The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed all lines adjuster, committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is a licensing and regulatory agency of the State of Florida charged with, among other duties, the responsibility and duty to enforce the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, which consists of Chapters 624-632, 634, 635, 641, 642, 648, and 651, Florida Statutes (2002). See § 624.307(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). Respondent has been continuously licensed in the State of Florida as an independent all lines adjuster authorized to transact insurance adjusting business since August 1986. On January 1, 1999, at approximately 11:55 p.m., Respondent was driving his Ford Bronco in Tampa, Florida. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Deputy White noticed that Respondent's license tag appeared to be expired. He followed Respondent for about a quarter of a mile, while he ran Respondent's tag number through the computer to determine whether it was, in fact, expired. Upon receiving an affirmative response, Deputy White pulled over Respondent's vehicle. Reserve Deputy McLaughlin was riding with Deputy White. Deputy McLaughlin approached Respondent's car and immediately detected a strong odor of burning marijuana. Deputy White then approached the car and confirmed the smell of marijuana smoke. The deputies asked Respondent for permission to search his vehicle. According to both deputies, Respondent not only gave them permission to search his car, but told them where they could find the marijuana, which was inside a black travel bag on the back seat of the car. Both deputies testified that Respondent told them he had received the marijuana as a Christmas gift. Respondent was arrested for possession of more than 20 grams of cannabis, a third-degree felony pursuant to Subsection 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1998). At the hearing, Respondent testified that the black travel bag containing the marijuana belonged to an acquaintance to whom he had earlier given a ride. Respondent testified that he did not know the marijuana was in the car until the deputies found it and denied having told the deputies where to find it or that it was a Christmas gift. Respondent's testimony on these points was not credible. On or about February 12, 1999, a one-count information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, charging Respondent with possession of cannabis in violation of Subsection 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1998), a third-degree felony. On September 30, 2002, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge, which was accepted. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Respondent was placed on probation for a period of six months and ordered to perform 50 hours of community service. Respondent successfully completed his probation, and an order terminating probation was entered on February 5, 2003. After Respondent's arrest, but before the disposition of his case, the Department received an unrelated complaint concerning the manner in which Respondent was handling claims. Ms. Raulerson, a Department investigator, performed an investigation. She discovered that the Department did not have a current resident address for Respondent and obtained the correct address through Respondent's father. On January 3, 2002, Ms. Raulerson issued a letter of guidance to Respondent regarding the subject matter of the investigation. Ms. Raulerson's letter also reminded Respondent of his obligation to notify the Department of changes in his principal business, residence, and mailing addresses. She enclosed a copy of the appropriate form on which to notify the Department of address changes. During her investigation of Respondent's claims handling, Ms. Raulerson had a telephone conversation with Respondent. Ms. Raulerson mentioned that, unrelated to her investigation, the Department had received information indicating that Respondent had been charged with a felony. Respondent told Ms. Raulerson that the charge had been dismissed. Ms. Raulerson responded that if the charges had been dismissed, Respondent would be prudent to forward the paperwork to the Department so that its records could be corrected. In October 2002, Mr. Wilds, a Department investigator, was assigned to investigate whether Respondent had been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to a felony, and had failed to notify the Department of his conviction or plea. Mr. Wilds was unable to contact Respondent at the addresses in the Department's files, which indicated that Respondent did not take the advice in Ms. Raulerson's letter of guidance. Mr. Wilds added the failure to notify the Department of his address change to his investigator. Mr. Wilds contacted the Hillsborough County Circuit Court to request documentation regarding the outcome of Respondent's criminal case. In response, the Hillsborough County clerk's office provided Mr. Wilds with certified documents indicating that Respondent had pled nolo contendere and been placed on probation. Mr. Wilds next contacted the Department of Corrections to obtain information on Respondent's probationary status. By letter dated December 6, 2002, Respondent's probation officer, Robert Hughey, confirmed that Respondent was serving a probationary period of six months, commencing September 30, 2002, and scheduled to terminate on March 29, 2003. Subsection 626.621(11), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that the following constitutes grounds for the discretionary discipline of an agent's licensure: (11) Failure to inform the department or office in writing within 30 days after pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being convicted or found guilty of, any felony or a crime punishable by imprisonment of 1 year or more under the law of the United States or of any state thereof, or under the law of any other country without regard to whether a judgment of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of the case. Respondent failed to report to the Department, within 30 days of doing so, that he entered a plea of nolo contendere to a third-degree felony charge of possession of cannabis on September 30, 2002. Respondent testified that he did not inform the Department of his plea of nolo contendere to a felony because Mr. Hughey assured him that he had already notified the Department. The evidence establishes that Mr. Hughey contacted the Department only after Mr. Wilds requested information as to Respondent's probationary status and that this occurred more than 30 days after Respondent entered his plea. However, Respondent's reliance on Mr. Hughey militates against a finding that Respondent's failure to notify the Department was willful. As to the failure to notify the Department of his address changes, Respondent testified that he has always relied on his employers to notify the Department of his address when appointment papers are filed on his behalf and that there was never a problem until these investigations commenced. While Respondent's reliance on his employers does not absolve him of the personal responsibility envisioned by Section 626.551, Florida Statutes (2002), it does militate against a finding that Respondent's failure to notify the Department of his address changes was willful. Respondent's insurance license has not been previously disciplined in the State of Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2002), as alleged in Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint; guilty of violating Subsection 626.621(11), Florida Statutes (2002), as alleged in Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint; and guilty of violating Section 626.551, Florida Statutes (2002), as alleged in Count III of the Amended Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's licensure as an all lines adjuster be suspended for three months for the violation of Count I, for three months for the violation of Count II, and for two months for the violation of Count III, with the suspensions for Counts II and III to run concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2004.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint issued against him, as modified at hearing, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, including the parties' prehearing stipulation filed October 21, 2004, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October 17, 1988, licensed as an insurance representative in the State of Florida holding 02-16, 02-18, and 02-40 licenses. His licensure identification number is A268617. In 2001, criminal charges were filed against Respondent in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01-2309/B. On or about February 20, 2002, Respondent submitted, in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01-2309/B, a verified Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty, which read as follows: My name is Robert Trueblood and I acknowledge that I am the Defendant charged in the above-styled criminal case[]. I am represented by a lawyer, Arthur L. Wallace, III. I wish to withdraw my plea of not guilty and plead guilty to: Count 2 - Sale of Unregistered Security and Count 3 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent. I understand that each of these counts is a third degree felony and each is punishable by up to five (5) years in the Department of Corrections and a $5,000.00 fine. I have told my lawyer all the facts and circumstances about the charges against me. I believe that my lawyer is fully informed on all such matters. My lawyer has counseled and advised me on the nature of each charge; on any and all lesser included charges; on all possible defenses that I might have in this cause; and all the penalties that might be imposed if convicted.[1] I understand that I may plead not guilty to any offense charged against me. If I choose to plead not guilty, the Constitution guarantees me the right to maintain that plea and (a) the right to a speedy and public trial by jury; (b) the right to see, hear and face in open Court all witnesses called to testify against me and to cross- examine said witnesses; (c) the right to use the power and process of the Court to compel the production of any evidence, including the attendance of any witnesses in my favor; (d) the right to have the assistance of a lawyer at all stages of the proceedings and to have one appointed for me if necessary; and (e) also the right to take the witness stand at my sole option; and if I do not take the witness stand I understand the jury, at my request, will be told that this may not be held against me. I also understand that by pleading guilty and admitting the truth of the charges against me, I am waiving all of the rights referred to in the above paragraph and the Court may impose the same punishment as if I had ple[]d not guilty, stood trial and been convicted. I know that if I plead guilty there will be no further trial of any kind, which means that by pleading guilty I waive my right to trial. I understand that some of the charges filed against me in this case may have occurred in whole or in part in Florida Counties other than Orange. However, I wish to resolve, in Orange County, all the charges filed in case number CR 01-2309 and do affirmatively waive my right to venue in other counties where the crimes may have occurred. I am 55 years of age. I have gone to school up to and including 5 y[ea]rs [of] college. I am not under the influence of any alcoholic beverage, drug or medicine at the time I sign this plea agreement. My physical and mental health is presently satisfactory. No one has made any promise, assurance or guarantee to me that I would receive any consideration in exchange for pleading guilty other than as set out in this plea agreement. I declare that no one has subjected me to any force, duress, threats, intimidation or pressure to compel or induce me to enter a plea of guilty. I am entering this plea with the understanding that I may serve every day of the sentence I am agreeing to in this plea agreement. Although I may have received advice or opinions as to the potential for some type of early release, I hereby acknowledge under oath that I have not relied upon those opinions or that advice as an inducement to enter this plea. I believe that my lawyer has done all that a competent attorney could to counsel and assist me. He has answered all my questions about this case to my satisfaction and I AM SATISFIED WITH THE ADVICE AND HELP HE HAS GIVEN ME. I understand that if I am not a United States citizen, this criminal proceeding could cause me to be deported to the country of my origin. I understand that if I fail to pay any fines or costs as ordered by the Court, there will be a lien placed against me. I understand that I waive my right to appeal any rulings of the Court previously made in this case except as specifically stated herein. I understand that I have the right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the Court within thirty (30) days from the date of sentence. I understand that any appeal must be in writing. I understand that if I wish to take an appeal and cannot afford an attorney to help in my appeal, the Court will appoint an attorney to represent me for that purpose. I request the Court to accept my plea, knowing that upon it being accepted by the Court that nothing will remain to be done except for the Court to enter its judgment and sentence. I offer my plea freely and voluntarily and of my own accord and with full understanding of all matters set forth in the Information and in this Petition, the Certificate of my lawyer and Plea Agreement which are contained herein. Though I may have been assisted by my lawyer, I certify that the statement and representations herein above made are my own and have not been suggested directly or indirectly by him or anyone else, and that the decision to plead guilty was made by me. I further represent that my attorney has advised me of considerations bearing on the choice of which plea to enter and the pros and cons of such plea, the likely results thereof as well as any possible alternative which may be open to me. I represent to the Court that the plea bargain attached hereto was negotiated by my attorney with my full and complete consent thereto and that the decision to plead guilty was made by me. I fully concur in the efforts of my attorney and agree to the terms of the bargained plea. The Plea Agreement between Respondent and the prosecutor (which was referenced in Respondent's Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty) read as follows: The Defendant, and the State, pursuant to the provisions of Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.171, agree and stipulate to recommend to the Court the following resolution of the above- styled case: Defendant agrees to plead guilty as charged to Count 2 - Sale of Unregistered Security and Count 3 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent. The State will stand silent as to the issue of adjudication. The Defendant shall be sentenced to five (5) years of supervised probation with all standard conditions, as well as the following special conditions: The Defendant shall testify truthfully when requested by the State, without the necessity of subpoena, in reference to any and all matters related to the facts and circumstances surrounding the Defendant's charges in this case. The Defendant shall pay restitution in an amount to be determined. The Defendant agrees the amount of restitution owed is not limited to the transactions to which he is entering this plea. Defendant shall pay court costs as directed by the Court. Defendant shall be required to pay $3,5000.00 for costs of prosecution to the Office of Statewide Prosecution, Department of Legal Affairs for the State of Florida. The Defendant shall pay $500.00 to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and $500.00 to the Office of Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance for costs of investigation involved in this case. The Defendant shall have no contact, directly or indirectly, with any of the witnesses in this case. [4]. If the Defendant violates any law while awaiting sentencing or if he fails to appear for sentencing as ordered by the Court, the State shall not be bound by this agreement and may recommend any lawful sentence and the Court may impose any sentence permissible under the law. The Defendant shall not be entitled to withdraw his plea of guilty in this case. [5]. The State agrees to nolle prosequi Count 4 - Sale of Unregistered Security, Count 5 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent, Count 6 - Sale of Unregistered Security, and Count 7 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent. [6]. If the sentence agreed upon in this plea agreement is a departure from the sentencing guidelines, both the State of Florida and the Defendant agree not to appeal this sentence. [7]. Should the Defendant violate his community control or probation, he affirmatively agrees that he shall be sentenced pursuant to the sentencing guidelines. [8]. The Defendant affirmatively agrees not to request that the Court impose a sentence lower than the sentence outlined above. [9]. Both the State and the Defendant understand that the trial judge has the ultimate responsibility for the sentence the defendant actually receives and that the recommendations made above are not binding on the trial judge unless adopted thereby. The Defendant shall not be entitled to withdraw his pleas of guilty in the event that the trial judge imposes a sentence different from that recommended above. On February 20, 2002, after Respondent entered his guilty pleas in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01- 2309/B to Count 2 (alleging the "Sale of Unregistered Security," in violation of Section 517.07, Florida Statutes) and Count 3 (alleging the "Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent," in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes), the court accepted the pleas, withheld adjudication, and placed Respondent on two concurrent five-year terms of probation, with the special condition that he "serve 1 Day[] in the Orange County Jail, with 1 Day[]'s credit for time served." Other special conditions, including those described in the Plea Agreement set out above, were also imposed.2 Respondent failed to notify Petitioner in writing within 30 days after entering his guilty pleas in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01-2309/B that he had entered the pleas. Respondent has previously been disciplined by Petitioner's predecessor, the Department of Insurance (DOI). By Consent Order issued November 1, 2000, in DOI Case No. 31036-00-AG, Respondent was suspended for a period of three months. The Consent Order approved the parties' Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * The Department has caused to be made an investigation of the Respondent and other individuals involved in the marketing and promotion of Legends Sports, Inc. As a result of that investigation, the Department alleges that the Respondent induced individuals to invest in Legends Sports, Inc. and represented that the investment was guaranteed by a surety insurer. However, the investment was not a good investment, the purported surety insurer did not exist or was not authorized to conduct business in this state, and the investment resulted in substantial losses to individual investors. The investigation resulted in a multi- count criminal information (hereinafter referred to as the "criminal actions") being filed against Respondent and other Legends Sports agents in the Seminole County Circuit Court in Sanford, Florida, Case No. 98- 4569CFW. Specifically, Respondent was charged with the following felonies: sale of unregistered securities, sale of securities by an unregistered dealer and unlawful transaction of insurance. Respondent has entered or will enter a plea of guilty to lesser included charges which are first degree misdemeanors. As a result of the plea, the Court in the criminal action, among other things, placed the Respondent on probation. As a condition of probation, the Court ordered the Respondent to pay restitution to the individuals who invested in Legends Sports through the Respondent and suffered financial losses as a direct consequence of such investments. The restitution amount represents the commissions received by the Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the "restitution order in the criminal action"). The Court in the criminal action also ordered that a criminal restitution judgment, that is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, be entered for the full amount of the promissory notes sold by the Respondent, unless a judgment has already been entered in that amount in favor of the Receiver for Legends Sports. Respondent denies knowingly misrepresenting the Legends Sports investment. * * * 13. This Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order is subject to the approval of the Insurance Commissioner. Upon his approval, and without further notice, the Insurance Commissioner may issue a Consent Order providing for the following: Incorporation by reference of the terms and conditions of this Settlement Stipulation For Consent Order. Respondent's licensure and eligibility for licensure as an insurance agent within the state are SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months pursuant to section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes. The suspension shall take effect on 11/1/2000. * * * Approximately a year earlier, by Consent Order issued July 12, 1999, in DOI Case No. 99-CE58350, Respondent was fined $250.00 for failure to comply with continuing education requirements. Respondent's health has deteriorated in recent years. He has "been in the hospital several times with . . . heart [problems]."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of twice violating Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I and II of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and of violating Section 626.621(11), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count III of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and suspending his licenses for nine months for having committed these violations. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2004.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner should be permitted to take the examination for licensure as a real estate sales associate.
Findings Of Fact In September 2003, the Petitioner filed an application for licensure by the State of Florida as a real estate sales associate. In an application section titled "Background Information" question 1 asks in relevant part, "[h]ave you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . ." to which the Petitioner responded in the affirmative. "Background Information" question 4 in relevant part asks, "[h]as any license, registration, or permit to practice any regulated profession, occupation, vocation, or business been revoked, annulled, suspended, relinquished, surrendered, or withdrawn . . ." to which the Respondent replied in the affirmative. Question 1 directs an applicant who responds in the affirmative to disclose the full details of the incident(s) by completion of "form 0050-1." Question 4 directs an applicant who responds in the affirmative to disclose the full details of the termination(s) by completion of "form 0060-1." The disclosure forms completed by the Petitioner (if any) are not in the Respondent's files and are unavailable for review. The Petitioner's application package was presented to the Commission on December 16, 2003. After considering his presentation, the Commission denied his application and instructed him to return with additional information related to the disclosed charges. The Petitioner apparently sought reconsideration, and his application package was again presented to the Commission on March 17, 2004. After reconsidering the Petitioner's background, the Commission again denied his application. The Petitioner then sought an administrative hearing to challenge the denial of his application. On or about July 26, 2000, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with stalking. The Commission's records indicate that the Petitioner completed a pretrial program and was sentenced to 50 hours of community service. At the administrative hearing, the Petitioner testified that he was placed on probation for six months, and had to complete a six- month psychological evaluation. The stalking charge was nolle prossed. At the hearing, the Petitioner stated that at the time of the stalking charge, he was working at a retail establishment. The object of his attention was a 16-year-old female who was working in the vicinity. The Petitioner was approximately 36 years old. The Petitioner asserted that he did not know the female was 16 years old at the time. He denied that he "stalked" the female, but stated that he merely spoke to her a few times in person and attempted to contact her once by telephone. He continued to express surprise at the stalking charge. On or about June 6, 2001, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, a felony, and criminal mischief. He was sentenced to two years of probation, six months of psychological evaluation, and was required to pay court costs. Adjudication of guilt was withheld. At the hearing, the Petitioner stated that he went to the home of an ex-girlfriend to collect a $500 debt she allegedly owed to him. He testified that he knocked on her door and got no response. As he left her residence, he saw that her automobile was unlocked. He opened the hood of the ex- girlfriend's vehicle and ripped out the spark plug cables. He asserted that he "didn't steal anything" because he threw the cables away and didn't keep them. On or about September 5, 2001, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, entered an order based on the Petitioner's stipulation, revoking his Class "D" Security Officer's License, based on the burglary charge.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order denying the Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Alfonso Santana, Esquire Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Fernando Freire 5242 Millenia Boulevard, No. 304 Orlando, Florida 32839 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Juana Watkins, Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802 North Orlando, Florida 32808-1900
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Driving Under the Influence (DUI) with property or personal damage and DUI manslaughter, are crimes that relate to the practice of, or the ability to practice, dentistry, within the meaning of section 466.028(1)(c), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the First Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Health, Board of Dentistry, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of dentistry in the state of Florida, pursuant to section 20.43, and chapters 456 and 466, Florida Statutes. Stipulated Facts At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Matthew Moye, D.D.S., was a dentist within the State of Florida, having been issued license number DN16032 on August 2, 2002. Respondent’s address of record with the Department is Marion Correctional Institution, Post Office Box 158, Lowell, Florida 32663. Respondent began his private dental practice, Big Bend Dental, in 2009. Respondent offered the following procedures in his practice: composite fillings; crown and bridgework, including preparing teeth for crowns; root canals; dentures; extractions, including molar and wisdom teeth extractions; Botox; and lip fills. Respondent has never been the subject of a disciplinary action against his license to practice dentistry. On or about October 31, 2010, while under the influence of alcohol, Respondent was involved in a motor vehicle collision in which he lost control of his vehicle on the Harbor Island Bridge in Tampa, Florida. Respondent struck three people with his vehicle, killing two, and caused property damage. On November 7, 2013, Respondent pled guilty to, and was convicted of, two counts of first-degree misdemeanor DUI with Property or Personal Damage and two counts of second-degree felony DUI Manslaughter based on the above incident. Respondent’s sentence included: 12 years of incarceration; 10 years of probation following release from incarceration; and Permanent revocation of driver’s license. Respondent has not practiced dentistry since being incarcerated. Other Findings of Fact Dr. Johnson testified that dentists operate from a position of trust, and that there is an expectation of professionalism and good judgment on the part of persons holding a license to practice dentistry. Upon his review of the police reports and court documents related to Respondent’s crime, he opined that the acts described therein evince recklessness and a lack of good judgment. As a result, he believed that the crimes affected Respondent’s practice or ability to practice dentistry. On cross-examination, Dr. Johnson candidly admitted that his opinion as it related to DUI Manslaughter was based on how he felt about that crime, and on his personal principles. He reviewed no journals or professional publications. He did not review court decisions or Board of Dentistry final orders. He was aware of no general consensus in the dental community as to whether DUI Manslaughter is a crime related to the practice or ability to practice dentistry. He had no training in substance abuse impairment, and could not state whether a single DUI could be used to diagnose alcohol abuse or impairment. As to evaluating whether an act affects the practice of dentistry, Dr. Johnson testified that “at some point along the way, there’s always going to be personal opinion. You know, could be somebody like mine. Could be a personal opinion on the Board of Dentistry.” What is clear from the totality of Dr. Johnson’s testimony is that his opinions reflect his personal belief as to whether DUI Manslaughter affects the practice or ability to practice dentistry, an opinion influenced by his self-perception as “a very black-and-white person.” Despite the stipulation as to his expertise, Dr. Johnson could identify nothing in his education or experience that made him an expert in crimes that affect the practice of dentistry, other than his years as an experienced, well-regarded, and respected oral and maxillofacial surgeon. The legislature’s 2013 amendment of section 90.702, Florida Statutes, was intended to replace the Frye standard of opinion testimony, which allows “pure opinion” testimony, with the Daubert standard, which does not. Chapter 2013-107, sections 1 and 2, Laws of Florida. In 2017, the Supreme Court declined to adopt the legislative change under its authority over procedural matters in Florida courts. In re: Amendments to the Fla. Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017). Whether the Supreme Court’s decision to decline to adopt the Legislature’s Daubert amendment bears on the issue at DOAH, an executive branch agency, is an interesting question, but one for another day. In this case, Dr. Johnson’s testimony comes down to a matter of weight. Were his testimony directed to a particular standard-of-care on the part of a licensed dentist, the undersigned would have no problem accepting his years of experience as a suitable basis for an opinion on that issue. Dr. Johnson’s opinion that the “act” of deciding to drive a vehicle while intoxicated is evidence of recklessness or lack of judgment that can reasonably affect the ability to practice dentistry. However, Dr. Johnson’s subjective belief that the unintentional outcome of that act evinces a greater lack of trustworthiness, or shows a higher degree of reckless behavior or poor judgment, does not rise to the level of competent, substantial evidence to support a finding that DUI Manslaughter is any more related to the practice of dentistry than is a DUI. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the act of driving under the influence of alcohol, regardless of the outcome of that act, is directly related to Respondent’s ability to provide effective and safe treatment of his patients. As it pertains to this case, the behavior that reflects on Respondent was his decision to get behind the wheel of his car while intoxicated. That is the conduct for which there is some evidence that demonstrates that Respondent exhibited “reckless behavior” and a “lack of judgment.” Counsel for Petitioner presented a well-researched and articulate analysis of the reasons underlying the legislature’s policy decision to classify incidents of impaired driving resulting in death as manslaughter. The basis for that policy decision is that a death resulting from DUI is the result of a presumptively negligent and culpable act, i.e., getting behind the wheel of a vehicle. However, the cases cited by Petitioner highlight the “policy choice” made by the Legislature to impose a heightened penalty for a DUI that results in death. The citation to State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1999), is certainly apropos, and worthy of repeating: We recognize that the Legislature accords disparate treatment to DUI and DUI manslaughter, for example. On the one hand, driving while drunk is a misdemeanor which requires at least three convictions to earn a year's imprisonment. § 316.193(2)(a) 2.c., Fla. Stat. (1995). It will only become a third-degree felony carrying a potential of five years' imprisonment upon a fourth or subsequent conviction. § 316.193(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). In contrast, a drunk driver whose operation of his or her automobile causes the death of another is guilty of a second-degree felony, carrying a potential fifteen-year prison term. The Legislature clearly has made the policy choice to impose more severe sanctions on the drunk driver who kills someone than on the drunk driver who is fortuitously caught before possibly killing someone. While that may seem a bit unfair, it is hardly irrational. Id. at 565 n. 29. (emphasis added). There has been no such express legislative “policy choice” here. Rather, as it relates to this case, the Legislature has chosen to sanction conduct only to the extent that it relates to the practice of dentistry.1/ The motivation for legislative policy decisions and regulatory decisions are entirely different. See, Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 285, 295 (2010). (“Unlike criminal law, which is aimed at punishing wrongdoers, or civil law, which is aimed at victim compensation, professional discipline seeks to protect public welfare by incapacitating or rehabilitating dangerous physicians.”). The fact that the Legislature elected to punish DUI Manslaughter more severely than DUI based on the result of the act is not sufficient grounds to impose a different regulatory penalty for the same “act” based on the result. There has been no express “policy choice” by the Department that an act is more worthy of a different regulatory sanction based on its result. Again, it is the voluntary act of driving while intoxicated that reflects on the ability to practice dentistry, not the unintended, even tragic, result. The tragic outcome of Respondent’s reckless act of driving while impaired, though it certainly affects how Respondent’s behavior is treated from a criminal perspective, has little to do with whether it affects the clinical quality of his work, the quality of his patient care, or his ability to practice dentistry. The nature of the violation in this case has fairly been characterized as one of “character,” and not “competence.” As observed by Professor Sawicki, “many of the most serious disciplinary actions taken on the basis of criminal convictions involve criminal misconduct with no immediately apparent impact on patient safety or public health.” Sawicki, supra at 304. The incident here was not shown to have any effect on Respondent’s technical qualifications or abilities to practice dentistry. There was no suggestion that the DUI was the result of a broader pattern of alcohol abuse that affected Respondent’s practice of dentistry at the time of the incident. Given the terms of his probation after he is released -- neither driving nor alcohol consumption will be allowed -- there will be no possibility of a recurrence of the violation. Thus, the violation is directed to societal issues of trust and judgment, rather than ability and competence. The evidence in this case is sufficient to demonstrate that the act of driving while impaired is one that generally demonstrates recklessness and a lack of good judgment, and that such attributes can be correlated to one’s ability to effectively practice dentistry. The evidence in this case was not sufficient to demonstrate that the crime of DUI Manslaughter involves any greater degree of recklessness, or a heightened degree of poor judgment than does a DUI. Furthermore, the undersigned rejects the contention that Respondent’s inability to practice dentistry during his period of incarceration is a basis for revocation of his license. Petitioner pointed to no requirement that a licensed dentist engage in any minimum number of practice hours to maintain a license. Any necessary practical experience can be addressed in reasonable conditions as addressed herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Dentistry, enter a final order: determining that Respondent violated sections 456.072(1)(c) and sections 466.028(1)(c) and (mm), as a result of the recklessness and lack of judgment exhibited by his decision to drive while under the influence of alcohol; placing Respondent’s license on probation for a period of one year, to commence upon his release from incarceration, with appropriate terms of probation to ensure Respondent’s practical ability to perform dentistry as authorized by rule 64B5-13.005(3)(d)2.; imposing an administrative fine of $10,000 to be paid within a reasonable period of time from Respondent’s release from incarceration; requiring reimbursement of costs to be paid within a reasonable period of time from Respondent’s release from incarceration; requiring completion of an ethics course; requiring 100 hours of community service to be performed concurrently with that required as a condition of Respondent’s probation; and requiring an evaluation from the Professionals Resource Network. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2018.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the application filed by John Stover Mark (Petitioner) for licensure as a resident independent all lines adjuster should be approved.
Findings Of Fact On June 13, 2005, the Petitioner was driving his vehicle and was stopped for unlawful speeding. During the traffic stop, the law enforcement officer discovered that a grand theft warrant had been issued and was outstanding against the Petitioner. Prior to the traffic stop, the Petitioner was unaware of the warrant. The Petitioner was arrested on the warrant and charged with a third degree felony count of grand theft. The Petitioner testified that the charge was related to a claim by his former employer that the Petitioner had stolen tools from a construction job site. According to the Petitioner, he had been employed in the construction industry for many years by the same employer and had become unhappy with the lack of financial support he believed he was receiving from the employer. Eventually, he decided to quit the job and called his employer from the job site to do so. The Petitioner testified that he advised the employer that he was leaving the job and that the tools that belonged to the employer were being left at the job site. The abandoned tools apparently went missing, and the Petitioner was subsequently charged with the theft of the equipment. Although the Petitioner testified that he entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge upon advice of his public defender, the court records indicate that the Petitioner entered a guilty plea to one count of grand theft, a third degree felony, on July 29, 2005, in Case No. 05-CF-012565, Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, Florida. The confusion related to the actual plea entered is immaterial to the disposition of this case. In any event, adjudication was withheld, and the Petitioner was sentenced to make restitution and pay court costs and to complete a five-year probationary period. The probation was terminated by order of the Court after approximately two years after the Petitioner had complied with all other requirements of his sentence. The Petitioner was subsequently injured in an automobile accident and through the services of the Department of Education, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR), received training for another occupation for which he was physically capable. The Petitioner testified that the DVR provided computer equipment and also funded the educational training that was a requirement for licensure as an insurance adjuster. The Petitioner testified that he disclosed the grand theft felony to his DVR counselor, who was apparently unconcerned or unaware that the felony incident posed an impediment to the Petitioner's prospects for licensure as an insurance adjuster. After completing the relevant training, the Petitioner filed an application for licensure as a resident independent all lines adjuster on July 11, 2007. The application contained the following question: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered. The Petitioner answered the question in the affirmative. The Petitioner truthfully answered other questions on the application related to the felony problem and properly disclosed the relevant information. There is no evidence that the Petitioner has failed to disclose the grand theft incident in response to any inquiry material to this case, or has made any attempt to conceal the matter from the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application for licensure as a resident independent all lines adjuster be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: William Gautier Kitchen, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 John Stover Mark 8143 Sudbury Drive Port Richey, Florida 34668 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a certificate as a law enforcement officer, Certificate Number 02-22949. That certificate is currently inactive. Respondent was employed as a deputy sheriff with the Polk County Sheriff's Department in January of 1978. Respondent resigned this position on or about October 22, 1982. On or about September 9, 1982, Respondent was involved in the apprehension and arrest of an individual named James Pitts. A Winter Haven police officer, Dennis Warren, actually effected the arrest of the above suspect on or about September 9, 1982. During the arrest, Pitts resisted Officer Warren and in so doing, Officer Warren sustained injuries to his right hand. The area in which the struggle occurred consisted of loose dirt and gravel. Immediately after the arrest, Officer Warren's uniform was disheveled, dirty and ripped. The knuckles on his right hand were bleeding. Immediately after the arrest, Respondent's uniform was clean, not disheveled and no dirt was present. The dirt and gravel at the scene of the arrest were the type that would adhere to a uniform. After Officer Warren arrested the suspect, Respondent was unable or unwilling to walk the suspect to the police car. Another officer (Bill Stone), walked the suspect to the police car and placed the suspect in the vehicle. Respondent was present during the arrest of James Pitts and observed Officer Warren struggling with said individual. Officer Warren requested Respondent's assistance in the arrest but Respondent failed to provide such assistance. During Respondent's tenure as a deputy sheriff, he failed to assist other officers on several occasions during violent confrontations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1984.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the Board of Nursing revoke respondent's license number 83209-2. It is further recommended that upon proof of counseling or other rehabilitative measures taken by respondent, the Board exercise its discretion to relicense respondent with examination after a period of six months has elapsed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 28th day of April, 1977, in Tallahassee Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Geraldine Johnson, R.N. Licensing and Investigative Coordinator Florida State Board of Nursing 6501 Arlington Expressway Bldg. B. Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Julius Finegold, Esquire 1005 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Patrick V. Clancy, Esquire 2420 Garfield Street Hollywood, Florida 33020
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Randy Lee Pomerantz, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in the State of Florida as a general lines, property, casualty, surety, and miscellaneous lines insurance agent. On or about May 30, 1989, the Respondent, along with one of his former employees, was charged by Information in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida, in Case No. 89-20405, with fifteen felony counts and three misdemeanor counts. The fifteen felony counts included one count of a RICO violation, one count of scheme to defraud, three counts of grand theft in the second degree, and ten counts of grand theft in the third degree. On or about July 13, 1990, the Respondent entered a plead of nolo contendere to Count VIII of the information, which was one of the counts charging grand theft in the third degree in violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. The prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi as to all other counts insofar as they related to the Respondent. Adjudication of guilt was withheld on Count VIII. The Respondent was placed on probation for three years and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,325.03. The Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to Count VIII of the Information was a plea of convenience. The Respondent did not commit the acts alleged in Count VIII of the Information. As the Respondent explained at the hearing, at the time of his plea his wife was about to give birth and he did not feel he could take a chance on a "roll of the dice" with a jury trial.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer issue a Final Order in this case dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of February 1991. MICHAEL PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-4430 The following are the specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, and 4: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Although it is likely that the facts alleged in Count VIII of the Information related to the transaction of insurance business in this state, such is not established by clear and convincing evidence. And, in any event, the matter is irrelevant in light of the findings that the Respondent's plea was a plea of convenience and that the Respondent was not guilty of the crime charged. Findings proposed by Respondent: COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ted Crespi, Esquire 110 Tower, Suite 815 110 S.E. 6th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Tom Gallagher Bill O'Neil State Treasurer and General Counsel Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level and Treasurer Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1997), by pleading or having been found guilty of a crime which involves moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. (All Chapter and Section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation and discipline of real estate licensees in the state. Respondent is licensed in the state as a real estate broker pursuant to license no. 0414405. The last license issued is inactive. On December 15, 1997, Respondent entered into a plea of guilty to aggravated assault and leaving the scene of an accident with injuries. Both crimes are third-degree felonies under Sections 784.02(1) and 316.027(1)(a), respectively. The court adjudicated Respondent guilty and sentenced Respondent to two years of community control to be followed by two years probation. Both sentences ran concurrently. The court also imposed miscellaneous fines in the cumulative amount of $255 and ordered Respondent to pay probation costs. On January 13, 1998, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner voluntarily disclosing his plea and conviction. Respondent has no prior disciplinary history. Both convictions involve a single incident which occurred on November 23, 1996, at the Draft House, 1615 Lee Road, Orlando, Florida, a bar in Orange County, Florida. Respondent touched the female owner of the bar on her buttocks. The owner's son took offense to the incident. When Respondent left the bar, the owner's son followed Respondent to Respondent's car in the parking lot. The owner's son hit Respondent in the nose with his fist. Respondent got into his car. The owner's son smashed the windshield of Respondent's car with a steel bar. Respondent left the scene to call for help. When Respondent drove away, Respondent's car struck the owner's son. Respondent did not remain at the scene because he feared for his own safety. Respondent stopped a few blocks away and called 911. The extent of injuries of the person struck by Respondent's car was not established at the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(f), and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura McCarthy, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Richard F. Ronnick 4271 Biltmore Road Orlando, Florida 32804-2201 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Alton Lynn Gillen, Jr., is a licensed Surety Agent doing business in the State of Florida. Respondent was charged by information, on or about December 23, 1980, in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, with a violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and with conspiracy to traffic in cannabis. On February 5, 1981, Respondent pled nolo contendere to the charges contained in the information. On May 13, 1981, an Order was entered in the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County, Florida, adjudicating Respondent guilty of a violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and of conspiracy to traffic in cannabis. Respondent was sentenced by the same order to state prison for a period or term of ten years. Respondent, having reserved his right to appeal as a condition of the nolo contendere plea, thereafter appealed this conviction and is currently awaiting its determination. Respondent, through his attorney, contacted Petitioner to ascertain whether or not he would be permitted to continue operating under his license after adjudication of guilt and while his appeal was pending. In a telephone conversation between Respondent's attorney and Onez O'Neill, Chief of Bureau of Licensing, on February 20, 1981, Respondent was advised that once the Department received formal notice of the convictions, a revocation proceeding would probably be instituted, but that his license would be reinstated upon receipt by the Department of certified copies of the information, judgment and sentence, and notice of appeal. Within a few days after being adjudicated guilty (May 13, 1981), Respondent obtained certified copies of those documents, as well as certified copies of notice of appearance by the appellate attorney, motion for supersedeas bond, and the supersedeas bond. On or about May 20, 1981, Respondent personally delivered those documents to O'Neill's office with a cover letter from his attorney (R-Ex 1). Since O'Neill was not in her office that day, Respondent gave the documents to the assistant chief, Joe Crutchfield. Respondent explained the nature of the problem and the reason for the delivery of the documents. Crutchfield assured him that everything appeared to be satisfactory and that he would personally discuss the matter with O'Neill the next day. On or about June 1, 1981, Petitioner caused a letter to be sent to Respondent by John Rich, a licensing specialist employed by Petitioner (R-Ex 2). This letter advised that Respondent could "continue operating as a bondsman under his current license until such time as the legal appeal process has been finalized...", subject to approval by the surety company underwriting Respondent. Based on the affirmative representations of Petitioner, by telephone and by its letter of June 1, Respondent continued to write bonds and incur financial obligations as a result thereof. Respondent also continued making contributions to a "build-up fund" held in trust for his underwriter. The buildup fund is money generated out of bond premiums which is held in an escrow account for the underwriter if it becomes legally liable for an estreature of a bond written by Respondent. On September 30, 1981, Petitioner renewed Respondent's license with full knowledge of his convictions (P-Ex 3). On April 5, 1982, Petitioner filed its Administrative Complaint seeking to revoke Respondent's license based on his adjudication of guilt of the two criminal charges to which he pleaded on February 5, 1981.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint, subject to refiling if Respondent's appeal is denied. DONE and ORDERED 30th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Yon, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Burton C. Conner, Esquire 207 N.W. Second Street Okeechobee, Florida 33472 The Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner & Treasurer Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
