The Issue The issue is whether the correctional officer certificate of Melvin J. Simmons should be revoked for lack of good moral character due to having sexual relations with an inmate in the Palm Beach County Jail where Mr. Simmons was employed?
Findings Of Fact Melvin J. Simmons was issued a certificate as a correctional officer by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on May 30, 1984, certificate 44-84-502-02. In February 1985, Mr. Simmons and Lidia Gonzalez were employed as correctional officers at the Palm Beach County Jail. Both had attended the Police Academy in the same class. In February 1985, Pearline Bartee was incarcerated at the jail. As a trustee, Ms. Bartee was able to move about the jail. Ms. Gonzalez worked in the watchtower at the jail. Simmons approached her to have her arrange a meeting between himself and Bartee in the enclosed stairwell between the first and second floors of the jail. Women inmates were housed on those two floors. Simmons told Gonzalez that he wanted the meeting to engage in sex with Bartee. Simmons asked Gonzalez to warn him through the intercom system in the watchtower and stairwell if a supervisor approached the stairwell while Simmons and Bartee were together there. Simmons had two meetings with Bartee in the stairwell and thanked Gonzalez for looking out for him. On both occasions Simmons had sex with Bartee in the stairwell. Sergeant Michael Tucker of the staff investigation unit of the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department investigated a rumor that correctional officers had engaged in sex with female inmates. During the course of the investigation, Tucker received information that Simmons may have been involved in misconduct. On April 23, 1987, Sergeant Tucker and a polygraphist, Aaron Saylor, interviewed Simmons about the allegations of sexual misconduct. Simmons initially denied the allegations and grew increasingly nervous during the interview. Due to Simmons' demeanor, Tucker told Simmons that he doubted Simmons' truthfulness and was asked to submit to a polygraph examination. Respondent then admitted that he had engaged in intercourse with Bartee in the stairwell on three occasions in February 1985. Sexual contact between correctional officers and inmates is inconsistent with the employment practice of the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That certificate 44-84-502-02 issued to Melvin J. Simmons be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 21st day of April, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2937 All proposed findings of fact have been adopted except Finding of Fact 9 relating to rumors that inmate Bartee may have become pregnant. In light of the evidence that Ms. Bartee, herself, told correctional officer Gonzalez that Bartee was not pregnant, there is no record basis for such a finding. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Melvin J. Simmons 1412 West 7th Street Riviera Beach Florida 33404 Marzell Mitchell, Jr., Esquire Harvey Building, Suite 413 224 Datura Street West Palm Beach Florida 33401 Rod Caswel1, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert R. Dempsey, Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Department of Corrections, the employer and Respondent herein (Department, Respondent) engaged in a discriminatory employment action against the Petitioner by terminating her allegedly on account of her age.1/
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was hired as a Correctional Officer at the Hernando Correctional Institution (HCI) on or about December 20, 1996. HCI houses youthful and adult female inmates. Inmate Gaspar Incident Lieutenant Laura Reed was the dayshift officer in charge at HCI on March 22, 2005. At that time, at approximately 12:09 p.m., she ordered Officer Donald Langdon to perform a security inspection of a holding cell area. Lt. Langdon entered through the building's exterior door which opens to a vestibule in a holding cell area. The vestibule has two other solid doors; the steel door leading to the holding cell area is located a few feet from the exterior door, and there is a door at the far end of the vestibule that leads to administrative offices. There is an officer's desk and storage lockers in the vestibule. The three holding cells are typically used at HCI to house disruptive inmates. Each is a 12-by-12 square with a 10- foot ceiling. The side walls are of cement and the front and back walls are constructed of bars that are covered by a clear wall of lexan, a material similar to Plexiglas. Officer Langdon checked to make sure that nothing in the cells was broken and he searched the cells for contraband. He filled out a form indicating nothing was broken in the first and third cells and that he had not found any contraband and notified Lt. Reed of his findings. He then left the holding cell area. At about 12:10 p.m. Lt. Reed asked Officer Donna Jaje to help escort inmate Anita Gaspar to the holding cell because she was being disorderly and "acting out." Thereafter, Lt. Reed and Office Jaje arrived at the holding cell area where they strip searched the inmate but found no contraband. During the strip search the inmate commented that she "was not going to stay on this earth." The inmate's comment concerned the two officers because it indicated that she might be considering injuring herself. The inmate was placed in the first holding cell and Reed ordered Officer Jaje to remain with the inmate until relieved. Officer Jaje maintained a constant vigil observation of the inmate, and Lt. Reed left to advise a psychological specialist concerning inmate Gaspar and her comment. The psychological specialist determined a few minutes later that the inmate might have the potential to injure herself and put her on a "one-to-one observation," which requires constant visual observation based upon a fear of suicide. Suicidal inmates are not common at HCI, thus when an inmate is determined to be suicidal, since the institution does not have appropriate facilities, the procedure is to maintain a constant visual observation of the inmate until the inmate can be transferred to Lowell Correctional Institution (Lowell CI). Lowell CI does have appropriate facilities for such inmates. The Petitioner was assigned to work as a medical officer on the day in question. Lt. Reed instructed the Petitioner to relive Officer Jaje at inmate Gaspar's holding cell and told her to stay with that inmate. Prior to the Petitioner's arrival, Officer Jaje had maintained constant visual contact with the inmate. When Petitioner Lawhorn arrived at the holding cell to relieve Officer Jaje, around 12:45 p.m., Lawhorn sat in a chair directly in front of the inmate's holding cell. Jaje told Lawhorn that the inmate was on SOS and gave Lawhorn the keys to the holding cell. Petitioner Lawhorn asked for the "observation form" and Officer Jaje went to the medical unit and returned with the observation form. When an inmate is on SOS status, an observation form must be completed at 15 minute intervals. The officer observing the inmate must document on the form all the inmates activities such as sitting, lying down, talking, eating, etc. Constant visual observation is a different procedure than that used for typical inmates being incarcerated in a holding cell for disciplinary reasons. In that instance the correctional officer is only required to check on the inmate and observe every 15 minutes. Because constant visual observations are not required between those 15-minute, checks the officer may then perform other duties. The Petitioner had been trained to know the difference between these two procedures. About 1:30 p.m. Officer Langdon escorted a different inmate to the holding cell area. He knocked on the exterior door and received no answer and tried the door which was unlocked, although it should have been locked. When he entered the vestibule, Petitioner Lawhorn opened the door to the holding cell area as if answering Langdon's knock, but then returned to the holding cell area. Langdon is a male officer and therefore cannot strip search a female prisoner. He requested assistance in carrying out the required strip search of the inmate he had escorted to the holding cell area, but received no response to his radio request. After waiting some ten minutes he apparently discussed the matter with Petitioner, not knowing that the Petitioner was assigned to maintain constant visual observation of Inmate Gaspar. The Petitioner volunteered to strip search the other inmate for him. Langdon suggested that she strip search that inmate in cell three while he kept an eye on the inmate in cell one. The Petitioner refused that request, apparently because the other inmate was not dressed. She closed the door between the vestibule where Langdon was and the holding cell area where she carried out the strip search. Several minutes later Lawhorn opened the door to the holding cell area and placed the inmate's property in a locker and then returned to the holding cell area. Officer Langdon then reported to the control room that the inmate he was charged with had been placed in the third holding cell and he left the area. At about 2:30 p.m. Lt. Moffitt was in his office located in the same building as the holding cell area. He heard yelling, screaming, and a commotion emanating from the holding cell area. He and Officer Holley went to the holding cell area to determine the cause of the disturbance. When Lt. Moffitt entered the vestibule area he observed the Petitioner sitting at the officer's desk. The solid steel door to the holding cell area was closed. As he passed the Petitioner he told her he thought that she was supposed to be watching inmate Gaspar. The Petitioner replied that she was watching the inmate. Lt. Moffitt opened the door to the holding cell area and talked to Inmate Gaspar. She told him that she did not want to be transported to Lowell CI and that she would resist being transported. As Moffitt left the holding cell area he directed the Petitioner to watch the inmate and the Petitioner placed a chair in front of the holding cell of Inmate Gaspar in order to watch her constantly. About 2:35 p.m. the Petitioner needed a restroom break. There was no telephone at the officer's desk in the vestibule. She therefore went to the laundry area and informed a Sergeant there that she needed a restroom break. A few minutes later Officer Black came and relieved the Petitioner. Officer Black maintained a constant visual observation of Inmate Gaspar until the Petitioner returned, about 20 minutes later. About 3:45 p.m., Lt. Moffitt returned to the holding cell area. The Petitioner was then complying with his instructions by sitting in the chair and watching Inmate Gaspar. The shift changed at 4:00 p.m. and Lt. Moffitt conferred with Lt. Oudshoff, the oncoming shift supervisor. Moffitt told Lt. Oudshoff that an inmate in the holding cell area had stated that she was going to resist being transferred that evening. He and Lt. Oudshoff went to talk with Inmate Gaspar and were able to convince her not to resist the transfer to Lowell CI. During the course of that conversation both Lt.s were surprised when inmate Gaspar offered to give them "her weapon," as she termed it, whereupon she produced a 5-by-7-inch piece of lexan. The inmate was apparently asked how she was able to obtain the piece of lexan while under direct supervision. The inmate purportedly replied that Petitioner Lawhorn had left the cell several times throughout the day, leaving her unsupervised. The inmate did not testify, (although her account is in documentary evidence) but whether or not her version of events concerning the Petitioner leaving the cell several times a day, giving her the opportunity to break off a piece of lexan, is true, it was demonstrated to have been the motivation for the disciplinary action taken against the Petitioner. The appropriate supervisors were informed of the details of this incident as Lt. Moffitt knew them and an investigation ensued. Ultimately, disciplinary action was determined to be appropriate and the Petitioner was terminated from employment with the Department based on this incident, as the culmination of other disciplinary incidents on the Petitioner's employment record. Officer Langdon was also disciplined concerning the incident. His discipline was lesser as he was accorded a reprimand and was not terminated. Officer Langdon is younger than the Petitioner but Officer Langdon also had no disciplinary incidents or entries on his employment record whatever until the subject incident. That was the reason he was accorded lesser discipline than that meted out to the Petitioner. Thus, although the discipline imposed upon the Petitioner and Langdon was disparate, Officer Langdon was not proven to be a similarly- situated employee because his discipline related to a previously unblemished disciplinary record and the Petitioner had had at least four other disciplinary incidents and disciplines imposed on her employment record, from 2003 forward. On December 23, 2004, the Petitioner was working in the medical department at HCI. She was the medical officer and responsible for ensuring that inmates arrived for their appointments on time and for monitoring inmates awaiting medication in the "pill line." She was issued keys when she arrived at work that day and on December 23 was issued key ring number 219. The Petitioner left her observation post at the pill line on that occasion in order to allow other inmates into a gate to the adult canteen. While the Petitioner was unlocking that gate, key ring 219 broke off her keychain which was attached to her belt and remained in the adult canteen gate lock. The Petitioner let those inmates through the gate and went back to her post. She was in a hurry because Nurse Barras, who was working in the medical department, was screaming at her. She became distracted and did not notice that the key ring remained hanging in the canteen gate lock. A few minutes later another correctional officer saw an inmate pulling the key ring out of the canteen gate lock. The Petitioner was not aware the key ring was missing until that officer confronted her with the keys that he confiscated from the inmate. In any event, the Petitioner was not paying sufficient attention to her duties in opening the lock to the adult canteen and allowed herself to become distracted by the nurse's behavior and thus negligently left her key ring in the lock. If she had been paying due care to her surroundings and to her duties, she would have been aware that the key ring had broken off the key chain on her belt and would have observed the inmate pulling the key ring out of the lock. The Petitioner was accorded a five- day suspension for this commission of negligence, an infraction of the Department's rules. That suspension was upheld by the Public Employees Relations Commission. An incident also occurred on March 28, 2005, which was taken into account in the decision to terminate the Petitioner. That incident involved an inmate who yelled at the Petitioner and who was therefore being counseled by the Petitioner. During the course of their conversation, the inmate "declared a psychological emergency," whereupon the Petitioner called on her radio for assistance. She then wrongfully allowed the inmate to leave her custody and control in the immediately area instead of handcuffing the inmate. She then failed to assist the other officer or officers who responded to her call for help in calming the inmate. This was a violation of Department rules and was a factor in her termination. In addition to the above disciplinary actions the Petitioner received a written reprimand for negligence on June 30, 2004. On May 7, and August 20, 2003, she received written reprimands for failure to follow oral or written instructions. On June 10, 2003, she received a written reprimand for failure to truthfully answer questions. In her charge of discrimination, and at hearing, the Petitioner contended that she was subjected to discrimination based upon her age. She did not adduce preponderant evidence, however, which would show that any person outside her protected group, as for instance, persons under 40, or persons younger than she, were treated any differently, discipline-wise or otherwise, while being similarly-situated, comparative employees. The only evidence in this regard that she adduced was to the effect that Officer Langdon, who is younger than the Petitioner, was subjected to lighter discipline. Officer Langdon, however, was not a similarly-situated employee because, although younger, his employment and disciplinary record was unblemished until the incident involving the processing of Inmate Gaspar in the holding cell area. He had been employed substantially longer than the Petitioner's nine years. Thus, although he was disciplined less severely, he was not shown to be a similarly-situated employee because of the disparate nature of his, versus the Petitioner's, employment disciplinary records. Aside from this incident involving Officer Langdon, no other preponderant evidenced was adduced that any other employees were treated differently or better based upon their age or that the Petitioner was treated in a worse manner because of her age. The Petitioner contends that she was subjected to disparate treatment and harassment based upon her age (and, at hearing, based upon her gender, although that was not plead in the Petition or in the Charge of Discrimination). This amounted to vague testimony to the effect that she was constantly harassed by her superiors, and subjected to unwarranted discipline, particularly by Lt. Moffitt after he became her supervisor. She attempted to advance this claim by testimony that her medical problems involving anxiety and chest pain began after Lt. Moffitt arrived at the facility in 2003. This is belied by the fact, however, that other evidence in the record shows that these medical complaints actually began in 1999, some years before Lt. Moffitt became employed at the facility and became the Petitioner's supervisor. There is no preponderant proof that the Petitioner was subjected to altered terms or conditions of employment based upon her gender, or due to any comments or conduct of a sexual nature. For instance, there is absolutely no evidence that any demands for sexual favors were made upon her and that her terms and conditions of employment were conditioned upon compliance therewith. Moreover, there was no preponderant evidence that she was treated in a different way, such as being exposed to more disciplinary actions or more severe disciplinary measures than were her male counter-parts. Her testimony that male employees were subjected to less severe discipline or no discipline was not persuasive. This is because, for the most part, they were not identified, and no evidence was adduced to show that they were truly similarly-situated male employees in terms of the positions they held, the circumstances of their employment and more particularly the circumstances surrounding their disciplinary actions, in terms of being disciplined based upon similar facts and circumstances. Moreover, the discipline meted out to them was not shown to be disparate in relation to that given the Petitioner because there was not showing by the Petitioner that their employment records and disciplinary records were otherwise similar to her. Rather, the only evidence concerning this is that Officer Langdale's employment disciplinary record was unblemished and therefore substantially different from the Petitioner's, when he was accorded less severe discipline than the Petitioner arising out of the same incident. His better record was the reason for the less severe discipline. Additionally, there is the Petitioner's uncorroborated testimony concerning an incident involving preparing an inmate for transport to another facility in the prison van. She firmly demanded that the inmate be re-buckled in a seat belt. A verbal altercation inferentially ensued with Sergeant Moynihan. The Petitioner claims he cussed at her and was not disciplined, while she was "written up" for allegedly calling him a liar. There was insufficient credible evidence to show enough facts concerning this event so that a judgment could be made if it occurred; whether the two employees were similarly-situated in terms of their conduct and their disciplinary records; and whether there was disparate treatment of one versus the other. There was no showing that the Petitioner was subjected to abusive language or other abuses related to her gender or to any sexually discriminatory motive in her working environment. There was no evidence of any unwelcome sexual harassment or other conduct of a sexual nature which was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of her employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment.2/ In summary, the above Findings of Fact do not reveal that any of the disciplinary action, including the termination at issue, was meted out by the Respondent Department for any discriminatory motives regarding the Petitioner's age or that of other employees. Moreover, complaints regarding gender discrimination were not made until the Petitioner's testimony at hearing. Therefore, under generally accepted principles of notice pleading and due process of law they can not be addressed and decided in this proceeding because the Respondent has not had an opportunity to prepare a defense against them. Parenthetically, however, the evidence adduced by the Petitioner does not demonstrate any discriminatory motive or action taken by the Respondent Employer based upon reasons of gender or of any sexual nature. There has been no showing that any comparative employees, male or female, were treated in a disparate way and more favorably than the Petitioner based upon their age. Moreover, even if such had been demonstrated, the Respondent has come forward with preponderant, persuasive evidence that the employment action at issue, the Petitioner's termination, occurred as a result of progressive discipline imposed in accordance with the Respondent's written policies and rules. It was imposed as a result of the Petitioner's deficient performance and her deficient and more extensive record of disciplinary actions imposed against her for her lapses in performance, as compared to other similarly-situated employees.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witness, and the pleadings and arguments of the party, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Anderson is a certified correctional officer, certified by Petitioner. Her certificate number is 190482. At the time of the incident at issue, Anderson was working for the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. On May 27, 2003, Patricia Johns (Johns) was in the Wal-Mart parking lot in Clewiston, Florida. Johns was taking groceries she had purchased from a shopping cart and placing them in her vehicle. She placed her sweater and her purse in a shopping cart while she was loading the groceries. Johns retrieved her sweater from the cart, but left her purse in the cart. She pushed the cart with the purse in it between her vehicle and another vehicle, got into her vehicle, and left the parking lot. A few seconds later Anderson pulled into Johns' parking space. Anderson's vehicle bumped the shopping cart, pushing it forward a couple of feet. She got out of her vehicle, went over to the cart, and removed the purse. Anderson, while wearing her correctional officer uniform, placed the purse in the backseat of her vehicle, took her son out of the vehicle, and went into Wal-Mart. She did not take the purse into Wal-Mart and attempt to locate the owner. The purse was a Tommy Hilfiger brand valued at $50. Inside the purse was a wallet with $18 in cash, a credit card, and blank checks. A cellular telephone valued at $350 was also in the purse. Anderson picked up some prescriptions at Wal-Mart, returned to her vehicle, and eventually returned home. She knew that the purse did not belong to her, but claimed that she was planning to turn the purse in at the police department the next day. Her claim that she was going to turn the purse into the police is not credible based on later actions. Sometime after she had returned home, she remembered she had put the purse in the back of her vehicle and asked her fiancé to get the purse. When he went to retrieve the purse, only the wallet remained minus the cash. During the time that Anderson left Wal-Mart and the time that her fiancé discovered that the purse, cash, and cellular telephone were missing, both Anderson and her fiancé had driven the vehicle while carrying other passengers. Anderson did not remove the purse, cash, and cellular telephone from the vehicle. She believes that one of the other passengers who had been riding in her vehicle on May 27, 2003, took the purse, cash, and cellular telephone. The next day, Anderson placed the wallet in a zip-lock plastic bag and dropped it in a drop box at the post office. She did not notify the owner of the purse that she had taken the purse from the Wal-Mart parking lot, and did not notify the police until later that she had taken the purse. Johns reported to the police that her purse had been stolen. An investigation ensued, and it was learned based on a video tape of the Wal-Mart parking lot on May 27, 2003, that Anderson had taken the purse. A police officer attempted to contact Anderson by telephone concerning the incident. On June 9, 2003, Anderson gave a taped interview to police officers, in which she admitted taking the purse out of the shopping cart and placing it in the backseat of her car. She was arrested for grand theft and released on the same day after posting a bond. An information for grand theft, a third degree felony, was entered against Anderson on August 13, 2003. She agreed to make restitution in the amount of $419, and a Notice of Nolle Prosequi was entered on December 5, 2003. As a result of the incident at issue, Anderson was dismissed from her position as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. She is sincerely sorry for her actions and has made restitution for the property taken.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Lenora R. Anderson is not guilty of a violation of Subsection 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that she failed to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011; and imposing the following penalties as set forth in Subsection 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2003): issuance of a written reprimand and placement of Respondent on probation for two years under conditions as specified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2004.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her, if any.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Tanika Parker was certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on September 9, 2005, and was issued correctional certification number 251547. (admitted fact) From August 13, 2004, until July 13, 2006, Respondent was employed as a correctional officer by the Florida Department of Corrections and was assigned to the Dade Correctional Institution. (admitted fact) On January 9, 2006, Respondent applied for a correctional officer position with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office. (admitted fact) On March 10, 2006, as part of the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office application process, Respondent answered the written question: "Have you had an unprofessional relationship with an inmate, detainee, probationer or parolee, or community controlee [sic]?" by circling on the form as her response: "No." (admitted fact) Also during March 2006, George Montenegro, a Senior Inspector in the Department of Corrections Inspector General's Office assigned to the Dade Correctional Institution, received information from a confidential informant that Respondent "was involved with" an inmate with the nickname of "Plump." Although an investigation was begun, it was not until early July when a second confidential informant disclosed the identity of Plump. It was inmate Leroy Rogers. Thereafter, Plump's phone calls were monitored, and his cell was searched on July 21, 2006. Among other items in Plump's cell were 34 photographs. At that point Respondent had resigned and was no longer an employee of the Department of Corrections. Since Respondent was in the process of being hired by the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, Inspector Montenegro contacted that agency and spoke with Eric Monath, a Sergeant with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Division of Internal Affairs. The 34 photographs taken from Plump's cell included the following: one of a cake inscribed "Happy Birthday Plump"; one with a little girl licking the icing off the cake knife; two of the front of Respondent's residence with the little girl in front; eleven more of the little girl at various locations; one close-up of an adult female's breasts; six close-ups of an adult female's naked genitalia; eight of an adult female's genitalia and/or buttocks either partially or fully covered by underwear; one of a T-shirt decorated with two hearts, one of which was inscribed "Plump" and the other one "Plumpness"; and three of a woman in that T-shirt, wearing some of the same underwear depicted in some of the other pictures. The photos of the naked or clothed woman do not show the woman's face, head, or neck. They only focus on a particular part of the female's anatomy. One of the pictures, however, shows the female from behind with her hands on her hips, and that one reveals a scar or discoloration on the woman's left, inside forearm. On July 27, 2006, Respondent attended an orientation session at the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, wearing a sleeveless shirt. Sergeant Monath saw that same identifying mark on Respondent's forearm. On August 1, 2006, Sergeant Monath met with Inspector Montenegro at the Walgreen's near Respondent's residence and presented the photos with the identifying Walgreen's information on the back of each one to the store's manager. The store manager confirmed that the identifying information was for that store and, using it, checked the store's computer records. The customer for whom the photographs were developed was Respondent. Inspector Montenegro and Sergeant Monath then drove to Respondent's residence and compared the front of the structure to the structure depicted in the photographs. It was the same, including the location of the sprinkler head in the front yard. The monitored phone calls made by Plump were to a female who was never identified in the phone calls. However, during one of the calls, the female yelled instructions to someone in the background named Taliyah. Respondent's application for employment by the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office listed as the only person living with her, her daughter Taliyah Wilcox. Inmate Rogers' visitor log shows that Respondent visited him thirteen times between November 4, 2006, and July 7, 2007. She listed herself as a "personal friend."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations in the Administrative Complaint filed against her and revoking her correctional certificate numbered 251547. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of September, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: George G. Lewis, Esquire George G. Lewis, P.A. 950 South Pine Island Road, Suite 150 Plantation, Florida 33324 Sharon S. Traxler, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement - 7100 Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ Petitioner forfeited his Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) Investment Plan account by entering a nolo contendere plea to two counts of violating section 893.13(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes, a second-degree felony.
Findings Of Fact The Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding Mr. Combs began working for DOC on May 25, 2001, as a Correctional Officer Level 1 at the Union Correctional Institution (“Union Correctional”) in Raiford, Florida. Union Correctional is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 inmates, and Mr. Combs assisted with their care and custody. In January of 2006, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Sergeant. While his responsibilities were very similar to those of his previous position, Mr. Combs was now supervising other correctional officers. In October of 2011, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Lieutenant, and was responsible for supervising 50 to 70 correctional officers at Union Correctional. In April of 2013, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Captain, and transferred to Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida. A captain is the highest ranking correctional officer on a given shift, and Mr. Combs supervised approximately 50 correctional officers at a time, including sergeants and lieutenants. Like Union Correctional, Florida State Prison is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 prisoners. A colonel manages Florida State Prison, and it has two separate units. One of those units is a work camp housing lower- custody inmates who may work outside the facility, and the main prison is the other unit. Each of the units is run by its own major. In February of 2015, Mr. Combs was promoted to Major and took charge of the work camp at Florida State Prison. At some point in 2014 and prior to his promotion to Major, Mr. Combs had begun taking Oxycodone recreationally. Mr. Combs typically purchased one Oxycodone pill three to four times a week, and Dylan Hilliard (a Correctional Officer 1 at Florida State Prison) was Mr. Combs’ primary source of Oxycodone. Mr. Hilliard usually worked at the main prison, but he occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs knew Mr. Hilliard because of their employment with DOC. Mr. Combs purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard at the latter’s home in Lawtey, Florida. However, some transactions occurred in Mr. Combs’ state-issued housing on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Hilliard charged Mr. Combs $35 for an Oxycodone pill, and that was a discount from the $38 price Mr. Hilliard charged others. Mr. Combs allowed his subordinates (Sergeants Jesse Oleveros and Evan Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. After returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard, Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give Mr. Combs an Oxycodone pill free of charge. Operation Checkered Flag was a joint task force led by the Bradford County Sheriff’s Office, and its purpose was to arrest individuals involved with the distribution and use of illegal drugs. The authorities arrested Mr. Hilliard after he engaged in an illegal drug transaction with an undercover agent from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. A subsequent search of Mr. Hilliard’s cell phone revealed text messages between Mr. Hilliard and several other DOC employees, including Mr. Combs. Mr. Hilliard referred to Mr. Combs as “Chicken-Hawk” or “Hawk” in those text messages, and the two of them used car part terminology as a code for different milligram sizes of Oxycodone. Operation Checkered Flag ultimately resulted in the arrest of 10 DOC employees. The authorities arrested Mr. Combs on July 1, 2015, based on allegations that he had committed six felonies relating to the alleged unlawful and illegal purchase and distribution of Oxycodone. DOC fired Mr. Combs on approximately July 1, 2015. Mr. Combs initially denied all of the allegations. However, after spending nearly 56 days in jail, Mr. Combs reached an agreement with the State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County that called for his criminal charges to be reduced in exchange for his cooperation with Operation Checkered Flag. During an interview on August 20, 2015, with members of Operation Checkered Flag, Mr. Combs admitted that he had purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. In addition, Mr. Combs admitted that on six or seven occasions he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave the prison grounds so that they could purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. The State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County chose to dismiss most of the charges against Mr. Combs. The Information ultimately filed against Mr. Combs set forth two counts alleging that he violated section 893.13(2)(a)1., by illegally purchasing Oxycodone on March 23, 2015, and March 31, 2015. Those purchases occurred approximately 10 miles from Florida State Prison at Mr. Hilliard’s residence in Lawtey, Florida. Neither Mr. Combs nor Mr. Hilliard was on duty during those transactions. On August 25, 2015, Mr. Combs pled nolo contendere. The Bradford County Circuit Court entered judgment against Mr. Combs based on the two violations of section 893.13(2)(a)1., but withheld adjudication. All of the conduct underlying Mr. Combs’ nolo contendere plea occurred while he was employed by DOC. The SBA Determines that Mr. Combs Forfeited his FRS Benefits At all times relevant to the instant case, Mr. Combs was a member of the FRS. The FRS is the legislatively-created general retirement system established by chapter 121, Florida Statutes. See § 121.021(3), Fla. Stat. The SBA is the governmental entity that administers the FRS Investment Plan, a defined retirement benefits contribution plan. § 121.4501(1), Fla. Stat. Via a letter dated August 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that a hold had been placed on his FRS account due to the criminal charges. As a result, no distribution of employer contributions from Mr. Combs’ account would be permitted until the SBA had evaluated the final disposition of those criminal charges. Via a letter dated September 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that he had forfeited his FRS benefits as a result of his nolo contendere plea. In support thereof, the SBA cited section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, which provides for the forfeiture of a public employee’s FRS retirement benefits upon the entry of a nolo contendere plea to certain types of offenses. The SBA’s letter closed by notifying Mr. Combs of his right to challenge the SBA’s proposed action through an administrative hearing. Mr. Combs requested a formal administrative hearing and asserted that the crimes for which he was convicted did not fall within the scope of section 112.3173(2)(e). In other words, Mr. Combs argued that his convictions were not associated with his employment at DOC and thus did not amount to a violation of the public trust. Testimony Adduced at the Final Hearing Mr. Combs testified that he was responsible for the work camp and the supervision of the correctional officers assigned there. He also testified that he would occasionally supervise correctional officers who normally worked in the main prison. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Hilliard was his primary source of Oxycodone and that Mr. Hilliard occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs was aware that two Florida State Prison employees who worked directly under him (Sergeant Jesse Oleveros and Sergeant Evan Williams) were purchasing Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave Florida State Prison grounds six or seven times in order to purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give him an Oxycodone pill after returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs acknowledged during his testimony that DOC policy prohibits correctional officers from leaving prison grounds during their shift. Mr. Combs acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs also acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to be on prison grounds with illegal narcotics. Finally, Mr. Combs acknowledged that as a sworn officer with the Department of Corrections, he had an obligation to report any criminal activity committed by a correctional officer working at Florida State Prison, regardless of whether that correctional officer reported to him. Findings of Ultimate Fact An examination of the circumstances associated with Mr. Combs’ Oxycodone purchases from Mr. Hilliard demonstrates that there is a nexus between Mr. Combs’ employment as a correctional officer with DOC and his commission of the crimes to which he pled nolo contendere. For instance, Mr. Combs came to know his primary source of Oxycodone (Mr. Hilliard) through their mutual employment with DOC. Indeed, Mr. Combs supervised Mr. Hilliard when the latter was assigned to the work camp at Florida State Prison. Also, Mr. Combs knew that these transactions were illegal. As noted above, he and Mr. Hilliard used a code based on car part references to disguise the actual subject of their communications. Contrary to DOC policy and Florida Law, Mr. Combs allowed two of his subordinates (Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their duty shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs would then receive a free pill from Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams. Mr. Hilliard sold Oxycodone to Mr. Combs at a reduced price. It is reasonable to infer that Mr. Combs received this discount due to his high-ranking position at Mr. Hilliard’s place of employment and because Mr. Combs facilitated Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams’ purchases of Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs willfully violated DOC policy and Florida law by allowing correctional officers to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs knowingly violated his obligation as a sworn correctional officer by not reporting the criminal activity committed by Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs defrauded the public from receiving the faithful performance of his duties as a correctional officer. The public had a right to expect that one of its employees would not purchase drugs from someone he supervised. The public also had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not use his authority at Florida State Prison to facilitate Mr. Hilliard’s illegal drug sales to other DOC employees. In addition, the public had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not engage in illegal transactions on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Combs realized a profit, gain, or advantage through the power or duties associated with his position as a Major at DOC. Specifically, Mr. Combs satisfied his Oxycodone habit through purchases made from a DOC employee who he supervised. Also, Mr. Combs used his position to facilitate other sales by Mr. Hilliard, and Mr. Combs’ assistance led to him receiving free Oxycodone and a discounted price on his Oxycodone purchases. The findings set forth above in paragraphs 49 through 57 are the only ones needed to establish a nexus between Mr. Combs’ public employment and the two counts to which he pled nolo contendere. That nexus is evident from Mr. Combs’ testimony, Mr. Combs’ Responses to the SBA’s Requests for Admissions, and the Stipulated Facts. It was not necessary to consider the exhibits to which Mr. Combs raised objections, i.e., the arrest warrant, the warrant affidavit, and the audio recordings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner was a public employee convicted of specified offenses that were committed prior to retirement, and that pursuant to section 112.3173 he has forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account, except for the return of his accumulated contributions as of the date of his termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2016.
The Issue Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, William Van Poyck, and the Intervenor, Robert David Roy, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner and the Intervenor are subject to the rules of the Respondent. The evidence failed to prove that the Petitioner and Intervenor are, or have been, placed in administrative confinement by the Respondent. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, the Florida Department of Corrections, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, a rule of the Respondent, governs the placement of an inmate in "administrative confinement". "Administrative confinement" is "the removal of an inmate from the general inmate population for . . . " various specified reasons. Rule 33-3.0081(1), Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated September 27, 1990, the Respondent advised the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee"), of proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Be letter dated November 5, 1990, M. Catherine Green, an attorney with the Committee, informed the Respondent that a review of the proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, had been completed. Ms. Green also informed the Respondent of certain "technical errors" and "substantive errors" that she found with Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Green indicated that a "substantive error" referred to "errors which will result in recommended objections to the committee unless they are eliminated prior to adoption." Among the "substantive errors" identified by Ms. Green, was a comment concerning the following portion of Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code: (3) Placement in administrative confinement shall be for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results. Ms. Green's comment concerning the portion of Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, quoted in finding of fact 9 was, in pertinent part, as follows: What does "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" mean? This has the effect of not notifying the inmate of the length of time in which he will be in administrative confinement and the criteria to be considered in releasing him or her. The rule discusses criteria for placing inmates in administrative confinement, but sets no criteria other than "desired results" as to when an inmate shall be released. If the two criteria are the same, please make that clear. Another of the "substantive errors" identified by Ms. Green, was a comment concerning the following portion of Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code: (4)(a) An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement by the senior correctional officer after an informal hearing when no reasonable alternative exists. The reason for placement shall be explained to the inmate, and he shall be given an opportunity to present his views on the matter to the senior correctional officer. When the senior correctional officer places an inmate in administrative confinement, this action shall be documented on a Report . . ., including the reasons for the action and a summary of the inmate's comments or objections. The inmate may also submit a written statement. Rule 33-3.0081(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, provides for review of the senior correctional officer's "informal hearing" and Rule 33-3.0081(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code, provides for a 48-hour delay in the "informal hearing" in case of certain emergencies. Ms. Green's comment concerning the portion of Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, quoted in finding of fact 11 was, in pertinent part, as follows: Please provide a cross reference to the rules of procedure for an informal hearing. Does the review procedure conflict with provisions of Chapter 33-29, F.A.C.? Please clarify what the phrase "when no reasonable alternative exists" means in reference to an inmate's confinement after an informal hearing. . . . . In a letter dated January 23, 1991, the Respondent, through a Senior Attorney, responded to Ms. Green's comments. The following response to Ms. Green's comments concerning Rule 33- 3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, was made: The Department of Corrections will delete the phrase "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" and replace it with "continue until the factors which created the need for protective management have been resolved". The Respondent subsequently proposed to amend Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, by deleting the phrase "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" and replacing it with the phrase "continue until the factors which created the need for protective management have been resolved". The proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, does not substantively change the circumstances under which an inmate placed in administrative confinement will be returned to the general inmate population. Under Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, prior to the proposed amendment, "the shortest time possible" occurred when the factors which necessitated placing an inmate in administrative confinement no longer applied. The proposed amendment merely clarifies when "the shortest time possible" has occurred. The following response to Ms. Green's comments concerning Rule 33- 3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, was also made in the January 23, 1991, letter: The Department of Corrections will delete the phrase "an informal hearing" and insert "being advised of an incident or situation which prohibits the inmate from remaining in open population without endangering himself or others or compromising the security of the institution". The Respondent subsequently proposed to amend Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, by deleting the terms "informal hearing" and replacing them with the following underlined language: (4)(a) An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement by the senior correctional officer after being advised of a situation or incident which prohibits the inmate from remaining in open population without endangering himself or others or compromising the security of the institution, if the situation cannot be resolved. The reason for placement shall be explained to the inmate, and he shall be given an opportunity to present his views on the matter to the senior correctional officer. When the senior correctional officer places an inmate in administrative confinement, this action shall be documented on a Report . . ., including the reasons for the action and a summary of the inmate's comments or objections. The inmate may also submit a written statement. . . . The proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, does not substantively change the manner in which an inmate is informed that he or she is being placed in administrative confinement. The "informal hearing" previously required in Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, required no more than the proposed amendment provides for. By eliminating the terms "informal hearing" the proposed rule amendment eliminates any confusion as to whether some more formal process is to be followed by the Respondent in informing an inmate that he or she is being placed in administrative confinement. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which contained the proposed amendments at issue in this proceeding was subsequently filed by the Respondent with the Bureau of Administrative Code, for publication, and with the Committee. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking included the following "purpose and effect" clause: The proposed amendments are needed in order to correct technical and substantive errors noted by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. The proposed amendments provide clarification of policies and procedures regarding administrative confinement and protective management. The purpose and effect clause is consistent with the substantive changes to Rule 33-3.0081(3) and (4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, at issue in this proceeding. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, at issue in this proceeding are arbitrary or capricious. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that any of the suggestions concerning Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, made by Ms. Green were ever approved, adopted, or reviewed by the Committee. In fact, Ms. Green indicates in her letter that "substantive errors" she perceived would be recommended as objections to the Committee only if they were not eliminated prior to adoption. Since the "substantive errors" at issue in this proceeding were eliminated, they were apparently never recommended or considered by the Committee.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since August 10, 1988, certified by the Commission as a correctional officer. He holds certificate number A86-502-07. Respondent has spent his entire career as a correctional officer with the Metro-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (hereinafter referred to as "Metro"). He currently holds the rank of corporal. On June 26, 1989, Respondent was a Correctional Officer I and assigned to the third floor of Metro's Pre-Trial Detention Center, which is also known as the Main Jail. He worked the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift that day. During the eight month period prior to June 26, 1989, Respondent served as the acting supervisor of the third floor of the Main Jail during his shift. June 26, 1989, was Corporal Darlene Beasley's first day as the Main Jail's new third floor supervisor during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift. Respondent was one of the officer's under her supervision that day. On June 26, 1989, the third floor of the Main Jail housed approximately 220 inmates in three separate wings, "A" Wing, "B" Wing and "C" Wing. John Breedlove was one of these inmates. Breedlove was 19 years old. His height was approximately five feet, eight inches. His weight was approximately 210 pounds. Breedlove had the privilege of being a trustee. Consequently, his cell was in "B" Wing, which housed all of the trustees on the floor. Trustees are inmates who are given various tasks to perform in and around the Main Jail. They perform these tasks under the supervision of a Labor Supervisor and receive monetary compensation and gain time for their services. As a general rule, trustees are accompanied to and from their work assignments by their Labor Supervisor, who signs them out when he or she takes them from the floor and signs them back in when he or she returns them to the floor. Sometimes, however, a staff member other than a Labor Supervisor will assume the responsibility of escorting trustees to and from their work assignments. Escorting trustees to and from their work assignments lessens the likelihood that they will be successful in any efforts they may make while they are out of their cells to obtain contraband and distribute the contraband to other inmates at the facility. On June 26, 1989, Breedlove was assigned trustee duty in the rear lobby of the Main Jail, which is located on the first floor of the facility. The work was to be performed during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift that day under the supervision of Labor Supervisor Ricardo Gibson. Gibson signed Breedlove out at the beginning of the shift and escorted him to his work assignment on the first floor. Sometime thereafter Breedlove asked Gibson if he could return to the third floor to get a haircut and take care of some laundry. Gibson replied that Breedlove could do so, but only after he had completed his work assignment. Later that day, after he had done some, but not all, of the work he had been assigned, Breedlove encountered Beasley, who was on the first floor to obtain information concerning the whereabouts of certain inmates assigned to her floor. Breedlove told Beasley that he had completed his work assignment and requested that she escort him to the third floor. Beasley complied with Breedlove's request. Respondent had just finished giving the inmates in "A" Wing their dinner meal when he noticed Breedlove sitting on a bench outside the attorney interview rooms located on the third floor. Respondent asked Breedlove what he was doing there. Breedlove responded that he had returned to the floor to get a haircut and to do his laundry. Respondent admonished Breedlove for being on the floor and instructed him to return to his work assignment. Respondent thereupon continued his feeding of the inmates on the floor. After he had delivered to the inmates in "B" Wing their dinner meal, Respondent again saw Breedlove outside the attorney interview rooms. Respondent asked Breedlove what he was still doing there and reminded him that he had been told to return to his work assignment. Gibson then arrived on the scene. He too admonished Breedlove for leaving his work assignment. After Gibson arrived, Respondent continued his feeding of the inmates on the floor. After he finished feeding the inmates in "C" Wing, Respondent observed that, notwithstanding his and Gibson's prior admonishments, Breedlove was still on the floor. Respondent approached Breedlove and asked him why he had not followed his instructions to leave the floor and return to his work assignment. Breedlove's response was that Beasley had brought him back to the floor. Respondent then went to speak about the matter with Beasley, who was doing paperwork in the control booth on the floor. The control booth is a secure enclosed area situated adjacent to the third floor lobby where the elevators are located. It is constructed of concrete, concrete block, one quarter inch thick polished wire glass and steel mesh. Manning the control booth is a Correctional Aide, who from his vantage point in the front of the booth can look through the glass and observe activity that is taking place in the lobby area of the floor as well as on the corridors of all three wings of the floor. Correctional Aide Harold McCartney was manning the control booth during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift on June 26, 1989. Beasley was seated at a desk behind McCartney. Respondent walked up to Beasley and asked her if she had brought Breedlove back up to the floor. Beasley indicated that she had. Respondent and Beasley then discussed the matter further. The discussion resulted in Beasley agreeing to take Breedlove back downstairs to the rear lobby to finish his work assignment. She thereupon retrieved Breedlove. She then walked to the elevators on the floor. Breedlove followed behind her. Correctional Aide Gregory McKenzie was also waiting for an elevator to go downstairs. The elevator stopped and McKenzie and Beasley walked on. Just as Breedlove was about to walk on to the elevator, he uttered, in an irritated tone of voice, some profanity. Respondent heard Breedlove. This was the final straw as far as Respondent was concerned. He believed that Breedlove was no longer deserving of the privilege of being a trustee. Respondent therefore told Breedlove that he was "busted." In jail parlance, "busted" means removed from trustee status. Any correctional officer in the Main Jail has the authority to "bust" a trustee. Respondent ordered Breedlove to get off the elevator and to go to his cell to pack his belongings. Breedlove got off the elevator and appeared to be headed in the direction of his cell in "B" Wing when he stopped, turned around and just stared at Respondent. Respondent reacted by repeating his order that Breedlove go to his cell. Breedlove, however, did not move. Respondent then started walking towards Breedlove. Breedlove then turned his back to Respondent and made an obscene remark directed at Respondent. Given Breedlove's defiance, Respondent reasonably felt that he needed to take control of the situation and physically guide Breedlove to his cell. He thus walked up to Breedlove, who was somewhere between two to eight feet from the front of the control booth, and put his hand on Breedlove's shoulder to lead him to his cell. As Respondent grabbed Breedlove by the shoulder, Breedlove suddenly started to pull away. Respondent followed after Breedlove, grabbing him by the back of his pants while trying to maintain the grasp he had on his shoulder. The struggle ended abruptly when Respondent fell on top of Breedlove and they both went to floor. Before hitting the ground, Breedlove struck his face on one of the glass panels of the control booth, breaking the glass as well as the wires inside the glass. Although it may have appeared otherwise to those who witnessed the incident, Respondent did not intentionally push or shove Breedlove into the control booth glass. The only force that Respondent purposely used against Breedlove was that which was reasonably necessary to overcome Breedlove's physical resistance to Respondent's directives that he return to his cell. Breedlove started to bleed profusely after hitting the glass. Blood was streaming down his face and onto to his shirt. Respondent was more fortunate than Breedlove. He did not come in contact with any glass. He was startled by the breaking of the glass, but uninjured. After falling to the ground, he got off of Breedlove and backed away to regain his composure. He stood by as Beasley rushed to Breedlove's aid. Beasley helped Breedlove to his feet and took him to the jail clinic to receive medical assistance. Although Respondent did not offer any assistance, his help was not needed inasmuch as Beasley had the situation under control. Breedlove suffered multiple lacerations on his right cheek as a result of the incident. At the jail clinic, bandages were wrapped around his face to control the bleeding. Because of the nature of the injury, Breedlove was referred to Jackson Memorial Hospital (hereinafter referred to as "Jackson") for further treatment. At Jackson, Breedlove was seen by a nurse practitioner. A small piece of glass was removed from his right check and he received six stitches. After taking Breedlove to the clinic, Beasley went to the office of the shift commander, Lieutenant Francie D'Erminio, to report what had happened between Respondent and Breedlove. A short time thereafter, Respondent arrived at D'Erminio's office to tell her about the incident. D'Erminio ordered that the matter be investigated. An internal investigation of the incident was conducted. Following the completion of the internal investigation, Respondent was given a 15 day suspension by Metro. Respondent successfully appealed his suspension. He subsequently was promoted to corporal.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding the evidence insufficient to prove that Respondent is guilty, as charged, of having failed to maintain "good moral character" in violation of Section 943.1395, Florida Statutes, and (2) based upon such a finding, dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against him. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of August, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1993.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners were inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution in Raiford, Florida. Respondent has stipulated that Petitioners have "standing" to challenge the rules and the policy and procedure directives which are the subject of this proceeding. At the time the petition in this cause was filed, Petitioners challenged the validity of Rule 33-3.081, Florida Administrative Code, as it existed as of its latest revision on May 22, 1981. However, subsequent to the filing of the petition in this cause, and prior to the date of final hearing, Respondent amended Rule 33-3.081, and filed these amendments with the office of the Secretary of State on June 23, 1983. At final hearing in this cause, the parties stipulated to the Petitioners maintaining a challenge to newly amended Rule 33-3.081(4), (5), and (9)(a) and (d), Florida Administrative Code. On or about November 30, 1979, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.11, which was subsequently revised on June 14, 1981. This directive contains 13 separately titled sections. The first section, entitled Authority, simply lists the authority, both statutory and rule-based, for issuance of the directive. Section three contains definitions which, with a single exception not relevant here, are identical to those contained in Rule 33-3.081(2). Sections four through thirteen likewise recapitulate provisions contained in Respondent's rules or in relevant statutes. The following is a list of titles of sections four through thirteen, each of which is followed with a parenthetical reference of the rule provision substantially incorporated therein: Staff Selection (33- 3.081(10)); Basis for Placement (33-3.081(1)); Placement (33-3.081(4)); Protection Cases (33-3.082); Visiting (33-3.081 (5)); Gain Time (33-11.11 and Section 944.28, Florida Statutes); Review of Administrative Confinement (33- 3.081(6)); Self-Improvement Programs (33-081(7)); Facilities (33-3.081(8)); General Provisions (33-3.081(9)(a)-(k)). Sections 13(l) and (m) of the policy and procedure directive essentially reiterate the provisions of Rule 33-3.081(6) and 33-3.081 (11) , respectively. On or about June 14, 1981, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.20, entitled "Discipline." This directive which purportedly issued pursuant to the authority contained in Sections 944.09, 944.14, 944.15, 944.28 and 945.21, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-3.08, Florida Administrative Code. In fact, each of the 20 separately numbered portions of this directive substantially recapitulate requirements already contained in Rule 33-3.08, Florida Administrative Code. The single exception is Section 7 of the directive, entitled Administrative Confinement, which finds its support in Rule 33-3.081. Neither Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.11 nor Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.20 purport to create or otherwise adversely affect rights of inmates in any manner which differs from corresponding provisions of Rules 33- 3.081, 33-3.08 or the provisions of the Florida Statutes cited as authority for issuance of the policy and procedure directive. Rather, the rights of inmates are specifically determinable pursuant to those cited statutory provisions and the requirements of Rules 33-3.081 and 33-3.08, and the challenged policy and procedure directives simply recapitulate the requirements contained therein.
