The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Hardin Hammock Estates (hereinafter referred to as "Hardin"), discriminated against Petitioner, Ms. Celeste Washington (hereinafter referred to as Ms. Washington), on the basis of her race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections through 760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Celeste Washington is a black adult. Hardin is a housing rental complex with 200 single- family residences. Hardin is located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Hardin provides "affordable housing" to lower-income individuals and, therefore, its residents are required to meet certain income requirements in order to be eligible for a residence at Hardin. At the times material to this proceeding, Hardin was managed by Reliance Management Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "Reliance"). At the times material to this proceeding, Salah Youssif, an employee of Reliance, acted as the property manager at Hardin. Mr. Youssif is himself black, having been born in Sudan. Ms. Washington's Charge. On or about August 29, 2002, Ms. Washington filed a Complaint with the Commission. After investigation of the Complaint, the Commission issued a Determination of No Reasonable Cause, concluding that "reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred" and dismissing the Complaint. On or about May 5, 2003, Ms. Washington filed a Petition with the Commission. Ms. Washington alleged in the Petition that Hardin had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.36, Florida Statutes. In particular, Ms. Washington alleged that Hardin had "violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, in the manner described below": Washington was told that the waiting list at Hardin Hammock Estates was closed. She visited this development twice and was told the waiting [sic] was close [sic]. At that time she viewed the wating [sic] list and the majority of the names are [sic] Hispanic. Islanders do not consider themselves as Black Americans. The "ultimate facts alleged & entitlement to relief" asserted in the Petition are as follows: Hardin Hammocks has willful [sic] and [knowingly] practice [sic] discrimination in there [sic] selection practice and a strong possibility that the same incomes for Blacks & others [sic]. Black Americans rent is [sic] higher than others living in these [sic] developments. At hearing, Ms. Washington testified that Hardin had discriminated against her when an unidentified person refused to give her an application and that she believes the refusal was based upon her race. Management of Hardin; General Anti-Discrimination Policies. The residence selection policy established by Reliance specifically precludes discrimination based upon race. A human resource manual which describes the policy has been adopted by Reliance and all employees of Reliance working at Hardin have attended a workshop conducted by Reliances' human resource manager at which the anti-discrimination policy was addressed. An explanation of the Federal Fair Housing Law of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development is prominently displayed in the public area of Hardin's offices in both English and Spanish. As of July 1, 2002, approximately 52 of Hardin's 200 units were rented to African-American families. Hardin's Application Policy. When Mr. Youssif became the property manager at Hardin, there were no vacancies and he found a disorganized, outdated waiting list of questionable accuracy. Mr. Youssif undertook the task of updating the list and organizing it. He determined that there were approximately 70 to 80 individuals or families waiting for vacancies at Hardin. Due to the rate of families moving out of Hardin, approximately one to two families a month, Mr. Youssif realized that if he maintained a waiting list of 50 individuals it would still take approximately two years for a residence to become available for all 50 individuals on the list. Mr. Youssif also realized that, over a two-year or longer period, the individuals on a waiting list of 50 or more individuals could change drastically: their incomes could change; they could find other affordable housing before a residence became available at Hardin; or they could move out of the area. Mr. Youssif decided that it would be best for Hardin and for individuals interested in finding affordable housing that Hardin would maintain a waiting list of only 50 individuals and that applications would not be given to any person, regardless of their race, while there were 50 individuals on the waiting list. Mr. Youssif instituted the new waiting list policy and applied it regardless of the race of an applicant. If there were less than 50 names on the waiting list, applications were accepted regardless of an individual's race; and if there were 50 or more names on the waiting list, no application was accepted regardless of an individual's race. Lack of Evidence of Discrimination. The only evidence Ms. Washington presented concerning her allegations of discriminatory treatment is that she is black. Although Ms. Washington was refused an application for housing at Hardin,3 the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Washington's race played any part in the decision not to give her an application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Celeste Washington's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2003.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his handicap contrary to Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2009), Fair Housing Act, as amended (the Act).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a public housing authority that administers the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Housing Choice Voucher Program, known as the “Section 8” program, within Bay County, Florida, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. Under the Section 8 program, Respondent uses funds, supplied by HUD, to pay a percentage of the monthly rent on a leased “unit” directly to the landlord. The Section 8 tenant pays the balance of the monthly rent to the landlord. The percentage paid by Respondent on each Section 8 voucher is determined by the family’s size, income, medical expenses and other similar factors. The percentage is reevaluated annually when the voucher holder is “recertified” for continuing eligibility for the Section 8 program by Respondent’s staff. As part of each recertification, the voucher holder signs a form listing “Family Obligations” required by HUD. In part, the “Family Obligations” require a Section 8 tenant to keep utilities on in the unit and to give the landlord and Respondent written notice before moving out of a unit. After Petitioner moved from New Jersey to Panama City, Florida, he received a Housing Choice Voucher from Respondent on March 23, 2005. He executed a lease for a HUD-approved unit on March 22, 2005. The lease was originally for a term of one year and then automatically became a month-to-month tenancy. Paragraph 27 of the lease requires 14-days’ written notice to terminate the lease. On June 16, 2009, Petitioner visited Respondent’s office and spoke with Andrea Lawson, the Assistant Section 8 Coordinator. She knew Petitioner from several re-certifications she had conducted on his voucher, the most recent one being on February 4, 2009. On June 16, 2009, Petitioner told Ms. Lawson that he wanted to move to be closer to friends and family, and that he and Ms. Maldonado were “bored” because there were not enough activities going on in the area. For these reasons, Petitioner wanted his Section 8 voucher transferred to Osceola County, under the "portability" provision of the Section 8 program. As was her normal custom, Ms. Lawson hand-wrote a memo for the file memorializing the conversation. Petitioner's testimony relative to the above-referenced conversation with Ms. Lawson is not credible. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner's apartment flooded in February 2009, or that he requested to have his Section 8 voucher transferred to Osceola County because he was getting sicker and the doctors in Panama City did not "understand" him. The same day as Petitioner’s visit, Ms. Lawson sent an inquiry, via telefax, to the housing authority in Osceola County, asking if they were “absorbing” Section 8 voucher holders. That term means that the receiving housing authority agrees to pay the voucher holder’s rent subsidy in the new locale, and that the original housing authority will have no further obligations to fund the voucher. The housing authority in Osceola County replied that they were not absorbing at that time. Ms. Lawson telephoned Petitioner to inform him of Osceola’s answer. In late fall of 2009, Petitioner telephoned Carol Ramer, a Section 8 Coordinator, several times. He first requested that she again ask the housing authority in Osceola County if it was absorbing, and later twice requested that she ask Orange County if it was absorbing. The replies from both authorities were that they were not absorbing. Letters mailed by Ms. Ramer to the Petitioner, to inform him of the negative replies, were returned to her as undeliverable. In early January 2010, Respondent received a letter from an attorney, on behalf of Petitioner, requesting that Respondent make a reasonable accommodation for Petitioner’s handicap by agreeing to pay the voucher subsidy for him in Osceola County. The situation where the original housing authority agrees to pay for a voucher outside its jurisdiction is referred to in the lexicon of Section 8 as “porting” or “to port”. The letter was the first time Respondent was asked to make an accommodation, or to agree to “porting” the Petitioner. The letter was also the first indication that Respondent received, indicating that Petitioner may have moved to Kissimmee in Osceola County on his own. Because of the letter, Ms. Ramer went to the unit in Parker, Florida, to see if Petitioner was still residing there. She found three United Parcel Service delivery notice stickers affixed to the front door; all three were dated in mid-August 2009. She also found no signs that the unit was occupied. Ms. Ramer then contacted the City of Parker water department and was told the water service to the unit had been shut off at the customer’s request on June 18, 2009. Petitioner and his cousin admitted during the hearing that they put the water “on-hold” before they left. Petitioner asserts that while “passing through the streets” of Kissimmee, he found several apartments that were cheaper than the rent on his unit in Parker. However, he admitted that he did not know if those cheaper units met HUD’s standards for the Section 8 program. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that he left his Section 8 unit in Parker on June 18, 2009, re-located to Kissimmee, and has never returned to Bay County. He also admitted that he never gave his landlord or Respondent any written notice that he intended to vacate his unit in Parker. In addition, he admitted he is familiar with the Section 8 Family Obligation rules and signed off that he would comply with them. In recent years, HUD has significantly cut back its Section 8 funding allotted to local housing authorities. At the same time, the downturn in the economy has increased unemployment in Bay County, thus requiring Respondent either to pay a greater percentage of existing Section 8 vouchers or to terminate some vouchers. Increased unemployment has forced Respondent to implement cost cutting measures, including the following: (a) through attrition, reducing the number of families served under the voucher program from over 420 several years ago to only 326 now; (b) issuing no new vouchers; (c) adopting a policy that it would not “absorb” voucher holders moving into Bay County and would not “port” voucher holders to jurisdictions outside Bay County. No one has been "ported" out or "absorbed" in three years. This policy applies across the board to all voucher holders. The only families who have moved out during this period and retained their vouchers are those that were “absorbed” by the receiving housing authorities. Both Osceola and Orange Counties are higher cost areas than Bay County. If Respondent were to agree to “port” a voucher to either of those counties, it would have to pay more than it pays for one family in Bay County, thus reducing its ability to serve as many local residents as possible with its limited funding. Petitioner presented no evidence of quantifiable damages.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Adalberto Diaz 2307 Boggy Creek Road, Box 38 Kissimmee, Florida 34744 William C. Henry, Esquire Burke Blue Hutchison Walters & Smith, P.A. 16215 Panama City Beach Parkway Panama City, Florida 32413 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Hernando County Housing Authority (Respondent) unlawfully engaged in a discriminatory housing practice against Peggy Troiano (Petitioner) on the basis of her disability by refusing to provide Section 8 funding for a housing unit being occupied by Petitioner and the housing unit's owner, Petitioner’s daughter, Julia Williams.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner was an individual participant in a tenant-based voucher arrangement under the Section 8 Housing Program funded by HUD and administered by Respondent. Petitioner is an individual claiming that she is disabled because of a toxic injury that requires her to live isolated in a non-toxic environment. Respondent does not contest Petitioner’s claim of disability and it is, therefore, found that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of applicable law. Julia Williams is Petitioner’s daughter who, at all relevant times, owned the house located at 15141 Pomp Parkway, Weeki Wachee, Hernando County, Florida (“15141 Pomp Parkway unit”). Ms. Williams is specially trained to deal with toxic injury and is paid through a federally-funded, consumer-directed program to provide assistance to Petitioner. Respondent is a public housing agency that administers the Section 8 Housing Program as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which recodified the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. As a recipient of funding from HUD for its Section 8 Program, Respondent is required to comply with HUD Section 8 regulations, as well as all Federal, State, and local fair housing laws and regulations. In order to receive funding from HUD, Respondent is required to sign an annual contributions contract (ACC) wherein it agrees to follow the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). If Respondent does not follow the C.F.R. or HUD’s guidelines, HUD has the right to terminate Respondent’s Section 8 program funding. In addition, HUD could make Respondent repay any funding used for ineligible housing. On March 17, 2014, during the annual reexamination for her Section 8 voucher, Petitioner signed, under the penalty of perjury, a summary report which identified her as the only household member permitted to live in any unit under her Section 8 voucher. Around the time of the annual reexamination, Petitioner was living at a unit on Philatelic Drive with plans to move into and rent a unit at 15141 Pomp Parkway. The Pomp Parkway unit was owned, but not being occupied, by Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams. In April of 2014, Petitioner asked Respondent for permission to rent the unit from her daughter. Petitioner and her daughter spoke with Respondent’s officials about her request. Generally, a public housing agency, such as Respondent, cannot approve a unit for participation in the Section 8 program if it is owned by a parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, sister, or brother of any member of the participant’s family. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.306. Respondent, however, ultimately approved Petitioner’s rental of the Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 program, even though it was owned by Petitioner’s daughter, pursuant to a limited exception under 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d), which provides an express exception to the rule if “the [public housing agency] determines that approving the unit would provide reasonable accommodation for a family member who is a person with disabilities.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d). Also, during April of 2014, Petitioner and Ms. Williams were working on constructing a caregiver suite for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit and had discussions with Respondent’s staff about it. There are documents purportedly created during this time frame summarizing several conversations between Respondent, Petitioner, and Ms. Williams. The documents state that Respondent’s officials had a conversation with Petitioner and her daughter wherein they discussed the requirements for a live- in aide and that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that Ms. Williams could never live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Respondent also contends that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that, even if Ms. Williams was approved as a live-in aide, Ms. Williams could not live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On the other hand, Petitioner contends that the alleged conversations warning her that her daughter could not reside in the home did not occur during this time frame, and that she and her daughter continued to renovate the house to specifications suitable to accommodate Petitioner's disability with the expectation that her daughter would ultimately be able to reside in the home after renovations were complete. Upon consideration of the credibility of the witnesses and timing of the purported documents, the undersigned finds that the testimony and documents regarding these alleged April conversations are unreliable and do not support a finding that the conversations and warnings actually occurred during the April time frame. The evidence is also insufficient to support Petitioner's contention that Respondent was somehow responsible for Petitioner's expectation that her daughter would be able to both act as Petitioner's caregiver and live in the home while Petitioner was receiving rent vouchers under the Section 8 program. Petitioner was the only person that Respondent approved to live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under her Section 8 voucher. In May of 2014, Petitioner’s daughter entered into a one-year residential lease with Petitioner and a Housing Assistance Payment Contract (HAP Contract) with Respondent. According to the HAP Contract, Petitioner was the only person able to reside in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without the express, written consent of Respondent. At the time the HAP Contract was signed, Petitioner advised Respondent that she would be the only person living in the unit. Ms. Williams, as the landlord, signed a check cashing agreement with Respondent wherein she agreed Petitioner would be the only person occupying the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Also, Petitioner’s income verification summary report provides that Petitioner is the only person allowed to live in a unit covered by her Section 8 voucher. In early May of 2014, Ms. Williams moved into the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without notice to Respondent. Petitioner has never received written approval from Respondent to have Ms. Williams live and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 voucher program. By letter dated June 17, 2014, Petitioner submitted an HCHA Live-in Aide Request Verification Form, along with letters from her doctor. Petitioner also requested that her daughter Julia Williams serve as her live-in aide. Approval for a live-in aide is a different process than the approval process to have someone added to the household. While Petitioner's request for a live-in aide stated that Petitioner was living at 15141 Pomp Parkway, it did not mention that Petitioner's daughter was the owner of the dwelling, nor did it include a specific request that Ms. Williams be allowed to move into and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that she owned. Upon receipt of the written request for a live-in aide by Petitioner, Respondent began its investigation to determine whether Petitioner met the qualifications for a live-in aide and whether Ms. Williams met the qualifications to serve as a live- in aide. Respondent has implemented 24 C.F.R. § 5.403 into its written policy regarding live-in aides, which provides: LIVE-IN ATTENDANTS A family may include a live-in aide provided that such live-in aide: Is determined by the [public housing agency] to be essential to the care and well-being of an elderly person, a nearly-elderly person, or a person with disabilities, Is not obligated for the support of the person(s), and Would not be living in the unit except to provide care for the person(s). Under the C.F.R., a public housing agency is required to approve a live-in aide, if needed, as a reasonable accommodation for an elderly or disabled person. 24 C.F.R. § 982.316 (“The PHA must approve a live-in-aide if needed as a reasonable accommodation” to a family with an elderly or disabled person.). By letter dated June 27, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner of the approval of her request for her daughter to serve as her live-in aide. Although Respondent was aware that a home occupied by an owner was not eligible for a Section 8 voucher at the time it gave its permission for Petitioner's daughter to serve as Petitioner's live-in aide, the letter did not speak to that issue. Rather, the June 27, 2014, letter, signed by Donald Singer, stated: Pursuant to your letter dated June 17, 2014 requesting a reasonable accommodation for a live in aide. Your letter also ask [sic] that the live in aide be your daughter, Julia Williams based upon her qualifications as presented. After reviewing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) regulations for Live-in Aides and the Housing Authority's Section 8 Program Administrative Plan for Live in Aides our office has determined that your daughter, Julia Williams meets the program qualification(s) to act as your Live in Aide. Therefore our office is approving Julia E. Williams as your Live in Aide effective immediately. Should you have any questions regarding this action/letter please contact our office at 352-754-4160. By email on August 11, 2014, Petitioner notified Mr. Singer that she and her live-in aide, Julia Williams, intended to live at the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On August 11, 2014, Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams was still the owner of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Under 24 C.F.R. § 892.352, a unit being occupied by its owner is deemed “ineligible” and a public housing agency is prohibited from providing funding for such unit. The C.F.R. provides a limited exception for shared housing that allows an owner to occupy a unit funded by Section 8. Under that limited exception, however, the Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. 24 C.F.R. § 982.615(b)(3). Based upon the prohibition under the C.F.R. which forbids a public housing agency from funding a unit occupied by an owner who is a blood relative of the Section 8 participant, by letters dated August 22, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner and Ms. Williams that the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was “ineligible housing” that could not be funded. The letters also informed Petitioner that Julia Williams' approval as a live-in aide did not supersede HUD regulations and that, because Julia Williams was occupying the unit, Respondent was terminating the HAP contract effective September 30, 2014. The only reason Respondent terminated the funding for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was because the C.F.R. does not allow Respondent to continue funding a unit occupied by its owner. Prior to the August 22nd letters, Respondent was advised by HUD that Respondent did not have any discretion in funding “ineligible housing.” HUD approved the draft of the August 22nd letters. The evidence does not support a finding that either Respondent or HUD waived or should otherwise be prevented from applying the limitations and requirements of the law that a Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. Respondent would have been willing to continue Petitioner’s housing assistance as long as Petitioner met program requirements and the housing was deemed eligible housing under the C.F.R. through the issuance of a new three-bedroom voucher for a different unit, or by having Petitioner live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without Ms. Williams both owning and occupying the unit. By letter dated August 27, 2014, Respondent provided Petitioner with a new Section 8 voucher and voucher packet information so that Petitioner could start searching for a new rental unit where Ms. Williams could continue to serve as Petitioner’s live-in aide under Petitioner’s Section 8 voucher. The new voucher was required to be returned to Respondent by September 30, 2014. There was no testimony that Petitioner returned the new Section 8 voucher to Respondent by September 30, 2014, or that Ms. Williams moved out of 15141 Pomp Parkway by that date. On September 4, 2014, before the funding was terminated for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit, Petitioner filed a complaint for discrimination. Petitioner emailed a signed three-bedroom voucher on October 30, 2014, a month after funding under the new voucher expired, for the rental of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that had already been deemed ineligible housing as defined by 24 C.F.R. § 982.316. That voucher is not valid and the facts fail to support a finding that Respondent’s refusal to allow Petitioner to participate in the Section 8 voucher program while occupying a unit owned and occupied by her daughter was because of Petitioner’s disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED the 22nd day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated the Fair Housing Act, Section 760.20, et seq., Florida Statutes (2009), by denying Petitioner housing based on his mental disabilities.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Luis Bermudez, filed a complaint against Respondent, Lake County Housing Authority, citing allegations of discrimination. Respondent denies the allegations of discrimination. The Florida Commission on Human Relations, upon review of Petitioner's complaint, entered a Notice of Determination of No Cause.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations upholding its Determination of No Cause and dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sarah Rissman Taitt, Esquire Lake County Housing Authority Post Office Box 7800 Tavares, Florida 32778 Luis Bermudez 7637 Dive Cote Drive Orlando, Florida 32818 Stacey M. Kleinfeld Lake County Housing Authority Post Office Box 7800 Tavares, Florida 32778
The Issue Whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“the Commission”) has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Commission conducted an investigation of GHA’s allegations. That investigation determined that GHA had not been acting as Ms. Duff’s attorney and that the assistance provided to Ms. Duff was mostly clerical in nature. The investigation also determined that GHA suffered no harm related to housing. As a result, the Commission determined that it had no jurisdiction over GHA’s claim. On November 18, 2016, the Commission issued a “Notice of Determination of No Jurisdiction.” In addition to notifying GHA of its decision, the Commission advised GHA that it could challenge its determination by requesting an administrative hearing. GHA filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission on January 30, 2017, and took issue with the Commission’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction over this matter. With regard to the Commission’s determination that GHA was not Ms. Duff’s attorney, GHA stated the following: Patrick Coleman did admit that he was not an attorney, however Patrick Coleman confirmed on several occasions that he and GHA have in fact been Ms. Kelly Duff’s representative by means of a Power of Attorney since May 11, 2016. Please see the attached Power of Attorney signed by Ms. Duff. Patrick Coleman of GHA admitted to not performing traditional phone testing or in person testing at the respondent[‘s] property – that is correct. However, GHA has stated that their Testing Investigation process included an investigation of the respondent’s housing process, including: the Concord Rental Agreement, the Service Animal Addendum, an in depth review of the Concord Rents website and their published documents, and a review of the Reserve at Brookhaven website followed by a review of their published materials. It was GHA’s investigation, recovery, and scrutiny of the Service Animal Responsibility Addendum that uncovered the potentially discriminatory language which prompted an inquiry regarding the Respondent’s policy addressing assistance animals in the pool area. As for the Commission’s determination that GHA’s assistance to Ms. Duff was mostly clerical in nature, GHA stated that it assisted Ms. Duff with protecting her “Fair Housing Rights” in the following ways: (1) interviewed Ms. Duff in order to verify that she was a bona fide victim of discrimination; (2) provided Ms. Duff with fair housing education via a webinar; (3) wrote two reasonable accommodation requests for Ms. Duff; (4) worked with Ms. Duff’s physician in order to draft a letter describing Ms. Duff’s disability and her need for an assistance animal; (5) wrote, reviewed, and approved all written communications from Ms. Duff to Respondent; (6) interviewed Ms. Duff’s employer; (7) wrote and filed Ms. Duff’s fair housing complaint; and (8) represented Ms. Duff during every phone interview conducted by the Commission. The Commission referred the instant case to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) on January 30, 2017. On February 14, 2017, the undersigned sua sponte issued an “Order to Show Cause” requiring GHA to “show cause on or before March 1, 2017, why the instant case should not be dismissed based on a lack of standing.” GHA did not file any response to the Order to Show Cause.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Gratus Housing Advocates’ Petition for Relief due to a lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Patrick Coleman Gratus Housing Advocates, Inc. 3513 Provine Road Mckinney, Texas 75070 Brookhaven Development Land LTD Suite 101 700 West Morse Boulevard Winter Park, Florida 32789 Andrew Kemp-Gerstel, Partner 44 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Nidia Cruz, was subjected to discriminatory acts and/or interference with her exercise or enjoyment of fair housing rights as alleged in her Petition for Relief.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Nidia Cruz, after notice, failed to appear at the final hearing. Respondent, Tabitha B. Legg, appeared at the final hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Nidia Cruz. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nidia Cruz 45 Emanuel Road, Lot 3 Brunswick, Georgia 31525 Tabitha B. Legg 6445 Addax Avenue Cocoa, Florida 32927 Nidia Cruz 145 Emanuel Road, Lot 3 Brunswick, Georgia 31525 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether respondent committed a violation of the Fair Housing Act as alleged in the petition for relief filed on August 21, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Melanie A. Hils, resides in Jacksonville, Florida. She is disabled by virtue of “birth defects in (her) legs,” and she receives a monthly disability check from the Social Security Administration, her sole income. Respondent, Advantage Property Management, Inc., is a Subchapter S corporation owned by Vernon L. Dean and is engaged in the business of managing residential rental properties in Jacksonville, Florida. In this case, petitioner contends that respondent, through the actions of its owner, violated the Fair Housing Act while she was a tenant in a property managed by respondent. Respondent denies the allegation. A preliminary investigation by the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) resulted in a Determination of No Reasonable Cause. The facts underlying this controversy are not lengthy but they are sharply in dispute. Petitioner first met Dean in March 1993 when she executed a lease agreement with him to rent an apartment at 1614 LaRue Avenue. She stayed in that apartment until April 30, 1994, when she moved into her husband’s mobile home. On June 8, 1995, petitioner signed a one-year lease with respondent to rent a one-bedroom apartment located at 2905 Downing Street. She agreed to pay $285.00 per month, including water. Shortly after she moved into the apartment, the hot water heater became inoperative, and petitioner called respondent’s office manager, Barbara, to request that a repair be made. The water heater was repaired by a local plumbing service on June 20, 1995. In her petition for relief, petitioner alleged that Dean made four unannounced visits to her apartment between June 12 and July 5, 1995. At hearing, however, she claimed that, without notice or invitation, he visited her on five occasions between the same dates, and they spoke for approximately thirty minutes each time. Petitioner says that respondent visited her to see if she “got moved in okay,” say “hello,” check the breaker on the water heater, “see if (her) hot water heater had been fixed,” and on the last visit, to “pick up her rent check” for July. On each of those occasions, she says they discussed a variety of subjects, ranging from music to boating, but nothing offensive or of a sexual nature. Except for a visit to check the water heater breaker, respondent denies that he ever visited the apartment. Assuming, however, that these visits occurred as described, they still did not constitute sexual harassment or rise to a level of being so pervasive or severe as to alter the terms, conditions or privilege of her tenacy. Petitioner also says that respondent, while in an excited state and breathing irregularly, telephoned her early one Sunday morning suggesting that she ”have sex with him.” Respondent denies that such a call ever occurred, and his testimony is accepted on this issue. On July 5, petitioner says respondent appeared at her front door and asked for the July rent check. She described him as having “a very angry look on his face.” Petitioner’s contention that respondent followed her into the bedroom when she was writing a rent check and “took (her) glasses off,” but nothing more, is not deemed to be credible. Indeed, petitioner did not even allege this occurred in her complaints filed with HUD and the Commission. On August 29, 1995, petitioner gave respondent thirty days’ notice on her lease. She did so after receiving a telephone call from an unidentified person who said nothing but played a song with lyrics which “frightened” her. There is no evidence that respondent was the person who made the call. Although she remained in the apartment until at least the end of September, petitioner acknowledged that Dean never returned to the apartment after July 5. Given the totality of the circumstances, it is found that a hostile housing environment based on sexual harassment did not occur. Accepting petitioner’s allegation that respondent made five unwelcome visits to her apartment, such visits were not so severe or pervasive as to alter the terms, conditions or privilege of petitioner’s tenency. Petitioner has requested quantifiable damages, fees and costs occasioned by her leaving respondent’s apartment. When she gave thirty days notice before the expiration of her lease, she lost her $200.00 deposit. She also incurred moving expenses of $150.00. She then signed a seven-month lease on an apartment on Oak Street for $260.00 per month, but later found it unsatisfactory because of foul odors and repairs which were never fixed by the landlord. When she terminated that lease before its expiration, she lost her $260.00 security deposit. On December 5, 1995, she moved into the Kings Inn at Regency, a motel, for which she paid a weekly rent of approximately $161.50. She departed the motel on July 8, 1996, and moved into an apartment in the Riverside area, where she has lived since July 1996. Petitioner asks for the difference between the rent paid at Downing Street and the higher rents she has paid since that time, plus any lost security deposits. In addition, she has incurred costs to pursue this action, including fees for a deposition and transcript. She has also asked for the payment of a “civil penalty” to the Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., which represented her in this action, and for damages for the “emotional distress suffered due to Respondent’s sexual harassment.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying the petition for relief.DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 COPIES FURNISHED: Migdalia Figueroa, Esquire 126 West Adams Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Vernon Dean Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 1997. Advantage Property Management, Inc. 1974 Fulton Place Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent Perry Carrell ("Respondent") failed to provide reasonable accommodations for Petitioner Jean Rath’s ("Petitioner") disability and discriminated against Petitioner because of her disability in violation of Florida’s Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief that is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact In 2005, Respondent purchased condominium unit 604 in Tiara Towers, located at 3120 North Highway A1A, Fort Pierce, Florida 34949. Respondent purchased the condominium unit as his primary residence. In 2013, Respondent decided to rent the unit to Petitioner. In May 2013, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a written residential lease agreement for Petitioner to lease the premises from Respondent from July 1, 2013, to June 30, 2015. Pursuant to the lease, Petitioner was obligated to pay monthly rent to Respondent in the amount of $1,850.00. Petitioner’s tenancy was subject to the rules and regulations of the condominium association. The association’s rules do not allow for tenants to have pets. In addition, the association requires all leases be in writing. The written lease between Petitioner and Respondent expired on June 30, 2015. A properly executed second written lease was never executed by Petitioner and submitted to the association. Nevertheless, Petitioner continued residing at the premises on a month-to-month basis. Petitioner is disabled and requires a service animal because of her disability. Over the course of the tenancy, the association became concerned about Petitioner’s violation of its rules, including the lack of documentation of Petitioner’s dog as a service animal, and the lack of a new written lease after the initial lease expired on June 30, 2015. In an effort to assist Petitioner in keeping the dog, Respondent gathered information to demonstrate the qualifications of Petitioner’s dog as a service animal and provided the documentation to the association on Petitioner’s behalf. Based on the lack of a new written lease and the absence of sufficient documentation as to the service animal, the association fined Respondent $2,000.00. Respondent provided Petitioner with a termination of lease and demand to vacate notice on May 28, 2016. The notice of termination was based on the fines by the association against Respondent for not having a timely signed lease in place, and the association’s belief that sufficient documentation had not been presented to support the dog as a service animal. Petitioner vacated the unit on or about July 1, 2017. Respondent did not re-lease the unit and sold the unit on March 22, 2017. During the appeal process, the fine of $1,000.00 related to the service animal was rescinded by the association. Respondent paid the $1,000.00 fine related to the lack of a written lease, and has not requested reimbursement from Petitioner. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged Respondent did not discriminate against her on the basis of her disability, and that Respondent advocated to the association on her behalf. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that Respondent did not fail to reasonably accommodate Petitioner’s disability or discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of her disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Jean Rath 422 Southeast Naranja Avenue Port St. Lucie, Florida 34983 Glenn J. Webber, Esquire Glenn J. Webber, P.A. 101 Southeast Ocean Boulevard, Suite 203 Stuart, Florida 34994 (eServed) Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
