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GLADYS L. WHALEY vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 95-000059 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jan. 09, 1995 Number: 95-000059 Latest Update: Oct. 06, 1995

The Issue The central issue is whether the Petitioner is entitled to modify her deceased husband's retirement benefit option.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact. Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Lamar W. Whaley, Jr., deceased. From 1972 to 1990, Mr. Whaley was employed by the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners (Board) and as such was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Whaley retired from his position as a minibus driver with the Board on June 29, 1990. In anticipation of his retirement, Mr. Whaley filed an FR-9 Form with the Division of Retirement (Division). The FR-9 Form, entitled "Request for Audit," was signed by Mr. Whaley and dated November 6, 1989. The FR-9 Form is used by members of the Florida Retirement System who want estimates of the monthly payments which they will receive after they retire. The FR-9 Form provided a space where Mr. Whaley could list the name and birthdate of a joint annuitant. On the FR-9 Form, Mr. Whaley named the Petitioner and the Petitioner's birthdate in these spaces. On the line immediately after the spaces provided for name and birthdate of the joint annuitant, the FR-9 expressly states that "This is not an official beneficiary designation." By listing a joint annuitant and that individual's birthday on the FR-9 Form, the Division is able to calculate the monthly benefits that would be payable to a member under each of the four retirement options available. In response to Mr. Whaley's audit request, the Division calculated the amount of the monthly payments he and/or his survivor would receive under the four retirement options available. On or about November 22, 1989, the Division sent Mr. Whaley information which reflected an estimate of the monthly benefits he and/or his survivor would receive under each of the four retirement options from which he was eligible to select. Included with the estimate of retirement benefits sent to Mr. Whaley, was a document entitled, "What Retirement Option Should I Choose?". This information sheet listed sent to Mr. Whaley listed and described the four different options. In 1990, members of the Retirement System contemplating retirement were provided a Division Form FR-11, Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement (Application). The application listed the four different options and provided a brief description of each. Next to Option 1 was the following: "Benefit for the Member Only." A further notation on the application read, "SEE THE REVERSE SIDE FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THESE OPTIONS." The Application adequately described the consequences of the election of each option. The explanation read as follows: Option 1: A monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. This option does not provide continuing benefit to a beneficiary. Upon your death, the monthly benefit will stop and you beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions you paid which are in excess of the amount you received in benefits. If you wish to provide a beneficiary with a continued monthly benefit after your death, you should consider selecting one of the other three options. The option 1 benefit is the maximum form of lifetime payment and all other optional payments are derived by applying actuarial factors to the option 1 benefit. Option 2: A reduced monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. If you die before receiving 120 monthly benefit payments, your designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit payment in the same amount as you were receiving until the total monthly benefit payments to both you and your beneficiary equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. Option 3: A reduced monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. Upon your death, your joint annuitant (spouse or financial dependent), if living, will receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount as you were receiving. No further benefits are payable after both you and your joint annuitant are deceased. Option 4: An adjusted monthly benefit payable to you while both you and your joint annuitant (spouse or financial dependent) are living. Upon the death of either you or your joint annuitant, the monthly benefit payable to the survivor is reduced to two- thirds of the monthly benefit you were receiving when both were living. No further benefits are payable after both you and your joint annuitant are deceased. (Emphasis in original text.) On January 12, 1990, Mr. Whaley executed an Application. The Application listed the Petitioner as beneficiary and indicated that the retirement option selected was Option 1. In selecting Option 1, Mr. Whaley rejected all other options. The fact that Petitioner was listed on the application as a beneficiary is of no consequence given that Mr. Whaley chose Option 1. An explanation on the back of the retirement application expressly states, "This option does not provide continuing benefit to a beneficiary." Because Mr. Whaley chose Option 1, Petitioner, as his beneficiary, would have been entitled only to a refund of Mr. Whaley's contributions in the event that Mr. Whaley's contribution exceeded the amount of monthly benefits paid to him before prior to his death. Petitioner did not assert, nor did the evidence establish that the refund provision in Option 1 applies in the instant case. Petitioner stated that Mr. Whaley could read and was not mentally impaired at the time he completed the retirement application, yet Petitioner testified that the agency did not explain to Mr. Whaley the benefits of the plan which he selected. According to the testimony of Stanley Colvin, administrator and supervisor of the Division's Survivor Benefits Section, staff members are available to provide counseling to members who come in or call with questions relative to their retirement. There is no record that Mr. Whaley ever contacted the Division with questions regarding the various options. The pastor of the church which Petitioner is a member testified that Mr. Whaley may have needed help to understand the ramifications of legal documents. Mr. Whaley's daughter also testified that her father may not have understood the retirement option he chose. Both the pastor and Mr. Whaley's daughter testified further that in conversations with Mr. Whaley, he had indicated to them that he had taken care of the legal work necessary to ensure that his was family was taken care of in the event of his death. Notwithstanding the testimony of Petitioner and others, there is no evidence that at the time Mr. Whaley selected Option 1 he did not fully understand the nature and effect of his selection. Neither does the evidence support the claim that the selection of Option 1 by Mr. Whaley was inconsistent with his desire or intention at the time the choice was made. At the time of Mr. Whaley's retirement, he was in good health. Given this fact it is not unusual that he selected the option that would provide him with the maximum monthly benefit. Statements by Mr. Whaley that he had taken care of matters and that "things were in order" do not provide substantial evidence that the selection of Option 1 by Mr. Whaley was made only because he did not fully understand the consequences of his choice. The testimony revealed that upon Mr. Whaley's death, the Petitioner was the beneficiary of his life insurance policy and also the recipient of benefits under his social security. Under these circumstances, Mr. Whaley's selection of Option 1 was not necessarily inconsistent with his statement that things "were in order" or his listing Petitioner as beneficiary on the Application. On several documents provided to and/or completed by Mr. Whaley, it was clearly stated that once a member begins to receive his benefit, the option selection cannot be changed. The information sheet, "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?," mailed to Mr. Whaley on or about November 22, 1989, contained the following provision: Option Choice Cannot Be Changed Once you begin to receive your benefit your option selection cannot be changed. Therefore, it is important to carefully study your personal circumstances before making your decision . . . . The Application submitted to the Division by Mr. Whaley on or about January 25, 1990, contained a statement that "[o]nce you retire, you cannot add additional service nor change options." Finally, the Acknowledgment of Retirement Application sent to Mr. Whaley by the Division on or about February 8, 1990, provided in relevant part the following: ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT CHECK IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED! Mr. Whaley received his first retirement check on or about the last working day in July 1990. Petitioner testified that Mr. Whaley cashed this check in July or August of that same year. By cashing that check, Mr. Whaley was precluded from thereafter changing his retirement option. By selecting Option 1, Mr. Whaley received the maximum benefits payable to him during his lifetime. However, under the provisions of retirement Option 1, upon Mr. Whaley's death, his beneficiary, the Petitioner is not entitled to receive any benefits.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a final order denying the request of Petitioner to modify the retirement benefits elected by Mr. Whaley, the deceased husband of Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0059 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1a-1c. Rejected as not being supported by competent and substantial evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1-6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7-8. Accepted. 9-11. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Gladys Whaley 3807 East Norfolk Street Tampa, Florida 33604 Robert B.Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Legal Office Cedars Executive Center-Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 265 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (4) 120.56120.57121.031121.091 Florida Administrative Code (2) 60S-4.00260S-4.010
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EVELYN S. WRIGHT vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 75-000187 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-000187 Latest Update: Jun. 16, 1975

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, EVELYN S. WRIGHT, as an employee of Metropolitan Dade County and a member of the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System, elected to transfer into the Florida Retirement System (FRS) effective December 1, 1970. (Exhibit 3) On April 10, 1972, Petitioner terminated her employment with Metropolitan Dade County and applied for FRS disability retirement benefits pursuant to Section 121.091(4), Florida Statutes, on May 22, 1972. (Exhibit 2) Petitioner's application for FRS disability retirement benefits was initially denied by the Administrator of the Florida Retirement System on August 21, 1972. (Exhibit 4) On January 6, 1975, Petitioner inquired of the Supervisor of the Respondent's Disability Determination Unit, Mr. David Ragsdale, as to the possibility of withdrawing the accumulated contributions in her retirement account. At this time, Petitioner, was advised by Mr. Ragsdale that a withdrawal of contributions would cancel her membership rights in the Florida Retirement System. (TR - p.9) Respondent forwarded to Petitioner, by letter dated January 7, 1975, the appropriate form for making application for a refund of accumulated retirement contributions. The transmittal letter specifically advised the Petitioner that, "Should you complete and return the enclosed card, M81, you would have no further rights or service credit with the Division of Retirement." (Exhibit 5) On January 14, 1975, Petitioner executed, and her employer verified, an application for refund of accumulated retirement contributions. The application form clearly stipulated: "I hereby make application for refund of my accumulated contributions in the Florida Retirement System. I do hereby waive for myself, my heirs and assignees all rights, title and interest in the Florida Retirement System." (Exhibit 6) Petitioner's application for refund of contributions was received by the Respondent on January 17, 1975. Respondent refunded to Petitioner her accumulated contributions in the amount of $3,056.02 by Voucher No. 237738, Warrant No. 0309435, dated January 28, 1975. (Exhibit 6) The attorney for Petitioner, John H. Abramson, was advised by the undersigned hearing officer by telephone that Leave to Take Deposition was granted. By letter from the said attorney the Division was notified that Petitioner's file was being closed.

Florida Laws (1) 121.091
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BOBBIE JONES SCOTT vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 96-003761 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Walton Beach, Florida Aug. 09, 1996 Number: 96-003761 Latest Update: Oct. 10, 1997

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to disability retirement benefits calculated as if she had reached the age of 65, irrespective of her true age.

Findings Of Fact From April 1969 until March 1996, Petitioner, Bobbie Jones Scott, was employed as a school teacher by the Okaloosa County School Board. She served 27 years as an elementary school teacher, teaching at the same Okaloosa County elementary school for her entire tenure. Prior to commencing her teaching career, Petitioner served as a library aide in Okaloosa County for the full 9-month term of that position in the 1967-1968 school year. Petitioner is a member of the TRS. The TRS was closed to new members on December 1, 1970. Since closure, teachers have been enrolled in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). At some point, Petitioner purchased retirement credits in TRS for the school year during which Petitioner served as a library aide. Early retirees under both TRS and FRS, retiring without disability, have their retirement benefits actuarially reduced by five percent per year or five-twelfths percent per month for each year or fraction of year that the retiree is under the age of 62. See, Section 121.021(30), Florida Statutes and Rule 6S-7.003, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner first inquired about retirement in 1993, when her husband, also a teacher, retired. She requested and obtained from the Division an estimate of early retirement benefits. In 1993, the early retirement penalty reduced Petitioner's retirement benefit to 67.9 percent of her normal retirement benefit. The reduction was so great that Petitioner elected to keep teaching. On October 16, 1994, Petitioner severely injured her arm when she slipped on a freshly waxed floor at the elementary school. Several surgical procedures were required over the next two years as a result of this accident. Despite extensive physical therapy, Petitioner did not regain full range of motion and full use of her dominant right arm. Petitioner could not raise her arm above shoulder level and could not raise it high enough to write on a blackboard. The injury clearly interfered significantly with Petitioner's ability to teach. In December 1994, because of her injury, Petitioner requested an estimate of retirement benefits. Again, the early retirement penalty reduced the retirement benefit to 77.9 percent of normal benefits. The reduction was so great that Petitioner could not afford to retire. Approximately three months after her accident on January 17, 1995, the Petitioner returned to teaching. Her physical therapy and surgical treatment continued. In June 1995, while recuperating from the third operation on her arm, Petitioner called the Division of Retirement to request information on disability retirement. She specifically told the person she spoke with that she was a member of TRS. Petitioner was sent an application form and instructions for retirement under FRS instead of an application and instructions for TRS. At that time, the Petitioner did not submit the application because a decision on the application would not be reached before the start of the 1995-1996 school year. Petitioner wished to avoid commencing the school year, only to leave teaching several weeks into the school year, necessitating finding and hiring a replacement teacher and disrupting the students’ course of studies. In November 1995, Petitioner was diagnosed with diabetes. Teaching was becoming detrimental to Petitioner's health. At the urging of her physician she elected to pursue disability retirement. The Petitioner reviewed a booklet sent to her by Respondent entitled "Florida Retirement System Disability Benefits." The Petitioner relied on the statement on page 27 of the booklet which states, "Disability benefits are not reduced for early retirement." Based on that statement Petitioner applied for disability retirement and submitted the disability retirement application which she had received earlier along with the requisite supporting documentation on January 10, 1996. Neither the FRS disability retirement application form nor the FRS Disability Retirement Handbook informed Petitioner that there would be an early retirement penalty for disability retirees. However, the FRS literature also indicates that employees who are members of other retirement systems may be governed by different rules and should look to those other retirement systems. Unfortunately, Petitioner had been given the wrong information by the Division of Retirement even though she had specified she was a member of TRS. On February 9, 1996, after receiving Petitioner's application, the Division of Retirement sent a letter to Petitioner advising her that the incorrect disability retirement application form had been used. A TRS Disability Retirement Application form was enclosed with the letter. Only the title of the application was changed. In essence, the TRS application was the same as the FRS application. No booklet or pamphlet explaining the TRS system was provided. On February 14, 1996, immediately upon her receipt of the February 9, letter and the TRS Disability Retirement Application form, Petitioner telephoned the Division of Retirement and spoke with Mark Sadler, a retirement administrator in the disability determination section within the Division of Retirement. The Petitioner explained that she had used the disability retirement forms provided to her by the Division. She inquired as to whether an additional 30 days would be needed to process her application. She also indicated that the reason she was still working and had not retired previously is that she could not afford to be assessed the early retirement penalty. Mr. Sadler informed the Petitioner that she would need to submit the correct TRS Disability Retirement application. However, Mr. Sadler agreed to accept the physician’s report of disability already submitted with the FRS form and to expedite her request for disability retirement since the medical information which Petitioner had submitted met the TRS requirements for disability documentation. On or about March 7, 1996, Petitioner received notification from the Division of Retirement that her application for disability retirement had been approved. The next day, Petitioner met with Virginia Bowles, a benefits specialist with the Okaloosa County School Board, to obtain an estimate of her retirement benefits under Plan E of the TRS system. Mrs. Bowles prepared an estimate of Petitioner’s benefits. The estimate did not show any reduction of benefits for early retirement. The form Ms. Bowles prepared was clearly labeled "estimate" and provided, inter alia, that Petitioner would receive a calculation of her retirement benefits from the Division of Retirement in approximately three weeks. While in Mrs. Bowles’ office, Petitioner insisted on confirmation from the Division of Retirement that an early retirement penalty would not be imposed on her benefits. In the Petitioner’s presence, Mrs. Bowles called the Division of Retirement to verify that there was no early retirement penalty for disability retirees. Mrs. Bowles was assured that there was no such penalty. Mrs. Bowles immediately relayed that information to Petitioner. Based on this representation, Petitioner immediately resigned her position on March 8, to be effective March 13, 1996.1 Had Petitioner known there would be a reduction in her disability retirement benefits and had she not received incorrect information from both the Division of Retirement and the Okaloosa County School Board, she would have found some way to continue working to avoid the early retirement penalty even though continued employment would have been detrimental to her health.2 At the time of her retirement, Petitioner had attained the age of 58 years and 4 months, 44 months short of the normal retirement of age 62. The estimate prepared by Ms. Bowles reflected that Petitioner's monthly retirement benefit would fall between $1,458.20 and $1,512.41. At the time of her resignation, Petitioner was earning over $39,000 per year as an experienced teacher. Once Petitioner resigned her position, she could not immediately return to work. Board policy required her to wait one year before re-employment and then she could be rehired at a starting teacher’s salary of about $21,000. A couple of weeks after resigning her position, Petitioner received a calculation of her retirement benefits from the Division of Retirement. The benefits were significantly lower than the estimate of benefits prepared by Mrs. Bowles. Retirement benefits under Plan E are calculated by, first, determining an "average final compensation," or AFC, for an employee by averaging the 10 highest years of salary in the employee’s last 15 years of employment. The employee’s compensation percentage, or "comp percent," is then determined by assigning a 2 percent value for every year of creditable service. The AFC is then multiplied by the comp percent to arrive at a retirement benefits figure. In Petitioner’s case, the Division calculated AFC as $32,601.10. The Division, based on 27.9 years of service, arrived at a comp percent of .558, resulting in a normal retirement allowance of $18,191.41 per year or $1,515.95 per month.3 However, because Ms. Scott fell into the early retirement category under TRS her benefits were reduced. In calculating Petitioner’s disability benefits, the Division of Retirement reduced the otherwise normal retirement benefit calculation by 18.33 percent to 81.667 percent of her normal benefit. The reduction resulted in a monthly retirement benefit of $1,238.03. The reduction is the result of a five- twelfths of one percent reduction for each month that Petitioner was short of age 62 and is the correct benefit calculation under TRS. See Rule 6S-7.003, Florida Administrative Code.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Retirement calculated Petitioner’s benefits correctly and is not estopped from reducing Petitioner’s benefits based on her status as a disability retiree. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1997.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57121.021238.03238.07601.10
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SHEAH RARBACK vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 86-003653 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003653 Latest Update: Jun. 05, 1987

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witness and her demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: Petitioner, Sheah Rarback is the daughter, and Petitioner Mae Rarback is the wife of Paul Rarback, deceased. Paul Rarback and Mae Rarback were married for over forty (40) years. Paul Rarback commenced employment in a permanent position with the Human Resources Department, Metropolitan Dade County, in December of 1973. Mr. Rarback was employed as a food services manager. On December 23, 1973, Paul Rarback enrolled with the Florida Retirement System and submitted a Personnel History Record Form FRS-MIO to the Division of Retirement. On the form, Paul Rarback listed his two grandsons, Hod and Caynon Rabino, as beneficiaries and Sheah Rarback as contingent beneficiary for the purpose of receiving benefits in the event of his death. On February 1, 1985, Paul Rarback requested an Application for Disability Retirement from his employer because of polymyositis (muscle atrophy). On February 23, 1985, Paul Rarback's employment with Metropolitan Dade County officially ended. Rarback's personnel file indicated that his employment was terminated with a code E/G, which is a retirement code. On March 18, 1985, Paul Rarback completed his "Application for Disability Retirement," Division of Retirement Form FR-13. Rarback listed his daughter Sheah Rarback as the beneficiary and chose "Option 1: Maximum Benefit." The FR-13 form listed four different options as follows: Option 1: Maximum Benefit Full benefit payable to the member for his lifetime. If death occurs before the total benefits paid to member equals the contributions made, the difference, if any, is refunded to beneficiary in a lump sum payment. Option 2: Ten Years Certain Lifetime benefit to member, but not less than 120 monthly payments to someone. A decreased retirement benefit payable to a member during his lifetime and, in the event of his death within a period of ten (10) years after his retirement, the same monthly amount shall be payable for the balance of such ten (10) year period to his beneficiary, or in case the beneficiary is deceased, in accordance with Section 121.091(8), Florida Statutes, as though no beneficiary has been named. Option 3: A reduced monthly benefit payable to the retired member for his lifetime and upon his death a monthly benefit in the same amount is payable to his joint annuitant (spouse or other dependent designated at retirement), if living, for the lifetime of that person. Option 4: A reduced monthly benefit payable to the retired member while he and his joint annuitant are both living. Upon the death of either the retired member or his joint annuitant, the monthly benefit payable to the survivor for the lifetime of that person is reduced to two-thirds of the original benefit even if it is the retired member who is the survivor. During the previous ten years, Mae Rarback had become increasingly senile, was unable to care for herself and had been placed in various nursing homes. Mae Rarback is presently in Douglas Gardens Nursing Home, Miami, Florida, where she has been for the past four years. By letter dated June 27, 1985, the Division of Retirement advised Paul Rarback that it intended to deny his request for disability retirement benefits because the medical documentation submitted did not support his claim of permanent and total disability. In addition, Rarback was advised that he could apply for early service retirement, with a reduction in benefits of 5 percent for each year under age 62 or in the alternative, he could request a refund of his retirement contributions and cancel his membership with the system. The last paragraph of the letter stated in part as follows: . . . before a final decision is made, the Director wants you to have the opportunity to submit additional medical evidence or a written statement, if you wish to challenge the grounds on which he intends to act. If you chose to submit additional evidence or written statement, it will be considered in making the final decision. On June 29, 1985, Paul Rarback died in Miami, Florida. By letter dated February 26, 1986, the Respondent advised Sheah Rarback, through her attorney, that according to their files, the primary beneficiary of Paul Rarback's account was Sheah Rarback, designated on March 28, 1985. On or about July 23, 1986, Petitioner Sheah Rarback received notification from the Division of Retirement that she would receive only the accumulated contribution of Paul Rarback to the retirement account in the amount of $887.67.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioners' request that the designation of beneficiary be reformed to allow Mae Rarback to receive the benefits from her deceased husband's retirement account as though she had originally been designated the beneficiary and joint annuitant be DENIED and the petition DISMISSED. DONE AND ORDERED this 5th day of June 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Stewart Marcus, Esquire 2251 S.W. 22nd Street Miami, Florida 33145 Burton M. Michaels, Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street Building C - Suite 207 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (1) 121.091
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VERNON TAYLOR BELL vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 81-002499 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002499 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1982

The Issue May Petitioner make an application with Respondent for disability retirement benefits when he was already applied for and has received regular retirement payments?

Findings Of Fact Mr. Vernon Taylor Bell voluntarily terminated his employment with the Department of Legal Affairs on February 26, 1980. By that date he had accumulated 23.66 years of service for credit in the Florida Retirement System. After his termination Mr. Bell had a conference with a retirement benefits specialist, Ms. Taylor, who is an employee of Respondent. At Mr. Bell's request she gave him an estimate of his retirement benefits for a regular retirement. She did not discuss the benefits which a disabled retiree might receive. The testimony of Ms. Taylor and Mr. Bell is in conflict on whether or not she discussed disability retirement benefits with him. Ms. Taylor's testimony is accepted as being more credible because Mr. Bell was shown throughout his testimony to have a poor memory. Mr. Bell began to receive regular retirement benefits in the monthly amounts of $178.32 on May 30, 1980. Since that date he has continued to receive and accept regular retirement payments. Petitioner has cashed or deposited his first benefit check. If Mr. Bell were to be granted disability retirement benefits rather than regular retirement benefits, his monthly payment would be substantially increased. Petitioner did not present credible evidence that he was misinformed or mislead by Respondent about the relative advantages to him in electing to apply for regular retirement as opposed to applying for disability benefits. On August 26, 1980, Mr. Bell wrote a letter to Mr. Andrew M. McMullian III, who is the State Retirement Director. Mr. Bell stated that he had been given incorrect information about the disability benefits he might be eligible for. He requested that he be allowed to make an application as a disabled retiree. On October 1, 1980, Mr. McMullian responded to Mr. Bell in a letter which states in part: We have reviewed your retirement account and have determined the information provided to you by this office was correct regarding your retirement eligibility. We regret if there was any misunderstanding on your part re- garding disability retirement; however, we cannot honor your request to be retired with disability at this late date, because you applied for regular retirement which was approved for you effective April 1, 1980. Your initial monthly benefit was $178.32 and your July 1980 benefit payment contained a cost-of-living increase, thus your current monthly benefit is $179.73. The Florida Retirement System law requires certification by two licensed physicians in Florida that one is totally and permanently disabled and unable to render any useful and efficient work before this agency can approve an employee for retirement with disability. Apparently, you made no attempt to retire with disability, other than discussing the matter in general with us, and according to our records, you made no application for disability retirement. Further, a retiree is not allowed by law to change his type of re- tirement once he begins drawing monthly re- tirement benefits.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the State Retirement Director enter a Final Order authorizing Mr. Bell is submit an application for disability retirement benefits. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Department of Administration Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24 day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Silas R. Eubanks, Esquire 103 North Gadsden Street Post Office Box 4266 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 William Frieder, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091
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VIVIAN RENAUD vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 15-001528 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallevast, Florida Mar. 18, 2015 Number: 15-001528 Latest Update: Jun. 24, 2015

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s husband’s selection of Option 1 for his pension plan benefits could be changed.

Findings Of Fact Mrs. Renaud, who is deaf, was married to Mr. Renaud for approximately 40 years. Mr. Renaud was employed by the State of Florida as a correctional officer at all times relevant hereto. He entered the State retirement program (in the pension plan) in November 1994. Mr. Renaud was in the “special risk” category of retirement class based on his position as a correctional officer. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud signed and submitted a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Service Retirement” form to the Department, indicating his intent to retire. The application was signed and notarized; it designated Mrs. Renaud as the sole beneficiary of his retirement benefits. On the same day, Mr. Renaud signed an “Option Selection” form, wherein he designated which of four payment options he wanted to utilize for payment of his retirement income. He selected Option 1, which states: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. The form also contains the following statement: “I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options or change my type of retirement . . . once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed, deposited or when my Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) participation begins.” The option selection form was signed by Mr. Renaud and notarized by a certified notary public. Inasmuch as Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, it was necessary that he and his designated beneficiary (Mrs. Renaud) also fill out form SA-1, the “Spousal Acknowledgement” form. On the acknowledgement form, Mr. Renaud indicated that he was married. Mrs. Renaud then signed the “spousal acknowledgement” portion of the form. The acknowledgement statement included this statement: “I, Vivian Renaud, being the spouse of the above named member [Mr. Renaud], acknowledge that the member has selected either Option 1 or 2.” Option 2 provides for continued benefits during the retiring person’s lifetime. However, benefits to the person’s spouse will continue for only a 10-year period. If the retiring person dies within the first 10 years of retirement, the spouse would only receive benefits for the balance of the 10-year period starting at the retirement date. The benefits under Option 2 are, therefore, limited in nature. The state retirement system requires a person selecting Option 1 or Option 2 to have their spouse acknowledge that selection choice because those benefits have finite ending dates, whereas retirement benefits under the other options continue as long as either the retiree or his/her beneficiary is living. By letter dated October 30, 2013, the Department acknowledged receipt of Mr. Renaud’s retirement application. The letter referenced the date the application was received (October 24, 2013) and the option Mr. Renaud had selected (Option 1). The letter was mailed to Mr. Renaud’s address of record, the same address he listed in his retirement application. The letter was sent to Mr. Renaud some 30 days before the first retirement benefit check was deposited in his account. Mrs. Renaud does not remember seeing the letter, but inasmuch as it was addressed to Mr. Renaud, her recollection of its receipt is not relevant. After Mr. Renaud’s death, his family found numerous un-opened letters in his car; the acknowledgement letter from the Department could well have been in that group. Mr. Renaud retired on November 1, 2013. His first payment of retirement benefits was transferred to his bank by way of electronic fund transfer, commonly referred to as direct deposit, on November 27, 2013. The gross amount of his monthly retirement benefit was $1,987.85; the net amount was $1,937.75 after $30.09 had been deducted for taxes. At that time, Mr. Renaud had not signed form W4P, the form which showed how many dependents the retiree was claiming for tax purposes. After later filling out that form (in which he indicated he would prefer to file as “single” for tax purposes), his monthly net benefit was reduced to about $1,735. Mr. Renaud received a direct deposit of retirement benefits on December 31, 2013; on January 31, 2014; and again on February 28, 2014. Mr. Renaud passed away on March 26, 2014, only five months after commencing his retirement. In accordance with the provisions of Option 1, Mr. Renaud’s retirement benefits ceased at that time. His beneficiary was entitled to payment for the entire month that he expired, but was not to be provided any further retirement benefits. Thus, a final payment was deposited in Mr. Renaud’s account on March 31, 2014. Mrs. Renaud was provided notice of the cessation of retirement benefits due to Mr. Renaud’s death. She timely filed a protest, seeking to have the payment of benefits reinstated. The Department denied her request, resulting in the instant matter. It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, Mrs. Renaud acknowledged that Mr. Renaud had selected either Option 1 or Option 2, and that retirement benefits were directly deposited to Mr. Renaud’s bank account for several months. Mr. and Mrs. Renaud’s signatures were duly notarized and have a presumption of legitimacy. Mrs. Renaud disagrees as to whether Mr. Renaud’s selection of Option 1 was legitimate, legal, or proper under the circumstances as she views them. First, Mrs. Renaud contends that Mr. Renaud was not mentally well at the time he signed the option selection form. The basis for her contention is that Mr. Renaud had experienced some seizure-related behavior during the year prior to signing the form. He had driven his car north on US Highway 301 one day in July 2012, “heading to work,” but ended up in Georgia without remembering why or how he got there. He later apparently lost his driver’s license because of the seizures (although the testimony on that issue was not clear).1/ Mr. Renaud worked for approximately 15 more months after his inexplicable drive to Georgia. Mrs. Renaud also argued that Mr. Renaud’s signatures on the three different forms he signed on October 24, 2013, were not similar to each other, indicating in her mind that he was having some sort of medical or psychological difficulty at that time. Inasmuch as there could have been any number of reasons the signatures were different (whether he was in a hurry, what base existed under the paperwork, etc.), there is insufficient evidence to determine why the signatures did not match. Mrs. Renaud’s testimony regarding the signatures is not persuasive. Ed Renaud said Mr. Renaud had been forced to retire due to his medical condition, i.e., that he had lost his driver’s license due to having seizures and the Department of Corrections would not let him work if he could not drive. However, Ed Renaud also said Mr. Renaud was able to continue working even when he was “forced” to retire. Again, the testimony on these facts was not clear. Mrs. Renaud said she should have been provided an interpreter on the day she signed the acknowledgement form. She did not state whether she requested an interpreter or whether the agency employee who provided her the form was aware of her disability.2/ Again, no one from Mr. Renaud’s employer, the Department of Corrections, testified at final hearing as to what happened on the day the forms were signed. Mrs. Renaud stated that she could read and write English, so she knew what she was signing.3/ She did claim to be confused as to whether her husband had selected Option 1 or Option 2, but candidly admitted that Mr. Renaud never told her one way or the other which option he had chosen. He only told her that he would “continue to provide for her in the future.” She believed the amount which was to be deposited in their account each month under Option 2 would be approximately $1900. The first check was in that approximate amount (due to the fact that Mr. Renaud had not established the amount of taxes to be deducted from his check at that time). The next five checks were in a lesser amount, approximately $1700. There is no evidence that Mrs. Renaud questioned the amount of the later checks. However, once the first check had been deposited in Mr. Renaud’s bank account, he would not have been allowed to change his option anyway. Lastly, Mrs. Renaud said her husband’s medical and mental condition was not conducive to making the option selection in October 2013. However, there was no competent evidence to support her claim. There was no direct testimony as to Mr. Renaud’s condition on the day he signed, nor as to whether he was or was not capable of understanding what he was signing. The only statement about his condition that day was that he wanted to park the car far enough away from the building that his co-workers could not see that Mrs. Renaud had driven the car. Ed Renaud also pointed out the issue of Mr. Renaud’s three signatures that day looking different from each other, but his lay opinion is not evidence upon which a finding of fact can be made as to Mr. Renaud’s mental condition. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud had not been adjudged mentally incapacitated and no guardian had been appointed. Ed Renaud said that Mr. Renaud still believed he could perform his work assignments at that time and did not want to retire. But, other than his wife, no one provided any evidence that Mr. Renaud did not understand what he was signing. Mrs. Renaud, however, could not say which option he had selected because he never told her. Her subsequent presumption that Mr. Renaud did not intend to choose Option 1 is not persuasive. It should be noted that selection of Option 1 by Mr. Renaud set his average pre-tax monthly benefit at around $1,900.00; had he chosen Option 2, the benefit would have been around $1,700. Thus, there was incentive to “roll the dice” and select Option 1, hoping that he would survive long enough to provide for his wife. In this case, sadly, that gamble did not pay off. The facts of this case are sad in that Mr. Renaud had every intention of providing for his wife financially as long as she lived. However, he either made a mistake when he selected his payment option or he attempted to tempt fate and hope for the best. In either case, once he made his selection and began receiving benefits, the die was cast. Based upon the facts as presented, there is no basis for overturning the Department’s denial of Mrs. Renaud’s requested amendment of the payment option.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services denying Petitioner's request for entitlement to her husband’s retirement benefits following his untimely death. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2015.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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T. G. GRANTHAM vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 89-002455 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-002455 Latest Update: Nov. 21, 1989

The Issue Whether an employee who has retired on ordinary early retirement and cashed more than 30 retirement checks should be heard on a claim made some two years or more after he retired that he is entitled to disability retirement benefits?

Findings Of Fact On January 15, 1983, petitioner Tommy Gene Grantham left the Escambia County Sheriff's Department after more than 14 years as a deputy sheriff. Respondent gave petitioner notice on April 27, 1983, of its intention to deny his application for disability benefits, which he had made on grounds he was "unable to lift, stand, or perform any type of physical exertion." Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. Petitioner took appropriate steps to cause his application for disability benefits to be placed on the agenda of the State Retirement Commission for its December 13, 1983, meeting. On the following day, the Commission entered a final order dismissing cause, which had the effect of denying the application. Respondent received petitioner's application for service retirement on December 4, 1986. Petitioner made this application because he needed the money. He had only recently been released from the Pavilion, a mental ward at a hospital in Pensacola, where he had been confined in a padded cell from November 15 to December 1, 1966. On December 10, 1986, respondent acknowledged receipt of the application. Respondent's Exhibit No. 4. The form acknowledgment said, "[O]nce you retire you can not add additional service nor change options. Retirement becomes final when the first benefit check is cashed." Respondent's Exhibit No. 4. By the time of the hearing in this matter, respondent had cashed more than 30 monthly retirement checks. Nancy Grantham has been married to the petitioner for 15 1/2 years although, between September 5, 1986, and February of 1987, she and her husband were legally separated. Over the years, according to Mrs. Grantham, her husband has suffered from serious mental problems. It was she who took him to the Pavilion on November 15, 1986, when, she recalls, he was "talking crazy," anxious, depressed, and apparently suicidal. At no time has any court adjudicated the petitioner incompetent. The respondent's policy is to honor elections made by retirement system members, even members seeking disability retirement on psychiatric grounds, in the absence of an adjudication of incompetency.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That respondent dismiss petitioner's application for disability retirement benefits. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 1989. APPENDIX With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 and 6, the agency actions were not final at those times. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2, 4 and 5 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3, it is not clear when the application was mailed. COPIES FURNISHED: Tommy G. Grantham 2266 Berrydale Road Cantonment, FL 32533 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 22399-1550

Florida Laws (2) 120.56120.57
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OBIE HADDEN vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 75-001054 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001054 Latest Update: Dec. 15, 1975

The Issue Prior to the hearing a short pre-hearing conference was held. It was stipulated to by the parties that Hadden was a member of the Florida Retirement System, had over 17 years of creditable service, and that Hadden could no longer perform the duties of an automotive mechanic because of his physical limitations. Hadden had applied for regular disability retirement benefits. The Division controverted Hadden's eligibility for such benefits on the basis that while Hadden could not perform the duties of an automotive mechanic that his physical condition did not prevent him from rendering useful and efficient service to the State in some other capacity calling for less strenuous activity.

Findings Of Fact Hadden is a white male, 51 years old, who worked as an automotive mechanic for Polk County for over 17 years. Hadden had had no formal schooling and can read and write very little. From Hadden's testimony and observations at the hearing regarding Identification of documents, it was apparent Hadden is functionally illiterate. Evidence was received that the former employer had indicated that there were no positions available for which Hadden was qualified. Hadden testified that he did do yard work at his home, mowing the lawn with a riding mower and weeding flower beds. However, Hadden indicated that if he became hot he would suffer pains in his chest and have to take his medication and lay down and rest for several hours. It appeared that even light physical work was beyond his capacity to perform on a regular continuing basis. Doctors' reports supporting Hadden's retirement application indicate that Hadden's physical condition will not improve and will probably worsen. Doctors restrict his activity to "mild" activity which is not strenuous or continuous. This would be consistent with Hadden's testimony regarding yard work. It should be noted that medical reports indicate that Hadden's heart condition is complicated by a nervous condition which restricts his ability to perform tedious manual work.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091
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THELMA H. DAMPIER vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 91-001489 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Mar. 05, 1991 Number: 91-001489 Latest Update: Jun. 11, 1991

The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner, Thelma H. Dampier, is entitled to consideration of her second application for disability retirement benefits based on the submission of new medical information.

Findings Of Fact Thelma H. Dampier was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS), Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and had more than ten years of creditable service. She terminated her employment in August, 1988. In October, 1988, Ms. Dampier applied for in-line-of-duty disability retirement under FRS. By its final action letter received by Ms. Dampier on July 27, 1989, the Division denied her application for disability benefits. Under the applicable procedural rules, Ms. Dampier had 21 days to file a petition for an administrative hearing before the State Retirement Commission. She failed to request a hearing on the denial of benefits and her right to a hearing ceased. On September 8, 1990, Ms. Dampier filed a second application for in- line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. The application included medical records from Doctors Evans, Andrews, Barrow, and Chance. The medical records of Doctors Evans and Andrews had been submitted with and considered in connection to the first application. The medical records of Doctors Chance and Barrow were submitted for the first time with the second application. The report of Dr. Barrow opines that Ms. Dampier is permanently and totally disabled, but it does not reflect her condition at the time she terminated employment or any connection between her condition and her employment. The report of Dr. Chance, a chiropractic physician, relates to neck, shoulder and lower back pain. The report does not state that Ms. Dampier is totally and permanently disabled. Instead, it states that Ms. Dampier suffers only mild degenerative changes. It also does not relate that opinion to the date on which her employment terminated. The Division has a policy set forth in a Memorandum for Record dated July 17, 1990, regarding handling of reapplications for disability benefits. The policy specifies that reapplications will be considered "only when the member presents information of the existence of a medical condition that existed prior to termination of employment--unknown at the time of the initial application." This policy is reasonable and consistent with the Chapter 121.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Division of Retirement enter a Final Order denying consideration of Thelma H. Dampier's second application for in-line-of-duty disability benefits. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division ofAdministrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Division of Retirement Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(3); and 4(4). Proposed findings of fact 5 and 6 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 7 is repetitive and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Thelma H. Dampier Post Office Box 342 Melrose, FL 32666 Stanley M. Danek Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Building C Tallahassee, FL 32399 A. J. McMullian III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Building C Tallahassee, FL 32399 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091
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