The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a software engineer with almost 30 years of experience in the industry. From 2001 until August of 2006, Petitioner was employed by ITT Industries (ITT). Petitioner's employment with ITT came to an end when he was involuntarily terminated. Following his termination, Petitioner filed an employment discrimination complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that ITT had discriminated against him because he suffered from Tourette's syndrome (which caused him to have vocal tics and to stutter). Petitioner did not take any action to pursue these allegations of employment discrimination beyond filing this complaint against ITT with the EEOC. Petitioner has been unable to obtain a "permanent job" as a software engineer since his termination by ITT. Respondent is a defense contractor that "make[s] [military] simulation and training equipment." In early 2008, Respondent was looking to fill a temporary software engineer position. Edge Dynamics was one of the outside employment agencies that Respondent used to assist it in the hiring process. On January 9, 2008, Edge Dynamics provided Petitioner's resume to Edward Kaprocki, a senior principal software engineer with Respondent. Mr. Kaprocki was responsible for interviewing applicants for the position and making hiring/rejection recommendations. After reviewing Petitioner's resume, Mr. Kaprocki "thought [it] looked interesting enough where it would worth talking to [Petitioner]," and he so advised Sandra Asavedo, his "point of contact" at Edge Dynamics. Ms. Asavedo made the necessary arrangements to set up a face-to-face interview between Mr. Kaprocki and Petitioner. The interview took place in Mr. Kaprocki's office on January 14, 2008. It lasted about 45 minutes to an hour. Petitioner seemed to Mr. Kaprocki to be "a little bit nervous," but Petitioner did not do or say anything to cause Mr. Kaprocki to believe that Petitioner suffered from any disability. During the course of the interview, Petitioner showed Mr. Kaprocki his personal website, which contained information about and pictures of "some of the projects that [Petitioner] had worked on." Based on the interview, Mr. Kaprocki determined that Petitioner did not have the skill-set that was needed for the position Respondent was seeking to fill. Immediately following the interview, Mr. Kaprocki went to his supervisor, Steve Preston, whose office was "right down the hall," and recommended that Petitioner not be hired to fill the position. Mr. Kaprocki then telephoned Ms. Asavedo to let her know that Petitioner was not going to be hired so that she could inform Petitioner. Mr. Kaprocki's decision to recommend against hiring Petitioner had nothing to do with Petitioner's suffering from Tourette's syndrome or his having filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Indeed, at the time he made his decision, Mr. Kaprocki did not even know that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Mr. Kaprocki first learned of these matters only after Petitioner had filed his Complaint in the instant case. After being told that he would not be hired for the position, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Kaprocki several times, pleading with Mr. Kaprocki to "reconsider hiring him." Mr. Kaprocki told Petitioner "that the decision had been made" and would not be reconsidered. Mr. Kaprocki felt that Petitioner, by making these telephone calls, was "badgering and harassing him." To satisfy his own personal curiosity (and for no other reason), Mr. Kaprocki looked online to find out more about the person who was subjecting him to this "badgering and harass[ment]."2 Mr. Kaprocki did not discover, as a result of his online search, that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or that Petitioner had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. His search, however, did reveal certain comments Petitioner had made in an online forum that Mr. Kaprocki considered to be "extremely unprofessional." After reading these comments, Mr. Kaprocki was even more confident than he had been before he began his search that he had made the right decision in not recommending Petitioner for employment. Petitioner was never offered a position with Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding Respondent not guilty of any unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a very well-credentialed, internationally-recognized cancer researcher who is black and a native of Cameroon. He has been granted lawful permanent residence status in the United States (with an EB-1 classification, signifying that he is an alien with "extraordinary ability"). Petitioner received his Doctor of Medicine degree in 1999 from the University of Yaounde I in Cameroon. He spent the next five years as a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Rochester Medical Center in Rochester, New York.3 He worked in the Department of Orthopaedics (under the supervision of Randy N. Rosier, M.D., Ph.D.) for the first two of these five years and the James P. Wilmont Cancer Center (under the supervision of Dr. Rosier and Joseph D. Rosenblatt, M.D.) for the remaining three years. Petitioner enjoyed a considerable amount of independence, and was "very productive," during his time at the University of Rochester Medical Center. In June 2005, Petitioner began working as a post- doctoral associate assigned to the Viral Oncology (VO) program at UM's Sylvester Comprehensive Cancer Center (Sylvester) in Miami, Florida. He remained in this position until his termination (which he claims was discriminatorily motivated) in September 2006. Sylvester "serves as the hub for cancer-related research, diagnosis, and treatment at [UM's] Miller School of Medicine" (Miller). The VO program is administratively housed in the Division of Hematology/Oncology of Miller's Department of Medicine. Dr. Rosenblatt, Petitioner's former supervisor at the University of Rochester Medical Center, is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, the Chief of the Division of Hematology/Oncology. According to the Sylvester website, the goals of the VO program include: Investigating the mechanisms of oncogenesis and innate immune subversion in viral associated cancers including those that arise in immunocompromised patients. Devising novel and targeted therapeutic and preventive strategies for viral associated malignancies. Implementing basic and clinical international collaborative studies in developing nations that have a high incidence of these tumors. William Harrington, Jr., M.D., is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, "in charge" of the VO program. Dr. Harrington, who is white, is a 1984 Miller graduate. He has been working for UM since his graduation 24 years ago. For the past 17 or 18 of these years, he has held positions having supervisory authority over other UM employees. As the head of the VO program, Dr. Harrington runs a "small" laboratory (Dr. Harrington's lab) staffed by a post- doctoral associate, lab technicians, and a research nurse (all of whom he directly supervises). Dr. Harrington's lab is a "hundred percent funded by [competitive] peer review grants": four from the National Institutes of Health (NIH); one from the Leukemia Society; and one from the State of Florida. It is "one of the best-funded labs" at UM. In addition to running his lab, Dr. Harrington also sees and treats patients at UM's Jackson Memorial Medical Center (Jackson Memorial). Approximately 95% of his patients are indigent, with a large number of them being of African descent (black). Dr. Harrington "specializes" in viral lymphomas, with a strong emphasis on diseases that occur predominantly in persons of African descent (certain AIDS-related lymphomas, HTLV-related lymphomas, and Burkitt lymphoma). Over the years, Dr. Harrington has had occasion to do work outside the United States, in areas where these diseases are prevalent, including the Afro-Brazilian state of Bahia, where, approximately 12 years ago, he met his wife Tanya, who is of African descent. Dr. Harrington has also "worked with colleagues in Zambia . . . on AIDS-related lymphomas and pediatric Burkitt lymphomas." Approximately seven or eight years ago, Dr. Harrington "sponsored post-doc[toral] trainees from Zambia in his lab." Dr. Harrington was introduced to Petitioner by Dr. Rosenthal. After reviewing Petitioner's "bio-sketch," Dr Harrington interviewed Petitioner and was sufficiently impressed to offer Petitioner an unadvertised post-doctoral position in his lab. Dr. Harrington hired Petitioner because Petitioner had the "skillset" Dr. Harrington was looking for. Dr. Harrington was particularly influenced by Petitioner's background, including publications, in NF-kappaB signaling, which was an "area[] of [Dr. Harrington's] interest." Moreover, Dr. Harrington thought Petitioner was a "smart capable man." At the time he hired Petitioner, Dr. Harrington was aware Petitioner was black and from Cameroon. Neither Petitioner's race, nor his national origin, played any role in Dr. Harrington's hiring decision. As a post-doctoral associate, Petitioner was the "senior lab person" working under Dr. Harrington's supervision. He was expected to assume a "higher level [of responsibility] than other staff personnel in [the] lab . . . in terms of doing a given set of experiments or [other] work." Dr. Harrington and Petitioner initially enjoyed a cordial working relationship. They had "excellent rapport" and even socialized after work hours. At Dr. Harrington's invitation, Petitioner came over to Dr. Harrington's house approximately "every other Friday" and for the Thanksgiving holiday. Although Dr. Harrington did not hire Petitioner specifically to "build[] international research programs," once Petitioner was hired, Dr. Harrington did discuss the matter with Petitioner, and he authorized Petitioner to initiate contact with cancer investigators in Cameroon to explore the possibility of their collaborating with Dr. Harrington on a project involving NF-kappaB signaling and Burkitt lymphoma. After having received Dr. Harrington's authorization, Petitioner "made contact with some of [his] mentors back in Cameroon, all [of whom were] involved in [Cameroon's] national cancer control program." On July 13, 2005, Dr. Harrington himself sent an e- mail to these Cameroonian investigators, which read as follows: Thank you Dr. Mouelsone for your response. I was considering putting together a project on Burkitt lymphomas that would principally be a study on the biology of the tumor in endemic and HIV associated cases. We would collaborate with investigators in Brazil and Africa. The study would be focused on targets that could be exploited in novel therapies as well the role of ebv [Epstein Barr virus] in different types of tumors. We already have IRB approval for collection of residual lymphoma specimens as well as protocols for the processing that would be required. A challenge in any grant is keeping the project focused and attractive scientifically for the reviewers. The participating center would have to have the capability to identify and consent patients as well as processing and storage . . . . Therefore one would need reagents, a research nurse (maybe 50%) salary and liquid nitrogen dewar as well as some support for a PI. Maybe I could send everyone the aims of a recently submitted grant to see if it would be possible. I could send our informed consent document since it broadly covers all viral associated tumors. I am attaching a recent article and I sincerely appreciate your help. I also am a fan of the Cameroon's football team the "indomitable lions." Dr. Harrington ultimately determined to collaborate exclusively with the Brazilian investigators, with whom he had a longstanding professional relationship, and not with the Cameroonian investigators, on this particular project. During the first several months of Petitioner's employment, he engaged in research involving NF-kappaB signaling. He also helped write an article (entitled, "Zidovudine: A Potential Targeted Therapy for Endemic Burkitt Lymphoma") that was published in the East African Medical Journal. When presented with the draft of the article that Petitioner had prepared, Dr. Harrington commented to Petitioner (by e-mail dated July 28, 2005), "[T]his is better than the one I wrote." Petitioner also contributed to the preparation of a successful NIH grant application submitted on September 1, 2005, by Dr. Harrington (as Principal Investigator/Program Director) seeking funding for his lab, as well as for collaborators in Brazil and at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, to "investigate in primary BLs [Burkitt lymphomas] the form of EBV [Epstein Barr virus] latency and its relationship to NF- k[appa]B"; to "determine the susceptibility of primary tumor cell lines to antiviral apoptosis"; and to "investigate commonly available, inexpensive agents that are known to induce the EBV lytic cycle and potentiate phosphorylation of AZT [azidothymidine, also known as Zidovudine]." The grant application was "based on . . . work that had been done [prior] to [Petitioner's coming to work in Dr. Harrington's lab]." The following individuals were listed as the "key personnel" on the grant application: Dr. Harrington; Iguaracyra Araujo, M.D., of Brazil; Jose Barreto, M.D., of Brazil; Carlos Brites, M.D., Ph.D., of Brazil; Dirk Dittmer, Ph.D., of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and Isildinha Reis, Ph.D., of UM. The following statements were made on the grant application concerning Dr. Reis' and Petitioner's anticipated roles in the proposed project: Isidinha Reis, Ph.D. (Biostatistician) will be in charge of the statistical component of this project including periodic analysis of data pertaining to this grant. She will participate in phone conferences with Ms. Shank and Luz. She will be particularly important for the conduct of this study since she is Brazilian by birth and fluent in Portuguese. 7.5% support is requested. Valentine Andela (Post Doctoral Fellow) will be in charge of all the day-to-day laboratory aspects of Dr. Harrington's component of the project. This includes receipt of isolates shipped from Brazil and then forwarding them to Dr. Dittmer, cell culture, DNA and RNA preparation and hybridization, EMSA and immunoblot analysis, cryopreservation of samples, etc. 50% support is requested. In the fall of 2005, Dr. Harrington discussed with Petitioner an article published in a "science magazine" that reported on Epstein-Barr virus (EBV) microRNAs, which, at the time, was a relatively unexplored area of research and one in which Dr. Harrington "definitely [did] not" have any "expertise." During the discussion, Petitioner expressed an interest in studying EBV microRNAs. Dr. Harrington "agreed [this] would be an interesting project to pursue," and he "thought [Petitioner] could do a good job" on it. With Dr. Harrington's approval, Petitioner thereafter started his research of EBV microRNAs, a project that consumed most of his work time during the remainder of his employment with UM. The project included helping draft a manuscript detailing the findings of the research. The experiments that Petitioner did as part of the project were on tumor samples that had been "collect[ed]" and "intial[ly] analy[zed]" by Brazilian investigators with whom Dr. Harrington had collaborated with in the past. In November 2005, Petitioner advised Dr. Harrington that he was considering participating in a clinical residency program, and Dr. Harrington "agreed to help [Petitioner] out" in any efforts he might make to seek a residency position. At Petitioner's request, Dr. Harrington wrote a letter of reference (dated November 16, 2005), "highly recommending" Petitioner for such a position. Dr. Harrington indicated in his letter, among other things, that in the "relatively brief time" that Petitioner had worked for him, Petitioner had "exceeded [Dr. Harrington's] expectations and made novel findings in the area of lymphoma and Epstein Barr virus." In addition to writing this letter of reference, Dr. Harrington, on Petitioner's behalf, contacted Stephen Symes, M.D., who at the time was the "head of the [Jackson Memorial medical] house staff program." Dr. Symes told Dr. Harrington that the "logical thing for [Petitioner] to [first] do [was] . . . a clinical rotation" at a teaching hospital, such as Jackson Memorial (during which he would act as either an observer or as an actual member of a medical team). Petitioner had planned to participate in a two-week clinical rotation at Jackson Memorial in December 2005, but had to change his plans because, when December came, he was still immersed in the EBV microRNA research project he had undertaken and had no time to do the rotation. Dr. Harrington was pleased with the quality of the work that Petitioner was doing on the project. In an e-mail he sent Petitioner on March 6, 2006, Dr. Harrington stated that he was "really excited about [Petitioner's] work," which he described as "novel and probably the best thing to come out of [his] little lab." On or about March 20, 2006, Dr. Harrington provided Petitioner with his written annual performance evaluation. He gave Petitioner an overall rating of "exceeds standards," with Petitioner receiving an "exceeds" rating in the categories of "Job Knowledge," "Supervision Required," "Quality of Work," "Adaptability," "Customer Service," and "Safety," and a "meets" rating in the category of "Time Management." Dr. Harrington made the following handwritten comment on the evaluation with respect to the latter category: I would like him to maintain more regular hours but his work is outstanding. Dr. Harrington felt compelled to make this comment because, although he "liked the work [Petitioner] was doing," "there were issues [regarding Petitioner's] disappearing for long periods of time [from Dr. Harrington's lab without telling Dr. Harrington where he was] and [Dr. Harrington] thought that this was becoming problematic." These "unexplained absences" from the lab were becoming more frequent and Dr. Harrington felt like Petitioner was "pushing the envelope." The improvements that Dr. Harrington had hoped to see in Petitioner's attendance did not materialize, and the relationship between the two deteriorated precipitously. On March 29, 2006, following a confrontation he had with Dr. Harrington, Petitioner sent an e-mail to Dr. Harrington, in which he advised: I did not mean to be rude this afternoon and you are absolutely right in pointing out that I am tense and consequently reactive. All things considered, I am putting undue pressure on myself. I am pretty much accepted in the Master of Arts in International Administration (MAIA) program at the UM. It is a professional degree program that puts a lot of weight on a practicum of the degree candidate[']s choice. I had proposed to implement the strategy articulated in the attached manuscript, which was previously funded in 2003 by an NCI-UICC grant for international cancer research and technology transfer. I am going to commit[] to the MAIA program, get it done in a year, and then reassess. I can go on to work in international developmental aid or go on to do a residency. If I was pushing for a tenure track faculty position, it is in part because I wanted to pursue the first option, but do it gradually over 3 years under your wing. Of course, I was counting on that plan being in line with your grand scheme, i.e. developing international programs. Dr. Harrington responded that same day by sending Petitioner the following e-mail: Ok I can help you with letters etc. I understand and that sounds like a good program. I want to expand these studies to Africa and hopefully in the future we can work together. I need your help on this paper. I think you have done very nice work. Things are pretty tough in the academic arena these days. A few days later, on April 1, 2006, Dr. Harrington, upset with what he felt was Petitioner's continuing lack of respect for his supervisory authority over the operation of the lab, sent Petitioner an e-mail, in which he stated the following: I have given this some thought and I don't think that this is working out with you. I am tired to see that you have simply disappeared without even a word to me and although you do very nice work it isn't worth it to me at this point. I also did not like the way you simply dismissed the fact that I had to do the work as outlined in the grant. I have tried very hard to go out of my way to accommodate you but at this point I feel that I have no authority at all. I want you to sit down on Monday and give me all the data for this paper, raw and otherwise. I also received all the pictures from Iguarcyra and the tumors are on the way. If you don't want to finish this then I will send everything to [D]irk. It is too bad because there is a lot we could have accomplished. Later that month, on April 28, 2006, reacting to another instance of Petitioner's being away from the lab when he was expecting Petitioner to be there, Dr. Harrington sent the following e-mail to Petitioner: I have been waiting around here to look at the figures. If you don't come in you should call, or if you leave for the majority of the day, you should call. I have spoken to you about this to no avail. You are a smart guy but am sick of this. Finish your paper and find another job. You will have to leave the computer here too. I will not ask for a raise for you nor a faculty position. Dr. Harrington sent Petitioner a follow-up e-mail the next day, which read as follows: I really am disgusted. You have thrown away everything this year, both for you and me. Your unstable behavior makes me question everything you have done also and so I will have to cancel submitting this paper until Lan[4] or JC can repeat some of the work. You are throwing away your tuition benefits also and have adversely affected everyone, most of all yourself. I have contacted the appropriate ones about this. I strongly urge you to do all I have outlined below.[5] I will not consider anything else. In an April 30, 2006, e-mail to Dr. Harrington, Petitioner responded: I will let the facts speak for themselves. Prior to joining your lab, I spent over five years working in a highly interactive and competitive environment. My record is infallible. You have in fact benefited tremendously from my intellect, my experience and especially my poise. I trust you would assemble an ethics committee to probe my work. I expect a letter of termination in due form and I would transfer all of the research material accordingly. This e-mail generated the following response from Dr. Harrington, which was communicated to Petitioner later that day by e-mail: Poise, what a joke. If you walk off with the data and th[]e computer I will call security. The morning of May 2, 2006, Petitioner sent the following e-mail to Dr. Harrington: Dear Dr. Harrington: Per your request, I will transfer everything to Lan no later than next week, Monday the 8th. This was all a set up anyway, to bog me down in the lab. So I would not make a fuss about any of this. I will put this all behind me. Nonetheless, I have backed up every relevant document that exonerates me from any denigration. In a way, I should thank you for throwing me out to the world and bringing me to face my fears. So thank you. Valentine Dr. Harrington replied a little more than a hour later, stating in an e-mail to Petitioner: I have always t[h]ought that you were the smartest person that has worked for me. Your work is really beautiful and I certainly could not have done it. I am very disturbed over this and I don't see why you could not level with me. Your behavior at times was just too much, not your demeanor but the fact that you simply went on mental walkabouts and disappeared. You have to get a grip on your ego and not wear it on your sleeve. I had really thought we could have basically kicked ass in this area but I don't think that you realize the precarious nature of this business and that you have to be careful about straying into something or somebody that will leave you []no[] grant money. Valentine you can ask Joe. I spent most of my time bragging about your work to everyone. If you are smart, which you obviously are, then you don't have to go around telling that to people, they know. The most important thing is that you get along with people and when you would just not show up without even calling it really pissed me off. It was telling me that I am not even worth a phone call. I can be a real asshole, again ask Joe, and I have done myself harm from being so. But like it or not I am a lot older and more senior than you. You will far surpass me in research if you get a grip on your ego. If not there will be an ever shrinking number of people that care. I would like for you to call me on my beeper or cell. Petitioner defended himself in the following manner in an e-mail he sent to Harrington later that morning: You cannot say that I [am] an egomaniac. I give of myself and I give very generously. That is the record I left in Rochester and that is the record I have left in your lab. To say people there will be an ever shrinking number of people who care is again not true. You should know that whenever I call[ed] on a favor from Rochester, for example getting into the . . . MA in Intl Admin [program], the response was immediate and overwhelmingly positive. I never thought I was smart and never said it. This much I know, I work very hard and I have a generous heart and I will not l[]ose my way. Those are all the values I ever had and I will stick to it. God promised the path would be rough, but the landing would be safe. Again, thank you. Valentine. The final e-mail of the morning was sent by Dr. Harrington to Petitioner. In it, Dr. Harrington informed Petitioner: I am trying to get in contact with the [B]razilians and check on the id of the sa[m]ples one final time and I will try to submit the paper this week. The "paper" to which Dr. Harrington was referring in his e-mail was the manuscript (written by both Petitioner and Dr. Harrington) of the EBV microRNA research project Petitioner was spearheading (EBV microRNA Manuscript). On or about May 12, 2006, following an instance of Petitioner's not "com[ing] in [to the lab] nor call[ing] to advise [Dr. Harrington] of [his absence]," Dr. Harrington spoke with Petitioner about his "unexcused absences" and provided him with specific verbal instructions regarding his attendance and use of his work time. In a May 12, 2006, e-mail, Dr. Harrington informed Desiree Uptgrow of Sylvester's human resources office of the talk he had had with Petitioner and the directives he had given him. The e-mail read as follows: I spoke to Mr. Andela regarding his unexcused absences from work. I referred to the recent time on Friday, when he did not come in nor call to advise me of this. I also spoke to him about concentrating on work and not other activities while in the lab. I will not excuse this or any further incidents. He is expected to comply with the following: 1) arrival at work at a reasonable hour, by this I mean between the hours of 9 to 10 am and cessation of work at a reasonable hour by this I mean 5-6 pm. 2) Weekly goals will be outlined by me in terms of expected experiments to be performed (of course results may vary since the nature of research may not be predictable). 3) an attitude of collegiality in that if there is down time for whatever reason help would be offered by him to other lab personnel. 4) no unexplained long absences from the lab during the day. An expected lunch break of an hour is acceptable. Further deviations from the above will result in a second and third entry into his file whereupon he will be subject to dismissal. William Harrington MD As he put it in his testimony at the final hearing, Dr. Harrington "had no problem with [Petitioner's] going somewhere for an hour or going somewhere for a couple of hours and doing something, but [he] had problems with [Petitioner's] simply disappearing and not giving [him] . . . the courtesy of letting [him] know what was going on." On June 1, 2006, Dr. Harrington (as the corresponding author) submitted the EBV microRNA Manuscript (which was entitled, "Targeted Suppression of CXCL11/I-TAC by EBV encoded BHRF1-3 microRNA in EBV related B-Cell Lymphomas" and is hereinafter referred to as the "First Manuscript") to Blood, a medical journal published by the American Society of Hematology. Petitioner was listed as the first author in the manuscript. Among the other individuals given authorship credit were the Brazilian investigators. It was Dr. Harrington's decision to include them. He felt that "they clearly deserved to be co- authors" and that "it would have been unethical to not have included them." Petitioner disagreed with Dr. Harrington's assessment of the Brazilian investigators' entitlement to authorship credit. In a July 17, 2006, decision letter, Blood's associate editor advised Dr. Harrington that the First Manuscript had been evaluated and deemed "not acceptable for publication in Blood." On July 20, 2006, after what he considered to be further instances of insubordinate conduct on Petitioner's part, Dr. Harrington sent an e-mail to Ms. Uptgrow (as a follow-up to the May 12, 2006, e-mail he had previously sent her), in which he stated the following: There have been a couple of recent incidents which I want to submit in writing. Last week Mr. Andela called me and said that his flight from DC was cancelled or overbooked and he would be late. I replied that this was OK but he never called, emailed or showed up to work. Yesterday he came in past 11 am and also did not call. More concerning is that I had asked him to set up an experiment and later asked my lab tech to assist. When I spoke to my tech this morning he told me that Mr. Andela was not doing the experiment because he saw no reason to. I consider this to be insubordination. Later that same day (July 20, 2006), Ms. Uptgrow sent an e-mail to Nicole Lergier and Lynetta Jackson of Miller's human resources office advising of Dr. Harrington's desire for "assist[ance] in the termination of [Petitioner] based on [Petitioner's] continue[d] lack of following instructions " The afternoon of July 24, 2006, Dr. Harrington and Petitioner engaged in the following argumentative e-mail exchange, evidencing the further decline of their relationship: 1:51 p.m. e-mail from Dr. Harrington to Petitioner I asked you to do the bl-8 line and Peterson line. I don't care to hear that you chose not to do them. 2:05 p.m. e-mail from Petitioner to Dr. Harrington Sorry but I don't know what you are talking about - and it is very disconcerting. I told you we had done the BL8 line and you told Lan to send the Peterson line to Dittmer for profiling. That's where we left off on that - this was reiterated at the meeting you convened with Lisa, Lan, Julio and I. 2:10 p.m. e-mail from Dr. Harrington to Petitioner No that is not true. Lan said that you did not want to do another primary and I said repeatedly that I wanted it done. Your problem [V]alentine is that you think that you are in charge, ie I want a tenured position, I don't want to do old things etc. while I have to keep the grant money coming in. I respect your ability to do certain things and you are a s[m]art guy but clearly you would prefer to be autonomous. The question is how do you attain that. 2:44 p.m. e-mail from Petitioner to Dr. Harrington Dr. Harrington- that is hearsay - you and I had this conversation over the BL8 and the P[e]terson and I said the BL8 had been done and I would run the P[e]terson line in parallel with the dicer exp[erimen]t, once I had gotten the conditions right. I don't think I am in charge - and just how could I, when day in and day out you seek to undermine every "independent" effort I make, that's what[']s expected of a post-doctoral fellow... Every independent effort I have led has panned out - not because I am smart but because I put the time and effort to think it through. When I joined your lab, it was on a 1 year stint - and now I am starting on my second year because you[] wanted it that way. I joined your lab to work on NFkappB, which is what you are funded for and what I had some expertise in, but then you had me work on something totally novel - miRNAs - and the work is done. If I asked for a tenure track position - it is because I recognized (or I thought I did) that you needed someone permanent in the lab - furthermore I was investing too much time and effort on the miRNA work... despite my best efforts (which you do not acknowledge) this is not working out. So I am going right back to the drawing board by doing a residency - we had agreed on this back in May that I was taking a month off in August to do a rotation. I am taking off to Europe for a short vacation on the 6th of August to prepare for my 2 week clinical rotation. So to answer your question - I am giving up on any autonomy and I am going right back to doing a residency. 3:02 p.m. e-mail from Dr. Harrington to Petitioner You never told me about vacation time but ok... you said you would be out for aug (without pay) so am I to presume that aug 6th will be your last day? We don't seem to get along and that's that, no hard feelings. 3:09 p.m. e-mail from Petitioner to Dr. Harrington August 5th would be my last day. 3:17 p.m. e-mail from Dr. Harrington to Petitioner And I will try my best to make sure that happens[.] [Up] until the 5th I would appreciate it if you did run Peterson and bl-8 since they will be cleaner than the primaries. Although not obligated to do so, Dr. Harrington agreed to make sure that Petitioner was paid for the two weeks that, according to his July 24, 2006, 2:44 p.m. e-mail to Dr. Harrington, he was going to be spending doing his clinical rotation (after his trip to Europe). Petitioner left Miami on August 5, 2006, and went to Russia to participate in a two-week "short course" for which he received three credits towards his MAIA degree at UM. (He had enrolled in the MAIA degree program earlier that year.) On August 10, 2006, while he was still in Russia, Petitioner sent the following reply to an e-mail he had received from Dr. Harrington "regarding when [his] return date from the 2 week clinical rotation would be": Sorry I missed that - the 8th of September. Thanks. Petitioner returned to Miami from Russia on August 18 or 19, 2006, "exhausted" and "burned out." He stayed home to rest until returning to work on September 8, 2006. He never did the clinical rotation he told Dr. Harrington he was going to do, but he nonetheless was paid by UM (as Dr. Harrington said he would be) for the two weeks he represented he was going to be engaged in this activity. At no time during his absence from work did Petitioner tell Dr. Harrington he was, in fact, not doing a clinical rotation. He concealed this information because he "wanted to avoid a confrontation" with Dr. Harrington. Dr. Harrington, however, was not entirely in the dark about the matter. On August 22, 2006, through e-mail correspondence, he had checked with Dr. Symes to see if Petitioner had "ever showed up for a clinical rotation" at Jackson Memorial and had been told by Dr. Symes that he had "not heard from [Petitioner] at all." When Petitioner returned to work on September 8, 2006, Dr. Harrington asked him for documentation showing that he had done a clinical rotation at Jackson Memorial during the time he had been away. Petitioner told Dr. Harrington that he did not have any such documentation. Dr. Harrington understood Petitioner to "follow[] that up by saying he had done a clinical rotation in Rochester." Dr. Harrington then "asked [Petitioner] for documentation of that clinical rotation," which Petitioner was unable to produce. The conversation ended with Dr. Harrington telling Petitioner to leave the lab and go home, explaining that he would be bringing the matter to the attention of the human resources office. At this point, Dr. Harrington had decided that it was "just impossible to continue the working relationship" he had with Petitioner and that Petitioner had to be terminated. He was convinced that Petitioner had lied to him about doing a clinical rotation and that, by having been absent from work for the two weeks he was supposed to have been doing such a rotation, Petitioner had effectively abandoned his job. Moreover, Dr. Harrington felt that Petitioner had "exploited" him and was continuing to disregard his supervisory authority. Later in the morning on September 8, 2006, Petitioner sent Dr. Harrington the following e-mail: Hi Dr. Harrington This is just written confirmation that you asked me not to resume work today and to stay away until you had convened a meeting with human resources. Thanks Valentine Petitioner never returned to Dr. Harrington's lab. September 8, 2006, was his last day in the "work environment" of the lab. As he had promised he would, Dr. Harrington made contact (by e-mail) with the human resources office. He concluded the e-mail by stating: At this point, under no circumstances will I allow Mr. Andela back into my lab and he is dismissed. Lynetta Jackson of the human resources office responded to Dr. Harrington by sending him, on September 11, 2006, the following e-mail: Dr. Harrington, We're required to follow a process when terminating employees. As we discussed a few weeks ago, all terminations must be approved by Paul Hudgins.[6] I'm still out of the office for medical reasons. This matter is being referred to Nicole Lergier/Karen Stimmel for follow-up. Nicole Lergier was the human resources employee who handled the matter. Ms. Lergier met with just Petitioner on September 14, 2006. At the outset of the meeting, she informed Petitioner that there was a "request for [his] termination" made by Dr. Harrington. She explained that Dr. Harrington "was concerned that [Petitioner] had taken several weeks off to complete a clinical rotation for which [Petitioner] had been paid but [for] which [he] had never registered," and that Dr. Harrington considered Petitioner's conduct to be "job abandonment and . . . grounds for immediate termination." She then went on to tell Petitioner that the purpose of the meeting was to give Petitioner the opportunity, without Dr. Harrington's being present, to give his side of the story and "to bring forward any issues." Petitioner took advantage of this opportunity. He defended himself against the charges Dr. Harrington had made against him and countercharged that Dr. Harrington had been abusive, "manipulative[,] and unprofessional." At no time did Petitioner complain to Ms. Lergier that Dr. Harrington was "prejudiced against [him] because [he was] black or because [he was] from Cameroon." Petitioner indicated to Ms. Lergier that he "had no interest in going back to Dr. Harrington's lab," but that, among other things, he wanted the EBV microRNA Manuscript to be published. On the same day that the meeting took place, Petitioner sent the following e-mail to Ms. Lergier: This is in response to Dr. William J. Harrington's complaint that I abandoned my job functions. The attached e-mails dated Monday 7/24/2006 indicate that I was gone on leave, without pay. What[']s more, there [is] evidence of professional misconduct, manipulation and negative inputs on Dr. Harrington's part. This is not the first instance. The e-mails dated Tuesday 5/2/2006 to 4/28/2006 document another one of many such instances. The time I took off in August was not nearly enough to recover from a tremendously negative work environment where I nonetheless made many positive contributions, in ideas, manuscripts and grants. The facts speak for themselves. At this point, I do not intend to return to work with Dr. Harrington and I trust Human Resources would find a constructive solution to this problem. Approximately an hour later, Petitioner received an e- mail from Dr. Harrington, which read as follows: Your paper will be submitted with you as first author. I have 9 tumor blocks corresponding to the patients in [B]razil and a couple of new ones here that we will assay for eber, cxcl-11 (we got a new ab.) and LMP-1. Lan has repeated the rpa's on the lines (BL-5, R) and several new primaries and they look very good, cleaner than the previous ones. Once I get this done I will send you a draft prior to submission. Dr. Harrington subsequently submitted a revised version of the First Manuscript (Revised Manuscript) to Blood. The Revised Manuscript was "shorter," but not "substantially different from the [First] [M]anuscript." Petitioner was still listed as the first author, which Dr. Harrington "thought was [only] fair since . . . [Petitioner] had done most of the lab work on that article." Dr. Harrington did not believe that, in submitting an "abbreviated" manuscript with Petitioner's name on it as first author, he was doing anything that was contrary to Petitioner's interests or desires. Notwithstanding Dr. Harrington's best efforts, the Revised Manuscript, like the First Manuscript, was rejected for publication in Blood. Although listed as the first author, Petitioner had not "sign[ed] off" on, or even seen, the Revised Manuscript before its submission to Blood. He ultimately received an e- mailed copy from Dr. Harrington. The next day, upon running into Dr. Harrington on the UM campus, Petitioner told him: [Y]ou cannot put my name on a paper that I didn't write. You can't have me as a first author on a manuscript that I didn't sign off on. Take my name off that paper. I have moved on. Dr. Harrington complied with Petitioner's request. Petitioner's name was not on the version of the EBV microRNA Manuscript Dr. Harrington submitted to another medical journal, Cancer Research, "sometime in late 2007," which was accepted for publication and published in March 2008. On or about September 20, 2006, Petitioner was contacted by Ms. Uptgrow and given the option of resigning his position or being terminated. Petitioner told Ms. Uptgrow that he "wasn't going to resign." On September 25, 2006, Dr. Harrington sent Petitioner the following letter, advising Petitioner that his employment was being terminated "effective immediately": As you know, you have been counseled many times regarding your unsatisfactory performance and attendance issues. Unfortunately, these problems persist despite our counseling efforts. There have been several emails and conversations that have taken place, which you were advised that any further incidents would result in additional disciplinary action. Specifically, we had agreed you would take the weeks of August 5, 2006 - August 18, 2006- off for vacation and this would [be] followed by a 2 week clinical rotation[.] [Y]ou notified your supervisor that you would return on September 8, 2006, 3 weeks after completing your vacation. Despite all of the previous warning and effort to work with you on the problems that concerned your supervisor, it has continued. Due to your failure to adhere to University policies and procedures and ongoing problems, you have left us no alternative but to terminate you effective immediately. Any accrued vacation will be paid to you in your final paycheck. You are to return all University property issued to you upon employment to Desiree Uptgrow to expedite the processing of your final check. Please contact Benefit Administration, (305)284-6837, regarding continuation of benefits you may be entitled to. You should receive information regarding COBRA benefits from the Office of Benefits Administration in a separate letter. If you do not receive this letter, please contact the Office of Benefits Administration at (305)243-6835. Dr. Harrington's termination of Petitioner's employment was based solely on what Dr. Harrington perceived to be Petitioner's deficiencies as an employee. Neither Petitioner's race, nor his national origin, played any role in this or any other action Dr. Harrington took affecting Petitioner. On September 29, 2006, four days after his termination, Petitioner sent the following e-mail to Dr. Harrington: Hi Dr. Harrington: Dr. Symes urged me to do a 2 week clinical rotation/observership with Hem/Onc as the department of internal medicine no longer offers this. Would it be possible to do it with you, starting next week, Wednesday the 3rd of October. Thanks for your consideration. On the advice of UM legal counsel, Dr. Harrington did not respond to this e-mail. Instead of seeking other employment following his termination, Petitioner "focused" on completing the requirements to obtain his MAIA degree at UM. In accordance with UM policy, he continued to receive tuition remission benefits for the 2006 fall semester (the semester in which he was terminated), but after that semester, the benefits ceased. Petitioner believes that he has completed the requirements for his MAIA degree and is entitled to receive his diploma and final transcript, which UM has withheld. UM's records, however, reflect otherwise. They reveal that he has not yet received any credit for the Practicum in International Administration (INS 517) course that he needs to obtain his degree. This course involved Petitioner's writing and defending a thesis. In the spring of 2007, while Petitioner was working on his thesis, his car, which was parked on the UM campus, was ticketed by the City of Coral Gables police and subsequently towed by Downtown Towing Company for "safekeeping." After unsuccessfully attempting to retrieve his vehicle, he demanded that UM compensate him for his loss. UM (acting through its Assistant General Counsel, Judd Goldberg, Esquire) and Petitioner engaged in settlement negotiations. At least as early as August 8, 2007, UM insisted, as a condition of its agreement to any settlement, that Petitioner sign a full and general release reading, in pertinent part, as follows: In exchange for the promises which the University makes in this Agreement, Andela agrees to waive voluntarily and knowingly certain rights and claims against the University. . . . . The rights and claims which Andela waives and releases in this Agreement include, to every extent allowed by law, those arising under . . . the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1871, and 1964, . . . the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 . . . and any amendments to said laws. This is not a complete list, and Andela waives and releases all similar rights and claims under all other federal, state and local discrimination provisions and all other statutory and common law causes of action relating in any way to: (a) Andela's employment or separation from employment with the University which accrued or may have accrued up to the date of execution of this Agreement; and/or (b) Andela's status as a student at the University which accrued or may have accrued up to the date of execution of this Agreement. . . . On September 13, 2007, Petitioner filed his employment discrimination complaint with the FCHR (complaining, for the first time to anyone, that he had been a victim of race and national origin-based discrimination by UM, acting through Dr. Harrington). On September 22, 2007, Petitioner sent the following letter to Mr. Goldberg: I will not surrender my civil rights by signing the full and general release agreement, in order to receive a settlement for my above referenced car that was swindled. Compelling me to surrender my civil rights is an act of retaliation, based on your knowledge of an employment discrimination complaint filed against the University of Miami. As specified on page two-paragraph two- of the attached letter from the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR), "the law prohibits retaliation against any person making a complaint, testifying or participating in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing on an alleged unlawful employment practice." Unless you correct this unlawful act by the end of business day - Monday 24th of October - I will notify the FCHR. Mr. Goldberg responded by sending Petitioner the following letter, dated September 24, 2007: This letter acknowledges receipt of your correspondence of September 22, 2007 addressed to myself and President Shalala. The University does not believe that the settlement and general release agreement is retaliatory. Indeed, the settlement and general release agreement was provided to you before you filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. At this juncture, the University will respond to the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations when it is formally advised of the charge by the Commission.[7] If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please call my office directly as it is my office that handles all legal matters for the University. Thank you for your attention to this matter. This letter constitutes communication regarding settlement and cannot be used for any other purpose. At no time has Petitioner filed any employment discrimination complaint with the FCHR alleging that he was retaliated against for having engaged in activity protected by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (although he did make such allegations in the Petition for Relief he filed in the instant case).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding UM not guilty of the unlawful employment practices alleged by Petitioner and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2008.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Melvin Blum ("Mr. Blum"), was employed by the Respondent National Enquirer, Inc. ("National Enquirer"), 2/ from 1962 until his voluntary resignation in June 1980. The National Enquirer publishes a weekly tabloid newspaper in Palm Beach County, Florida. Since joining the National Enquirer, Iain Calder ("Mr. Calder") has held various positions as an employee and officer of the publication and its affiliated companies. Mr. Calder first joined the Enquirer in 1964 as London Bureau Chief. In 1967, he came to the United States as articles editor, a position he held until the early 1970's. In due course, he was promoted to senior articles editor, executive editor, editorial director, and then editor in 1975. In 1976, Mr. Calder became President of the National Enquirer. After the death of the owner, Mr. Pope, in 1988, Mr. Calder became Chairman of the company in order to sell the publication. After new owners acquired the publication, Mr. Calder became editor-in-chief of the publication and executive vice- president of the parent company. In December 1995, Mr. Calder stepped down as editor-in-chief and president and assumed the position of editor emeritus. Mr. Calder has known Mr. Blum for close to 30 years. Mr. Calder was familiar with Mr. Blum's work. When Mr. Calder was editorial director and then editor, Mr. Blum indirectly reported to him through his department head. Additionally, Mr. Calder would occasionally sit in as managing editor to learn the business of layouts. During those occasions, he would directly supervise Mr. Blum. While not close friends, Mr. Calder and Mr. Blum occasionally socialized outside of work. In Mr. Calder's view, while Mr. Blum was talented in using photographs, he had problems with headlines and with writing. Malcolm Hayes ("Mr. Hayes") first joined the National Enquirer in 1973. On his first stint at the publication, he held the positions of deskman, assistant editor, associate editor, and then managing editor. Mr. Hayes left the National Enquirer in 1986. Upon his return in 1989, he served in the position of assistant managing editor and then assumed his current position of managing editor upon the death of the prior managing editor, Nat Chrzan. Mr. Hayes first met Mr. Blum when he joined the National Enquirer in 1973. They worked together for seven years. While working together, Mr. Hayes had an opportunity to observe Mr. Blum's work. It was Mr. Hayes' general impression that while Mr. Blum was efficient, thorough, and had good layout skills, he had problems with words and headlines. Mr. Blum has had a hearing impairment since he was 17 years old. During the 18 years Mr. Blum worked at the National Enquirer, he wore a hearing aid. Both Mr. Calder and Mr. Hayes knew Mr. Blum wore a hearing aid while he worked at the National Enquirer. Neither Mr. Calder nor Mr. Hayes felt it was an impediment to his work. It was never considered a negative factor. Mr. Calder believed he communicated well with Mr. Blum while he worked at the publication. Mr. Calder did not view it as limiting Mr. Blum's ability to perform his job in any way. In July of 1990, Mr. Blum wrote to Mr. Calder inquiring about the possibility of returning to work at the National Enquirer. Mr. Calder wrote a cordial letter in reply indicating that there were no openings for the position of a deskman. Additional letters were exchanged between Mr. Blum and Mr. Calder. In a February 1, 1991, letter, Mr. Calder wrote to Mr. Blum informing him there were still no available positions on the "desk." He further indicated that should a position become available, it would be the decision of the Managing Editor whether to rehire him. While Mr. Calder had the authority to hire and always retained veto power, it was his philosophy and policy not to mandate that his department heads hire a particular individual. Upon the resignation of a key member of Mr. Hayes' staff, Mr. Hayes attempted to fill a position on the "desk" with an individual who had in addition to "desk" experience, desktop publishing skills and management potential. The paper was moving into computers and was looking for someone with those skills. Additionally, Mr. Hayes' deputy at the time indicated that he did not want to serve in that role and fill-in for Mr. Hayes in his absence. As the term is used at the National Enquirer, a deskman is an individual who is a layout editor and writes headlines, writes captions, edits copy, and basically puts the pages together. Two members of Mr. Hayes' staff recommended William Condie ("Mr. Condie") for the position. Both individuals had worked with Mr. Condie when they were employed by the New York Post. Mr. Condie was at the Post at the time he was recruited. The National Enquirer had previously been very successful in recruiting newspaper people from the New York Post. Mr. Condie met both the experience requirements and the skill requirements that the National Enquirer was seeking. Mr. Condie had been involved in "desk work" for thirty years. He had served in various "desk" capacities at the London Daily Express, New York Daily News, and New York Post. Mr. Condie had a lot of experience in laying out pages. He was also a very good headline writer with good word skills. In addition to his extensive desk experience, Condie had worked with computers both at the New York Daily News and the New York Post. He also had a personal computer at home and was somewhat of a computer buff. Mr. Condie's background also reflected management experience. Prior to coming to the National Enquirer, Mr. Condie held the position of Night Managing Editor at the New York Post; the Post was considered one of the premier tabloids in the country. Mr. Condie was responsible for supervising all aspects of production of the newspaper after the first edition. He had performed in other management positions as well. Mr. Calder had known Mr. Condie for more than 30 years. Mr. Calder had an opportunity to work with Mr. Condie when Mr. Condie had previously worked at the National Enquirer. At one point in time early in their careers, Mr. Calder had reported to Mr. Condie. Based on his experience and skills, Mr. Condie was invited to the National Enquirer for a try-out in May 1991. At the end of the trial period, Mr. Condie was offered a position. The decision to hire Mr. Condie was made on or before June 5, 1991. Mr. Hayes made the decision to hire Mr. Condie which was approved by Mr. Calder. Mr. Condie began his full-time employment at the National Enquirer on July 8, 1991. The National Enquirer hired Mr. Condie on the basis of his qualifications. Since Mr. Condie was hired, no other positions on the "desk" became available at the National Enquirer. Neither Mr. Hayes nor Mr. Calder viewed the hiring process as a competition between Mr. Condie and Mr. Blum. Had Mr. Condie never been a candidate, Mr. Blum would not have been selected for the position. Mr. Blum lacked the qualifications that the National Enquirer was looking for in a candidate. Both Mr. Hayes and Mr. Calder were familiar with Mr. Blum's abilities and limitations. Mr. Hayes had worked with Mr. Blum for seven years. During that time, Mr. Hayes had an opportunity to observe Mr. Blum's professional work. While he felt Blum was efficient and thorough and had good layout skills, he felt Mr. Blum had problems with words and headlines. The nature of the publication had also changed since Mr. Blum had worked at the National Enquirer. Mr. Blum also did not have the management experience that Mr. Hayes was looking for in a candidate. During his entire time at the National Enquirer, Mr. Blum was never in a management position. Since leaving the National Enquirer, Mr. Blum's only managerial experience was at Senior Power, a free newspaper he started with another individual. While Mr. Blum was responsible for all business decisions, editorial decisions, and finances at Senior Power, it was a naive business concept and a financial failure. Given their personal experience with Mr. Blum, both Mr. Hayes and Mr. Calder felt that his personality was not conducive to supervising people. Additionally, Mr. Blum had no desktop computer experience at a major tabloid. Given their familiarity with Mr. Blum's experience and skills, neither Mr. Hayes nor Mr. Calder considered Mr. Blum a viable candidate for the position for which Mr. Condie was hired. Mr. Blum has no written evidence that the National Enquirer discriminated against him on the basis of his hearing. Mr. Blum knows of no statements made by Mr. Hayes, Mr. Calder, or anyone else evidencing discrimination against him on the basis of his hearing. In fact, Mr. Blum believes he was not rehired because of a grudge. Mr. Blum's hearing impairment played no role in the National Enquirer's decision not to rehire him. Mr. Blum filed his Charge of Discrimination on March 26, 1992.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case dismissing the Petition For Relief and denying all relief sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 1996, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 1996.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Superior Construction Company Southeast, LLC (Superior), wrongfully terminated Petitioner, James Walker, and refused to rehire him based on his disability in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA).
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner was hired as a laborer by Superior in March 2016. During his tenure with Superior, Petitioner also worked as a flagger and a roller machine operator (roller operator). Superior is a construction company specializing in roadway and highway improvement projects. Superior was Petitioner’s employer as defined by the FCRA. § 760.02(7), Fla. Stat. During the relevant time period, Petitioner worked for Superior on a construction assignment known as “15901 Wekiva Project” (Wekiva Project). Oscar Matson, Superior’s superintendent at the relevant time, was Petitioner’s ultimate supervisor and made day-to-day decisions regarding equipment and staffing. Mr. Matson made all employment decisions with regard to Petitioner, including his hiring and job assignments. Jose Gomez, the project manager at the relevant time, oversaw the administrative side of Wekiva Project and supervised the engineering staff. Mr. Matson consulted with Mr. Gomez regarding the construction staff, and Mr. Gomez was familiar with all of the employees working on this project, including Petitioner. The parties stipulated Petitioner suffers from a disability. Relevant Policies Although Superior offered evidence of its Equal Opportunity Policy (EOP), there is no evidence it provides protections for applicants or employees with disabilities. The EOP states in relevant part: Statement of Policy To further the provisions of equal employment opportunity to all persons without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and to promote the full realization of equal opportunity through a positive continuing program[,] it is the policy of Superior Construction Company to assure that applicants are employed and that employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, religion, sex, color or national origin. * * * N. Handicapped Relative to direct federal contracts, we shall not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of a physical or mental handicap in regard to any position of which the employee or applicant for employment is qualified. There was no evidence whether the Wekiva Project was federally funded or part of a federal contract. Although there was no evidence of a written policy, there was testimony that Superior had a reasonable accommodation process that allows an employee who requires an accommodation to request one through his or her supervisor or through a Human Resources hotline. This process was followed by Petitioner. Petitioner’s Accommodations Petitioner began working for Superior as a laborer with the primary duties of shoveling dirt and cleaning roads. The laborer position was physically demanding and required standing, climbing, crawling, and lifting up to 40 pounds. The position also required constant walking and moving within the project site. Petitioner worked ten-hour shifts on weekdays and eight-hour shifts on weekend days. In April 2016, approximately a month after he was hired, Petitioner was hospitalized for a toe injury incurred at work. Although he was injured on the job and knew he was obligated to report the injury to his supervisors, Petitioner did not. He failed to report the incident to Mr. Matson or anyone else because he did not want “a workman’s comp” issue. On or around April 19, 2016, Petitioner brought medical documentation titled “Work/School Status” to Superior indicating that his work duties should be modified until May 10, 2016. The medical documentation indicated Petitioner should be limited to “light duty.” It also indicated Petitioner could perform the following activities: “Limit[ed] standing/walking” and “Light weight activity.” As a result, Mr. Matson initially placed him in a “flagger” position. This position involved directing traffic in one place, and was considered “light duty” because it did not involve heavy lifting or continuous walking. Although the timing is unclear, Mr. Matson later placed Petitioner in the position of roller operator, where he operated a large piece of equipment. As a roller operator, Petitioner was not required to stand, walk or lift. There was no evidence Petitioner complained to Mr. Matson regarding the assignment to either the flagger or roller operator position, nor did he request further accommodation. The undersigned finds Superior accommodated Petitioner’s request for “light duty.” Petitioner had no attendance, disciplinary, or other issues from April 2016 through the summer of 2016 in the flagger or roller operator position. On August 12, 2016, Petitioner was admitted into a medical facility and was out of work. Upon his return on or about August 18, 2016, Petitioner gave Mr. Matson medical documentation titled “Disability Certificate.” That document certified that Petitioner was “unable to return to work” and was “not able to work until further notice.” As a result of the August 18, 2016, meeting, Mr. Matson prepared Petitioner’s termination paperwork. What triggered the termination paperwork on August 18, 2016, is in dispute. Petitioner asserts when he returned to Superior, Mr. Matson told him he was concerned about his health and fired him. Superior counters that Petitioner informed Mr. Matson he had to quit because he was unable to work due to his medical condition, and Superior advised Petitioner to reapply when he was ready. For the reasons below, the undersigned finds Superior’s version of the facts is more consistent with the credible evidence and testimony. First, Superior’s version of events is corroborated by Petitioner’s own sworn statements made in his Charge and Amended Charge of Discrimination, in which he states Superior “advised me to come back to work when I was ready.” Second, Mr. Matson’s testimony that Petitioner told him he was unable to work is consistent with the Disability Certificate provided by Petitioner and with Mr. Matson’s work notes made on August 18, 2016. Those notes indicate Petitioner “said he had to quit because he has austioprosis [sic]. We filled out a termination paper for him.” Although Petitioner challenges the reliability of these notes because he actually had “osteomyelitis,” it is plausible that Mr. Matson mislabeled or misspelled the illness given his unfamiliarity with it and the phonetic similarity between the two terms. Third, Petitioner’s assertion that he was fired is inconsistent with statements he made on subsequent applications when asked the “reason for leaving” Superior. In one application he answers “no work”; in another he lists “medical reasons.” Nowhere does he disclose or state that he was fired or terminated. Finally, based on Petitioner’s demeanor and the inaccuracies and inconsistencies between his testimony and the other evidence, the undersigned finds Petitioner’s testimony less credible than that of Mr. Gomez and Mr. Matson. Petitioner was unable to recall specific dates or details about alleged conversations or his work/medical status. Petitioner admitted he lied to Superior about the injury causing him to go out on leave in April 2016. He blamed discrepancies between his hearing testimony and sworn statements in the documents submitted to the Commission on his attorney; he blamed inconsistencies in the statements made in his disability benefits paperwork on the insurance company; and he explained misleading statements in subsequent job applications as necessary white lies. The undersigned finds Superior’s explanation that it processed Petitioner’s termination after it was clear he could not work and there was no date certain as to when he could return, and its version of facts surrounding Petitioner’s separation more credible. Regardless, however, of whether he quit or was fired, Petitioner was not qualified to work on August 18, 2016. He offered no evidence, nor is there anything in the record, indicating that his inability to work had ever changed, or that the restrictions and limitations set forth in the Disability Certificate were ever lifted. As such, the undersigned finds Petitioner could not perform his job duties and could not work as of August 18, 2016. Petitioner’s Reapplication Petitioner claims he reapplied for a position with Superior numerous times after August 2016. Other than a July 2017 application, it is unclear how often or what other times he reapplied. Petitioner claims Superior did not rehire him because of his disability. As proof, he states Mr. Matson and Mr. Gomez made comments inquiring about his health. The undersigned finds these comments were innocuous and were expressions of concern for his well-being, rather than related to his specific disability. Petitioner’s attempt at reemployment with Superior is also suspect. There was no admissible evidence to prove that Superior was actually hiring in July 2017. In fact, there was evidence Petitioner only reapplied for work at Superior to better his legal position for future litigation; Petitioner admitted he reapplied for a position at Superior “because my attorney said to reapply to see how they would react.” Petitioner also made statements in disability insurance applications that he was unable to work at the time he reapplied for work at Superior. Specifically, as of July 17, 2017, the date of Petitioner’s Social Security Application for Disability Insurance, Petitioner indicated he could not work and had been unable to work since September 1, 2016. Irrespective of Petitioner’s motives, Superior asserts it did not consider his disability when Petitioner reapplied, but rather that it did not rehire Petitioner because it had no vacancies. Mr. Matson credibly testified that in July 2017, the Wekiva Project was coming to an end and he was struggling to keep the staff occupied until the next assignment. Mr. Matson explained, “we were long on help at that time.” Mr. Gomez also met with Petitioner in July 2017 regarding his reapplication. At the time Superior was working on another project, Project 16903. Mr. Gomez told Petitioner that he would be eligible for the next project, Project 17904, but that project was not starting until late 2017 or early 2018. This is consistent with Petitioner’s application dated July 5, 2017, which has a handwritten notation: “Consider Rehire for 16903 per Jose G. till 17904 Ready.” Mr. Gomez was not responsible for Project 17904, nor was there any evidence that the person hiring for Project 17904 was aware of Petitioner’s disability. Superior never rehired Petitioner. The undersigned finds Superior did not consider Petitioner’s disability, but rather, based its decision not to rehire Petitioner on the fact it did not have any vacancies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, James Walker, did not prove that Respondent, Superior Construction Company Southeast, LLC, committed an unlawful employment practice against him; and dismissing his Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 2019.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a human resource assistant with Respondent because of her perceived handicap, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, a 33-year-old female, was hired by Respondent on or about February 6, 1995, as a temporary employee as a human resource assistant in the Personnel Services Department of the School Board of Orange County. Petitioner received the same training given to all new employees in her position. One employee in the department served as the primary trainer and Petitioner relied on her for training and assistance. On April 10, 1995, Petitioner was evaluated on her ability to perform in her temporary assignment. The assessment reflected satisfactory performance for the period February 6, 1995, through April 10, 1995. Petitioner demonstrated the ability to provide good telephone skills when dealing with customers. Petitioner did not notify Respondent that she was disabled or that she required a reasonable accommodation in order to perform her job. During this period, Petitioner was recommended to fill a regular position in the same department to replace an employee who had retired. Petitioner's regular position was effective May 1, 1995. As was customary, Petitioner was on probationary status for a six-month period following that appointment. The new position required Petitioner to work more independently than the temporary position had required. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner successfully completed her formal training and was responsible for her own workload and prioritized work tasks. At the time Petitioner assumed her new position all work in the area was current with no tasks pending. Shortly after her appointment to her new position, Petitioner demonstrated she was experiencing extreme difficulty in handling the detailed process that is required in order to complete tasks of the position. Petitioner received limited assistance to help her better understand the process; however, her skill level continued to deteriorate. During the period May 1, 1995, through July 14, 1995, Petitioner showed signs of stress and nervousness while at work and was late four times and took sick leave on two occasions. Petitioner did not discuss her "disability" or that she was having "psychological" problems with her supervisors. Petitioner was not regarded as having a physical or mental impairment while on probationary status. On July 14, 1995, Petitioner was terminated from her position while on probation. Petitioner was given the option of taking a probationary letter of termination or resigning. Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation. The basis for Petitioner's termination was that she was unable to effectively manage the technical aspects of the position; deterioration in her communication skills; and concern for the reasons for her absence and tardiness during her probationary period. Petitioner is not a disabled person, nor was she perceived to be disabled by her employer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Kyle McNeil 523 Hicksmore Drive Apartment A Winter Park, Florida 32792 Frank Kruppenbacher, Esquire Orange County School Board 445 West Amelia Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Sylvester Brown, was subject to discrimination in employment for the reasons alleged in the Petition.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Sylvester Brown, was terminated from his position as Laborer, position number 51343, within the Facilities Operation and Maintenance Department of Florida State University (FSU) on October 7, 1999, for violation of a Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave. The Petitioner had been employed by FSU for 24 years. Petitioner's Disciplinary Violations Leading to Termination Attendance is a critical element of the Laborer's job because departmental productivity depends on the reliable availability of employees. The Petitioner received a copy of Rule 6C2-4.070, Guidelines for Disciplinary Action, Rules of the Florida State University Administrative Code on January 29, 1988, which provided notice to the Petitioner of FSU's standard of conduct and the associated penalties for violation. The Petitioner was cited for numerous disciplinary infractions prior to his dismissal. The Petitioner's work history documents a consistent trend of absences which grew progressively worse over time. A list of documentation in evidence, exhibiting disciplinary action taken by FSU against the Petitioner includes: A three day suspension for Absence Without Authorized Leave (AWOL) and Excessive Absences, dated January 3, 1997. A written reprimand for Excessive Absences and AWOL, dated August 6, 1996. An oral reprimand for excessive absences, dated April 26, 1996. 1996. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated February 29, A written reprimand for AWOL, dated August 14, 1991. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated June 5, 1989. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated February 22, 1989. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated July 8, 1988. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated May 25, 1988. The Petitioner was cited for excessive tardiness in an official written reprimand dated July 8, 1988, and the Petitioner was again reminded that his performance hindered the department's ability to perform its function. An oral reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated January 28, 1988. An oral reprimand for misuse of state property and equipment, dated July 11, 1985. A written reprimand for misuse of state property and equipment dated March 21, 1984. A written reprimand for excessive absences, dated February 7, 1984. A written reprimand for AWOL and misuse of state property and equipment dated, January 25, 1983. A three day suspension for AWOL, dated July 27, 1981. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated July 13, 1981. The Petitioner was directed in an August 14, 1991, written reprimand to phone his supervisor as close to 8:00 a.m. as possible on days he would be unable to report to work. The Petitioner was reminded in the February 29, 1996, written reprimand of the policy requiring employees to provide supervisors with advanced notice or documentation for leave to be authorized. The Petitioner was informed on April 26, 1996, that his absences, both excused and unexcused, exceeded established attendance and leave standards. Specifically, from January through April, the Petitioner used 33 hours of annual leave, 31 hours of sick leave, and 29 hours of leave without pay. FSU notified the Petitioner that his absences and sick leave totaling 33 hours during the period from April 26, 1996 to August 6, 1996, were deemed excessive and in contravention of departmental standards. The Petitioner was also cited for six hours of being absent without authorized leave. The Petitioner's chronic absenteeism did not improve. The period from August 6, 1996 through January 3, 1997, witnessed 46 hours of sick leave or unauthorized leave on the Petitioner's part. An inventory of the Petitioner's absences following his suspension from January 7-9, 1997 until August 22, 1997, catalogued 56 hours of sick leave, 16 hours of leave without pay and two hours of absence without authorized leave. This amount of leave was "considered to be excessive and completely unacceptable." [Id.] Further, the university did not receive any medical excuses for the Petitioner's use of sick leave during this period. [Id.] Counseling was provided to the Petitioner by FSU regarding the use of sick leave on August 17, 1998. An examination of the Petitioner's attendance revealed that he used 63 hours of sick leave from February 20, 1998 through August 6, 1998. [Id.] The university's standard for the same period of time was 33 hours of sick leave. [Id.] The Petitioner was further advised by FSU that he would not be compensated for three consecutive absences or three absences within a 30-day period without proper medical documentation. FSU assessed the Petitioner's attendance from January 8, 1998 through August 6, 1998, by comparing the standard allocated for sick leave to the Petitioner's actual use of sick leave. The sick leave standard for employees for the period under review was 44.16 hours whereas the Petitioner expended 67 hours of sick leave. [Id.] The record establishes that the Petitioner was warned 17 times in writing through reprimands, memorandums, and counseling notices dating back to 1981 that absenteeism was punishable under university employee disciplinary standards. Tardiness and absenteeism are, in fact, grounds for dismissal under the FSU Handbook for Employees. The Petitioner was warned twice in writing that failure to rectify his recurring absenteeism could result in his dismissal. Petitioner's Termination The FSU's Guidelines for Disciplinary Action are based on the concepts of progressive and cumulative discipline. The Disciplinary Guidelines outline standards to apply for punishable offenses to ensure similar treatment. Ms. Susannah Miller, Manager of Employees Relations at FSU, testified that the Petitioner's personnel file revealed the worst case of absenteeism she has seen at FSU. Excessive absences is defined in the Guideline for Disciplinary Action as "an attendance record of recurring absences, even though all or a majority of the absences were necessary and excused." Dismissal is allowed as proper punishment for an employee's fourth violation of the excessive absence rule. FSU notified the Petitioner of its intention to terminate him for excessive absences, effective on or shortly after October 12, 1998. In lieu of firing the Petitioner, FSU elected to allow the Petitioner to enter into a "Last Chance Agreement" (LCA) with FSU to avoid dismissal. Ms. Miller stated that Last Chance Agreements allow a final opportunity for employees to improve their performance. Ms. Miller further testified that to her knowledge FSU has never retained any employee that violated a Last Chance Agreement. The Last Chance Agreement required the Petitioner to (1) obtain prior written approval of requests for annual leave or leave without pay; (2) follow departmental policy and call-in between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. and speak personally with his supervisor or proper designee if he was sick and unable to report to work; and (3) agree that violation of any LCA provision would result in immediate termination for cause. The Petitioner violated the Last Chance Agreement when he did not report for work on August 27, 1999, because he neither obtained prior approval for the absence nor followed the call-in procedure. The Petitioner also failed to provide any documentation justifying his absence. The Petitioner was in violation of the Last Chance Agreement on August 31, 1999, when he was tardy without permission and failed to follow the call-in procedure. The Petitioner's breach of the Last Chance Agreement is even more egregious because he collected his paycheck prior to work and could have easily informed his supervisor or the designee that he needed leave that day. In addition to violating the terms of the Last Chance Agreement, the Petitioner was also AWOL on August 27 and August 31, 1999. AWOL is "failure to obtain approval prior to any absence from work" and is punishable by dismissal for the third occurrence. The Petitioner admitted that he violated the Last Chance Agreement. On September 15, 1999, FSU informed the Petitioner of its decision to terminate him for violating the Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave. The Petitioner was dismissed on October 7, 1999. Petitioner's Step One Grievance was denied on December 13, 1999. FSU's decision to terminate the Petitioner for violation of the Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave was upheld by the State University System of Florida in its Step Two Grievance decision. Petitioner's Injury The Petitioner's Position Description reveals that lifting is an integral part of a laborer's duties. The Petitioner's 1995 Position Description allocates 85 percent of the job's essential function to lifting, moving and arranging university property and requires that the laborer be able to lift 30 pounds. The Petitioner sustained a back injury at work on September 4, 1997. The Petitioner's job duties changed as a result of the injury and he was tasked with inspecting fire extinguishers from September 10 through November 12, 1997. A physical capacity assessment performed on the Petitioner indicated that he was capable of performing at a medium demand level. The Department of Labor defined medium demand as capable of lifting 50 pounds and pushing and pulling 50 pounds. The Petitioner was temporarily re-assigned to the Grounds Section of the Facilities, Operations and Maintenance Department on December 23, 1997. The Petitioner testified that his job function involved re-cycling. The Petitioner's assignment in the Grounds Section was light duty and he was informed that his job duties could be modified after his physician reviewed the physical capacity assessment. Dr. Alexander, the Petitioner's physician, declared the Petitioner fit for medium demand duty with a 35-pound lifting limit on March 24, 1998. Robert Pullen, American Disabilities Act Coordinator at FSU, was directed by Carolyn Shackleford, under the University's Reasonable Accommodation Policy, to ensure that the Petitioner's job activities with the Grounds Section did not exceed the 35p-pound lifting threshold. The Petitioner never contacted Mr. Pullen's office regarding reasonable accommodation. Mr. Pullen determined that the Petitioner's duties did not violate the lifting restriction and were in full compliance with the accommodation policy. The Petitioner testified that he could lift 35 pounds repetitively. The record reflects no evidence of age discrimination committed by the Respondent against the Petitioner. The record indicates no evidence that the Petitioner was terminated due to his race. The Petitioner presented no evidence or testimony regarding retaliation by FSU.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore,
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2008),1 by discriminating against Petitioner based on her color and/or her age.
Findings Of Fact The Town is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner was hired by the Town in November 2004 as an administrative assistant to Mayor Anthony Grant. Petitioner is a dark-skinned African-American woman who was 51 years of age at the time of the hearing. Petitioner was interviewed and hired by a committee appointed by Mayor Grant. The committee included town clerk Cathlene Williams, public works director Roger Dixon, and then- chief administrative officer Dr. Ruth Barnes. Mayor Grant did not meet Petitioner until the day she started work as his administrative assistant. The mayor's administrative assistant handles correspondence, filing, appointments, and anything else the mayor requires in the day-to-day operations of his office. For more than two years, Petitioner went about her duties without incident. She never received a formal evaluation, but no testimony or documentary evidence was entered to suggest that her job performance was ever less than acceptable during this period. In about August 2007, Petitioner began to notice a difference in Mayor Grant's attitude towards her. The mayor began screaming at her at the top of his lungs, cursing at her. He was relentlessly critical of her job performance, accusing her of not completing assigned tasks. Petitioner conceded that she would "challenge" Mayor Grant when he was out of line or requested her to do something beyond her job description. She denied being disrespectful or confrontational, but agreed that she was not always as deferential as Mayor Grant preferred. During the same time period, roughly July and August 2007, Petitioner also noticed that resumes were being faxed to the Town Hall that appeared to be for her job. She asked Ms. Williams about the resumes, but Ms. Williams stated she knew nothing and told Petitioner to ask the mayor. When Petitioner questioned the mayor about the resumes, he took her into his office and asked her to do him a favor. He asked if she would work across the street in the post office for a couple of weeks, to fill in for a post office employee who was being transferred to the finance department; as a team player, Petitioner agreed to the move. While she was working as a clerk at the post office, Petitioner learned that the mayor was interviewing people for her administrative assistant position. She filed a formal complaint with the Town. For a time after that, she was forced to work half-time at the post office and half-time in the mayor's office. On or about October 22, 2007, Petitioner was formally transferred from her position as administrative assistant to the mayor to the position of postal clerk in the post office. Her salary and benefits remained the same. At the hearing, Mayor Grant testified that he moved Petitioner to the post office to lessen the stress of her job. Based on his conversations with Petitioner, he understood that Petitioner was having personal or family problems. He was not privy to the details of these problems, but had noticed for some time that Petitioner seemed to be under great stress. The post office was a much less hectic environment than the mayor's office, and would be more amenable to her condition. Ms. Williams, the town clerk, testified that the mayor told her that Petitioner was stressed and needed more lax duties than those she performed in the mayor's office. Mr. Dixon, the public works director, testified that Petitioner had indicated to him that she was under pressure, but she did not disclose the cause of that pressure. He recalled that, toward the end of her employment with the Town, Petitioner mentioned that she felt she was being discriminated against because of her skin color. Petitioner denied ever telling Mayor Grant that she was feeling stressed. She denied telling him anything about her family. Petitioner stated that the only stress she felt was caused by the disrespect and humiliation heaped upon her by Mayor Grant. Petitioner's best friend, Gina King Brooks, a business owner in the Town, testified that Petitioner would come to her store in tears over her treatment by the mayor. Petitioner told Ms. Brooks that she was being transferred to the post office against her will, was being forced to train her own replacement in the mayor's office,3 and believed that it was all because of her age and complexion. Mayor Grant testified that he called Petitioner into his office and informed her of the transfer to the post office. He did not tell her that the move was temporary. He did not view the transfer from administrative assistant to postal clerk as a demotion or involving any loss of status. Mayor Grant testified that an additional reason for the change was that he wanted a more qualified person as his administrative assistant. He acknowledged that Petitioner was actually more experienced than her eventual replacement, Jacqueline Cockerham.4 However, Petitioner's personal issues were affecting her ability to meet the sensitive deadlines placed upon her in the mayor's office. The mayor needed more reliable support in his office, and Petitioner needed a less stressful work environment. Therefore, Mayor Grant believed the move would benefit everyone involved. Mayor Grant denied that Petitioner's skin color or age had anything to do with her transfer to the post office. Petitioner was replaced in her administrative assistant position by Ms. Cockerham, a light-skinned African- American woman born on October 17, 1961. She was 46 years of age at the time of the hearing. Documents introduced by the Town at the hearing indicate the decision to hire Ms. Cockerham was made on March 26, 2008. Ms. Williams testified that she conducted the interview of Ms. Cockerham, along with a special assistant to the mayor, Kevin Bodley, who no longer works for the Town. Both Ms. Williams and Mayor Grant testified that the mayor did not meet Ms. Cockerham until the day she began work in his office. Petitioner testified that she knew the mayor had met Ms. Cockerham before she was hired by the Town, because Mayor Grant had instructed Petitioner to set up a meeting with Ms. Cockerham while Petitioner was still working in the mayor's office. Mayor Grant flatly denied having any knowledge of Ms. Cockerham prior to the time of her hiring. On this point, Mayor Grant's testimony, as supported by that of Ms. Williams, is credited. To support her allegation that Mayor Grant preferred employees with light skin, Petitioner cited his preferential treatment of an employee named Cherone Fort. Petitioner claimed that Mayor Grant required her to make a wake-up call to Ms. Fort every morning, because Ms. Fort had problems getting to work on time. Ms. Fort was a light-skinned African-American woman. Under cross-examination, Petitioner conceded that Mayor Grant and Ms. Fort were friends, and that his favoritism toward her may have had nothing to do with her skin color. Petitioner claimed that there were other examples of the mayor's "color struck" favoritism toward lighter-skinned employees, but she declined to provide specifics.5 She admitted that several dark-skinned persons worked for the Town, but countered that those persons do not work in close proximity to the mayor. As to her age discrimination claim, Petitioner testified that a persistent theme of her conversations with Mayor Grant was his general desire for a younger staff, because younger people were fresher and more creative. The mayor's expressed preference was always a concern to Petitioner. Petitioner testified that she felt degraded, demeaned and humiliated by the transfer to the post office. She has worked as an executive assistant for her entire professional career, including positions for the city manager of Gainesville and the head of pediatric genetics at the University of Florida. She believed herself unsuited to a clerical position in the post office, and viewed her transfer as punitive. In April 2008, Petitioner was transferred from the post office to a position as assistant to the town planner. Within days of this second transfer, Petitioner resigned her position as an employee of the Town. At the time of her resignation, Petitioner was being paid $15.23 per hour. Petitioner is now working for Rollins College in a position she feels is more suitable to her skills. She makes about $14.00 per hour. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that there was a personality conflict between Petitioner and Mayor Grant. Neither Petitioner nor Mayor Grant was especially forthcoming regarding the details of their working relationship, especially the cause of the friction that developed in August 2007. Neither witness was entirely credible in describing the other's actions or motivations. No other witness corroborated Petitioner's claims that Mayor Grant ranted, yelled, and was "very, very nasty" in his dealings with Petitioner.6 No other witness corroborated Mayor Grant's claim that Petitioner was under stress due to some unnamed family situation. The working relationship between Mayor Grant and Petitioner was certainly volatile, but the evidence is insufficient to permit more than speculation as to the cause of that volatility. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, due to this personality conflict, Mayor Grant wanted Petitioner transferred out of his office. He may even have used the subterfuge of a "temporary" transfer to exact Petitioner's compliance with the move. However, the purpose of this proceeding is not to pass judgment on Mayor Grant's honesty or skills as an administrator. Aside from Petitioner's suspicions, there is no solid evidence that Mayor Grant was motivated by anything other than a desire to have his office run more smoothly and efficiently. Petitioner's assertion that the mayor's preference for lighter-skinned employees was common knowledge cannot be credited without evidentiary support. Petitioner's age discrimination claim is supported only by Petitioner's recollection of conversations with Mayor Grant in which he expressed a general desire for a younger, fresher, more creative staff. Given that both Petitioner and Ms. Cockerham were experienced, middle-aged professionals, and given that Mayor Grant had nothing to do with the hiring of either employee, the five-year age difference between them does not constitute evidence of discrimination on the part of the mayor or the Town. Petitioner was not discharged from employment. Though Petitioner perceived it as a demotion, the transfer to the post office was a lateral transfer within the Town's employment hierarchy. Petitioner was paid the same salary and received the same benefits she received as an administrative assistant to the mayor. A reasonably objective observer would not consider working as a clerk in a post office to be demeaning or degrading.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the Town of Eatonville did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on December 24, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Linda J. Coonrod, was employed by Respondent, Baptist Hospital (the hospital), since approximately 1993. She became a unit coordinator in approximately 2002 and remained in that position until she was terminated from employment effective September 4, 2007. Petitioner is a licensed practical nurse. Her position as a unit coordinator required her to perform such tasks as answering the phone, coordinating doctors' appointments and doctors' orders, and performing various tasks using a computer. Petitioner’s regular work schedule was Monday through Friday from 6:00 a.m. until 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. Petitioner was scheduled to work on Thursday, August 30, 2007, and Friday, August 31, 2007. However, she did not report to work on either August 30 or 31. Petitioner did not report to work as scheduled on August 30 and 31, 2007, because she had been admitted as a patient to the emergency room of the hospital on the evening of August 29, and remained a patient at the hospital on August 30 and 31, 2007. She was discharged on September 1, 2007, a Saturday. Melanie Kuzma is a registered nurse and is employed by Respondent as the clinical manager of the medical floor. Ms. Kuzma was Petitioner’s supervisor when Petitioner was employed at the hospital. Unfortunately, Ms. Kuzma did not know why Petitioner did not report for work as scheduled on August 30 and 31. Petitioner was being treated at the hospital for chest pain and was given several medications while a patient there. She could not or did not notify Ms. Kuzma of her admission to the hospital and her resulting unavailability to report to work as scheduled. Petitioner did not ask her treating nurse, her treating doctor, or anyone else to inform Ms. Kuzma of her whereabouts. No one else contacted Ms. Kuzma as to Petitioner’s whereabouts. In any event, Ms. Kuzma was not aware of why Petitioner did not report to work as scheduled. While in the hospital as a patient, Petitioner was not in the same unit in which she worked as an employee. Ms. Kuzma was not a supervisor over the area of the hospital where Petitioner was a patient. When Petitioner did not report to work as scheduled on August 30, 2007, Ms. Kuzma called Petitioner’s home. No answering machine or voice mail was available to leave a message, so she and the unit coordinator continued to call Petitioner’s home throughout the day with no success. When Petitioner did not report to work as scheduled the following day, Ms. Kuzma and the unit coordinator continued to call Petitioner’s home. Again, they did not reach Petitioner and had no way of leaving a message. Attempting to call a person who fails to report to work as scheduled is standard practice at the hospital. A person who fails to report to work as scheduled and fails to call in is referred to by the hospital as a “no call, no show.” Ms. Kuzma notified Venus Jones, the Employee Relations Manager for the hospital, that Petitioner had not reported to work as scheduled and failed to call in for two days. Ms. Jones informed Ms. Kuzma that when an employee had two days “no call, no show,” that it would result in discharge from employment with the hospital. Petitioner reported to work on Monday, September 3, 2007, which was a holiday. It was then that Petitioner told Ms. Kuzma that she had been admitted as a patient in the hospital on the evening of August 29, and remained a patient on August 30 and 31, 2007. Ms. Jones has terminated the employment of other employees for “no call, no show” for a two-day period. Ms. Jones does not consider anything unique about Ms. Coonrod’s situation. Ms. Jones did not consider Petitioner’s reason for her “no call, no show” to work to be adequate. On September 11, 2007, Ms. Jones sent a letter to Petitioner informing her that her employment was terminated for failure to report to work and failure to notify her department of her absence. Petitioner acknowledged that her heart problem which precipitated her hospitalization at the time in question was not a disability. This medical condition did not prevent her from working and did not limit her from doing everyday tasks such as getting dressed, driving, brushing her teeth, or other normal life activities. When questioned at hearing about her medical condition, Petitioner responded, “I’m not disabled. I don’t have a handicap because of it.” Further, there is no evidence in the record that anyone employed by Respondent perceived Petitioner to have a disability.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Employment Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda J. Coonrod 40487 Audiss Road Milton, Florida 32583 Russell F. Van Sickle, Esquire Beggs & Lane. LLP Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32591-2950 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether Petitioner was terminated from his employment with Respondent because of his race, his alleged disability, and in alleged retaliation for his attempt to file a workers' compensation claim in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. Petitioner also has been diagnosed with obsessive/compulsive disorder and major depression. On March 21, 1997, Petitioner began his employment with Florida Department of Corrections as a substance abuse counselor at Lancaster Correctional Institution. Petitioner's employment status was in career service, probationary status for six months from the date of his employment. A probationary status employee can be terminated without cause. Petitioner's employment as a counselor required him to be present at the institution a reasonable amount of time in order to perform his counseling duties. From March 21, 1997 through September 2, 1997, Petitioner failed to report for work 39 full workdays out of a possible 115 workdays. In addition, Petitioner had five other workdays that he only worked part of the day, with a total of 16 hours of leave used over those days. Sixteen hours is the equivalent of two full workdays missed by Respondent. As a result, Petitioner was absent from work approximately 35 percent of the time. Thirty-five percent absence rate was excessive based on Petitioner's job duties. Most of the leave was without pay because Petitioner had not accumulated enough sick or annual leave to cover his absences. The leave was taken for various reasons, but a large part of the leave was taken when Petitioner was hospitalized due to his mental condition. Petitioner's doctor released him from his hospitalization on August 8, 1997; however, Petitioner did not return to work until August 20, 1997. The last pay period ran from Friday, August 22, 1997 to Thursday, September 4, 1997. Petitioner only worked 20 hours out of 40 the first week and two hours out of 40 the second week. Around September 1, 1997, Petitioner went to the personnel office to inquire about filing a workers' compensation claim based on his disability. The staff person he spoke to did not know the procedure for filing a workers' compensation claim. She told Petitioner she would find out the procedure and asked him to return the next day. Other than Petitioner's speculation about the events following his initial inquiry about filing a workers' compensation claim, other material evidence regarding the events following his initial inquiry and Respondent's response thereto was submitted into evidence. The evidence is insufficient to draw any conclusions of a factual or legal nature regarding Petitioner's workers' compensation claim and his termination. Petitioner was terminated on September 2, 1997, the day following his initial inquiry about workers' compensation. Petitioner received his letter of termination on September 2, 1997. Petitioner was a probationary status employee when he was terminated. Eventually, Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim. The claim was denied by the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. In 1997, L.D. "Pete" Turner was the warden at Lancaster Correctional Institution. As warden, Mr. Turner supervised Petitioner. Mr. Turner made the decision to terminate Petitioner due to his excessive absences. Mr. Turner did not terminate Petitioner based on Petitioner's race, his alleged disability, or because of Petitioner's attempt to file a workers' compensation claim. Petitioner was needed at work and he was not there a sufficient amount of time to fulfill his job duties. In fact, there was no competent evidence that there was any connection between Petitioner's termination and/or his race, disability, or desire to file a workers' compensation claim. Petitioner alleged that two employees at the institution were excessively absent but were not terminated. The employees were Doris Jones and Victoria Englehart. Both individuals were career service employees with permanent status. They were not probationary status employees. Doris Jones is an African-American female. Victoria Englehart is a white female. No other evidence was produced at the hearing regarding these two employees, their attendance records, job duties or anything else of a comparative nature. Clearly, the evidence is insufficient to make any comparison between these two employees and Petitioner's employment and termination.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Otis Ware Post Office Box 2155 Trenton, Florida 32693 William J. Thurber, IV, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Azizi M. Dixon, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact No findings are made in this case. Petitioner did not appear and did not submit evidence to support findings of fact.