ms. Spotts conducted the May 1995 inspection at the group home, she asked Respondent about the person or persons who was responsible for conducting repair work at the home. Respondent answered that her husband performed those duties. Respondent indicated that her husband worked both inside and outside the group home, to which Ms. Spotts responded that the husband needed to be screened during this relicensure. Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the husband cut grass at the group home. Respondent told Ms. Spotts that Respondent's husband was repairing walls and halls inside the house. In discussion concerning the need to do a background check for the husband the Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the husband did work at the home when the children were not there. In response Ms. Spotts told the Respondent that children might come back from school while the husband was there. Following this conversation about the need to have the husband checked for his background Ms. Spotts was persuaded that the Respondent had agreed to those arrangements. Those remarks were followed by correspondence dated May 16, 1995, in which Ms. Spotts informed Respondent that the Respondent needed to have a complete background screening check performed on the husband. With this correspondence Ms. Spotts enclosed a local law enforcement check form and advised the Respondent to sign the background check form and have her husband sign and return the executed information within ten days with an appropriate fee of $32.00 for processing the fingerprint card. The correspondence reminded the Respondent that the issue of background screening for the husband was important and needed prompt attention. Respondent received the correspondence. Respondent did not send Ms. Spotts the background screening information as requested. Ms. Spotts had in mind promptly processing the information on the husband to facilitate granting the Respondent a 90-day license pending the processing of information about the husband's background. When Ms. Spotts conducted her inspection Mr. Ivey was present on that day. After Ms. Spotts had examined the information in the personnel file for Mr. Ivey that has been described she asked the Respondent about Mr. Ivey's employment status. Respondent indicated that Mr. Ivey had been employed since January, 1995. Ms. Spotts noted that there was no abuse registry clearance information or local information other than Alachua County Sheriff's Office information or FBI information concerning clearance of Mr. Ivey available in the records at the group home. The group home is expected to maintain clearance information. Petitioner does not maintain clearance information concerning group home employees. In response to Ms. Spotts' questions about Mr. Ivey's status Respondent told Ms. Spotts that Respondent had sent the clearance request forms to Ms. Spotts. The information sent by Respondent to Ms. Spotts when seeking background screening for Mr. Ivey included an application form provided by HRS, an affidavit of good moral character, a Sheriff's statement, a fingerprint card, HRS Form 1651 and information concerning rules of the Linton Group Home. On May 8, 1995, when Ms. Spotts informed Respondent that the information related to Michael Ivey's background screening was incomplete this was the first time that Respondent realized the deficiency. Ms. Spotts' view is that information concerning background screening and clearance for employees in a group home is sent to Ms. Joyner in District 3, whereas information concerning the owner/operator clearance goes to Ms. Spotts at District 13. It is not clear that Respondent understood this distinction. It is not clear whether the Ms. Spotts eventual instruction to Respondent to send background information to screen employees to Ms. Joyner occurred before or after information was sent to Ms. Spotts related to screening for Mr. Ivey. Notwithstanding the special disposition of the background screening for the husband which was requested in May, 1995, to be processed through Ms. Spotts to accommodate the issuance of a 90-day license to the Respondent, earlier in 1995 Ms. Spotts had told the Respondent that the background screening for employees at the group home should be processed through Ms. Joyner. Ms. Spotts was not sure what the Respondent's understanding of the appropriate place to send background screening information for employees prior to this 1995 conversation. Not finding sufficient information concerning Mr. Ivey, Ms. Spotts asked the Respondent to re-submit the request for clearance for that employee. As with the information pertaining to the husband, Respondent was instructed to send the information to Ms. Spotts to accommodate the issuance of a 90-day license pending the processing of information about Mr. Ivey's background. Respondent did not re-submit information for background screening for Mr. Ivey. Ms. Spotts provided Respondent with necessary forms to submit for background screening for employees. At the end of May, 1995, Ms. Spotts called Respondent to inquire concerning the submission of background screening information for the husband and Mr. Ivey. Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the husband had gone to Nevada around May 19, 1995, and that Mr. Ivey had quit on that date. During this conversation at the end of May, Respondent told Ms. Spotts that Respondent was not sure when the husband would return from Nevada. In fact, Respondent knew that her husband was in jail based upon the domestic violence complaint that Respondent had placed against her husband. In this conversation Respondent did not wish to talk with Ms. Spotts because Respondent had visitors in her home. She did not tell Ms. Spotts about the husband's incarceration in this conversation because she did not want the people who were visiting and standing in the room where she was on the phone to hear that her husband was in jail. In the conversation in late May, 1995, Ms. Spotts told Respondent that Respondent had 30 days to "rectify the problem" or loose the license for the group home. This is taken to mean obtaining background information for the husband and Mr. Ivey. In a subsequent conversation around June 7, 1995, the Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the husband had been in jail and was no longer living in the family home. Respondent also told Ms. Spotts that the Respondent was involved with paying for a motel in Ocala, Florida, for the husband's residence. In this conversation, Respondent informed Ms. Spotts that her husband had been in jail because of a domestic dispute. Respondent also told Ms. Spotts that she did not know when she could get the necessary information from the husband to process the background screening requested by Ms. Spotts. The problem which Respondent explained to Ms. Spotts concerning the background screening for the husband was the inability to get a copy of the husband's fingerprints. Respondent remarked in that conversation that the husband had been doing a little work around the house and working in the yard. Respondent also remarked that she did not think that it was necessary to have background screening but she would have it done when her husband was released from jail. Respondent made no mention concerning the possibility that her husband would return to work at the group home. The husband was released from incarceration on June 8, 1995 and returned to jail on June 13, 1995 and was released again on August 25, 1995. In the June 7, 1995 conversation, Respondent asked if Elsa Alvarez from the Petitioner agency had contacted Ms. Spotts about the pending investigation of Respondent and her children associated with the domestic violence case. In the conversation the Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the Respondent had a restraining order against her husband but that the restraining order did not pertain to the husband and his ability to access the group home. Ms. Spotts suggested that the restraining order be modified to place the additional prohibition on the husband. Respondent indicated that she would pursue this suggestion with her lawyer. The restraining order was never modified to prohibit the husband from having access to the group home. Once Ms. Spotts found out that the Respondent had acted to restrain or enjoin the husband from acts directed to the Respondent she asked that a copy of the injunction be posted at the group home. Respondent complied with that request. In addition to placing the May 31, 1995 restraining order on a bulletin board at the group home, Respondent told the staff members that her husband was not to "come around". Given the pendency of the background screening for the husband, a conditional license was issued to the group home effective June 1, 1995, with a 30-day license period. The basis for this decision was premised upon Ms. Spotts' belief that the husband would return from his trip to Nevada and be employed at the group home. On June 5, 1995, Ms. Spotts sent Respondent correspondence indicating that the license for the group had been renewed for the 30-day period pending completion of the background information on Respondent's husband. That correspondence indicated that a meeting would be held with the Respondent on June 13, 1995, to discuss the future licensing of the group home beyond the expiration of the conditional license. Respondent received this correspondence. The correspondence was sent before Ms. Spotts became aware that Respondent's husband had been placed in jail. Ms. Spotts continued to insist on a background check on Mr. Smith because she was persuaded by the June 7, 1995 conversation with the Respondent that the Respondent and the husband would reconcile their differences. Throughout the licensing process Ms. Spotts is without knowledge concerning the husband staying in the group home or serving or supervising the clients at that home. Ms. Spotts is not aware of any complaints about Mr. Ivey while he served as a provider at the group home. Respondent's husband never stayed at the group home or had any direct contact with the residents clients. In addition to the work previously described, the work that he did at the group home included changing air- conditioning vents, and light bulbs and one plumbing repair. The husband also moved a bed at the group home while the Respondent was in attendance. On June 13, 1995, Ms. Spotts was informed that the Respondent was getting a dissolution of the marriage to Mr. Smith. In that conversation Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the Respondent did not want the husband around her daughters in their family home. In that connection, the husband's background had been checked in association with the domestic violence situation in the Respondent's home, during which it was discovered that the husband was on the child abuse registry for sexual abuse. Before that time Respondent was unaware that her husband had been named in the abuse registry. That discovery contributed to the decision by the Respondent to seek dissolution of their marriage. Ms. Spotts in conjunction with Carole Perez, Program Administrator for Developmental Services at District 13, decided to not hold the June 13, 1995 meeting to discuss further licensure in view of problems perceived with the background screening related to Mr. Ivey and Respondent's husband, having in mind the high level of dependency by the clients that were served by the group home, some of whom were unable to communicate. In their opinion those circumstances demanded providers who met all necessary requirements to include background screening. In determining to deny license renewal Ms. Spotts and her supervisor Carol Perez were concerned about Respondent's honesty in cooperating with Petitioner in having a background screen performed on the husband, and whether the cooperation was not forthcoming as a means by Respondent to avoid the possibility that the husband would not be cleared and the possibility that Respondent's husband would have continuing contact with the group home. The Petitioner in the person of Ms. Spotts and Ms. Perez decided to cancel the June 13, 1995 meeting to consider license renewal after consultation with representatives of the children and families program who were conducting an investigation about the group home. Respondent was notified of the cancellation. The children were removed from the home and placed in other licensed facilities or returned to their respective homes on June 20, 1995. At hearing Respondent admitted that there was a possibility that the husband would have returned to her personal home following his incarceration. That possibility ended when the Respondent learned for the first time that her husband was a confirmed child abuser as recognized by the child abuse registry in Florida. This knowledge came about based upon an investigation into the domestic violence situation that has been described. Respondent's husband had been incarcerated based upon the alleged domestic violence against Respondent. That circumstances arose in May, 1995, before Respondent's husband was served with an injunction for protection. The service was made on May 22, 1995. On May 31, 1995, an injunction order for protection was entered in the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit in and for Marion County, Florida. In operative terms the injunction enjoined and restrained the husband from threatening, assaulting, harassing or otherwise physically or mentally abusing the Petitioner. The order was not intended to enjoin the Respondent's husband from contact with her. The order describes that those parties (husband and wife) could have peaceful, non-threatening, nonviolent contact. The court had entered a preliminary injunction on May 20, 1995, as modified by the May 31, 1995 order. On June 19, 1995, Respondent petitioned for dissolution of marriage from Mr. Smith. On August 14, 1995, the final judgement of dissolution was entered. The final order dissolving the marriage kept in place the injunction entered on May 31, 1995, and awarded exclusive possession of the personal residence to Respondent and enjoined her former husband from coming to that premises. Respondent assumed that the necessity to obtain background information ended when the Respondent made the decision to seek dissolution of the marriage. At present Respondent does not have the Linton Group Home in her control.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which grants Respondent permission to renew the group home license upon the payment of a $750.00 fine. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX CASE NO. 95-3741 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact by the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraph 1 is acknowledged in the preliminary statement to the recommend order. Paragraph 2 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the sentence pertaining to the affidavit of good moral character. The affidavit was available. Paragraphs 4 through the first two sentences in Paragraph 16 are subordinate to facts found. The last sentence in Paragraph 16 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 17 through 23 are subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 9 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 10 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 11 through 25 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire HRS District 13 Legal Office 1601 West Gulf-Atlantic Highway Wildwood, FL 34785 Frederick E. Landt, III, Esquire 445 NE 8th Avenue Post Office Box 2045 Ocala, FL 34478 Sandy Coulter, Acting Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates a mobile home park in Winter Haven, Florida, known as Swiss Village Mobile Home Park, in which lots are leased to mobile home owners on an annual lease. There are 383 lots in this park and this park has held a permit issued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services since 1980 (Exhibit 1). Edward G. Ackerman and his wife entered into a lease with Respondent for the use of a mobile home lot for the period January 15, 1981 until December 31, 1981, at a monthly rental of $75.07 (Exhibit 2). That lease provides for year-to-year renewal with rent for future years based on the Cost of Living Index as determined by the U.S. Government at the nearest reporting period to the end of each calendar year (Exhibit 2). A Guaranteed Lifetime Rent Agreement (Exhibit 3) was executed by the lessor concurrently with the lease in Exhibit 2, which guarantees the rental on the lot leased to Ackerman shall not be increased more than the U. S. Cost of Living Index as long as Ackerman resides in a mobile home located on the leased lot. Using the annual change and CPI to recompute Ackerman's monthly rental has resulted in the rent increasing from $75.00 per month in 1981 to $89.50 per month in 1985 (Exhibit 4). Prior to the time of this hearing Ackerman had purchased a condominium to which he had moved and he was no longer a tenant at the Swiss Village Mobile Home Park. All leases negotiated in years subsequent to 1981, have a similar escalation clause in the rent with the additional proviso that the monthly rent would be increased each year a minimum of $5.00 per month, with the maximum increase not exceeding the CPI. Respondent has used the October All Items Consumer Priced Index For All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) in determining the annual rent increase since operations commenced. This report is received in November and by promptly advising tenants the amount their rent will change, because of changes in the CPI-U, each. tenant receives approximately 30-days notice prior to the January 1 effective date. If the terms of the lease agreement are literally complied with and the December CPI is used, Respondent would have to calculate the rent due January 1 on the CPI which it receives in January. By the time tenants are notified of the effects of the CPI on their rent for the coming calendar year, they would already have paid an inadequate sum for the January rental, and perhaps for the month of February also, and would be billed for the deficiency. There is an active Home Owners Association at Swiss Village Mobile Home Park. This association has not complained of the failure of Respondent to provide 90 days notice prior to the automatic rent change which comes every January, nor have they requested arbitration. In order to insure tenants receive 90 days notice of the rental change, due to changes in the CPI, Respondent would have to use the July Consumer Price Index, which it receives in August. Had Respondent used the July CPI report and given tenants 90 days notice of the annual rental increases since 1981, these increases would have exceeded the increase computed using the October CPI (Exhibit 6). Exhibit 6 indicates the actual adjustments of rentals since 1981, has been $5.00 per month or the CPI, whichever is less.
The Issue The issue presented is whether subsections (1) and (4) of Rule 7D-32.002, Florida Administrative Code, are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
The Issue The issues in this case concern the attempt by Petitioner to collect $11,684.62 in attorneys fees and costs associated with the defense of the case of State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Petitioner, vs. Donald L. Hilgeman and Marilyn Hilgeman, d/b/a DLH Enterprises; and Pat Montgomery, as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort, Respondents, DOAH Case No. 89-4100, and $931.50 in attorneys fees and costs attributable to the pursuit of the present case to collect those attorneys fees and costs attributable to the defense of the administrative prosecution. See Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this inquiry Petitioner was a mobile home park owner as defined by Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes (1987). Petitioner, Marilyn Hilgeman, his former wife, and Pat Montgomery had administrative charges brought against them through a notice to show cause. In that notice to show cause those three individuals were identified as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort in Silver Springs, Florida. In particular the present Respondent charged the Petitioner and the others with violating Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) for having refused to meet with a designated mobile home owners committee within 30 days of giving notice of a lot rent increase and having been requested to conduct that meeting for purpose of discussing the reasons for the increase in the lot rental amount. The accused sought a formal hearing as envisioned by Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. That hearing was conducted by the undersigned and a recommended order entered on April 18, 1990, in the aforementioned DOAH Case No. 89-4100. For reasons set out in the conclusions of law found within the recommended order, the suggested disposition of that case was one which found the several Petitioners innocent of any wrong doing and called for the dismissal of the administrative prosecution. On July 25, 1990 the prosecuting agency entered its final order in DOAH Case No. 89-4100. It accepted the fact-finding in the recommended order; however, it modified the conclusions of law and recommended disposition. Unlike the recommended order, the final order in its conclusions of law specifically found that the present Petitioner and the others accused had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, wherein at page 17 it was held "Therefore, it is concluded Respondent violated Sections 723.037(3), Florida Statutes." The conclusions of law in the final order went on to say that in mitigation of the violation the prosecuting agency had considered the apparent confusion of those Respondents regarding the affect of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, as it might influence the actions of the accused and in particular, the present Petitioner. In the final order concerning the mitigating affects of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, it was decided that notwithstanding any misunderstanding the accused had as to the significance of the Rule it could not alter the statutory requirements of having a meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase as described in Section 723.037(3), Florida Administrative Code (1987). The language within Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, stated: If requested to do so by the park owner or subdivision developer, the committee shall certify that it has been selected as described in Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Admin- istrative Code. This certification shall include a certificate of all members of the committee attesting to its proper formation under the statute and these rules. For reasons expressed in the recommended order that rule was seen as tolling the 30-day requirement for meeting expressed in Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) on the facts found in both the recommended and final orders. This was based upon a recognition that the present Petitioner had employed the rule in an attempt to gain a certification from the committee of mobile home owners prior to the conduct of a meeting to discuss the increase in lot rentals. Again, this belief that the rule tolled the requirement for conducting the meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase expressed in the recommended order was rejected in the final order. The final order controls absent further relief by resort to the appellate court process. In describing the reasons why the prosecution maintained that the rule could not alter the statutory requirement for holding a meeting within 30 days, the final order states that there are policy considerations that make it important for the committee and the park owner to meet within 30 days and those reasons concern the fact that the rent increase becomes effective within 90 days over the notice, the informational value of having the reasons explained for the lot increase as a prelude to any request to having a dispute about lot rental increases submitted to mediation within 30 days following the scheduled meeting. The final order goes on to describe, through its conclusions of law, that the meeting to discuss lot rental increase was not held until November 14, 1989 over a year after the notice of lot rental increase. That statement comes immediately before the conclusion of law that the present Petitioner had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. In the conclusions of law set out in the final order the prosecuting agency in its paragraph describing the mitigating circumstances acknowledges the possible confusion on the part of the accused as well as the mobile home owners committee when it describes, as did the recommended order, the filing of a complaint by the committee as a means of ostensibly preserving the right to have the meeting envisioned by Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), when taken against the background of the opportunity to have a credential check of mobile home owners committee members as envisioned by Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code. This refers to the issue of whether a meeting could be held after 30 days from the notice of intended lot rental increase absent such a complaint. In the statement on mitigation the final order recognizes that the administrative prosecution was penal in nature and that Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) and Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code needed to be read in context and should be strictly construed with ambiguities favoring the accused. The final order cites to State v. Pattishall, 99 Fla. 296, 126 So. 147 (1930) and Davis v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 457 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 1DCA 1984). The treatment of those cases and the resolution of the dispute through final order is one which finds the accused in violation of Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), but mitigates the disposition in the way of the penalty based upon the reading given Pattishall and Davis, supra. That factual impression is given when the order in disposition is examined wherein it is stated through the final order, "Based upon the consideration of the facts found, the conclusions of law reached, and the mitigation evidence, it is ordered that the notice to show cause is hereby dismissed." On August 22, 1990, the present Petitioner noticed an appeal of the final order in the administrative prosecution but later abandoned that appeal before the court had the opportunity to speak to its merits. On October 22, 1990, the present Petitioner filed a petition for collection of attorneys fees and costs spoken to in the statement of issues. The petition for attorneys fees and costs were subjected to a motion to dismiss based upon a claim of untimeliness and that motion was denied by order of December 10, 1990. The present Respondent requested an evidentiary hearing as contemplated Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, and the evidentiary hearing was conducted on the date described before. When the present Petitioner abandoned his appeal to the District Court, he necessarily was placed in the position of arguing that the final order drawn by the prosecuting agency constituted the basis for the claim that he was a small business party who had prevailed in the dispute related to DOAH Case No. 89-4100. See Section 57.111(3)(c)1, Florida Statutes. Contrary to his assertion the final order as described in these facts did not favor the present Petitioner. Although the prosecuting agency did not choose to impose a penalty against the present Petitioner based upon its assessment of matters in mitigation and dismissed the case without exacting a penalty, it had found the present Petitioner in violation of a substantiative provision of law, i.e. Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987). Thus, the disposition cannot be said to favor the present Petitioner. Having decided this mixed question of fact and law against the present Petitioner, it is not necessary to make findings of fact concerning whether the present Petitioner is a small business party as defined at Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes and whether the present Respondent was substantially justified in this administrative prosecution related to law and fact as contemplated by Sections 57.111(3)(e) and (4)(a), Florida Statutes, or to examine whether special circumstances exist that would make the award of attorneys fees and costs unjust.
