The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Rural Metro of North Florida, Inc., violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent on October 11, 1999, as an Emergency Medical Technician Basic, until July 2001 when he was reclassified with Respondent as an Emergency Medical Technician Paramedic, until his termination from employment with Respondent on April 16, 2003. In July 2001, Petitioner told his then manager, Dominic Persichini, that he no longer wanted to work with his partner, Marlene Sanders, and he requested a transfer. Petitioner gave as his reason for the transfer that Ms. Sanders was interested in him in an inappropriate way which disrupted his family life. He never actually heard Ms. Sanders make any inappropriate sexual remarks directed at him. Ms. Sanders accused Petitioner of allowing his wife to interfere with their working relationship and to involving herself in Ms. Sanders' personal life, which made her uncomfortable working with Petitioner. On March 27, 2002, Stephen Glatstein, Respondent's new General Manager, wrote a letter to Petitioner in which he acknowledged that problems had occurred between Petitioner and Ms. Sanders, that the two of them would be separated and reassigned to new shifts, and that Petitioner was being reassigned to the B-shift rotation (1800-0600 hours), which conflicted with his family duties. Petitioner received a good evaluation and a pay raise dated February 15, 2003, in which his supervisor, Ryan Jenkins, stated that "Michael's abilities meet or exceed industry standards. Michael keeps current by completing CEU's and taking refresher classes. There is one new Corrective Action Notice in his file since last year involving a post move. The incident was on 08-07-02 and to my knowledge there have not been any further problems since." Further, the evaluation reads that "Michael shows a great attitude and appears to really enjoy his job. This makes him very easy to work with. Michael's good personality and working knowledge of E.M.S. is a benefit to the customers that he serves. It is clear that we should be proud to have Michael as part of our team." Petitioner received letters of commendation from his supervisors and letters of thanks from patients and their families he had served. In April 2003, Natashia Duke, a new employee with Respondent, went to the General Manager, Mr. Chalmers, and accused Petitioner of having made statements of a sexual nature to her and of touching her inappropriately. Ms. Duke provided a written statement to Mr. Chalmers who forwarded the information to the Division General Manager, Chris Rucker. Mr. Rucker advised Mr. Chalmers to place Petitioner on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of an investigation concerning Ms. Duke's complaint. Mr. Chalmers followed this instruction and placed Petitioner on leave. Mr. Rucker traveled to Pensacola to meet with Mr. Chalmers and Ms. Duke. At this meeting, Ms. Duke reaffirmed what she had written in the complaint against Petitioner and told Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers about another employee she believed had been sexually harassed by Petitioner, Kristy Bradberry. The next day, Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers interviewed Ms. Bradberry who informed them that she had been sexually harassed by Petitioner. She provided a written statement which described the alleged harassment in detail. Ms. Bradberry told the interviewers of another person she believed had suffered sexual harassment by Petitioner, Tina Dunsford (Tina Richardson at the time of her complaint). Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers next interviewed Ms. Dunsford who confirmed that Petitioner had sexually harassed her as well by making sexual comments and propositions to her, and by touching her inappropriately. After Ms. Dunsford's interview, Ryan Jenkins, another of Respondent's employees, reported that Ms. Dunsford had complained to him of sexual harassment by Petitioner a few months earlier. Mr. Jenkins had failed to take any action on the previous complaint. After interviewing the three complainants, Ms. Duke, Ms. Bradberry, and Ms. Dunsford, Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers met with Petitioner. At that meeting, Petitioner denied all of the allegations made by the three female co-workers and gave no explanation for what they alleged had happened. Mr. Rucker believed the statements given by the three female co-workers who complained of sexual harassment by Petitioner were credible. Mr. Rucker made the decision with Mr. Chalmers to terminate Petitioner's employment. Respondent had no prior history of problems with any of the three female co-workers who complained of sexual harassment by Petitioner. Petitioner believes the sexual harassment charges were trumped up against him so that Respondent could fire him, since he was beyond the company probationary period and therefore could be terminated only for a business purpose pursuant to the company employee handbook. No evidence was produced at hearing to support a violation of company policy by Respondent in Petitioner's termination. At the time of hearing, Petitioner was employed with the Escambia County E.M.S.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael J. Welch 2060 Burjonik Lane Navarre, Florida 32566-2118 John B. Trawick, Esquire Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge 226 Palafox Place Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32591-1831 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been subjected to discrimination within the meaning of the relevant provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, based upon alleged sexual harassment in the course of her employment and retaliation for her complaints concerning the alleged sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was an employee of the Respondent at times pertinent hereto. It is undisputed that that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and that timeliness and jurisdictional requirements have been met. The Respondent obtained a contract with the United States Navy for a project to be performed at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida. It became the contractor for the project in approximately December of 1991. The contract, in pertinent part, provided that the Respondent would provide local cartage trucking services for the Navy on and in the environs of the Pensacola Naval Air Station. The project involved loading and transportation of aircraft parts and related supplies and equipment. The Petitioner was hired as a truck driver, delivering aircraft parts for the naval aviation depot (NADEP). During the course of that employment, there came a time when the Petitioner contended that she had been discriminated against because of her gender. The Petitioner contends that in a meeting in December of 1991, she was told by Terry Meyers, an employee of the Respondent and the Petitioner's supervisor, that she "didn't look like a truck driver" and that she had three weeks to look for another job. The meeting in which the statements were allegedly made was a meeting called by the Petitioner's supervisor and the project manager, Mr. Danny Francis, to address certain deficiencies in the Petitioner's performance. Another employee, Mr. Braughton, was also counseled at the meeting concerning his performance as a truck driver. His was the same type of employment position as that occupied by the Petitioner. Mr. Braughton is a white male. The Petitioner maintains that she informed a white male employee, Mike Morris, of the statements allegedly made at the meeting and that he immediately made a telephone call to Mr. Frank Moody, the president of the corporation, to put the president and the corporation on notice of sexual discrimination against the Petitioner. The Petitioner, however, was not present when Mr. Morris made that telephone call to Mr. Moody. Even had he made reference to alleged sexual discrimination in his telephone call to Mr. Moody, Mr. Morris only learned of the purported sexually-discriminatory statements from the Petitioner. The Petitioner maintained that Mr. Morris informed her that he had heard the statements made while standing at the door of the room in which the meeting occurred and that Mr. Morris initiated the telephone call on his own volition to Mr. Moody, based upon hearing those statements. Mr. Morris, however, testified to the contrary, stating that the Petitioner approached him and claimed that she was on probation and was fearful of being laid off from employment and that the Petitioner told him of the alleged sexually-discriminatory statements and that he did not hear them himself. He further testified that the Petitioner instructed him to contact Mr. Moody concerning her fears about her job and the alleged discriminatory statements or she would contact "HRO and EEO and have the contract shut down". Mr. Morris, indeed, called Mr. Moody but never mentioned the statements alleged by the Petitioner to have been made to her by Mr. Meyers during the performance evaluation meeting. In fact, it has been demonstrated by Mr. Morris' testimony, which the Hearing Officer accepts as more credible, that the Petitioner never complained to Mr. Morris about a sexually-discriminatory statement or purported sexual discrimination. Mr. Morris, instead, spoke to Mr. Moody about problems he saw occurring in the operation in Pensacola which he attributed to the project manager, Mr. Danny Francis. He told Mr. Moody that Mr. Francis was allowing employees to leave work early without Mr.. Moody's knowledge and still crediting them with working a full day on such occasions which, in effect, cost the corporation additional salary monies which were unearned. The meeting in which the Petitioner was allegedly confronted with the statement that she did not look like a truck driver and had three weeks to look for another job was called and conducted by Mr. Francis and Mr. Meyers was present. It is undisputed that Mr. Moody terminated Mr. Francis shortly after the telephone conversation with Mr. Morris. He replaced Mr. Francis with the current project manager, John Jacobs. Mr. Moody testified that in a telephone conversation with the Petitioner that she never mentioned to him the alleged sexually-discriminatory statements referenced above. Instead, he was told by both Mr. Morris and the Petitioner that she was concerned that she might lose her job because of the results of the meeting with Mr. Francis, in which he told her that she needed to improve her job performance. In fact, the management of the Respondent perceived a genuine job performance problem involving the Petitioner's conduct of her job duties. This was disclosed in the testimony of both Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Morris, where it was revealed that the Petitioner had had a continuing problem performing her job correctly and that Mr. Morris and the management personnel had worked with her constantly during the course of her employment term with the Respondent, taking more time and personal attention with her than with other employees. This was done in order to repetitively explain her job duties and give her additional chances to improve her work performance, in comparison to the lesser degree of attention and remedial help that they accorded other employees. Prior to February 3, 1993, the Petitioner had been employed with the Respondent for over a year. The testimony of Mr. Jacobs established, however, that even though her probationary period had long since elapsed, he still considered the Petitioner to be, in effect, an employee in training because she was deficient in correctly accomplishing all of the duties of her job. She was slow in performing her job duties, including preventive maintenance inspections of her vehicle and in making the "pickups and deliveries" of freight she was required to transport on her truck in the performance of her duties. The counseling session concerning her work performance occurring in December of 1991, referenced above, was during her probationary period. The white male employee, Mr. Rick Braughton, who was also counseled about deficient work performance on that occasion, was informed that he might not remain employed past his probationary period unless his performance improved. The Respondent had a regular practice and procedure, as part of its truck safety and preventive maintenance program, that employees, who were drivers, were required to give a preventive maintenance and safety inspection of their vehicles each day prior to leaving the company facility or terminal to transport aviation parts or other freight. This was regarded as crucial to proper job performance by the employer because of the concern about safety of the drivers and avoidance of damage, and liability for damage, to the expensive equipment and parts which the Respondent was required by its contract to transport, such as expensive military aircraft parts and related equipment. Among these preventive maintenance inspection duties that driver/employees, such as the Petitioner, were required to perform daily was the requirement to check the air in the truck tires and "top off" the tires with the required air pressure, if necessary. 10 Mr. Jacobs established that there came a time when the Petitioner was noted to have failed on multiple occasions, in the same week, to check and air her tires. Finally, upon this deficiency coming to his attention again on February 3, 1993, Mr. Jacobs suspended the Petitioner for a day without pay, for failing to check and air her tires. The Petitioner claims that she was the only employee singled out for this treatment concerning failure to inspect and air her tires. The testimony of Mr. Jacobs is deemed more credible, having observed the candor and demeanor of all of the witnesses, and it is determined that the employer had a good-faith belief that the Petitioner was deficient in this regard and that the reprimand, consisting of the one-day suspension, was justified. It was not demonstrated that, even if the Petitioner's version of events is true and that other driver/employees were not disciplined for failure to air their tires, that such a circumstance occurred as a result of the employer's knowledge of other driver/employees failing to air their tires and arbitrarily choosing not to discipline them. In fact, it was not demonstrated by preponderant, non-self-serving evidence that other employees had not been disciplined for failure to air their tires. In fact, it was not shown, other than by the self-serving testimony of the Petitioner, that other employees had failed to air their tires when required. The other drivers are mostly male, but one is a female. There was no showing that she was treated any differently than the male drivers. In summary, it has been established that the employer accorded the reprimand to the Petitioner because of a good-faith belief that her performance had been deficient, on repeated occasions, in this respect. It is undisputed that prior to the date the Petitioner received the reprimand, consisting of one-day suspension without pay, that the Petitioner had a generally good attitude about her job insofar as management was able to observe. Even though management had had some concerns about her performance and the slow manner in which she was learning certain aspects of her job, with resulting deficient effects upon her performance, management forbore from using these concerns to reduce her performance rating. She received good evaluations of her performance, insofar as her personnel record is concerned, prior to the time she was suspended for one day on February 3, 1993. After the Petitioner received the suspension she developed a "bad attitude" insofar as her perception of management was concerned. She began to complain frequently about vehicle safety or purported concerns she had about the condition of her vehicle related to safety, particularly the truck brakes. Prior to her suspension, she had never complained in this regard. Management also perceived that she appeared to show down her work performance and management came to believe that it was an intentional delay of her work performance on an ongoing basis. Prior to receiving the reprimand, she was never known to complain to management concerning discrimination on account of her gender. She had never informed the project manager or any other supervisory personnel concerning her purported belief that employee Meyers was "following her". Only after she received the reprimand on February 3, 1993 did she elect to file a sexual discrimination charge with the Commission. Mr. Meyers had some supervisory authority over the Petitioner. His job duties also required that he drive his truck around the Naval Air Station and the immediate vicinity in the normal performance of his duties. This circumstance resulted in his being in close proximity to the Petitioner during the course of their respective work days. He contends that he was not purposely following her for the purpose of harassing her. The overall evidence of record reveals, however, that he, indeed, did follow or stop in her vicinity on a number of occasions to observe her work performance. This was not shown to be out of the ordinary scope of his supervisory duties, especially because of management's concern that the Petitioner was not progressing in the learning and performance of her job duties as well as other employees, including the other female driver. The project manager, Mr. Jacobs, felt that the Petitioner's attitude continued to decline after the February 3, 1993 reprimand. He felt that her attitude and performance reached its lowest level on the date she was observed to be loading "unauthorized equipment" (apparently a portion of a helicopter assembly weighing approximately 4,000 pounds) on the flatbed trailer of her assigned work truck. She was not authorized to load that equipment and apparently, according to her testimony, she did so in order to provide a substantial amount of weight on her trailer for the purpose of having her brakes inspected by the quality assurance official for the project. She went to an unauthorized area for approximately one hour to have this inspection performed without the approval of the Respondent's management. Further, it was not necessary, in order to evaluate the brakes on the vehicle for proper function and safety, to have the weight of the unauthorized load placed on the trailer. If, indeed, the brakes had been defective, it would have been entirely possible that the expensive aircraft parts she had placed on the trailer without authorization could have been substantially damaged, the truck or other property could have been damaged, and, indeed, the Petitioner or other persons could have been injured. Additionally, the Petitioner misrepresented the reason she was in the unauthorized area where she had her brakes inspected by Mr. Lett, the quality assurance officer. In this connection, because she had begun to complain repeatedly about the condition of her brakes and her vehicle (after her reprimand), the project manager, Mr. Jacobs, had had certain other employees come in on several occasions at approximately 6:00 a.m., before normal working hours, and before the Petitioner arrived on the job site, to inspect the Petitioner's truck for safety and appropriate preventive maintenance purposes. These employees were not informed that it was the Petitioner's truck they were inspecting at the time they were told to do the inspections. The Respondent was attempting to ascertain the true condition of the Petitioner's truck and determine whether her reports concerning safety problems, particularly with her brakes, were accurate or not. In fact, on the morning of the day when the unauthorized load was placed on the truck and the Petitioner had Mr. Lett perform the inspection of her brakes at the unauthorized area, one of the Petitioner's co-employees had inspected her brakes before she arrived to take custody of her truck that morning. He had determined that the brakes were operating properly. The Petitioner and Mr. Lett apparently felt that the brakes were deficient when they were inspected early in the afternoon of that day. The record does not reveal whether the brakes were deficient when Mr. Lett inspected them or that some change in the adjustment of the brakes or other problem had arisen since the employee inspected them early that morning and found them to be in proper operating order. Be that as it may, management was of the belief on that day and prior thereto that the Petitioner, although reporting brake deficiency problems, did not truly experience such brake deficiency problems with her truck. This belief was based upon management perceptions concerning the Petitioner's attitude after her reprimand and upon the independent, confidential inspections management had other employees do on the Petitioner's truck. Accordingly, whether its belief was accurate or not, management was of the good-faith belief, on the date she was observed loading unauthorized, expensive equipment onto the flatbed truck, in an unnecessary fashion, for the purpose of having her brakes inspected, while being absent from her work assignment for one hour in an unauthorized area, that it had performance-related reasons to terminate her, which it did. This decision was made against the background of the increasingly poor attitude displayed by the Petitioner since her reprimand and because of the continuing problems management had experienced with the Petitioner's job performance since her initial employment one and one- half years previously. Although the Petitioner testified that as early as December of 1991, the management of the Respondent had spoken with her regarding her work performance and she interpreted that meeting as an attack on her gender and not upon her poor work habits, this contention was not verified by any other testimony. Having observed the candor and demeanor of the Petitioner versus that of the other witnesses, it is determined that her testimony is less creditable because of its self-serving nature. Although the Petitioner testified that a comment was made that "she did not look like a truck driver" and that she had three weeks to find another job, this was not verified through testimony of any other witness. To the extent that any other witnesses testified concerning these statements being made in a belief that discrimination had been exhibited toward the Petitioner, the evidence reveals that this information only came to these people through self-serving reports by the Petitioner herself. Meyers directly contradicts that these statements were made to the Petitioner and he states that he never heard anyone tell her that she had three weeks to look for a job or that she "didn't look like a truck driver". The petitioner provided no testimony or evidence which could show how these alleged statements constituted "sexual discrimination" or how the statements related to her sexual discrimination claim. It was not shown that any member of management, with employment-decision authority, made or condoned such statements even if it had been established that they evidenced gender-based discrimination, which was not done. The Petitioner did not complain of sexual discrimination per se until after she had received a reprimand from management. Likewise, she began to repetitively claim that her equipment was unsafe after the reprimand. The Petitioner may have been overly sensitive to management's concern for safety inspections of her truck because of being reprimanded for safety violations and was afraid she would "get into trouble" with management if she did not constantly report feared safety problems. The fact was established, however, that management had a genuine, good-faith belief that it was being harassed by these repetitive, unsafe equipment reports by the Petitioner, given the then- prevailing atmosphere surrounding the Petitioner's employment, characterized by her less than satisfactory attitude, as perceived by management, and the fact that management's confidential inspections of her equipment did not reveal any safety problems of the type reported by the Petitioner. Finally, it is especially noteworthy that during this period of time when the Petitioner made the claim of sexual discrimination and retaliation based upon her claim, that the Respondent had in its employ, in an identical job position, a female truck driver who had had no unsatisfactory experience by management with her performance, was not subjected to investigative or disciplinary measures, and who is still satisfactorily employed with the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the petition herein in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1459 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact which are not in separately-numbered, discrete paragraphs. The paragraphs contain some proposed findings of fact which the Hearing Officer accepts and some which are rejected as being not supported by preponderant evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the same subject matter. The proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are intertwined with argument and discussions of the weight of the evidence or testimony. Because the paragraphs in the proposed findings of fact contain both findings of fact which the Hearing Officer accepts and which the Hearing Officer rejects, discrete, specific rulings thereon are not practicable. It suffices to say that all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are subordinate to, but have been considered and addressed in the findings of fact portion of this Recommended Order and have been in that fashion completely ruled upon. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The same considerations are true of the Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Some portions of the findings of fact proposed by the Respondent consist of merely discussions and argument concerning the weight of the evidence and some are acceptable to the Hearing Officer based upon the Hearing Officer's determination of the weight and credibility of the testimony and evidence. Some are rejected as being unnecessary or subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact made on the same subject matter. Here, again, this Recommended Order completely and adequately addresses the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, and the Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted to the extent they are not inconsistent with those made by the Hearing Officer and to the extent they are inconsistent therewith, they are rejected as being not supported by preponderant evidence or as being immaterial, unnecessary, or subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry W. McCleary, Esquire 3 West Garden Street Suite 380 Pensacola, FL 32501 Donna Gardner, Esquire 213 South Alcaniz Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2006), and if so, what remedy should be ordered?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female formerly employed by the School District. From February 2006 to April 18, 2007, she was employed as a paraprofessional in the special education unit at Flagler Palm Coast High School. Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Section 760.02(6) and (10), Florida Statutes, in that Petitioner is female and filed a complaint of gender discrimination and retaliation with the Commission. Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. From the inception of her employment and until March 13, 2007, Ms. Price was assigned as a paraprofessional (parapro) in Mr. Robert Rinker's classroom. Ms. Price had not been in the work force for several years before taking the job at Flagler Palm Coast High School and was taking classes at night to obtain her teaching degree. Mr. Rinker teaches in what was described as a self- contained classroom for students who are classified as emotionally handicapped in the exceptional education program. At Flagler Palm Coast High School, at least some of the students in the program would attend classes in the 300 building of the campus, and would have fewer classes and teachers compared to a traditional schedule. However, students would not necessarily be limited to one classroom all day. They could, for example, have classes with other special education teachers in the 300 building. Parapros are evaluated by the assistant principal. While teachers with whom the parapro worked might be asked to provide input for evaluations, the teachers are not considered to be their supervisors. Ms. Price was in the classroom with Mr. Rinker during first and second periods, between classes, and during lunch. During third and fourth period, Mr. Rinker supervised students in the gym while Ms. Price remained in the classroom with students who did not go to the gym. Stan Hall also teaches special education in the 300 building of Flagler Palm Coast High School. During Ms. Price’s employment, he was assisted by a parapro named Kathy Picano. Ms. Picano sometimes visited Ms. Price in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. She is significantly younger than both Ms. Price and Mr. Rinker. Mr. Rinker is a jovial man and a veteran teacher. He coaches soccer and has coached basketball. He is well liked by his peers and by the students he teaches. Mr. Rinker often tells jokes and stories, and sometimes his jokes are “off color” or of a sexual nature. The jokes and stories are told to both male and female colleagues and not in the presence of students. No other staff member had ever told Mr. Rinker that his jokes were offensive and no one had ever complained to supervisory personnel that they were offended by Mr. Rinker’s behavior. Mr. Rinker sometimes used the phrase, “a good lovin’ is the universal cure.” He testified that he had heard this phrase since his childhood from his older relatives, and simply meant that when someone is having a bad day, a hug or other encouragement helps make things better. The remark could be addressed to students and staff alike. He did not mean anything sexual by the phrase, and others hearing the phrase did not interpret it as a sexual remark. Mr. Rinker’s testimony is credited. Ms. Price, however, was offended by Mr. Rinker’s jokes. She testified that nearly every conversation with Mr. Rinker became focused on sex. According to Ms. Price, the first week she worked with Mr. Rinker, they were discussing mailboxes in the classroom, and he stated, “let’s talk about the box you are sitting on.” She understood that he was referring to her vagina. Ms. Price stated that she was shocked by this statement, but did not say so because it was her first week on the job. Mr. Rinker does not remember ever making such a statement. Whether or not this incident actually happened, it occurred over a year prior to Ms. Price's complaint to either the School District or the Commission. Also that first week, Ms. Price mentioned in the classroom that she had a headache, and in response Mr. Rinker rubbed her shoulders or neck. Ms. Price was offended but did not tell Mr. Rinker his touch was unwelcome. Ms. Price claims that while things were not too bad the first semester she worked with Mr. Rinker, eventually it got to the point where she was unable to have a conversation with Mr. Rinker without it focusing on sex. She claimed that he sometimes purposefully rubbed up against her in the classroom.1/ In order to avoid talking to him or being physically close to him, she moved her desk to another part of the room. While she claimed the situation was intolerable, she did not report Mr. Rinker’s behavior to any supervisor and did not tell him she was offended by his conduct. Kathy Picano and Ms. Price sometimes spent time together in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. Mr. Rinker sometimes told jokes in Ms. Picano's presence and sometimes “invaded her personal space.” He acknowledged that he might have patted her on the back in passing as part of a greeting, but Ms. Picano described the touch as no different from what she might have received from her grandmother. Although Ms. Picano did not particularly care for Mr. Rinker’s jokes, she attributed them to being “just his personality.” She was not offended by Mr. Rinker’s behavior and, before being questioned with respect to Ms. Price's complaint in this case, never complained about it to him or anyone else in authority at the school. She acknowledged hearing Mr. Rinker make the “good lovin” comment, but found it endearing, as opposed to harassing. Ms. Price, however, was deeply offended by what she viewed as Mr. Rinker’s behavior toward Ms. Picano. The things with which she took offense did not stop with Mr. Rinker’s jokes or the attention she perceived that he gave to Ms. Picano. She did not think that Mr. Rinker or Mr. Hall did an adequate job of teaching, and was upset that Mr. Hall’s students were allowed, on occasion, to come to Mr. Rinker’s classroom to finish assignments because they were disruptive. She did not appreciate the way Mr. Peacock, the assistant principal, performed his job and believed there was an unwritten code where coaches and athletes did not have to follow the same rules as others on campus. Perhaps most of all, she was offended because students in Mr. Rinker’s classroom talked about sex too much and she did not believe that he did enough to stop it. In her view, this was exacerbated when Mr. Hall’s students were allowed to come over and finish work. Further, she believed that the students were using the computers in the classroom to access inappropriate videos and music that were offensive. Computers were in the classroom for students to complete assignments and to do research for school projects. When they were finished with their work, students sometimes played games on the computers and checked sports sites. Sites such as “myspace,” however, were blocked in accordance with school policy. While Ms. Price claimed the students were using the computers for inappropriate purposes, she admitted that she could not see what was on the computer screens from where she sat in the classroom. The testimony of the students did not corroborate her claim. All stated computers were used for school work and when school work was finished, to play games as stated above. Only one student indicated that he watched music videos. All the others denied doing so. There is no question that the students in Mr. Rinker’s class sometimes talked about sex and used profanity in the classroom.2/ One of the classes was a health class. The students were teenagers, many of whom had significant emotional problems with little or no support at home. Some of their individual education plans addressed the problem of too much use of profanity, with a goal of reducing its use in the classroom setting. Staff who testified all stated that trying to eliminate the use of profanity entirely was probably not a realistic goal, but modifying behavior to reduce it was. Their testimony is credited. Ms. Price was not the only one who complained about students talking about sex in the classroom. Barbara Ryan was another parapro who sometimes worked in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. She agreed that the students sometimes talked about sex and remembered a particular incident where she thought the discussion was particularly explicit and she said something to Mr. Rinker. He told the students involved to “knock it off.” In December 2006, an anonymous call came in to Ms. Myra Middleton at the District office complaining about inappropriate language used by students in the 300 building. Ms. Middleton referred the person to Mr. Peacock in accordance with School District policy. She spoke to Mr. Peacock, who said he would take care of it. After the phone call, Mr. Peacock went to each of the classrooms in the 300 building and spoke to the students about the inappropriateness of using profanity and talking about sex in the classroom. There was no evidence, however, that the anonymous call was placed because of conduct occurring in Mr. Rinker's classroom. The talk by students did not necessarily stop after Mr. Peacock spoke to the students. However, the more credible evidence is that these conversations did not involve the entire class, but rather small groups of students. Several students testified they never heard talk about sex in the classroom. The conversations that did occur took place while other conversations were also taking place. When Mr. Rinker heard the conversations, he told students to stop. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Rinker heard each conversation that Ms. Price heard or that he deliberately chose not to address the students’ behavior. Nor is there any evidence that the students’ discussions regarding sex were in any way directed toward her. Mr. Rinker was not particularly computer literate. As a consequence, Ms. Price entered all of the students' grades in the computer. She had access to Mr. Rinker’s password and would print out his e-mail. In early March, 2007, Mr. Rinker received an e-mail from Mr. Peacock’s secretary directing that he see Mr. Peacock regarding his evaluation. Ms. Price did not believe that Mr. Peacock intended to complete the required observation for Mr. Rinker's evaluation, and this offended her. Ms. Price answered the e-mail as if she were Mr. Rinker, noting that no observation had yet taken place. This conduct violated the written standards applicable to parapros. Mr. Peacock discovered that Ms. Price, and not Mr. Rinker, had responded to his secretary's e-mail. On March 9, 2007, Mr. Peacock called Ms. Price into his office and told her that it was improper for her to send e-mails under Mr. Rinker’s name. During the meeting, Ms. Price explained that she was inputting grades, attendance and all other computer data. Mr. Peacock advised that additional training would be made available for Mr. Rinker, but that she was not to perform his duties. Ms. Price was under the impression that she was receiving a reprimand. She also felt that Mr. Rinker, who was also counseled by Mr. Peacock, did not defend her as vigorously as he should, and that he was the one who should be in trouble. In fact, Mr. Rinker told Mr. Peacock that Ms. Price had his permission to use his password for the computer and that she was very helpful. Ms. Price’s reaction to this incident was well out of proportion to the incident itself. Moreover, she did not appear to recognize that what she did in signing Mr. Rinker’s name to the e-mail was wrong. She was crying, both after the meeting and into the next week. The meeting with Mr. Peacock took place on a Friday. On Monday, Ms. Price was on a previously-scheduled day off. On Tuesday, she was still upset to the point of tears, and went to see Sue Marier, the ESE Department head. Although she was told repeatedly, both by Ms. Marier and by Mr. Peacock, that she was not being formally reprimanded for the incident, she continued to believe she was being treated unfairly. She told Mr. Rinker, Ms. Marier and Mr. Peacock that if she was going down, then so was Mr. Rinker. The following day, March 14, 2007, Ms. Price went to the principal, Nancy Willis, and complained that Mr. Rinker had been sexually harassing her since the beginning of her employment. Ms. Willis advised Ms. Price to put her complaint in writing, which she did. The complaint was forwarded immediately to the district office for investigation. During the investigation, Mr. Rinker was suspended with pay. Mrs. Willis also asked Ms. Price if she wanted to be moved to a different classroom, and Ms. Price indicated she did not want to be around Mr. Rinker. Mrs. Willis went to Sue Marier, the ESE Department Head, and asked where there was a need for a parapro so that Ms. Price could be transferred. At the time of the request, Ms. Marier did not know that Ms. Price had filed the complaint regarding sexual harassment and thought Ms. Price was still upset over the computer e-mail incident. She told Mrs. Willis that the greatest need was in the class for autistic children, and Ms. Price was transferred to that class. A decision had been made to add more staff, including another teacher, for that area, but positions had not yet been advertised. Parapros do not generally have the right to choose their assignments. They are placed in the classroom with the greatest need. At the time of Ms. Price's transfer, the autistic classroom was the classroom with the greatest need. This transfer did not result in a change in pay or status. There were significantly fewer students in the autistic class than in Mr. Rinker's class, and at least one of the students had a one-on-one aide in the classroom. While there was a slight change in schedule, it was not significant, and she remained a parapro at the same rate of pay. Both Sue Marier and Nancy Willis went by at different times to check on Ms. Price in her new placement. The more credible evidence indicates that Ms. Price did not complain about being in this classroom. The School District has two policies that deal with sexual harassment: Policy number 662, entitled Prohibition of Sexual Harassment - Employees, and Policy number 217, entitled Prohibiting Discrimination, Including Sexual and Other Forms of Harassment. It is unclear why the School District has both at the same time. The definitions regarding sexual harassment in both policies are similar, with Policy number 217 being slightly more detailed. The complaint procedure outlined in Policy number 217 is clearly more detailed, and it cannot be said that it was followed to the letter in this case. However, Policy number 217 was amended after the investigation took place in this case. No testimony was presented to show whether the more detailed procedures presently listed in Policy number 217 were in place at the time of the investigation. Further, the documents related to the investigation reference Policy number 662, as opposed to Policy number 217. It is found that the investigation was conducted in accordance with Policy number 662, and that to do so was appropriate. Ms. Price’s complaint of sexual harassment was investigated by April Dixon and Harriet Holiday. Over the course of the next several days, both Mr. Rinker and Ms. Price were interviewed (separately) as well as several other staff members. Those staff members included Sue Marier, Kathy Picano, Donna Dopp, Stan Hall, Pat Barile (Sue Marier's assistant), Mr. Tietema (another teacher), and Barbara Ryan. The investigation conducted was reasonable, given the allegations by Ms. Price. Ms. Price's written complaint stated that Mr. Rinker made inappropriate sexual comments; that he rubbed up against her on numerous occasions; that Mr. Rinker allowed the students to talk in the classroom using sexually explicit language and had made no effort to stop it; and that he had made inappropriate sexual comments to Ms. Picano. Policy number 662 provides in pertinent part: Sexual harassment consists of unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: submission to such conduct is made, either explicitly or implicitly, a term or condition of employment (or of an individual's education). submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the basis for an employment or employment decisions affecting that individual; or such conduct substantially interferes with an employee's work performance, or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. Sexual harassment, as defined above, may include but is not limited to the following: verbal harassment or abuse; pressure for sexual activity; repeated remarks to a person with sexual or demeaning implications; unwelcome or inappropriate touching; suggesting or demanding sexual involvement accompanied by implied or explicit threats concerning one's employment. * * * Procedures. -- Any employee who alleges sexual harassment by any staff member must report the incident directly to the building principal or the employee's immediate supervisor. Alternatively, the employee may make the report to the Assistant Superintendent of Instructional Accountability. Filing a complaint or otherwise reporting sexual harassment will not affect the individual's status, future employment or work assignments. The right of confidentiality, both of the complaint and of the accused will be respected, consistent with the Board's legal obligations, and with the necessity to investigate allegations of misconduct and take corrective action when this conduct has occurred. In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the totality of circumstances, the nature of the conduct, and the context in which the alleged conduct occurred will be investigated. The Superintendent or designee has the responsibility of investigating and resolving complaints of sexual harassment. A substantiated charge against a Board employee shall subject such employee to disciplinary action, including but not limited to warning, suspension or termination, subject to applicable procedural requirements. After investigation of Ms. Price's complaints, April Dixon discussed her findings with Mr. Delbrugge, the School District Superintendent. She also turned over to him all of the transcripts of taped interviews and her conclusions regarding the investigation. She concluded, and he agreed, that the investigation showed Mr. Rinker told inappropriate jokes in the workplace but that in all other respects Ms. Price's complaints were not substantiated. The investigation also revealed that Ms. Price also used profanity and occasionally told sexually- related jokes in the workplace. The Superintendent decided that the appropriate penalty (in addition to the suspension with pay already imposed) was to reprimand Mr. Rinker with a letter in his file; to require him to receive additional training on sexual harassment; to warn him that further complaints would result in termination; and to place him on probation for the remainder of the school year. This discipline was consistent with the School District's collective bargaining agreement concerning discipline of instructional staff. Mr. Rinker was informed of this result March 19, 2007, and completed the sexual harassment training as required. Ms. Price was notified informally of the results of the investigation that same day. She received official notification by letter dated May 3, 2007. Ms. Price was very dissatisfied with the results of the investigation and the action taken by the School District. She felt that Mr. Rinker should be fired. It is clear, after hearing, that nothing less then Mr. Rinker's termination would appease her. Ms. Price was also unhappy with her new placement. She did not like being in the classroom with the autistic students and felt they were dangerous. She felt that she should have been allowed to remain in her original classroom and Mr. Rinker should have been removed. After less than three weeks, she tendered her resignation. This three-week period included one week off for Spring Break and some personal leave days taken due to Ms. Price's husband having a stroke. Her resignation is dated April 18, 2007, but her last day working in the classroom was approximately April 6, 2007. Ms. Price's resignation was voluntary. While there was some belief that she left because of her husband's stroke, Ms. Price disputes that assertion and insists that it was because of the conditions in the new classroom to which she was assigned. Her resignation letter, however, references neither reason. It states: Dear Ms. Willis: It is with sincere regret that I am writing this letter of resignation as an ESE Para Professional for Flagler Palm Coast High School. Please accept this as such. I do apologize for the short notice. I would also like to take this opportunity to express to you my appreciation of your handling of my complaint. You are the only one who has validated me as a person and as a worthy employee. I only had a brief encounter with you but it was enough for me to know that working directly under you would have been a pleasure as well as a great learning experience as I respect your leadership abilities. I recognize that this is a trying situation for all involved and that you have done your very best to rectify the matter under the circumstances. It is important for me to let you know that whatever happens in the future in regards to my claim, this is no way a reflection on you. I truly hope that you can appreciate my position and the importance of making positive changes for the future. Based upon the evidence presented, it is found that Ms. Price resigned for a variety of reasons, including her husband's stroke and her unhappiness with the new placement. However, her dissatisfaction with the handling of the complaint regarding Mr. Rinker and his continued employment was at least a part of her decision. Ms. Price was not subjected to an adverse employment action as a result of her complaint. To the contrary, school officials transferred her to another classroom at her request. The conditions in the new classroom setting were not onerous.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Human Relations Commission dismissing Petitioner’s complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2008.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her age or gender, or sexually harassed her, or retaliated against her in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Maureen Kuchar (Petitioner or Ms. Kuchar), filed a complaint, dated November 8, 2007, of age and sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation with the Commission. The record filed with the Commission indicated that Ms. Kuchar was 52 years old and is a female. Respondent, Creditors Interchange, LLC (Respondent or Creditors), is an “employer” within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Respondent operates a debt collection telephone call center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and has its headquarters near Buffalo, New York. Creditors employed Ms. Kuchar as a debt collector from February 14, 2005, until she resigned "effective immediately" on November 10, 2006. When she was hired, Ms. Kuchar signed acknowledgments that she received a copy of the employee handbook, a code of conduct, the non-harassment policy, and sexual harassment training. The non-harassment and sexual harassment training acknowledgement forms include requirements to notify the Human Resources Department (HR) located in New York, a supervisor, or a manager of any alleged violations. Javier Neptun, a co-worker of Ms. Kuchar at Creditors, sat in a nearby cubicle. Mr. Neptun identified their two supervisors as Carol Shaw and Larry Tartaglino. Mr. Neptun heard Ms. Shaw and Mr. Tartaglino and other employees calling Ms. Kuchar “stupid,” “dumb” and “cry baby.” Mr. Neptun never reported any of the incidents to HR. After Ms. Kuchar told Ms. Shaw that she had to take leave because of a family member’s attempted suicide, Mr. Neptun and Ms. Kuchar believed co-workers were also told about Ms. Kuchar's family issues in violation of Ms. Kuchar's privacy rights. That belief is based on co-workers' comments about the Baker Act that Ms. Kuchar overheard. In May 2006, Creditor's HR representative in the New York headquarters, Sara Mangan Riggie, heard about Ms. Kuchar's concern while investigating complaints from another employee, Sherry Meredith. Ms. Riggie called and talked to Ms. Kuchar, who confirmed her concerns about Ms. Shaw, but she said things were otherwise "fine." Ms. Riggie followed up with Ms. Shaw who denied sharing the information. Ms. Shaw resigned in July 2006. At her unemployment compensation hearing in February 2007, approximately three months after she quit, Ms. Kuchar for the first time named the co-workers who allegedly made comments about the Baker Act. Ms. Riggie interviewed the co-workers who denied recalling any such conversations. As she "increased her numbers" of collections, Ms. Kuchar said she expected to get access to a personal computer. She considered it essential to help track debtors, many of whom had no telephones, and to contact their family members. Ms. Kuchar believes she was denied the same assistance and access to the Internet by her supervisors, especially that division manager J. P. Hanson provided for younger women employees. There was, however, no evidence concerning the ages of the women whom she alleged received favorable treatment. In addition, Ms. Kuchar's failure to meet her collection goals were documented in Employee Warning Notices that she checked "I agree with the statements above," and signed on June 14, 2005, November 22, 2005, December 14, 2005, and January 13, 2006. As a result, her pay was decreased from $13.00 an hour to $12.00 an hour on January 14, 2006. The evidence does not support Ms.Kuchar's claim that she was increasing her collection numbers and, therefore, reasonably expected additional support services. According to Ms. Kuchar, in October 2005, Larry Tartaglino took a picture of Ms. Kuchar’s behind and put it on her keyboard in her cubicle. When she asked him about the picture, Ms Kuchar said Mr. Tartaglino just laughed. She never reported the incident to HR and first raised the issue during her February 2007 unemployment compensation hearing. Mr. Tartaglino left his job at Creditors in July 2006. When Ms. Riggie attempted to investigate the claim, she could not find other employees who knew anything about the incident. The evidence of Mr. Tartaglino's alleged action is insufficient. Ms. Kuchar testified that she was in the ladies restroom, which had a broken lock on the door, when co-worker Terry Cementic opened the door that led to the collection floor, left it open, and walked away. There is no evidence to support Ms. Kuchar's claim regarding this incident. Ms. Kuchar and a co-worker, Ilene Calligan, age 45, engaged in ongoing arguments in October 2006. Ms. Calligan called Ms. Kuchar "stupid, dumb, you old bitch," and said she should "grow up." In another incident, towards the end of the month, Ms. Calligan leaned on Ms. Kuchar's cubicle while talking to another co-worker, Paul Roberts. Ms. Kuchar started screaming because she said they were laughing and talking over her cubicle, interfering with her efforts to work. After each incident, both women received Coaching Notes admonishing them for their unprofessional behavior. After a verbal altercation between Ms. Kuchar and Ms. Calligan, on October 31, 2006, both were sent home for the rest of the day with pay. Ms. Kuchar said she was using her cellular telephone at work, during her break in the breakroom where cell phone use was permitted at the time, when Division Manager Hansen slammed the door to the breakroom almost "in [her] face." She thinks that a co-worker was fired the next day for allowing her to "vent" to him about the incident, but there is no evidence to support her suspicion. In the Employer Coaching Note related to the cell phone incident, there is no mention of her being in the break room, rather it says: Topic of Discussion: Use of cell phone on the collection floor Facts: Maureen has been warned in the past regarding use of her cell phone on the collection floor. On 10/20/06, at approximately 3:56 pm, Maureen was using her cell phone on the collection floor. Under the section for employee comments, Ms. Kuchar checked, "I disagree with the statements above" and gave, as her explanation "I was punched out and on my way out the door." Approximately 15 people worked in the call center, eight of whom formed a clique that Ms. Kuchar said ridiculed, laughed at, and intentionally bumped into her chair or invaded her space in her cubicle. Creditors admits that some of her co- workers were rude and did not like Ms. Kuchar, but it appropriately investigated and disciplined those involved in incidents reported to its HR Department. Ms. Kuchar said she called Ms. Riggie from the telephone in the conference room in the Fort Lauderdale office, and was interrupted by her supervisor, Fort Lauderdale office manager Elizabeth Valencia, who took the telephone away from her and told Ms. Riggie that she would handle the situation. Ms. Riggie's notes do not support the claim that the call was interrupted, but that it ended with her usual advise to the employee to maintain the confidentiality of her complaints while they were being investigated. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that Ms. Kuchar was barred from or unable to make a complaint to appropriate HR personnel. Ms. Riggie received an email from Ms. Valencia on November 10, 2006, notifying her that Ms. Kuchar had quit and said it was because she had been treated unfairly. Ms. Riggie left telephone messages for Ms. Kuchar to discuss her claim of unfair treatment, but the calls were not returned. Creditors, as explained by Christie Cahalan, Director of Human Resources, did not receive most of the specifics of Ms. Kuchar’s allegations of discrimination until her unemployment compensation hearing in February 2007. There is insufficient evidence that Ms. Kuchar's poor relationship with her co-workers were based on either her age or gender. There is no credible evidence of sexual harassment or any retaliation against her.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations, and dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Christie Cahalan Creditors Interchange, LLC 80 Holtz Drive Cheektowaga, New York 14225 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kathryn A. Terry, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1300 Orlando, Florida 32801 Maureen Kuchar 2550 Northeast 51st Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues for determination are whether Petitioner, Kenneth Davis, made sexually harassing statements and made body contact with a female counselor so as to constitute sexual harassment and a hostile work environment, in violation of Pinellas County Sheriff Office Civil Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying in person and the documentary materials received in evidence, stipulations by the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are found: Respondent, Sheriff Everett S. Rice (Sheriff), is a constitutional officer of the State of Florida, responsible for providing law enforcement and correctional services within the geographic boundaries of Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner, Detention Deputy Kenneth Davis (Deputy Davis), is a 23-year employee with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, having spent his entire career as a detention officer. As a result of years of training and experience, Deputy Davis is intimately familiar with the Sheriff's policy regarding sexual harassment, detention policies, operations, procedures, and the priority of security applicable to detention deputies. The evidence demonstrates that in the collective opinions of those detention deputies who worked longest with Deputy Davis, all agreed that his personality was that of one who "[was] loud and obnoxious--to pretty much everybody," "play[ed] around a lot," "never insulted anybody," and "[didn't] mean any harm." At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis held the rank of detention corporal until the Sheriff reduced his rank to Deputy and removed him from his position of detention corporal on March 10, 2003. Deputy Davis' chain-of-command consisted of Major Kirk Brunner, Detention and Correction Bureau commander; Captain Nesbitt; Lieutenant Keith George; and Sergeant Buckingham. Deputy Davis did not have authority over Lori Atwater (Ms. Atwater), the complainant in this cause. He was not in her chain-of-command nor was he one of her bosses in the sense that he could assign her tasks. At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis worked in detention barrack C, North Division. Barrack C is a two-storied structure divided into B block and C block, with each cellblock divided into an upper level and lower level. Deputy Davis had four deputies under his supervision in cellblock C. At all times pertinent to this cause, Control Deputy Salazar worked the control center at barrack C. The control deputy is stationed in a glassed enclosure with clear view of individuals desiring entrance into the waiting room of barrack C and with clear view of inmates desiring to leave the cellblock and enter the waiting room. On or about March 4, 2002, Ms. Atwater, an African- American and a long-time resident of St. Petersburg, Florida, commenced employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as an inmate-counselor. Ms. Atwater has an Associate of Science degree in Computer Technology Engineering and a Bachelor of Science degree in Management Information Systems. Her inmate- counselor duties consisted of identifying inmates who had family, legal, and personal issues requiring her intervention. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) employed Ms. Atwater for ten years before she began employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. While employed with DCFS, she worked in food stamps, Medicaid, protective services, adoptions, and several community recruitment programs. DCFS also has a policy against sexual harassment. The Sheriff has adopted Pinellas County Sheriff's Office General Order 3-4, which defines and prohibits sexual harassment. Pursuant to General Order 3-4, sexual harassment is defined as: All unwelcome or unwanted advances; including sexual advances or unwanted sexual attention, whether between person(s) of the opposite or same sex. This includes, but is not limited to, leering, touching, patting, brushing against, hugging, kissing, fondling, any other similar physical contact, or quid pro quo arrangements (i.e., a situation in which an employee is forced to engage in unwelcomed sexual conduct in order to protect or advance his/her job.) Unwelcome requests or demands for favors, including sexual favors. This consists of subtle or blatant expectations, pressures, or request for any type of favor, including sexual favor, including unwelcome requests for dates, whether or not the request is accompanied by an implied or stated promise of preferential treatment or negative consequences. Inappropriate third party comments or one time comments made which do not constitute a hostile work environment, language not directed at the offended member, jokes (spoken, printed or drawn) that are not directed at the offended member or joint banter of a sexual or offensive nature in which the offended member may or may not be a party. All employees of the Sheriff, including Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater, received instructions regarding the Sheriff's Sexual Harassment Policy. The evidence demonstrates that beginning in March of 2002 and continuing through the months of April and May 2002, Ms. Atwater noticed, without telling him to stop and without reporting her resulting complaint to her supervisor, that Lieutenant George would call her "Ms. Ashwood." At some unspecified time prior to March of 2002, Ms. Atwater concluded that the name "Ms. Ashwood" was offensive. Ms. Atwater based her conclusion on her interpretation and knowledge of the general reputation of a Ms. Ashwood (no first name given) within the African-American community of St. Petersburg. According to Ms. Atwater, Ms. Ashwood was known throughout the African- American community for engaging in sexual encounters with multiple partners. As a direct result of her superior, Lieutenant George, continuously calling her Ms. Ashwood, a name she considered to be sexually offensive, Ms. Atwater chose not to report her sexual harassment complaint against Lieutenant George through the proper protocol. The record contains no evidence that Ms. Atwater asked Lieutenant George what was his intended meaning by calling her Ms. Ashwood. The evidence demonstrates that Lieutenant George, having been involved in both the hiring of Ms. Atwater as well as involved in her performance evaluation, knew her name to be Ms. Atwater. Alleged statements made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria during a lunch period. The evidence demonstrated that Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis initially enjoyed a rather cordial relationship at work during the period of March through May 2002, at least by outward appearances. Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater both attended read- off sessions; on occasions, they walked together from the read- off sessions back to barrack A; and on two separate occasions, they were seated at the same table in the compound's buffet- styled cafeteria. They did not have contact with each other beyond what was necessary in the performance of their respective duties. They did not have contact with each other outside the workplace. On some unspecified date during lunch in the compound cafeteria, Ms. Atwater chose to ask Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George kept calling her Ms. Ashwood. According to Ms. Atwater, Deputy Davis came over to the table where she sat and she allegedly initiated the following conversation: Atwater: I really don't appreciate that, him [Lieutenant George] calling me Ms. Ashwood. Davis: He's probably P-U-S-S-Y whipped and you probably remind him of her. Atwater: He just alluded to--and used the term inside whore. Atwater: What's an inside whore? Davis: That's when you sleep with someone that makes Decisions for your career. Atwater: If I ever get promoted around here it will not be because I've slept with anybody, but based on my own merits. At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied the allegations regarding the above statements attributed to him by Ms. Atwater. Thus, the evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis made those statements attributed to him with the intent of sexually harassing Ms. Atwater, and if the statements were, in fact, made, whether his answers were truthful responses to her question. The compound cafeteria has several long tables seating six to eight persons and several shorter tables seating four to six persons. It is significant that not a single witness, from among others who were seated at the same table with Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis in the cafeteria on that unspecified day, was called to corroborate the statements allegedly made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater. With knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy coupled with her prior knowledge of DCFS's similar sexual harassment policy, and having been highly offended by Deputy Davis' conversation, it is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job included accurate record keeping, made no attempt to record this first incident with Deputy Davis resulting from repeated incidents with Lieutenant George. Additionally, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and report to her immediate supervisor her complaint of sexual harassment by a relatively new co-worker. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity, thus proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Deputy Davis made unwelcome or unwanted sexual comments or advances and/or unwelcome unwanted sexual demands, nor created a hostile work environment as Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what was said or not said by Ms. Atwater or by Deputy Davis during the alleged conversation that took place on some unspecified date in the compound cafeteria. Alleged intentional body contact by Deputy Davis with Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria buffet serving line. Ms. Atwater further testified that on another unspecified day while she was in the cafeteria buffet serving line fixing her salad, she felt "a brazen--it felt maybe like his [Deputy Davis] radio or something-it was hard--and then he went in my ear 'boo.' It made me jumpy and I made a squealing noise-because I didn't expect anything to braze in the back on my----." Continuing, Ms. Atwater testified that Lieutenant George came in the cafeteria at that time, and she asked him "why don't you tell your friend to just cut it out?" The Sheriff did not call Lieutenant George to testify. No other witness testified to corroborate Ms. Atwater's statements. Deputy Davis denied this second allegation of intentionally making body contact with Ms. Atwater and speaking in her ear. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity and that Deputy Davis engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur on that unspecified date between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater in the buffet serving line in the compound cafeteria. It is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job required accurate and detailed daily record keeping, made no record of Deputy Davis' second alleged sexual harassment of her person. With firsthand knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy plus her ten-year experience with a similar sexual harassment policy during her employment with DCFS, Ms. Atwater chose again not to follow proper protocol. She chose not to properly report this second incident to her immediate supervisor. Her second decided refusal to report what she considered sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if Deputy Davis was guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve him from liability. Having chosen for the second consecutive occasion not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis does present a significant impediment regarding Ms. Atwater's memory, recall, and credibility. Alleged repeated harassing comments by Deputy Davis resulting from Ms. Atwater's frightened squealing. Concluding, Ms. Atwater testified that "for months" after the undated cafeteria serving line incident, "every time" she would see Deputy Davis (minimum twice a week in barrack C) he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." According to her, these statements allegedly resulted from the cafeteria serving line incident and from a subsequent work related discussion and disagreement between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater regarding the form "62" (a form used by inmates requesting to see the counselor). Ms. Atwater, when confronted with what she considered a third but continuing sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, again chose not to follow protocol and report this third incident to her supervisor. It is significant that according to Ms. Atwater, she was initially and had been continuously sexually offended by Lieutenant George calling her Ms. Ashwood. When she inquired of Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her Ms. Ashwood, she was again sexually offended by his alleged answer to her question. She turns then to Lieutenant George, who was continually sexual harassing her and (did not ask him to stop calling her Ms. Ashwood) asks his assistance (not to file a proper complaint) but to have Deputy Davis (whose answer to her question about Lieutenant George she considered sexual harassment) to "just knock it off." Regarding her third alleged sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis (Ms. Atwater with knowledge that Lieutenant George and Deputy Davis were friends and she admittedly intended to take advantage of their friendship), she went to Lieutenant George, who (1) had continuously called her Ms. Ashwood; (2) was in her chain-of-command; and (3) was also in Deputy Davis' chain-of-command (but not file a complaint against Deputy Davis) and asked if he would "talk to his friend [Deputy Davis]--I don't want to make waves over this-I don't want to make a big to do-if you could talk to him--just have him knock it off." At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied her third allegation that he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." It is significant that after months and three separate allegations of sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and make a sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis to Lieutenant George, who would have been obligated to initiate a formal investigation. She chose instead to ask a favor from one who had continuously called her the sexually harassing name of Ms. Ashwood. The evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis continually made the alleged sexual and harassing comments to Ms. Atwater during an unspecified number of months. The Sheriff presented no witness to corroborate Ms. Atwater's allegations on this issue. Lieutenant George was not called to testify, leaving Ms. Atwater's hearsay testimony regarding this particular issue without corroboration. For the third time, Ms. Atwater chose to not follow protocol and report her third sexual harassment incident. The fact finder acknowledges that her third decided refusal to report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a third time not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis to her immediate supervisor does present a significant obstacle in the evaluation of Ms. Atwater's credibility. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity that Deputy Davis for months engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur during unspecified months when Deputy Davis may have been in the presence of Ms. Atwater. Allegations that Deputy Davis intentionally delayed or caused delay of inmates desiring conference with Ms. Atwater. Regarding her final allegation of sexual harassment by retaliation against Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater recalled that on one occasion, Deputy Davis intentionally caused a "two-hour" delay in getting inmates on her list from their cells to the conference area where she awaited them. The purported intent of this alleged two-hour delay was to threaten or to produce a negative consequence regarding Ms. Atwater's performance of her duties. I find that Ms. Atwater's August 9, 2002, memo to her supervisor, Deputy Armsheimer, purporting to be a chronology of events that occurred on August 8, 2002, conclusively demonstrates that Deputy Davis was not the cause, directly or indirectly, for Ms. Atwater's two-hour delay in getting the two inmates she had requested. The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Atwater gave her form "62" list (inmates to be pulled who had requested a conference with her) to the control deputy, Deputy Salazar, in barrack C and waited 40 minutes. Returning to the holding area and inquiring as to the whereabouts of her inmates, Deputy Davis and not Deputy Salazar informed Ms. Atwater that the top three inmates on her list were not there. Ms. Atwater asked Deputy Davis of the inmates' whereabouts, but he gave her no further explanation. Ms. Atwater thereafter called Deputy Hartfield, who is in her chain-of-command, to ask if he would look into the matter and Deputy Hartfield promised to get back to her. Ms. Atwater waited for Deputy Hartfield's return call. After waiting an unspecified period of time and not receiving Deputy Hartfield's returned message, she called Deputy Hartfield a second time and was told that he had relayed his message to control (Deputy Salazar) about one and one-half hours ago. In that message, Deputy Hartfield explained that her first requested inmate (no name given) had been moved to maximum security and her second inmate (Brandon) was written up earlier that morning by him. In her August 9, 2002, memo to Deputy Armsheimer, Ms. Atwater wrote, "the conversation concluded with me stating [to Deputy Hartfield] if I had known 1 1/2 hours ago, I would have just left out of here and could have eaten lunch." It is significant that Ms. Atwater authored her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Deputy Armsheimer, for the singular purpose of explaining the exact cause (and persons involved) of her two-hour plus wait for inmates who were not pulled for her. At the final hearing in May 2003, she contradicts her August 9, 2002, written statements by testifying that Deputy Davis caused her a "two-hour" delay in pulling her inmates. This obvious contradiction is a severe detriment upon her credibility. Ms. Atwater's memorandum to Sergeant Groff, dated October 30, 2002, was written to give a recount of her experiences with Deputy Davis during all times pertinent to this case. She began her memorandum with the statement: "[S]o for the whole story to be clear, I must tell you how we ended up here and start from the beginning." In her first sentence of the second paragraph appears the first conflict in the evidence of record. In that sentence, Ms. Atwater writes, "Shortly after starting to work here, I began to experience unpleasantness from Cpl. Kenneth Davis. His obnoxious gestures, comments and disposition could not be tolerated any longer." (This conclusion consisted of the three separate allegations against Deputy Davis made herein above.) With this opportunity to formally complain of sexual harassment in the work place, Ms. Atwater failed to include the fact that it was she who initially asked Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her the sexually offensive name of "Ms. Ashwood." Intentionally choosing to allege that Deputy Davis' answer to her question why Lieutenant George kept calling her "Ms. Ashwood" was the initial sexual harassment that created a hostile work place is contradictory to her testimony. Continuing, Ms. Atwater wrote--"I did tell him that I felt he 'played too much,' and need[ed] to stop moaning and groaning behind me." Even though she recounted moaning and groaning, she specifically omitted her alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis (Finding of Fact 12 hereinabove) when he answered her question "why Lieutenant George calls me Ms. Ashwood." This is significant in that Ms. Atwater's testimony was that Deputy Davis' alleged verbatim statements when he answered her question were so "sexually harassing" that she was "immediately" offended the moment she heard them. Yet, she omits any mention that it was Lieutenant George continuously calling her "Ms. Ashwood" that initially and repeatedly offended her. The name Ashwood she considered had such a negative sexual reputation in the community that she was immediately offended and sexually harassed when Lieutenant George first called her Ms. Ashwood and each time thereafter. She omits any mention that it was her inquiry of Deputy Davis, "why Lieutenant George [sexually harassing her] was calling her the offensive name of Ms. Ashwood" that produced the alleged response. Based upon Ms. Atwater's acknowledgement contained in her October 30, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Groff, I find that her allegations that Deputy Davis caused a delayed wait of two hours to get inmates pulled and, thus, "creat[ed] a hostile work environment" to be contrary to her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Armsheimer, admitting that had she known her inmates were not in barrack C, she would have left and had lunch "one and one-half" hours prior. Ms. Atwater further admits in writing that from May of 2002 forward, she and Deputy Davis "barely" spoke to one another. If Ms. Atwater's memory is presumed to be accurate and she and Deputy Davis discontinued speaking to one another during the March through May 2002 period, it was not logical to conclude that Deputy Davis repeatedly and continually moaned and groaned in her ear for "months" thereafter (i.e. June, July, August, and October). For the fourth time, Ms. Atwater chose not to and did not report this fourth incident to her immediate supervisor at or near the time it occurred. Her sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis was filed after her October 2002 complaint was filed against Lieutenant George. Her fourth decided refusal to immediately report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a fourth time not to report the initial alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis during the March through May period, when coupled with the contradiction between her testimony that Deputy Davis was the cause of a two-hour delay in pulling her inmates, and her memorandum wherein she acknowledges that her inmates had been written up by Sergeant Hartfield, presents a credibility obstacle. Ms. Atwater makes no further mention of Deputy Davis in her October 30, 2002, memoranda, devoting the remainder to Lieutenant George. She recounts in detail their initial friendly relationship, turning to a cold and unfriendly relationship, the keeping-your-distance treatment, their many phone conversations at work, their lunch dates away from the work place, and their private phone calls when at home, ending on October 24, 2002, with an incident of kissing and Lieutenant George rubbing his groin against her buttocks and her resisting his advances. (See Joint Exhibit J-1.) In her final paragraph, Ms. Atwater relates how, unbeknownst to Lieutenant George, she arranged for a three-way call between herself, Lieutenant George, and her uncle, a City of St. Petersburg employee. She arranged the three-way call for the purpose of securing a witness to corroborate her statements regarding the Lieutenant George sexual harassment encounter. Though her alleged initial sexual harassment was initiated by Deputy Davis and continued for months, Ms. Atwater made no similar attempt to corroborate her claims of sexual harassment against Deputy Davis. Knowing that Deputy Davis was not within her chain-of-command and not in a supervisory position over her, there was no logical reason for Ms. Atwater to fear promotions and job security. Ms. Atwater knew that filing a complaint against a lieutenant within her chain-of- command presented a greater risk than filing a complaint against Deputy Davis who was not in her chain-of-command. Her choosing not to record (or procure corroboration) the Deputy Davis incidents, when coupled with her delay of many months in reporting her compliant through proper channels because of fear of reprisal, rings hollow. It was after the Administrative Review Board had begun an investigation of Ms. Atwater's October 2002 complaint of sexual harassment against Lieutenant George that the Sheriff initiated an investigation of Deputy Davis. Only after her egregious October 24, 2002, incident involving Lieutenant George did she file a subsequent and separate sexual harassment compliant against Deputy Davis. In the absence of corroboration, Ms. Atwater's testimony of a single incident of intentional touching and her testimony of alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis and his unequivocal denial presents a "she said-he said" dilemma. Neither party's testimony is inherently more credible than the other party's testimony. Contrary to the opinion of Major Brunner, who sat on the Administrative Review Board, that when the Administrative Review Board questioned Deputy Davis regarding those allegations, Deputy Davis was "in denial." This assumption and by implication presumed guilt, thereby lending credibility to Ms. Atwater's allegations, is a conclusion not based on fact and is contrary to the evidence adduced during the de novo proceeding. Ms. Atwater's testimony of incidents having occurred over a four-month or more period and the lack of time or specific dates coupled with the contradictions between her testimony during the final hearing and her August 9, 2002, memorandum to her supervisor, creates an unfathomable chasm in the evaluation of her credibility. The Inspection Bureau of the Administrative Inspection Division investigated Ms. Atwater's complaint and submitted their investigative results to the Administrative Review Board, made up of various employees with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Petitioner, Deputy Davis, had violated the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida, 89-404, as amended by Laws of Florida, 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4: violation of provisions of the law or rules, regulations, and operating procedures of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' conduct was a violation of the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Rules 3-1.1 (level five violation) and 5.16, relating to sexual harassment and discrimination as defined in the Sheriff's General Order 3-4. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' available range of discipline was calculated in conformance with the matrix contained within General Order 10-2 of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office that allocates a point scale to various violations. The matrix provides that a level five offense, which includes sexual harassment, results in a 50- point assessment. Deputy Davis scored a total of 50 cumulative points with a discipline range of five-day suspension up to and including termination. Demotion is also authorized under the applicable General Order. After considering the evidence and available sanctions, the Sheriff notified Deputy Davis on March 10, 2003, that he was imposing a ten-day suspension without pay and demoting him from the rank of corporal to the rank of detention deputy. After weighing all the evidence, including the Sheriff's evidentiary presentation of Ms. Atwater's testimony of verbal comments made and intentional body conduct allegedly engaged in by Deputy Davis, this fact finder finds the uncorroborated hearsay evidence insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations that Deputy Davis made sexually harassing verbal comments to Ms. Atwater, and that he made intentional sexually harassing body contact with her, so as to create a hostile work environment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office enter a final order finding that: Petitioner did not commit the verbal and physical conduct alleged in the charging document and that there was no violation of the rules, regulations, and policies of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as alleged. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's demotion from his previous rank of detention corporal to the rank of detention deputy was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office be restored with full detention corporal's pay and benefits. Petitioner be restored to the rank of detention corporal2 and given full duties and responsibilities as previously held. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2003.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Mojo Old City BBQ ("Mojo"), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on his gender.
Findings Of Fact Mojo is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Mojo owns and operates a restaurant at 5 Cordova Street in St. Augustine. Mojo has put in place written policies and procedures that prohibit, among other things, discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, gender, national origin, or any other categories of persons protected by state or federal anti- discrimination laws. The policies also provide a specific complaint procedure for any employee who believes that he or she is being discriminated against or harassed. At the time of his hiring, Petitioner received an orientation that thoroughly explained the anti-discrimination and reporting policies. Testimony at the hearing established that Petitioner was again informed of these policies at an employee insurance meeting held in October 2013. Petitioner, a black male, was hired by Mojo on August 2, 2013, as a dishwasher. Petitioner testified that “from day one” he was called names and harassed by everyone at Mojo, employees and managers alike. He stated that an employee named Linwood Finley would yell that he didn’t want to work with a man who looked like a girl, or a “he/she.” Mr. Finley said, “I don’t want to work with a man that can't have kids.” Petitioner testified that the managers and staff would accuse him of looking between their legs. Employees would walk up to him and try to kiss him. He was told that he had to go along with these antics or find somewhere else to wash dishes. Petitioner testified that he believed he was fired for refusing to kiss other male employees. He had seen Mr. Finley and another male employee kissing behind the restaurant. He stated that two male employees had tried to kiss him and he refused their advances. Petitioner testified that he complained about the kissing to anyone who would listen. He said, “I’m not a woman, I’m a man. I got to come in here every day to the same stuff over and over. Y’all act like little kids.” Petitioner stated that when he complained, the harassment would stop for the rest of that day but would resume on the following day. Petitioner testified that there is a conspiracy against him in St. Augustine. For the last five years, he has been harassed in the same way at every place he has worked. Petitioner specifically cited Flagler College, the Columbia Restaurant, and Winn-Dixie as places where he worked and suffered name calling and harassment. Petitioner testified that he wanted to call several employees from Mojo as witnesses but that he was unable to subpoena them because Mojo refused to provide him with their addresses. Petitioner could provide no tangible evidence of having made any discovery requests on Mojo. Petitioner was terminated on November 29, 2013, pursuant to a “Disciplinary Action Form” that provided as follows: Roderick closed Wednesday night2/ in the dish pit. Again we have come to the problem with Roderick not working well with others causing a hostile work environment. This has been an ongoing issue. This issue has not resolved itself, and has been tolerated long enough. Roderick has been talked [to] about this plenty of times and written up previously for the same behavior. The documentary evidence established that Petitioner had received another Disciplinary Action Form on October 2, 2013, providing a written warning for insubordination for his hostile reaction when a manager asked him to pick up the pace in the evening. Laura Jenkins, the front-house supervisor at Mojo, was present at Mojo on the night of November 27, 2013. She testified that Petitioner had a history of getting into arguments with other kitchen employees that escalated into screaming matches during which Petitioner would commence calling the other employees “nigger.” Ms. Jenkins stated that on more than one occasion she had asked Petitioner to cease using “the ‘N’ word.” On the night of November 27, Petitioner was running behind on the dishes, so Ms. Jenkins asked another kitchen employee, Colin Griffin, to pitch in and help him. Petitioner did not want the help and argued with Mr. Griffin. Ms. Jenkins testified that Petitioner was screaming and cursing. The situation was so volatile that Ms. Jenkins felt physically threatened by Petitioner. She was afraid to discipline him that evening while she was the sole manager in the restaurant. On November 29, Ms. Jenkins met with kitchen manager Billy Ambrose and general manager Linda Prescott. They decided that Petitioner’s actions could not be tolerated anymore and that his employment would be terminated. Mr. Ambrose testified that on several occasions he sent people to help Petitioner in the dish pit and Petitioner refused their help. Petitioner would get into arguments with other employees over such things as the proper way to stack dishes. Mr. Ambrose named four different employees, including Mr. Finley, whom he sent to help Petitioner. Each one of them reported that Petitioner started an argument. Mr. Ambrose stated he went in to help Petitioner himself on one occasion and that Petitioner “kind of gave me attitude” despite the fact that Mr. Ambrose was his supervisor. Mr. Ambrose testified that Petitioner had an argument with Mr. Finley one morning that resulted in Mr. Ambrose having a cautionary talk with both employees. Mr. Ambrose sent Mr. Finley to help Petitioner in the dish pit. Petitioner stated, “Nigger, I don’t need your help.” Mr. Ambrose asked if there was a problem. Petitioner said, “No, we’re fine.” Mr. Ambrose asked Mr. Finley if everything was all right. Mr. Finley replied, “Yeah, I guess he’s just having a bad day.” Mr. Ambrose returned to his work only to find, five minutes later, that the two men were nose to nose arguing about the fact that Mr. Finley wasn’t washing dishes the way Petitioner liked. Ms. Jenkins, Mr. Ambrose, and Ms. Prescott all testified that they had never seen another employee harass Petitioner and had never heard of such a thing occurring. Petitioner never complained to any of these supervisors about discrimination or harassment of any kind. All three testified that they had never seen male employees kissing one another on the job nor seen any male employee attempt to kiss Petitioner. The three supervisors never heard any employee make comments about Petitioner’s appearing to be a girl. Ms. Jenkins testified that as a gay woman she would absolutely not allow any discrimination based on Petitioner’s gender orientation. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Mojo for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Mojo's stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s gender. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Mojo discriminated against him because of his gender in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that his dismissal from employment was in retaliation for any complaint of discriminatory employment practices that he made while an employee of Mojo. There was no credible evidence that Petitioner ever complained to a superior about the alleged harassment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Mojo Old City BBQ did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2015.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Lincare, Inc., is liable to Petitioner, Sharon Ford, for subjecting her to a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Complaint Allegations Lincare is a Tampa-based company that focuses on home- healthcare services. It has an annual revenue of over $3 billion and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a company based in Germany. Ms. Ford, a married woman with children, is an accountant and an attorney. Lincare first hired her as its acquisition counsel in 2001 and promoted her to director of acquisitions in 2002. She held that position for almost 15 years before she left the company on January 27, 2017. Mr. Tripp, a married man with children, served as an Arabic linguist in the Army before obtaining his law degree. Lincare hired Mr. Tripp to replace Ms. Ford as its acquisition counsel in 2002 and promoted him to general counsel in 2013. He still holds that position. On January 19, 2018, almost a year after leaving Lincare, Ms. Ford filed a Complaint with the Commission alleging a hostile work environment. She alleged that Mr. Tripp, over a 15-month period from December 2015 through March 2017, subjected her to severe and pervasive sexual harassment. On July 13, 2018, the Commission issued its notice of determination of no reasonable cause and mailed it to Ms. Ford. The notice advised her that she “may request an administrative hearing . . . by filing a Petition for Relief within 35 days of the date the determination was signed by the Executive Director.” Ms. Ford received the notice in the mail on July 16, 2018. On August 16, 2018, 34 days after the Commission issued its notice, Ms. Ford requested an administrative hearing by mailing her Petition to the Commission via U.S. mail. The Commission received the Petition on August 20, 2018. On the same day, the Commission generated its transmittal letter. But, instead of transmitting the Petition to DOAH, the Commission advised Ms. Ford that the Petition appeared to be untimely because it was received three days beyond the 35-day deadline under section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. After Ms. Ford responded that she timely requested a hearing by post-marking her Petition before the 35-day deadline, the Commission transmitted the case to DOAH on September 21, 2018. The transmittal letter, dated August 20, 2018, did not dismiss the Petition as untimely but rather requested assignment of a judge to “conduct all necessary proceedings required under the law.” Lincare’s Structure and Policies Between 2015 and 2017 Lincare had three officers: chief executive officer (“CEO”), chief financial officer (“CFO”), and chief operating officer (“COO”). The corporate chart had the CEO at the top and the CFO and COO, who reported to the CEO, immediately thereunder. The second tier of the chart listed six department heads, none of whom were corporate officers: corporate compliance officer, head of business innovation, head of human resources, head of public relations & communications, general counsel, and director of acquisitions. These managers were equal on the hierarchy chart and all reported directly to the CEO. As director of acquisitions, Ms. Ford brought in the deals, negotiated the business side, and quarterbacked them to closing. She helped move the deals along by ensuring that Lincare personnel communicated and accomplished their required tasks. She provided business advice to the legal department and worked closely with the acquisition attorney (on smaller deals) and the general counsel (on larger deals). Ms. Ford received a salary and an objective bonus tied to the deals that closed.2/ As the general counsel, Mr. Tripp oversaw legal affairs and supervised five lawyers in the legal department, but had no control over any other department. As to the deals, Mr. Tripp handled the legal aspects, such as contracts, due diligence, and compliance, provided legal advice, and assessed risks. The CEO, COO, and CFO had sole authority to decide whether a deal closed. Mr. Tripp received a salary and a discretionary bonus tied to the company’s financial success in a given year. Although Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp gave each other advice, they were equals on the corporate chart. Mr. Tripp had no authority over Ms. Ford and lacked the power to hire, discipline, promote, transfer, fire, or control her compensation. They were coworkers who both answered directly to the CEO. The head of human resources (“head of HR”) ran the HR department and its roughly 15 to 18 employees. Directly under the Head of HR was the employee relations director, Ms. Adams. Among other things, the HR department oversaw the employee handbook and investigated reports of discrimination and harassment. The handbook included a detailed anti-harassment policy forbidding sexual harassment by any employee at work or at work-related events outside the office. Harassment was defined to include unwelcome sexual advances, requests for conduct of a sexual nature, and other unwelcome behavior that was personally offensive and interfered with work effectiveness done in person or through electronic means. The policy prohibited any employee from making employment decisions based on the submission to or rejection of sexual advances, and noted in bold that any violation would subject an employee to discipline up to an immediate discharge. The handbook contained a detailed reporting procedure for employees who believed, had concerns, or suspected they or anyone else may have been harassed. The policy required them “to immediately notify” a named individual based on their location, which included the employee relations director or the HR Manager for employees in the corporate office. The handbook required employees to follow the procedure and noted that the failure to do so could adversely affect their rights to pursue a claim. Lincare took harassment allegations seriously. Once an allegation was reported, the employee relations director or HR managers investigated; the legal department was not involved unless a particular legal question arose. They obtained as much information as possible from the victim, spoke to potential witnesses, reviewed available documents, and interviewed the accused. If the investigation uncovered no corroborating evidence and the accused denied any wrongdoing, a report would be added to the accused’s personnel file; upon a second allegation, the accused would be terminated. If a supervisor retaliated against an employee for reporting harassment, that supervisor would be terminated. Lincare disseminated the handbook and updated versions to employees and required them to sign a form acknowledging that they received the handbook and would abide by its policies. Ms. Ford signed such forms each time she received a revised handbook, including in 2015——the version in effect until she left Lincare in January 2017. She knew about the harassment policy, the reporting requirement, and the fact that her failure to so report could adversely affect her rights. Friends and Coworkers for Over 15 Years Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp worked closely together at Lincare for 15 years and they became good friends in the process. When Lincare hired Mr. Tripp as acquisition counsel in 2002, he worked closely with Ms. Ford on hundreds of deals. They were in constant, daily contact to strategize, handle diligence and compliance issues, advise each other on the tasks they both had to complete, and ensure the deals closed. They also had a close friendship. They regularly went to lunch alone and with others, as often as three days per week, attended social events with mutual friends, and spoke on the phone and texted about business and personal matters. They had much in common as married parents with kids around the same age and they enjoyed each other’s company. When Mr. Tripp became general counsel in 2013, Ms. Ford initially worked closely with the new acquisition counsel. In late 2014, however, she and Mr. Tripp resumed working closely together when Lincare began negotiating larger transactions. Project Maverick was the largest acquisition of Ms. Ford’s career and it closed in March 2016. Project Falcon was the largest divestiture of her career and it closed in August 2016. These two deals, and others, required Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp to work even more closely together from 2015 until she left the company in January 2017. They often met multiple times per day. Ms. Ford sought Mr. Tripp’s assistance on the legal side and he sought her assistance on the business side. As before, she remained the quarterback shepherding the deal forward. Their friendship continued during this period. They invited each other to lunch regularly, alone and with coworkers. They attended social events with friends, including holiday dinners in 2015 and 2016. On out-of-town work trips, they rented cars together and sometimes spent time alone, such as for meals. They continued to text and speak on the phone about business and personal matters. They talked about their families, children, and other personal matters much like longtime friends do. They checked in on each other when personal crises occurred. And, when Ms. Ford began tense negotiations with the CEO about her compensation, which ultimately led her to leave Lincare, she relied on Mr. Tripp as a sounding board and for moral support. Even after Ms. Ford left the company in January 2017, she maintained contact with him. They had lunch alone at least once. For months, they continued to text each other, even about personal matters such as when she texted him after he had been in a car accident. However, their communication largely ceased once Ms. Ford filed a lawsuit against Lincare over her compensation. Ms. Ford’s Testimony Accusing Mr. Tripp of Sexual Harassment The first incident occurred on December 11, 2015. In that 10 to 20 minute conversation in her office, Mr. Tripp professed strong feelings for her and that he desired a confidential, sexual relationship with her. She rejected him and said they were just friends. She immediately called her husband and spoke to him all the way home. She felt humiliated, embarrassed, and angry. She did not attend a football game that weekend with other coworkers to avoid Mr. Tripp and kept her communications with him to e-mail for the next week. The second incident occurred in her office later in December 2015. While discussing another affair that may be happening at work, Mr. Tripp said he could not report the other employee because he wanted to do the same thing with Ms. Ford, notwithstanding the professional and personal risks. She again rejected him. For the next few weeks, Ms. Ford tried to avoid him as much as possible, but she had to face him because the deals began to lag. She said he continued to make comments here and there, but she offered no specific details. The third incident occurred in January 2016, after a conference call in Mr. Tripp’s office. He said he knew Ms. Ford was avoiding him, but he could not function. He told her he was willing to leave his wife, but she again rejected him. Over the next few months, the comments and innuendo pretty much ceased so Ms. Ford decided to go back to being friends to ensure that the Maverick and Falcon deals closed. However, a fourth incident occurred in the parking lot after a late conference call in June 2016. Mr. Tripp professed that his feelings were stronger now and that he was waiting for Ms. Ford to change her mind. She said her feelings had not changed and he said he understood. For the remainder of 2016, Ms. Ford testified generally that Mr. Tripp continued to make comments about his inability to function and that he got more obsessive as the year progressed. But she offered little detail about the comments or where and when they occurred, except that she had to be around Mr. Tripp’s wife several times and she and Mr. Tripp agreed it was uncomfortable. The fifth incident occurred in October 2016 when Mr. Tripp told her he was learning Hebrew to “connect” with her in her native language. He tried to communicate with her in Hebrew in person and via text, despite her telling him to stop because it made her very uncomfortable. As a result, she again started to avoid him at the office, though he texted her to see if she was alright and admitted to acting like a high school student. In January 2017, Mr. Tripp continued with innuendo, spoke in Hebrew, and told Ms. Ford that he might move closer to her. She believed he was obsessed, which made her nervous about his stability and her safety. But she offered no specific dates on which these events occurred. Mr. Tripp came to Ms. Ford’s office twice that month after she had heated meetings with the CEO, including on her last day at the company, January 27, 2017. He cried because he could not imagine how he would go on if she left, as she was the only reason he came to work every day. That evening, he told her on the phone that he now knows what a divorce feels like. Mr. Tripp continued to harass her following her departure, including taking his family to the same ski resort in March 2017. She testified that she stayed in her room to avoid him and never initiated contact with him while there, though text messages admitted into evidence confirm she texted him several times, about a security breach and generally about his vacation. In January 2018, a year after she left the company during a mediation of her lawsuit against Lincare, Ms. Ford for the first time accused Mr. Tripp of sexual harassment. She had not reported the allegations pursuant to Lincare’s policy, though she knew it required her to do so. She never informed other coworkers either. In fact, the only person she said she told was her husband, though he did not testify at the hearing. Ms. Ford testified that she did not report the allegations because she had a contentious relationship with the CEO during this period and she believed the CEO would terminate her. She also was concerned that Mr. Tripp was unstable and could decide to kill the deals to ensure she missed out on her bonuses. Lastly, she thought reporting would be futile due to Lincare’s culture of harassment, including by one of the two individuals to whom she was directed to report, the head of HR. Mr. Tripp’s Testimony Denying the Alleged Sexual Harassment Mr. Tripp said that he never harassed Ms. Ford. Indeed, no one has ever accused him of harassment. He said he never expressed romantic feelings for her, suggested having a sexual relationship with her, or did anything to scare her. Ms. Ford’s allegations against him came as a shock. He believed they had been good friends for over 15 years and she never indicated otherwise. They enjoyed each other’s company, had children around the same age, and spoke often about business and personal things, like friends often do. Even during the period of alleged harassment, he noticed no changes in her behavior. They continued to invite each other to lunch regularly, often eating together alone, and continued to discuss deeply personal matters about their families. They texted each other often and attended holiday dinners with friends. She chose to sit next to him at a work event at a hotel in the fall of 2016. The same could be said for business trips during this period. On a March 2016 trip to New York, Ms. Ford left a group dinner early with him because he was sick, they worked out the next day, and had breakfast. On an August 2016 trip to Nashville to celebrate the closing of the Maverick deal, they rented a car together and went to dinner alone after Ms. Ford invited him. On a trip to New York in August/September 2016, Ms. Ford stayed with Mr. Tripp to retrieve his briefcase from the office and went to the airport together after the rest of the team left. Mr. Tripp admitted to learning some Hebrew, but because he liked languages (he was an Arabic linguist in the Army), not to become romantically connected to Ms. Ford. He practiced with her because she was the only person he knew who spoke Hebrew, just as he did with other coworkers who spoke another language. She never said it made her uncomfortable. Mr. Tripp also admitted that his wife suggested moving closer to Plant High School because it had a beneficial program for their son. The idea had nothing to do with Ms. Ford, who did not live nearby, and they decided not to move in any event. Even on her final days at Lincare, they had usual interactions. Mr. Tripp admitted calling Ms. Ford the evening of her last day (but said he had not come down to her office earlier) to express concern for his friend and sadness that they would no longer be working together. He did not recall commenting about a divorce, but if he had, it only related to her being a friend. For a few months after she left Lincare, Mr. Tripp believed their relationship had not changed. They continued to text each other and had lunch alone at least once. Though he took a ski trip to the same resort in March 2017, his wife chose the resort and Ms. Ford reached out to him several times during that trip to see how he was doing. Ms. Ford also texted him after he had a car accident in March/April 2017. It was not until several months after Ms. Ford left Lincare and filed her lawsuit against the company that he noticed a change in her attitude. At one point, he invited her to lunch with a mutual friend, but she did not respond and he later learned they had lunch without him. Ms. Ford also told him on the phone that he was going to hate her someday, though he had no idea then what that meant. After a hurricane in August/September 2017, he reached out to make sure she was safe; she thanked him and wished his family well too. That was their last communication before the sexual harassment allegations were made. Credibility Findings as to the Conflicting Testimony After hearing the conflicting testimony from Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp and observing their demeanor, the undersigned found it exceedingly difficult initially to determine who is telling the truth and who is quite an effective storyteller. Ms. Ford’s conviction in her accusations against Mr. Tripp was equal to his conviction in his denials. But, when considering all of the record evidence and testimony, the scales of credibility tip in Mr. Tripp’s favor for several reasons. For one, Ms. Ford cultivated a professional and personal relationship with Mr. Tripp throughout the alleged harassment period and continued to do so even after she left Lincare. Although she said she maintained contact because they had to work together and she wanted him as an ally, she also accused him of stalker-like, obsessive, humiliating, and unstable behavior. Her efforts to maintain a friendship with him, even after leaving Lincare, are at odds with someone who feels humiliated and fears for their safety. Ms. Ford’s testimony also veered from the affidavit she filed with the Commission. She testified that he generally made comments between November 2016 and January 2017, yet her affidavit offered more specifics as to the comments allegedly made. Her testimony about him moving to her neighborhood was entirely omitted from her affidavit. Her testimony about his efforts to sometimes communicate with her in Hebrew was at odds with the affidavit’s claim that he did so “continuously.” And, her testimony about the comments he made on her last day at Lincare differed as to substance and degree from her affidavit. Further, Ms. Ford’s testimony was directly refuted by other evidence. She testified that she did not affirmatively communicate with him about anything personal in March 2017, but text messages confirm that she checked in with him several times during the trip about his vacation and engaged in more friendly conversation than initially admitted. Ms. Ford’s reasons for waiting until a year after she left Lincare to report the accusations also call her credibility into doubt. Though she testified that she feared Mr. Tripp would kill two large deals and her bonuses therefrom, those deals closed in March and August 2016, and yet she never reported the allegedly ongoing harassment before she left Lincare at the end of January 2017. It also cannot be ignored that she waited until January 2018 to report the accusations and did so during the mediation of her compensation lawsuit against the company. Lastly, though not fatal to her claim, Ms. Ford’s failure to present any corroborating evidence cannot be ignored. She testified that she lost weight, suffered hair loss, and could not sleep, and said that it was the worst year of her life. Yet, the record is devoid of evidence that any other friends or coworkers noticed such changes, that she missed work or social events, or that she suffered at work in any way. She said he sent her inappropriate text messages, but provided no proof of them. She apparently kept a journal about work issues, but did not document the harassing incidents. And, though she said she immediately told her husband in December 2015, she chose not to present his testimony even though he was the only person who could corroborate her accusations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Sharon Ford, failed to timely file her Complaint and, regardless, that Ms. Ford failed to establish that Respondent, Lincare, Inc., committed an unlawful employment practice against her, both of which warrant dismissal of her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2019.
The Issue Does the Department of Corrections' Sexual Harassment Policy, as contained in the Pamphlet "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities", in a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy", and Chapter 7 of the Department's Personnel Procedures Manual, constitute umpromulgated rules, pursuant to Section 120.535 F.S.? Are existing Department of Corrections Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4), and 33-4.003(22) and (24), F.A.C. invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority due to vagueness, pursuant to Section 120.56 F.S.?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a career-service employee working as a Parole Officer I for DOC. He has earned a master's degree in criminology. At all times material, DOC has had in effect a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy" (P-5), a Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities" (P-3), and a Personnel Procedures Manual. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual is entitled "Sexual Harassment Complaints" (P-6). DOC has not adopted these documents as rules, and Petitioner here challenges them as unpromulgated rules. On February 22, 1996, Petitioner received written notice that he would be suspended without pay for ten days as a result of his violation of DOC Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4) and 33- 4.003(23)(25), F.A.C., (since renumbered) and the DOC's Policy on Sexual Harassment. The letter did not rely on Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual or its Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities". Petitioner appealed this action to PERC, which subsequently entered a recommended order upholding DOC's disciplinary action. Language from PERC's recommended order, which is pertinent to this instant rule challenge is: Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.001(4)(a) states, in pertinent part, that 'No . . . employee shall knowingly . . . commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any state statute, rule, directive or policy statement.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.002(4) states, in pertinent part, that 'Each employee . . . shall perform his duties fairly and impartially and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4,.003(23) states that a first offense of conduct unbecoming a public employee is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.003(25) states that a first offense of willful violation of rules, regulations, directives or policy statements is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. The DOC pamphlet entitled 'Florida Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment: Your Rights and Responsibilities,' provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual Harassment requires two elements: The alleged conduct must be of a sexual nature, must be unwelcome and unwanted. Sexual harassment may be any of, but not limited to, the following: * * * continued suggestions regarding invi- tations to social events outside the work place, after being told such suggestions are unwelcome; * * * prolonged staring or leering to [sic] a person; * * * 32. State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Personnel Procedures Manual, Chapter 7, Sexual Harassment, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * O. Sexual Harassment - Sexual Harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature from or involving an employee's supervisors, peers, subordinates or any other persons in contact with an employee or applicant during the course of the conduct of the employee's or applicant's business when: Submission to such conduct is either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 33. The DOC Sexual Harassment Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual harassment may result from unwelcome sexual advances or a hostile environment created by conduct offensive to the victim such as suggestive or lewd comments, dirty jokes, offensive pictures or physical touching. Accordingly, all employees are being placed on notice that any employee found guilty of having engaged in sexual harassment will be severely disciplined, up to and including dismissal. * * * The charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee is a general charge that is subsumed if the Agency has a more specific charge that fully describes the alleged misconduct. Ford v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 FCSR Para. 148 (1993); Mathis v. Department of Corrections, 6 FCSR Para. 122 (1991). In this case, I conclude that the charge of unbecoming conduct is subsumed within the charge of sexual harassment and should be dismissed. PERC's recommended order also applied the foregoing provisions. At the date of formal hearing in the instant rule challenge, PERC had issued no final order. Before this instant Division of Administrative Hearings final order could be entered, PERC had extended the time for the parties to file exceptions to its hearing officer's recommended order, and ultimately, on August 13, 1996, PERC adopted its hearing officer's recommended order, thereby rendering Petitioner subject to future disciplinary action at the second occurrence level under Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C. The final order of PERC is now under appeal by Petitioner. These facts are officially recognized, sua sponte. Petitioner received copies of the Pamphlet, the Sexual Harassment Policy, and a copy of Chapter 33-4, F.A.C., on July 16, 1993, when he began employment with the agency. He did not receive a copy of Chapter 7 of the Personnel Manual and was unaware of it until his PERC proceeding. DOC imposes disciplinary action against its employees for conduct which constitutes sexual harassment. Petitioner received periodic training in agency seminars on the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, including annual film presentations. He did not receive similar training regarding "conduct unbecoming a public employee", which is a term utilized in Section 110.227(1), F.S., and for which an employee may be disciplined. Section 110.227(1), F.S., also permits discipline of employees for "willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules". Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., provides, in pertinent part: Responsibility for Conduct of Employees, Inmates and Others. No Administrator, Superintendent, Officer-In-Charge, Supervisor, or other employee shall knowingly permit any subordinate, inmate or other person to, nor shall he, commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any statute, rule, directive or policy statement . . . . Petitioner claims that Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., is vague as applied to him because he is not an administrator, superintendent, officer-in-charge, or a supervisor. According to Petitioner, this rule in only applicable to those who supervise subordinates. Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: (4) Each employee shall keep himself physically fit, mentally alert, personally neat and clean and shall perform his duties fairly and impartially, and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public . . . . Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., is entitled "Range of Disciplinary Actions" and lists a number of violations. Item (22) is "Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee"; Item (24) is "Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations, Directives, or Policy Statements". The range of disciplinary penalties is increased at the second occurrence level under the rule. The agency Policy Statement, Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the agency Personnel Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming a public employee and contain definitions of sexual harassment, including hostile work place sexual harassment. The first sentence of the Pamphlet states that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and is conduct unbecoming a public employee, as provided in Sections 110.105, 110.227 and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. (Rules of the Department). The first page of the Pamphlet states EEOC guidelines defining sexual harassment, as recognized by the agency: Unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's employment, or Submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by [sic] decisions affecting an individual, or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work [sic] hostile or offensive working environment. The Pamphlet goes on to advise that sexual harassment requires two elements: conduct of a sexual nature/that is unwelcome and unwanted. It lists examples of harassing behavior, advises of the need to report such behavior, and explains the agency's internal complaint procedure and the procedure's protections against retaliation. It gives references for legal remedies outside the agency. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual states basically the same information as the Pamphlet, lists the same legal authorities and details the internal complaint procedure. It specifically provides, If there is a determination that there is cause to believe sexual harassment occurred, disciplinary action shall be taken in accordance with Chapter 33-4 Department of Corrections Rules. Chapter 7 was first effective on January 25, 1989 and last amended on March 5, 1993. It derives its authority from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Sections 110.105, 110.227, and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. Both the agency Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming an employee. Petitioner's position with regard to whether or not the Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual constitute unpromulgated rules appears to center on his belief that without them, employees are not on notice as to exactly what behavior constitutes sexual harassment, that they contain a subtext of what types of sexual harassment, i.e. hostile work environment, will be disciplined, or that they alone reveal that sexual harassment constitutes "conduct unbecoming". Petitioner testified that he understood blatant sexual harassment, such as unconsented physical contact, to be conduct unbecoming a public employee, but he did not have a clear understanding about the "gray areas", such as complimenting co- workers, socializing outside work, or what acts constituted hostile work place sexual harassment. However, Petitioner testified that he was on notice that the agency had an Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy and that at all times material, he knew that if he committed sexual harassment, he would be subject to discipline, up to and including termination. Petitioner admitted that if any employee engaged in actual sexual harassment against another employee, the offending employee would not command the respect of fellow employees, as described in Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C. He also was on notice through Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., that he could be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violations of law or policy statements". He is charged at law with knowledge of Section 110.227(1) requiring discipline for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violation" and Chapter 760 F.S., which implements Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The agency routinely disciplines its employees for sexual harassment and has a long history of application of its Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy. Petitioner did not submit any evidence as to how Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual, the Pamphlet, or the one- page Policy Statement had any affect on him, beyond the discipline described, supra. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented to show that the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, the Pamphlet, or Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual have any affect on any person not employed by Respondent. There was no evidence that any of the provisions in these documents were self-executing.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Carrabba's Italian Grill, Inc., subjected Petitioners, Jasen Baker and Bernard Southwell, to a hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a chain of casual Italian restaurants. Respondent has adopted a policy against discrimination and harassment. In addition to prohibiting harassment, the policy instructs employees whom to contact if they experience harassment. The policy is contained in an employee handbook that is distributed to all employees during the initial orientation process. During orientation, Respondent's manager reviews the employee handbook with the new employee, including the policy on sexual harassment. During the orientation process, Respondent also requires employees to view a video that explains that Respondent will not tolerate harassment. The video familiarizes the employees with the company's expectations regarding the reporting of harassment in the workplace. During the orientation process, the employees are required to sign an acknowledgment on the exterior of their employee folders indicating that they have received and read the policy against harassment. The critical sections of the policy are reprinted on the folders immediately above the signature lines. All of Respondent's restaurants are required to display a poster known as the "Carrabbamico Info" poster in the kitchen area. This poster reprints the harassment policy and provides employees with a list of names to call if they feel that they have been harassed. Respondent has implemented reasonable precautions to prevent harassment from occurring in its restaurants. In the Central Florida market, Respondent's restaurants are overseen by a joint venture partner named Dick Meyer. Meyer is responsible for hiring and firing the managers of the restaurants that he oversees. In March 2000, Lawton DePriest became the managing partner at Respondent's Palm Bay location. DePriest reported to Meyer. DePriest remained in that capacity until September 2003, when he became the managing partner of Respondent's restaurant located in Formosa Gardens. It was DePriest's management style to frequently yell at employees in order to motivate them. It is also possible that he had favorites on the staff of the Palm Bay restaurant. Baker was hired by Respondent's Palm Bay restaurant in January 2002. At the time that Baker began working for Respondent, he attended an orientation session conducted by DePriest. It was DePriest's practice during orientation to discuss harassment issues and instruct employees to come to him directly if they experience any problems with sexual harassment. If for some reason an employee is not comfortable with him, DePriest would encourage the employee to contact any other person listed on the poster. Baker was given a copy of Respondent's handbook, which contains the company's policy against harassment. On that same date, January 19, 2002, Baker signed his employee folder on the blank line under the harassment policy indicating that he had read and received the policy. Whether he reviewed the employee handbook further after that date is irrelevant. Baker "vividly remembers" that during his orientation, he watched the videotape that included instructions on what he should do if he felt harassed. However, during the hearing, Baker denied ever seeing the Carrabbamico Info poster. However, Baker admitted on cross-examination that during his deposition, he had acknowledged seeing the Carrabbamico Info poster posted in the store. During the deposition, Baker specifically remembered that there were business cards with contact information for Meyer and Cheri Ashe attached to the bottom of the poster. Despite Baker's attempt to deny seeing the poster, his earlier answers in deposition were more credible in view of his specific recollection of the attached business cards and the lack of any persuasive explanation for the discrepancy. After completing his orientation, Baker initially worked as a dishwasher. Later, he was shown how to do food preparation work. Before coming to work for Respondent, Baker had previously worked for a restaurant by the name of Golden Corral. During the time that he worked with Golden Corral, he became acquainted with a co-worker named Bernard Southwell. In the summer of 2002, Petitioners discussed the possibility of Southwell coming to work for Respondent. Baker spoke favorably of the restaurant and recommended that Southwell submit an application. At the time, Baker had worked for Respondent for six or seven months. Baker did not express to Southwell that he had observed or experienced any problems with unwelcome harassment. Southwell submitted an application and was hired by Respondent's Palm Bay restaurant in August 2002 as a dishwasher. At the time he began employment with Respondent, Southwell was living with a friend of his named Joe Corbett. At the time, Baker was living in a one-bedroom apartment with his girlfriend. Several weeks later, Baker's girlfriend decided to move out. According to Petitioners, she suggested to Southwell that he move into Baker's apartment to replace her. Around October 2002, Southwell moved out of the Corbett residence and moved in with Baker. A third employee named Chris Germana also moved into the residence around the same time. Because the apartment only had one bedroom, Germana slept on the couch. Petitioners slept in the bedroom. When employees at the restaurant learned of these arrangements, speculation began about whether the two men were homosexual. According to Petitioners, sometime after Southwell started to room with Baker, co-workers at the restaurant started referring to Petitioners by nicknames. The co-workers referred to Baker as "powder," "crack pipe," and "crack head." Baker knew that "powder" was a reference to a character from the movie "Powder" and that the name had nothing to do with his sexuality. The co-workers also referred to Petitioners as "butt buddies." Southwell testified that a male co-worker, Christopher Bouley, told him, "I know you guys are lovers." Bouley, Arnold Samuel and DePriest all used these nicknames on occasion to refer to both Petitioners, according to Baker. After several months, Southwell eventually went to DePriest and complained about the "powder," "crack pipe," and "butt buddies" nicknames. Southwell told DePriest that the nicknames were funny at first, but that they started getting old. DePriest then told Samuel and Bouley to stop using the nicknames. Thereafter, the use of the nicknames stopped. Southwell claimed that Bouley would gyrate his hips behind other employees as they were bending down. However, Petitioners both admitted that Bouley would do these hip motions to both male and female employees. During the hearing, Petitioners claimed that Bouley subjected them to unwelcome touching. Baker claimed that Bouley had touched his buttocks once. However, Baker acknowledged that when his deposition was taken prior to the final hearing, he did not mention that Bouley touched his buttocks. In fact, when asked during his deposition whether he had been sexually harassed, Baker testified that he had not and that he had only been verbally harassed. Furthermore, Baker made no mention of any physical touching in the Affidavit that he submitted to FCHR at the time he filed his charge of discrimination. Southwell never saw Bouley touch or grab Baker's buttocks. And despite their close relationship, Baker never told Southwell that Bouley had grabbed his buttocks. Accordingly, Baker's allegation that he was touched inappropriately by Bouley or any other of Respondent's employees is not credible. Southwell claimed that Bouley had touched his buttocks on two or three occasions and touched his nipples twice. Southwell also claimed that Bouley had touched his penis on one occasion. According to Southwell, he was bending down to pick up sauté pans when Bouley, who was supposedly standing behind him, reached between Southwell's legs from behind and clutched Southwell's genital area through his trousers. This incident supposedly occurred during the restaurant's hours of operation while customers were in the restaurant. The alleged grabbing supposedly took place in front of a stove that sat in full view of customers seated at the restaurant's bar. Bouley flatly denied ever touching Southwell's genitals or private area. In the Affidavit that Southwell submitted to FCHR at the time he filed his charge of discrimination, Southwell made no mention of Bouley touching Southwell's penis. At the time that he submitted this Affidavit, Southwell was represented by counsel. Southwell did not offer any convincing reason for the omission of any description of his genitals being grabbed. Accordingly, Southwell's allegation that Bouley touched Southwell's genitals is not credible. Although Petitioners testified that they spoke to DePriest on several occasions, they admit that they never spoke to any of the other individuals listed on the harassment poster to complain about sexual harassment. DePriest testified that the only complaint he ever received had to do with the nicknames and that he took prompt action to resolve this problem. Annually, Respondent submits an employee experience survey to its employees that is completed anonymously and forwarded to an outside company for analysis. After the survey is completed, employees participate in a small group feedback session to discuss the results of the survey. On March 11, 2003, DePriest held the feedback session for his store, which was attended by Petitioners. During the session, Southwell commented about the situation with the nicknames. He indicated that the situation was resolved when it was brought to DePriest's attention. This was the sole extent to which either employee complained of unwelcome behavior. Respondent was not on notice of any problems with regard to touching or more serious inappropriate behavior. On March 12, 2003, Petitioners' last day of work, Southwell approached DePriest to complain about scheduling for a special event at the convention center. Southwell stated that he and Baker had signed up to participate in this event. Southwell was scheduled for the event, but Baker was not. DePriest explained that he needed Baker to float, because there were not enough people scheduled to work at the restaurant that night. DePriest later talked to Baker, who indicated that he was not disappointed that he was not participating in the event. That conversation, however, was the last time that DePriest saw Baker. DePriest learned that Petitioners had left before the end of their shift, when the plates in the restaurant were getting low and the sauté pans were getting stacked up. DePriest asked about the whereabouts of Petitioners and learned that they were seen riding their bicycles away from the restaurant. DePriest could not contact them because they did not have a telephone. DePriest eventually terminated their employment for voluntarily walking off the job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order that: Dismisses the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Jasen Baker, in DOAH Case No. 05-0623, FCHR No. 23-03891; and Dismisses the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Bernard Southwell, DOAH Case No. 05-0632, FCHR No. 23-03892. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jason M. Gordon, Esquire Gordon & Cornell 103 North Atlantic Avenue Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Kevin D. Johnson, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez, P.A. 501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1400 Tampa, Florida 33602 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are, one, whether Respondent corruptly used his official positions to sexually harass female subordinates in violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes; and, two, whether Respondent solicited or accepted sexual favors from female subordinates based upon any understanding that his vote, official action, or judgment would be influenced thereby, in violation of Section 112.313(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Rudy Maloy (“Maloy”) worked at the Florida Department of Transportation (“DOT”) from 1980 until October 21, 2001. The last seven years of his career in state government were spent in DOT’s Turnpike District Planning Office, where Maloy served as the “Public Involvement Manager.” In that capacity, Maloy conducted workshops and public hearings around the state concerning Turnpike projects. In 1992, Maloy was elected to the Leon County Commission as a Commissioner-at-Large. He was reelected twice, in 1996 and 2000. At the time of the final hearing, Maloy was a sitting Commissioner. Laurie Bradley When Maloy began working in the Turnpike District Planning Office on October 7, 1994, Laurie Bradley (“Bradley”) was already employed there in a career service position, namely, administrative assistant to the director of planning. Though she reported to the director, who was her immediate supervisor, Bradley performed secretarial functions for others in the office, including Maloy after his arrival. Maloy did not have the authority to promote Bradley, increase her salary, or let her go, but he was one of Bradley’s “bosses” in the sense that he could assign her tasks. Maloy and Bradley enjoyed a cordial relationship at work, at least by outward appearances. For example, Maloy frequently gave Bradley (and other co-workers) the complimentary tickets to events such as hockey games and concerts that he, as a County Commissioner, routinely received but could not always use himself. Bradley genuinely appreciated this token of Maloy’s generosity. She thought Maloy was a very friendly person, and she was friendly toward him. The two, in Bradley’s words, “got along fine.” At the final hearing, however, Bradley testified about other acts and practices of Maloy’s that she considered decidedly unfriendly. According to Bradley, Maloy touched her inappropriately on a number of occasions, as follows: Hugs. Bradley alleged that Maloy hugged her——from the side, around the waist——many times, and that after awhile this began to bother her. Shoulder rubs. Bradley alleged that “fairly often” Maloy stood behind her and rubbed her shoulders without ever being invited or encouraged to do so. Kisses. Bradley alleged that in or around February 1996, Maloy kissed her on the cheek. Bradley also claimed that a few weeks later, Maloy kissed her on the mouth, while the two were alone together in an elevator going down at the end of a workday. Caresses. Bradley asserted that on one occasion in May 1996, within hours, ironically, after they had received sexual harassment training, Maloy taunted her by stroking her arm and asking if such behavior constituted sexual harassment. Bradley further averred that Maloy expressed his opinion that if one person is bothered by another’s conduct in the workplace, then the two should resolve the problem privately, rather than reporting it to management. Finally, Bradley alleged that, as part of this episode of teasing, as she perceived it, Maloy stated that he might be able to get her a job with the county having a higher salary than her present position.1 Maloy testified that he never touched Bradley inappropriately, and he specifically denied her allegations to the contrary. Thus, the evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Maloy sexually harassed Bradley. It is significant, therefore, that not a single witness who testified at the final hearing had actually seen Maloy touch Bradley improperly or in an unwelcome manner. In contrast, one disinterested witness testified credibly that she observed Bradley hug Maloy once or twice as a friendly gesture of thanks for receiving tickets to a hockey game; this testimony is accepted as true. Several witnesses who lacked personal knowledge of any misconduct on Maloy’s part were called to establish that Bradley told others in confidence——at or near the time of the events in question——that Maloy was allegedly harassing her. There is no doubt that Bradley did share such information with others. In fact, her contemporaneous accusations were soon reported to persons in DOT’s management, who understandably insisted that an investigation be conducted. Consequently, Bradley submitted a formal written complaint about Maloy to her employer, and DOT investigated the matter.2 That Bradley complained to others about Maloy in 1996 is circumstantial evidence from which one might infer that the alleged sexual harassment occurred.3 It is relatively weak circumstantial evidence, however, because it ultimately rests largely, if not entirely, on the credibility of the very same person——Bradley——whose testimony it was offered to corroborate. Indeed, drawing the inference largely would beg the question of Bradley’s veracity, for doing so would require that her veracity (which Maloy disputes) be assumed.4 Having carefully weighed and evaluated all of the relevant, persuasive evidence, the undersigned is unable to find, without hesitancy, that Maloy engaged in the conduct of which Bradley has accused him. This determination, it should be stressed, reflects the fact-finder’s judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is purposefully not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur between Bradley and Maloy.5 The undersigned affirmatively finds that whatever transpired between them, Maloy did not intentionally use or attempt to use his official positions to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Bradley.6 Likewise, it is found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no understanding between Maloy and Bradley that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from Bradley——assuming he requested or received any such thing, which was not clearly and convincingly proved. Ophelia Morris In December 1996, Ophelia Morris (“Morris”) replaced Bradley as the director’s administrative assistant in the Turnpike District Planning Office. As had Bradley, Morris served as a secretary to a number of managerial employees, including Maloy. She was a career service employee. Maloy could assign work to Morris, but he lacked the power to promote or fire her. Maloy and Morris became friends, and their friendship deepened over time. By 1999, the two were sufficiently close that Morris routinely confided in Maloy, sharing private information with him concerning the personal problems she was having with her then-fiancé, whom she planned to (and did) marry in May of that year. In June 1999, soon after Morris got married, Morris and Maloy began a mutually consensual sexual affair. While there are some conflicts in the evidence regarding certain immaterial details of their relationship,7 the fact-finder is convinced that neither party entered into this adulterous affair as the result of coercion, bribery, intimidation, harassment, or any type of untoward pressure, either express or implied; rather, each wanted to have an extramarital sexual relationship with the other. Some time in the autumn of 1999, Maloy offered Morris a job as his aide at the County Commission.8 The undersigned is not convinced that Morris had attempted, in any serious way, to break away from the ongoing affair with Maloy before he made this offer of employment. To the contrary, it is found that, more likely than not, Morris remained satisfied with——and had no present intention to end——the affair at the time Maloy proposed to hire her as his aide.9 Morris testified that, after initially demurring, she finally agreed to accept the at-will position as Maloy’s aide, wherein she would serve at his pleasure, but only on the condition that she and Maloy must cease having sex once she was on the county’s payroll. Morris claimed that Maloy reluctantly assented to this condition. Morris started working for Leon County as Maloy’s aide on Monday, December 20, 1999. At a Christmas luncheon that week, Morris met Denise Williams, a one-time aide to County Commissioner Cliff Thaell who was then employed in the county’s Public Works office. The two women quickly became friends and—— within a matter of days——lovers, commencing their own affair shortly after the start of the new year. In January 2000, some secrets were revealed. Denise Williams divulged to Morris that she, Denise, had slept with Maloy and asked whether Morris had done the same. Morris lied to Denise Williams and denied that she had slept with Maloy. Shortly thereafter Morris confronted Maloy with Denise Williams’s disclosure, and he admitted that the two had indeed had sex with one another. That same month, Denise Williams separately told Maloy about the affair she and Morris were having. Maloy was upset, angry, and hurt that Morris had been seeing Denise Williams. He urged her to end the affair with Denise Williams, but Morris did not immediately follow Maloy’s counsel. By February 2000, Maloy’s ongoing interest in Morris’s sexual relationship with Denise Williams was starting to cause Morris to become concerned that she would be fired because of that affair. Consequently, Morris stopped talking to Denise Williams, effectively suspending their relationship, and informed Maloy about the apparent breakup. In the meantime, Morris and Maloy continued their liaison, contrary to the supposed understanding that the sex would stop. At hearing, Morris claimed that she continued to participate in the affair with Maloy only because she feared he would fire her if she refused. However, while Maloy clearly had the power summarily to dismiss Morris, there is no convincing evidence that he ever expressly or impliedly threatened——or even intended——to take such action if she declined to have sex with him. In June 2000, unbeknownst to Maloy, Morris resumed her relationship with Denise Williams. Then, in July or August 2000, Denise Williams left a sexually explicit message for Morris on the county’s voice mail system, in a voice mailbox that Maloy checked on a routine basis. Maloy happened to hear this message before Morris did, and he was not pleased. The voice message incident was the beginning of the end of Morris’s employment as Maloy’s aide. Before long——and for a variety of reasons that are not relevant to this case—— Morris resigned, effective September 8, 2000. Two findings about Morris’s separation are made based on a preponderance of the evidence. First, Maloy did not fire Morris or force her to resign. Second, Morris did not leave because of her sexual relationship with Maloy.10 The purported understanding, mentioned above, that the affair between Maloy and Morris would terminate upon Morris’s becoming Maloy’s aide is the factual linchpin of the Commission’s case as it relates to Morris. The reason for this is that Morris clearly and candidly testified (and the undersigned has found) that her relationship with Maloy was mutually consensual and not the product of sexual harassment during the entire period she was employed with DOT. Thus, to establish that Maloy either intentionally misused his public positions to sexually harass Morris or, by sleeping with her, improperly accepted sexual favors as consideration for some official action, the Commission needed convincingly to distinguish and separate the mutually consensual “DOT phase” of the affair (which did not violate the ethics laws11) from the allegedly coercive “County Commission phase.” The undersigned is not convinced, however, that the subject affair comprised two such distinct phases. The evidence is too much in conflict regarding whether Maloy and Morris had an understanding about——or even discussed——ending their affair effective the date Morris started working as Maloy’s aide for the undersigned to find without hesitancy that such occurred.12 As a result, and in any event, it is not clear to the undersigned fact-finder that the affair between Maloy and Morris was coercive during the time she worked as his aide. The evidence in this regard, as the undersigned has evaluated and weighed it, is much too ambiguous to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction that, beginning in January 2000, Maloy was explicitly or implicitly forcing Morris to have sex with him——especially given the undisputed fact that Morris freely and voluntarily had been sleeping with Maloy for the previous six months because she wanted to.13 Additionally, the undersigned affirmatively finds, based on the greater weight of the evidence, that whatever transpired between them, Maloy did not intentionally use or attempt to use his official positions to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Morris. Finally, it is found, also by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no understanding between Maloy and Morris that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from Morris. Denise Williams Denise Williams, introduced above, was an aide to Commissioner Thaell from October 1997 through November 1999. At hearing, Denise Williams testified that, in June 1998, Maloy——whom she had known since the mid-1980’s——began to “prey” on her after learning that she was separated from her husband. She alleged that Maloy frequently came into her office, uninvited, to look at her legs, rub her shoulders, or give her a hug. She asserted that this attention was unwanted but admitted that she never told Maloy to stop. To discourage Maloy, she claimed, she tried to dress in a less feminine way. At the same time, she acknowledged, she sometimes hugged Maloy back.14 The picture of Maloy that Denise Williams’s testimony ultimately paints——for which, it must be said, there is no independent, eyewitness corroboration——is that of a man pursuing her with dogged persistence, ignoring her constant attempts to turn him off.15 Maloy, in contrast, suggested that Denise Williams had taken the initiative, signaling her availability by often making mildly suggestive comments to him such as, “You could have been my husband.” It is not surprising, then, that while there is no dispute that the two had casual sex at Denise Williams’s apartment in February 1999, the evidence regarding how this came about is very much in conflict. Denise Williams testified that, despite having no desire whatsoever for Maloy, she finally gave in to his repeated requests for sex in order to “let him satisfy his curiosity” in the hope that he then would quit “bugging” her.16 For his part, Maloy depicted Denise Williams as the initiator who, one Tuesday or Wednesday, unexpectedly told him that her kids would be gone the next weekend and asked him to come over for a “visit” on Saturday, which invitation he accepted. It is undisputed that Maloy and Denise Williams had casual sex a second time, in July 1999, again at her place.17 Given the conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence, the fact-finder is not convinced, without hesitancy, that the events unfolded precisely as Denise Williams has described them. Yet, he is not able to find, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Maloy’s testimony is entirely accurate, either. Thus, there can be no affirmative findings, one way or the other, on the broad question whether Maloy sexually harassed Denise Williams. Concerning the particular charges, the fact-finder is not convinced that Maloy intentionally used or attempted to use his official position to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment or “pursuit” of Denise Williams. Nor is he convinced that there was an understanding between Maloy and Denise Williams that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from her. These determinations, it should be clear, reflect the fact-finder’s assessment of the quality and weight of the evidence; although properly made by the undersigned in his role as the trier of fact, they are not affirmative findings concerning what occurred or did not occur during the relevant timeframe.18 Tina Williams Tina Williams (no relation to Denise) was Maloy’s aide at the County Commission for about six months, from July 15, 1999, through the end of that year. Before coming to work for Maloy, she had worked as an accountant at the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”), the state agency where persons who believe they have been discriminated against can file charges as a first step towards redress. Tina Williams had been introduced to Maloy in late 1998 by a mutual acquaintance, Edward Dixon, who at the time was not only a Gadsden County Commissioner but also was associated with the FCHR in some way. A few months later, Tina Williams had bumped into Maloy again at a local function, and he had asked her to apply for the position as his aide, which she later did. After having received favorable recommendations from Commissioner Dixon and from Ron McElrath, a fraternity brother of Maloy’s who was then the Executive Director of the FCHR, Maloy had hired Tina Williams. Tina Williams claims that Maloy sexually harassed her on numerous occasions, in various ways, starting before she was hired and continuing into September 1999. She testified, for example, that he frequently put his hand on her lap or attempted to do so, hugged and attempted to kiss her, talked dirty on the telephone, and made suggestive comments, including, once when they were on an out-of-town business trip together, “this is so soft” in reference to the bed in her hotel room. Tina Williams testified that the harassment stopped in September 1999, at which point, she asserted, Maloy became increasingly critical of her work and avoided her. Their relationship, she testified, seemed to improve in November 1999, but then in December Maloy asked for her resignation, which she tendered.19 Maloy testified that he hired Tina Williams to be his aide with high expectations concerning her abilities but soon became disappointed in her failure, as he saw it, to measure up. At hearing, Maloy asserted that Tina Williams had simply not worked out in the position for a number of reasons that need not be recounted here. Suffice it to say that Maloy testified he asked Tina Williams to leave in December 1999 because he was generally dissatisfied with her performance on the job. Maloy flatly denies that he ever said or did anything to Tina Williams that could be considered improper or untoward, including touching, kissing, hugging, shoulder-rubbing, suggestive comments, or like conduct. The conflicts in the evidence concerning Tina Williams’s allegations of harassment clearly cannot be attributed to individuals’ unique perspectives or differences of opinion. This is not a situation where two people have described the same historical event in different but reconcilable terms; instead, the testimony has produced two mutually exclusive versions of history. Determining which of the protagonists is telling the purest truth is a difficult task made tougher by several factors. First, there is no independent corroboration of either his testimony or her testimony by a witness having personal, firsthand knowledge of the facts. This is a greater problem for the Commission, of course, because Maloy did not have the burden to prove his innocence. Absent independent corroboration, the conflicting testimony presents a classic “he said-she said” dilemma whose resolution, if one must choose between the competing narratives,20 depends on whether “he” or “she” is deemed to be the more credible witness. In this particular case, because the Commission bears the burden of proving its case by clear and convincing evidence, Tina Williams must be judged not just credible, but considerably more credible than Maloy to sustain a finding of guilt.21 Herein, then, lies the second factor (or interrelated pair of factors) that complicates the fact-finding function: Neither participant’s testimony is inherently incredible;22 and conversely, neither one’s testimony is inherently more credible than the other’s. Tina Williams’s saga of sexual harassment cannot be rejected out of hand as a fabrication; it is obviously not fantastic. Upon hearing her story, one does not think, “That could not possibly have happened.” To the contrary, Tina Williams’s testimony is very believable. And yet, Maloy’s testimony, too, is eminently believable. He has not presented some half-baked alibi that tests credulity but rather has said exactly what one would expect an innocent man, falsely accused of sexual harassment, to say: “I did not do it.” What more, indeed, could he say, if in fact he were innocent? There was, really, no way for Maloy affirmatively to disprove the particular allegations that Tina Williams made. Third, having closely observed both Tina Williams and Maloy on the witness stand, the undersigned is unable to state with assurance, based on their respective demeanors, which of the two was probably telling the truth——or who was not. Both appeared to be sincere in recounting what had happened (or not happened) as they recalled the events in question. Neither appeared to the fact-finder to be lying. After carefully weighing all of the evidence with the foregoing factors in mind, the undersigned is not so convinced by either side’s proof as to conclude with confidence that any particular version of history advanced at hearing is highly verisimilar relative to the competing alternative. To the point, the evidence at bottom does not produce in the mind of this fact-finder a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of Tina Williams’s allegations.23 Thus, the fact-finder is not convinced that Maloy intentionally used or attempted to use his official position to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Tina Williams. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, however, the undersigned finds that there was no understanding between Maloy and Tina Williams that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from her——assuming he requested or received any such thing, which was not clearly and convincingly proved. Ultimate Factual Determinations24 The undersigned determines as a matter of ultimate fact that the Commission has failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Maloy violated either Section 112.313(2) or Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, as charged, in relation to his respective associations with Laurie Bradley, Ophelia Morris, Denise Williams, and Tina Williams. It is therefore determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Maloy is not guilty of the ethics violations with which he has been charged.
Recommendation The fact-finder having determined that the evidence fails clearly and convincingly to establish a factual basis for culpability on any ground charged, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order declaring Maloy not guilty of violating Sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2003.
