Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed by HRS at the Broward County Public Health Unit ("BCPHU") as a Fiscal Assistant II, a career service position. Petitioner began working for HRS in approximately August, 1973. From approximately July of 1986 through July of 1991, Petitioner's supervisor at BCPHU was Sylvia Villafana. During this time period, Ms. Villafana frequently counseled Petitioner regarding excessive absenteeism and tardiness which interfered with Petitioner's ability to meet necessary deadlines at work. Even before 1986, Petitioner's personnel record reflects excessive use of sick leave and problems with prompt and consistent attendance at work. These issues were discussed with Petitioner on several occasions. In March of 1991, Ms. Villafana scheduled a meeting for March 21, 1991, with Petitioner and Jeff Keiser, the personnel manager for BCPHU. At that meeting, Ms. Villafana intended to issue a written reprimand to Petitioner regarding excessive absenteeism. The March 21, 1991, meeting was scheduled to begin at 2:00. Petitioner left the BCPHU building at approximately 1:00 p.m. that day and did not attend the meeting. Petitioner contends that she was having chest pains and went to the hospital that afternoon. Petitioner did not advise her supervisor that she was leaving the premises. Petitioner did advise at least one co-worker at BCPHU that she was leaving. The next day, Petitioner's daughter called Ms. Villafana and told her that Petitioner was in the hospital. Ms. Villafana told Petitioner's daughter that documentation would be needed of Petitioner's medical problems. No records of Petitioner's hospitalization were ever presented to Ms. Villafana or any other HRS supervisor. Petitioner was apparently discharged from the hospital on the evening of March 22, 1991. Petitioner contends that she called Ms. Villafana on Monday, March 25, and told her that she was still under a doctor's care and that she would return to work as soon as he released her. Ms. Villafana contends that the telephone conversation did not occur until March 29, 1991. In any event, Petitioner did not ask for authorized leave. During the telephone conversation, Petitioner indicated that she had a doctor's appointment on April 2. Ms. Villafana told Petitioner that medical documentation of her problem would be necessary. On April 3, 1991, Petitioner did not return to work. At this point, Ms. Villafana had virtually no information regarding Petitioner's alleged illness and/or condition. Ms. Villafana inquired of other employees regarding Petitioner's condition, but was unable to learn anything more. On the afternoon of April 3, 1991, Petitioner contacted Ms. Villafana and indicated that she would be back to work on April 9, 1991. The April 3 conversation was acrimonious. Because there were several large project deadlines coming due, Ms. Villafana emphasized that medical documentation was needed to support Petitioner's claim of illness. Petitioner did not show up for work on April 9, 1991. On April 10, 1991, Petitioner called and told Ms. Villafana that she was mailing in notes from her doctors and then hung up. On April 11, 1991, Ms. Villafana found notes from two doctors on her desk. The notes were submitted into evidence at the hearing, but were not authenticated by the physicians who purportedly authored them. One of the notes was allegedly from Dr. Murillo, a cardiologist. This note indicated that Petitioner would be able to return to work on April 15, 1991. The second note was from Dr. Love, an orthopedic surgeon, who indicated that he was scheduled to see Petitioner again on April 24, 1991, and that Petitioner was "unable to return to work" until then. No explanation was given as to the nature of Petitioner's injuries. At the hearing in this case, Petitioner contended that she was seeing Dr. Love in connection with injuries supposedly received during an automobile accident on February 20, 1991. No persuasive evidence was presented as to the nature and extent of those injuries. The car accident occurred on the evening of February 20 and Petitioner reported to work the next day. No evidence was presented to establish that Petitioner missed any work as a result of the car accident prior to the time she left work on March 20, 1991, complaining of chest pains. Ms. Villafana advised Petitioner that the doctor's notes submitted on April 11 did not provide adequate documentation of her medical condition and/or inability to work. Petitioner did not report to work on April 25, 1991, and did not contact her supervisor. Neither Ms. Villafana nor the personnel office had a home phone number or current residence address for Petitioner. One of Petitioner's friends gave Ms. Villafana a P.O. Box number which Petitioner was using as a mailing address. On April 30, 1991, Ms. Villafana prepared a letter which was sent to Petitioner at her last known address and by certified mail to the post office box. That letter advised Petitioner that as of the close of business on Monday, April 29, 1991, she was absent without authorized leave and was in jeopardy of being deemed to have abandoned her position. The letter noted that the last medical excuse from Dr. Love expired as of the end of the normal work day on April 24, 1991. The certified letter was not claimed. On April 30, 1991, Petitioner spoke with Jeff Keiser who advised her that she would be receiving a letter regarding the possible abandonment of her position. Petitioner did not request and was not given authorized leave. During one of their conversations over this period of time, Ms. Villafana advised Petitioner that she should document in writing a request for leave. No such written request was ever received. Also during one of these conversations, Petitioner acknowledged that she had received the April 30, 1991 letter. On May 2, 1991, Ms. Villafana received two additional notes on Dr. Love's letterhead. One of the notes was dated April 24, 1991, and indicated that Petitioner was scheduled for a follow up visit on May 8, 1991. The second note was dated May 1, 1991, and indicated that Petitioner was unable to return to work for two weeks. The note on Dr. Love's letterhead dated May 1, 1991, included some information regarding Petitioner's alleged medical problems. However, Ms. Villafana advised Petitioner that she needed additional information regarding her condition. On May 13, 1991, Petitioner provided Ms. Villafana with a note on Dr. Love's stationery dated May 8, 1991. This note indicated that Petitioner was unable to work for two more weeks and was scheduled for a follow up visit on May 22, 1991. Ms. Villafana spoke with Petitioner on May 23, 1991. During that conversation, Petitioner indicated that she was returning to the doctor on May 30 and hoped to be in the office on May 31. Petitioner did not show up for work on May 31, 1991. On June 3, 1991, Petitioner called Ms. Villafana and advised her that she was going to see the doctor and, if he released her, she would be back at work on Wednesday, June 5. Petitioner did not show up for work on June 5, 1991. On June 20, 1991, Ms. Villafana received a note on Dr. Love's office letterhead indicating that Petitioner visited his office on June 14, 1991, and was unable to return to work for one week. Around this time, another note was received which indicated that Petitioner had an office visit on June 7, 1991, and was unable to return to work for one week. In a letter dated June 21, 1991, Ms. Villafana advised Petitioner that her [C]ontinued actions have placed [her] employment with the HRS BCPHU in serious jeopardy. Leave of absence (sick leave and/or leave without pay) was never formally requested by you since your midday departure on 3/20/91 and was, therefore, not approved. Chapter 22A-8.002 of the State of Florida Career Service Personnel Rules and Regulations states that 'the granting of any leave of absence with our without pay shall be in writing and shall be approved by the proper authority within the agency.' This was not done. On various occasions, I requested that you inform me of your intentions in reference to your leave, which you did not communicate to me, your supervisor, of your plans. As of this date, you have been on unauthorized leave for three months... All avenues of communication to you have been exhausted; I am unable to call you because you state that you have no telephone; certified mailings to your P.O. Box and various addresses have been returned unclaimed; etc. On the few and far between telephone calls from you, I received the run around stating that medical notes are forthcoming in the mail. This practice will no longer take effect. You are therefore, Ms. Gray, to return to work on 8:00 a.m. on Monday, July 1, 1991... The June 21, 1991 letter was sent to Petitioner by certified mail. Copies were also sent to Petitioner's P.O. Box and last known address in unmarked envelopes. Petitioner did not show up for work on July 1, 1991. During the hearing, Petitioner contended that she did not receive the June 21 letter until July 3, 1991. Petitioner contends that Dr. Love did not release her to return to work until July 10, 1991. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she spoke to Ms. Villafana and Mr. Keiser on July 3, 1991. Neither of these supervisors gave her authorization for any additional leave. Petitioner contends that she told them that she would not return to work until released by her physician. There is no evidence that either Ms. Villafana or Mr. Keiser granted her leave to remain absent for any additional time. On July 10, 1991, Petitioner contacted her supervisor about returning to work, but was told that she was deemed to have abandoned her position. At the hearing Petitioner produced two typewritten notes on the stationary of Dr. Love dated June 21, 1991, and July 10, 1991 (Petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 2). Neither of these notes were properly authenticated and there is no evidence to establish who wrote them or when. As noted above, Dr. Love did not testify at the hearing. These alleged records of Dr. Love's treatment of Petitioner were not provided to Ms. Villafana or the BCPHU Personnel Office until after Petitioner as deemed to have abandoned her position. Petitioner contends that she provided the Personnel Office and/or her supervisors with a copy of Dr. Love's reports prior to receiving the June 21, 1991 certified letter. However, the more credible evidence established that from June 20 through at least July 10, neither Ms. Villafana nor the Personnel Office was provided with any documentation from any physician that Petitioner was unable to work. The evidence established that from June 21, 1991, until July 10, 1991, Petitioner did not show up for work, did not provide any additional documentation regarding her absences and was not granted authorized leave. During the time she was employed at BCPHU, Petitioner was presented with a copy of the HRS Employee Handbook. That Handbook advised employees that they could be deemed to have abandoned their position if they were absent for three consecutive work days without authorization. Ms. Gray should have been aware of the requirements regarding sick leave and leaves of absence and her need to provide documentation regarding her course of treatment to the BCPHU Personnel Office. By certified letter dated July 25, 1991, Respondent advised Petitioner that she was deemed to have abandoned her career service position.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order finding that Inez Gray abandoned her career service position with HRS and is not eligible to be reinstated or to receive any back pay. DONE and ENTERED this 7 day of August 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7 day of August 1992. APPENDIX Only Petitioner submitted a proposed findings of fact. The following constitutes my rulings on those proposals. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 3. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7 and 24. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 24. The last note submitted was dated June 14, 1991 and indicated that Petitioner was unable to return to work for one week. This last note was received by Petitioner's supervisors on June 20, 1991. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 19-22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 33. The first sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 25 and 27. The second sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Larry Strong, Acting Secretary Department of Management Services 2737 Centerview Drive, Knight Building Koger Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Management Services 2737 Centerview Drive, Knight Building Koger Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Ben Patterson, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 1215 Thomasville Road P.O. Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Judith C. Engelberg Acting District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 201 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 513 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-1885
Findings Of Fact On October 12, 1981, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the felony charge of unemployment compensation fraud, adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was placed on probation for one year (Exhibit 2). The probation was terminated by Order Dismissing Warrant entered October 27, 1982 (Exhibit 3). The unemployment compensation fraud resulted from Petitioner's continuing to receive unemployment compensation following his discharge from the armed services after he had obtained full-time employment. The Information charged Petitioner with failure to disclose a material fact, to wit: he reported that he was unemployed while he was in fact working and receiving wages from Pacific Packing Company (Exhibit 2). In Application For Filing for Examination as an Ordinary Life, Including Health, agent dated March 16, 1984, Petitioner, in response to question 11(a) on this application asking if he had ever been charged with a felony, answered, "no." He gave the same answer to question 11(b) which asked if he had ever been convicted of a felony. Petitioner testified that he discussed the completion of this application with a fellow employee of an insurance agency at which he was working; and, since he had, on a earlier application for temporary employment, furnished the information regarding his unemployment compensation fraud conviction to the Department of Insurance, he did not deem it necessary to again report this offense. The fellow employee confirmed that he had discussed this answer with Petitioner and had suggested Petitioner answer the question as he did. Neither petitioner nor this witness satisfactorily answered the Hearing Officer's question how Petitioner could answer no to question 11 and then swear that all answers given on the application are true and correct. Petitioner's minister testified that Petitioner is a deacon in his church and he has found Petitioner to be truthful, honest, and capable of making mistakes and admitting them. As a temporary employee of A. L. Williams Company, a distributor of insurance products, Petitioner was deemed to be truthful, honest, and upright.
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to hear this cause, alleging that Respondent Employer has committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Following a July 28, 2003, "Notice of Determination: No Jurisdiction," by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief as more fully described below. On or about September 3, 2003, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. It appearing on the face of the referral package that Respondent did not regularly employ 15 persons and that therefore Respondent did not qualify as an "employer" under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, a September 12, 2003, Order was entered scheduling a telephonic hearing for October 1, 2003, and permitting the filing of any documents in support of the parties' respective positions. Respondent's "Submission of Materials in Support of Dismissal of Petition and Supporting Memorandum of Law" was served by United States Mail on September 25, 2003. It contained a prayer for dismissal. Pursuant to Rule 28-106.204, Florida Administrative Code, Petitioner was entitled to respond in writing by October 6, 2003. Petitioner did not respond. Respondent's "Supplemental Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction" was served upon Petitioner by hand-delivery, by United States Mail, and by "e-mail" on September 26, 2003. Per Rule, Petitioner was entitled to file a written response by October 8, 2003. Petitioner did not respond. A Corrected Order entered September 26, 2003, permitted the parties until October 7, 2003, to submit any documents tending to support or refute jurisdiction by the Division of Administrative Hearings over this cause. This Order also rescheduled the telephonic hearing for October 9, 2003. Petitioner filed nothing in response to either the September 12, 2003, Order or the September 26, 2003, Corrected Order. At the October 9, 2003, telephonic conference call, Respondent appeared through counsel. The opening of hearing was delayed five minutes, but Petitioner did not appear. Thereafter, oral argument upon all Motions proceeded without Petitioner. Petitioner still had not called in to the meet-me telephone number after 15 minutes, and the telephonic hearing was concluded. In an abundance of caution, an Order to Show Cause was entered on October 10, 2003, giving Petitioner 10 days in which to show cause, in writing, filed with the Division, why this cause should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner has filed nothing. Therefore, Respondent's documentation, including but not limited to: Respondent's accountants’ affidavits and its payroll journals, unemployment tax returns, and a payroll schedule, may be presumed true and accurate. All the documentation supports a finding that Respondent never employed more than 14 people for any one week in the year 2001 and employed 15 or more employees for only one week (December 21-28, 2002) in the year 2002.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing this cause for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Truman Jeffery Mayfield 902 Phillips Street Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Robert G. Riegel, Jr., Esquire Ryan R. Fuller, Esquire Coffman, Coleman, Andrews & Grogan, P.A. Post Office Box 40089 Jacksonville, Florida 32203
The Issue Whether the Petitioner demonstrated that she was terminated from employment by Respondent as the result of an unlawful employment practice based on her race, or as retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to a practice which is an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a provider of health-care services that receives funding from the West Volusia Hospital Authority (WVHA). Respondent operates health clinics in Pierson, DeLand, and Deltona, Florida. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a Certified Medical Assistant on September 25, 2009. After a period of time in Respondent’s Pierson office, Petitioner was transferred to Respondent’s DeLand office. Petitioner’s duties included those as a referral clerk. In that capacity, Petitioner arranged, scheduled, and coordinated referrals from Respondent’s medical providers to outside physicians and laboratories. Petitioner also performed blood-draws, Pap smears, and related services. Petitioner was frequently behind in her referrals. Petitioner sought assistance with her referrals. Taken in the light most favorable to Petitioner, an employee of Respondent with some apparent supervisory authority denied her requests, and advised other employees that they were not to assist Petitioner in catching up. In October 2010, Petitioner was assigned to Respondent’s newly created Emergency Room Diversion (ERD) program. That assignment caused a change in Petitioner’s shift from the 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. shift, to the 12:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. shift. She was returned to her normal day shift in mid-November. The disruption in her standard shift caused Petitioner to fall further behind in her referrals. To minimize the problem, nurses began to make referrals for their doctors when they had the time. On November 19, 2010, Petitioner called Juanita McNeil, an elected commissioner of the WVHA, to discuss what Petitioner perceived to be sub-standard patient care that, in some cases, related to referrals that were not being timely completed, and for which Petitioner was receiving no assistance. Petitioner asked Ms. McNeil to keep their conversation confidential because she feared that she would be terminated for going outside of the chain of command. Later in the day on November 19, 2010, Petitioner was presented with a separation notice by which she was terminated from employment. The separation notice listed four reasons for her termination. The reasons were “employee not doing job in a timely manner, being rude with patients, being rude with other employees, [and] insubordination (calling the WVHA) instead of talking with appropriate supervisors.” During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that “100% of the reason that I was fired is because of me calling the WVHA.” Upon follow up inquiry, Petitioner reiterated that she was terminated for insubordination in bypassing her supervisors to contact a WVHA commissioner, and that reason formed the basis for her complaint that she had been the subject of discrimination or retaliation. Petitioner knew of no other employee that ever communicated directly with a WVHA commissioner, or that ever escaped disciplinary sanctions for having done so. Thus, there was no comparator upon which to measure whether Petitioner was treated differently under like circumstances as a result of her race. Petitioner’s admission of the basis for her termination is dispositive of this case. Being terminated for insubordination, in the absence of evidence that persons outside of her protected class were treated differently, is not related to Petitioner’s race. Petitioner’s admission demonstrates that her claim is not founded on an unlawful employment practice based on her race, or retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to a practice which is an unlawful employment practice. Based on Petitioner’s admission, the undersigned concluded that there was no legal basis upon which relief could be ordered under the Florida Civil Rights Act. Thus, the final hearing was adjourned.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Graham is a black male. He filed an employment application with Pier 1, a "chain retailer," on August 23, 1999. The application indicated that he applied for a position as a sales associate but in fact he was to be employed as a stockroom assistant. His employment application included a block denominated, "Work Availability." Graham completed this block indicating that he was available to work between 6:00 a.m., and 12 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The employment application stated in the block denominated, "Work Availability," the following: "Although an effort will be made to accommodate individual work schedule preferences and availability, work schedules such as start time, number of daily or weekly hours and assigned work days are subject to change at any time. Availability to work on weekends is required. Number of hours may vary based on business necessity and could change an individual's employment status." Graham was hired on August 30, 1999, as a full-time employee. He worked primarily in the back stockroom. A meeting of store personnel was scheduled at the store on Sunday, November 17, 1999, at 6:30 p.m. Graham was aware of the meeting. He was 20 minutes late because he was participating in a church service at Macedonia Primitive Baptist Church. As a result of his tardiness he was presented with an Associate Corrective Action Documentation, which is a confidential Pier 1 form. The form noted that this was his first "tardy." The form as completed took no action such as suspension or loss of pay. It merely informed him that further instances of tardiness could lead to disciplinary action. Graham testified that he was treated differently from a white woman employee, one Christy Musselwhite, who did not attend the meeting, because Musselwhite did not receive a counseling form. However, Graham's personal knowledge of Musselwhite's situation was insufficient to demonstrate that Musselwhite was treated differently from Graham because of race or gender. Graham felt humiliated because he received the Associate Corrective Action Documentation form. Graham resigned from Pier 1 effective November 12, 1999, so that he could begin employment with the Florida Department of Children and Family Services at a rate of pay in excess of that which he received at Pier 1.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission Human Relations enter a final dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Russell D. Cawyer, Esquire Kelly, Hart & Hallman 201 Main Street, Suite 2500 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Kenneth Terrell Graham 2811 Herring Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303-2511 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Ronni Morrison Pier 1 Imports Post Office Box 961020 Fort Worth, Texas 76161-0020
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should reimburse Petitioner for the attorneys' fees and costs Petitioner expended in its successful defense of Respondent's Stop-Work Order.
Findings Of Fact Hernandez, Inc., was a contractor based in the Jacksonville, Florida area, and was in the business of installing dry wall, among other construction-related activities. Its principal owner, Jorge Hernandez, founded the company in 1981. The Department of Financial Services is the state agency responsible for enforcing the Workers' Compensation Law. This duty is delegated to the Division of Workers' Compensation. The Division is a state agency. It is not a nominal party. On February 5, 2004, Hernandez, Inc., was engaged in installing drywall in the Bennett Federal Building in Jacksonville, Florida, using its own personnel, who were leased from Matrix, Inc., an employee leasing company, and two subcontractors, GIO & Sons (GIO), of Norfolk, Virginia, and U&M Contractors, Inc., (U&M), of Charlotte, North Carolina. The leased employees were properly covered by workers' compensation insurance provided by the lessor. Prior to contracting with GIO and U&M, Hernandez, Inc., asked for and received ACORD certificates of insurance, which on their face indicated that the subcontractors had both liability coverage and workers' compensation coverage. It is the practice of Hernandez, Inc., to ensure that certificates of insurance are provided by subcontractors. The office staff of Hernandez, Inc., at all times prior to going out of business, tracked the certificates and ensured that they were kept current. Hernandez, Inc. had relied on hundreds of these ACORD certificates in the past. During times pertinent, neither GIO or U&M maintained workers' compensation insurance on their employees that complied with the requirements of Section 440.38(7), Florida Statutes. On February 5, 2004, Katina Johnson, an investigator with the Division's Jacksonville office, made a routine visit to the Bennett Federal Building with another investigator. She observed personnel from Hernandez, Inc., and its subcontractors GIO and U&M, installing dry wall. She also determined that Hernandez, Inc., had a contract to install dry wall as a subcontractor participating in the construction of the Mayport Naval Station BEQ. U&M worked at both the Bennett Federal Building site and the Mayport BEQ site as a subcontractor of Hernandez, Inc. Ms. Johnson discovered that neither U&M nor GIO had workers' compensation coverage for its employers. Ms. Johnson asked for and received the certificates of insurance that Hernandez, Inc., had obtained from GIO and U&M, which facially suggested that Hernandez, Inc., had determined that its subcontractors had appropriate coverage. Nevertheless, she issued a SWO on February 26, 2004, to Hernandez, Inc., as well as GIO, and U&M. By the SWO, Hernandez, Inc., was charged with failure to ensure that workers' compensation meeting the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Insurance Code, was in place for GIO and U&M. She also issued an Order of Penalty Assessment that eventually became an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated March 19, 2004. The SWO stated, in bold print, that Hernandez, Inc., was, "Ordered to Stop Work and Cease All Business Operations in the State." Hernandez, Inc., was, at the time, also engaged in construction at the new Jacksonville Library and at the Carlington Apartments, both of which were located in Florida. By the terms of the SWO, Hernandez was required to stop work in those sites also. The Division had no evidence that might cause it to believe that Hernandez, Inc., was operating in violation of the law at those sites. The SWO contained with it a Notice of Rights advising that a formal or informal administrative hearing might be had and required that a petition for a hearing be filed within 21 days of receipt of the SWO, if a hearing was desired. Hernandez, Inc., was not informed that it had the right to an immediate hearing. Hernandez, Inc., timely filed a petition demanding a formal hearing. In an effort to get back to work, Hernandez, Inc., entered into an agreement with the Division, whereby it paid a partial penalty of $46,694.03, but admitted no liability. The formal hearing did not take place until August 16, 2005. Ms. Johnson had the power to issue a stop-work order. She did not have to get approval from a neutral magistrate or from the Division. Because she was a recent employee of the Division, she conferred with her supervisor Robert Lambert before taking action, and he approved her action in writing. In February 2004, it was the policy of the Division to issue SWO's for all work sites even though it concluded that a violation had occurred in only the site or sites visited. The Division policy did not require an investigation into all worksites as a prerequisite to shutting down all worksites. The policy requiring a contractor to cease work at all worksites was not adopted as a rule. In February 2004, the Division asserted that compliance with Section 440.10(1)(c), Florida Statutes, required a general contractor to look beyond an ACORD certificate of insurance to determine if subcontractors had complied with the requirement to maintain the required workers' compensation coverage ". . . under a Florida endorsement using Florida rates and rules pursuant to payroll reporting that accurately reflects the work performed in this state by such employees." This policy was not adopted as a rule and was subsequently abandoned. The Division, in implementing this policy, asserted that a general contractor must actually review the policy of a subcontractor presenting an ACORD certificate and determine if it was in effect and if it complied with Florida law. This policy was not adopted as a rule and the policy was subsequently abandoned. The Division further asserted that the employees of the subcontractor of a general contractor were to be viewed as if they were employees of the general contractor, when contemplating workers' compensation coverage. This policy was not adopted as a rule. Ms. Johnson acted in conformance with the Division's policies in effect at the time the SWO was issued. The net worth of Hernandez, Inc., was a negative $1,821,599, on December 31, 2003. Hernandez, Inc., was struggling financially in February 2004, but was on the way to recovery until the SWO was issued. On November 30, 2004, the net worth of Hernandez, Inc., was a negative $1,161,865, and this figure included the sum of $978,000 that Mr. Hernandez put into the business. Accordingly, Hernandez, Inc., was a small business party for purposes of Subsection 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, during times pertinent. The SWO, which terminated work at all Hernandez work sites, torpedoed any chance the company had to continue in business. Mr. Hernandez mortgaged his house, which he subsequently lost to creditors, in an effort to keep Hernandez, Inc., in business. All of his efforts failed. The failure was a direct result of the actions of the Division. The Division's interpretations of the law that precipitated their policies, and thus the failure of the business, were both wrong and unreasonable. Subsequent to the hearing and Recommended Order in Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation v. Hernandez, Inc., Case No. 04-1174 (DOAH October 3, 2005), the Chief Financial Officer entered a Final Order styled, In the Matter of: Hernandez, Enterprises, Inc., Case No. 75492-05-WC (Florida Department of Financial Services, January 25, 2006). The Final Order noted that the contractor, Hernandez, Inc., complied with the extant law when it, ". . . demanded and received proof of insurance. . . . " The Final Order also noted that there was no authority produced by the Division that would permit the imposition of a fine on Hernandez, Inc. The Final Order further recited that there was no statutory duty on the part of a contractor to ensure (emphasis supplied) that its subcontractors had secured workers' compensation coverage for its employees. It noted that, ". . . without some formal delineation of the specific obligations of a contractor in ascertaining proof of insurance from a subcontractor, the Department cannot impose a penalty upon the facts presented in the instant case." The Division was ordered to rescind the SWO issued February 26, 2004, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated March 19, 2004, and was further ordered to repay the amount of $46,694.03, which had been paid to persuade the Division to abate the SWO. The action was initiated by the Division, which is a state agency. At the time the SWO was initiated, there was no reasonable basis in law and fact to do so. The actions of the Division were not "substantially justified." Hernandez, Inc., prevailed in the hearing because the Chief Financial Officer entered a Final Order in its favor and the Order has not been reversed on appeal and the time for seeking judicial review of the Final Order has expired. Hernandez, Inc., is, therefore, a "prevailing small business party." Hernandez, Inc., paid its law firm, Holbrook, Akel, Cold, Stiefel & Ray, P.A., $51,815.50 in attorneys' fees, and paid $8,837.00 in costs, in its successful defense of the Division's actions.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner timely filed a complaint of discrimination in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Prior to November 28, 2007, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent. On November 26, 2008, the Petitioner sent a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ) to the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). The TAQ was submitted via facsimile transmission and was not signed. The Petitioner believed she was complying with the directives of the FCHR website and that follow-up assistance (from the FCHR) would not be required. The Petitioner did not understand that a signature was required, notwithstanding the place for same (along with a date) on page 2 of the TAQ. The Petitioner maintains that the FCHR website instructions were unclear and that she erroneously relied on the directions that did not specify she was required to sign the TAQ. The Petitioner filed a signed Charge of Discrimination with the FCHR on January 14, 2009. On February 5, 2009, the Petitioner received a "Notice of Receipt of Complaint" from the FCHR. At the same time, a copy of the complaint was furnished to the Respondent, who was then, presumably, put on notice of the Petitioner's charge. The FCHR did not advise the Petitioner that the TAQ had to be signed. In the course of its review of the instant charge, the FCHR entered a determination of "untimely." Per the FCHR's assessment, the charge of discrimination was filed more than 365 days from the last incident or act of discrimination. Thereafter, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against the Respondent. The Commission then forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Levitt, Esquire Allen, North & Blue 1477 West Fairbanks Avenue, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32789 Marie C. Perez 517 29th Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Samuel J. Marshall, was born on November 19, 1936. In March 1986 he began employment as a truck driver hauling sand for Taylor Concrete and Supply, Inc. (Taylor) at its Palatka, Florida plant. When he began his employment with Taylor, Marshall advised his supervisor that because of his religious beliefs, he could not work on Saturdays. The name of the religion is not of record. Marshall says that after giving such notification to his employer, he was never required to work on Saturdays during his tenure with Taylor. This was not contradicted. In 1989, Taylor sold the plant to respondent, Tarmac Florida, Inc. (Tarmac). As an employer with more than fifteen full-time employees, Tarmac is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Shortly after the sale, petitioner was advised that his position as a sand truck driver was being eliminated but he could transfer to a position as a ready-mix driver in the ready-mix division at the same plant. Petitioner accepted this offer effective November 28, 1989. Because the new position required the driver to work every other Saturday, petitioner advised the new plant manager, Byron White, that he could not work on Saturdays because of his religious beliefs. After Marshall produced evidence to verify his claim, White excused Marshall from working on Saturdays. Tarmac employee timecards confirm that Marshall was never required to work on a Saturday. Petitioner was required to undergo a brief period of training by riding for several weeks with a senior driver, James Bolt. During petitioner's training period, Bolt was engaged in the illicit practice of selling any concrete left in his truck at the end of the day to third parties and then pocketing the money. This was obviously contrary to company policy. Petitioner was aware of this activity but said nothing. On occasion, Bolt would give petitioner some of the illicit proceeds, which he accepted. In the first week of February 1990, or after he had completed his training with Bolt, petitioner went to White and told him that there was "illicit" activity being conducted at the plant, but he refused to disclose the nature of the activity or the name of the individual engaged in that enterprise. He also failed to tell White that Bolt had given him money. White communicated this conversation to the regional manager, Jack Stegall, but because they had no specific information on which to proceed, they were unable to investigate the allegations. Tarmac has a number of plants within each division. It is not uncommon for drivers to be transferred from one location to another, based on the varying demands of the different plants. In June 1990 Stegall decided to transfer two drivers from the Palatka plant to the Green Cove Springs plant due to increased business at the latter facility. Petitioner and another driver, Dennis Folmer, then approximately thirty years of age, were selected for transfer since they had the least seniority in the Palatka ready-mix division. After learning of Stegall's decision, petitioner contacted Stegall and advised him that he believed the company policy required that transfer decisions be made based on seniority with the company, rather than seniority in a particular position. Stegall then checked with the human resources department and learned petitioner was correct. Petitioner's name was thereafter removed from the transfer list and James Bolt, who had less seniority than petitioner, was placed on the list. During his meeting with Stegall, petitioner informed him about the illegal concrete sales that had occurred during his training period. After petitioner was told to inform White about this matter, he took White to the locations where he was with Bolt when the concrete was illegally sold. He also turned over to White the $30 he had received from Bolt. Based on Marshall's revelation, on June 25, 1990, Bolt was terminated as an employee for the unauthorized sale of concrete. Because he had come forward and disclosed the illegal activity, petitioner was only given a one-week suspension without pay. Petitioner did not question nor challenge the suspension and admitted to White that he was involved in the sales. Also, on July 11, 1990, he was given a warning notice prepared by White and which read in part as follows: Sam confessed to selling unauthorized concrete on three separate occasions. Sam also reported others involved. For this reason only Sam was given one week off. If for any reason this happens again or attempt (sic) to, Sam will be terminated. Although petitioner was handed a copy of the notice, he refused to sign it, threw it back at White and walked away. At the same time petitioner notified Stegall of the illegal concrete sales, he also asked Stegall about the possibility of transferring to Tarmac's Deland facility, which was closer to his home. Stegall indicated he would try to assist petitioner with a transfer, if possible. The next day, petitioner drive to the Deland facility and spoke with the Deland plant manager who indicated there was a ready-mix driving position available. The plant manager also agreed to contact White on petitioner's behalf. Even so, because the Palatka facility was short two drivers due to the transfer of Bolt and Folmer to Green Cove Springs, White could not afford to allow petitioner to transfer to Deland. He did promise petitioner that he would arrange for a transfer as soon as an opportunity arose which would not adversely impact the Palatka facility. After petitioner's suspension for his participation in the illegal sale of concrete, Tarmac received complaints from other Tarmac employees regarding petitioner. Believing this conduct to be detrimental to the integrity of the company and a disruption of the harmony of the work unit, Minor Turrentine, then the Tarmac area production manager, advised petitioner that if he continued to talk about the illegal sale of concrete with other drivers and customers, he would be terminated for breaching company policy, that is, disclosing confidential information that was contrary to the company's best interests. He was also given a written warning on July 16, 1990, which read as follows: You were recently suspended for your admitted involvement in certain activities that are against company policy. It has been reported that you have openly discussed these matters with employees at various locations. Be advised that any further discussion concerning your suspension and the circum- stances surrounding it will be considered breach of confidentiality, which is a violation of company policy. Any further violation of company policy will subject you to severe disciplinary action, up to and including discharge. After White received further complaints regarding petitioner, Tarmac terminated petitioner's employment effective August 21, 1990, for breaching company policy. The separation notice, which was dated the same date, gave the following reason for his termination: Employee was formally warned on July 16 to discuss no further his recent suspension. Discharged for further discussion on or about 8/20/90. There is no evidence as to whether petitioner was replaced by another driver, and if so, the age of that driver. When terminating petitioner, Tarmac did not do so because of petitioner's age or religious beliefs. Indeed, Marshall conceded at hearing that he had no direct proof of discrimination but merely believed he was improperly terminated for those reasons. As evidence of age discrimination, petitioner speculated that Tarmac may have been attempting to lower its insurance rates by removing an older person from its payroll, a belief based solely on a conversation he had with an insurance agent a few weeks prior to hearing. However, at least three other ready mix drivers at the Palatka plant are older than Marshall. He also speculated that because he was not required to work on Saturdays, this caused ill-will among his co-workers, and Tarmac terminated him for his religious beliefs. Again, there was no proof, either circumstantial or direct, to support this assertion. Regarding the claim that Tarmac's decision to transfer petitioner to Green Cove Springs in June 1990 was in retaliation for him telling White that working Saturdays was against his religion, the evidence shows that petitioner was removed from the transfer list once his seniority was brought to the company's attention. Petitioner also suggests that he was denied a transfer to the Deland facility in June 1990 as retaliation for his religious beliefs. However, the evidence shows that it was not feasible for Tarmac to transfer him at that time due to a shortage of drivers but Tarmac promised that an effort would be made to comply with his request when it was feasible. Petitioner did not state whether he desires reinstatement to his former position. In his petition for relief, petitioner did request "70 percent of (his) average yearly base pay since August 20 on". However, petitioner's salary at the time of discharge is not of record. Further, there was no evidence presented to establish his salary nor the monetary losses, if any, petitioner has suffered by virtue of his termination. He is currently employed with another company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5927 Respondent: Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 7-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12-13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 14-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 16-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 20-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 24. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordinate, a conclusion of law, or not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Samuel J. Marshall S. R. Box 1075 Georgetown, Florida 32139 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Donna M. Griffin, Esquire 1408 North Westshore Boulevard Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33607
