The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner overpaid Respondent Medicaid funds, for which Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes (2002), authorizes Petitioner to seek repayment from Respondent.
Findings Of Fact During 1998, Respondent was an authorized Medicaid provider, pursuant to Medicaid provider number 105425200, and was a party to a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. Respondent filed claims with Petitioner for payment, under the Medicaid program, for the goods and services that are the subject of the audit described below, and Petitioner paid Respondent for these claims. The audit period in this case is 1998. During 1998, Respondent submitted to Petitioner 36,257 claims for nearly 5.5 million units of over one thousand types of drugs. These claims totaled $3,075,449.88, which Petitioner paid Respondent. On June 2, 1999, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent informing it of a review of its pharmacy claims for 1998. The letter requests documentation of all purchases of 12 named drugs for 1998 and documentation of all credits for these drugs during the same period. The letter states that acceptable documentation includes itemized wholesaler sales history reports, itemized manufacturer sales history reports, itemized invoices, and credit return receipts. By letter dated June 5, 1999, Respondent provided the requested information. By letter dated June 23, 2000, Petitioner advised Respondent that it had examined the paid Medicaid claims for 1998 and the acquisition documentation that Respondent had provided in June 1999. The letter states: "You have failed to provide adequate documentation to the effect that the available quantity of certain drugs of given strength was as great as the quantity of those drugs billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid.” Thus, Petitioner made a "provisional" determination that it had overpaid Respondent $1,092,205.32. The letter invites Respondent to provide additional information to reduce the overpayment determination. The June 23 letter contains an Overpayment Attachment that lists ten of the twelve drugs for which Petitioner had sought documentation in its earlier letter. For each of these ten drugs, the Overpayment Attachment lists the generic code, number of units for which Medicaid paid, the total amount of Medicaid payments, the total units documented by Respondent to have been available during the relevant period, and the number of units for which Respondent provided no availability documentation. The Overpayment Attachment also calculates the amount of Medicaid payments attributable to the unavailable units and the total overpayment, which is $1,092,205.32. The overpayment calculations described in the preceding paragraph assume that all available units of the audited drugs were sold to Medicaid patients. The effect of this improbable scenario reduces the amount of the overpayment. The overpayment calculations attempt no extrapolation of overpayments on the over 10,000 other drugs for which Respondent received Medicaid payments during 1998. The effect of limiting the overpayment calculation to the ten listed drugs reduces the amount of the overpayment. However, the ten listed drugs are the drugs that generated the most Medicaid payments to Respondent and account for over one-third of the total Medicaid payments during the relevant period. Respondent provided additional information to Petitioner on August 30 and November 3, 2000. However, after examining the information, Petitioner advised Respondent, by letter dated April 8, 2002, that its final determination was that Respondent owed $1,096,489.77 due to its receipt of Medicaid overpayments. The overpayment increased by over $4000 due to the determination that Respondent's records documented 1000 fewer available units of two dosages of Risperdone than Petitioner had previously determined.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner $1,096,489.77, plus interest, to repay overpayments that it received from the Medicaid program for the sale of drugs in 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Grant P. Dearborn Assistant General Counsel Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5407 Jose M. Herrera Jose M. Herrera, P.A. 1401 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner must reimburse Respondent for payments totaling $1,140,763.88 that Petitioner received from the Medicaid Program in compensation for the provision of prescription drugs between late-August and November of 1998. Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to retain the payments in question because Petitioner allegedly has failed to demonstrate that it had available during the pertinent period a sufficient quantity of the prescription drugs in question.
Findings Of Fact The parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts and the evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Parties The Agency for Health Care Administration (the “Agency”) is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. As one of its duties, the Agency must recover "overpayments . . . as appropriate," the term "overpayment" being statutorily defined to mean "any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake." See Section 409.913(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Palm Beach Pharmacy, Inc. (“PBPI”), d/b/a Eddie’s Drug (“Eddie’s”) was, at all times material hereto, a duly contracted Medicaid provider, having entered into a Medicaid Provider Agreement with the Agency and been assigned a Medicaid Provider Number: 106343000. Eddie’s is a Florida licensed pharmacy.1 As an enrolled Medicaid provider, Eddie’s is authorized to dispense drugs and supplies to Medicaid recipients. In return, Eddie’s has agreed to comply with all governing statutes, rules, and policies, including those policies set forth in the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook (the “Handbook”). The Agency, which prepared the Handbook and furnishes it to Medicaid providers, has incorporated the Handbook by reference into Rule 59G-4.250(2), Florida Administrative Code. PBPI, which owned and operated a number of pharmacies (including Eddie’s), maintained its corporate headquarters in West Palm Beach, Florida. Eddie’s was located in Miami, Florida. On July 1, 1998, PBPI acquired a drug store known as Jay’s Drugs (“Jay’s”). Jay’s was located in Miami, Florida, across the street from Eddie’s. Thus, before both stores came under common ownership, they had been competitors. This case arises out of the Agency's attempt to recover alleged overpayments on Medicaid claims for which Eddie’s was paid several years ago. The "audit period" that is the subject of the Agency's recoupment effort is April 1, 1998 to July 31, 1999, although the actual period in controversy is much shorter. From July 1, 1998, until the end of the audit period, PBPI owned and operated both Eddie’s and Jay’s. The Underlying Facts The transactions at the heart of this case occurred between late-August and November of 1998, during which period (the “Focal Period”) Medicaid reimbursed Eddie’s more than $1 million for prescription drugs including Neupogen and Epogen/Procrit (collectively, the “Drugs”). The Drugs are used to treat AIDS patients and persons infected with HIV. Prior to the Focal Period, Eddie’s had not dispensed $1 million worth of the Drugs——or any figure approaching that amount——in three or four months’ time. The reason for the dramatic spike in Eddie’s business is that Eddie’s was dispensing the Drugs to customers of Jay’s pursuant to an arrangement designed to manipulate PBPI’s contractual obligations to the former owner of Jay’s under the purchase and sale agreement by which PBPI had acquired Jay’s. Essentially, the arrangement was this. Jay’s was dispensing the Drugs to a large number (approximately 150) of Medicaid beneficiaries who were receiving treatment at a nearby clinic. Because the Drugs were administered to the patients via intravenous infusion, the clinic typically obtained the Drugs from Jay’s in bulk. To fill these prescriptions, Jay’s ordered the Drugs from a wholesale supplier, which usually delivered the Drugs to Jay’s the next day. At some point before the Focal Period, arrangements were made to have the clinic present its prescriptions for the Drugs to Eddie’s rather than Jay’s.2 The evidence does not show, exactly, how this was accomplished, but whatever the means, the clinic abruptly began bringing prescriptions for the Drugs to Eddie’s.3 This diversion of Jay’s’ business to Eddie’s was intended to deprive Jay’s of Medicaid reimbursements to which Jay’s’ former owner had access as a source of funds for paying down a note that PBPI had given for the purchase of Jay’s. By having Eddie’s dispense the Drugs and submit the Medicaid claims, Medicaid money flowed into Eddie’s’ bank account (rather than Jay’s’ bank account) and hence was not immediately available to the former owner of Jay’s to reduce PBPI’s debt. During the Focal Period, Eddie’s did not purchase the Drugs from a wholesaler but instead acquired them from Jay’s. The process by which this was accomplished involved a pharmacy technician named Wright, who was employed at Eddie’s, and a pharmacist named Shafor, who worked at Jay’s. Wright (at Eddie’s) accepted the prescriptions for the Drugs as the clinic brought them in Then, she called Shafor (at Jay’s) and told him the quantities needed to fill the prescriptions. Shafor ordered the Drugs from a wholesaler, which delivered them in bulk to Jay’s, usually the next day. Upon receiving the Drugs, Shafor personally delivered them to Wright, who, recall, was across the street at Eddie’s. Wright labeled and dispensed the Drugs. Eddie’s submitted a claim for the Drugs to Medicaid, and Medicaid paid Eddie’s. PBPI maintained separate accounting ledgers for Eddie’s and Jay’s, respectively. The company’s accountants recorded the subject transactions in these ledgers so that Jay’s——not Eddie’s——would “recognize” the sales of the Drugs. In a nutshell, this was done through “inter-company” transfers whereby all of the money that Eddie’s received from Medicaid for the Drugs was moved, on the books, into an account of Jay’s. In this way, any profit from the sales of the Drugs (the difference between the wholesale cost of the Drugs and the Medicaid reimbursement therefor, less overhead) was realized on Jay’s’ books.4 The Medicaid payments to Eddie’s that the Agency seeks to recoup were included in four remittance vouchers dated September 2, 1998; September 30, 1998; October 28, 1998; and November 25, 1998, respectively. The September 2 payment to Eddie’s totaled $287,205.52. Of this amount, $276,033.23 reimbursed Eddie’s for dispensing the Drugs. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of September 30, 1998, the sum of $276,033.23 had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The September 30 payment to Eddie’s totaled $439,175.77, of which $432,700.36 was paid in consideration of the Drugs. The October 28 Medicaid payment was $431,753.82, of which total the Drugs accounted for $424,202.76. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of October 31, 1998, the sum of $870,929.59 (439,175.77 + 431,753.82) had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The November 25 payment to Eddie’s totaled $407,088.00. Of this amount, $393,063.00 reimbursed Eddie’s for dispensing the Drugs. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of November 30, 1998, the sum of $407,088.00 had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The Agency’s Allegations On October 31, 2000, the Agency issued its Final Agency Audit Report (“Audit”) in which Eddie’s was alleged to have received $1,143,612.68 in overpayments relating to the Drugs. In the Audit, the Agency spelled out its theory of the case; indeed, the Audit is the only document in the record that does so. The Agency cited several statutory provisions. First, Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes, was referenced. This section states: When presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to supervise the provision of, and be responsible for, goods and services claimed to have been provided, to supervise and be responsible for preparation and submission of the claim, and to present a claim that is true and accurate and that is for goods and services that: * * * (e) Are provided in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with federal, state, and local law. Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes. The Agency did not allege (or prove), however, that Eddie’s had violated Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes.5 Put another way, the Agency did not plead or prove lack of supervision, submission of a false claim, or that the Drugs were not provided in accordance with applicable law. Next, the Agency cited Section 409.913(8), Florida Statutes, which provides: A Medicaid provider shall retain medical, professional, financial, and business records pertaining to services and goods furnished to a Medicaid recipient and billed to Medicaid for a period of 5 years after the date of furnishing such services or goods. The agency may investigate, review, or analyze such records, which must be made available during normal business hours. However, 24-hour notice must be provided if patient treatment would be disrupted. The provider is responsible for furnishing to the agency, and keeping the agency informed of the location of, the provider's Medicaid- related records. The authority of the agency to obtain Medicaid-related records from a provider is neither curtailed nor limited during a period of litigation between the agency and the provider. The Agency further alleged, as fact, that Eddie’s had failed, upon request, “to submit invoices from [its] suppliers to substantiate the availability of drugs that [were] billed to Medicaid” and thus had not “fully substantiated such availability.” The Agency, however, did not invoke any of the available remedial provisions as authority to impose a sanction for this alleged failure to turn over Medicaid-related records. See, e.g., Sections 409.913(14)(b), (c), and (d), Florida Statutes. The Agency cited Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the Agency to “require repayment for inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive goods or services from the person furnishing them, the person under whose supervision they were furnished, or the person causing them to be furnished.” There was no allegation (or proof), however, that the Drugs which Eddie’s had purported to dispense (i.e. the Drugs for which it had submitted Medicaid claims) were “inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive.” Thus, Eddie’s was not alleged (or shown) to have violated Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes. Finally, the Agency relied upon Section 409.913(14)(n), Florida Statutes, which is the basis of the Agency’s legal theory. This section provides: The agency may seek any remedy provided by law, including, but not limited to, the remedies provided in subsections (12) and (15) and s. 812.035, if: * * * (n) The provider fails to demonstrate that it had available during a specific audit or review period sufficient quantities of goods, or sufficient time in the case of services, to support the provider's billings to the Medicaid program[.] The Agency contended, additionally, that “[b]illing Medicaid for drugs that have not been demonstrated as available for dispensing is a violation of the Medicaid laws and regulations and has resulted in the finding that [Eddie’s] ha[s] been overpaid by the Medicaid program.” (Emphasis added). The Agency explained, “Medicaid payments that have been substantiated by documented inventory are assumed to be valid; and payments in excess of that amount are regarded to be invalid.” Thus, the Agency’s theory of recovery is that Eddie’s must forfeit “overpayments” arising from its failure to demonstrate the availability, in inventory, of a sufficient quantity of the Drugs for which claims were submitted, as required by Section 409.913(14)(n), Florida Statutes. After the Audit was issued, the Agency accepted a handwritten note regarding the transfer of a small quantity of Drugs from Jay’s to Eddie’s as sufficient to demonstrate the availability of such amount. This resulted in a slight reduction of the amount of the alleged overpayment, to $1,140,763.88. The Separate Audit of Jay’s The Agency conducted a separate audit of Jay’s, concerning which some evidence was introduced at hearing. Without getting into unnecessary detail, the audit of Jay’s revealed that Jay’s had purchased, during and around the Focal Period, a quantity of the Drugs that exceeded the number of units that Jay’s had billed to Medicaid. It was Eddie’s theory that this “excess inventory” of Jay’s matched, more or less, the alleged inventory shortfall at Eddie’s, thereby corroborating the testimony concerning the transfer of these Drugs from Jay’s to Eddie’s for dispensation. At hearing, the parties sharply disputed whether, in fact, Jay’s had transferred the Drugs to Eddie’s. The Agency, of course, maintained that such transfers were not properly documented; Eddie’s argued that the documents and other evidence, including testimony about the transactions in question, adequately demonstrated that the transfers had, in fact, occurred. There was no dispute, however, that if it were found that such transfers had occurred, and if, further, the documents (and other evidence) pertaining to the inventory of Jay’s were accepted as proof of the quantities of Drugs so transferred, then all but $176,078.30 worth of the Drugs could be accounted for. Thus, as counsel for Eddie’s conceded at hearing, the Agency is entitled to recoup some sum of money. The question is whether that sum is $1,140,763.88 or $176,078.30. Ultimate Factual Determination Based on all of the evidence in the record, including the deposition testimony received through the parties’ joint stipulation, it is determined that, more likely than not, Eddie’s had available during the Focal Period a sufficient quantity of the Drugs to support all but $176,078.30 worth of the claims in dispute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Eddie’s to repay the Agency the principal amount of $176,078.30. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2002.
The Issue Whether the Respondents were overpaid by Medicaid for radiology and nuclear medicine services provided to Florida Medicaid patients. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA, Agency or Petitioner) asserts that the Respondents, Lazaro Plasencia, M.D., and Ana M. Elosegui, M.D., billed Medicaid for procedures they did not perform in violation of Medicaid policy, the Florida Administrative Code, and Florida Statutes. The Respondents maintain that because of ambiguities in Medicaid policy regarding reimbursement protocols for the radiology services at issue, the Respondents mistakenly believed in good faith that under the applicable Medicaid regulations and guidelines, Medicaid would reimburse the "maximum" fee allowable under the relevant fee schedule. The Respondents acknowledge that the "professional component" of the radiology services at issue was provided by a third-party physician specialist. The Respondents further assert that they are entitled to, at the minimum, payment of the "technical component" of the medically necessary radiological services that they provided to Medicaid recipients. The Petitioner seeks reimbursement from Dr. Plasencia in the amount of $196,129.52 and $122,065.08 from Dr. Elosegui.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of monitoring the Medicaid Program in Florida. At all times material to the allegations of DOAH Case No. 07-2195MPI, the Respondent, Dr. Plasencia, was a licensed medical doctor in good standing with the State of Florida, license #ME49315, and was also a Medicaid provider, #0448125-00. Similarly, at all times material to the allegations of DOAH Case No. 07-2462MPI, the Respondent, Dr. Elosegui, was a licensed medical doctor in good standing with the State of Florida, license #ME85963, and was also a Medicaid provider, #2654636-00. Drs. Elosegui and Plasencia practiced medicine together in a shared office space in Miami, Florida. The Respondents were not members of a "group practice." The Respondents were individual providers who billed Medicaid separately, using their individual Medicaid provider numbers. The doctors performed services for Medicaid recipients and submitted the charges for those services to Medicaid. Medicaid has a "pay and chase" policy of paying Medicaid claims as submitted by providers. Audits performed by the Agency then, after-the-fact, reconcile the amounts paid to providers with the amounts that were payable under the Medicaid guidelines and pertinent rules. If more is paid to the provider than allowable, a recoupment against the provider is sought. In these cases, the Respondents conducted (or supervised) various tests including "Radiological and Nuclear Medicine" services for Florida Medicaid patients in a shared office setting. The services at issue in these cases were billed under the CPT procedure codes of series 70000 and 90000. The Petitioner has not challenged any procedure at issue as not "medically necessary." Moreover, the Petitioner does not dispute that the Respondents performed or supervised the "technical component" of the universe of the radiological services at issue. The "professional component" for the universe of the radiological services at issue in this proceeding was outsourced to third-party physicians. The Respondents contracted with the outside third-party physicians for the "professional component" services to read and interprete the radiological product. These third party physicians were not Medicaid providers, nor were they part of a Medicaid group provider that included the Respondents. When billing for the radiological services, the Respondents billed Medicaid for both the "technical" and "professional" components using the "maximum" fee set forth in the Fee Schedule. The Respondents knew or should have known that they had not performed a global service as they never performed or supervised the "professional" component of the services billed. The Petitioner performed an audit of the radiological claims for Dr. Plasencia for the dates of service July 1, 2001 through December 31, 2005. On December 1, 2006, the Petitioner issued a Final Audit Report that concluded Dr. Plasencia had been overpaid $196,129.52. Additionally, the Petitioner sought an administrative fine against Dr. Plasencia in the amount of $1,000.00. Similarly, the Petitioner performed an audit of the radiological claims submitted by Dr. Elosegui for the dates of service October 11, 2002 through December 31, 2005. On December 1, 2006, the Petitioner issued a Final Audit Report that concluded Dr. Elosegui had been overpaid $122,065.08. The Petitioner also sought an administrative fine against Dr. Elosegui in the amount of $1,000.00. In January 2005, the Fee Schedule applicable to CPT 90000 procedure code services was revised. The Fee Schedule specified a reimbursement amount for the "technical" component of the radiological services in the CPT 90000 code set. Prior to that time, there had been no reimbursable amount for the "technical component" performed separately from the "professional component." The Medicaid provider agreements executed between the parties govern the contractual relationships between these providers and the Agency. The parties do not dispute that those provider agreements, together with the pertinent laws or regulations, control the billing and reimbursement claims that remain at issue. The amounts, if any, that were overpaid were related solely to the radiological services billed under a global or inclusive manner that included the "professional" component within the amount claimed to be owed by Medicaid. The provider agreements pertinent to these cases are voluntary agreements between AHCA and the Respondents. The Fee Schedule adopted by the Petitioner dictates the code and reimbursement amounts authorized to be billed pursuant to the provider agreement. The Respondents performed or supervised the "technical components" for the radiological services billed to Medicaid. The Respondents did not perform the "professional component." For all of the 70000 series billing codes the components can be split and the "technical component" can be identified and paid separately. For these billing codes, the Respondents were given (or paid for) the "technical component" of the 70000 codes. Similarly, for the 90000 billing codes, for the "technical component" portion where it was identifiable and allowable, the Petitioner gave the Respondents credit for that amount. The "technical component" for the 90000 billing codes was not identifiable or allowable prior to 2005. Prior to the amendment to the Fee Schedule the 90000 billing codes were presumed to be performed in a global manner; i.e. the "professional component" and the "technical component" were done together by the Medicaid provider submitting the claim. That was not the factual case in these audits. Respondents were not authorized to bill the 90000 codes in the global manner as they did not perform the "professional component" of the services rendered. Any Medicaid provider whose billing is not in compliance with the Medicaid billing policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. The Petitioner administers the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to its authority AHCA conducts audits to assure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. These “integrity” audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. These “integrity” audits are to assure that the provider bill and receive payment in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. The Respondents do not dispute the Agency’s authority to perform audits such as the ones at issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order of recoupment as set forth in the reports at issue. The final order should also impose an administrative fine against each Respondent in the amount of $1,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Holly Benson, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Robert M. Penezic, Esquire Broad and Cassel Post Office Box 14010 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302-4010 L. William Porter, II, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center III 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Robert N. Nicholson, Esquire Broad and Cassel Post Office Box 14010 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302-4010
The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether certain provisions of the Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan, as adopted in Rule 59G-6.010, Florida Administrative Code, which are relied upon by the AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION to apply a fair rental value system of property reimbursement to Petitioner are invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1995). Petitioner also asserts a state and federal constitutional equal protection challenge to the existing rule provisions. (Petitioner’s constitutional issues are preserved, but are not determined in this proceeding.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, CONSULTING MANAGEMENT AND EDUCATION, INC., d/b/a GULF COAST NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER (CME), is the licensed operator of a 103-bed nursing home in Clearwater, Florida, which is presently known as GULF COAST NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER (GULF COAST). CME participates in the Florida Medicaid Program as an enrolled provider. Respondent, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (AHCA), is the agency of the State of Florida authorized to implement and administer the Florida Medicaid Program, and is the successor agency to the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, pursuant to Chapter 93-129, Laws of Florida. Stipulated Facts Prior to 1993, the GULF COAST nursing home facility was known as COUNTRY PLACE OF CLEARWATER (COUNTRY PLACE), and was owned and operated by the Clearwater Limited Partnership, a limited partnership which is not related to CME. In 1993 CME agreed to purchase, and did in fact purchase, COUNTRY PLACE from the Clearwater Limited Partnership. Simultaneous with the purchase of COUNTRY PLACE, CME entered into a Sale/Leaseback Agreement with LTC Properties, Inc., a Maryland real estate investment trust which engages in the financing of nursing homes. The Purchase and Sale Agreement between Clearwater Limited Partnership and CME was contingent upon the Sale/Leaseback Agreement and the proposed Lease between CME and LTC Properties, Inc. On September 1, 1993, CME simultaneously as a part of the same transaction purchased COUNTRY PLACE, conveyed the facility to LTC Properties, Inc., and leased the facility back from LTC Properties, Inc. As required, CME had notified AHCA of the proposed transaction. AHCA determined that the transaction included a change of ownership and, by lease, a change of provider. CME complied with AHCA's requirements and became the licensed operator and Medicaid provider for COUNTRY PLACE. Thereafter, CME changed the name of the facility to GULF COAST. After CME acquired the facility and became the licensed operator and Medicaid provider, AHCA continued to reimburse CME the same per diem reimbursement which had been paid to the previous provider (plus certain inflation factors) until CME filed its initial cost report, as required for new rate setting. In the normal course of business, CME in 1995 filed its initial Medicaid cost report after an initial period of actual operation by CME. Upon review of the cost report, AHCA contended that the cost report was inaccurate and engaged in certain "cost settlement" adjustments. During this review, AHCA took the position that CME's property reimbursement should be based on FRVS methodologies rather than "cost" due to the lease. In November of 1995, CME received from AHCA various documents which recalculated all components of Petitioner's Medicaid reimbursement rates for all periods subsequent to CME's acquisition of the facility. In effect, AHCA placed CME on FRVS property reimbursement. The practical effect of AHCA's action was to reduce CME's property reimbursement both retroactively and prospectively. The retroactive application would result in a liability of CME to AHCA, due to a claimed overpayment by AHCA. The prospective application would (and has) resulted in a reduction of revenues. CME is substantially affected by AHCA's proposed action and by Sections I.B., III.G.2.d.(1), V.E.1.h., and V.E.4. of the Florida Medicaid Plan. Additional Findings of Fact The Florida Medicaid Plan establishes methodologies for reimbursement of a nursing home's operating costs and patient care costs, as well as property costs. The dispute in this matter relates only to reimbursement of property costs. CME as the operator of the GULF COAST nursing home facility is entitled to reimbursement of property costs in accordance with the Florida Medicaid Plan. CME as the operator of the GULF COAST facility entered into a Florida Medicaid Program Provider Agreement, agreeing to abide by the provisions of the Florida Medicaid Plan. The Sale/Leaseback Agreement entered into by CME and LTC Properties Inc. (LTC) specifically provides for a distinct sale of the nursing home facility to LTC. LTC holds record fee title to GULF COAST. LTC, a Maryland corporation, is not related to CME, a Colorado corporation. The Florida Medicaid Plan is intended to provide reimbursement for reasonable costs incurred by economically and efficiently operated facilities. The Florida Medicaid Plan pays a single per diem rate for all levels of nursing care. After a nursing home facility's first year of operation, a cost settling process is conducted with AHCA which results in a final cost report. The final cost report serves as a baseline for reimbursement over the following years. Subsequent to the first year of operation, a facility files its cost report annually. AHCA normally adjusts a facility's reimbursement rate twice a year based upon the factors provided for in the Florida Medicaid Plan. The rate-setting process takes a provider through Section II of the Plan relating to cost finding and audits resulting in cost adjustments. CME submitted the appropriate cost reports after its first year of operation of the GULF COAST facility. Section III of the Florida Medicaid Plan specifies the areas of allowable costs. Under the Allowable Costs Section III.G.2.d.(1) in the Florida Title XIX Plan, a facility with a lease executed on or after October 1, 1985, shall be reimbursed for lease costs and other property costs under the Fair Rental Value System (FRVS). AHCA has treated all leases the same under FRVS since that time. AHCA does not distinguish between types of leases under the FRVS method. The method for the FRVS calculation is provided in Section V.E.1.a-g of the Florida Medicaid Plan. A “hold harmless” exception to application of the FRVS method is provided for at Section V.E.1.h of the Florida Medicaid Plan, and Section V.E.4 of the Plan provides that new owners shall receive the prior owner’s cost-based method when the prior owner was not on FRVS under the hold harmless provision. As a lessee and not the holder of record fee title to the facility, neither of those provisions apply to CME. At the time CME acquired the facility, there was an indication that the Sale/Leaseback transaction with LTC was between related parties, so that until the 1995 cost settlement, CME was receiving the prior owner’s cost-based property method of reimbursement. When AHCA determined that the Sale/Leaseback transaction between CME and LTC was not between related parties, AHCA set CME’s property reimbursement component under FRVS as a lessee. Property reimbursement based on the FRVS methodology does not depend on actual period property costs. Under the FRVS methodology, all leases after October 1985 are treated the same. For purposes of reimbursement, AHCA does not recognize any distinction between various types of leases. For accounting reporting purposes, the Sale/Leaseback transaction between CME and LTD is treated as a capital lease, or “virtual purchase” of the facility. This accounting treatment, however, is limited to a reporting function, with the underlying theory being merely that of providing a financing mechanism. Record fee ownership remains with LTC. CME, as the lease holder, may not encumber title to the facility. The Florida Medicaid Plan does not distinguish between a sale/leaseback transaction and other types of lease arrangements. Sections IV.D., V.E.1.h., and V.E.4., the “hold harmless” and “change of ownership” provisions which allow a new owner to receive the prior owner’s method of reimbursement if FRVS would produce a loss for the new owner, are limited within the Plan’s organizational context, and within the context of the Plan, to owner/operators of facilities, and grandfathered lessee/operators. These provisions do not apply to leases executed after October 1, 1985. Capital leases are an accounting construct for reporting purposes, which is inapplicable when the Florida Medicaid Plan specifically addresses this issue. The Florida Medicaid Plan specifically addresses the treatment of leases entered into after October 1985 and provides that reimbursement will be made pursuant to the FRVS method. The Florida Medicaid Plan is the result of lengthy workshops and negotiations between the agency and the nursing home industry. The Florida Medicaid Plan complies with federal regulations.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments, and, if so, what is the aggregate amount of the overpayments.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent, the Agency for Health Care Administration, is the single state agency charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida under Section 409.907, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, The Doctor's Office, was a Florida corporation approved by the Agency to provide group Medicaid services. At all times relevant to this matter, Petitioner was owned entirely by non-physicians who employed salaried physicians to provide Medicaid services. Petitioner, at all times relevant to this matter, offered physician services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to a contract with the Agency under provider number 371236P-00. Petitioner, pursuant to the specific terms in the contract with the Agency, agreed to abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program, and Federal laws and regulations. Petitioner, pursuant to its contract with the Agency, agreed to only seek reimbursement from the Medicaid program for services that were "medically necessary" and "Medicaid compensable." The Audit In mid-1996, the Agency, pursuant to its statutory responsibility, advised Petitioner that it intended to audit Petitioner's paid Medicaid claims for the alleged medical services it provided between July 1, 1994 and June 30, 1996. In September 1996, the Agency conducted an initial audit site visit, and randomly selected 61 patient files for review. The complete patient files, provided by Petitioner, were reviewed by Sharon Dewey, a registered nurse consultant and Agency employee, as well as Dr. Solenberger, a physician consultant and Agency employee. In accordance with its procedure, the Agency determined that Petitioner had submitted a total of 580 claims for reimbursement relating to the 61 patient files and had received full payment from the Medicaid program for each claim. On March 3, 1997, the Agency issued a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR), and advised Petitioner that it had over-billed Medicaid and received an overpayment from the program. Shortly thereafter, the Agency auditors, Dr. Solenberger and Ms. Dewey, met with Frank Colavecchio, Petitioner's Corporate Representative, and discussed the Medicaid violations alleged in the review. During the meeting, the Agency requested Mr. Colavecchio to instruct Petitioner's staff physicians to review their records and provide a written rebuttal to the Agency's initial determinations. Within days, and prior to any further action, the Agency placed the audit on indefinite hold. The Agency decided to delay the audit until certain proposed legislation relating to peer review and the integrity of the Medicaid reimbursement program was enacted. Two years later, Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes, was enacted during the 1999 legislative session and became law. Shortly thereafter, in 1999, the Agency hired Dr. Larry Deeb, a board-certified, practicing pediatrician, to perform a peer review of Petitioner's practices and procedures. Dr. Deeb has performed similar medical records reviews for the Medicaid program since 1981 and possesses a thorough understanding of CPT coding and the EPSDT requirements. Dr. Deeb received the medical files provided by Petitioner, and reviewed each patient file in the random sample, including the medical services and Medicaid-related claim records. On November 11, 1999, Dr. Deeb completed his peer review of 564 of the 580 claims provided in the random sample and forwarded his findings to the Agency. Dr. Deeb advised the Agency that 16 reimbursement claims involved adult patients and he therefore did not review them. Utilizing Dr. Deebs findings, the Agency employed appropriate and valid auditing and statistical methods, and calculated the total Medicaid overpayment that Petitioner received during the two year audit period. On July 17, 2000, approximately four years after the original audit notification, the Agency issued its Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR). The Agency advised Petitioner that, based upon its review of the random sample of 61 patients for whom Petitioner submitted 580 claims for payment between 1994 and 1996, Petitioner received $875,261.03 in total overpayment from the Medicaid program during the audit period. Petitioner denied the overpayment and requested a formal administrative hearing. Following the initial commencement of the final hearing in this matter in December 2001, Dr. Deeb, again, reviewed the disputed claims and modified his opinion relating to 6 claims. Thereafter, the Agency recalculated the alleged overpayment and demanded Petitioner to pay $870,748.31. The Allegations The Agency alleges that specific claims submitted by Petitioner, which were paid by the Medicaid program, fail to comply with specific Medicaid requirements and therefore must be reimbursed. Since its inception, the Medicaid program has required providers to meet the Medicaid program's policies and procedures as set forth in federal, state, and local law. To qualify for payment, it is the provider's duty to ensure that all claims "[a]re provided in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with . . . state . . . law." Section 409.913(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1993). Medicaid manuals are available to all Providers. Petitioner, as a condition of providing Medicaid services pursuant to the Medicaid program, is bound by the requirements and restrictions specified in the manuals, and under the contract, is required to reimburse the Medicaid program for any paid claims found to be in violation of Medicaid policies and procedures. The evidence presented at hearing established that Petitioner frequently violated various Medicaid policies and procedures. First, Petitioner repeatedly failed to comply with Section 10.9 of the Medicaid Physician's Provider Handbook, (MPPH), and Sections 409.905(9), 409.913(5)(e), 409.913(7)(e), and 409.913(7)(f), (1993, 1994 Supp. 1995, and 1996), Florida Statutes, which require all medical services to be rendered by, or supervised by a physician, and attested to by the physician's signature. Medical records reflecting services for paid claims must be physician signature certified and dated, or the services are not defined as physician's services. In addition, Petitioner routinely failed to correctly document the provision of certain physician's assistant (P.A.) Medicaid services that require the personal supervision of a physician or osteopath. See Chapter 1 of the Physician Assistant Coverage and Limitations Handbook, March 1995, and Appendix D (Glossary) in the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 (HCFA-1500). In addition, Petitioner failed to comply with Medicaid regulations that require an approved physician to be present in the facility when certain P.A. services are delivered and to attest to it by signature within twenty-four hours of service. See Section 11.1 of the MPPH, effective July 1994, and Sections 409.905, and 409.913 (1993, 1994 Supp., 1995, and 1996 Supp.), Florida Statutes. The evidence presented at hearing also demonstrates that Petitioner repeatedly violated specific record keeping requirements located in Section 10.9 of the MPPH, Sections 10.6 and 11.5 of the Medicaid EPSDT Provider Handbook (EPSDT), and Sections 409.913(5)(e), 409.913(7)(e), and 409.913(7)(f), (1993, 1994 Supp., 1995, and 1996), Florida Statutes. In addition, the Agency demonstrated that Petitioner occasionally failed to document support for the necessity of certain services or simply billed for services that were not medically necessary. As indicated, Medicaid policy limits a physician to bill only for services that are medically necessary and defines the circumstances and varying levels of care authorized. In fact, Section 11.1 of the MPPH, effective July 1994, provides in part: The physician services program pays for services performed by a licensed physician or osteopath within the scope of the practice of medicine or osteopathy as defined by state law . . . . The services in this program must be performed for medical necessity for diagnosis and treatment of an illness on an eligible Medicaid recipient. Delivery of all services in this handbook must be done by or under the personal supervision of a physician or osteopath . . . at any place of service . . . . Each service type listed has special policy requirements that apply specifically to it. These must be adhered to for payment. The manual further provides clear guidelines defining authorized services for reimbursement which Petitioner apparently overlooked. For example, the manual defines the four types of medical history exams that Medicaid providers may conduct, the nature of the problems presented, and the appropriate and authorized tests. The manual also identifies the varying degrees of medical decision-making complexity related to Medicaid services and provides instructions relating to the method of selecting the correct evaluation and management code for billing. Petitioner consistently violated coding restrictions. Moreover, the Medicaid policy manual also outlines the specific procedures and billing requirements necessary for seeking payment for medical services including the early periodic screening for diagnosis and treatment (EPSDT) services. Chapter 10 and 11 of the MPPH specifically state that services that do not include all listed components of the EPSDT are not defined as an EPSDT, and upon audit, the Agency re-calculated Petitioner's medical services at the appropriate procedure code. Stipulation Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that certain paid claims were correctly determined by the Agency to be overpayments. Specifically, the parties agreed that portions of samples 1, 3, 14, 21, 28, 41, 46, 47, 51, 53, and 56 could not be claimed for reimbursement since lab services which are part of an office visit reimbursement and/or lab service fees performed by an independent outside lab are not permitted. In addition, the parties agreed that specific portions of samples 1, 13, 14, 27, 28, 33, 35, 43, 46, 47, 52, 53, and 55 could not be claimed since Modifier 26 billing, the professional component, is only appropriate when the service is rendered in a hospital and Petitioner's services were rendered in an office. Pediatric Sample With regard to the random sample of pediatric files, upon careful review, the evidence presented at hearing sufficiently demonstrates that Petitioner was overpaid the following amounts on the following paid claims for the following reasons: The prolonged physician's services billed to Medicaid were not documented as having been provided or medically necessary. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 1 1/18/1996 99354 $ 36.64 1 5/14/1996 99354 $ 36.64 13 9/25/1995 99354 $ 36.64 19 9/28/1994 99354 $ 39.50 21 12/18/1995 99354 $ 36.64 28 3/06/1995 99354 $ 36.64 42 6/04/1996 99354 $ 36.64 43 12/19/1994 99354 $ 36.64 47 9/28/1994 99354 $ 39.50 47 10/17/1995 99354 $ 36.64 51 4/05/1995 99354 $ 36.64 53 11/02/1995 99354 $ 36.64 56 5/01/1996 99354 $ 36.64 The level of care billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care provided was at the 99213 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 1 9/14/1995 $ 34.14 1 1/18/1996 $ 34.14 1 5/14/1996 $ 34.14 33 9/28/1994 $ 20.00 47 10/17/1995 $ 34.14 The level of care billed and paid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99214 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 53 5/31/1995 $ 21.69 The level of care billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99204 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 25 7/27/1994 $ 2.00 The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99203 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 35 5/11/1995 $ 37.96 51 12/08/1994 $ 15.00 55 11/21/1995 $ 37.96 58 9/22/1995 $ 37.96 The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99204 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 43 12/11/1994 ($ 3.00) credit The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the medical services provided and documentation supported an EPSDT visit. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 53 2/06/1995 $ 16.53 The required components of the EPSDT were not documented as being performed at the office visit that had been claimed and paid as an EPSDT and therefore, the difference between the EPSDT payment received and the value of the procedure code for the documented level of office visit that occurred (i.e., 99214, 99213, 99212, 99211, or 99203), is deemed an overpayment. Cluster Number Date of Service Level of Visit Overpayment 1 7/28/1995 99213 $ 39.82 3 6/28/1995 99213 $ 39.82 5 3/03/1995 99203 $ 21.43 6 7/07/1994 99213 $ 5.00 10 8/17/1995 99212 $ 43.82 12 1/31/1996 99204 $ 0.00 14 5/31/1995 99213 $ 39.82 18 10/04/1994 99213 $ 5.00 18 1/29/1996 99214 $ 27.37 20 8/25/1994 99213 $ 5.00 21 12/11/1995 99214 $ 27.37 29 8/17/1994 99212 $ 9.00 Cluster Number Date of Service Level of Visit Overpayment 29 9/06/1995 99213 $ 39.82 40 7/25/1994 99203 $ 0.00 41 5/06/1996 99214 $ 27.37 46 9/19/1994 99213 $ 5.00 46 10/19/1995 99213 $ 39.82 47 11/02/1994 99213 $ 5.00 51 9/07/1995 99213 $ 39.82 53 7/10/1995 99213 $ 39.82 53 1/19/1995 99213 $ 39.82 59 5/02/1996 99203 $ 43.39 Adult Samples At hearing, Petitioner disputed all of the Agency's findings relating to patients over the age of 21 and objected to Dr. Deeb, a pediatrician, performing any review of their files. While Dr. Deeb is not the appropriate peer to review adult patient files, the following adult claims did not require substantive peer review and resulted in overpayment due to the stated reason: There were not any medical records in existence to indicate that any medical services were performed. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 2/20/1995 99215 $ 53.00 2 7/11/1995 99215 $ 59.14 2 8/09/1995 99215 $ 57.14 2 9/07/1995 99213 $ 23.00 2 10/11/1995 99213 $ 23.00 2 1/02/1996 99213 $ 23.00 2 3/22/1996 73560/Rad.Ex. $ 16.36 2 4/01/1996 99215 $ 57.14 2 4/05/1996 99213 $ 23.00 2 4/23/1996 99213 $ 23.00 15 2/16/1996 99213 $ 23.00 15 2/19/1996 99215 $ 57.14 16 5/14/1996 Blood Count $ 8.00 Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 16 5/14/1996 UA $ 3.00 16 5/14/1996 99215 $ 57.14 23 7/28/1994 99213 $ 23.00 23 5/09/1995 72069/26 Rad.Ex. $ 6.98 23 5/09/1995 72069/Rad.Ex. $ 17.45 23 10/20/1995 99213 $ 23.00 34 4/24/1996 99214 $ 35.45 57 11/17/1995 99215 $ 59.14 60 4/10/1996 99215 $ 57.14 61 5/22/1995 99213 $ 23.00 The medical records failed to contain the required physician's signature and date authenticating the fact that the services billed were performed by either P.A. Olsen or P.A. Avidon under physician supervision. The services provided by the non-physician employee were reviewed and down-coded by the Agency to the appropriate level physician's office visit code. Cluster Number Date of Service Proc. Code Pd./ P. Code Allowed Overpayment 2 6/30/1995 99215/99212 $ 36.14 2 7/20/1995 99215/99213 $ 34.14 2 7/28/1995 99215/99213 $ 34.14 2 9/05/1995 99215/99212 $ 36.14 8 4/17/1995 99205/99203 $ 35.96 17 3/27/1995 99205/99203 $ 35.96 23 5/09/1995 99215/99213 $ 32.14 23 6/09/1995 99215/99213 $ 32.14 34 4/23/1996 99205/99203 $ 35.96 The medical records failed to contain the required physician signature authenticating the fact that the services were provided by a physician. The services provided were reviewed and down-coded by the Agency to the appropriate level physician's office visit code. Procedure Code Cluster Number Date of Service Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 6/14/1995 99215/99211 $ 45.14 16 5/15/1996 99215/99211 $ 45.14 61 5/05/1995 99205/99204 $ 14.53 The provider improperly sought payment for lab services that were part of the office visit reimbursement and/or lab services performed by an independent outside lab. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 3/08/1996 UA $ 3.00 2 4/03/1996 UA $ 3.00 15 2/08/1996 UA $ 3.00 16 5/15/1996 Blood Count $ 8.50 16 5/15/1996 Blood Count $ 8.00 The provider improperly sought payment for Modifier 26 billings (professional component) which are only appropriate when the service is rendered in a hospital. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 2/17/1995 Radiologic exam $ 6.98 2 6/14/1995 Radiologic exam $ 7.20 8 4/17/1995 Tympanometry $ 9.00 16 5/13/1996 Radiologic exam $ 5.45 16 5/15/1996 Radiologic exam $ 6.98 In addition to the policy and procedural violations, Petitioner, in egregious violation of the Medicaid program, admittedly submitted Medicaid claims for the services of specialist physicians (such as an allergist, OB/GYN, podiatrist, psychologists, and ophthalmologists) not within its Provider group, collected Medicaid funds based on those claims, and reimbursed the respective specialist. While Petitioner's corporate representative, Mr. Colavecchio, was admittedly responsible for the coding and billing of the Medicaid services submitted for reimbursement, he was minimally aware of the Medicaid policy requirements and possessed limited working knowledge of CPT coding and EPSDT billing. In addition, Petitioner's employees, Dr. Keith Wintermeyer and Dr. Marcia Malcolm, were only moderately familiar with the CPT coding and EPSDT component requirements. They provided little input to Petitioner regarding CPT coding and the sufficiency of certain physician's services relating to EPSDT billing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency re-calculate the overpayment consistent with the Findings of Fact, and include only those identified violations in the cluster samples of the adult patient files, and issue a Final Order requiring Petitioner to reimburse, within 60 days, the Agency for the Medicaid overpayments plus any interest that may accrue after entry of the Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Felker-Little, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Charles D. Jamieson, Esquire Ward, Damon & Posner, P.A. 4420 Beacon Circle West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue is whether the Agency’s Lowest Charge Rule as identified in the petition filed in this matter is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented as prohibited by section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2013).
Findings Of Fact Respondent, AHCA, is the Florida agency responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program in Florida and is the agency responsible for the adoption, implementation and enforcement of the Lowest Charge Rule at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner, LabCorp, provides medical testing and clinical diagnostic services used by hospitals, physicians, and other medical providers to diagnose and treat patients in Florida and nationwide. LabCorp is a Florida Medicaid provider. Quest operates commercial reference laboratories in Florida and nationwide, providing a range of clinical laboratory services to assist health care providers in diagnosing and treating disease and other health conditions. Quest is a Florida Medicaid provider. As Florida Medicaid providers, LabCorp and Quest are subject to the rules adopted by AHCA to administer the Medicaid program in Florida, including the Lowest Charge Rule. The Lowest Charge Rule substantially affects the amounts LabCorp and Quest are entitled to charge and are paid for Medicaid services under chapter 409, Florida Statutes, and the applicable Florida regulations and handbooks. LabCorp and Quest are substantially affected by the Lowest Charge Rule and therefore have standing to seek an administrative determination of its invalidity. This action challenges the validity of the Lowest Charge Rule, which is included in both the first sentence of rule 59G- 5.110(2), and in the Provider General Handbook at page 1-4. 10. Rule 59G-5.110(2), states: Charges for services or goods billed to the Medicaid program shall not exceed the provider’s lowest charge to any other third party payment source for the same or equivalent medical and allied care, goods, or services provided to person [sic] who are not Medicaid recipients. Any services or goods customarily provided free of charge to patients may not be billed to Medicaid when provided to Medicaid recipients. Any payment made by Medicaid for services or goods not furnished in accordance with these provisions is subject to recoupment and the agency may, in such instances, initiate other appropriate administrative or legal action. The Provider General Handbook, adopted pursuant to rule 59G-5.020, repeats the Lowest Charge Rule at page 1-4: What the Provider May Charge for Services The provider’s charges for services billed to Medicaid must not exceed the provider’s lowest charge to any other third party source for the same or equivalent medical and allied care, goods, or services provided to individuals who are not Medicaid recipients.
