The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 484.051(2), 484.056(1)(g), 484.056(1)(h), 484.056(1)(k), 484.053(1)(f), 484.053(3), 455.624(1)(j), and 484.0512(l), Florida Statutes,1 and Rule 64B6-6.010, Florida Administrative Code, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Stephens is and has been, at least since March 1999, a licensed Hearing Aid Specialist. His license number is AS 0002599. On April 26, 1999, O.G. purchased a pair of hearing aids from Stephens. The total price of the hearing aids was $3200. O.G. paid $1600 using his Visa credit card on April 26. The hearing aids were delivered by Stephens to O.G. on May 14, 1999, at which time O.G. paid the remaining $1600 by Visa credit card. O.G. was not happy with the hearing aids and returned to Stephens' place of business, Hearing World, sometime in June 1999. Stephens convinced O.G. to try a different pair of hearing aids instead of getting a refund. O.G. agreed, and Stephens ordered a new pair of hearing aids, which Stephens delivered on June 30, 1999. O.G. was not happy with the second pair of hearing aids and again returned them to Hearing World. Stephens persuaded O.G. to try another set of hearings aids. By letter dated July 26, 1999, Stephens advised as follows: This letter is to confirm that: When you receive your remade instruments on or before August 15, 1999, you will have 30 days to try them without penalty. Should you decide that you wish to return them for a refund you may do so and receive a full refund of your investment. Further, should you need an extension of the trial it will be granted based on your request before the original trial expires. O.G. agreed to Stephens' proposition. The third set was delivered on August 14, 1999. The third set of hearing aids was also unacceptable to O.G. Stephens ordered a fourth pair and delivered them to O.G. on October 1, 1999. O.G. was not satisfied with the fourth pair and asked for a refund. On November 19, 1999, O.G. received a letter from Stephens stating: We are in receipt of your request for cancellation. I do accept this letter as your notice. We are very sorry that we were not able to satisfy your hearing needs. We are having a very difficult time financially at this time and will not be able to refund your money as timely as you would like. However, we do owe you a refund and will take care of it as soon as we are financially able to do so. The refund time is running about 8 weeks. O.G. did receive $300 from Stephens as part of the refund. Stephens made no further payments to O.G. On February 15, 1999, Joseph Wright (Wright) applied to the Department for admittance to the hearing aid specialist training program and was approved for the training program period March 12, 1999, through September 11, 1999. The notice from the Department to Wright advising him that he was approved for the training program stated: "A trainee may continue to function as a trainee until receipt of the examination grade results." Stephens was Wright's sponsor. As part of the training program, Stephens taught Wright, using text books and hands-on training. Stephens showed Wright how to make molds and do fittings. As Wright progressed, he was allowed to make the molds and do fittings by himself. Wright would show the molds to Stephens after Wright completed them. If Wright had trouble fitting a client, Stephens would come and assist Wright. Generally Stephens was in the office when Wright did fittings. After completing the six-month training program, Wright took the Hearing Aid Specialist Examination in September 1999. Wright did not pass the examination. On October 29, 1999, the Department mailed Wright the notice that he had not passed the examination. The evidence did not establish when Wright received the notification that he had failed the examination. Nor did the evidence establish when Stephens became aware that Wright had failed the examination. At least by April 14, 2000, Wright was aware that he had failed the examination because on that date he again applied with the Department to enter the hearing aid specialist program under Stephens' sponsorship. Stephens was also aware by April 14, 2000, that Wright had failed the examination because Wright's application included a signed statement from Stephens dated April 14, 2000, indicating that he would be Wright's sponsor. The Department admitted Wright to the training program for the period April 22, 2000, through October 21, 2000. The dates for his examination were January 19 and 20, 2001. In February 2000, J.F. received an advertisement from Hearing World, advertising free hearing examinations. On March 2, 2000, J.F. went to Hearing World for the free examination. He did not see Stephens and was helped by Wright. J.F. signed a written purchase agreement to purchase two hearing aids from Hearing World for $5,700. Wright performed the examination, made the molds for the hearing aids, and signed the purchase agreement on behalf of Hearing World. J.F. gave Wright a check for $5,700 on March 2, 2000, as payment in full for the hearing aids. On March 23, 2000, Wright delivered the hearing aids to J.F. and signed the purchase agreement as having delivered the hearing aids. Stephens was not physically present in the room with Wright and J.F. at the time the delivery was made. The purchase agreement did not contain the signature and license number of Stephens. The written purchase agreement provided: The purchaser agrees to wear the hearing aid(s) for a period of 30 days from the date of delivery. In the event that the purchaser decides to return the hearing aid(s), they must be returned to the specialist of record in new working order, on or before the 30th day of possession. Upon receipt of the hearing aid(s) Hearing World will refund the purchase price, less mold and dispensing fees (mold fee $150 for one aid, $200 for a set. In addition, a 5% of the purchase price-dispensing fee may be retained). J.F. tried wearing the hearing aids but experienced vertigo when using them. He talked to Wright on April 3 and explained the problem he was having with the hearing aids and indicating he wanted to return the hearing aids for a refund. Wright explained to J.F. that only Stephens had the authority to make a refund. J.F. met with Stephens on April 12, 2000. Stephens explained that he had a cash flow problem and could not make a full refund at that time. It was agreed that J.F. would return one of the hearing aids and try to wear the other one. On April 14, 2000, J.F. returned to Hearing World and explained to Stephens that the use of one hearing aid did not solve the vertigo problem that he was experiencing. J.F. returned the other hearing aid and asked for a complete refund. Stephens told J.F. that he did not have the funds to make a full refund and gave J.F. $100. Stephens made no further payments to J.F. for the refund on the hearing aids. Stephens filed a petition for bankruptcy on September 27, 2000. A Discharge of Debtor was entered on January 8, 2001, in In Re: Stephens, Donald Lane, Case No. 00-14949-8W7, United States Bankruptcy Court Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division. J.F. and O.G. were listed as creditors holding unsecured nonpriority claims.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: In Case No. 03-0404PL, finding that Donald Stephens violated Subsections 484.0512(1) and 484.056(1)(h), Florida Statutes, as set forth in Count I of the Administrative Complaint; Subsection 484.051(2), Florida Statutes, as set forth in Count II of the Administrative Complaint; and Subsection 484.056(1)(h), Florida Statutes, and Rule 64B6-6.010, Florida Administrative Code, as set forth in Count IV of the Administrative Complaint. In Case No. 03-0404PL, dismissing Count III of the Administrative Complaint. In Case No. 03-0404PL, issuing a reprimand and imposing administrative fines of $1,000 for the violations set forth in Count I, $500 for the violations set forth in Count II, and $500 for the violations set forth in Count IV. In Case No. 03-0405PL dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2003.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent's license as a hearing aid specialist in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaints filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the issues herein, the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists has been the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of hearing aid specialists and the regulation of the hearing aid provider profession in Florida. The Respondent has been a licensed hearing aid specialist in this state, holding license number AS 00010006. Stanley I. Williamson is an 84-year-old blind and arthritic retiree who has worn hearing aids since the early 1980's. He has known Mr. Conley since that time and has purchased his hearing aids from the Respondent both when the Respondent was working for other suppliers and when he went into business for himself. In the summer of 1997, Mr. Williamson went to the Respondent to get the wax cleaned out of his hearing aids. Mr. Williamson did not feel he needed new aids at the time. However, on June 6, 1997 Respondent Mr. Conley called him and tried to sell him some new aids. Mr. Williamson told the respondent he didn't want new aids because his were working well, but Mr. Conley suggested he bring them in anyway. Mr. Williamson went to the Respondent's office and tried the new ones the Respondent showed him but decided he did not want them because he felt they did not work properly. Nonetheless, on that same day, June 6, 1997, Mr. Williamson took them, signed a contract for the new aids, and gave the Respondent a check for $1,095. At that time, the Respondent told Mr. Williamson he could bring the aids back within 30 days if they were not acceptable. The Argosy hearing aids Mr. Williamson got from the Respondent on June 6 did not work properly, and when Mr. Williamson complained, the Respondent agreed to get him another pair. Mr. Williamson picked up this second pair of aids at the Respondent's office, Conley's Hearing Aid Center in Clearwater on June 20, 1997. At that time Mr. Williamson signed a second contract and gave the Respondent a second check for $1,095. On June 24, 1997, the Respondent had Mr. Williamson, who was still not satisfied with the performance of the Argosy aids, sign a third contract with his company under which the Respondent agreed to provide a pair of 3M Single Pro hearing aids for a total price of $3,390. The Respondent gave Mr. Williamson credit for the two prior payments of $1,095 each, and Mr. Williamson gave the Respondent an additional check for $1,200. According to Mr. Williamson, the 3M aids, which the Respondent delivered on July 8, 1997, also did not work to his satisfaction, so after just a few days, on July 10, 1997, he exchanged them for a different pair of 3M aids, Dual Pro. The sales receipt for the aids that the Respondent gave to Mr. Williamson on July 10, 1997 did not contain the buyer's signature, nor did it list the serial numbers for the hearing aids provided. Mr. Williamson thought he was getting the top of the hearing aid line but in fact, the Dual Pro aid was the middle line. According to a pamphlet he saw later, the top of the line is called Multi Pro; the middle, Dual Pro; and the bottom, Single Pro. Though a new contract was signed reflecting the Dual Pro aids, there was no additional charge. The Respondent guaranteed all hearing aids sold to Mr. Williamson to be acceptable or, if returned within 30 days of purchase, a full refund would be given. The Dual Pro aids also did not work to Mr. Williamson's satisfaction, and he returned them to the Respondent on or about August 4, 1997, an act witnessed by the Respondent's associate, Michelle Pfister. None of the hearing aid sets was kept by Mr. Williamson for more than 30 days. Mr. Williamson contends that when he returned the second pair of Argosy aids and received the 3M Single Pro aids in exchange, he asked Mr. Conley for a refund. At that time, Mr. Conley said he didn't have the money. When Mr. Conley delivered the Single Pro aids, and again when he delivered the Dual Pro aids, Mr. Williamson asked for a refund instead. Each time the Respondent claimed he didn't have the money. On October 4, 1997, Mr. Williamson wrote to Conley's Hearing Aid Center, the Respondent's business, and threatened recoupment action if the Respondent did not return the money he had paid for the aids he had returned. The hearing aids Mr. Williamson purchased were all returned to the Respondent, but no refund was ever made. According to Ms. Pfister, the returned hearing aids were subsequently sent back to the manufacturer for credit. The credit was not to her account with the manufacturer, however, and she does not know who received it. Ms. Pfister, also a licensed hearing aid specialist since 1998, bought Conley's Hearing Aid Center from the Respondent on July 27, 1997. At the time of the purchase, Ms. Pfister was not employed by the Respondent, but she had worked for the Respondent on and off since 1995. On June 26, 1997, the Respondent signed a form to sponsor Ms. Pfister as a hearing aid specialist trainee and served as her sponsor until she passed the examination and was licensed on June 23, 1998. Respondent continued to work on the premises after the sale until Ms. Pfister was licensed. When Ms. Pfister took over the business, the sales contract called for all hearing aids on site to be sold to her as inventory, She also received a statement from the Respondent that there were no unresolved issues with clients, and she did not assume any liabilities incurred by the business prior to her take over. When she assumed active management of the practice, Ms. Pfister received all of the Respondent's patient files. Katherine Sadilek is a 93-year-old retiree who purchased a pair of pre-owned 3-M Model 8200 hearing aids from the Respondent on April 8, 1997 for $1,800. The aids were paid for in full on April 9, 1997. The receipt for this sale that the Respondent gave to Ms. Sadilek did not contain the serial numbers of the aids, nor did it describe any of the terms and conditions of the sale or a guarantee. Ms. Sadilek returned the aids to the Respondent exactly 30 days after the purchase date because she was not satisfied with them. The Respondent did not refund her money but agreed to try to re-sell them for her. He offered her $100.00 for them, which she refused. The Respondent retained the aids and never returned them to Ms. Sadilek or paid her for them. A review of the documentation relating to the sales to both clients show them to be devoid of any information showing any improvement to the clients' hearing as a result of the hearing aids sold to them by the Respondent. A showing of improvement is required to form the basis for non-refund of amounts paid for hearing aids. The Respondent filed for bankruptcy in December 1998. The Respondent was licensed as a hearing aid specialist in Indiana in 1970 and in Florida in 1978. He has practiced in Florida for almost 20 years without any complaints being filed against him except those in issue here. The Respondent attributes most of his problems to his marriage dissolution in 1979, the settlement relating to which caused his financial problems and his bankruptcy. He claims he offered to make periodic payments to Mr. Williamson but Mr. Williamson refused that offer. The Respondent is 61 years old and presently receiving worker's compensation. Though he is not presently in the hearing aid business, he hopes to be in the future and needs to keep his license to earn a living.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists enter a final order suspending the Respondent's license for a period of six months and thereafter placing it under probation for a period of three years under such terms and conditions as may be deemed appropriate by the Board. It is also recommended that the Board impose an administrative fine of $3,000, and assess appropriate costs of investigation and prosecution. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary L. Asbell, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Mail Stop 39 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Donald Conley 3377 Southwest Villa Place Palm City, Florida 34990 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent lawfully denied Petitioner's application to sit for the September 1997 hearing aid specialists' examination.
Findings Of Fact By Application dated October 31, 1996, Petitioner requested a license as a hearing aid specialist. The 1996 application answers no to questions asking if Petitioner ever had a hearing-aid "license" disciplined or application denied by another state. The application leaves blank a question asking for the identification of the states in which the applicant is or has been "licensed" to dispense hearing aids. Based on the information contained in the 1996 application, Respondent approved the application, on November 8, 1996, so that Petitioner could take the laws and rules examination on January 10, 1997. Due to past experience, this was the only part of the examination that he was required to take in order to obtain a Florida license. Subsequently, Respondent learned that Illinois had revoked a hearing aid specialist certificate held by Petitioner. Respondent's board members discussed this issue with Petitioner at the Board Meeting of January 31, 1997. After a full discussion of he facts, the Respondent's board members decided not to deny Petitioner's 1996 application, but to issue a probationary license, if he passed the laws and rules examination. The Board's favorable decision was made in the presence of Petitioner and confirmed by letter to him dated March 12, 1997. The letter states in part: The Board met on January 31, 1997 and re- considered your application for examination and licensure as a hearing aid specialist. After discussion the Board voted to allow you to take the examination and gave approval for licensure pending a passing score on the examination. They also as a condition for licensure voted for one (1) year of probation once you become licensed and for you to [in]cur any cost involved in this issue. Although unknown by all parties at the January 31 Board Meeting, Petitioner had failed the January 10 examination, as he was informed by letter dated February 17, 1997. By Application dated June 10, 1997, Petitioner again requested a license as a hearing aid specialist. This 1997 application is the subject of the present case. The 1997 application states that Illinois had revoked his license to dispense hearing aids and, rather than providing the requested details, states, "in file." The 1997 application adds no additional information in response to the question asking whether other states have disciplined Petitioner's licenses or denied his applications to dispense hearing aids. However, by letter dated February 20, 1997, Colorado had denied Petitioner's application for a "registration" to sell hearing aids, and Petitioner had retained an attorney to contest that decision. Petitioner claims that a material distinction exists between licenses, on the one hand, and registrations or certificates, on the other hand. His contention is that Respondent's application form inquires only about licenses and not registrations or certificates. However, Petitioner understood from his past dealings with the Board that they viewed his history in Illinois as material, and the Illinois final and recommended orders revoke Petitioner's "certification," not his "license." By Order filed September 24, 1997, Respondent denied the 1997 application because of the discipline in another state, in violation of Section 484.056(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and misrepresentations in the application, in violation of Section 484.056(1)(b), Florida Statutes. By Amended Order filed August 4, 1998, Respondent added two reasons for denial. First, Petitioner was convicted of a crime related to the practice of dispensing hearing aids or the ability to practice dispensing hearing aids, in violation of Section 484.056(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Second, Petitioner did not meet the requirement of good moral character, in violation of Section 484.045(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has pleaded no contest three times to an attempt to purchase a controlled substance or possession of a controlled substance--twice in 1995 and once in 1998. Each time, the court withheld adjudication and sentenced him to probation. In December 1997, Petitioner was arrested for resisting arrest, obstructing an officer without violence, and fleeing and attempting to elude the police. He pleaded no contest and the court withheld adjudication and fined him $250.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists deny Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Joe Baker, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 E. Raymond Shope, Attorney 1404 Goodlette Road, North Naples, Florida 34102 Donna Erlich Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Kent A. Broy, committed the violations alleged in an Administrative Complaint filed with by Petitioner, the Department of Health, on April 11, 2003, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Health (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of complaints involving hearing aid specialists licensed to practice in Florida. Respondent, Kent A. Broy, is, and was at the times material to this matter, a hearing aid specialist licensed to practice in Florida, having been issued license number AS2169 on April 13, 1989.5 The Administrative Complaint. On April 11, 2003, an Administrative Complaint, DOH Case No. AS 2001-19941, was filed with the Department against Mr. Broy. Mr. Broy disputed the issues of fact alleged in the Administrative Complaint and requested a formal administrative Hearing by a Request for Formal Hearing filed with the Department on Mr. Broy's behalf by counsel. The remaining four counts of the Administrative Complaint, Counts I, II, III, and V, allege violations of subsections of Section 484.056(1), Florida Statutes: Section 484.056(1)(g) (Count I); (j) (Count II); (w) (Count III); and (m) (Count V). All four counts include the following introductory sentence: "Petitioner realleges and incorporates herein by reference the facts alleged in paragraphs 1-16 [of the Administrative Complaint]." Paragraphs 1 through 6 are general allegations which were admitted by Mr. Broy. Patient G.H. Patient G.H., who was 88 years of age at the time, visited a business known as Audibel Hearing Care Center (hereinafter referred to as "Audibel")6 and located at 1620 North U.S. Highway 1, Jupiter, Florida, on October 24, 2001, a Tuesday. G.H. was accompanied by his wife, J.H. G.H. went to Audibel to determine whether he needed hearing aids. Mr. Broy, who G.H. assumed was a licensed hearing aid specialist, assisted G.H.7 As alleged in the Administrative Complaint, G.H. agreed to purchase a pair of "in the ear" hearing aids for $6,810.00. Mr. Broy attempted to make molds of the G.H.'s ear canals so that the hearing aids G.H. had agreed to purchase could be ordered. Molding material was placed in G.H.'s ear, but when it was removed it was found to be covered with wax. Mr. Broy attempted to remove the wax from G.H.'s ear with some type of instrument. This caused pain in G.H.'s ear, so the effort was discontinued. Mr. Broy then gave G.H. some oil to use to attempt to soften the wax, and he scheduled G.H. to return the next week. In furtherance of the sale and purchase of the hearing aids, G.H. signed a Purchase Agreement. The Agreement states that G.H. was purchasing 2 "Merc CIC Dig" hearing aides at $4,200.00 each ($8,400.00 total) less a 20% discount, leaving a discounted price of $6,720.00 plus a $90.00 administration fee. The Purchase Agreement includes, in part, the following regarding return of the hearing aids: Return Policy - . . . . Purchaser may return the hearing aid(s), so long as the hearing aid(s) is returned to the seller within the 30 day trial period in good working condition. A return claim form may be obtained from the distributor at the location checked on the face of this agreement. A request for return must be submitted in writing, within 30 days. . . . . The distributor identified on the face of the Purchase Agreement was Audibel. The Purchase Agreement did not identify the guarantor for the refund. No hearings aids, however, were delivered to G.H. at the time he signed the Purchase Agreement or anytime subsequent thereto. G.H. paid the full purchase price, charging the full price to a credit card. Shortly after executing the Purchase Agreement, G.H. decided that he did not want the hearing aids8 and he returned to Audibel. He told Mr. Broy that he no longer wanted the hearing aids.9 G.H., not receiving satisfaction from Mr. Broy, ultimately challenged the amount he paid for the hearing aids with his credit card company. He was refunded the $6,810.00 charge. On January 9, 2002, Mr. Broy charged $630.00 to G.H.'s credit card. That amount has not been refunded. During the investigation of this matter, Neil Bailes, an investigator for the Agency for Health Care Administration, who had never met or spoken to Mr. Broy in person, spoke to someone whom he believed was Mr. Broy. The individual he spoke with told him that records relating to G.H.'s purchase and subsequent return of hearing aids were in G.H.'s possession, and, therefore, he could not provide those records.10
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the a final order be entered by the Board of Hearing Aid Specialist dismissing the April 11, 2003, Administrative Complaint against Kent A. Broy. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2004.
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Petitioner should receive a passing grade on the September 1997 Hearing Aid Specialist examination.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: In September 1997, Petitioner was a trainee and candidate for licensure as a hearing aid specialist, pursuant to Chapter 484, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64B6-8, Florida Administrative Code. A trainee studying hearing aid dispensing must do so under the direct supervision of a “sponsor” who is an active Florida licensed hearing aid specialist with an established place of business. Section 484.0445, Florida Statutes; Rule 64B6- 8.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner’s sponsor was Gerald Amato, a hearing aid specialist of over 20 years’ experience. Mr. Amato was a franchisee of Beltone, a manufacturer of audiometric equipment, including hearing aids and audiometers. Beltone supplied all of the equipment used by Petitioner. An “audiometer” is a piece of equipment that measures a person’s ability to hear, and is regularly used by hearing aid specialists and trainees. Petitioner testified that, shortly before he commenced his training program, Beltone converted from manual audiometers to computerized audiometers. Petitioner contends that he was placed at an unfair disadvantage because the examination proctors would not allow him to plug in his computerized audiometer for use during the examination. Petitioner argued that the older, manual audiometers provide visual cues such as dials and meters even when they are not plugged in, cues that assist the trainee to successfully complete the examination. The computerized audiometer, on the other hand, presents nothing but a blank screen when it is not plugged in. Petitioner acknowledged that no one taking the exam was allowed to plug in an audiometer. However, he contended that this was a situation in which technology had outpaced the testing procedures, and that Respondent should have made provisions for persons with computerized equipment to take the exam on an even footing with persons using manual equipment. Ms. Wilma Ferrer, a psychometrician familiar with the hearing aid specialist examination procedures, testified that candidates were informed they could not plug in their audiometers at least three times before they sat for the exam. The “Candidate Information Booklet,” sent by mail to candidates about a month before the exam, expressly states: “Each candidate is required to bring an audiometer with recorded speech and/or live voice capability to be used during the candidate’s examination. Do not plug in audiometer during examination.” During the hands-on portion of the exam, candidates demonstrate proper procedures, using the proctors as their subjects. If the audiometers were plugged in, there would be some chance of damaging the proctors’ hearing during the exam. Ms. Mary Lou Lauster, an expert regarding hearing aid specialists, testified that the purpose of the audiometer portion of the exam is to permit candidates to demonstrate they know which buttons to push to perform each audiometer function, and that they know how to properly fit the headset. Ms. Lauster conceded that some of the older audiometers provide visual cues, but stated her opinion that Petitioner would not be disadvantaged by his use of the computerized audiometer, if he knew how to run it. According to Ms. Lauster, the exam is simply an opportunity for the candidate to talk his or her way through the procedures, and it should make no difference whether the audiometer is plugged in. In other words, the candidate should not need visual cues to successfully negotiate the examination. Ms. Lauster denied the implication that the examiners and the agency itself were unprepared to deal with Petitioner’s new equipment. She testified that other candidates have used the same computerized equipment with success and without incident. At the hearing, Petitioner suggested that a better policy might be to require all candidates to be tested on a single, standard audiometer, so that no candidate could be perceived to have an unfair advantage. Ms. Lauster disagreed with this suggestion, stating that candidates are generally more comfortable using the audiometers with which they were trained. It is found that Respondent’s decision not to allow candidates to plug in their audiometers during the examination was rational and supported by legitimate concerns for the proctors’ hearing. Petitioner was given ample notice that he would not be allowed to plug in his audiometer. Other candidates using the same or similar equipment have successfully completed the examination. All candidates were treated equally in this regard, and Petitioner was not entitled to a special exemption from Respondent’s clearly stated testing policy. Respondent was well aware of the trend in the industry away from manual audiometers, and considered the existence of newer, computerized equipment in deciding to maintain its testing policy of not allowing audiometers to be plugged in during the examinations. Petitioner suggested that his equipment presented a brand new situation that Respondent had not anticipated, but this suggestion was not supported by the evidence presented at hearing. Petitioner also claimed that the proctor engaged him in unnecessary conversation regarding his audiometer, and that this conversation distracted him during the examination. Even crediting Petitioner’s version of events, this conversation cannot be found to have caused Petitioner’s poor performance on the practical portion of the examination. For reasons that cannot be attributed to Respondent, Petitioner entered the examination anticipating that he would be allowed to plug in his audiometer. The undersigned does not doubt Petitioner’s assertion that his performance on the examination was adversely affected when he was not allowed to plug in his audiometer. However, the fault lies with Petitioner, not with Respondent. Petitioner is not entitled to the award of any additional points in the practical portion of the examination. In his challenge letter, Petitioner also contested Questions 1 and 20 of the written, multiple choice portion of the examination. At hearing, Petitioner withdrew his challenge of Question 20. Each of the written questions was worth one point. Petitioner failed the examination by three points. Thus, even if it were found that he should be awarded one point for Question 1, Petitioner would not achieve a passing score. Petitioner’s challenge of Question 1 will nonetheless be addressed, to ensure a complete record in this proceeding. Question 1 referred to the effect that the addition of an “air” vent would have on an earmold. Petitioner chose the answer that it would “accentuate the low frequencies.” The correct answer was that it would “reduce the feeling of pressure in the ear canal.” Ms. Lauster testified that, while venting may accentuate frequencies, it does not necessarily relate to high or low frequencies. A vent may accentuate high or low frequencies, depending on the size of the vent. The general tendency is for a vent to enhance high frequencies. Ms. Lauster's opinion was supported by a standard textbook on hearing instrument science and fitting practices. It was undisputed that the addition of an air vent does relieve pressure in the ear canal. Thus, the best answer to Question 1 was “reduce the feeling of pressure in the ear canal.” Respondent correctly found that Petitioner’s response to Question 1 was not the best answer, and correctly denied him credit for that question. Petitioner alleged that Question 1 was of such difficulty that it should either not be counted, or his answer should be counted as correct. Respondent demonstrated that 26 out of 50 candidates answered the question correctly, thus negating Petitioner’s contention in this regard. Question 1 was properly graded as a question of medium difficulty, and is a valid and acceptable item on the examination.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Health, Board of Hearing Aid Specialists, enter a final order denying Petitioner’s challenge to the grade assigned him for the September 1997 Hearing Aid Specialist licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry L. Allman, pro se 110 St. Lucia Loop Apollo Beach, Florida 33572 Anne Marie Williamson, Esquire Florida Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building Six, Room 240 1309 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. James Howell, Secretary Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building Six, Room 306 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue presented in this case is whether Respondent, Gary Segretario, committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Gary Segretario, is and at all times material hereto was a licensed hearing aid specialist in the state of Florida, holding license number AS2321. Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Hearing Aid Specialists, is the state agency charged with the authority and duty to regulate the practice of hearing aid dispensing within the state of Florida. In June 1997, purportedly in response to increasing misconduct by various hearing aid specialists, the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists issued an emergency rule amending Rule 61G-9-6.010, Florida Administrative Code, and changing the justification for the purchaser's refund from a measured improvement in the purchaser's hearing to failure of the purchaser to obtain satisfaction from the hearing aid. In 1999, the Florida Legislature created Section 484.0512(3), Florida Statutes, and added a 30-day refund provision into the Statute when the purchaser has a valid reason as defined by the Board's Rule. On April 24, 1998, in response to a telephone solicitation, patient D.V. presented to Hearing Care 2000 in Daytona, Florida, for the purpose of a hearing examination. On that date, patient D.V. was tested by Respondent and his assistant Eric Collins, a licensed hearing aid specialist trainee. Following the testing, Respondent recommended and patient D.V. agreed to purchase a hearing aid for his left ear. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that Respondent advised patient D.V. that he would lose his hearing if he did not purchase a hearing aid. The contract provided for a 30-day refund of the hearing aid purchase. On or about April 29, 1998, Respondent received the hearing aid from the manufacturer and contacted patient D.V. An appointment for delivery of the hearing aid was scheduled for May 1, 1998. After patient D.V. missed the appointment, another appointment was scheduled for May 15, 1998. On May 15, 1998, Respondent presented the hearing aid to D.V. At the time of delivery, patient D.V. complained of feedback and Respondent immediately placed a vent plug in the hearing aid. Patient D.V. departed Respondent's office with the hearing aid in his possession on May 15, 1998. On or about May 19, 1998, patient D.V. returned to Respondent's office complaining of feedback. To cure the problem, Respondent forwarded the hearing aid to the manufacturer for a soft coat finish. Three days later on May 22, 1998, patient D.V. returned for the hearing aid, was again tested, scored 100 percent without feedback, and took possession of the aid. To ensure satisfaction, a follow-up appointment was scheduled for May 29, 1998; however, patient D.V. failed to appear. On June 29, 1998, patient D.V. entered Respondent's office and demanded a refund. Upon being denied, patient D.V. physically attacked trainee Collins, threw the hearing aid at the receptionist, and eventually departed. The evidence deduced at Hearing indicates that patient D.V. physically maintained possession of the hearing aid from May 15, 1998, through May 19, 1998, and May 22, 1998, through June 29, 1998, a total of 43 days, before requesting a refund. The following day, on June 30, 1998, Respondent's wife, Barbara Segretario, advised patient D.V. via letter that he was no longer permitted within the Daytona office. Shortly thereafter, patient D.V. contacted his credit card company and disputed the hearing aid charge apparently alleging that he never signed the credit card slip. Cathy Gionfriddo, an employee at Hearing Care 2000, forwarded a copy of patient D.V.'s signed credit card slip and signed contract to the credit card company for signature comparison. Following the lengthy dispute process, the credit card company ruled in favor of Hearing Care 2000. Thereafter, patient D.V. filed a small claims action against Respondent, wherein the small claims judge ruled in favor of patient D.V. and awarded him a $450.00 judgment. Patient D.V. received the money in April 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Hearing Aid Specialist issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary L. Asbell, Esquire Post Office Box 326 Lloyd, Florida 32337 E. Raymond Shope, II, Esquire 1404 Goodlette Road, North Naples, Florida 34102 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Reginald Dixon, Esquire Bureau of Practitioner Regulation Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Respondent was licensed as a Hearing Aid Specialist having been issued license number 0000804. During the period 1985-1986 the license of T. Ray Black was displayed on the wall at East Pasco Hearing Aid Center in Zephyrhills, Florida, but Respondent never worked at this address. East Pasco Hearing Aid Center is owned and operated by Arvina Hines whose license as a Hearing Aid Specialist was revoked circa 1981. Ms. Hines hired people to work at East Pasco Hearing Aid Center and trained them in selling and fitting hearing aids. Pamela Strife worked at the East Pasco Hearing Aid Center from 1981 until 1986 and never met Respondent nor did she ever see him at the center. She did see Raymond J. Black and Cynthia Sue Bennett, the father and sister of Respondent, working at the center. Raymond J. Black's license was revoked January 26, 1981. Arvina Hines submitted an application for training program for Hearing Aid Specialist on April 21, 1986. (Exhibit 5), in which Respondent signed the sponsor affidavit as the sponsor of Ms. Hines. He did not provide any supervision to Hines. Sheila Louise Thomas submitted as application February 25, 1985, for a training program as a Hearing Aid Specialist (Exhibit 4), on which Respondent signed as sponsor. Ms. Thomas was trained by Ms. Hines. Thomas does not recall completing the application for training, but identified her signature thereon. She has never met Respondent. Peggy Goodman worked at East Pasco Hearing Aid Center for three weeks in 1985. During the time she was employed she never saw Respondent at the center.