The Issue The following are the issues presented: Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) has jurisdiction to determine the claim of Petitioners Wal-Mart, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”) and Sedgwick CMS (“Sedgwick”) to relief under section 440.13(8) and (11), Florida Statutes; If DOAH has jurisdiction, whether Petitioners have standing to raise the issue of medical overutilization; If DOAH has jurisdiction and the Petitioners have standing, whether Petitioners are estopped from seeking reimbursement of any monies paid to Intervenors Florida Institute for Neurologic Rehabilitation (“FINR”) and Fruitville Holdings - Oppidan, Inc. (“Oppidan”); If DOAH has jurisdiction and Petitioners have standing and are not estopped, whether Intervenors engaged in overutilization of medical care in their care and treatment of the injured worker, D.F.; Whether Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (the “Department), has the authority to order Intervenors to reimburse Petitioners for payments related to overutilization by Intervenors in the medical care of D.F.; and If the Department has such authority, how much money should Intervenors be ordered to reimburse Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for administering the Workers’ Compensation Law, chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Section 440.13 governs the Department’s responsibilities and procedures for overseeing the provision by employers to their employees of “such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require, which is in accordance with established practice parameters and protocols of treatment as provided for in this chapter ” § 440.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Petitioner Wal-Mart is an “employer” as that term is defined in section 440.02(16). Petitioner Sedgwick acts as a workers' compensation servicing agent or “third party administrator” (“TPA”) for Wal-Mart and is a workers’ compensation “carrier” as defined in section 440.13(1)(c). D.F. is an “employee” as that term is defined in section 440.02(15). In 2003, during the course of his employment with Wal- Mart in Sarasota, D.F. fell approximately six feet from a ladder to the ground, landing on his left side and striking his head. D.F. was diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury. Through Sedgwick, Wal-Mart accepted the compensability of D.F.'s injuries under the law and began furnishing “medically necessary treatment, care and attendance” to D.F. as required by section 440.13(2). In the immediate aftermath of the accident, D.F. was treated at Sarasota Memorial Hospital, where he was diagnosed with cephalgia (headache), left flank contusion, and cervical strain. He was later seen at First Care in Sarasota with complaints of headache, and by a Dr. Barnea (no first name in the record) with complaints of headaches, dizziness, backaches, trouble with memory, and an inability to taste food. D.F. was also seen by Dr. Hal Pineless, a neurologist at the Neurocare Institute of Central Florida, who diagnosed D.F. with a cerebral concussion with post-concussive syndrome, post-concussive headaches, depression, and anosmia (loss of the sense of smell). In January 2005, D.F. took a handful of pills in what was at least a suicidal gesture, if not a serious attempt to kill himself. He was admitted to the Halifax Medical Center, and a Baker Act2/ proceeding was initiated against him. Although D.F. was found not to meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization at that point, three months later he was referred by James Hutchens, his attorney, to Dr. Howard Goldman, a psychiatrist, because of the attorney's fear that D.F. would again attempt to harm himself. In February 2007, D.F. was evaluated at FINR, an inpatient neurologic rehabilitation facility in Wauchula. FINR recommended inpatient treatment for D.F. at their facility for an initial period of 30 to 60 days. The cost of the treatment was set at $950 a day. Susan Smith was the Sedgwick claims adjuster assigned to D.F.’s claim. Relying on the expertise of the physicians at FINR, Ms. Smith agreed to the admission and the price. Ms. Smith testified that when she took over the case, there were five physicians treating D.F., including a neurologist, a psychotherapist, a psychiatrist, and a physiatrist. The physicians were all requesting different courses of treatment and were prescribing medications that were in some instances contraindicated with each other. The physicians were not communicating with each other. D.F.’s case was “just a mess.” Ms. Smith stated that FINR seemed to present an opportunity for D.F. to receive all of his treatments in one place, with one physician in charge, in a coordinated fashion. D.F. was admitted to FINR in March 2007. Dr. Jorge J. Villalba, the medical director of FINR, diagnosed D.F.'s medical conditions as post-traumatic headaches, anxiety, and depression. FINR provided monthly reports of D.F.'s progress to Sedgwick. D.F.’s treatment was administered by a team of physicians at FINR and consisted of medical monitoring, occupational therapy, physical therapy, and speech therapy. D.F. was provided vocational rehabilitation in FINR’s computer lab and in the wood shop, where he worked on sanding, staining, and building wood products. In August 2007, D.F. was transferred to Oppidan, an assisted living facility, as a “step down” in treatment from the inpatient FINR facility. Oppidan is affiliated with FINR, which does all of the billing for both entities. Again relying on the expertise of the physicians, Ms. Smith agreed to the transfer and to the $850 per day cost of care at Oppidan. Oppidan provided monthly reports to Sedgwick similar to those provided by FINR. These reports, later characterized as "boilerplate" by the Department’s expert medical advisor, Dr. Matthew Imfeld, showed that D.F. was receiving treatment similar to that which he had received at FINR, i.e., medical monitoring, occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech therapy, and vocational therapy. D.F. remained at Oppidan from August 2007 until August 2011, more than four years after his initial admission to FINR. Ms. Smith testified that she was in constant contact with the treatment facility and persistently inquired as to when D.F. would be ready for release from the facility. Ms. Smith noted a pattern in which D.F. would seem to improve to the point of discharge and then suffer some form of relapse or new symptom that would preclude his discharge. Increased symptoms included complaints of personality changes, anxiety, syncopal episodes accompanied by frequent falls, medication adjustments, emotional withdrawal, suspected Parkinson's syndrome, ringworm, shoulder problems, ringing in the ears, and anhedonia.3/ Petitioners worked with Oppidan’s medical staff to determine conditions for D.F.’s discharge from Oppidan. On January 9, 2009, Petitioner’s then-counsel, Brian Bartley, discussed the situation with Dr. Villalba and Dr. Jeffrey Walden, D.F.’s neuropsychologist. They agreed that D.F.’s needs could potentially be met within an outpatient day program. At Mr. Bartley’s suggestion, Dr. Villalba and Dr. Walden investigated the Adult Daycare program at Manatee Glens, a behavioral health hospital with an outpatient component. Though they rejected Manatee Glens as an appropriate placement, Drs. Villalba and Walden sent Mr. Bartley a letter, dated January 15, 2009, that outlined the components they felt necessary for an acceptable outpatient program: [D.F.] requires comprehensive case management services to oversee his program, assist with making and following-up on appointments, assist in managing his benefits, and coordinate his care. [D.F.] will require oversight of his medications. We feel that a home health nurse or, alternately, a nurse on site at a potential discharge site, would be necessary to provide for this need by packing his medication box with him, assessing him for possible side effects, overseeing a schedule of routine labs, etc. His wife can assist with prompting him at his medication times as necessary during non-program hours, but we do not recommend that she have primary responsibility for managing his medications or medical status. [D.F.] will require reliable transportation to and from his program and ancillary appointments. His wife will not be able to be his sole source of transportation. First, the only licensed and tagged vehicle they own is an old van that has had multiple reliability issues. Second, his wife has her own ongoing medical concerns that may interfere with her capacity to provide reliable transportation even with a working vehicle. [D.F.] requires activities that challenge him to be in the community and addressing his anxiety and panic symptoms. As such, a club-house model day program will be inadequate. He requires a vocational program where he is in a workplace, managing interpersonal relationships, and working on specified tasks. He has thus far been able to manage such assignments only with the assistance of a one-to-one job coach on the site with him and working at his side. As such, job coaching services will be required for all vocational hours. [D.F.] requires community recreational activities to further challenge his capacity to cope and master anxiety-producing situations with less structure than a workplace. His present program addressed this need through one-to-one lunch outings, fishing trips, etc. During these activities, he is encouraged to use the coping strategies developed in his psychotherapy sessions to manage and persevere despite his debilitating anxiety. [D.F.] requires a quiet place to which he can temporarily retreat and regroup between community-based activities. He can become overwhelmed in busy and chaotic environments such as a room with loud music or television playing, a busy game room, or an activity center. He has coping strategies he utilizes when he must be in such environments, but the availability of a place where he can escape such over- stimulation is required to facilitate his participation in his activities. [D.F.] requires continued participation in weekly cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy. He also requires regular contact with a neurologist and a neuropsychiatrist. His current program includes massage therapy as well to address his shoulder and to assist with relaxation skills. He also receives assistance with the management of his personal budget, including development of computer-based budgeting program, planning of future expenses and anticipated income, and development of financial priorities. He will require continued assistance in this area as well. We hope this adequately describes the services we feel will be required to address [D.F.’s] needs in an outpatient environment. Please feel free to contact us with any comments or questions you may have. We will gladly review any proposed discharge site and offer our thoughts regarding the acceptability of such a site to meet his needs. The record indicates that Mr. Bartley suggested at least one more potential discharge site to the medical staff at Oppidan. In a letter dated March 27, 2009, Drs. Villalba and Walden stopped short of rejecting this option outright but did set forth a list of concerns and requests for further information regarding the details of the proposed treatment. The record does not indicate whether Mr. Bartley followed up on these concerns and requests, or whether Petitioners proposed another outpatient program for D.F. By the time of D.F.’s discharge, FINR and Oppidan’s billed charges for his treatment totaled $1,451,301.27. Wal- Mart, through Sedgwick, paid these bills in full without disallowance, adjustment, or reduction. At all times relevant, Ms. Smith relied upon the expertise of the medical staff at FINR and Oppidan’s facilities confirming that the treatment being provided was medically necessary. Ms. Smith also understood that D.F. had been "Baker Acted" and feared that he might harm himself if Oppidan discharged him upon her disallowance of the charges for his treatment. Though they continued paying the charges during D.F.’s stay at Oppidan, Petitioners noted the mounting costs and apparently endless course of treatment. Petitioners referred D.F. to Glenn J. Larrabee, Ph.D., a diplomate in clinical neuropsychology, who examined D.F. on September 28 through 30 and October 5, 2009, and reviewed all of his available medical records. Dr. Larrabee produced a 41-page report, dated November 9, 2009. The report concluded that D.F.’s medical records “suggest that at worst, he suffered a mild traumatic brain injury of an uncomplicated nature, given normal CT Scan the day of injury and multiple subsequent normal CT Scans of the brain.” Dr. Larrabee noted that recovery from such an uncomplicated injury is usually three months at most and that D.F. had no cognitive or emotional complaints in follow-up visits shortly after the injury. It was only a few weeks later that he displayed the symptoms of anosmia. Dr. Larrabee’s examination of D.F. showed “deliberate feigning of odor identification in the left nostril, with significantly worse- than-chance performance, strongly supporting the feigning of anosmia.” Dr. Larrabee further noted evidence of normal neuropsychological test performance in D.F.’s initial neuropsychological evaluation with a Dr. Frank in early 2004, in a second neurological evaluation conducted by a Dr. Bosco in 2007, and in Dr. Larrabee’s own current examination. These results “strongly contradict the presence of any persistent deficit from his original mild traumatic brain injury.” In each of these tests, Dr. Larrabee also noted “evidence of invalid test performance with failure of symptom validity tests and measures of response bias,” a further indication that D.F. was deliberately feigning responses. Dr. Larrabee wrote that “[o]ther health care professionals have noted a motivational basis or non-neurologic basis to symptomatic complaint.” Dr. Salter in 2005 included “factitious disorder” as one of his diagnoses, and Dr. Tatum noted that D.F. displayed seizures without any indication of actual epilepsy. Dr. Larrabee concluded that, while there was “compelling evidence of malingering” on the neuropsychological examinations, other professionals have noted “significant personality disorder features” that could lead one to be dependent on the inpatient hospitalization setting. Dr. Larrabee found that there could be “a mix of intentional (i.e., malingering) and unintentional (psychiatric) factors” in the case of D.F. He recommended a one-month stay in a psychiatric facility for evaluation and treatment. Without such hospitalization, it could not be determined whether D.F. had a legitimate psychiatric disorder or whether such disorder was a consequence of his workplace injury. At about the same time as the referral to Dr. Larrabee, Petitioners began to explore legal channels to procure D.F.’s discharge from Oppidan. Petitioners sent the case file to an attorney, Edward Louis Stern, who testified at the final hearing. Mr. Stern testified that he met with D.F.'s attorney for the purpose of obtaining his cooperation in having D.F. discharged. Mr. Stern provided D.F.'s attorney with a copy of Dr. Larrabee’s report. Mr. Stern stated that D.F.'s attorney agreed in principle to the discharge of D.F. but wanted to identify the parameters that would be allowed by FINR/Oppidan for his safe release. To this end, a meeting was set up for June 3, 2010, that included the program director at FINR, the treating neuropsychologist, a vocational consultant, D.F., D.F.'s spouse, and D.F.'s attorney. Mr. Stern reported that no one at the meeting was willing to definitively identify the parameters of D.F.'s discharge. Mr. Stern left the meeting with the definite impression that D.F.’s attorney would not agree to D.F.’s discharge. He also believed that no one at the facility would be willing to identify parameters for discharge. Therefore, Mr. Stern and his clients decided to initiate formal overutilization proceedings based on peer review, pursuant to section 440.13(6). Mr. Stern noted that peer review requires two or more "physicians" to make an evaluation of the care in question. Petitioners had in hand only the opinion of Dr. Larrabee, a neuropsychologist whose non-physician opinion would not be admissible before a Judge of Compensation Claims. After some negotiation, D.F.’s attorney agreed to an examination by a psychiatrist. On September 3, 2010, Dr. R.J. Mignone, a board- certified psychiatrist practicing in Sarasota, evaluated D.F. at Petitioners' request. Dr. Mignone’s 35-page report included a detailed narrative of D.F.’s treatment history, Dr. Mignone’s examination, and his impressions and recommendations. In brief answers to a series of questions propounded by Petitioners, Dr. Mignone concluded that D.F.'s industrial accident was not "the major contributing cause" for the psychiatric care he had been receiving at FINR/Oppidan. Dr. Mignone found no DSM-IV Axis I psychiatric injury to D.F. and concluded that D.F.’s treatment at FINR/Oppidan was actually "psychiatrically contraindicated." Dr. Mignone concluded that it would be appropriate to discharge D.F. from Oppidan with the understanding that some regression should be expected once his “Axis II characteropathy” ceased to be reinforced by the inpatient setting. Dr. Mignone believed that D.F.'s medical professionals had been guilty of "walking on eggshells" in their treatment of him and that D.F.'s "acting out" behavior had been a major factor in FINR/Oppidan's program design. Dr. Mignone concluded that because D.F.’s condition was unrelated to his work injury, all of the treatment he had received at FINR and Oppidan constituted overutilization. After a great deal more legal jockeying, a second peer review was performed by Dr. Thomas Goldschmidt on January 7, 2011. Dr. Goldschmidt is a specialist in neurology and psychiatry, and was specifically recommended by Dr. Mignone to perform an examination of D.F. However, because D.F.’s attorney declined to allow the examination, Dr. Goldschmidt’s opinion was based on his review of the medical record and Dr. Mignone’s evaluation. He summarized his findings as follows: The claimant experienced MTBI [mild traumatic brain injury] on May 9, 2003. He reported loss of consciousness for seconds and was able to drive himself home afterwards. Serial evaluations over time have chronicled multiple normal CT brain scans, normal forty-eight hour EEG monitoring suggesting PNES [psychogenic nonepileptic seizures, i.e., seizures with a psychological cause], symptom exaggeration/malingering on neuropsychological testing, pertinacious somatic preoccupation with trait characterological disturbance consistent with passive-dependent underpinnings, and counter-therapeutic institutionalization at OPPIDAN. As such, the claimant’s clinical course has iatrogenically served to enhance his misguided perception of being “brain injured” in pursuit of satisfying his formidable but chronically frustrated dependency needs. Furthermore, his clinical course is atypical for MTBI and cannot be objectivity [sic] reconciled with the neuropsychological or clinical data provided for my review. From a non-organic perspective, the claimant has parlayed his seven year old MTBI into a state of invalidism largely facilitated by OPPIDAN. In effect, his illness-behavior has been iatrogenically perpetuated by reinforcing the notion of “brain injury” and treatment of psychogenic-mediated symptomatology unrelated to his 2003 work injury. Negotiations continued and a private mediation resulted in a negotiated settlement between Petitioners and D.F. The parties agreed that Petitioners would no longer be responsible for workers’ compensation benefits as of the date the agreement was signed, though D.F. would continue to receive payments for lost wages and supplemental benefits. It was agreed that Petitioners would cease making payments to FINR/Oppidan on August 30, 2011, the date that D.F.’s residency would discontinue. In light of Petitioners’ suspicions regarding D.F.’s possible malingering, it is reasonable to ask why they never disallowed or adjusted any of the bills generated by FINR/Oppidan’s treatment of D.F. Mr. Stern testified that Petitioners did not unilaterally disallow payment out of fear that FINR/Oppidan might retaliate against D.F. by immediately discharging him, thereby risking another suicide attempt and possible tort liability for Petitioners.4/ Petitioners also feared that unilateral disallowance of payments could negatively affect their ongoing negotiations with D.F.’s counsel regarding voluntary discharge from Oppidan. On January 28, 2011, Petitioners filed the Reimbursement Petition with the Department, naming FINR and Oppidan as respondents and expressly disclaiming any direct reimbursement dispute with D.F. The Reimbursement Petition recited the history of D.F.’s treatment. It did not name a specific instance of overutilization; rather, it stated that all of D.F.’s treatment by FINR and Oppidan constituted overutilization. The Reimbursement Petition requested that the Department, “in accordance with Section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes . . . disallow the payment of services previously paid by the Petitioner[s] and reimburse Petitioners all sums paid.” The Reimbursement Petition also requested the return of payments made by Petitioners in accordance with section 440.13(11)(a).5/ Attached to the Reimbursement Petition was a copy of DFS Form 3160-0023, entitled “Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute,” executed by Wal-Mart and Sedgwick. Just below the title of DFS Form 3160-0023 is the following statement: “A Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute must be served on the Agency within 30 days after the Petitioner’s receipt of a notice of disallowance or adjustment of payment, pursuant to 69L-31.008, Florida Administrative Code.” Section 440.13(7)(a) likewise provides, in relevant part: Any health care provider, carrier, or employer who elects to contest the disallowance or adjustment of payment by a carrier under subsection (6) must, within 30 days after receipt of notice of disallowance or adjustment of payment, petition the department to resolve the dispute. The petitioner must serve a copy of the petition on the carrier and on all affected parties by certified mail. The petition must be accompanied by all documents and records that support the allegations contained in the petition. Failure of a petitioner to submit such documentation to the department results in dismissal of the petition. FINR and Oppidan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Reimbursement Petition arguing that jurisdiction for a reimbursement review can be invoked only where a medical bill has been disallowed or adjusted for payment. They further argued that Petitioners could not invoke the Department’s jurisdiction to conduct a mandatory utilization review under section 440.13(6) because of that subsection’s provision that if a carrier finds that overutilization of medical services has occurred, the carrier “must disallow or adjust payment for such services.” FINR/Oppidan argued that the dispute mechanism afforded a carrier under section 440.13 is limited to disallowing or adjusting a payment, which triggers the filing of a petition by the health care provider and a response from the carrier. Given that the Sedgwick did not disallow or adjust any payments, the Reimbursement Petition should be dismissed. As a result of the Reimbursement Petition, the Department initiated an investigation of FINR/Oppidan and of Dr. Villalba individually as medical director of FINR/Oppidan pursuant to section 440.13(11). Eric Lloyd, who at the time was program administrator of the office of medical services in the Division of Workers’ Compensation, testified that the Department did not then have a formalized method for reporting provider violations and that the language of 440.13(7) makes it clear that only a health care provider may pursue a petition for resolution of a reimbursement dispute. Mr. Lloyd stated that the Department therefore treated the Reimbursement Petition as a report of provider violation and converted the matter into a review under section 440.13(11). Delays in the resolution of the audit were caused by the need to advertise for and contract the services of an Expert Medical Advisor (“EMA”) pursuant to section 440.13(9). The Department’s initial contracting efforts were futile. Two contracted EMAs disqualified themselves for conflicts of interest. The Department finally engaged the services of a certified EMA, Dr. Imfeld, a specialist in the field of physical medicine and rehabilitation. Dr. Imfeld reviewed D.F.'s medical records from FINR/Oppidan, as well as the reports from the various doctors that were provided to the Department by the parties. Petitioners provided documents pursuant to a “Health Care Provider Violation Referral Document Request” issued by the Department on March 31, 2011, and a “Health Care Provider Violation Referral Document Request Addendum” issued by the Department on April 4, 2011. Both documents required the carrier to submit various forms of documentation. The Department’s initial document request states that the Reimbursement Petition alleged “that services rendered by Dr. Jorge Villalba, M.D. (hereinafter “Provider”), for the treatment rendered to the above referenced injured employee while an inpatient at FINR/OPPIDAN was in excess of established practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes.” In fact, the Reimbursement Petition made its allegations against FINR and Oppidan as institutions. Dr. Villalba was not mentioned by name in the Reimbursement Petition. The only reference to him was a statement that “[b]oth entities seemingly have the same medical director or attending physician.” Pamela Macon, bureau chief of the bureau of monitoring and audit in the Division of Workers’ Compensation, conceded at the hearing that it was her office that decided to include Dr. Villalba in the investigation because he was the medical director of the facilities. The language of the document requests plainly reflects an attempt to impute to Petitioners the Department’s own decision at the outset of the investigation to focus on Dr. Villalba individually. The end result of the investigation was that charges were brought against Dr. Villalba, but not against FINR or Oppidan as institutions. As explained more fully below, the case against Dr. Villalba was settled. No case was ever brought against the institutions. The following colloquy at the hearing is between Ms. Macon and counsel for Petitioners: Q. And as I understand it, you added Dr. Villalba to the case because he would have been, as the medical director, responsible for any medical care that was provided within the facility and he then should be responsible? A. Yes. Q. That’s why you added him? A. Correct. Q. But then you changed your mind and determined that he wasn’t involved with it at all, so you weren’t going to give – you weren’t going to penalize him? A. Right, that he didn’t render the direct care. Q. Okay. Did you ever make a determination who did the direct care? A. Not to my knowledge, no. Mr. Lloyd testified as to a policy dispute within the agency as to whether a “health care provider” violation may be brought only against individual health care providers or whether a facility can also be found in violation and sanctioned. He acknowledged that the statutory term “health care provider” explicitly includes health care facilities, but cited the difficulty involved in disciplining a facility such as FINR, which treats multiple injured workers. If the Department bars an entire facility, it would affect not just the individual injured worker whose treatment is in question but any others the facility is treating now or in the future.6/ In his report, dated August 12, 2013, Dr. Imfeld concluded that while D.F.'s 2003 accident resulted in a mild traumatic brain injury, it did not cause a seizure disorder or Parkinson's disease. He further concluded that all of the inpatient treatment from FINR/Oppidan was excessive and not medically necessary. On September 23, 2013, the Department entered its “Report of Health Care Provider Investigation and Notice of Intent to Impose Penalties Pursuant to §440.13, F.S.”7/ The Notice of Intent was directed to Dr. Villalba individually and stated as follows, in relevant part: The record in this matter, corroborated by the EMA opinion, evidences certain care that was neither medically necessary nor clinically appropriate for D.F.'s compensable condition. Accordingly, the Department finds that because of your role at FINR and OPPIDAN, you have directly or indirectly engaged in a pattern or practice of overutilization or a violation of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, in the treatment rendered to D.F. Dr. Villalba filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on October 7, 2013, in response to the Notice of Intent. The Department and Dr. Villalba agreed to hold the case in abeyance rather than forward it to DOAH. The case was ultimately settled, the parties entering into a Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order on May 13, 2014. The settlement provided that the Department would withdraw and dismiss its Notice of Intent and that Dr. Villalba would withdraw and dismiss his petition for an administrative hearing with prejudice. Mr. Lloyd testified that after the Notice of Intent was filed against Dr. Villalba, the Department received a Recommended Order from an Administrative Law Judge in another DOAH case in which the Department had issued a Notice of Intent against an individual physician for overutilization. The Recommended Order was “pretty critical of the Department and the process that was involved,” and the Department felt obliged to enter a settlement for attorney’s fees. Mr. Lloyd testified that the Department believed Dr. Villalba’s case had “the same shortcomings” as that earlier case. Mr. Lloyd stated that this belief played a large role in the decision to settle with Dr. Villalba in lieu of trying to prove a difficult case of overutilization in a formal proceeding. Wal-Mart and Sedgwick were given no notice of the settlement negotiations or the entry of the Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order between the Department and Dr. Villalba. Mr. Lloyd testified that there is no statutory obligation for the Department to apprise the complainant of the status of the Department’s investigations. On March 23, 2015, the Department issued an order titled “Workers’ Compensation Medical Services Reimbursement Dispute Dismissal” that purported to dispose of the Reimbursement Petition filed by Wal-Mart and Sedgwick on January 28, 2011. The order provided as follows, in relevant part: There is no information to suggest that Wal- Mart, Inc. or Sedgwick CMS discontinued authorization for treatment and care for [D.F.] by the Respondent herein during the specified dates of service. * * * The issues raised by Wal-Mart, Inc. and Sedgwick CMS are utilization review issues, not appropriate for resolution in reimbursement dispute resolution proceedings under section 440.13(7), Florida Statutes. The utilization issues were resolved by the Department in its MSS Case No. ROV00039 and Department Case No. 143376 [i.e., the case against Dr. Villalba that was dismissed via Consent Order]. Therefore, this Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute in MMS Case No. 20110531-001 is hereby DISMISSED.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2016.
The Issue The issues for consideration are those allegations set forth in an Administrative Complaint brought by the State of Florida Department of Professional Regulation (Department), in which the Respondent, Scarlett Jones, R.N., is accused of various violations of Chapter 464, Florida Statutes. Through Count One it is said that the Respondent transcribed an order for Heparin to be administered to the patient K.W. as 15,000 units when the physician's order quoted the dosage as 5,000 units, and that the patient was given two dosages at 15,000 units as opposed to the required 5,000 units. In an additional accusation against the Respondent, related to patient care, Respondent is said to have failed to indicate in the patient K.W.'s nursing notes, on or about May 16, 1988, that an administration of Aminophylline was to be restarted during the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. Further, it is alleged that this substance was not restarted until 8:00 a.m. on the next day as discovered by a subsequent shift employee. As a consequence, Respondent is said to have violated Section 464.018(1) (f), Florida Statutes, related to alleged unprofessional conduct. Count Two to the Administrative Complaint alleges that on or about June 4, 1988, the Respondent who was assigned to care for the patient E.J., was told by a co-worker that the patient had fallen out of bed and soiled himself and that the Respondent failed to respond to the patient's needs after repeated requests. Eventually, it is alleged that the patient's wife assisted him back to bed and the co-worker took care of the patient's hygiene. As a consequence, Respondent is said to have violated Section 464.018(1)(f), Florida Statutes, related to unprofessional conduct and that she violated Section 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes, for knowingly violating a rule or order of the Board of Nursing. Finally, the third count of the Administrative Complaint alleges that the Respondent, on or about June 14, 1988, was found asleep while on duty in violation of Section 464.018(1)(f), Florida Statutes, an act of unprofessional conduct, including, but not limited to, the failure to conform to minimum standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. For these alleged violations, the Department seeks to impose disciplinary action which could include revocation or suspension, the imposition of an administrative fine and/or other relief which the Board of Nursing might deem appropriate.
Findings Of Fact During the relevant periods under consideration in this Administrative Complaint the Respondent was licensed by the Department as a registered nurse and subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Nursing in disciplinary matters. The license number was 1702172. On April 11, 1988, Respondent took employment with Gadsden Memorial Hospital in Gadsden County, Florida, in a position of charge nurse on the Medical-Surgical Pediatrics Unit, also known as "Med-Surg. Ped." That unit provides short term acute care for post-operative patients, acute medical patients, and acute pediatric patients, some of which require 24-hour observation. Response to the needs of the patients is given by three nursing shifts in each day which begins with shifts of 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., followed by the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. and then 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. on the following morning. Upon hiring, Respondent was assigned to the work the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. and was the only registered nurse on duty during that shift. Among the responsibilities of the charge nurse at the time under examination here, was the assessment of patients on the unit as well as an awareness of the abilities of those other employees who were working in this shift. This was in an effort to provide direct supervision of critical care patients and included supervision of activities performed by a Nurse Technician. Respondent was more directly responsible for critical patients. Other duties included making frequent rounds and checking vital signs in an attempt to insure that the patients were stable. Respondent as charge nurse on "Med-Surg. Ped." could not leave the floor without notification of the house supervisor, another registered nurse. This person would replace the Respondent on those occasions where the Respondent would need to vacate the floor. In addition it was expected that the Respondent would notify those personnel who were working with her on the unit, where she intended to go and how long she would be gone. Before departing it was expected that the Respondent would check the stability of patients. physician's Orders were written on March 2D, 1988, in anticipation of the admission of patient K.W. to Gadsden Memorial Hospital to "Med. Surg Ped." The admission was under orders by Dr. Halpren. Among those orders was the prescription of Heparin, 5,000 units, subcutaneously every 12 hours. The Physician's Orders in terms of legibility are not immediately discernible but can be read with a relatively careful observation of the physician's orders. A copy of those may be found at Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. The problem that tends to arise is that on the line which immediately follows the orders related to Heparin 5,000 units, is found the word hysterectomy written in such a fashion that the initial portion of the letter "H" might be seen as being placed on the prior line giving the unit dosage of the Heparin the appearance of being 15,000 units as opposed to 5,000 units. On April 11, 1988, K.W. was admitted to Gadsden Memorial Hospital as anticipated. At the time of admission the Physician's Orders previously described were provided. Surgery was scheduled and the patient file was made on "Med-Surg. Ped." Under the practices within this hospital, the ward clerk was responsible for transcribing physician's orders onto the patient's Medication Administration Record. This was done here by the ward clerk, S. Diggs. This is to be checked for accuracy by the charge nurse, to include Respondent, with the fixing of the signature to this Medication Administration Record verifying the accuracy of the clerk's entries. Respondent initialed the Medication Administration Record for the patient designating that Heparin in the amount of 15,000 units Q-12, meaning to be given every 12 hours was the requirement, and had been administered in that dosage. This may be seen in a copy of the Medication Administration Record which is part of Petitioner's Exhibit No. The patient was to undergo extensive abdominal surgery, to include the possibility of a hysterectomy and the incorrect administration of Heparin might promote problems with bleeding. The incorrect amount of Heparin as a 15,000 unit dosage was given to K.W. on two occasions. Another patient who was admitted to the ward which Respondent was responsible for as charge nurse was the patient A.W. Physician's Orders were written for that patient by Dr. Woodward on May 16, 1988. A copy of the Physician's Orders may be found at Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence. Among the substances prescribed was Aminophylline drip 20 milligrams per hour I.V. This patient had been admitted to the pediatric unit with a diagnosis of asthma and prescribed the Aminophylline to aid the patient's breathing. It was expected that patient A.W. was to be administered two dosages of Aminophylline, an intermediate dosage to be given every few hours in a larger quantity, and a continuous drip to run at 20 milligrams per hour. Within Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6 are nursing notes made by Respondent concerning A.W. On May 17, 1988, between the hours of 12:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. it is noted that Respondent was having trouble with patient A.W.'s I.V. She states that the I.V. site was assessed and had to be pulled and that she was not able to reinsert due to the uncooperative nature of this child. The I.V. was restarted by the house supervisor nurse. An entry at 6:30 a.m. made by the Respondent describes the I.V. position as acceptable. When the shift changed at 7:00 a.m. the new charge nurse did not find the Aminophylline drip in progress, as called for, and this is noted in a 7:30 a.m. entry made by this registered nurse, Sherry Shiro. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence is a Confidential Incident Report prepared by the Gadsden Memorial Hospital concerning allegations against the Respondent. They have to do with an alleged incident that occurred around 5:00 a.m. and contain the purported observations by Lucinda Mack, a licensed practical nurse on duty at that time, and they were received on June 15, 1988, by Carol Riddle, R.N., Director of Nursing at Gadsden Memorial Hospital, and the person responsible for investigating this matter. The copy of the Confidential Incident Report contained observations about the alleged failure of treatment by the Respondent directed in the matter of the patient E.J. These remarks are hearsay. They do not corroborate competent evidence at hearing concerning any oversight by the Respondent in the treatment of the patient E.J. On or about June 14, 1988, the Director of Nursing, Carol Riddle, called the night supervisor Michelle Warring at 2:00 a.m. to ascertain if the Respondent was on duty. Respondent was working on that date. At 2:15 a.m. Warring advised Riddle that the Respondent could not be found and Riddle went to the hospital at that time. When she arrived at the facility at 3:00 a.m. she went to "Med-Surg. Ped." where she was informed by the communications clerk that Lucinda Mack, LPN, was the only nurse on duty in that unit, and that the clerk did not know where Respondent could be found. Riddle and Warring then looked through the patient rooms in "Med-Surg. Ped." but could not find the Respondent. One and a half hours after commencing the search Riddle located the Respondent in a different wing of the hospital which contains a respiratory therapy manager's office. Respondent was there with her husband asleep, with the door locked and lights off. At that time she was the only registered nurse on duty in "Med-Surg. Ped." which had six patients receiving care on that evening. Respondent was not performing her duties or supervising those other persons who worked with her on the unit. Respondent had been observed asleep at her nurses' station desk on several other occasions by Dale Storey, a registered nurse working at the Gadsden Memorial Hospital. Linda Reed, a nurse technician at Gadsden Memorial Hospital had observed the Respondent asleep on duty. As commented on by nurse Riddle, who is qualified to give expert opinion testimony about the performance of the Respondent in her nursing practice, the conduct set out before in these findings of fact constitutes unprofessional conduct in the practice of nursing, in a situation which the Respondent knew what her duties were as charge nurse and failed to perform them at an adequate level.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which fines the Respondent in the amount of $1,000 for the violation related to the care of patient K.W. as set out in Count One and for sleeping on duty as set out in Count Three. And, finds that the violation related to patient A.W. as set out in Count One and the violation alleged in Count Two related to the patient E.J. were not proven. DONE and ENTERED this 19 day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19 day of April, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 88-5719 Petitioner's fact finding is subordinate to the finding in the Recommended Order with exception of paragraph 16 which is not relevant and reference within paragraph 34 to the date June 24, 1988, which should have been June 14, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa M. Bassett, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Scarlett Jones 2636 Mission Road, #138 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Judy Ritter, Executive Director Florida Board of Nursing 111 East Coastline Drive, Room 504 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a 120 bed skilled nursing home facility for the chronically ill. It has over 80 employees, and is owned by H.M.O. of Brandon, Florida. It is an employer within the meaning of Pinellas County Ordinance 84-10. The Petitioner is a mature, black woman who worked for Respondent as a certified nursing assistant for 14 years. She received average and above average evaluations during her tenure with Respondent, which ended on September 28, 1988. Other than the matters set forth herein, there were no other reports of patient abuse involving Petitioner during her employment with Respondent. By her demeanor and testimony at hearing, it is found that Petitioner had a sincere concern for the welfare of her patients, and was a dedicated employee whose life centered around her job and her patients. All of the witnesses testifying on behalf of the Respondent, as well as the patient involved in the alleged incidents which lead to the Petitioner's termination, are white. According to an incident report completed by Diane Roberts, former Director of Nursing, a patient at Respondent's nursing home, M.T., complained on September 28, 1988, that a black female aide fitting Petitioner's description had squeezed her hand very hard, causing her pain. While looking into this matter, Respondent's former Administrator, Barbara Johnson, learned of an earlier alleged slapping incident, which Roseanne Ingroia, a nursing aide, then confirmed. An incident report was completed about the slapping incident by Antoinette Clausi, Director of Nursing, on September 29, 1988. Ingroia testified that she heard the Petitioner and the patient, M.T., arguing on September 11, 1988, and that she heard a slap. She did not appear clear and certain in her testimony, however, and her testimony about her exact location when this incident occurred was contradictory. As a result of these allegations of abusive conduct toward the patient, M.T., Petitioner was called at home on September 28, 1988, and was told she was being terminated by Respondent. Respondent acted without giving Petitioner an opportunity to even address the charges being made against her. The allegations were taken at face value, and without any meaningful investigation at all, Respondent terminated the 14 year employment of this dedicated employee. This allegation of abuse was eventually reported to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) sometime after Petitioner was terminated, and after preliminary investigation, the Department initially classified the report as "confirmed". However, on January 24, 1989, the classification of this report was changed to "indicated", and the Petitioner is no longer identified as the "alleged perpetrator". However, since Petitioner was terminated prior to any report of alleged abuse being filed with the Department, the appearance of Petitioner's name on the abuse registry as a result of the filing of this allegation could not have been a factor in the Respondent's decision to terminate her. The Respondent acted precipitously, without any reasonable investigation, and before any report of alleged abuse was filed with the Department. On or about October 5, 1988, Petitioner filed a complaint of discrimination with the Clearwater Office of Community Relations against Respondent alleging that she was unlawfully terminated due to her race, black. After investigation by staff, a recommendation of probable cause was made, and after conciliation efforts failed, the matter was referred by the Office of Community Relations to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal hearing. It was established that patient abuse or neglect is set forth in the Respondent's Personnel Policies as a specific cause for immediate termination without prior warning. Employees who are terminated for cause are ineligible for rehire. No testimony was received from anyone who witnessed the alleged hand squeezing incident, and Ingroia's testimony about the alleged slapping incident was not convincing, especially in view of the reclassification of this report of abuse by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services from "confirmed" to "indicated". The former Director of Nursing, Diane Roberts, who apparently interviewed the patient, M.T., did not testify, nor did the former Administrator who actually terminated Petitioner, Barbara Johnson. Thus, there is no competent substantial evidence in the record which would support a finding that Petitioner abused the patient, M.T., and that therefore Respondent had cause to terminate her. As such, Respondent's action is inconsistent with, and violates its Personnel Policies. Thus, Petitioner is not ineligible for rehire since she was not terminated for cause. Respondent terminated Petitioner immediately, and without notice on September 28, 1988. A report of abuse had not yet been filed against Petitioner with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and therefore, at the time of her termination, there was no reasonable appearance of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action taken by Respondent. With the reclassification of this report by the Department to "indicated", and with the Respondent's failure to establish at formal hearing that Petitioner abused M.T. in any way, there is no legitimate, con-discriminatory basis for Respondent's action, and for its refusing to rehire Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the City of Clearwater, Community Relations Board, enter a Final Order finding that Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner based upon race, and ordering that upon the occurrence of the next available vacancy, Respondent reinstate Petitioner to her former position at her former salary, plus any salary increases which have been granted in the interim, and with full back pay and benefits from the date of her termination to the date of her rehire. DONE AND ENTERED this 15 day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15 day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Forbes 508 East Boyer Street Tarpon Springs, FL 34688 David A. Crosby, Administrator Tarpon Springs Convalescent Center P. O. Box 1058 Tarpon Springs, FL 34688-1058 Ronald McElrath, Manager Office of Community Relations P. O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 34618 Miles A. Lance, Esquire P. O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 34618
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation filed in this cause, the testimony of the witnesses, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Respondent, Randall E. Pitone, M.D., is a medical doctor licensed (license number ME 0029098) by the State of Florida since 1976. Respondent is a diplomate in psychiatry having received certification from the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent was in the practice of psychiatry in the State of Florida. Respondent has been affiliated with or authorized to practice in a number of hospitals in the Pinellas County area. He enjoys a good reputation among the community of practicing psychiatrists and has covered for several of them during the course of his practice. The Respondent became Patient 1's treating psychiatrist in 1982 when the patient was almost 18 years of age. Patient 1 has a borderline personality disorder and other problems for which she required treatment. In order to more effectively provide treatment for borderline patients, Respondent attended at least two courses related to borderline personality disorder during the early 1980s. From September, 1982 through May, 1988, Respondent treated Patient 1 with individual psychotherapy. During this time, Patient 1 was hospitalized on several occasions and Respondent counseled with her within the hospital setting and at his office. Borderline patients are typically very needy, seductive, and manipulative in their approach to others. During her period of treatment Patient 1 frequently attempted to initiate a romantic relationship with Respondent who diplomatically refused her advances. On each of these occasions, Respondent explained to Patient 1 that he could not have a romantic relationship and continue therapy. Also during this period, Respondent was married and devoted to his family. In May, 1988, Respondent and Patient 1 ended their formal physician- patient relationship. Patient 1 was not sincerely pursuing therapy. Additionally, she had a new boyfriend with whom she seemed happy. Respondent encouraged her to seek therapy but she mistakenly believed that she did not need it. Although she would periodically drop by to visit with Respondent, she did not make appointments for therapy. Nor did she obtain therapy from another psychiatrist despite Respondent's encouragement for her to do so. Respondent's wife left him sometime in 1988. Her departure was very difficult for Respondent. The couple divorced in June, 1988, and Respondent's former wife remarried shortly thereafter and moved to Georgia. Respondent's children resided with him until sometime in 1989 when they moved to their mother's home. Subsequently, Respondent allowed Patient 1 to move into his home. She resided with him from June, 1989 until April, 1990. Throughout this period of cohabitation, Respondent included Patient 1 in his family activities. She went to his brother's home with him for Christmas and went on a cruise to Jamaica with his relatives. Respondent did not hide their relationship from his family or friends. During this period Respondent and Patient 1 engaged in sexual intercourse. Patient 1 has been hospitalized on several occasions since 1982. During one such hospitalization, on or about October 30, 1988 (after formal therapy had ended), Dr. Helm consulted with the Respondent regarding Patient 1's suspected drug abuse. Patient 1 has a serious addiction to alcohol, cocaine, and crack cocaine. This addiction dates at least as far back as the summer of 1989, and perhaps earlier. Respondent knew of Patient 1's addiction to cocaine and of her abuse of other substances. Respondent prescribed medications for Patient 1 in a misguided effort to wean her from street drugs. Whenever Respondent refused to give Patient 1 prescriptions, she would become outraged and destructive. On one such occasion, Patient 1 exited the car in which the couple was travelling and bolted in front of an oncoming truck. As a result Patient 1 was hospitalized with a broken pelvis. Between May, 1988, and March, 1990, Respondent wrote or authorized the prescriptions listed in attachment A for Patient 1. These prescriptions were given to Patient 1 despite the fact that she was no longer formally receiving psychotherapy from Respondent. Moreover, many of the prescriptions issued are not of the type generally associated with the treatment of psychiatric patients since they are more commonly associated with pain relief. Amitriptyline is a legend drug. Dalmane is a brand name of flurazepam, a legend drug and controlled substance. Valium is a brand name of diazepam, a legend drug and controlled substance. Xanax is a brand name of alprazolam, a legend drug and controlled substance. Darvocet is a brand name of a compound containing propoxyphene, a legend drug and controlled substance. Tylenol #3 and Tylenol #2 are brand names of acetaminophen or apap with codeine, legend drugs and controlled substances. Percodan is a brand name of oxycodone with aspirin, a legend drug and controlled substance. Percocet is a brand name of oxycodone with acetaminophen or apap, a legend drug and controlled substance. Legend drugs are required by federal or state law to be dispensed only on a prescription. Respondent inappropriately prescribed legend drugs/controlled substances to Patient 1. Respondent prescribed drugs for Patient 1 after they were living together and engaging in sexual relations. The types and quantities of prescriptions written by Respondent for Patient 1 were not justified by examinations and records maintained by the Respondent, were not issued in the course of medical practice, and were clearly excessive. By prescribing the drugs listed in attachment A, Respondent failed to provide Patient 1 with that level of care, skill and treatment, which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as acceptable under the conditions and circumstances of this case. Respondent also failed to seek consultation in connection with his concerns over Patient 1. Instead, Respondent set himself up as her sole provider and savior. This action was medically inappropriate and further evidences Respondent's loss of objectivity in this instance. In effect, Respondent became a patient in need of treatment as a result of his erroneous and misguided efforts to assist Patient 1. On April 11, 1990, an order of emergency restriction of Respondent's license was issued by Larry Gonzalez, acting as Secretary of the Department. That order placed specific restrictions on the Respondent's license which include: -the prescription of controlled substances utilizing sequentially numbered triplicate prescriptions; -the review of each prescription by a supervisory physician; -the prohibition of providing medical services to Patient 1; and -the submission of monthly reports by a monitoring physician which includes specific information regarding Respondent's practice, any problems, a review of prescriptions and patient records. To date, Respondent has complied with the restrictions placed on his license. Additionally, Respondent has sought and obtained psychiatric counseling in connection with his errors in thinking related to his relationship with Patient 1. Respondent developed a rescue fantasy in which he perceived that he alone could assist Patient 1 recover from her illnesses. This was not a medically sound approach to the dilemma within which Respondent became embroiled. As Respondent fell in love with Patient 1, he lost his professional perspective and undertook this ill-fated rescue of her. An examination of Respondent's medical records does not suggest that the activities which gave rise to the allegations of this case have occurred regarding other patients. From the circumstances of this case, it is unlikely another incident or series of incidents of this type will recur. Sexual activity between a psychiatrist and his patient has detrimental effects on the patient. In this instance, that conduct had detrimental effects on both the Respondent and Patient 1. Since Respondent fell prey to Patient 1's manipulative nature, his judgment became impaired and she was able to orchestrate an inappropriate response from Respondent. It cannot be found, however, that Respondent used their relationship to induce Patient 1 to engage in sexual activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Sections 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes, and imposing the following penalties: suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of one year during which time the Respondent shall continue counseling, followed by a two year period of probation under the terms set forth in the emergency order issued April 11, 1990, together with an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00. DONE and ENTERED this 14 day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14 day of November, 1990. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-3276 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 20 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 21 it is accepted that Respondent provided the prescriptions as described, however, he had formally ended psychotherapy of Patient 1 in May, 1988. It was inappropriate for him to issue the prescriptions. Paragraphs 22A. and 22C. are accepted. Paragraph 22D. is rejected to the extent that it finds Respondent did not maintain appropriate records, otherwise, rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Note: there is no paragraph 22B. Paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraph 24A. is accepted. Paragraphs 24B. and 24C. are rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. With regard to paragraph 25 it is accepted that Respondent prescribed substances for Patient 1 inappropriately and excessively, otherwise the paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 26, 27, 30 and 31 (because it allowed her to manipulate Respondent into prescribing inappropriately--he should have been the physician not a co-patient) are accepted. Paragraphs 28 and 29 are rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. To the extent addressed in findings paragraphs 3 through 7, Respondent's paragraphs 4 through 9 are accepted; otherwise rejected as irrelevant or a recitation of testimony. With the exception of the last sentence, paragraph 10 is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as speculative or conjecture--it is accepted that Respondent was in a stress-filled, emotional situation. Paragraphs 11 through 14 are accepted. Paragraph 15 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 16 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 17 is accepted. Paragraphs 18 through 19 are accepted. Paragraphs 20 through 23 are rejected as recitation of testimony but see findings of fact paragraphs 27, 28, and 29. Paragraphs 24 through 28 are rejected as recitation of testimony. With regard to paragraph 29 it is accepted that the Respondent does not pose a threat to the public under his current circumstances. Otherwise, paragraph 29 is rejected as recitation of testimony or irrelevant. Paragraph 30 is accepted. Paragraph 31 is rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraph 32 is accepted. Paragraph 33 is accepted. ATTACHMENT A Date Drug Prescribed 5/14/88 Dalmane 6/02/88 Valium 7/15/88 Percodan 7/20/88 Percodan 7/27/88 Xanax 7/27/88 Percodan 8/12/88 Percodan 9/06/88 Percodan 9/13/88 Zantac 9/23/88 Percodan 10/7/88 Darvocet N-100 10/29/88 Xanax 11/18/88 Percodan 01/6/89 Xanax 1 mg 01/09/89 Xanax 1 mg 01/10/89 Percodan 01/11/89 Xanax 01/16/89 Xanax 01/18/89 Xanax 01/21/89 Xanax 01/20/89 Tylenol 3 01/24/89 Tylenol 3 01/25/89 Tylenol 3 01/26/89 Xanax 01/31/89 Xanax 02/02/89 Percodan 02/04/89 Xanax 1mg 02/04/89 Percodan 02/04/89 Xanax 1mg 02/09/89 Percodan 02/10/89 Xanax 02/10/89 Percodan 03/03/89 Xanax 03/03/89 Percodan 03/13/89 Percodan 03/14/89 Xanax 1mg 03/17/89 Percodan 03/20/89 Xanax 03/24/89 Xanax 03/24/89 Percodan 03/27/89 Percodan 03/27/89 Xanax 03/29/89 Percodan 03/31/89 Percodan 04/07/89 Xanax 1mg 04/10/89 Percocet 5mg 04/11/89 Percodan 04/21/89 Percodan 04/24/89 Percodan 04/25/89 Percodan 04/25/89 Xanax 04/26/89 Percodan 04/28/89 Percodan 04/28/89 Xanax 04/29/89 Percodan 05/01/89 Xanax 05/02/89 Percodan 05/04/89 Percodan 05/05/89 Percodan 05/09/89 Xanax 05/11/89 Xanax 05/14/89 Xanax 1 mg 05/18/89 Xanax 1 mg 05/20/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/06/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/08/89 Percodan 06/09/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/09/89 Percodan 06/14/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/14/89 Percodan 06/16/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/23/89 Xanax 1mg 06/24/89 Percodan 06/26/89 Percodan 07/01/89 Xanax 07/07/89 Xanax 1 mg 07/07/89 Percodan 07/10/89 Percodan 07/15/89 Percodan 07/17/89 Percodan 07/20/89 Percodan 07/21/89 Valium 10 mg 07/21/89 Percodan 07/28/89 Percodan 07/30/89 Valium 07/31/89 Percodan 08/02/89 Percodan 08/04/89 Percodan 08/05/89 Valium 10 mg 08/07/89 Valium 10 mg 08/07/89 Percodan 08/09/89 Percodan 08/20/89 Valium 10 mg 09/01/89 Percodan 09/04/89 Valium 09/06/89 Percodan 09/19/89 Percodan 09/22/89 Valium 09/22/89 Percodan 09/28/89 Percodan 10/01/89 Percodan 10/02/89 Percodan 10/02/89 Valium 10 mg 10/04/89 Valium 10 mg 10/04/89 Percodan 10/05/89 Xanax 1 mg 10/06/89 Percodan 10/13/89 Darvocet-N. 100 10/13/89 Valium 10/13/89 Tylenol #2 10/17/89 Tylenol #2 10/19/89 Valium 5 mg 10/20/89 Tylenol #3 10/24/89 Tylenol #3 10/24/89 Valium 5 mg 10/25/89 Tylenol #3 10/26/89 Percocet 10/30/89 Percocet 10/30/89 Tylenol #4 10/30/89 Valium 10 mg 11/03/89 Percodan 11/17/89 Percodan 11/17/89 Valium 10 mg 11/24/89 Valium 10 mg 11/24/89 Percocet 11/27/89 Percocet 11/29/89 Percocet 01/02/90 Valium 10 mg 01/02/90 Percodan 01/12/90 Tylenol #3 01/12/90 Valium 10 mg 01/13/90 Xanax 1 mg 01/17/90 Tylenol #3 02/04/90 Xanax 1 mg 02/17/90 Percodan 02/20/90 Percodan 02/28/90 Percodan 03/10/90 Percodan 03/16/90 Percodan 03/17/90 Percodan COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb Chief Trial Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 730 Sterling Street, Ste. 201 Tampa, Florida 33609 Grover C. Freeman FREEMAN, LOPEZ & KELLY, P.A. 4600 West Cypress, Ste. 500 Tampa, Florida 33607 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 458.331(1)(g), (j), (m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.20 and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Ronald L. Cohen, M.D. (Dr. Cohen), is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0024014. Dr. Cohen's last known address is 7800 West Oakland Park Boulevard, Suite 216, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Dr. Cohen's area of practice is urology, and he is board certified. He has been practicing in Fort Lauderdale since 1976. During his years of practice, he has enjoyed an excellent professional reputation. Between on or about July 2, 1990, through on or about May 16, 1992, Dr. Cohen treated Patient R.G. for various complaints. On or about July 2, 1990, Patient R.G., a thirty-four year-old female with a history of chemical dependency from the age of twelve for which she first underwent treatment in or about 1986, presented to Dr. Cohen with voiding complaints including post void dysuria, frequency, urgency, and urgency incontinence. However, such information about chemical dependency was unknown to Dr. Cohen until a subsequent time. Patient R.G. did not reveal to Dr. Cohen either her history of chemical dependency or treatment of that dependency. Dr. Cohen performed a physical examination of Patient R.G. wherein Dr. Cohen dilated Patient R.G.'s uretha. Dr. Cohen noted that Patient R.G.'s urinalysis was entirely within normal limits. Dr. Cohen then diagnosed Patient R.G. with urethritis, urthrel stenosis, and trigonitis. Dr. Cohen prescribed Patient R.G. a three-day supply of Noroxin and pyridium to improve Patient R.G.'s symptoms. Noroxin is an antibacterial agent indicated for the treatment of adults with complicated urinary tract infections. Pyridium is an analgesic agent indicated for the symptomatic relief of pain, burning, urgency frequency and other discomfort arising from irritation of the lower urinary tract mucosa. Patient R.G.'s symptoms persisted. On or about July 13, 1990, Patient R.G. underwent a cystoscopy, urethal dilation, and hydraulic bladder distention by Dr. Cohen at Outpatient Surgical Services in order to rule out interstitial cystitis. Dr. Cohen's postoperative impressions were as follows: Interstitial cystitis (inflammatory lesion of the bladder) and urethral stenosis. On or about July 17, 1990, Patient R.G. presented to Dr. Cohen's office in severe pain secondary to the cystoscopy and bladder distention. At that time, Patient R.G. complained of feeling bloated suprapubically. Dr. Cohen instilled dimethyl sulfoxide to relieve Patient R.G.'s pain. Patient R.G.'s symptoms were subsequently temporarily resolved. On or about January 19, 1991, Patient R.G. next presented to Dr. Cohen with complaints of a recurrent episode of urinary frequency and burning on the previous day. Shortly thereafter, in early 1991, Dr. Cohen asked Patient R.G. to go to lunch. Dr. Cohen and Patient R.G. subsequently began a social relationship which included sexual intercourse. At the time that Dr. Cohen initiated the relationship with Patient R.G. he was aware of the prohibitions against such conduct, knew he had choices available to him, but declined to exercise professional self-discipline. Dr. Cohen did exercise influence as Patient R.G.'s physician for the purpose of engaging in sexual relations. Dr. Cohen has never had a sexual relationship with any other patient. On or about April 8, 1991, Dr. Cohen wrote a prescription for thirty units of Valium 10 mg. for Patient R.G. who had at that time complained to Dr. Cohen of anxiety due to marital difficulties. Valium is defined as a legend drug by Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains diazepam, a Schedule IV controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Valium is indicated for the management of anxiety disorders or for the short-term relief of symptoms of anxiety. Dr. Cohen's medical records of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition do not include any reference to the Valium prescription and therefore the records fail to justify his prescription of Valium, a controlled substance indicated for the treatment of anxiety, to Patient R.G. On May 16, 1992, Dr. Cohen wrote a prescription for thirty units of Prozac 20 mg. Prozac is defined as a legend drug by Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains Fluoxetine Hydrochloride which is not a controlled substance. Prozac is indicated for the treatment of depression. Dr. Cohen's medical records of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition do not include any reference to the Prozac prescription and therefore the records fail to justify his prescription of Prozac. Dr. Cohen inappropriately prescribed Prozac, a legend drug indicated for the treatment of depression. Prozac, however, was not indicated in the treatment of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition, interstitial cystitis. Dr. Cohen admitted to having prescribed Prozac to Patient R.G. as a favor so that Patient R.G. did not have to see her psychologist for said prescription. Dr. Cohen admitted to having a sexual relationship with Patient R.G. Dr. Cohen, by virtue of his sexual relationship with Patient R.G. and his inappropriate prescribing of Prozac for Patient R. G., failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Dr. Cohen underwent an evaluation by Thomas J. Goldschmidt, M.D., a specialist in neurology and psychiatry, in conjunction with Richard Westberry, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist. Dr. Goldschmidt issued a report on their evaluation in which he stated: We see no evidence of any exploitative tendency regarding Dr. [Cohen] in his relationship with this patient. There is no evidence of any sexual addiction component. And we do not feel that his is behavior that is likely to reoccur or compromise his ability to practice urology. We see this as an isolated incident that Dr. [Cohen] approached in a very naive fashion and was primarily orchestrated by the dynamics of a sexually provocative, aggressive female who proposed a sexual act that was nonthreating (sic) to the patient while simultaneously providing ego gratification for longstanding, underlying emotional conflicts dealing with castration fears and anxiety. Dr. Cohen voluntarily entered into a contract with the Physician's Recovery Network to assist him in dealing with his despondency and depression. Dr. Cohen continues to see Dr. Westberry on a weekly basis for his despondency. Dr. Cohen has never had any disciplinary action taken against his license nor has he been dismissed from any position at a hospital at which he had staff privileges. Dr. Cohen has staff privileges at four hospitals. Dr. Cohen was Vice Chief of Staff at one of the hospitals until he voluntarily resigned that position when this case surfaced in order to avoid embarrassment to the hospital.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Dr. Cohen violated Sections 458.331(1)(g), (j), (m), (q) and (t) as set forth in Counts 1-5 in the Administrative Complaint, and imposing a $5,000 fine for the violations of Sections 458.331(1)(g) and (j), Florida Statutes and a $5,000 fine for violations of Sections 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statues, for a total of $10,000, and placing Dr. Cohen on probation for two years under terms and conditions to be set by the Board of Medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-3274 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-9: Accepted. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 12-14: Accepted. Paragraph 15: Rejected as irrelevant because the administrative complaint did not state such a violationas it related to the valium but only as to the Prozac. The violation relating to valium was the record keeping. Paragraphs 16-19: Accepted. Paragraph 20: Accepted except as to the valium. The administrative compliant did not allege such a violationas it related to valium. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Accepted as to his professional reputation. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 5: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 6: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder is unnecessary. Paragraphs 7-13: Accepted. Paragraph 14: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 15: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Dr. Cohen is the party whoinitiated the social relationship with R.G. when heasked her out to lunch. He was physically attracted tothe patient and that is why he asked her out. Paragraph 16: Accepted. Paragraph 17: The first sentence is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found because Dr. Cohen did prescribe medication forR.G. which had nothing to do with the complaints forwhich she was seeing Dr. Cohen. Paragraph 18: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. See paragraph 17. Paragraphs 19-22: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 23: The first and second sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The thirdsentence is accepted to the extent that he has enteredcounseling. Paragraphs 24: Accepted to the extent that he is in counseling and that such a relationship will not likelyoccur again. Paragraph 25: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 26: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance that such a relationship is unlikely to happen in the future. Rejected to the extent that it implies that R.G. gavefree, full informed consent to the sexual activity. Paragraphs 28-29: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 30: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 31-34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 36-39: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald G. Korman, Esquire Korman, Schorr and Wagenheim The Dart Building 2101 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 400 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire 2851 Remington Green Circle, Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32308-3749 Albert Peacock, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6506 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Agency For Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Jerome W. Hoffman General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
