The Issue Whether the Division properly denied Petitioner's request to change Petitioner's retirement in the Florida Retirement System from an early retirement service benefit to disability retirement.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Petitioner worked for Miami Dade Transit from August 1990 to March 2004, and was a member of FRS while employed there. Afterwards, Petitioner went to work as an auditor with a private employer, Robert Half, in New York. In 2007, Petitioner sustained an injury while working for Robert Half. In 2008, the Division generated an Estimate of Retirement Benefits for Petitioner detailing what her benefit amounts would be if she decided to retire. In February or March 2009, Petitioner informed the Division by telephone that she could no longer work and wanted to retire. Subsequently, the Division mailed Petitioner a retirement application. On April 13, 2009, the Division received Petitioner's filled-out application for service retirement. Directly above Petitioner's signature, the application stated: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. Petitioner's application was incomplete and could not be processed upon receipt. On or about April 17, 2009, the Division sent Petitioner an Acknowledgment of Service Retirement Application requesting that Petitioner send "birth date verification of your joint annuitant" if she chose Option 3 or 4 and "The Option Selection for FRS Members, Form FRS-11o" to finalize the application. The acknowledgment stated at the bottom: ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD SERVICE CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR RETIREMENT DATE, CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT OR ELECT THE INVESTMENT PLAN. RETIRMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED. In April 2009, the Division generated a second Estimate of Benefits for Petitioner, which she received. On or about May 8, 2009, Petitioner completed her retirement application by providing the Division the option selection form, which notified the Division that she selected Option 2. Directly above Petitioner's signature, the selection form FRS-11o stated: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. When Petitioner received the estimate and saw the early retirement benefit amount, she called the Division to question what she considered a small amount. It was explained to Petitioner that she lost a certain percentage because she was retiring early and that her retirement was either "being processed, or it was processed." Petitioner's application for retirement was approved by the Division and Petitioner was awarded the Option 2 retirement benefit she requested with the effective date of May 1, 2009. Petitioner's first retirement check was dated April 23, 2010, and was cashed by Petitioner on July 28, 2010. Petitioner's retirement status was final when she cashed her benefit payment. On June 6, 2011, Petitioner contacted the Secretary of Division of Management Services by email and requested that she receive disability retirement for the first time.1 On, June 23, 2011, the Division informed Petitioner by letter that her retirement status was final when she cashed or deposited a benefit payment and that the request to change her retirement from regular service retirement to disability retirement could not be honored. On or about July 19, 2011, Petitioner requested a hearing regarding the issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request to change her early service retirement benefit to disability retirement. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2012.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to purchase leave of absence retirement credit on behalf of James Gapinski, Petitioner's ex- husband and a deceased member of the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Geraldine Gapinski, is the former spouse of James Gapinski, deceased. At the time of his death, Mr. Gapinski was an employee of Florida State University and a "vested" Florida Retirement Service (FRS) member. Petitioner is an employee of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and an active member of FRS. Mr. Gapinski was continuously employed by Florida's Univeristy System from approximately 1970, until his death on November 20, 2000, with the exception of a period from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977, during which period he took an approved leave of absence. During the period September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977, no contributions were made by Mr. Gapinski or on Mr. Gapinski's behalf to FRS toward his accruing retirement benefits and he earned no creditable service in FRS for this eight month period he was on his leave of absence. On May 4, 2000, Mr. Gapinski requested an audit and estimate of retirement benefits from Respondent. At the time of his request for an audit and estimate, Mr. Gapinski and Petitioner had begun a dissolution of marriage proceeding (divorce). At all times material, each litigant had independent legal counsel, and each lawyer was aware that Mr. Gapinski's FRS benefits were "on the table" for division of the marital estate in the course of the divorce proceedings. At all times material, Mr. Gapinski was terminally ill with cancer. On September 14, 2000, Mr. Gapinski applied for participation in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). His application (DROP Form DP11) requested a DROP "begin date" of September 1, 2000, and designated each of Mr. Gapinski's two adult daughters as 50 percent primary beneficiaries. Petitioner, who at that time was still married to Mr. Gapinski, was not even designated a secondary beneficiary. The application, which Mr. Gapinski signed, stated in pertinent part, I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach my normal retirement date as determined by law . . . I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement after my DROP begin date (emphasis in original). The application also specified eight required acts before Mr. Gapinski could retire and become a DROP participant, including, but not limited to, 4. A check payable to FRS for any amount you owe, or a written statement that you do not wish to claim the service . . . . On September 15, 2000, Respondent provided James Gapinski with two estimates of benefits. Estimate No. 1 showed the benefit Mr. Gapinski would be entitled to if he chose to purchase the one year leave of absence for $6,820.52, providing for a DROP beginning date of September 1, 2000. This estimate further advised that 6.5 percent per annum would be posted on June 30, 2001. It also stated, Comments: The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977. This amount must be paid for a DROP begin date of September 1, 2000. Mr. Gapinski was also notified of the need to purchase his leave of absence credit in a letter from Respondent dated September 15, 2001, stating, in pertinent part, as follows: The following items are pending. The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977. If you do not elect to pay the above amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notification of your intent. * * * Completion of the Option Selection for FRS members, . . . AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE OR CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT. * * * Estimate No. 2 sent to Mr. Gapinski on September 15, 2000, showed the benefit Mr. Gapinski would be entitled to if he chose not to purchase his leave of absence and waited until March 1, 2001, to participate in DROP, when he would accrue 30 years of service without counting the gap left by his 1976-1977 leave of absence. This estimate also stated: Comments: This estimate does not include the purchase of your leave of absence and is provided for comparison purposes. It is provided for DROP purposes with a March 1, 2001, DROP begin date (see the enclosed DROP brochure). If you do not elect to pay the amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notice of your intent. Apparently, neither attorney ever saw any of the foregoing papers. The thrust of Petitioner's attorney's actions and advice was to obtain survivorship retirement benefits, not necessarily DROP benefits, for Petitioner. On October 23, 2000, Petitioner's attorney was told by telephone by Ms. Ferguson, a representative of Respondent, that Petitioner must make a non-party request to release Mr. Gapinski's retirement information to her. So far as this record shows, no third party request was ever made, but that day, Petitioner's attorney and Ferguson also generally discussed retirement pay-out options that Mr. Gapinski could elect, and Petitioner's attorney was generally aware that the DROP process was not complete. On October 24, 2000, Petitioner's attorney discussed by telephone, retirement, divorce, and survivorship benefit issues and life insurance payment options with Ms. Hudson, a representative of Respondent. On October 26, 2000, Petitioner's attorney discussed, by telephone, retirement options and steps to be taken, with both Ms. Ferguson and Mr. Helms, another of Respondent's representatives. Mr. Helms told her the DROP application was not complete but if the couple were still married, Option No. 3 would give the most benefit for survivorship benefits. During the October 2000, conversations, Petitioner's attorney made each of Respondent's representatives aware of the impending divorce and of Mr. Gapinski's impending death, but the attorney did not specifically inquire how soon the lapsed time payment must be made and none of Respondent's representatives volunteered information on that issue. At Mr. Gapinski's request, the divorce proceeding was bifurcated. Prior to the divorce, Petitioner's attorney had done independent research and was aware that Mr. Gapinski had to pay the $6,820.52, in order to perfect the DROP program and in order to complete 30 years of creditable service in order to be eligible for survivorship benefits on his retirement. This information was communicated to Petitioner by her attorney and whether or not Petitioner would be willing to pay half the amount was discussed. Petitioner stated she would be willing to pay half the amount owed. As a condition to her agreement to bifurcate the divorce proceeding, that is, as a condition to letting Mr. Gapinski out of the marriage but reserving jurisdiction in the Circuit Court to resolve certain disputes concerning assets and entitlements, Petitioner required that the couple enter into an "Agreement" on October 27, 2000, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: BIFURCATION: The Husband shall be entitled to bifurcation of the dissolution action. The marriage of the parties shall be dissolved with the Court reserving on all remaining unresolved issues not addressed in this agreement. In light of the Husband's health, the Wife shall schedule and appear at an ex parte hearing to dissolve the marriage, to obtain Court-ordered approval of this agreement, and to ensure the Court's reservation of jurisdiction to hear any and all issues pertinent to support and the division of property not yet settled by the parties. * * * B. The Wife further agrees that all marital assets awarded to her in this cause (including proceeds from the Husband's retirement and life insurance in the event the Husband predeceases her), shall be placed in an inter vivos trust, from which she may draw living, personal, and medical expenses, during her life, with the parties' adult daughters named as the irrevocable beneficiaries of the remainder of such trust. C. The Husband agrees to bequeath sufficient marital assets, awarded to him in this cause, to the parties' adult daughters to aid in their comfort and support. HUSBAND'S RETIREMENT: The Husband shall elect an option on his retirement with the State of Florida that provides for survivorship benefits for the benefit of the Wife. The wife shall be entitled to all such retirement survivorship benefits which, like the other assets she receives in this bifurcated action, shall be placed in an inter vivos trust for her living, personal and medical expenses, during her life, with the adult daughters as irrevocable beneficiaries of the remainder of the trust. The Husband shall, simultaneously with the signing of the agreement, execute such documents as are necessary to create retirement survivorship benefits in accordance with this term. Should the Husband fail to execute the survivorship option on his retirement or should he ever change such option in contravention of this term, the Husband agrees that the obligation of this term is binding upon his estate, which estate shall be responsible for paying such retirement survivorship benefits to the Wife. The Agreement could have, but did not, specifically require that the leave of absence be purchased by either Mr. Gapinski or Petitioner. Petitioner's and Mr. Gapinski's Agreement does not bind the Respondent, which was in no way privy to that Agreement. Petitioner and Mr. Gapinski's marriage was dissolved on November 1, 2000. Petitioner's attorney provided Mr. Gapinski, through his counsel, with DROP forms (FST-12 and FRS-11o). On November 1, 2000, Mr. Gapinski executed Option 2 for his DROP retirement on these forms, naming Petitioner as his sole primary beneficiary and negating his prior designation of his adult daughters as beneficiaries. Option No. 2 provides for a reduced monthly benefit payable for the FRS member's (Mr. Gapinski's) lifetime. If the member dies before receiving 120 monthly payments, his designated beneficiary (Petitioner) would receive a monthly benefit in the same amount until the monthly benefit payments to both of them equaled 120 monthly payments, when payments would terminate. Option No. 2 is available for regular service retirements as well as DROP retirements. Option No. 3 is also available for regular service retirements and DROP retirements. Option No. 3 would have provided a reduced monthly benefit payable for Mr. Gapinski's lifetime, and upon his death, his joint annuitant, if living, would receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount as Mr. Gapinski was receiving. Then, no further benefits would be payable after both he and his joint annuitant were deceased. There are exceptions to the foregoing general description, none of which matter to the case at bar. Option No. 3 would clearly provide more money to Petitioner if she were eligible. On November 2, 2000, Petitioner's attorney had three short telephone conversations with Mr. Helms, who opined that since Mr. Gapinski had signed up for DROP while the couple were still married, Petitioner could still get Option No. 3, with DROP retroactive to September 1, 2000, but that the leave of absence must be paid for. Apparently, Petitioner's attorney did not ask what would happen if the gap was not paid for before Mr. Gapinski died and no representative of Respondent volunteered that information. The thrust of Petitioner's case continued to be to persuade Mr. Gapinski to pay the whole amount due and to change his Option election to No. 3. On or about November 3, 2000, Mr. Helms sent an estimate letter based on selecting a September 1, 2000, retirement date with Option No. 1, to Mr. Gapinski. This estimate letter stated Mr. Gapinski had 30.11 years of creditable service. It did not mention DROP or any pay back. It did state that no lump sum retirement or cash value payments were available. (Second page of attachment to Exhibit P-11). On November 3, 2000, Petitioner's attorney wrote Mr. Gapinski's attorney that Mr. Gapinski was considered by Respondent to be in the DROP program as of September 1, 2000, not March 1, 2001, as supposed before the divorce, but he had not bought back his leave by paying $6,820.52, and requested that Mr. Gapinski change his Option Election Form to Option No. 3 and authorize the payment of the $6,820.52 to Respondent. On or about November 9, 2000, Petitioner's attorney sent the already-executed FST-12 (Beneficiary Designation Form) and FRS-11o (Option Selection for FRS Members) showing Option No. 2 to Respondent. Mr. Helms acknowledged receipt. On or about November 9, 2000, Mr. Helms told Petitioner's attorney that the forms were correct and anyone could pay the $6,820.52. The attorney felt Mr. Gapinski was enrolled in DROP but that the $6,820.52 was still needed. On November 15, 2000, Petitioner's attorney sent Mr. Helms a letter memorializing their conversation, in which Mr. Helms had indicated it was not necessary for Petitioner to sign below the Option No. 2 selection paragraph on FRS 11o as long as she was aware of the option Mr. Gapinski had selected. On November 20, 2000, Mr. Gapinski passed away without anyone having purchased his leave of absence credit. Mr. Gapinski was only 57 years of age when he died. DROP retirement or regular service retirement with full benefits is possible at 62 years of age or upon attaining 30 years of creditable service. Mr. Gapinski remained in regular employment until his death. Because he had not purchased the leave of absence credit, Mr. Gapinski died with only 29 years and 9 months of creditable service for purposes of retirement. In other words, he was 3 months and ten days short of the 30-year retirement mark necessary to activate DROP or regular service retirement. Petitioner never communicated directly with Respondent until after Mr. Gapinski's death. Mr. Gapinski's will provided for the effective disinheritance of Petitioner to the extent provided by law. On December 14, 2000, Petitioner's attorney spoke by telephone with Mr. Helms, who told her he thought Petitioner could still pay the leave of absence money but he would call her back. On December 15, 2000, Stanley Colvin, another of Respondent's representatives, telephoned Petitioner's attorney to say Petitioner could not pay the amount after Mr. Gapinski's death. At no time prior to Mr. Gapinski's death did any representative of Respondent affirmatively represent to anyone that Petitioner could pay the money after Mr. Gapinski's death or the conditions under which no benefits would be paid or specifically what would happen if Mr. Gapinski died before the money was paid by someone. By a December 15, 2000, letter, Respondent notified Petitioner that since Mr. Gapinski had elected not to purchase the leave of absence, he could not have reached the required 30 years of service necessary to participate in the DROP program until March 1, 2001. It further stated that since Mr. Gapinski's death occurred before completion of the required months necessary to participate in DROP, his DROP application was cancelled and his choice of Option No. 2 was nullified. Moreover, Mr. Gapinski was viewed as an active FRS member on the date of his death, and because Petitioner, though designated as his beneficiary was not also a joint annuitant, she could only receive a refund of Mr. Gapinski's retirement contributions in the amount of $4,719.19,and was not eligible to receive Option No. 3. Respondent did not send a similar letter to prior beneficiaries, the decedent, or his estate/personal representatives. Petitioner requested a review, and on February 2, 2001, Respondent issued its proposed final agency action letter, to the same effect as the December 15, 2000, letter. Respondent did not send a similar proposed final agency action letter to prior beneficiaries, the decedent, or his estate/personal representatives. However, the undersigned notes that Mr. Gapinski's adult daughters, who also were his joint personal representatives, were present in the courtroom on September 24, 2001, the first day of hearing. As of the second day of hearing on October 21, 2001, the estate had been closed and the personal representatives had been discharged. Mr. Larry Hunnicutt, Benefits Administrator for the Bureau of Retirement Calculations, Division of Retirement, testified by deposition. He indicated that Respondent Division of Retirement has no rules in place specifically addressing DROP. Therefore, in DROP cases, Respondent interprets and applies Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and the existing rules addressing regular service retirement. In practice, Respondent gives DROP applicants a 90-day grace period from the date of application in which to finalize all the outstanding documents or other requirements for DROP eligibility, including payments of amounts due, even though there are no provisions in place authorizing a grace period for DROP applicants. If there are money amounts due, the member must pay up during this period. If the member fails to pay up during this period, the DROP application and the option selected for DROP is cancelled by a certified letter, but the designated beneficiary remains intact. Herein, because the amounts were not paid before Mr. Gapinski died, and because it would serve no purpose to notify the decedent, who could no longer complete his DROP requirements, Respondent did not send the deceased member a cancellation of his DROP application and Option No. 2 selection. Rather, it treated the DROP application and option selection as null and void and notified his ex-wife, the designated beneficiary, of what Respondent understood to be her rights. In this notification, Respondent applied the statutes as its personnel understood them to apply to a member who dies in active service prior to reaching either 62 years of age or 30 years of creditable service. Respondent would have permitted Petitioner to pay the money on Mr. Gapinski's behalf only during his lifetime. If the amount due had been paid, and Petitioner were qualified for Option No. 2, she would receive approximately $500,000 plus cost of living increases as opposed to $4,719.19. She would receive considerably more if she qualified for Option No. 3.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to purchase leave of absence credit on the account of James Gapinski. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Florida Retirement System's retirement benefit option selected by Petitioner's deceased son should be changed from Option 1 to Option 2.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Kerr is the mother of the late Mr. Kerr. Mr. Kerr was employed by the Broward County Sheriff's Office (BSO) from January 2, 1990 through September 28, 2004. Mr. Kerr was a detective, hereinafter referred to as Det. Kerr. As a result of being an employee of the BSO, Det. Kerr was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). During his employment, BSO, not Det. Kerr, made contributions to the FRS for his benefit. Retirement is the agency charged with the responsibility of administering the FRS. In complying with its duties, FRS publishes and provides an informational handbook and forms regarding retirement issues to its FRS members. FRS' staff also provide counseling to FRS members who inquire about FRS issues. A website is also maintained by FRS for its members to inquire about FRS issues and obtain information about retirement. On July 29, 2004, Det. Kerr completed an Application for Disability Retirement (Application), which was signed and notarized. The Application indicated, among other things, that he was applying for regular disability benefits and that Dr. Garry Friedberg was one of his treating physicians. Det. Kerr designated Ms. Kerr as his primary beneficiary on the Application. On August 2, 2004, Retirement received the completed application. Det. Kerr had over 16 years of creditable service, and he was, therefore, vested as a Special Risk member of the FRS and eligible for retirement benefits. Retirement acknowledged receipt of the documents needed to make a determination on Det. Kerr's disability retirement application. Also, Retirement advised him that, if his disability retirement application was approved, further documents would be required before he could be placed on the retirement payroll. One of the additional documents requested by Retirement was Form FRS-11o, which was FRS' Option Selection Form for its members. FRS-11o must be completed before retirement benefits can be paid. FRS-11o notices the member of four different options for payment of retirement benefits and contains a narrative describing the effect of the selection of each of the four options. Option 1 yields the maximum monthly benefit, but when the retiree dies there is no survivor benefit. Option 2 yields a reduced monthly benefit for 10 years, but, if the retiree dies before the end of the 10 years, the benefit is paid to the surviving beneficiary for the balance of the 10 years. Option 3 provides a reduced benefit for the joint lifetimes of the retiree and beneficiary. Option 4 provides a reduced benefit for the lifetime of the retiree and beneficiary, which benefit is reduced by 33 1/3 percent upon the death of either. By letter dated August 19, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr that his application for disability retirement was approved. The letter further advised him, among other things, of other documents that he had to submit, including a completed FRS-11o, before he could be placed on the retirement payroll. By letter dated August 23, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr of his estimated monthly disability retirement benefits under Option 1 ($2,364.84) and Option 2 ($2,189.13). Insufficient information was available to Retirement to calculate the estimated monthly disability retirement benefits under Options 3 and 4, so none were provided. The letter further advised Det. Kerr as to what was required for Retirement to calculate monthly estimates for Options 3 and 4. Additionally, the August 23rd letter, enclosed a blank FRS-11o for Det. Kerr to complete and return. Furthermore, the letter included an informational document, entitled "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?," regarding making his option selection. This informational document is a standard document included by Retirement, with Retirement's estimates of disability retirement benefits. As to changing an option choice, the document provides in pertinent part: Once you cash or deposit a benefit payment, or begin the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), your [option] selection cannot be changed. Therefore, it is important to carefully study your personal circumstances before [your] decision. Regarding Option 2, the document provided in pertinent part: [T]his option would be particularly appropriate if you are in ill health and your future physical condition is uncertain at the time of retirement since independent children, other heirs, charities, organizations, or your estate or trust can be designated as beneficiaries for Option 2. The document invites FRS members to contact Retirement with any questions. No evidence was presented to demonstrate the Det. Kerr contacted Retirement regarding questions as to the options. On August 27, 2004, Det. Kerr completed and had notarized FRS-11o. FRS-11o reflected, among other things, the following: the selection of Option 1 by an "X" and being circled; and his marital status as being not married. The language describing Option 1 next to the selection was as follows: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. Also, on FRS-11o was Option 2. The language describing Option 2 next to the selection was as follows: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. On September 1, 2004, Retirement received Det. Kerr's FRS-11o, on which Option 1 was selected and which was properly completed, signed, and notarized. It is undisputed that Det. Kerr's FRS-11o met all requirements as to being in a status of completion. Typically, FRS-11o is the only indication as to a member's wishes regarding his or her option selection. According to Retirement, usually, the disability retirement application is completed prior to receiving an estimate of benefits, and, therefore, it is not uncommon for an FRS member to designate a primary beneficiary and later select Option 1 after reviewing his or her estimate of benefits. According to Retirement, only a member or someone acting on his or her behalf, such as a legal guardian or attorney-in-fact, can make a retirement option selection for the member. No evidence was presented that Det. Kerr, himself, requested a change to his selection of Option 1. On September 28, Det. Kerr resigned from the BSO. October 1, 2004, was established as Det. Kerr's effective disability retirement date. Det. Kerr died on October 20, 2004, less than a month after resigning, without receiving his first disability retirement benefit payment. At the time of his death, Det. Kerr was not married and had no children. Further, no parent was his legal guardian or dependent upon him for support. Det. Kerr's circumstances surrounding his option selection do not place his situation in the usual or typical category of FRS members referred to above by Retirement. Det. Kerr was suffering from AIDS. His symptoms first appeared in 1995. He was being treated by Garry Friedberg, M.D., a physician whose specialty was infectious diseases. As Det. Kerr's treating physician, on July 26, 2004, (approximately three months before Det. Kerr's death) Dr. Friedberg completed a "Disability Insurance - Attending Physician's Statement" form, regarding Det. Kerr's medical condition. The form contained several questions, including those as to diagnosis, prognosis, and mental and cognitive limitations. Dr. Friedberg diagnosed Det. Kerr with the end- stage of AIDS, which included wasting, assistance with activities of daily living, 12 to 15 loose stools per day, and pain in his stomach. Dr. Friedberg determined Det. Kerr's prognosis as terminal. Dr. Friedberg described Det. Kerr's mental and cognitive limitations as poor memory, difficulty concentrating, and inattentiveness. Question 5.c. of the form asked whether Det. Kerr was competent to endorse checks and direct the use of proceeds, to which Dr. Friedberg checked the yes box. It is undisputed that Det. Kerry had a close, loving- relationship with his mother and nephews. Det. Kerr's mother testified as to her son's desires and wishes for his retirement benefits. The undersigned finds her testimony credible. As her son's health deteriorated, Det. Kerr made her co-owner of his home in order for the home to become hers at his death. Det. Kerr had a loving relationship with his nephews and he wanted to make sure that their education would be paid-for through his retirement benefits. Det. Kerr informed his mother that he designated her as the beneficiary of his disability retirement plan so that she could keep his house and pay for the education of his nephews. In a letter dated May 18, 2005, Det. Kerr's healthcare providers gave insight into his medical condition and his intent regarding his disability benefits. The undersigned finds the letter persuasive. Among other things, they indicate that they were Det. Kerr's healthcare providers for several years and that, throughout 2004, Det. Kerr was administered opium to help control his chronic wasting diarrhea and administered opioid- based analgesics for chronic pain. Det. Kerr made it clear to his healthcare providers that his intent was to provide financially for his family at the event of his death. Without question, they insist that the narcotic regimen in Det. Kerr's treatment, caused him to mistakenly mark Option 1, which was the opposite of and completely contrary to the whole intent of what he wanted to do with his disability benefits. Furthermore, they indicate that Det. Kerr intended to check Option 2 in that it would provide for Det. Kerr's family as Det. Kerr had intended. One of Dr. Friedberg's clerical employees, John Carriere, notarized the option selection form at Dr. Friedberg's office for Det. Kerr on August 27, 2004. At that time, the employee had known Det. Kerr for approximately five years and knew what Det. Kerr's intentions were towards his (Det. Kerr's) family, concurring that Det. Kerr wanted his disability retirement benefits to provide for his (Det. Kerr's) mother and nephews. The employee observed that on that day Det. Kerr had lost considerable weight, was sweating, and was not looking well. The undersigned finds the clerical employee's testimony persuasive. Det. Kerr was friends with Robert Brown for 16 years. Mr. Brown is a certified financial planner but was not Det. Kerr's financial planner. The undersigned finds Mr. Brown's testimony credible. Mr. Brown was well aware that Det. Kerr wanted to make sure that his (Det. Kerr's) mother and nephews were taken care of with his disability retirement benefits. Det. Kerr sought advice from his friend regarding the disability retirement benefits. Mr. Brown and Det. Kerr met with the BSO's human resource counselor to discuss the different options available. Det. Kerr knew that he was dying, and he decided upon Option 2 because only it provided the benefits that he wanted for his mother and nephews upon his death. On August 27, 2004, Det. Kerr was at Dr. Friedberg's office and was completing FRS-11o (the option selection form), and he called Mr. Brown, who was busy at work. Det. Kerr requested Mr. Brown to remind him which option number to select. Mr. Brown requested Det. Kerr to call him after working-hours, but Det. Kerr insisted that Mr. Brown talk with him then and provide the requested information. Mr. Brown, not recalling the option number that had been previously determined to be selected but recalling only what the selection provided, informed Det. Kerr that the option decided upon was the one that left the money to his (Det. Kerr's) mother for ten years. Det. Kerr yelled back that he knew what the selection provided that he wanted, but now he only wanted the option number. Mr. Brown requested Det. Kerr to wait a few hours and call him back; but Det. Kerr did not. Later, when Mr. Brown and Det. Kerr were together, Mr. Brown asked Det. Kerr whether he needed any assistance with the retirement paperwork. Det. Kerr responded in the negative, indicating that he had finished the paperwork by himself and convincingly stating that the family was protected. Mr. Brown asked to review the form, but Det. Kerr did not have the form with him. With Det. Kerr so convincingly expressing himself that the family was protected, Mr. Brown did not think of the retirement paperwork again. A finding of fact is made that Det. Kerr at all times had decided on Option 2 and at all times had intended to check Option 2. A finding of fact is made that the medical evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that, due to Det. Kerr's terminal illness and the medications given to him, his mental capacity to make an informed choice at the time that he selected Option 1 was affected; and that he mistakenly checked Option 1, whereas Option 2 would have protected his family as he had intended, which intent had never wavered or changed. By letter dated December 6, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr's family that his estate was entitled to the disability retirement benefits due for the month of October 2004. Additionally, included with the letter was a "Joint Annuitant Information" document, and the family was advised that, if Det. Kerr had a survivor who qualified as a joint annuitant, a monthly benefit may be payable to such person. A joint annuitant was mentioned in several of the letters from Retirement to Det. Kerr, prior to his death, regarding his disability retirement. In a letter dated July 30, 2004, related to completing FRS-11o, a joint annuitant is mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in the Application, a joint annuitant is again mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in a letter dated August 10, 2004, again, a joint annuitant is mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in two letters dated August 19, 2004, a joint annuitant is again mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in the Estimate of Retirement Benefit document, a joint annuitant is mentioned only as it relates to Options 3 and 4; in an Estimate of Disability Retirement Benefits document, dated August 23, 2004, a joint annuitant is mentioned only as to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in a document provided to Det. Kerr by Retirement, entitled "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?" a joint annuitant is mentioned as it relates to all of the available options; in FRS-11o, a joint annuitant is mentioned only for Options 3 and 4; and in a letter dated December 6, 2004, after Det. Kerr's death, Retirement refers to a joint annuitant and includes information regarding a joint annuitant. No information was received by Retirement as to a joint annuitant. Further, at hearing no assertion of Ms. Kerr being a joint annuitant was made. Ms. Kerr is the personal representative of her son’s, Det. Kerr's, estate. On September 26, 2005, Retirement received a letter from Ms. Kerr's counsel requesting Retirement to change Det. Kerr's option selection from Option 1 to Option 2, explaining, among other things, Det. Kerr's intent but that his medical condition prevented him from following through with his intent. No mention was made in the letter of a survivor who qualified as a joint annuitant. Retirement contends that an option selection can only be changed in the event the designated beneficiary qualifies as a joint annuitant. On October 14, 2005, Retirement, by final agency action letter, denied the request to change Det. Kerr's option selection but erroneously cited Section 121.091(6)(h), Florida Statutes, as the statutory basis for the decision to deny the request, which stated as follows: (h) The option selected or determined for payment of benefits as provided in this section shall be final and irrevocable at the time a benefit payment is cashed or deposited or credited to the Deferred Retirement Option Program as provided in Subsection (13). Retirement admits that the basis for the denial stated in the final agency action letter is incorrect. No benefit payment had been issued, cashed or deposited. Retirement has never amended or sought to amend its denial-letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order granting the request of Rosalie J. Kerr and changing the retirement option selection of her deceased son, Robert R. Kerr, from Option 1 to Option 2. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Waltraud E. Paehler, was a classroom teacher in the Clay County public school system until 1993, and says she had a total of nineteen years of service. During that time period, she participated in the Florida Retirement System, which is administered by respondent, Division of Retirement (Division). In 1992, petitioner was suffering from a number of illnesses, including chronic kidney failure and congestive heart failure, which impaired her ability to continue working as a teacher. She also suffered from depression. These conditions continued into 1993. During this time period, she was hospitalized on at least two occasions. Because her work was very stressful, and tended to exacerbate her medical condition, petitioner accepted her physician's advice and decided to resign her teaching position effective April 14, 1993. On April 21, 1993, or a week later, she executed her application for retirement and opted to take early retirement effective May 1, 1993, when she was fifty-four years of age. Even though the local school board had periodically distributed information booklets to all teachers, including petitioner, concerning early, normal and disability types of retirement, and the various retirement options were discussed annually at each school's in-service training seminar, petitioner says she was still unaware of the disability retirement option. Thus, she elected to take early retirement on April 21, 1993. Because of her age, her retirement benefits were reduced by forty percent, or five percent for each year under the normal retirement age of sixty-two. Assuming she was qualified, had she elected to take disability retirement, there would have been no penalty because of her age. At or about the time petitioner decided to resign her teaching position, her daughter, who was assisting petitioner in her personal affairs, telephoned the local school board in an effort to ascertain potential retirement options for her mother. She spoke with an unknown individual in the school personnel office who the daughter says was not "very knowledgeable." The two discussed "in general what (her) mother could do" with respect to retirement, but the daughter says she received no specifics other than the fact that her mother would be "entitled to partial pay." She also requested that an application for service retirement form be mailed to her mother. The daughter then relayed this sketchy information to her mother. Because of financial constraints, and in order to receive her benefits immediately, petitioner decided to take early retirement rather than wait until normal retirement age. After selecting the option 1 benefit, which entitled her to benefits for her lifetime only, petitioner carried the form to her school's personnel office where she executed it on April 21, 1993, before the principal's secretary, a notary public. Although the secretary could not recall the specific event, she affirmed that she would not allow anyone to sign a document who did not appear to be competent. In selecting option 1, which gave the highest monthly benefits for early retirement, petitioner acknowledged she understood the ramifications of making that choice when she did so on April 21, 1993. Thus, on that date she possessed sufficient mental capacity to know that these benefits would last only during her lifetime, and her daughters would not receive any benefits after her death. At final hearing she confirmed that, prior to executing the form, she had reviewed the various options under early retirement and selected the first option since she "figure(d) (she had) done enough for them all (of her) life, they can take care of themselves." In June 1994, petitioner read an article in a teacher trade publication and learned that a number of states offered disability retirement as an option and did not penalize retirees for early retirement due to a disability. This article prompted petitioner the following month to write a letter to the Division. When petitioner made inquiry with the Division in July 1994 concerning a change from early (service) to disability retirement, she was told that under Rule 60S-4.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, she could not do so after cashing her first check. By then, petitioner had long since cashed the first retirement check mailed to her at the end of May 1993. That advice prompted her to eventually challenge the Division's rejection of her claim on the theory that she was "incapacitated" when she made her decision to take early retirement. In support of her contention that in 1993 she lacked the necessary mental capacity to make a reasoned decision concerning her retirement, petitioner presented the testimony of three health professionals from whom she was receiving care in 1993. Their deposition testimony is found in petitioner's exhibits 1-3 received in evidence. Dr. Hardin, a family physician, was petitioner's primary treating physician from February 1992 until April 1993. In the spring of 1993, he recalled petitioner as being "confused," "in an imbalanced state," suffering "mental duress," dependent on explicit instructions for appointments, and taking a variety of prescribed medications for tobacco cessation, chronic renal failure, congestive cardiac condition, high blood pressure, cardiomyopathy, tremors, anxiety and migraine headaches. Because of these conditions, Dr. Hardin found it difficult to believe that she could "handle" a more complicated matter such as choosing a retirement option. Dr. Hardin acknowledged, however, that during the spring of 1993, he had little chance "to follow her" since another physician, Dr. Stoneburner, was managing petitioner's most important illness, renal failure. Dr. Stoneburner, a nephrologist and internist who has treated petitioner for a kidney disease since 1985, felt that in the spring of 1993 she "was not in a very good position to make a competent decision based on her emotional state." Just prior to her retirement, he observed petitioner as having "significant depression" and "a lack of desire to work." She was also taking as many as six or seven medications at one time which could "possibly" cause "someone to be confused." Based on these circumstances, Dr. Stoneburner opined that petitioner was not competent to make a rational judgment. However, Dr. Stoneburner conceded that if petitioner had been given retirement options explained in layman's terms, and had someone to assist her in explaining the various options, she could have made an intelligent decision. Kristina Crenshaw, a licensed mental health counselor, met with petitioner on four occasions between February 18 and April 12, 1993. Ms. Crenshaw found petitioner to have "significant difficulty with depression," in an "agitated, very stressed, (and) overwhelmed" condition, and with a "strong sense of uncertainty about her future." While the witness believed that petitioner would have understood a pamphlet describing her retirement options, she would not have "necessarily understood all the implications to her own personal life." The witness agreed, however, that once petitioner made a decision to resign her job, she seemed more "upbeat" and "positive." Further, petitioner had told her by telephone on April 15, 1993, that she felt "much better" after retiring from her job. The counselor did not know if petitioner was mentally competent when she opted for early retirement a week later. Nothwithstanding the testimony of the health professionals, the findings in paragraph 7 are deemed to be more compelling on the critical issue of competency, and it is found that on April 21, 1993, petitioner understood the nature and consequences of her acts, and she was capable of binding herself by the retirement application. Therefore, her request to have rule 60S-4.002(4) waived, or to have her "contract" with the Division set aside, should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order determining that petitioner was mentally competent when she elected to take early retirement and that her request to have rule 60S-4.0002(4) waived so as to permit her to file a request for disability retirement be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4841 Petitioner: Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 4-5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6-7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Covered in preliminary statement. 14-20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 21-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 25-31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 32-37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 38-39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 40. Covered in preliminary statement. 41-43. Rejected as being unnecessary. Respondent: Rejected since the evidence shows that petitioner was employed by the Clay County School Board and not the Duval County School Board. Also, the only evidence of record as to years of service is the testimony of petitioner that she had nineteen years of service. However, this fact is not necessary to resolve the dispute. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8 and 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 6-7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 10-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for the resolution of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark H. Levine, Esquire 245 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1263 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for retroactive retirement benefits should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office for approximately twelve years, working in a special risk capacity. As a result of that employment, he was a member of the Florida Retirement System. In 1972 Petitioner completed Respondent's form FRS-M10 setting forth his membership as a special risk member of the Florida Retirement System as of November 1, 1970. Petitioner resigned his position on March 15, 1982, when he was 47 years of age and had more than ten years of creditable service. At the time of his resignation, he was employed in the position of Inspector, Director of Law Enforcement, the third in command at the Sheriff's Office. There are approximately 550,000 active members in the Florida Retirement System. Many members choose not to submit an application for retirement benefits on their normal retirement date for a variety of reasons. An application for retirement benefits is a prerequisite for the establishment of an effective retirement date for a member of the Florida Retirement System. In September of 1991, Petitioner applied for retirement benefits. At the time of his application, he was 57 years of age. Petitioner never contacted Respondent to request information or advice regarding his retirement benefits prior to filing his retirement application in September of 1991. Based upon receipt of Petitioner's application for retirement benefits in September of 1991, Respondent established October 1, 1991, as Petitioner's effective retirement date. In October of 1986 Petitioner received from the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office a copy of some of Respondent's forms which are utilized by persons filing applications for retirement benefits. Some of the information included in that package relates to persons who are regular members of the Florida Retirement System, not special risk members.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's request to change his effective retirement date and denying Petitioner's request for retroactive retirement benefits. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 92-0849 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 3-5 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 2 has been rejected as being contrary to the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 6-13 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-10 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Alice Gwynn, Esquire Suite 302 215 Fifth Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee FL 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Building C Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Larry Strong Acting Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional retirement benefits for her years of service between September 1966 and December 1974.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a retired member of the FRS. She began working for the Duval County Juvenile Detention Center (DCJDC) in August 1966. However, Petitioner's name was not placed on the payroll until September 1966 because of the time she was absent. As an employee of the DCJDC, Petitioner was a county employee but also a participant in the FRS. She made contributions in the amount of $1,850.78 to the FRS from September 1966 through December 1974. The FRS became non- contributory for all state and county employees in January 1975. Petitioner terminated her employment with Duval County on June 20, 1977. At that time, Petitioner requested a refund of her accumulated contributions to the FRS. Petitioner acknowledged in her request for refund that she waived her interest in FRS for the refunded service. On or about February 22, 1978, Respondent issued Voucher #273254 and Warrant #0364356 made payable to Petitioner in the amount of $1,850.78. Petitioner's testimony that she never received the refund is not credible. On or about October 16, 1981, Petitioner returned to work at DCJDC. After receiving several promotions, Petitioner transferred to a position at the Department of Health. Petitioner terminated her employment at the Department of Health on November 13, 1998. In August 2000, Petitioner filed an Application for Service Retirement. The application includes the following sworn statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. Respondent sent Petitioner an Acknowledgment of Service Retirement Application dated August 10, 2000. The acknowledgment indicated that Petitioner's retirement date was June 2000 and that she could purchase credit for refunded service from September 1966 through December 1974 by paying Respondent $7,918.46. The acknowledgment made it clear that Respondent required written notification if Petitioner did not intend to purchase this service. In March 2001, Petitioner executed an Option Selection for FRS Members. She selected Option 1, which provides her a monthly benefit for her lifetime. In a letter dated March 27, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent that she did not intend to buy back any time. Additionally, she stated as follows: I would like for my retirement application to be accepted/processed as is. The rate quoted was at $517.00. However, if this amount is incorrect, I would like to know as soon as possible. Based upon Petitioner's statement in the letter, Respondent began paying and Petitioner began receiving her retirement benefits effective June 1, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to any additional retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Veronica P. Holt 230 East First Street, Apartment 1313 Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Huldah C. Roach. At the time of her death, Mrs. Roach was a retired member of the Florida Retirement System, and was receiving retirement benefits pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. The Respondent, Division of Retirement, sent Mrs. Roach her retirement benefits for the month of June, 1977, at the end of that month. The warrant for the retirement benefit was received by the Petitioner on or about June 30, 1977, and was deposited by him in the joint account which he had shared with Mrs. Roach. On June 8, 1977, Mrs. Roach died. By letter dated July 4, 1977, the Petitioner advised the Respondent of his wife's death. He also advised the Respondent that he was holding the benefit warrant, but in a telephone conversation on August 22, 1977, he advised the Respondent that the warrant had been deposited in the joint account. By letter dated August 24, 1977, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that Mrs. Roach was entitled to retirement benefits only up to the date of her death, and that $330.81 of the June payment thus represented an overpayment. The letter included a demand for repayment of the asserted overpayment. The Respondent made no effort to collect the asserted overpayment between August 24, 1977, and December 5, 1979, when the Respondent, through counsel, forwarded a demand letter to the Petitioner. The petitioner was not able to identify what expenses he paid from the June, 1977, retirement benefit. Mrs. Roach received retirement benefits in excess of her total contributions to the Florida Retirement System, and under the retirement option that she selected, she was entitled to no additional benefits after the day of her death. The Respondent has consistently interpreted provisions of the Florida Retirement Law as allowing payment of retirement benefits only through the date of a retiree's death.
The Issue The sole issue in this cause is whether or not the payments received from Gadsden County by Petitioner, as set forth on pages 4 through 8 of her Amended Petition, for services rendered as Official Court Reporter pursuant to Chapter 29, Florida Statutes, constitute "compensation" within the meaning of that term in Chapter 121, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 27 and May 1, 1992, respectively, the Respondent and the Petitioner submitted to the Hearing Officer their Proposed Recommended Orders including proposed Findings of Fact. In the Appendix to Recommended Order, the Hearing Officer submitted recommended rulings thereon. The following constitutes the rulings in this Final Order on those proposed Findings of Fact. The Petitioner's and Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, are hereby accepted and adopted in that they track the stipulated facts contained in the PREHEARING STIPULATION dated and filed March 30, 1992. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11, are hereby rejected in that they are conclusions of law and were not contained within the stipulated facts contained within the PREHEARING STIPULATION, and are, therefore, not based upon competent substantial evidence. The actual employment position held by the Petitioner as an employee of the judicial branch of the State of Florida is clearly identified on Florida Retirement System Form FR-11, which was executed by the Petitioner on January 24, 1990, and certified by the Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit (Exhibit 6 attached to the PREHEARING STIPULATION), whereon the "Title of Position held" is stated to have been "Official Court Reporter, Second Judicial Circuit of Florida assigned to Gadsden County." The supplemental salary that was paid to the Petitioner by the County required paper work identifying her as a county employee for payroll purposes only; but, as a matter of law, she held her State position as an official court reporter solely at the pleasure of the Judges of the Second Judicial Circuit pursuant to Section 29.01, Florida Statutes. In the Conclusions of Law in this Final Order, this issue shall be fully analyzed. RULINGS ON HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 1 is hereby accepted as a proper statement of applicable law. Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 2 is hereby accepted as a correct statement of applicable law. Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 3 is hereby rejected in that it erroneously concludes that the Petitioner's salary and fees were authorized and set by statute, when, they had to have been authorized and set pursuant to Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. The conclusion of the Hearing Officer is incorrect because under Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, the compensation of, and the fees in question to be charged by, court reporters are authorized and set by such judicial rule. Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, adopted generally by reference the annual salary for court reporters set forth in Section 29.04, Florida Statutes, for a 60-hour work month. That judicial rule then goes on to provide for overtime at the rate of $10.00 per hour. That Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, also provides that the fees in question (for transcripts and depositions) to be charged by court reporters should be set in each circuit by administrative order, and, in the absence of such order, as provided by law. Such court reporters' fees, therefore, are set pursuant to said judicial Rule 2.070, which authorizes the charging of such fees in accordance with a circuit administrative order, and, in its absence, as provided by law. The setting of such fees and the authorization to charge same arise from said judicial Rule 2.070, and not from Chapter 29, Florida Statutes. The fee schedule set forth in Chapter 29, Florida Statutes, derives its legal efficacy not from its legislative enactment alone, but from its judicial approval in said Rule 2.070 in the event that a local circuit administrative order setting such fees has not been entered. In such instance, the fees are not set by statute, but by judicial approval of a statutory fee schedule. The judicial branch has set such fees, not the legislative. Thus, any such fees were not set by statute. The citations by the Hearing Officer in recommended Conclusion of Law No. 4 of Rules 22B-1.004(4)(b)1., and 22B-6.001(49), Florida Administrative Code, are rejected as being inapplicable to the proceeding at bar inasmuch as the Petitioner as an Official Court Reporter appointed pursuant to Section 29.01, Florida Statutes, was an employee of the State of Florida and was not an employee of Gadsden County. Under said Section 29.01 all official court reporters are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Chief Judge and a majority of the Judges of the Court in which the reporter is serving. Provision is made in Section 29.04, Florida Statutes, for the respective counties to provide funds necessary to pay the cost of reporting in criminal cases as necessary to provide competent reporters in such proceedings, but any such monies paid to such official court reporters would be paid to state employees. The judicial branch of government in Florida is a State court system. Official Court Reporters are hired and retained by the State Judges in a Circuit, and their employment is not determined or continued to any extent whatsoever by any Board of County Commissioners. Under Section 29.04(3), Florida Statutes, provision is made for the counties to supplement the funds necessary to pay the cost of reporting in criminal cases as necessary to provide competent reporters in such proceedings. The counties are a source of funding, and are not employers of the Official Court Reporters. In the case of Matter of Compensation of Hunter, 635 P.2d 1371 (Or. App. 1981), the Court of Appeals of Oregon held that where court reporters are appointed and hold their offices at the pleasure of the Judges, and are officers of the Court subject to the direction and control of the Judges, those court reporters are employees of the State of Oregon and not of the counties. At page 1373 of 635 P.2d the Court held: "The right to control is also important from a policy standpoint. The judges of the State of Oregon benefit directly from the services of the court reporters. They not only perform reporting duties in court, but are also the judges' official secretaries. See ORS 8.330. The State benefits most directly from court reporters' services, and it should be responsible for providing their workers' compensation insurance." Recommended Conclusion of Law of No. 5 is hereby rejected as a conclusion of law in that is a recitation of the relative positions of the parties and is not of any recommended holding or ruling by the Hearing Officer. Upon the reasoning and authorities set forth in Paragraph No. (3), above, recommended Conclusion of Law No. 6 is hereby rejected in that the fees in question were not authorized or set by legislative statute but were, in fact, authorized and set pursuant to judicial Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. The first three sentences of recommended Conclusion of Law No. 7 are hereby rejected in that they misconstrue the first sentence of Section 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, that states: "`Compensation', means the monthly salary paid a member, including overtime payments paid from a salary fund, as reported by the employer on the wage and tax statement (Internal Revenue Service form W-2) or any similar form." [Emphasis supplied] A form 1099 is not a form on which an employer reports salary paid from a salary fund to an employee, but, rather is a form utilized to report payments of income to an independent contractor. The "similar form" in that statute refers to an employer's wage and tax statement, which may be a form W-2, which is not the equivalent to a form 1099. As hereinafter discussed in Conclusions of Law Nos. (11), (12), and (13) of this Final Order, Official Court Reporters are "professional persons" within the meaning of that term in Section 121.021(22), Florida Statutes. The recommended Conclusion of Law of the Hearing Officer that the transcribing of criminal proceedings do not constitute "special or particular services" does not comport with either judicial Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, or a 1957 Opinion of the Attorney General of Florida. Under said judicial Rule 2.070 the basic salary for a court reporter is set in subsection (g) together with provision for the payment of overtime for hours in excess of 60 worked per month. In subsection (e) of Rule 2.070, provision is made for fees for what would constitute special or particular services by a court reporter, and the fees that may be charged for same. In a 1957 Opinion of the Attorney General of Florida (1957 0p. Att'y. Gen. Fla. 057- 109 (April 26, 1957)), the Attorney General of Florida analyzed Section 122.02, Florida Statutes, the predecessor to Section 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, as to what constituted compensation under the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). The opinion of the Attorney General was that hourly wages plus overtime would be included within the monthly compensation. But, at the end of that opinion the Attorney General concluded: "We conclude that in the case mentioned in the question the employing authority has prescribed the formula for fixing the monthly compensation or salary. It may vary depending upon the hours employed in discharging the routine work of the employment but the formula is fixed and applicable mathematically. This is not a situation where fees are paid for special or particular services. It is a regular retainer made depending upon the actual hours engaged in performing the month by month routine duties as School Board Attorney. It has no reference to fees for handing special items such as bond validation or other litigation." Under Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, official court reporters are paid their basic salary and overtime for their court appearances in reporting the proceedings. But, if they are to furnish transcripts of proceedings or depositions, which work would be done after their regular working hours, then the fees for such special or particular services are to be set by local circuit administrative order, or in the absence of same, as provided by law. These special or particular services that the court reporters are performing for such additional fees are not performed during their regular working hours, which by said Rule 2.070, is limited to 60 hours per month. And the last sentence of Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 7 that the Petitioner was a county employee is hereby rejected upon the grounds and reasoning set forth in Paragraph No. (4) above. The Hearing Officer's Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 8 (misnumbered as "7") is hereby rejected upon the grounds and for the reasons set forth in Paragraph Nos. (3) through (7) set forth above.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent enter a final order approving petitioner's request for additional retirement benefits by including in the calculation of average final compensation those fees received by petitioner between January 1973 and February 1990 as set forth on pages 4 through 8 of her amended petition. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-3168 Petitioner: Accepted in finding of fact 1. Accepted in finding of fact 2. 3-4. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 5-6. Accepted in finding of fact 4. 7. Accepted in finding of fact 5. 8-11. Accepted in finding of fact 3. Respondent: Accepted in finding of fact 1. Covered in preliminary statement and in finding of fact 2. 3-4. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 5-6. Accepted in finding of fact 4. 7. Accepted in finding of fact 5. COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1500 Edgar Lee Elzie, Esquire P. O. Box 82 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Burton M. Michaels, Esquire Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2630 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560
Findings Of Fact On June 19, 1987, the last day of the 1986-87 school year, Petitioner received his class schedule for the forthcoming 1987-88 school year at Kinlock Park Junior High School in Dade County, Florida, where he was the band director. Petitioner was discomfited with the schedule and resolved that he would investigate the process of applying for retirement benefits in view of a total of 36 years of service in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), inclusive of four years of military service. He knew he had been eligible for retirement since August, 1985. On July 1, 1987, Petitioner requested an appointment with administrative personnel of the Dade County School Board to discuss retirement options by executing and mailing a form entitled "Retirement Information/Appointment Request" to the Dade County School Board's Bureau of Personnel Management, Retirement Section. The form was received by the bureau on July 8, 1987. On the form, Petitioner stated he was tentatively planning to retire in August, 1987. Thereafter, Petitioner was contacted and attended a conference with a representative of the school board's retirement section on July 27, 1987, where he executed numerous personnel documents and completed the application for retirement benefits. The application was received by Respondent on July 30, 1987. The face of the application form contains a blank where an applicant for retirement inscribes the date for termination of service with all FRS employers. In the instant case, that blank reflects the date of June 19, 1987, as the effective date of Petitioner's termination of employment. Following the effective date of termination of employment on the application is the form's emphatic printed statement that this is the date for termination of employment and not the effective date of retirement. The application is notarized and bears the signature of Petitioner. While evidencing Petitioner's intent to terminate his employment on June 19, 1987, the application form provides no evidence of Petitioner's intent to retire prior to July 1, 1987. Another of the many forms which Petitioner received at the July 27, 1987, retirement conference is entitled "Retirement Information Form." Petitioner acknowledged his signature on this form which sets forth language stating that the signatory understands the data on the form is an estimate of his potential retirement benefits and that the amount may change. That form sets forth an effective retirement date of August 1, 1987. The Dade County School Board has 26,000 to 27,000 employees. Of this total number, approximately 18,000 are teachers. Between 400 and 500 of the employees seek retirement each year. Of that number, approximately 150-200 teachers retire in June of every year. All employees of the board are urged to contact the retirement section as soon as possible. The general policy is for the employee contemplating retirement to telephone the office. Four or five seminars are held throughout the year by various entities to familiarize school board employees with retirement procedures and benefits.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered establishing Petitioner's retirement date for purpose of receipt of retirement benefits to be August 1, 1987. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-3317 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS Petitioner did not submit proposed findings. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS Addressed. Addressed. Addressed. Addressed. Addressed. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary to conclusion. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan W. Thurston 4850 Northwest 24th Court Miami, Florida 33142 Burton M. Michaels, Esquire Department of Administration 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Hon. Adis Vila Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue presented in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to change his retirement to in-line-of-duty disability benefits pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S- 4.002(4).
Findings Of Fact The Department's Division of Retirement is charged with managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS) on behalf of the Department. The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. On or about January 3, 1983, Gordon B. Williams began his employment as a Vocational Instructor III for the Florida Department of Corrections. By reason of his employment, Mr. Williams became a member of FRS. Over the course of his career, Mr. Williams suffered a number of on-the-job accidents which resulted in various bodily injuries. On or about February 4, 1998, a Form FR-13a, signed by Sherry Rogers, Personnel Technician I, at Lake Correctional Institution was completed on behalf of Mr. Williams. The form indicated "regular" disability. By letter dated August 27, 1998, Mr. Williams tendered his resignation from his employment. His employment with the State of Florida terminated effective on or about September 23, 1998. Mr. Williams resigned because he was unable to continue performing his duties in light of his physical disabilities. Mr. Williams earned approximately 15.75 years of service credit in the FRS. Mr. Williams called the Division of Retirement to discuss his retirement twice: on or about October 22, 1998, and November 4, 1998. On or about December 14, 1999, Mr. Williams completed and filed with the Division an application for FRS early service retirement. His effective retirement date was November 1, 1998. However, the application received by the Department was not signed. On the unsigned form, immediately above where Petitioner should have signed the application, was the following statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. (Bold in original.) On January 8, 1999, the Division of Retirement notified Petitioner that his application was not signed in the presence of a notary public, and provided another application for him to complete and have properly notarized. This letter also indicated, in all-cap, bold-face type, "Once you retire, you cannot add additional service or change options. Retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited!" On January 29, 1999, a second Application for Service Retirement was filed with the Division of Retirement, signed by Mr. Williams and notarized on January 18, 1999. This application bore the same statement regarding the applicant's understanding of the inability to change retirement options or type as that quoted in Finding of Fact 9. A third application was submitted in approximately February 1999, to correct a problem related to the notarization of Petitioner's signature. This third application also contained the same statement identified in Finding of Fact 9. On or about March 24, 1999, Mr. Williams completed and filed with the Department a Health Insurance Subsidy Certificate and a withholding certificate for pension payments. Petitioner began receiving benefit payments in March 1999 and these payments were direct deposited to Petitioner's bank account. Petitioner did not apply for disability retirement prior to applying for service retirement. On or about December 28, 2007, a new Form FR-13a, signed by Luz Veintidos, Personnel Specialist, at the Department of Corrections Region III Personnel Office, was completed on behalf of Mr. Williams. This new Form FR-13a indicated "in-line- of-duty" disability. Attached to the new Form FR-13a was the original Form FR-13a completed in February 1998. On or about January 22, 2008, Mr. Williams completed and filed with the Department an application for in-line-of-duty disability retirement, along with a letter requesting that his type of retirement be changed from service retirement to disability retirement. Respondent's records do not indicate and no competent testimony indicates that Respondent received any documents related to Petitioner's claim for disability retirement prior to January 2008. While Petitioner inquired about disability retirement, no application was filed requesting it until 2008. By letter dated February 8, 2008, the Division of Retirement advised Mr. Williams that a retired member could not change his type of retirement after a benefit payment has been cashed or deposited and therefore the Division of Retirement could not honor his request. By letter dated February 25, 2008, Mr. Williams contended that he was "following Division of Retirement instructions when he applied for early service retirement instead of disability retirement" and that his October 1998 telephone conversation with the Division "was, in effect, a denial of application for benefits." He could not, however, identify who he talked to at the Division of Retirement that instructed him regarding his choice to file for early retirement. Nor did he indicate that at any time he understood that an application for retirement could be processed by an individual agency as opposed to the Division of Retirement, or processed by telephone without a written application. By letter dated April 11, 2008, the Division advised Mr. Williams of its final decision to deny his request to change his type of retirement from service retirement to disability retirement.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered denying Petitioner's request to change his retirement status to in-line-of-duty disability retirement. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Gordon B. Williams 19607 North Highway 27 Clermont, Florida 34715 Geoffrey Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
