The Issue The issue in this case is whether or not the position Petitioner held with Brevard County, Florida, from December 5, 2005, to October 31, 2006, entitled him to service credit in the Florida Retirement System (FRS).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a member of the FRS. He first worked for the Florida Department of Transportation in October 1976 and remained with the Department of Transportation until January 1980, when he began working for Osceola County, Florida. He worked for Osceola County until May 1990, when he began working for Brevard County, Florida. He worked for Brevard County until 2004. At the time he was laid off by Brevard County, Petitioner had 25.5 years of credible service in the FRS. Petitioner's expressed desire was to complete 30 years of credible service in the FRS. To that end, he met with Brevard County officials seeking re-employment in a position that would qualify him for additional credible service. In October 2005, Petitioner met with several Brevard County employees, including the county manager and Human Resource director, seeking a job that would enable him to get 4.5 more years of credible FRS service. As a result of his meetings and efforts, on October 28, 2005, Petitioner was offered a part-time position as a park ranger with duties that included "monitoring any scheduled activities at Rodes [sic] Park on Friday and Saturday evenings from approximately 9:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m., to ensure orderly behavior of park patrons." Accepting the offered position, Petitioner was employed as a Park Ranger I, with the stated job description. The following information appears on a Brevard County document titled "Authorization to Place Special Services Employee on Payroll" which memorialized his employment: Working Title: Park Ranger I, Part Time (less than 40 hrs per week); Hire Date: 12/03/05; and How many pay periods do you anticipate this job will last? 19 (PP) 38wks. Also noted on this document, "Enroll in FRS 95HA." An inter-office memorandum dated November 17, 2005, from Jeff Whitehead, south area parks operations manager to Peggy Busacca, county manager, regarding Petitioner's hiring, states in part: "This position will require an individual that has an extremely flexible schedule and that can be asked, at times, to report with very little notice. Furthermore, the majority of shifts will be on Friday and Saturday evenings, generally from 8:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. . . In addition, providing Mr. Bright with this opportunity will render him eligible to collect his retirement benefits." Frank Abbate, Brevard County Human Resource director, emailed Petitioner on December 19, 2005, stating, in part: "I'm glad to see that . . . you were able to get a position with Parks and Recreation that meets both[,] one of their Department's needs[,] as well as your interest in continuing to earn FRS service credits. I wish you the best and look forward to your achieving your goal of thirty years service under FRS!" Brevard County knew that Petitioner's employment was conditioned on his inclusion as a participant in the FRS, and, in fact, enrolled him in the FRS by making appropriate contributions on his behalf to FRS. At no time did Brevard County advise Petitioner that he was not participating in the FRS. Petitioner relied on Brevard County's assertion that he was an enrolled member of the FRS. Petitioner was hired with the mutual expectation that he would be available to work at Rhodes Park on any Friday and Saturday nights from 8:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. and that the employment would continue for 4.5 years so Petitioner would be able to obtain 30 years of credible FRS service. There was nothing "temporary" in the expectation of Petitioner and his employer regarding the duration of employment. During the period in question, December 2005 through October 2006, Petitioner worked at least one day per month. Petitioner's employment was continuing, not temporary, on-call, in that he was scheduled to be available to work at his assigned responsibility every Friday and Saturday. While Petitioner did not work every Friday and Saturday night, Petitioner did, in fact, work every Friday and Saturday night during the period in question, as requested by his employer, Brevard County. That is, he never failed to perform his assigned duties when requested. Petitioner was finally notified on November 7, 2007, that he was ineligible for participation in FRS. During this nearly two-year period of employment, Petitioner satisfactorily performed his employment responsibilities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Thomas L. Bright, is eligible for participation in the Florida Retirement System, while employed by Brevard County from December 3, 2005, through October 31, 2006. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Brian D. Solomon, Esquire Brian D. Solomon, P.L. 101 East 13th Street St. Cloud, Florida 34769 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue in this case is whether James B. Anderson, a deceased retiree in the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, selected Option 1 (maximum retiree’s monthly benefit without any spousal benefit after death of the retiree) or Option 3 (a reduced retiree’s monthly benefit with continued spousal benefit after death of the retiree).
Findings Of Fact On June 30, 2007, the named Petitioner, James B. Anderson, terminated his employment with the University of South Florida (USF) at the age of 69 years and 9 months. At the time, his tenure at USF spanned 27 years and entitled him to receive pension benefits under the Florida State Retirement System Pension Plan. Also on June 30, 2007, Mr. Anderson completed an application for retirement. By applying Mr. Anderson, who was USF’s Director of Insurance and Risk Management, acknowledged that he would not be able to add service, change options, change his type of retirement (regular, disability, and early) or elect the Investment Plan once his retirement became final, which would be when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Also on July 2, 2007, Mr. Anderson and his wife, Mitzi Anderson, executed a Statutory Official Form FRS 110 before a notary public. By doing so, they selected Option 1, which provides the maximum pension benefits to Mr. Anderson until his death and no pension benefits to his wife after his death. The form stated clearly, in bold print, that Option 1 did not provide a continuing benefit after Mr. Anderson’s death and that the selection of Option 1 would be final when Mr. Anderson cashed or deposited any benefit payment. The next day, Mr. Anderson faxed the executed form to the Division of Retirement, which mailed Mr. Anderson an acknowledgement of receipt of the executed form. The acknowledgement included a clear statement, in bold print, that Mr. Anderson would not be able to change his benefit option selection after retirement and that his retirement would become final when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Mr. Anderson had second thoughts about his benefit option selection and contacted Donna Pepper, a retirement specialist employed by USF, to discuss changing to Option 3, which would give him a reduced pension benefit that would continue and be paid to his wife after his death. On July 6, 2007, Ms. Pepper sent an email to Mr. Anderson stating: “Here is another option selection form so that you can change your option.” The email attached a blank Statutory Official Form FRS 110. Ms. Pepper’s email also stated: “As we discussed, you may want to indicate that this form should supersede the previously submitted form.” It also advised the Petitioner to keep a copy for his records and send the original to the Division of Retirement as soon as possible. On July 20, 2007, at 12:53 p.m., a comment was entered on the Integrated Retirement Information System (IRIS) telephone log, documenting that Mr. Anderson was considering changing his benefit option selection and would “either FAX a form with a change of option on it or call to let them know he would not make the change.” The comment also documented that Jan Steller in retirement payroll was asked to hold Mr. Anderson’s first check until “this is resolved.” Later the same day, at 2:30 p.m., another comment was added to document that Mr. Anderson had called back to say he had decided to stay with Option 1 and that Jan Steller had been called back and asked “to release his check.” On July 31, 2007, an initial pension check was sent to Mr. Anderson in the amount of $4,188.45, in accordance with his selection of benefit Option 1, which was about $1,200 more than it would be under Option 3. This check was not immediately cashed. On August 31, 2007, a second Option 1 pension check in the same amount was sent to Mr. Anderson. On September 4, 2007, Mr. Anderson deposited the first two benefit checks into his Bank of America account. He continued to receive and cash or deposit monthly Option 1 benefit checks through January 2015. Mr. Anderson died on February 14, 2015. His wife notified the Division of Retirement, which stopped benefit payments in accordance with Mr. Anderson’s Option 1 selection. In March 2015, Mrs. Anderson found among her husband’s papers a copy of an executed Form FRS 110 that selected Option 3. Notwithstanding the telephonic communications with the Division of Retirement on July 20, 2007, the executed form indicates that it was notarized on July 23, 2007. Included in handwriting at the bottom of the executed form was the language, as suggested by Ms. Pepper: “This option supersedes option dated 7-02-07.” Mrs. Anderson also found a copy of Donna Pepper’s e-mail dated July 6, 2007, with instructions on how to change the selection of pension payments. Mrs. Anderson sent copies to the Division of Retirement and requested Option 3 spousal benefit payments. The Division of Retirement denied Mrs. Anderson’s request because it did not receive an Option 3 benefit selection before the copy Mrs. Anderson sent in March 2015. There was no evidence that the form was sent to the Division of Retirement before then. This, together with the fact that Mr. Anderson received and cashed or deposited seven and a half years’ worth of monthly Option 1 benefit checks, which were each over $1,200 more than the Option 3 benefit would have been, support a finding that Mr. Anderson actually selected Option 1 and never switched to Option 3. It is not clear from the evidence why Mr. Anderson kept a copy of an executed change from Option 1 to Option 3 after deciding not to send it to the Division of Retirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that Mr. Anderson selected benefit Option 1, finally and irrevocably and that Mrs. Anderson is not entitled to Option 3 spousal benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Nicholas E. Karatinos, Esquire Law Office of Karatinos Suite 101 18920 North Dale Mabry Highway Lutz, Florida 33540 (eServed) Joe Thompson, Esquire Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) J. Andrew Atkinson, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Ste. 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact The ultimate issue to be decided is whether the Petitioner is eligible to transfer from Florida Teacher Retirement Plan A to Florida Teacher Retirement Plan E and if so, whether he should be allowed to do so at this time. Robert L. Wonsick, the Petitioner, served as a classroom teacher in the Pinellas County School System for approximately 19 years. He resigned from his employment as a school teacher on approximately June 14, 1972 which resignation was accepted by his employer. At that time, Petitioner advised duly the employer through its agent, Jerry J. Switts, Director of Elementary Placement and Retirement, that he was unable to return too work the 72-73 school year due to illness; therefore he opted to, void his Florida Retirement System Transfer Ballot which would have been effective July 1, 1972, and requested disability retirement under the Teacher's Retirement System Plan. Petitioner was advised by Switt's to submit a written request for final decision on his application filed for disability retirement. As indicated by his petition filed on or about March 5, 1976, Petitioner takes the position that he should be entitled to transfer from Teachers Retirement System (hereinafter referred to as TRS) Plan A to TRS Plan E. Petitioner attempted to elect to transfer to the Florida Retirement System (hereinafter sometimes referred to as FRS) in 1972, the effective date to be July 1, 1972. This was denied inasmuch as Petitioner had already resigned his employment and never worked under or contributed to FRS, since by his own testimony he resigned in August, 1972, on or about the second day of pre-school. Respondent therefore denied the application for transfer based on Section 121.051(2)(a) 3(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner submitted his transfer ballot which was received by Respondent along with numerous other employees in 1972. By letter dated September 8, 1972, Petitioner requested that his transfer ballot be cancelled. Upon learning that Petitioner had in fact not worked after July 1, 1972, the transfer ballot was forwarded for reasons previously stated by way of "Application for Retirement Acknowledgement Form" dated September 11, 1972. Petitioner was requested to supply certain information to Respondent and by that same form was advised that he might wish to transfer from TRS Plan A to TRS Plan B. By letter dated December 12, 1972, Petitioner was supplied with estimates of retirement benefits showing that his monthly benefits under Plan A would be approximately $129.00 per month and the benefits under Plan E would be approximately $260.00 per month with the caveat that in order to effectuate the transfer to Plan E (an option open to him at that time) it would be necessary for him to pay in approximately $2,550 in contributions. Said contributions were necessary to meet the statutory contribution rates for Plan E if Petitioner desired to become a member of said plan. Section 238.09, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was also notified that he would have to remit $228.47 if he wished to receive retirement credit for a leave of absence utilized by him during school year 1970-1971. Within the next few days i.e., December 15, 1972, Petitioner indicated without question that he intended to remain a member of Plan A and remitted the requested $228.47 in required contributions to receive retirement credit for the above mentioned leave of absence. During a hiatus of a considerable period, adequate medical evidence was provided to Respondent to demonstrate Petitioner's disability and he began receiving monthly benefits under his monthly benefit i.e., Plan A. Thereafter on September 12, 1973, Petitioner inquired of Respondent concerning difference in benefits available under Plan A and Plan E, and possibility of changing from one plan to the other. Respondent answered Petitioner's inquiry by letter dated January 4, 1974, informing him of his previous choice to remain in Plan A. In addition, Respondent informed him that inasmuch as he had chosen not to remit the additional $2,550 necessary to transfer to Plan E in 1972, there were no provisions under the law allowing a change in retirement plans to be made after an employee had elected to retire under another plan. It should be noted that Petitioner had been advised in December of 1972 of all options available to him prior to the time of his retirement and his subsequent choice of Retirement Plan was unequivocally made by him. Again, on May 9, 1974, Petitioner requested that his claim be reevaluated whereupon Respondent replied by letter dated May 20, 1974, advising that Respondent had followed his (Petitioner's) written instructions and had taken the action permitting him to retire under plan A per his request. He was again reminded of the status of the law which did not permit a change in retirement plans. He was reminded that assuming for the sake of argument that his account could be reopened and benefits be computed under the Florida Retirement System, it would be necessary for him too contribute more than $2,200.00 to his account which he had previously elected not to do when given the option. Accordingly, his request for reevaluation was denied by Respondent. Again, by letter dated June 5, 1974, Petitioner requested that he be credited with approximately $2,250.00 that he would have been eligible to receive had he retired under Plan E and requested that said amount be credited to his account in order to facilitate his transfer into Plan E. These requests were denied by Respondent by letter dated June 13, 1974. Thereafter, Petitioner wrote a series of letters to various state officials and agencies including federal agencies requesting reconsideration of Respondent's decision to decline his request to reevaluate his claim that he had not been afforded ample information to assist him in making an informed choice concerning his retirement benefits. Petitioner appeared and testified at the hearing and recalled the series of transactions entered into by him in transferring from the various plans. He testified that he was aware of the difference in benefits or that he became aware of the difference in benefits after he had made the decision to transfer from Plan E to Plan A. He voiced the opinion that he probably could not raise the additional $2,500.00 that would be required assuming that he was given the option of now transferring to Plan E. He indicated that he had received no public assistance and that his large family and the mental problems prevented him from making an intelligent choice at the time he made the election to retire under Plan A. During the hearing, he admitted that he had received full cooperation and assistance from Respondent but that it was his mental condition and other financial problems which hampered his ability to make an intelligent choice based on psychological problems, etc. Based on all the evidence presented in this case, it is clear that the Respondent afforded Petitioner all of the information requested and explained all the options available to him including the differences in the benefits of the various plans and his contributions for retirement in such plans. It is further clear that at each juncture, he was permitted to change his mind about enrolling in various plans when the change could be effectuated within the permissible guidelines under the law. With these facts in mind and inasmuch as there is no provisions in the law which permits a retiree from changing plans after his effective date of retirement, Petitioner's claim that he was wrongfully denied the opportunity to retire or to change his retirement plan to Plan E must fall as being unsubstantiated by the record evidence. I shall therefore recommend that his petition requesting permission to allow him to change from Plan A to Plan E be denied.
Recommendation Based on the above facts and conclusions of law, I recommend than the Petition filed herein requesting permission to retire from Plan A to Plan E be disallowed. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Lawrence L. Black, Esquire 152 8th Avenue, Southwest Largo, Florida 33540 Robert L. Wonsick 6260 Second Avenue, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33707
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Peter McRedmond, the deceased, should have been permitted to change the beneficiary on his state retirement plan to elect an annuity for the benefit of his estate and the Intervenor, Martin Horton.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Division of Retirement, was the state agency responsible for the control, operation and monitoring of the State Retirement System. Petitioner, Eugene McRedmond, is the surviving brother of Peter McRedmond, deceased, a former member of the Florida Retirement System. Intervenor, Martin V. Horton, is the former live-in friend and companion to Peter McRedmond and the individual who claims an interest in Peter's retirements benefits. For some period prior to 1988, Peter McRedmond was employed at Manatee Community College as a psychology professor and as such was a member of the Florida Retirement System, (FRS). He was so employed until he retired for disability in early 1990. Before that time, however, in August or September, 1988, he was diagnosed as having AIDS by Dr. Warren D. Kuippers, a physician with the Community Migrant Health Center. Tests taken at or around that time indicated he was suffering from toxoplasmosis, a disease of the brain in which significant portions of that organ are eaten by parasites, resulting in intermittent periods of impaired judgement and reasoning ability. He also suffered numerous other medical problems including weight loss, a wasting syndrome, general weakness and fatigue. Notwithstanding the seriousness of his illness, because Mr. McRedmond wanted to qualify for retirement under the FRS system, he continued to work for another year to meet the minimum requirements for retirement. On April 27, 1990, he made application for disability retirement to be effective July 1, 1990. As a part of that application, Mr. McRedmond selected Option 1 under the FRS as the method under which he desired his benefits be paid and named the Intervenor, Mr. Horton, as his designated beneficiary to receive any benefits legally due after his death. Mr. McRedmond could have elected to receive benefits under either Option 1 or Option 2 of the plan. Option 3 was not available to him because of his marital status. Under Option 1, he would receive payments of $639.33 per month for the remainder of his life, regardless of how long he lived. Under Option 2, he would have been paid a slightly lesser monthly sum, $587.51, for the rest of his life, but not less than 10 calendar years, and if he were to die before 10 years were up, the payments would go to his designated beneficiary. In May, 1990, consistent with the procedure then in effect within the Division, Mr. McRedmond was sent a second Option selection form to give him as much information as was possib1e and to make sure he understood what he was doing as it related to his option selection. Mr. McRedmond again selected Option 1, had his signature notarized, and returned the executed form to the Division. The individual who performed the notary service did not recall the transaction but indicated her routine practice was not to notarize a document for anyone who did not appear to know what he was doing. Peter McRedmond died on August 23, 1990 from the disease with which he was afflicted. Several months before his death, in mid June, 1990, Mr. McRedmond and Mr. Horton discussed finances and what Horton could expect after McRedmond's death. It is clear that Mr. McRedmond wanted to make arrangements for Mr. Horton to finish his education without having to work while doing so. At that time, McRedmond's life insurance policy, in the face amount of $60,000.00, had Horton as the beneficiary. Shortly before his death, however, upon the prompting of his brother, Eugene, Petitioner herein, Peter McRedmond directed the policy be changed to make his estate the beneficiary. This was done by Eugene through a power of attorney. There was also some discussion of an additional $500.00 per month which was to go to Mr. Horton, but no one, other than Mr. Horton, recalls this. Also shortly before his death, Mr. McRedmond and Mr. Horton travelled to the family home in Connecticut for several weeks. During that time, Mr. McRedmond had at least one major seizure and family members noticed that while he was sometimes forgetful, for the most part his thinking was rational and normal. There can be little doubt that Mr. McRedmond had deep feelings for Mr. Horton and wanted the latter to be provided for after his death. Friends of both relate the numerous comments McRedmond made to that effect and are convinced that at the time he made the contested election, Mr. McRedmond was not of sound mind sufficient to knowingly make the choice he made. To be sure, the ravages of his disease had taken its toll and there were numerous occasions on which he was not lucid or competent to determine issues such as here. On the other hand, the benefits administrator with whom McRedmond talked at the time he selected his retirement plan option was totally satisfied that at that time, he fully understood the nature and effect of the option he selected and was choosing that which was consistent with his desires at the time. By the same token, the notary, whose testimony was noted previously herein, also was satisfied he knew what he was doing at the time of the second election. In its final configuration, Mr. McRedmond's estate includes all his assets, including the proceeds of the insurance policy previously designated to go to Mr. Horton, for a total of approximately $120,000.00. According to the terms of the will, the estate is to be put into a trust from which Mr. Norton is to receive $1,000.00 per month for his lifetime, as well as all his medical expenses. Since Mr. Horton has tested HIV positive, these can be expected to be extensive. Eugene McRedmond is the executor of the estate. Petitioner and Mr. Horton claim that since the trust contains all of Peter's assets existing at his death, the only other source of the additional $500.00 per month would be the benefits from the FRS. Both cite this as evidence of Mr. McRedmond's intent that the option selection providing for payment after death was his intention. This does not necessarily follow, however. Notwithstanding what Petitioner and Intervenor state were his intentions, Mr. McRedomnd took no action to make the change in option selection which would have effectuated them. Instead, he went out of town to visit family for several weeks, and even after receipt of the first retirement check, received on July 31, 1990, still took no action to make the change. During this period, after the return from Connecticut, Mr. McRedmond's condition deteriorated to the point he was often bedridden and was periodically unaware. However, there is ample evidence to indicate that he was often lucid during this period and still took no action to change his retirement option. During this time, Mr. Horton conducted come of Mr. McRedmond's business affairs for him pursuant to specific instructions. These included making bank deposits and as a part of one of these deposits, when Horton was to deposit two checks as requested by McRedmond, he also deposited the first retirement check. Horton and Eugene McRedmond both claim that at no time did Peter McRedmond ask or authorize him to do so. In a visit that Petitioner made to his brother in early August, 1990, just weeks prior to Peter's death, according to Petitioner his brother explained he had selected the wrong retirement option and requested that Eugene attempt to change the election. Peter gave Eugene a Power of Attorney with which he was to do this as well as to change the beneficiary on the life insurance policy. Consistent with those instructions, Eugene wrote a letter to the Division explaining the situation and that the check had been deposited by mistake. On August 13, 1990, Eugene telephonically contacted the Division where he spoke with Melanie White. During this conversation, in which he again spelled out the circumstances which he believed constituted the mistaken election, he was told to file a power of attorney. When he did this, the Division would not honor it claiming that since it had been executed in May, 1990, some three months earlier, it was not current. Subsequent to the death of Peter McRedmond and the filing of the claim against the Division, Eugene McRedmond and Martin Horton have entered into an agreement whereby any sums recovered from the Division will be split with 25% going to Mr. Horton and 75% going to the Trust. Upon the death of Mr. Horton, any sums remaining in the trust will be split by Eugene McRedmond and another brother.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's and Intervenor's claims for retirement benefits under Option 2 of the Florida Retirement System retirement plan, on behalf of Peter McRedmond, be denied. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 29th day of July, 1991. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Buildi5g 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clark of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1991 APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 90-7104 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER AND INTERVENOR: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First two sentences accepted and incorporated herein. Third sentence not proven. & 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted that Peter McRedmond had numerous conversations with friends about providing for Mr. Horton, but it was not established that he mentioned using his retirement benefits for that purpose. & 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as not necessarily following from the facts. Rejected as speculation not supported by fact, except that Petitioner claims Peter desired to change the option selection. First sentence accepted. Second sentence accepted in so far as it asserts Peter told Horton he would receive a monthly sum of $1,000.00. Balance rejected. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as speculation and conclusion except for first sentence and first clause of second sentence. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17.-20. Accepted and incorporated herein. 21. First and second and last sentences accepted. 22.-24. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 28. Accepted. 29. Irrelevant. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1-4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8.-10. Accepted. Ultimate finding accepted. On the date he filed his application, Peter McRedmond was capable of understanding what he was doing and the implications thereof. & 13. Rejected as comments of the evidence and not Findings of Fact. First four sentences accepted. Remainder rejected except that McRedmond wanted Horton to get at least $1,000.00 per month for life, and more if possible. & 16. Accepted except for last two sentences of 16. Accepted except for last sentence which is a comment on the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. & 20. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Stafman, Esquire Stafman & Saunders 318 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 1639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 John A. Pieno Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Linda Stalvey Acting General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner's employment as a substitute teacher is creditable service under the Florida Retirement System, entitling her to retirement benefits and whether she may purchase retirement credit for out-of-state and federal service prior to vesting.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, aged 53, applied for retirement benefits from the Florida Retirement System (FRS) on October 20, 2003. Petitioner has 4.53 years of creditable service with the FRS due to her employment as a full-time teacher with the Alachua County School Board (School Board). She worked for the School Board from sometime in the early 1970s through May 1977. In May 1977, Petitioner terminated her employment with the School Board. She then joined the military, serving four years of active duty. After completing her military service in 1981, Petitioner worked out of state as a civil service employee with the Federal government. She also worked for a period of time in the private sector. In the 1990s, Petitioner returned to Alachua County, Florida. She worked as a substitute teacher for the School Board for approximately four years, from November 21, 1999 through February 14, 2002. Before beginning her employment as a substitute teacher/temporary employee in 1999, Petitioner signed a document entitled "Acknowledgement of FRS Status and Alternative Plan." This document clearly advised Petitioner that her employment as a substitute teacher was not covered under FRS. Petitioner was not employed by a participating employer in a regularly established position on July 1, 2001. She needs an additional 1.47 years of credible service in order to vest in FRS with six years of credible service.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to FRS benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert R. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Carolyn Johnson-Rollins Apartment N118 2701 Northwest 23rd Boulevard Gainesville, Florida 32605 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
Findings Of Fact The petitioner, Leo A. Price, was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) at the time of his retirement in June, 1979. He became an FRS member on January 1, 1979, by transferring from the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS). Mr. Price was appointed to a teaching position for the 1950-51 school year on June 8, 1950, by the Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Florida. He performed some limited duties for the Board of Public Instruction at the beginning of the 1950-51 school year, but his service was cut short as a result of illness. He received no salary payments for this service. Mr. Price recovered from his illness and began teaching in Dade County on January 31, 1951. He enrolled in the Teachers' Retirement System in February, 1951, and represented on his enrollment blank that he began service on January 31, 1951, and that he had not taught in Florida in prior years. Enrollment forms are required prior to membership in TRS. Mr. Price taught continuously from January 31, 1951, through June 30, 1979. On June 20, 1979, the School Board of Dade County retroactively approved a leave of absence for Mr. Price for the period from September, 1950, through January 30, 1951. No leave of absence had been authorized by the School Board prior to this retroactive authorization. Ruth Sansom, Assistant Bureau Chief, Bureau of Benefits, Division of Retirement, testified that she has worked with TRS and FRS in a supervisory capacity since 1963. In these seventeen years, no member has been allowed a service credit for a leave of absence that was retroactively granted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner, Leo A. Price, seeking a service credit for the period of time from September, 1950, through January, 1951, be denied. It is further RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner, Leo A. Price, for interest on all uncashed benefit warrants, be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 19 day of September, 1980. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Leo A. Price 1000 N. E. 96th Street Miami Shores, Florida 33138 Diane R. Keisling, Esquire Suite 207C, Box 81 Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether at the time of his father's death, Armando Martinez, Jr., was a "dependent beneficiary" of his father, a vested member of the Florida Retirement System, so as to be entitled to his father's retirement benefits?
Findings Of Fact Armando Martinez, Jr., was born on February 22, 1974, to Natalie M. Martinez and the late Armando Martinez, Sr. In 1992, when Armando, Jr., was eighteen years old, Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were divorced. The following year, 1993, less than two weeks after Armando, Jr.'s, nineteenth birthday, Armando Martinez, Sr., died. The cause of death was liver cancer, a disease from which Ms. Martinez presently suffers. At the time of his death on March 7, 1993, Mr. Martinez was a vested member of the Florida Retirement System. A municipal employee, he had been a bus operator. At some point close to commencement of his employment, slightly more than ten years prior to his death, Armando Martinez, Sr., had executed a Form M-10. The form named his wife, Natalie, as his primary beneficiary. Armando, Jr., the only child of Armando, Sr., and Natalie Martinez, was named as the sole contingency beneficiary. Following Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s death, Ms. Martinez disclaimed Florida Retirement System benefits. She did so in order for Armando, Jr., as the contingent beneficiary, to be able to receive the benefits. On February 17, 1997, the Division of Retirement denied Armando, Jr., survivor benefits. Had Mr. Martinez, Sr., died one-year and several weeks earlier, that is, prior to Armando, Jr.'s eighteenth birthday, the Division would have approved distribution of survivor benefits to him. But, although he was still a high school student, since he was older than nineteen by a few days at the time of his father's death, the Division required proof that Armando, Jr., had received half of his support from his father at the time of his father's death. No such proof was provided to the Division prior to or at the time of its preliminary denial. In fact, in his 1992 tax return, Mr. Martinez did not claim his son Armando, Jr., as a dependent. In this formal administrative proceeding, however, Armando Martinez, Jr., provided such proof, proof which was lacking until hearing. The year 1992 was very difficult for Armando Martinez, Jr., and his family. His parents separated, Armando, Jr., lived with his mother. Armando, Sr., lived elsewhere. Prior to his death, divorce proceedings were finalized. In the meantime, Ms. Martinez had lost her job. She remained unemployed for the entire year and in early 1993 as well. Armando, Jr., was still in high school at the time of his father's death. During the 1992-93 school year, to support himself and his mother, he obtained work part-time while he remained in school. Ms. Martinez paid the rent for their apartment at a rate of between $370 and $500 per month. The monthly phone bill of Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr., was approximately $50; utility payments $70; groceries $300; gasoline $10, automobile insurance $100; and school supplies $40. There were other expenses, clothes, for example, that occurred from time-to-time. In addition to minimal government support to Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr.'s, part-time employment income, Armando, Jr., was supported by cash payments provided by his father. Two or three times a month, Armando's father and a girl friend, Karen Jones, would drive to the front of the house. Because of his illness, Mr. Martinez remained in the car while Ms. Jones brought cash, usually between two and five hundred dollars in an envelope to the front door. On more than one of these occasions, Ms. Jones, the envelope, and the cash were observed by friends of the family at the moment of delivery. Ms. Martinez log of the estimates of these payments totals approximately $8,500, an amount in excess of Mr. Martinez's income reported in his 1992 tax return filed before his death in 1993 to be $6,389.00. But, Mr. Martinez, Sr. had access to other means of support and other monies including proceeds from insurance policies. The $8,500 provided to Armando, Jr., by Armando Martinez, Sr. constituted more than half of Armando, Jr.'s, support for the year 1992 and up until Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death in early 1993.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the Division of Retirement recognize Armando Martinez, Jr., to have been the dependent beneficiary of Armando Martinez, Sr., at the time of Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death, and therefore entitled to retirement benefits. DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Natalie Martinez Suite 3811 3801 Northgreen Avenue Tampa, Florida 33624 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue Whether Petitioner has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS), pursuant to sections 112.3173 and 121.091(5)(f), Florida Statutes, because of his conviction for official misconduct, a third degree felony under section 838.022(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. In January 1987, Petitioner began employment with the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT"), an FRS-participating employer. By reason of this employment, Petitioner was enrolled in the FRS, and DOT made contributions to the FRS on his behalf. In March 2001 and March 2005, Petitioner was elected to separate four-year terms as a Commissioner on the City Commission of the City of Deerfield Beach, Florida ("City"), an FRS-participating employer. By reason of his public office as a City Commissioner, Petitioner was enrolled in the FRS, and the City made contributions to the FRS on his behalf. Before entering upon the duties of his public office, pursuant to Florida law and the City Charter, Petitioner was required to take and subscribe substantially to the following oath: I do solemnly swear or affirm that I am a citizen of the State of Florida and of the United States of America and a registered voter and resident of the City of Deerfield Beach, as shown by the public records of Broward County, Florida. I am being employed as a Commissioner of the City of Deerfield Beach and will be a recipient of public funds. As such Commissioner I further swear or affirm that I will support the Charter of the City of Deerfield Beach, the Constitution of the State of Florida, and the Constitution of the United States, and that I will well and faithfully perform the duties of my office upon which I am about to enter. All elected officials of the City were subject to the standards of ethical conduct for public officers set by Florida law and the City Charter. Effective December 11, 2008, Petitioner resigned his position as City Commissioner. On or about December 29, 2008, Petitioner was charged, by information, with one count of grand theft, a third degree felony, in violation of sections 812.014(1)(a) and (b) and (2)(c)2., Florida Statutes; one count of official misconduct, a third degree felony, in violation of section 838.022(1), Florida Statutes; and one count of falsifying records, a first degree misdemeanor, in violation of section 839.13, Florida Statutes. The crimes with which Petitioner was charged were alleged to have occurred between October 6, 2007 and January 10, 2008. The basis for the official misconduct charge was that Petitioner falsified a campaign treasurer's report as part of his campaign for mayor of the City. The campaign treasurer's report is an official record or document belonging to the office of the City Clerk and/or the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections. Petitioner is no longer employed by DOT or the City. Petitioner is not retired from the FRS, and he has not received FRS retirement benefits. On or about May 7, 2010, Petitioner filed with the Division a completed FRS Pension Plan Application for Service Retirement (Form FR-11). By letter dated May 11, 2010, the Division advised Petitioner in relevant part as follows: This letter is to advise you of the status of your application for Florida Retirement System benefits. Our Legal office is reviewing your current legal situation for a determination of whether a forfeiture of benefits has occurred. If the determination is that forfeiture occurred, you will be notified and given information if you wish to appeal that determination. Your retirement application is pending until this review is complete. On May 10, 2011, a jury rendered a verdict which found Petitioner guilty as charged in the information. On July 29, 2011, the court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of the crimes. On or about August 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal. On May 1, 2013, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner's convictions for grand theft, official misconduct, and falsifying records, and authored an opinion which addressed Petitioner's contention that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the count of official misconduct. The Court wrote in relevant part: Section 838.022(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), makes it "unlawful for a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for any person or to cause harm to another, to ... [f]alsify, or cause another person to falsify, any official record or official document." In this case, the basis for the official misconduct charge was that appellant falsified a campaign report as part of his campaign for mayor of Deerfield Beach. On appeal, appellant focuses on section 838.022(2)(a), which defines "public servant" as not "includ[ing] a candidate who does not otherwise qualify as a public servant," for the argument that "he was not a public servant at the time of the alleged offense" but was "merely a candidate for public office." However, as the State argues, at the time appellant was a candidate for mayor, he "otherwise qualif[ied] as a public servant" by virtue of his status as a city commissioner. Chapter 838 defines "public servant" as including "[a]ny officer or employee of a state, county, municipal, or special district agency or entity." § 838.014 (6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). The statute distinguishes a mere candidate from a public job or office holder in order to reach the evil of public servants misusing their office. Here, appellant was not just a candidate at the time of the offense; it was his dual status as a candidate and an incumbent commissioner that brought him within the ambit of the statute. ... Gonot v. State, 112 So. 3d 679, 680 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)(emphasis in original). ULTIMATE FACTUAL FINDINGS Petitioner forfeited his rights and benefits under the FRS pursuant to sections 112.3173 and 121.091(5)(f), Florida Statutes, because he was convicted of official misconduct, a third degree felony, in violation of section 838.022(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that the Petitioner was convicted of a felony under section 838.022(1), Florida Statutes, and directing the forfeiture of his FRS retirement rights and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2013.
The Issue Whether Petitioner showed by the preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to receive Mr. Carl Kemper's retirement benefits. The specific factual issue for resolution is whether Petitioner brought forward evidence showing that Mr. Carl Kemper had selected Florida Retirement System Option 2 of Form FRS-11o, which would allow her to receive the monthly benefits, as opposed to Respondent's records, which show that Mr. Carl Kemper selected Option 1 of Form FRS-11o, which does not allow for continued benefit payments after his death.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Judith E. Mills', petition to receive Mr. Kemper's retirement benefits be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2011.
