The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent violated Subsections 648.44(8)(a), 648.44(8)(b), 648.45(2), 648.45(2)(e), 648.45(2)(j), 648.45(2)(k), 648.45(3), 648.45(3)(c), 648.45(3)(e), 648.30(1), 648.30(2), 648.30(3), and 648.30(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Chapter 648, the Department has jurisdiction over bail bond licensure, appointments, and related activities. Respondent, Pamela Jean Coleman, appeared before the undersigned in this proceeding, identified herself as Pamela Jean Coleman, and admitted that she is the Respondent in this matter and that the Department has jurisdiction over her and the subject matter involved in the Notice of Intent. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the Notice of Intent, Respondent was also known as Deborah Lee Diehl, Pamela Jean Jones, Pamela Jones, Pamela Coleman, Pam Jones, and Pamela J. Coleman. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the Notice of Intent, Respondent was not licensed as a bail bond agent in the State of Florida. On March 28, 1975, in Case Number 75-239CF, in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), Respondent pled guilty and was adjudged guilty of buying or receiving or aiding in concealment of stolen property, a felony (a crime of moral turpitude). On October 22, 1975, in Case Number 75-2390CF, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), Respondent, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, pled guilty and was adjudged guilty of the felony of violation of drug abuse law. Records of the State of Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) show that the conviction set forth in paragraph 6 above included convictions on March 28, 1975, and July 17, 1975, for parole violation. At the final hearing counsel for Respondent stated: Mr. Franklin: . . . I don't think there is any dispute as to those underlying facts about what happened in 1975 -- Ms. Coleman: Correct. Mr. Franklin: -- and what happened subsequent. And the subsequent event was that Ms. Coleman was -- received the grace of executive clemency. She did receive a limited restoration of civil rights that granted to her the restoration of all of her civil rights with the exception of a specific statutory authority to own or possess a firearm, at least as to all of the '75 convictions. . . . By Executive Order Number 80-C-0 filed with the Florida Secretary of State on March 7, 1980, Respondent was granted restoration of civil rights, except to specific authority for possession or owning a firearm, for any and all felony convictions in the State of Florida and/or restoration of civil rights in the State of Florida for any and all felony convictions in any state other than Florida, or in any United States court or military court for which this person has been duly discharged from imprisonment and/or parole, adult community control or probation, and for which this person has not been heretofore granted clemency. This grant of clemency included, but was not limited to, Case Nos. 75-239CF and 75-2390CF, in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach, Florida. On April 16, 1991, in Case Number CF91-1923AI-XX, Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, Respondent, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, was charged with grand thief. On or about November 25, 1991, Respondent pled nolo contendere to the reduced charge of petit theft and was found guilty and convicted of petit theft.1 Petit theft is a first-degree misdemeanor, which constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. Record of the Delaware Secretary of State, dated May 5, 1997, confirmed that the Clarence Luther Cephas, Ltd., Inc. (Cephas Bail Bond Agency) was duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, was in good standing, and had a legal corporate existence as of May 5, 1997. Record of the Florida Secretary of State, Application for Reinstatement, confirmed that the Cephas Bail Bond Agency applied as a corporation qualified to do bail bond business in Florida and was reinstated to do bail bond business as of January 19, 1999. The Cephas Bail Bond Agency's application listed Pamela J. Coleman, 2353 Mammoth Grove Road, Lake Wales, Florida, as its president, secretary, director, and registered agent. The application dated October 26, 2000, bore the signature of Respondent and listed her telephone number as (863) 533-0405. Two Uniform Business Reports (UBR) of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency were filed with the Florida Secretary of State on August 6, 2001, and March 29, 2002. Both reports bore the signature of Respondent as President of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency. Testimony of Petitioner's witnesses conclusively established, without dispute, that Respondent participated in the bail bond business of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency during the approximate period of March 1997 to November 27, 2002. During that span of time, Respondent did on various occasions act and represent herself to the public as one having power to act in several capacities and positions with the Cephas Bail Bond Agency. Her activities included acting as a registered agent, a director, a bail bond agent, a temporary bail bond agent, a runner, a bail enforcement agent, and a bounty hunter. Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., under oath on November 27, 2002, gave the following statement: I have known Pamela Coleman/Jones for approximately four years and she has been affiliated with me for most of the time that I have been in the bail bond business. I had asked her if she had ever been convicted of a felony and she said that she had been convicted as a teenager. She has a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights from the Office of Executive Clemency that is dated March 7, 1980. I was under the impression that if her rights had been restored, that it would not be a problem with her working for me. I named Pamela as an officer in my corporation because I did not have any family that I could list as an officer except for my daughter, who is a deputy sheriff and could not be an officer of the corporation. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, show that on or about December 16, 2002, an Amended Information was filed in Case No. CF02-00597A-XX, State of Florida vs. Pamela Jean Coleman, W/F, 09/17/1958, XXX-XX-9751, charging that between November 27, 2000, and January 25, 2002, in Polk County, Florida, Respondent, having been convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the law of any state, territory, or county, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, did participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of a bail bond agency or office thereof, or exercise direct or indirect control in any manner in such agency or office, or own shares in a closely held corporation which had an interest in a bail bond business, contrary to Section 684.44. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly and convincingly, during the period of November 2000 through December 2001, identified Respondent as the person who, on various occasions, did act in several capacities and positions as a bail bond agent and performed functions, duties, or powers prescribed for licensed bail bond agents. Undisputed evidence identified Respondent as the person who, early in 2001, presented herself to another and engaged in conduction and solicitation of bail bond business in the office of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency. Undisputed evidence identified Respondent as the person who, on June 19, 2001, presented herself and identified herself as Pamela Jean Coleman, Vice-President of Clarence Cephas Bail Bonds, to Noel Collier who was working in her husband's law office as a paralegal. Respondent presented to Ms. Collier bond release paperwork from the Cephas Bail Bond Agency and requested that a mutual client facing criminal charges sign the paperwork. Undisputed evidence demonstrated that on or about September 2001, Respondent held herself out as the person with whom to conduct bail bond business with Constance Castro in or about the home of Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., that served also as the Cephas Bail Bond Agency office. The records of Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, show that on or about January 31, 2003, in criminal Case No. CF02-00597A-XX, Respondent (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, a/k/a Pam Jones, and a/k/a Pamela J. Coleman) was tried, found guilty, and adjudicated guilty of a violation of Subsection 648.44(8), acting as a bail bondsman while being a convicted felon, a felony of the third degree, as charged in the aforesaid Amended Information. Respondent was sentenced by the court to 60 days in county jail (to be served on weekends) and placed on probation for a period of five years. The conditions of Respondent's probation required her to: (1) Pay restitution in the amount of $457.99 to the Department of Insurance within two years; (2) pay court costs of $400.00 within two years; and (3) not to be employed as a bail bondsman or to have any contact with her husband's (Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr.) business. Counsel for Respondent represented on this record that: (1) he was counsel of record in Case No. CF02-00597A-XX and that Respondent, in this proceeding, was the person charged, tried, convicted, and adjudicated guilty; and (2) he has filed a timely appeal of the conviction and sentence on behalf of Respondent in Case No. CF02-00597A-XX, in the Second District Court of Appeal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order as follows: Finding that Respondent, Pamela Jean Coleman, is disqualified from participation in bail bond-related activities by a prior conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; and that Respondent is guilty of participating in the bail bond business, in violation of Subsections 648.30(1) through (3); 648.44(8)(a); 648.45(2)(e), (j), and (k); and 648.45(3)(a), (c), and (e). Enter a Cease and Desist Order pursuant to Section 626.9581 and the Florida Insurance Code, directing Respondent, Pamela Jean Coleman, to immediately cease and desist any and all bail bond-related activities in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2003.
The Issue The issues are whether, in violation of section 648.45(3)(c), Florida Statutes, Respondent executed a bond after a judgment had been entered on a bail bond that she had executed and the judgment had remained unpaid or unsecured for at least 35 days; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed as a limited surety (bail bond) agent, holding license number A097887. She has not been previously disciplined. From March 2004 through August 2010, Respondent was appointed as a bail bond agent to represent Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (Lumbermens). On August 3, 2007, Respondent, as a bail bond agent, issued a bond on behalf of her principal, Lumbermens, in the amount of $75,000 for defendant Richard Benton. Almost two years later, Mr. Benton failed to appear at a mandatory court appearance on May 15, 2009, in Broward Circuit Court Case 07-13631CF10A. On May 15, 2009, a circuit judge entered an Order Estreating Bond, which ordered Lumbermens to pay $75,000 to the Broward County Clerk of Courts. On July 17, 2009, the Broward County Clerk of Courts entered a judgment in the amount of $75,000 against Lumbermens based on the Order Estreating Bond (Judgment). After "Ordered and Adjudged," the Judgment reads: "Judgment in the amount of $75,000 be and the same is hereby entered against Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins as surety" plus interest. On July 17, 2009, the Clerk's office served a copy of the Judgment to the bail bond agency at which Respondent worked. By Clerk's Certificate of Unsatisfied Judgment dated August 21, 2009, the Broward County Clerk of Courts certified that the $75,000 Judgment had not been satisfied as of the date of the certificate. The certificate, which, on its face, was not served on Respondent or her bail bond agency, states erroneously that the Judgment was against Lumbermens and Respondent. This flawed certificate does not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Judgment was unpaid, nor do the confusing docket remarks that the civil action against Lumbermens was "Disposed by Other," as indicated under the column marked "Statistical Closure(s)." However, Petitioner introduced into evidence Petitioner Exhibit 7, which is another Clerk's certificate certifying that the Judgment remained unpaid as of September 28, 2017. This establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the Judgment remains outstanding. After the expiration of 35 days following the entry of the Judgment, Respondent continued to execute surety bonds as a bail bond agent for one or more surety companies. In 2015, an investigator employed by Petitioner called Respondent and informed her about the Judgment against Lumbermens. The investigator told Respondent that the Judgment was outstanding and "could affect her license."
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 448.44(1)(m), Florida Statutes; suspending her limited surety license for three months; and reinstating the license at the end of three months without regard to whether the Judgment remains outstanding. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Matthew R. Daley, Esquire Department of Financial Services Office of the General Counsel 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Frank Eduardo Gil, Esquire The Law Office of Frank E. Gil, P.A. 10689 North Kendall Drive, Suite 208 Miami, Florida 33176 (eServed) Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, respondent Phillip Anthony Ronca has been licensed and eligible for licensure and appointment as a limited surety agent in Florida, and the parties so stipulated. He holds licenses as a limited surety agent and as a professional bail bondsman, both issued by petitioner. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. Respondent Ronca is the president and director of Ronca Bail Bonds, Inc., a Florida corporation transacting bail bond business from offices in Suite 12, 9719 South Dixie Highway in Miami, Florida, and has been at all pertinent times. He has no prior history of violating statutes or rules governing bail bond underwriting. On July 13, 1990, Mr. Ronca was at the Metro Dade County Jail at the corner of Northwest 12th Avenue and Northwest 14th Street in Miami, trying to locate Miguel Salamanca, whose lawyer had asked respondent to post bond, in order to accomplish his client's release. (The lawyer told him Mr. Salamanca had been arrested in the aftermath of a car wreck, but did not tell him which law enforcement agency had made the arrest or where the arrestee was being held.) Also present at the jail that day was Rina Romero (then surnamed Dillman) who, at the time, worked for a firm of private investigators retained by the "Dade County Bail Bondsmen Association to locate individuals, or bondsmen who were allegedly suspicious [sic] of soliciting business at the jail." T. 8- She had been shown respondent's photograph, and recognized him as one of seven or eight named "targets" of the investigation. Ms. Romero accosted respondent and related a tale of an apocryphal relative, purportedly confined on cocaine possession charges. In response to her specific questions, Mr. Ronca said bonds in such cases were set at $5,000 in Dade County, and that the premium for a bond in that amount was $500. He asked her questions about her putative relative, designed to ascertain the phantom detainee's whereabouts. Mr. Ronca never told Ms. Romero he was a bail bondsman, never offered to post bond for her (spurious) relative, and never requested the opportunity to do so. T. 75-76. He misrepresented no fact, and proposed no unlawful activity. At her request, as their brief conversation drew to a close, he gave Ms. Romero his business card, which proclaims "RONCA BAIL BONDS . . . Any Cost . Anytime . Anywhere." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. She testified she asked for the card so she could prove the fact of the encounter. T. 78, 79, 85. He testified he gave it to her only because she asked for it, and without any intention to advertise. T. 160, 161.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, recommended that petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint filed against respondent. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-2279 Petitioner's proposed recommended order did not contain proposed findings of fact. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 15 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 4, 5, 13 and 14 pertain to immaterial matters. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 6, the administrative complaint pleaded and respondent admitted 14th Street. With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 10 and 16 he never asked her for bail bonding business, or intended to violate applicable law. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Gallagher, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Donald E. Petersen, Esquire 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399 Benedict P. Kuehne, Esquire Sonnet, Sale & Kuehne One Biscayne Tower, No. 2600 Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, FL 33131-1802
The Issue Did Respondent knowingly permit a person who had been convicted of or who had pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under law of any state, territory or country, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, to engage in the bail bond business as an employee of Respondent's bail bond agency? If yes, should Respondent have her limited surety agent license disciplined?
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a limited surety agent, license no. 224404483. Petitioner has regulatory jurisdiction over that license. For that reason Petitioner may impose discipline should Respondent violate laws pertaining to Respondent's activities associated with the license. Respondent is President and Director of Crews Bonding Agency, Inc., 24 North Liberty Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32222, through which business she performs insurance-related activities concerning bail bonds. Crews Bonding Agency, Inc. was incorporated in Florida on March 31, 1988. The corporation is organized for the purpose of transacting any or all lawful business. The corporation provides bail bonds at the Liberty Street premises. The corporation also runs a parking lot concession at that location. Both businesses were operated at times relevant to the inquiry. On August 28, 1995, Star Legal Research, Inc. was incorporated to operate at 350 East Forsyth Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202. That street address is the street adjacent to the Liberty Street address. The Star Legal Research business works out of the same building that Crews Bonding Agency uses. The difference being that the entrance to Crews Bonding Agency is on Liberty Street and the Star Legal Research entrance is on Forsyth Street. A 1995-96 occupational license was issued to Star Legal Research c/o Jack I. Etheridge, Jr., Respondent's son, for the period October 1, 1995 to September 30, 1996. Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. owns Star Legal Research. Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. stated that the purpose for incorporating Star Legal Research was to provide work for Jack I. Etheridge, his father and Respondent's husband, in a setting in which Mr. Jack Etheridge, Jr. contends would be unassociated with Crews Bonding Agency. The attempt to disassociate Mr. Jack Etheridge from Crews Bonding Agency will be subsequently explained. When the hearing was convened Jack I. Etheridge had been working in an office in the building where Crews Bonding Agency has its business. That employment was under the guise of Star Legal Research. The office where Jack I. Etheridge works in the building is separated from the office associated with Crews Bonding Agency by a door. Jack I. Etheridge uses a separate entrance into the office where he works. That entrance is from Forsyth Street rather than the Bonding agency entrance from Liberty Street. The business done by Star Legal Research, according to Jack Etheridge, Jr., is one where "you can research any type of legal matters . . . that's pretty much it". Again, Jack Etheridge, Jr. states that his father, Jack Etheridge, ". . . researches legal, you know, business". Under this arrangement, Jack Etheridge is supposedly no longer affiliated with the Crews Bonding Agency in operating its parking lot or otherwise. From the record, it is unclear exactly what is meant by Jack Etheridge's performance of legal research. At present, the bail bond business is done in the front office to the building that houses Crews Bonding Agency and Star Legal Research. That office faces Liberty Street. In addition to the office where bail bond activities are conducted and the back office which faces Forsyth Street, where Star Legal Research is housed, there is a kitchen in the building. That constitutes the rooms in that building. Contrary to the claim by his son that Jack Etheridge is no longer affiliated with Crews Bonding Agency, Respondent identified that the present circumstances are such that Jack Etheridge helps with the Crews Bonding Agency parking lot business "if he sees a car and I don't, he will go there . . .". Respondent identified that she principally handles the parking lot when she is there at the business premises, but that on one occasion, she was in the hospital and was not available to do that work. Further, she stated that her physician did not really want her "running back and forth to the parking lot". Respondent intends to transfer the parking lot business from Crews Bonding Agency to Star Legal Research by January 1997. At one time, Jack Etheridge had been licensed by Petitioner as an insurance agent entitled to participate in bail bond activities. Prior to the passage of Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), he had been convicted of a felony in Florida. Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), stated: No person who has been convicted of or who has pleaded guilty or no contest to any felony, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, may participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of any bail bond agency or office thereof or own shares in any closely held corporation which has any interest in any bail bond business. Having a concern that Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), might disqualify him from continuing to act as an insurance agent in the bail bond business, Jack Etheridge brought suit in the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, In and For Duval County, Florida, Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K. Petitioner was named defendant in that suit. As a result, an order was entered stating: The provisions of Florida Statutes 648.44(3), Fla. Stat. (1983), or its successor(s) do not and cannot be determined to effect the status of plaintiff, Jack I. Etheridge, in his individual capacity as an officer and director of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation nor his ability to continue to maintain stock ownership of shares of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation. The provisions of this paragraph shall serve as notice to all interested parties that said statute does not apply to Jack I. Etheridge, individually, nor in his capacity as an officer, director and stockholder in F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation. Subsequently, in a case in the United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1, Jack Etheridge pled guilty and was found guilty and convicted of the offense of mail fraud, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1341-2. For this offense, he was imprisoned for a period of five years and ordered to make restitution in the amount of $237,393.83. The sentence was imposed on April 6, 1990. At that time, Jack Etheridge was not licensed by Petitioner. Respondent had separated from Mr. Jack Etheridge in 1986. She was reunited with her husband in 1989. Respondent was aware that her husband had been convicted in Florida in state court, the offense for which he sought relief in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, and that he had committed the federal offense in Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1. In August or September, 1992, federal probation officers came to the Crews Bonding Agency and spoke to Respondent about her husband's pending release from federal prison. In particular, those persons indicated that Mr. Jack Etheridge was going to be released in December of 1992. In this conversation, the probation officers told Respondent that they expected the husband to work for Crews Bonding Agency in a capacity that did not involve the handling of bail. Respondent told them that her husband could not work at the agency because she did not wish to jeopardize her Florida insurance license and livelihood. This is taken to mean that she was concerned about having a convicted felon working for her at the bail bond agency. In the conversation with the probation officers, Respondent was persuaded that the probation officers had the authority to place her husband with the bail bond agency to give the husband employment in some capacity, other than dealing with bail bond activities. The probation officers did not indicate the specific authority for requiring this placement. Respondent replied to the probation officers that her husband could run the parking lot and clean up. In offering that arrangement, Respondent operated on the assumption that the probation officers were familiar with the requirements in the Florida Insurance Regulations and Statutes. In the conversation between Respondent and the federal probation officers, Respondent made no mention of the ruling in the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, concerning her husband's exemption from Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), and its effects, or any subsequent law. After the conversation with the probation officers, and prior to her husband's release from prison, Respondent sought advice of counsel concerning the propriety of having her husband employed by Crews Bonding Agency. Robert Persons, Esquire is corporate counsel for Crews Bonding Agency. He incorporated the business. He has done work for the business as corporate counsel, beginning in 1988. He was aware that Mr. Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in the federal corrections system. Before Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Persons reviewed the previously-quoted language in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, in response to Respondent's request for legal advice. Respondent had told Mr. Persons that it was possible that she was going to hire her husband to run the parking lot for the Crews Bonding Agency. She wanted to know if there would be a problem with Petitioner's statutes that prohibited a bonding agency from operating with a felon working for it. Specifically, Respondent asked Mr. Persons if her husband could work in the parking lot. Mr. Persons told Respondent that his interpretation of the order was that the statutory prohibition against felons working for a bonding agency did not apply to her husband. For that reason, he did not believe that there would be a problem having the husband work at the parking lot. Moreover, he told Respondent that he did not believe that it presented a problem, in that the activities by the husband, when running the parking lot business, did not involve employment with the bail bonding operation. When he gave this advice, Mr. Persons was familiar with the parking lot concessions operation, having used the parking lot himself. He was also familiar with the bail bond business conducted by Crews Bonding Agency. John Gary Baker, Esquire was retained to assist Mr. Jack Etheridge in meeting the terms of the federal parole granted the client. This included correspondence with the probation office in an attempt to obtain early release. Once Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Baker went with the client and spoke to probation officer, Diane Thomas. This conversation took place sometime in late August or early September, 1993. Ms. Thomas told Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to obtain a job as a means to meet requirements for restitution. In this conversation, Ms. Thomas inquired concerning Respondent's income in an attempt to determine the amount that Mr. Etheridge should pay in the way of restitution. Mr. Baker tried to impress Ms. Thomas with the fact that Respondent's income and business were separate from Mr. Etheridge's circumstance. In the conversation, Mr. Etheridge told Ms. Thomas that he wished to be a bus driver. That was his profession prior to being involved in the insurance business in Louisiana, which led to his incarceration. Ms. Thomas would not agree to that arrangement. She indicated that Mr. Etheridge had to be located in a place where the probation officers could come and see him at anytime, day or night. Ms. Thomas asked the question about whether Mr. Etheridge could work for his wife at Crews Bonding Agency, and Mr. Etheridge stated that he did not wish to work for his wife. Ms. Thomas responded to these remarks by saying that she had an order that indicated that Mr. Etheridge could work at the Crews Bonding Agency. This refers to the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K. Ms. Thomas further told Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to work at Crews Bonding Agency. Before the date upon which the meeting was held with Ms. Thomas, Mr. Baker had not been acquainted with the circuit court order. When Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge left the meeting with Ms. Thomas, they went to the Crews Bonding Agency office; and Mr. Etheridge produced a copy of the circuit court order. Respondent was there at that time. Mr. Baker reviewed the order and expressed an opinion to Respondent and her husband that the husband could work at Crews Bonding Agency in any capacity, other than giving out forms or advice about bail bonds. At that point, there was conversation about the husband running the parking lot. That arrangement was one which Mr. Baker stated would be acceptable and would satisfy the terms of Mr. Etheridge's probation. Moreover, Mr. Baker offered the advice that the circuit court order would allow the husband to attend to clerical matters, such as answering the telephones. David R. Fletcher, Esquire was acquainted with Respondent. Mr. Fletcher was aware that Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in a federal facility. Mr. Fletcher was approached by Respondent, who asked Mr. Fletcher about the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, and the meaning of the order. In particular, Respondent made Mr. Fletcher aware that she was concerned about the federal probation office's instructions or the condition upon which Mr. Etheridge's probation would be served as an employee at Crews Bonding Agency. Respondent told Mr. Fletcher that she was concerned that this would create a problem because of the husband's prior record, taken to mean felony record. When Mr. Fletcher read the order, he expressed the opinion that the husband was exempt from the disqualifying provisions for felons working in a bail bond agency. At the time the conversation was held between Mr. Fletcher and Respondent concerning the husband's status as a felon, Mr. Fletcher understood that the husband would be returning from incarceration and working at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant. Respondent relied upon advice of counsel in deciding to allow her husband to work at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant. As contemplated by the instructions which the probation officers gave Mr. Jack Etheridge, he took employment at the Crews Bonding Agency. His duties included running the parking lot, vacuuming the building where the bond agency was located, and answering the telephone at the bail bond agency. When he would answer the telephone, Respondent noted that Jack Etheridge would state that he was not a bail bond agent and that the person who was calling would need to speak to the "bonds man". At times, Respondent received calls that had been patched through from the bail bond agency to another location, through efforts by Jack Etheridge. Respondent is aware that her husband took messages for the bail bond agency, as well. Respondent observed that Jack Etheridge principally stayed in the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, when he worked for the Crews Bonding Agency as parking lot attendant. Specific remarks made by Jack Etheridge in receiving calls for the bonding agency would be "Crews Bonding, would you hold please". If someone needed to speak to Respondent immediately, Mr. Etheridge would state "she is busy, hold please, if you will give me your number, I will have her call you back". Once while Jack Etheridge was employed at the Crews Bonding Agency, following release from federal prison, Ms. Thomas came to the agency to check on his status. Upon that occasion, Respondent spoke to Ms. Thomas and asked if her husband could drive a bus, instead of being employed by the bail bond agency. Ms. Thomas replied in the negative and stated that the husband had to stay with the agency and work with Respondent. Ms. Thomas told Respondent that Mr. Jack Etheridge had to be paid a check from the bonding agency. Respondent honored that request. The reason given for requiring that Mr. Jack Etheridge be paid a check was based upon the statement by Ms. Thomas that the husband had to take evidence of the check being issued and present that to the probation office. According to the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Jack Etheridge was paid $800.00 for four weeks worked in the third quarter of 1993; $2,800.00 for 13 weeks worked in the fourth quarter of 1993; $2,419.23 for 12 weeks worked in the first quarter of 1994; $2,854.61 for 13 weeks worked in the second quarter of 1994; and $3,080.00 for 13 weeks worked in the third quarter of 1994. Jack Etheridge, Jr. observed that his father, upon taking the position as parking lot attendant, worked in the kitchen area of the premises most of the time for a period and then moved into the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, later on. The kitchen area is separated from the room where the bail bonding business is conducted. The room on Liberty Street is where Respondent has traditionally conducted her bail bond business. Jack Etheridge, Jr. never observed his father work in a bail bond capacity once the father returned from incarceration. He did observe that when a car came into the parking lot, his father would direct the driver where to park the car and then return to the building. Jack Etheridge, Jr. made these observations while working in the front office, where bail bond business was conducted, and never noted his father being in that front office. Jack Etheridge, Jr. was at the premises most every day before attending the police academy. After attending the police academy, he spends most of his time at the bail bond agency, pending employment as a policeman. Mr. Persons goes to the location of the bail bond agency two to three times per week and uses a parking space in the parking lot. On those occasions, he sees Jack Etheridge in the parking lot. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge at the location of the Crews Bonding Agency numerous times, following Jack Etheridge's release from prison. Mr. Persons has gone to that location 150 times within two and one-half years, and it would be uncommon for Jack Etheridge not to have been at the location when Mr. Persons came by. On some visits Mr. Persons has spent as much as 15 or 20 minutes with Respondent and her son at the bail bond agency. On occasions when he visited the bail bond agency, he has never observed Mr. Jack Etheridge do anything related to the bail bond business, unless one considers that answering the telephone at the bail bond agency, when Respondent is unable to, constitutes bail bond business. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge put a caller on hold and then refer the call to Respondent. The observation by Mr. Persons, where Mr. Jack Etheridge was involved with answering the telephone in the bail bond office, was not the usual circumstance. In the past, when Mr. Persons observed the operation at the bail bond agency, the door separating the room that faces Liberty Street and the room that faces Forsyth Street was open. More recently, that door has been closed between the two rooms. Mr. Persons observed that in the more recent circumstances, Jack Etheridge was using the office that fronts Forsyth Street. Mr. Persons observed that at the time the hearing was conducted, Jack Etheridge was still maintaining the parking lot. Mr. Persons observed that prior to the creation of the Star Legal Research business, Jack Etheridge, when not located in the parking lot, would be found in the office which fronts Forsyth Street. In summary, under the present circumstances, it is unclear what Mr. Jack Etheridge is principally involved with at the premises primarily associated with Crews Bonding Agency and its businesses. Following advice by Mr. Baker that it would be acceptable for Mr. Jack Etheridge to work at the bail bond agency, he has been in the Crews Bonding Agency office approximately 100 times. On almost every occasion, Jack Etheridge would be in the back room on Forsyth Street. Nine out of ten times, Jack Etheridge would be in that location when observed by Mr. Baker. The only times that Mr. Baker would observe Jack Etheridge in the front office, where the bail bonding business was being conducted, would be if other bail bond agency employees were out making a bond or something of that nature. In that instance, Jack Etheridge would be sitting in the front office, where the bail bond business is conducted; and if someone came to park their car, he would take care of that business. If someone came into the office and asked about a bail bond, Jack Etheridge would remark, "Look, Anne (Respondent) is going to be back in a half hour, she is making a bond, or Clara will be back. Come back, or you can sit over there and wait". Clara refers to another employee of the bail bond agency. Mr. Baker also observed that on the occasion on which Jack Etheridge was in the front office, he would refuse to give information about bail bonds and limit himself to handling parking duties and answering the telephone if no one else was available to answer the telephone. Mr. Fletcher has seen Jack Etheridge at the bail bond agency location approximately twice per week, following Mr. Etheridge's release from incarceration. On these occasions, Mr. Fletcher would give Jack Etheridge keys to Mr. Fletcher's car and seek assistance in parking. In these visits to the agency, Mr. Fletcher never observed Jack Etheridge perform work as a bail bond agent. In fact, he never observed Jack Etheridge work anywhere other than in the parking lot. Respondent and her husband brought further action in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, assigned to Division CV-F. At that time, the previous judge, who had issued the aforementioned order on March 27, 1984, was not presiding in the case. That refers to the Honorable Henry Lee Adams, Jr., who now serves as a federal district judge. The judge who presided in the reopening of the circuit court case was the Honorable Lawrence D. Fay, Circuit Judge. On October 30, 1995, Judge Fay entered an order in Case No. 82- 10537CA, Division CV-F, enjoining consideration of Count I to the present administrative complaint, in which he ordered: The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by GRANTED with respect to Count I of the Administrative Complaint and First Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Defendant against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, and Defendant shall be enjoined from proceeding against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, as to Count I of same in DOAH Case No. 95-3964. Judge Fay also ruled: The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by DENIED with respect to the filing of any complaints under Section 648.44(7), Florida Statutes, relative to convictions, guilty pleas, or no contest pleas by Jack I. Ethe- ridge entered subsequent to March 27, 1984. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust adminis- trative remedies. Based upon the orders by Judge Fay, administrative prosecution has proceeded to resolve Count II to the administrative complaint addressed in DOAH Case No. 95-3964.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the First Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3964 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by the parties. Petitioner's Findings: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 5 constitutes legal argument. Respondent's Findings: Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 4 is established through the Preliminary Statement. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 7 is subordinate to facts found, with the exception that several other local attorneys were not contacted for advice. One additional attorney was sought out for advice, Mr. Baker. Paragraph 8, the first sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The remaining sentences are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 9 through 13 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 15-16 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 North West 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, FL 33166 Judy Groover, Esquire 24 North Market Street, Suite 301-A Jacksonville, FL 32202 Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent violated provision of the Florida Insurance Code by employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business. Whether Respondent violated the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code by failing to report a change of address to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in this matter, Respondent Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., was licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bond agent. Pursuant to Florida law, Petitioner has jurisdiction over the bail bond licensure and appointments of Respondent. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on March 28, 1975, in case number 75-239 CF, of buying or receiving or aiding in concealment of stolen property, a felony. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on October 22, 1975, in case number 75-2390 CF, of violation of drug abuse law, a felony. Records of the State of Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) show that the conviction set forth in paragraph 4 above included convictions on March 28, 1975, and July 17, 1975, for parole violations. On or about March 7, 1980, the State of Florida Office of Executive Clemency restored the civil rights of Pamela Jean Coleman, relative to Coleman's criminal convictions in Palm Beach County, Florida, in 1975. Records of the FDLE show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, plead nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty, and convicted of retail theft in Polk County, Florida, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, in case number CF91-1923, pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty and convicted of petit theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about December 16, 2002, an Amended Information was filed against Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, charging that between November 27, 2000, and January 25, 2002, in the County of Polk and State of Florida, having been convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the law of any state, territory, or county, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, did participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of a bail bond agency or office thereof or exercise direct or indirect control in any manner in such agency or office or own shares in a closely held corporation which had an interest in a bail bond business contrary to Section 648.44, Florida Statutes. Further, the records of said court show that on or about January 31, 2002, Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, was tried, found guilty and adjudicated guilty of a violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, acting as a bail bondsman while being a convicted felon, a felony of the third degree, as charged in the aforesaid Amended Information. Said conviction is presently on appeal before the Florida Second District Court of Appeal. Respondent knew or should have known the foregoing information. Documents under Seal from the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, pertaining to Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., Bailbonds, Ltd., Inc., show that Pamela Jean Coleman filed original documents on behalf of Respondent's corporation and corresponded with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, on behalf of the said corporation. She was listed as both the registered agent of the corporation and also a vice-president and director of the said corporation as set forth on a document filed over the signature of Respondent. Other filed documentation show Pamela Jean Coleman as the president, secretary, and as director of said corporation. These documents are accurate and valid. The original license application form, Florida Insurance Temporary License Application, under Section 11, Screening Question Information, contains the following language: "If you were adjudged guilty or convicted of a felony crime and your civil rights were lost, provide evidence that your civil rights have been restored." There is no evidence in the record that Coleman provided that information to Petitioner at the time the original application was filed or at any time subsequent to that period, and Coleman signed the application. Respondent gave a statement, under oath, before Luis Rivera, Special Investigator for Petitioner's predecessor (Department of Insurance), on November 27, 2000, wherein he stated: I have known Pamela Coleman/Jones for approximately four years and she has been affiliated with me for most of the time that I have been in the bail bond business. I had asked her if she had ever been convicted of a felony and she said that she had been convicted as a teenager. She had a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights from the Office of Executive Clemency that is dated March 7, 1980. I was under the impression that if her rights had been restored, that it would not be a problem with her working for me. I named Pamela as an officer in my corporation because I did not have any family that I could list as an officer except for my daughter, who is a deputy sheriff and could not be an office of the corporation. Respondent had a business address-of-record with Petitioner of B & B Bail Bonds, 580 North Broadway Avenue, Bartow, Florida 33830-3918, when in fact his business address was 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710. Respondent did not notify Petitioner of a change of address for his corporation as required by law. In November 2000 during an interview, Luis Rivera and another Special Investigator from his office advised Respondent that Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance) considered him to be in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, notwithstanding any restoration of civil rights granted to Pamela Jean Coleman. Luis Rivera visited the home office of Respondent, on March 7 and 21, 2000, at 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710, and knew of no other office location for that agent after that date. Constance Castro, a Special Investigator with the Tampa Office, Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, during September 2001, made an undercover visit to the bail bond office of Respondent, and pretended to be in need of a bail bond for a fictitious relative. She dealt directly with Pamela Jean Coleman who proceeded from the home living area of the house where Respondent was also located, to the office area of the home where Coleman conducted bail bond business with Castro. Special Agent Michael Kreis, Drug Enforcement Agency, in early 2001, had business with Cephas Bail Bonds. He went to the office thereof where he observed Pamela Jean Coleman sitting behind the desk. Coleman told him that she had posted bond the night before for the people he was asking about, and was very familiar with the street names of the people that were being sought. Coleman helped to arrange what was supposed to be a meeting between her and one of the suspects using the ruse that she needed the suspect to sign some bail bond paperwork. Kreis observed Respondent in the office but Coleman seemed to be in charge. Kreis observed her on the phone and dealing with people who came into the Cephas' bail bond office, and noted that by her actions and conduct, she was acting as a bail bond agent. On or about June 19, 2001, Noel Elizabeth "Nikki" Collier was working as a paralegal in her husband's law office when Pamela Jean Coleman visited their office with paperwork for one of their mutual clients to fill out. Coleman left her business card which read "Pamela J. Coleman, President, Clarence L. Cephas, Sr. Bail Bonds." Coleman was dressed in a black outfit with a badge attached to her belt. Coleman told her that if the mutual client did not sign the paperwork then the bail bonds would be revoked. When in the law office, Coleman identified herself as an agent for Clarence Cephas Bail Bonds. Respondent acknowledged that Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 8 was indeed a sworn statement made by him during a visit to Petitioner (then Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, at its offices in Tampa, Florida, in November 2000, and that he was indeed warned by Petitioner's personnel that he was in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes. He was subsequently warned by the filing of an Administrative Complaint in June 2001, an Amended Administrative Complaint in December 2001, and a Second Amended Complaint in March 2003. Respondent acknowledged that Pamela Jean Coleman was indeed listed as an officer and as a registered agent as well as the filer of various corporation documents, regarding his corporation and on file with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, and that he did sign the paperwork indicating that she was a corporate officer. Respondent further acknowledged that Coleman did participate in his bail bond business and that he did make payments to her as an employee, which included filing of a W-2 Form indicating said payments. During the pendency of this action, the State of Florida, by and through Jerry Hill, State Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, prosecuted Respondent for criminal violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes (2003), in the case styled State of Florida v Clarence Luther Cephas, Florida Tenth Circuit Court, Case Number CF02-00598A-XX (the "criminal case"). The Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit conducted a jury trial in the criminal case. On December 17, 2003, the jury rendered a verdict of "not guilty," and the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit rendered a judgment of not guilty in the criminal case. The allegations contained in the criminal case were identical to the allegation contained in Count one of Petitioner's Second Amended Administrative Complaint. During the approximate period of time March 1997 to at least December 2001, Respondent did employ and/or did otherwise allow Pamela Jean Coleman to participate in the bail bond business. Respondent did fail to notify the Department of Financial Services of a change of address as required by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order as follows: Finding Respondent guilty of employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business, in violation of Sections 648.30, 348.44(8)(b), 648.45(2)(e) and (j), and 648.45(3)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes; Finding Respondent guilty of failing to report a change of address; and Revoking the bail bond agent license and eligibility for licensure of Respondent pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Franklin, Esquire The Franklin & Carmichael Law Firm, P.A. 301 East Main Street Post Office Box 50 Bartow, Florida 33806 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Financial Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against Respondent on the basis of allegations of misconduct set forth in an Administrative Complaint dated August 13, 2003.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent Jean- Rene Joseph has been licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bond agent. At all times material to this case, Respondent worked as a bail bond agent with a bail bond company named America's Best Bail Bonds, Inc. At approximately 2:30 or 3:00 a.m. on the morning of January 29, 2002, Santacroce contacted Respondent for the purpose of arranging bail for a friend of hers named John Raymond Moyer ("Moyer"). Moyer needed a bond in the amount of $1,500.00. Respondent agreed to provide, and did provide, the requested bail bond for a fee of $150.00. On the morning of January 29, 2002, Santacroce paid $150.00 cash for the bail bond fee. Santacroce also agreed to furnish collateral for the bail bond issued on behalf of Moyer. In this regard, Santacroce agreed that she would either deliver the title to a specified automobile as collateral, or she would make payments of $250.00 per week until the bail bond on behalf of Moyer was fully collateralized. In the early morning hours of January 29, 2002, Santacroce did not have an original certificate of title to an automobile with her. Instead, she gave Respondent a color photocopy of title number 50460657, which was a certificate of title to an automobile. The certificate showed title to a 1986 Chevrolet in the name of a registered owner named Oliver C. Todd ("Todd"). Handwritten information on the certificate indicated that the registered owner had sold the automobile to AAA National Auto Sales, who in turn had sold the automobile to Santacroce. Santacroce also had with her at that time an affidavit signed by Todd that authorized Santacroce to retrieve the subject automobile from a towing company, as well as a document from Festa Towing Service, Inc, itemizing towing and storage charges. During the early morning hours of January 29, 2002, Respondent and Santacroce both signed a receipt document numbered 11122. Section 4 of that document describes the collateral or collateral documents as consisting of a promissory note and "Fl car title #50460657 or weekly payment of $250.00." Santacroce never made any payments towards collateralization of the subject bail bond. Moreover, Santacroce never delivered to Respondent the original of the certificate of title described above. Less than two weeks later, Moyer was arrested and jailed on other criminal charges. Through another bail bond company, Moyer posted bail on the second arrest. Santacroce no longer wished to have any liability on the bail bond issued on January 29, 2002. Accordingly, she asked Respondent to "surrender" the bond and have Moyer returned to jail. Moyer failed to appear for his court appearance that was guaranteed by the bail bond obtained by Santacroce. A bond forfeiture order was issued on February 12, 2002. Eventually, Moyer appeared, the forfeiture order was set aside, and the surety was discharged. Respondent's employer incurred expenses in the amount of $50.00 to have the forfeiture order set aside. At some point after the surety was discharged, Santacroce asked Respondent to return what Santacroce described as the certificate of title she had given to Respondent. Respondent could not return a certificate of title to Santacroce, because Respondent never received a certificate of title from Santacroce. Respondent never returned the photocopy of the certificate of title to Santacroce. That photocopy was still in Respondent's possession as of the day of the final hearing.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint in this case be dismissed because there is no clear and convincing evidence that Respondent received "car title #50460657" or anything else of value as collateral security for the subject bail bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Financial Services Suite N-321 401 Northwest Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33128 Hernan Hernandez, Esquire 1431 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent's temporary bail bond agent license should be revoked based upon his no contest plea in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 95-1792, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On or about February 6, 1995, a two-count criminal information was filed in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 95- 1972 against Respondent. Count I read as follows: STEVE TORRES, on or about JANUARY 16, 1995, in the County and State aforesaid, did unlawfully and feloniously commit an aggravated battery upon [M. R.] by actually and intentionally touching or striking the person of [M. R.] against her will, while [M. R.] was pregnant and the defendant knew or should have known that she was pregnant, in violation of s. 784.045(1)(b) and s. 775.087, Fla. Stat., contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. Count II read as follows: And the aforesaid Assistant State Attorney, under oath, further information makes that STEVE TORRES, on or about JANUARY 16, 1995, in the County and State aforesaid, did unlawfully, willfully and maliciously injure or damage certain personal property of [M. R.] by BREAKING THE WINDSHIELD OF [M. R.'S] VEHICLE, such damage being more than two hundred dollars ($200.00) but less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), in violation of s. 806.13(1)(b)2. Fla. Stat., contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. On November 6, 1995, Respondent entered a plea of no contest to both counts of the information. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and the entry of a sentence was suspended. In the summer of 2004, Respondent submitted to Petitioner an application for a temporary bail bond agent license. The application was submitted on an online application form developed by Respondent. One of the questions on the form was: "Have you ever been charged, convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction entered?" Respondent truthfully answered "yes" to this question. Along with his application, Respondent submitted a "temporary appointment" form that had been completed by Jack Hope of No Limit Bail Bonds, Respondent's then-prospective employer. On the form, Mr. Hope truthfully answered "yes" to the question: "Has the above applicant [Respondent] ever been convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a felony?" On October 18, 2004, Petitioner granted Respondent's application and issued him the temporary (18-month) bail bond agent license for which he had applied. Petitioner subsequently determined that, in light of Respondent's criminal history record, the license was issued in error. Although it had already issued Respondent a license, Petitioner, on October 28, 2004, attempted to rescind such action by issuing a Notice of Denial, which purported to deny Respondent's application for licensure because of his criminal history. Respondent requested, and was granted, a proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, on the matter. Hearing Officer Beverly Hayes was assigned to conduct the proceeding. On February 16, 2005, a hearing was conducted at which Hearing Officer Hayes received evidence and heard argument from the parties. On April 1, 2005, Hearing Officer Hayes issued a Written Report and Recommended Order recommending that "a Final Order be entered dismissing the Notice of Denial" inasmuch as the notice was "moot because [Petitioner had already] issued a license to [Respondent] prior to the filing of the Notice of Denial." On May 20, 2005, such a Final Order was issued. Prior thereto, on or about April 13, 2005, Petitioner had sent Respondent the following letter: A review of your records has been made and it has been determined that an error has been made in processing your application. You were inadvertently issued a Temporary Bail Bond license although you did not meet the qualifications specified in Florida Statutes. Section 648.355(1)(c) states that a person may not be issued a Bail Bond license who has been convicted or plead[ed] guilty or no contest to a felony, a crime involving moral turpitude, or a crime punishable by imprisonment of 1 year or more under the laws of any state, territory, or country, whether or not a judgment or conviction is entered. On November 6, 1995, in the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, you entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges of Aggravated Battery which was classified as a felony. Since you did not qualify for the license, it has been cancelled as of the issue date. You are not qualified to act in the capacity of a Bail Bond agent. Please immediately return the license to the address shown below. As noted above, on June 7, 2005, Petitioner issued an Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that his license should be revoked based on his 1995 no contest plea in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 95-1972.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a Final Order finding that Respondent is not qualified to hold a temporary bail bond agent license because of the no contest plea he entered in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 95-1972 and revoking his license based on this finding of disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first licensed as a ball bondsman in 1961 or 1962. In 1969 (Exhibit 2), Petitioner was charged with being incompetent and untrustworthy as a bail bondsman, found guilty and placed on one year's probation which was successfully completed. In 1973, Petitioner was again charged with conducting himself in a manner unbecoming a bail bondsman (Exhibit 3). These charges alleged failure to return the premium paid on a supersedes bond when the prisoner was not released from jail on the bond and failure to maintain his office open to the general public as required. In the Final Order issued in this case, Petitioner was fined $850 and placed on probation for two years. Upon failure of Petitioner to comply with the terms of the Final Order, his license was revoked for a period of ten months after which the revocation was set aside and his license restored. In 1979, a hearing was conducted by the undersigned Hearing Officer on charges alleging that Petitioner had failed to maintain the minimum requirement for permanent office records and failed to maintain a place of business accessible to the public and be actively engaged in the bail bond business in violation of Chapter 64B, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was found guilty as charged, and the recommendation that his license be revoked was adopted by the Commissioner of Insurance in the Final order. In 1986, Petitioner was arrested for operating a donut shop in Tampa utilizing topless waitresses in violation of Tampa Ordinance 24-11. These charges were dismissed on appeal to the circuit court (Exhibit 5). Witnesses called by Petitioner included the attorney who prosecuted the 1979 case (Exhibit 4) against Respondent; the investigator who investigated the 1979 charges for the Department, and a sitting circuit court judge who filed an appeal of the 1979 revocation order on behalf of the Petitioner At the time the charges which led to the revocation were preferred, Respondent was without power to write bonds, but still had an obligation to service bonds still outstanding. The two witnesses who testified in these proceedings on the status of a licensed bail bondsman without power to write new bonds both concurred that this places a bail bondsman in the anomalous position of one who has no need for an office to provide bail bonds for the public but who still needs to be accessible to those clients for whom he has outstanding bonds. This distinction was not clarified at the 1979 hearing. All three witnesses who testified on behalf of Petitioner were aware of nothing that would disqualify Petitioner as a bail bondsman at this time. No evidence was submitted that Petitioner was convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, except for the admission by Petitioner that on or about August 11, 1966, he pleaded guilty to uttering a check without sufficient funds on deposit with which the check could be honored. This offense occurred more than 20 years ago and prior to Petitioner twice being found qualified for licensure by Respondent as a bail bondsman.
Findings Of Fact The facts relevant to the charges here preferred are largely undisputed. In May 1978 Respondent's business address as reported by him to Petitioner was 2812 North 34th Street, Tampa, Florida. This address was visited by Petitioner's investigators on 23, 24, 25, and 30 May 1978. The building located at that address is owned and used by Scaglione Construction Company as its main office. There is no sign on the exterior of this building indicating a bail bondsman's office is located inside. While visiting the address, the investigators were advised that Respondent had no office there but Frank Puig did have a bail bond office in the building. Although there was some dispute regarding whether the investigators were shown Puig's office, or even allowed to go to the door of that office, whether they did or not is immaterial because Respondent readily admitted he had no files at this location and conducted no business therefrom. Again witnesses differed on whether there was a sign on the door of the office occupied by Puig. Whether there was a sign on that door reading "Frank Puig - Bail- bondsman" is irrelevant to the charge that Respondent had no sign designating his office. During the period in question, in fact, during most, if not all, of 1978, Respondent testified he was without power [of attorney] to write bonds. Exhibit 1 shows that three companies, Midland Insurance Company, Allied Fidelity Insurance Company, and Cotton Belt Insurance Company, Inc. all renewed Respondent's limited surety agency in October 1977 and all cancelled his limited surety agency 12-14-78. Respondent's testimony indicated that he was an agent only for Cotton Belt and that his power to write bonds had been withdrawn. According to Respondent's own testimony, he had no permanent office in which to keep his files and records and that these records were carried in his car and stored at his residence when not in his car. He was using Puig's telephone number as a place at which messages could be left for him. Respondent also testified that during 1978 he wrote no bonds and was only servicing existing accounts which preceded 1978.
