The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a license to possess Class II Wildlife for exhibition or public sale should be approved.
Findings Of Fact FWC is the state agency with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate all wild animal life in Florida. See Art. IV, § 9, Fla. Const.1 1 All references to the Florida Constitution, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code are to current versions that have not substantively changed as applied to the facts in this case. All persons who possess captive wildlife for the purposes of public display or public sale must have a license from FWC. See § 379.3761(1), Fla. Stat. By rule promulgated by FWC, categories of wildlife for which a license is required are broken down into three classes. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68A- 6.002. Generally, a person cannot possess Class I animals for personal pets unless they came into their possession prior to 1988. Class I animals include 24 different species generally considered extremely dangerous, and include wildlife such as chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, baboons, leopards, jaguars, tigers, bears, rhinoceros, elephants, hippopotamuses, crocodiles, and Komodo dragons. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68A-6.002(1)(a). Class II animals include 38 different species that may, with a proper license, be possessed as personal pets or for commercial purposes. Class II animals have the potential to cause harm but not to the extent of Class I animals and include wildlife such as Howler monkeys, Patas monkeys, Vervet monkeys, Macaques, bobcats, wolves, wolverines, honey badgers, and alligators. See Fla. Admin Code R. 68A-6.002(1)(b). Class III animals include wildlife not listed as Class I or II. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68A-6.002(1)(c). The application at issue in this case is Petitioner’s application, ID 75226, to possess, exhibit, or sell Class II wildlife. Petitioner’s application, dated September 9, 2019, identifies Macaques, Patas, Vervet, Grivet, and Green monkeys as species that he does not currently possess, put plans to possess. By letter to Petitioner dated February 5, 2020 (Denial Letter), FWC advised Petitioner that his application was being denied because of prior violations of law and FWC rules regulating wildlife. In particular, the Denial Letter states that on June 19, 2017, FWC investigator Rick Brown found Petitioner in possession of a Vervet monkey without a license. The Denial Letter explains that, on that same date, Petitioner told investigator Brown that Petitioner had sold a lemur, two squirrel monkeys, and an artic fox earlier in that year, but was unable to provide documents for those sales as required by FWC rule. According to the Denial Letter, Petitioner was issued misdemeanor citations for those violations and, on July 21, 2017, Petitioner received adjudication other than acquittal or dismissal for those violations. The Denial Letter also states that, during an investigation of Petitioner at a new location on February 13, 2018, conducted by FWC investigator Steve McDaniel, it was discovered that Petitioner had sold two ring-tail lemurs to an unlicensed individual on December 15, 2017, and that at the time of the sale Petitioner’s license was expired and was not otherwise valid for sales from Petitioner’s new location. The Denial Letter further states that as a result, Petitioner was issued a citation for selling the lemurs without a valid license and a written warning for selling to an unlicensed individual. According to the Denial Letter, on May 22, 2018, Petitioner received adjudication other than acquittal or dismissal for the citation. The Denial Letter concludes: Pursuant to Rule 68-1.010 [Florida Administrative Code], and due to facts stated above, your application has been denied. We are processing your application fee for a refund, and you should receive it within 21 days. During the hearing for this case, the factual basis set forth in the Denial Letter was demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence provided by the testimony of FWC investigators Brown and McDaniel, the documentary evidence, and Petitioner’s own testimony. Indeed, the evidence showed that during an investigation conducted by investigator Brown on June 19, 2017, Petitioner was found to be in possession of a Class II Vervet monkey without a proper license. Petitioner has never had a Class II license. It was also demonstrated that, at the time of that investigation, Petitioner was unable to produce sales records for a lemur, two squirrel monkeys, and an arctic fox that he had sold earlier that year. While Petitioner provided some documents at the hearing purporting to be records related to those sales, they were insufficient to overcome the preponderance of the evidence in this case. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted that he paid the fine from the citation issued against him for possession of the Vervet and lack of sales records. In addition, it was shown by a preponderance of the evidence that on December 15, 2017, Petitioner sold two ringtail lemurs to an unlicensed individual under a Class III license that was expired and that, prior to its expiration, had only been valid at his previous location, instead of the new location where the sale had taken place.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission issue a Final Order denying Petitioner Gregory Nelson’s application for a license to possess Class II wildlife for exhibition or public sale. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory Nelson 23033 Brouwerton Road Howey-in-the-Hills, Florida 34737 Rhonda E. Parnell, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent properly denied the applications of Petitioner for Class I wildlife; and whether Respondent's previous granting of Class I licensure to Petitioner estops Respondent from denying the instant applications.
Findings Of Fact On July 15, 1998, Petitioner applied to the Commission for licenses, via three separate applications, to possess wildlife, particularly bears, leopards, and baboons at three separate locations. The applications cited the addresses of 127 West Hiawatha Street, 116 West Elm Street, and 6802 North Highland Avenue, all in Tampa, Florida, as the locations where Petitioner planned to possess the animals. Petitioner applied to possess bears (family ursidae), leopards (family felidae) and baboons (family cercopithecidae) at each location. All these animals are Class I wildlife. Respondent issued Notices of Denial of the three applications to Petitioner on September 22, 1998. Class I animals are dangerous animals that cannot be possessed for personal use, and are typically found in zoos. They are dangerous because of their ferocity and size. These animals may be aggressive towards anyone, including their keeper. Class II wildlife are potentially dangerous animals which should only be possessed by experienced individuals. Class III animals are of smaller size and are less aggressive. The goal of the Commission's classification system is to promote the safehousing of wildlife, and to protect the general public and the individual keeping the animals. In the application for 116 West Elm Street, Petitioner noted that he presently possessed five white-tailed deer, one muntjac, and one emu, all Class III wildlife. Petitioner did not possess authorization to house Class I wildlife at 116 West Elms Street, the year previous to the instant application. In the application for 127 West Hiawatha Street, Petitioner noted that he presently possessed two panthers and one bobcat, both Class II wildlife, and two alligators, which are Class III wildlife. Petitioner did not possess authorization to house Class I wildlife at 127 West Hiawatha Street the year previous to the instant application. In the application for 6802 North Highland Avenue, Petitioner noted that he presently possessed no wildlife at this location. Petitioner did not possess authorization to house Class I wildlife at 6802 North Highland Avenue the year previous to the instant application. Two of Petitioner's locations are contiguous: 127 West Hiawatha Street, and 166 West Elm Street. Petitioner's location at 6802 North Highland Avenue is approximately one block from the other two sites, and on the other side of the street. Elm and Hiawatha are not one property, but two separate residences and addresses. The Hiawatha and Elm Street addresses were treated as two separate locations by the Commission as they are separate addresses with separate applications. The Elm Street and Hiawatha locations are separated by a fence at the back of each property. Petitioner uses a ladder to traverse over the fence between the Elm Street and Hiawatha locations. The area where Petitioner wishes to house Class I wildlife is a residential area with small single-family houses located close together, with small yards, and near a major road. There are residential properties to the east of both the Hiawatha and Elm Street locations. Petitioner's neighborhood is densely populated, with single-family residential dwellings and small lots. Petitioner's locations are within approximately 100 yards from large intersections at Sligh Avenue and Florida Avenue. The three properties where Petitioner sought to keep Class I wildlife are zoned single-family residential. Approximately six people per week visit through Petitioner's facilities. Petitioner has received various permits, including Class I, from the Commission for over the past 15 years. It is possible to obtain a Class I license and not be qualified to possess animals at the address on the license. Pursuant to law, a permittee for Class I wildlife has to meet specific requirements including standard caging requirements and land area. The land area required to house Class I wildlife is 1/4 acre minimum. An acre of land is 43,560 square feet. One-quarter of an acre is 10,890 square feet. The 1/4 acre minimum area for Class I wildlife is critical because it allows for a larger buffer for dangerous animals. Respondent wildlife inspectors visit applied-for sites to determine whether the facility meets the caging requirements, whether wildlife are housed safely and ensure the public is not at risk. Respondent inspections are made to determine whether caging is strong enough to contain animals safely and to verify the owner or possessor does not exceed the number of permitted animals. Wildlife officers regulate and enforce the caging of captive wildlife, both exotic and native. It is necessary to have cages meet the rules to protect the safety of the animal, the neighbors, and the keeper. Respondent's Lieutenant Stephen Delacure, who has been a Commission Wildlife Officer or Inspector for approximately ten years, has been to Petitioner's three locations in Tampa at least 15 times over the past four years. Delacure has never seen any Class I animals at any of Petitioner's three locations. On November 12, 1998, Delacure and Lieutenant Krause inspected all three of Petitioner's locations pursuant to his application. Delacure inspected the three locations for appropriate caging and land area for bears, leopards, and baboons. Delacure measured all locations with Petitioner present and indicated that he gave Petitioner "the benefit of the doubt" as to the measurements. Delacure measured the total area for 127 West Hiawatha Street to be 103 feet by 39 feet (front and depth) (4,017 square feet). Delacure measured the total area of 116 West Elm Street to be 87 feet by 69 feet (6,003 square feet). Therefore, Delacure found the combined area for 127 West Hiawatha Street and 116 West Elm to be 10,020 square feet. Delacure measured the total area of 6802 North Highland Avenue to be 102 feet by 42 feet (4,284 square feet). Delacure found no adequate caging for Class I bears, baboons, or cats at 127 West Hiawatha Street. In addition, Delacure found no caging for Class I wildlife at 116 West Elm Street nor 6802 North Highland Avenue. The November 1998 inspection was the basis for the issuance of the amended notice of denial for failure to meet land area requirements and to meet caging requirements. Respondent denied Class I licenses to Petitioner because of inadequate land area and caging. Class II licenses do not say "all" for possession purposes, as these licenses are defined by specific animal families. However, Class III licenses may say "all" for possession purposes. The Respondent changed Class I licenses to animal specific from the "all" designation to ensure that the animal possessor is familiar with the handling of that family or species of animal as nutritional, health, and handling requirements are different for each animal family. Linda Coomey is a building inspector for the City of Tampa, having done this job for 15 years. Coomey inspects zoning and code enforcement. Coomey has been to Petitioner's locations 12-13 times over the last eight years. Coomey calculated the area of 127 West Hiawatha Street as 38 feet by 103 feet (3,914 square feet). Coomey calculated the area of 116 West Elm Street as 65 feet by 80 feet (5,200 square feet). Therefore, Coomey found the combined area of 127 West Hiawatha Street and 116 West Elm Street is 9,114 square feet. The area of 6802 North Highland Avenue was calculated by Coomey as 50 feet by 104 feet (5,200 square feet). These measurements were taken from the Hillsborough County plat maps and Coomey does not consider any error in measuring the square footage as acceptable. The Hillsborough County Property Appraiser's Office found the area of the three properties to be as follows: 127 West Hiawatha Street, 38 feet by 103 feet (3,914 square feet); 116 West Elm Street, 65 feet by 80 feet (5,200 square feet); and 6802 North Highland Avenue, 50 feet by 104 feet (5,200 square feet). None of these individual areas is equal to or greater than 1/4 acre, nor does the combining of the areas of 127 West Hiawatha Street and 116 West Elm Street (3,914 square feet and 5,200 square feet, for a total of 9,114 square feet) meet or exceed 1/4 acre. The Hillsborough County Tax Collector's Office reports 127 West Hiawatha Street as being .09 acres; 116 West Elm Street as being .12 acres; and 6802 North Highland Avenue as being .12 acres. Therefore, the Hillsborough County Tax Collector's Office found the combined area of 127 West Hiawatha Street and 116 West Elm Street is .21 acres. Per Petitioner, 127 West Hiawatha Avenue is 39 feet by 103 feet (4,017 square feet) in total area, and Respondent's officers informed Petitioner he did not have the required acreage. Respondent informed Petitioner on more than one occasion that Petitioner could have a Class I license that allows a person to borrow an animal and not be allowed to posseses Class I animals on the license holder's property. On September 6, 1991, Petitioner was issued a license for 127 West Hiawatha Street, which cited that Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, felidae, cercopithecidae, and ursidae; Class II, felidae and cercopithecidae; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On July 23, 1993, Petitioner was issued a license for 127 West Hiawatha Street, which cited that Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, none; Class II, felidae; Class III, all excluding felidae. On June 29, 1993, Petitioner was issued a license for 116 West Elm Street, which cited that Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, ursidae, cercopithecidae, and felidae. On June 29, 1993, Petitioner was issued a license for 6802 North Highland Avenue, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, ursidae, felidae, and cercopithecidae; Class II, all excluding venomous reptiles; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On June 29, 1994, Petitioner was issued a license for 116 West Elm Street, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, felidae, cercopithecidae, and ursidae; Class II, all, excluding venomous reptiles; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On June 29, 1994, Petitioner was a issued a license for 6802 North Highland Avenue, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, felidae, cercopithecidae, and ursidae; Class II, all, excluding venomous reptiles; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On July 4, 1994, Petitioner was issued a license for 127 West Hiawatha Street, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, none; Class II, felidae; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On June 27, 1996, Petitioner was issued a license for 127 West Hiawatha Street, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, none; Class II, felidae; Class III, all, excluding venomous reptiles. On August 9, 1996, Petitioner was issued a license for 116 West Elm Street, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, felidae, cercopithecidae, and ursidae; Class II, felidae and cercopithecidae; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On August 9, 1996, Petitioner was issued a license for 6802 North Highland Avenue, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, felidae, cercopithecidae, and ursidae; Class II, felidae and cercopithecidae; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. This was the last instance where Petitioner was licensed to possess Class I wildlife. On September 16, 1997, Petitioner was issued a license for 127 Hiawatha Street, which cited Petitioner could possess: Class I, none; Class II, felidae; Class III, all. On September 16, 1997, Petitioner was issued a license for 116 West Elm Street, which cited Petitioner could possess: Class I, none; Class II, none; Class III, all, excluding venomous reptiles. On September 16, 1997, Petitioner was issued a license for 6802 North Highland Avenue, which cited Petitioner could possess: Class I, none; Class II, none. Lieutenant Dennis Parker is an inspector for Respondent, having worked for Respondent 26 years. Parker has consistently inspected Petitioner's facilities for more than 15 years. Parker measured 127 West Hiawatha Street "from curb to curb" in 1992 pursuant to Petitioner having a bear on the premises. Petitioner immediately received notice from Respondent that his acreage was inadequate via a "field revocation." Petitioner was ordered to remove the Class I animals. Petitioner was mistakenly provided a Class I license for ursidae before the Commission measured 127 West Hiawatha Street, under Parker's assumption that Petitioner had adequate acreage. A Class I license requires 1/4 acre or more to possess a Class I animal on that property. Petitioner's license for Class I ursidae was based on Petitioner's borrowing a bear for exhibition, with the bear being kept at a licensed facility not owned by Petitioner. Petitioner used 127 West Hiawatha Street as the mailing address for the license. Respondent had never inspected or authorized caging for bears at 127 West Hiawatha Street. Petitioner originally obtained bears without the knowledge and/or consent of Respondent, then a complaint was filed with Respondent. Petitioner recently had an animal escape from the 116 Elm Street location. Petitioner presently possesses Class I animals. Petitioner's properties do not meet the regulatory requirement for acreage size to house Class I wildlife pursuant to Rule 68A- 6.022 (formerly 39-6.022), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner is one of thousands of persons who has authority to possess animals, but does not have an approved facility address to house the animals. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the properties are combined, Petitioner's properties at 127 West Hiawatha and 116 West Elm fail to meet the mandatory requirements for acreage to house Class I wildlife, pursuant to Rule 68A-6.022, Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission enter a final order upholding the Commission's Amended Notice of Denial. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph R. Fritz, Esquire 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33603 Preston T. Robertson, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Allan L. Egbert, Ph.D., Interim Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 James Antista, Acting General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600
The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Petitioner, Sherrie Wentworth (Petitioner), is entitled to approval of her applications to renew her Wildlife Rehabilitation Permit, and her License to Possess Class III Wildlife for Exhibition or Public Sale.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are taken from the parties' joint pre-hearing stipulation, and the direct evidence adduced at the hearing. Stipulated Facts Petitioner pled no contest and had adjudication withheld on the following seven captive wildlife violations on April 28, 2015: Possession of Class I Wildlife (a tiger) without a required permit (a violation of section 379.3761, Florida Statutes). Failure to have a required permit for the importation of non-native species of wildlife (a tiger) (a violation of section 379.231(1)). Failure to possess the required financial responsibility for Class I Wildlife (a tiger) (a violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 68A-6.0024(3)). Maintaining Class I Wildlife (a tiger) on less than five acres (a violation of rule 68A-6.003(2)(c)2.a.). Personal possession of Class II Wildlife (a coyote) without a required permit (a violation of section 379.3762). Unsafe housing of Class II Wildlife (a coyote) (a violation of rule 68A-6.0023(2)). Not having caging of proper size for Class II Wildlife (a coyote) (a violation of rule 68A-6.003(2)(c)4.b.). Two warnings were issued by Respondent to Petitioner on September 20, 2017, for the following two captive wildlife violations: Failure to keep complete accurate records of squirrels entering the facility (a violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 68A-9.006(4)(b)). Failure to maintain a daily log of animals entering the rehabilitation facility (specifically to log a hawk taken in on September 14, 2017) (a violation of rule 68A-9.006(5)(e)). No additional adjudications or violations were entered against Petitioner between April 29, 2015, and September 19, 2017, that served as a basis for the denial at issue. There were no errors or omissions in the renewal applications at issue and there have been no previous errors or omissions in previous applications submitted by Petitioner that serve as a basis for the denial at issue. There have been no material changes to the criteria used to evaluate the issuance of the two licenses at issue since 2015. Petitioner admits that squirrels were not properly logged into Petitioner's records at the time of the September 20, 2017, warning violations. March 2015 In March 2015, then Captive Wildlife Investigator Steven Grigg responded to an anonymous complaint about a tiger at East Coast. See Resp. Ex. 4. Investigator Grigg testified that prior to that time Petitioner had expressed interest in getting a tiger, and he advised her regarding the necessary steps to obtain a Class I Wildlife permit that would allow her to possess a tiger. He was aware that the Class I Wildlife permit was denied in July 2014. Petitioner acquired the tiger while the Class I Wildlife permit application was pending, and she continued to possess the tiger for several months after being denied. At first, Petitioner denied having a tiger on the premises. The tiger was an approximately 200-pound female for which, in March 2015, Petitioner neither had the Class I Wildlife permit, nor did she have financial responsibility coverage and five acres for exclusive use. In addition, the non-native tiger was imported from outside the state without the necessary importation permit. Investigator Grigg issued Petitioner four separate citations related to unlawful possession of the tiger. See Stipulated Fact No. 1. Possession of a tiger without the necessary license and financial responsibility is a serious safety concern, both for the safety of the public and the person in possession of the animal. Possession of a tiger without having five acres of land on which no other use is taking place is necessary to ensure a buffer between the tiger and the public. East Coast sits on 2.5 acres, and Petitioner leased an adjacent 2.5 acres. See Pet. Ex. 2. Petitioner testified that she thought she had the necessary five acres for possession of the tiger. However, an examination of the lease for the adjacent property shows that there was a home with a couple residing there. Possession of a non-native tiger without the necessary import permit is a potential danger to native species of wildlife. Species outside of Florida may carry diseases not present in Florida wildlife. Bringing these species into the state without the necessary precautions associated with proper permits places native wildlife at risk. In addition, Petitioner kept the tiger at East Coast where injured and sick wildlife were also present. During the investigation of Petitioner's facility in March 2015, Investigator Grigg also discovered that she was keeping a coyote as a pet without a proper permit. Investigator Grigg cited Petitioner for keeping a Class II animal without the proper permit, and for housing the coyote in a cage that was neither the correct size nor the minimum necessary strength. See Stipulated Fact No. 1. A coyote is a Class II animal——the second most dangerous type of animal in Florida. Possession of a coyote without the necessary permit is a serious safety concern for the public. Petitioner's housing of the coyote in caging that was not as strong as the law requires also posed a danger to the public. Also during the March 2015 visit, Investigator Grigg discovered that Petitioner was keeping a red fox——a Class III animal——as a pet without a permit. Investigator Grigg issued a warning to Petitioner although he could have issued her a citation. He also issued Petitioner a warning for housing the fox in caging that was less than the minimum size required. Petitioner testified that she applied to Respondent and was granted a variance for the size of the cage for the red fox. September 2017 On September 20, 2017, Captive Wildlife Investigator J. Scott Wilkenson conducted an unannounced compliance inspection of Petitioner's facility. See Resp. Ex. 7. Petitioner had not entered approximately 60 squirrels into the facility logs as required by her Wildlife Rehabilitation Permit. That permit stated "[c]omplete, accurate written records shall be kept by the permittee . . . ." and "[a]ll permittees shall keep a log on each animal entering the facility for treatment . . . ." Petitioner testified that she entered the squirrels into a daily log, but she did not show proof of such a log to Investigator Wilkenson at the time of the inspection. Volunteer Donna Bloom testified that neither written nor electronic logs were provided to Investigator Wilkenson at the time of the inspection. Investigator Wilkenson issued a warning to Petitioner for the failure to enter the 60 squirrels into her facility logs as required by the law and her permit. At the September 2017 inspection, Investigator Wilkenson also noted that Petitioner did not enter record of a hawk into a daily log as required by Petitioner's Wildlife Rehabilitation Permit in effect at the time. The Wildlife Rehabilitation Permit stated that "[a]ll permittees shall keep a log on each animal entering the facility for treatment. The log shall include a record of the animals' treatment, condition, and disposition." Petitioner offered into evidence a record that purported to be the daily log reflecting the intake of the hawk. See Pet. Ex. 12. Investigator Wilkenson testified that he initially requested these documents but that they were not immediately available at the facility during his on-site inspection. Investigator Wilkenson issued Petitioner a warning for the failure to enter the hawk into a daily log as required by her permit. Petitioner and her recordkeeper, Ms. Bloom, admitted that the manual daily logs were not on-site during the September 20, 2017, inspection because Ms. Bloom took them home to enter into the computer. She testified that Hurricane Irma had impacted electricity at the facility and delayed entry of the manual daily logs into the computer. The Wildlife Rehabilitation Permit recordkeeping requirements are necessary to ensure permittee accountability. Records quickly show investigators what animals are on the permittee's property and their condition. Accurate records ensure that Respondent is able to carry out its constitutional responsibility regarding the care of wildlife for protection of both the public and the animals. Other Aggravating Evidence Investigator Grigg testified that over the years he repeatedly advised and warned Petitioner that it was necessary to follow the captive wildlife laws, including maintaining complete and accurate records. Investigator Grigg's interactions with Petitioner showed him that she would intentionally and with knowledge violate the captive wildlife laws for as long as she could before getting caught. Her actions left him concerned that she is not willing to comply with the captive wildlife laws. In addition, Petitioner has expressed to him that she does not have time to follow the rules and that Respondent's legal requirements impede her ability to care for the animals. Both Investigators Grigg and Wilkenson testified that Petitioner should reduce the number of species she intakes at the facility. Mitigating Evidence Petitioner testified that she opened East Coast in approximately January 2012, giving up her prior profession as a licensed pilot and investing approximately $100,000. Petitioner testified that her facility is the only rehabilitation center open 24 hours a day, seven days a week and year-round for injured animal intake. She testified that she takes animals that other centers will not and will travel from the center in Volusia County to Flagler County to pick up injured animals. She believes her operations provide a needed benefit to the community in Volusia and Flagler Counties. Ms. Lundell testified that the Chase Academy has 52 autistic children. The Academy partners with East Coast in an educational program for the students. Petitioner brings in the animals and educates the students about caring for and handling injured wildlife and wildlife in general. Petitioner testified that in September 2017, there was power loss and damage at East Coast caused by Hurricane Irma. Despite the situation, she testified that East Coast was the only rehabilitation center open and taking calls to pick up injured animals. She testified that she logged animals manually using paper forms, but on the date of Respondent's inspection, the paper forms were in the possession of Ms. Bloom, who was transferring the forms to Petitioner's electronic records system at home where there was power. However, Petitioner was unable to produce the paper forms at the time of Investigator Wilkenson's inspection or at any time thereafter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's applications for renewal of her Wildlife Rehabilitation Permit and License to Possess Class III Wildlife for Exhibition or Public Sale. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRANCINE M. FFOLKES Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher Block, Esquire Block Law Firm, PLLC Post Office Box 560618 Rockledge, Florida 32956 (eServed) Sherrie Wentworth 2090 Halifax Drive Port Orange, Florida 32128 Tracey Scott Hartman, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Brandy Elaine Elliott, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Harold G. "Bud" Vielhauer, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed)
The Issue Did Respondent, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (Commission) correctly deny the application of Petitioner, James Hammonds, to renew his Game Farm License (Case No. 19-6307)? Did the Commission correctly deny Mr. Hammonds' application to renew his License to Possess Class III Wildlife for Exhibition or Public Sale (Case No. 19-6326)?
Findings Of Fact The Parties Article IV, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution creates the Commission. It charges the Commission to "exercise the regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to wild animal life and fresh water aquatic life, and … exercise regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to marine life, … ." Chapter 379, Florida Statutes (2019), implements the constitutional provision and did so in 2017. Mr. Hammonds owns and operates The Monkey Whisperer in Parrish, Florida. He breeds and sells exotic animals. Mr. Hammonds holds five separate licenses authorizing him to own, breed, sell, and transport wild life. They are a Class III license5 (with a Capuchin Monkey and Spider Monkey endorsement) that authorizes him to exhibit and sell wildlife, a game farm license, a deer herd management license, a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) transport license, and a USDA license to trade in wildlife animals. The renewal of his Game Farm License and License for Exhibition and Public Sale of Wildlife are the subject of this matter. The Commission refused to renew both. Mr. Hammonds has held these two licenses since 2012. Since obtaining his licenses, Mr. Hammonds has passed all Commission inspections. In addition, the Commission has issued him a game farm license. The 2012 Conviction In 2012 Mr. Hammonds pleaded no contest to a charge of unlawfully selling wildlife to an unpermitted entity. The offense was sale of a marmoset at a flea market to an unlicensed purchaser. The record does not provide a citation to the statute violated. Mr. Hammonds was new to the exotic animal trade. He relied upon statements by the purchaser and a Commission representative that the Commission had issued the purchaser a license and that it was en route. The court adjudicated Mr. Hammonds guilty and ordered him to pay a fine and costs totaling $450.00. It also required Mr. Hammonds to pay an additional $50.00 for costs of prosecution. Mr. Hammonds paid the fine and 5 Section 379.3762(2), Florida Statutes (2019), creates three classifications of wildlife types. Class I is wildlife that because of its nature, habit, or status may not be possessed as a pet. Class II is wildlife presenting a real or potential threat to human safety. Class III is all wildlife not included in Classes I and II. costs. Aware of this conviction, the Commission nonetheless routinely approved Mr. Hammonds' license renewal applications and approved his application for a game farm license over the next six years. There is no evidence of or charge of any other violations by Mr. Hammonds until the charges involved in these cases. The Capuchin Monkey In October 2017, Mr. Hammonds sold a Capuchin monkey to Christina Brown. He verified her identity and Nevada residency by looking at her Nevada driver's license. Nevada does not require a license to own exotic animals, including Capuchin monkeys. The Commission did not prove that Ms. Brown did not hold a Florida permit to own wildlife.6 Mr. Hammonds had a few conversations with Ms. Brown and her assistant Manny Ortiz about the sale. On October 12, 2017, Mr. Hammonds completed the required USDA form, "Record of Acquisition, Disposition or Transport of Animals," for the Capuchin sale.7 Mr. Hammonds was advised that Jennifer and Michael Brister would pick up the monkey to transport it to Nevada. The Bristers are located in 6 Lack of proof is the hallmark of this case. The Commission relied solely upon the testimony of one witness. The testimony was almost entirely hearsay or descriptions of document contents. This is despite the Commission, according to its witness, having recordings, sworn statements, telephone records, and financial records to support its allegations. The Commission did not offer these into evidence. Hearsay alone cannot be the basis for a finding of fact unless it would be admissible over objection in a circuit court trial. § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2019). Document descriptions are subject to memory failings, incompleteness, inaccuracies, and other factors that make them less than persuasive. See § 90.952, Fla. Stat.; See Williams v. State, 386 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla. 1980). 7 The form does not have a field calling for the buyer's telephone number, or any telephone number for that matter. This is noted because the Commission's witness and Notices emphasize, as proof of guilt, an unsupported claim that Mr. Hammonds put his telephone number on the form where the buyer's telephone number went. The unsupported testimony and insistence on its significance is one of the reasons that the witness' testimony is given little credence or weight. Also Mr. O'Horo testified that the form showed a Virginia address for Ms. Brown. It shows a Nevada address. Tennessee. The Bristers held a USDA Class T Carrier permit issued under the federal Animal Welfare Act. Mr. Hammonds obtained proof that the Bristers held this federal permit required for interstate transport of the monkey. He went so far as to obtain a copy of their USDA certification to provide this service. Mr. Hammonds was also aware that the Bristers frequently did business in Florida. Other breeders recommended them highly. The Commission did not prove that the Bristers did not hold a Florida permit to own wildlife. The Bristers picked up the monkey, on behalf of Ms. Brown, from Mr. Hammonds in Florida. Other than to receive a telephone call reporting that the monkey had been delivered, Mr. Hammonds had no further contact with or communications about the monkey or Ms. Brown until the Commission's investigator contacted him. There is no admissible, credible, persuasive evidence about what happened to the monkey from this point forward. The Commission offered only uncorroborated hearsay testimony from Mr. O'Horo on this subject. The Rhesus Macaque Monkey Mr. Hammonds also assists people in rescues of exotic animals whose owners have realized they cannot care for them. In 2017, Mr. Hammonds facilitated the transfer of a Rhesus Macaque monkey from one individual to another. A Macaque monkey is a Class II animal. The monkey owner came to Mr. Hammonds' business seeking assistance because he could not handle the monkey. The monkey was in a pet carrier. Mr. Hammonds recalled a woman in Orlando who had contacted him in the past seeking a Macaque. He put the two individuals in touch with each other. The two individuals agreed to the exchange of the monkey. The woman came the same day, met the Macaque owner, and accepted the monkey from him. The owner kept the monkey with him in the carrier until he gave it to the woman. Mr. Hammonds was paid for his services in facilitating the exchange. There is no competent, persuasive evidence that Mr. Hammonds ever had ownership, physical possession, control, or custody of the Macaque monkey in any form.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, issue a final order renewing the Game Farm License and the License to Possess Class III Wildlife for Exhibition or Public Sale of Petitioner, James Hammonds. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda E. Parnell, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) David A. Fernandez, Esquire Florida Trial Counsel 4705 26th Street West, Suite A Bradenton, Florida 34207 (eServed) Sean P. Flynn, Esquire Flynn Law, P.A. 2200 Manatee Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34025 (eServed) Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case concerns whether the Respondent violated Sections and 585.80, Florida Statutes, by selling or offering to sell animal products that were adulterated, misbranded, or uninspected, and, if so, a determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is engaged in the business of selling meat products at its location at 4267 Northwest 12th Street, Lauderhill, Florida 33313, and holds Food Permit No. 55402, pursuant to Section 500.12, Florida Statutes. On January 12, 1993, a United States Department of Agriculture Compliance Officer performed an inspection at Respondent's facility. During this inspection, the Compliance Officer examined and placed under detention approximately 327 pounds of uninspected meat product, consisting of the following: two pig carcasses, one cow head, singed cow feet, beef lungs, and goat tripe. None of the products bore any marks of inspection. With the exception of the two pig carcasses, 1/ all of the uninspected meat product was being offered for sale to retail customers. Beef lungs, or "lite," may not be sold as human food under any circumstances in the State of Florida. The goat tripe, or stomachs, were adulterated with ingesta, which is the contents of the stomach at the time the animal is slaughtered. Some of the beef lungs were darkly colored which, in the opinion of the Compliance Officer, was because they were either old or had been left unrefrigerated for some period of time. One of the pig carcasses was unclean and bruised, and was therefore condemned. The other carcass was released to Mr. Richard Gray after it was determined by the Compliance Officer that, despite the lack of proper labeling, the pig carcasses were being held for the personal use of Mr. Gray. On February 12, 1993, a Department Compliance Officer performed a second inspection at Respondent's facility. At this time, the Compliance Officer examined and detained approximately 65 pounds of uninspected meat products, consisting of the following: goat feet (hide on), goat intestines, goat tripe, and beef lungs. None of the products bore marks of inspection, nor were they marked as "Not for Sale." The goat feet and beef lungs were adulterated with ingesta and were generally dirty. The products detained during the February 12, 1993, inspection, were delivered to Respondent's facility on January 19, 1993, as part of the same purchase of meat products as the items found by the USDA Compliance Officer on January 12, 1993. The Florida meat inspection program requires an animal to be inspected both before and after slaughter. Antemortem inspection is necessary to determine the general health of the animal, while postmortem inspection may reveal pathological conditions and diseases. The tissue is also examined for evidence of abscess, parasites, and arthritic conditions, as well as drug residues. These steps must be taken to safeguard the consumer from exposure to contaminated and diseased meat products. By means of the Department's letter dated May 29, 1991, Respondent has previously received a formal notice of warning concerning a separate violation of the same statutory prohibition, namely the sale and offer for sale of adulterated and misbranded cow and goat feet.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of a violation of Sections 500.04 and 585.80(2), Florida Statutes, by offering for sale uninspected animal products and adulterated animal products on January 12, 1993; Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of a violation of Sections 500.04 and 585.80(2), Florida Statutes, by offering for sale uninspected animal products and adulterated animal products on February 12, 1993; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00 for each of the two violations mentioned above, for a grand total of $2,000.00 in administrative fines. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May 1994.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is permitted by Petitioner to treat sick and injured wildlife under a wildlife rehabilitation permit, the latest and current permit being issued to Respondent on January 21, 1983. Respondent has been engaged in the business of treating sick and injured wildlife -- including both birds and mammals -- under permit from Petitioner for at least three (3) years. Petitioner issues wildlife rehabilitation permits to those persons demonstrating to Petitioner the degree of expertise in treating sick and injured wildlife necessary to assure safety to the treated animals. In addition, Petitioner monitors wildlife rehabilitation permittees to assure that sick and injured wildlife are treated humanely and caged in a safe and sanitary manner so as to protect the health and safety of the wildlife treated and the public. In order to monitor such permittees, periodic inspections of the premises where sick and injured wildlife is treated are made by Petitioner. In addition, Petitioner required such permittees to maintain records and to submit the same to Petitioner upon Petitioner's request. Wildlife rehabilitators are notified of this requirement through an informational packet provided them by Petitioner, which specifies that permittees must keep records of specimens cared for and submit reports of same to Petitioner upon request. The requirement that records be maintained and reported to the Petitioner upon request is applied to all of the one hundred (100) wildlife rehabilitators permitted by Petitioner. Examination of records is routinely requested by Petitioner when inspecting the premises where sick and injured wildlife is kept. On at least two occasions, Petitioner requested the production of records maintained by Respondent in connection with Petitioner's inspection of Respondent's wildlife rehabilitation facilities. On neither occasion did Respondent produce records for Petitioner's inspection. On February 3, 1983, Petitioner notified Respondent by letter that Respondent should submit a report of the numbers and types of wildlife accepted for rehabilitation and the disposition of said wildlife. The letter directed Respondent to submit his report immediately and to maintain records for examination by Petitioner in conjunction with future inspections. No report was submitted to Petitioner by the Respondent. On September 8, 1983, in response to a citizen complaint, Petitioner initiated an investigation of the wildlife rehabilitation operation of Respondent. In conjunction with its investigation of Respondent, Petitioner requested of Respondent the production of the wildlife rehabilitation records on September 22, 1983. Respondent did not produce the records as requested. Petitioner again requested Respondent to produce the records on September 23, 1983, and again Respondent failed to produce the records for Petitioner. Respondent did provide, on two separate occasions, documents to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, a federal agency. The documents submitted to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service purported to reflect numbers of birds treated by Respondent during 1982. The documents failed to reflect the type of treatment, the specific disposition of said birds, any reference to mammals, or any recording of numbers or types of mammals. The two separate documents submitted are in irreconcilable conflict as to numbers and types of birds treated. In addition, the documents contain no reference to certain birds delivered by Petitioner to respondent's wildlife rehabilitation facility during 1982. Said documents were never submitted by Respondent to Petitioner. On no occasion has Respondent produced any records or reports for 1982 to Petitioner in connection with Respondent's wildlife rehabilitation. On November 1, 1983, Respondent was informed by letter dated October 27, 1983, that Petitioner intended to revoke Respondent's wildlife rehabilitation permit due to Respondent's failure to comply with the record keeping and reporting requirements of the wildlife rehabilitation permit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission enter a final order revoking the wildlife permit of the Respondent Jack Kassewitz, Jr. DONE and ORDERED THIS 15th day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1984.
Findings Of Fact For more than 20 years, petitioner has worked as a state employee in law enforcement or as a teacher of persons' training for law enforcement work. From November of 1955 until September of 1976, he was employed as a special agent by the Florida Sheriffs' Bureau. From October of 1965 to March of 1972, he taught at Florida State University, first as an instructor in criminology, then as an assistant professor. On March 20, 1972, petitioner began working for respondent, in its Division of Animal Industry, as an agricultural investigator supervisor in the livestock theft program. Six months later petitioner attained career service status in this position, which has position number 0959. Position number 0959 is the only position within the single agency class of agricultural investigator supervisor. During the 1976 legislative session, and even before the session began, at committee hearings conducted in the course of the appropriations process, there was talk of abolishing the livestock theft program, a proposal which respondent's personnel resisted to the extent practicable. Although petitioner's name was never mentioned in these deliberations, on at least one occasion a legislator made specific reference to abolishing the position of agricultural investigator supervisor. After passage of the appropriations bill by the 1976 legislature, the Hon. Jack D. Gordon, Chairman, Senate Committee on Ways and Means, and the Hon. Edmond M. Fortune, Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations, wrote a letter to the Hon. J. H. Williams, Lieutenant Governor and Secretary of Administration, and the Hon. Ernest Ellison, Auditor General, to which they attached "computerized program component work papers for . . . use in development of the agencies' approved operating budgets for 1976-77." Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. The fourth item on the attachment reads, as follows: REDUCTION IN LIVESTOCK THEFT PROGRAM AGRICULTURAL INVESTIGATOR SPECIALIST; AGRICULTURAL INVESTIGATORS At no time has there been a position within respondent department called "agricultural investigator specialist." Notwithstanding the use of the title "agricultural investigator specialist," the legislature intended to abolish the position of "agricultural investigator supervisor." Mr. C. Douglas Shelby, now assistant director of administration for respondent, was respondent's personnel officer in June of 1976; the Hon. Doyle Conner, head of respondent, had delegated to Mr. Shelby authority to deal with personnel matters generally. When the appropriations bill passed, Mr. Shelby and Jerry Gullo, a training manager for respondent, began work on implementing the legislation. After considering Emergency Rule 22 AER 76-1, which took effect on June 15, 1976, Mr. Gullo drafted a letter to petitioner for Mr. Shelby's signature, dated June 16, 1976, notifying petitioner that his job would no longer exist as of the close of business on June 30, 1976. The letter was mailed on June 16, 1976; petitioner received notice of the letter's arrival on June 17, 1976, but actually saw it and read it for the first time on June 18, 1976. A copy of the letter was admitted in evidence as respondent's exhibit No. 5. In part, the letter advised petitioner that "you have the right to request a demotion to a class in which you previously held permanent status or reassignment in a class in which you held permanent status in lieu of layoff . . ." On receipt of the letter dated June 16, 1976, petitioner drafted a letter requesting reassignment or demotion, but when, on June 21, 1976, Mr. Gullo told petitioner that there would be no possibility of reassignment or demotion under Emergency Rule 22 AER 76-1, because, said Mr. Gullo, petitioner had not attained career service status in any class other than that of agricultural investigator supervisor, petitioner decided there would be no point in submitting the letter he had drafted and did not do so. Also on June 21, 1976, official notice of the abolition of respondents position number 0959 was mailed by respondent to Mr. Kennison. (Respondent's exhibit No. 3) Petitioner had no further discussion with respondent's personnel about the layoff before he left respondent's employ. On June 30, 1976, Lieutenant Governor William, acting as Secretary of Administration, and in response to a letter from Mr. Shelby, which was received in evidence as respondent's exhibit No. 3, approved "[s]tatewide within the Division of Animal Industry," respondent's exhibit No. 4, as the competitive area for purposes of Emergency Rule 22 AER 76-1. Id. On July 1, 1976, petitioner was out of a job, despite the good work he had done in the livestock theft program and his many years of state employment. Petitioner filed a timely appeal with the Career Service Commission. Respondent notified the State Personnel Director of the layoff by letter dated July 12, 1976, which came in evidence as respondent's exhibit No. 2. STATEMENT REQUIRED BY STUCKEY'S OF EASTMAN, GEORGIA v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) Respondent submitted no proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs two, three, and five through twelve of petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance. Paragraph one of petitioner's proposed fact findings has been adopted, in substance, assuming "at all times material hereto" is intended to mean from September 21, 1972, until June 30, 1976, or some portion of that time period. Paragraph four of petitioner's proposed fact findings has been adopted, in substance, except for the reference to respondent's exhibit No. 3, which is a copy of a letter from Mr. Shelby to Mr. Kennison, dated June 21, 1976. Paragraphs thirteen and fourteen of petitioner's proposed fact findings accurately reflect the evidence, but are irrelevant to resolution of the dispute.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent's layoff of petitioner be upheld. That petitioner be deemed to have made timely request for demotion or reassignment to a position in a class (other than agricultural investigator supervisor) in which he has held permanent career service status, if any there be. That respondent pay petitioner two weeks' pay at the hourly rate petitioner was earning at the time of the layoff. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay Hendrickson, Esquire 836 East Lafayette Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. Chastain, Esquire Room 513, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Conley M. Kennison Attn: Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Career Service Commission Department of Administration Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Respondent Janice Prather lives in a subdivision in unincorporated Bay County, Florida. She owns her house, which faces Brookins Road and stands on a lot 135 feet long and 100 feet wide. STAR In April of this year Ms. Prather acquired a six-year old sorrel mare, a Tennessee Walking Horse named Star, who stands 15.2 hands high. Ms. Brunty, whose horse trailer was used to bring the horse to Ms. Prather's home, described Star and Rhonda, Ms. Prather's teenaged daughter, as a "beautiful combination." Star is a gentle horse and small children, including Mr. Serpas grandchildren, have petted her. Some days Rhonda and her friend Michelle take Star riding and let her graze in Michelle's back yard before bringing her back. She spent one night at Michelle's. But most of the time she is confined to the Prathers' fenced back yard, although she was not there for a week or two around the time of the fair. SIX POUNDS A DAY Star produces manure at a rate of about six pounds a Day. Ms. Prather has taken some of this manure to church and to the parsonage for use on shrubbery and gardens there. Over an unspecified period, she has also taken horse manure to Mr. Harold B. Taylor of Millville about three times a week. It has made his gardens green. Thelma King has also used Star's excrement in her garden. Not all of the manure Star has deposited in the Prather back yard has left the premises. Trenches have been dug along the fence line and manure has been buried there. Before removing the manure that she has given away, Ms. Prather or others have gathered it in buckets which are kept in a child's wagon in the back yard, and which may stand there for several days. Nor do the droppings reach the buckets every day. There was testimony that Star's excrement lay where it fell for weeks on end, and Ms. Prather, who holds a full- time job, conceded that she did not remove the manure daily, although she insisted that there was almost daily removal. Sometimes the manure would be covered over with an inch or two of sand. When it rains, some of the waste leaves in the water that flows across the Prather back yard, turns brown and smelly, and covers the neighbors yards. By the time of the hearing, the ground in the Prather back yard, which has a high water table, was saturated with horse urine. Subdivision residents depend on individual wells and septic tanks. A CONGREGATION OF FLIES Most witnesses conceded that there were houseflies in the area long before Star's arrival, but there was overwhelming agreement that the horse bought with it a significant increase in their number. Mr. Serpas, whose house stands directly behind Ms. Prather's testified to the increase and reported, without contradiction, that a "tremendous number" of these flies enter his house whenever a door is opened. The Atwells, whose house is 100 feet from Ms. Prather's lot line also have more flies inside their house than before Star came to live in the neighborhood. The Clarks, whose house is next door to Ms. Prather's, installed an electronic fly killing device from which they regularly remove handfuls of dead flies. It was Mr. Clark who testified that Star's presence has meant "a congregation of flies" in and over his yard as well as Ms. Prather's. The housefly (Musca domestica) is a real, if familiar, health hazard. Because houseflies eat the same things people do, their control is a crucial element in food hygiene. When they land on food intended for human consumption, they bring with them germs they have picked up elsewhere. Horse manure is among the very best breeding grounds for houseflies. Adult houseflies deposit eggs in horse manure where larvae then pupae thrive before emerging as a new generation of adult houseflies seven to ten days later and flying from dung to food. Houseflies are capable of transmitting diseases to human beings and are a major factor in the transmission of some diseases. The wooden fence Ms. Prather has begun building around her back yard has not diminished the number of flies or the "barn yard odor," also attributable to Star's excrement. Both the flies and the excrement were the basis for the neighbors' repeated complaints to the Bay County Health Department (BCHD). ACTION BY THE AUTHORITIES With the neighbors' complaints, there began a series of visits by BCHD employees. BCHD records reflect that the inspector concluded that the neighbors' complaints were "invalid" on April 13, 1983, and reached the same conclusion on April 18, 1983, when the "yard was clean." Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. On May 2, 1983, the BCHD inspector found "[e]ight piles of horse manure in yard. One wagon full of manure also," Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, which, however, was at the BCHD's request, "cleaned up" by May 6, 1983. Before visiting thereafter, the BCHD inspector called ahead, as Ms. Prather had requested. On May 13, 1983, a BCHD employee took pictures of the horse manure he found on that visit. On May 24, 1983, two BCHD employees found "[s]ome manure" but "no flies." Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. Early on BCHD employees suggested to Ms. Prather informally that she board Star somewhere else. They eventually directed her in writing to remove the horse and threatened to initiate the present proceedings to impose an administrative fine if she did not. She received the administrative complaint on or before August 4, 1983. Photographs taken on November 19, 1983, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 show an accumulation of dung that must have been at least four days in the making. Star was in residence on November 5, 1983, and, indeed, during the whole period between August 4, 1983, and the time of the hearing, with the possible exception of a two-week period.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner impose a fine against respondent in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00). DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: JOHN PEARCE, ESQUIRE SUITE 200-A 2639 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303 JANICE PRATHER 3013 BROOKINS ROAD PANAMA CITY, FLORIDA 32405 DAVID PINGREE, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES 1323 WINEWOOD BOULEVARD TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301
The Issue Whether statements issued by the Respondent's employees constitute unpromulgated rules in violation of Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2007). Whether Florida Administrative Code Proposed Rule 5C- 27.001, incorporating a form is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The following are the stipulated facts (verbatim) as agreed by the parties: In November and December 2005, Division of Animal Industry inspectors conducted inspections of various pet facilities located throughout Florida and found 11 violations regarding OCVIs. Dr. Thomas J. Holt, D.V.M., State Veterinarian and Director of Animal Industry, is signatory on a July 2006 Memorandum directed to "All Florida Veterinarians," which purports to provide "guidelines and reminders" to veterinarians regarding the issuance of OCVIs pursuant to Section 828.29, Florida Statutes. The memorandum is attached as Exhibit A. Respondent does not license or regulate veterinarians in Florida. Respondent does not maintain a database of veterinarians licensed or located in Florida. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) maintains a database of USDA-accredited veterinarians. The July 6, 2006, memorandum was provided by Respondent to the United States Department of Agriculture. Respondent asked for the assistance of the United States Department of Agriculture to distribute the July 6, 2006, memorandum to all USDA-accredited veterinarians located in Florida. The July 6, 2006 memorandum was challenged by Petitioners as an unpromulgated rule on April 2, 2007. The Respondent agency published a Notice of Proposed Rule in the Florida Administrative Weekly on July 6, 2007, to adopt the Official Certificate of Veterinary Inspection for Intrastate Sale of Dog or Cat (OCVI form) as a rule. On May 15, 2007, the Department conducted a "Pet Certification Rules Workshop" regarding proposed changes to the OCVI. Current form DACS-09085, Official Certificate of Veterinary Inspections for Sale of Dog or Cat, was adopted by Florida Administrative Code Rule 5C-24.003, in 1999. This rule is currently in effect. A statement of Department Employee Diane Fuchs was recorded, and such statement is attached hereto as Exhibit B. None of the Petitioners have filed complaints with Respondent concerning any of the allegations contained in Petitioners' Request for Administrative Hearing or Amended Request for Administrative Hearing. The following facts are from the materials noted above: The "Exhibit A" memorandum referenced above that was signed by the Department's State Veterinarian/Director of the Division of Animal Industry stated on its face, "This fax is being sent by the Florida Veterinary Medical Association at the request of the State Veterinarians Office." The memorandum provided, in pertinent part: TO: All Florida Veterinarians SUBJECT: OCVI for Sale of a Dog or Cat Dear Florida Veterinarian: Recent audits of Official Certificate of Veterinary Inspection's (OCVI) for Sale of a Dog or Cat by the Division of Animal Industry (DAI), Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Service (FDACS) shows an increasing number of violations related to the use and issuance of such certificates by veterinarians. Each violation compromises the integrity of the certificate. Previously violations were handled via personal communication and/or written correspondence with the veterinarian outlining the violation and recommended actions on how to correct them. Beginning July 1, 2006, the DAI will implement enforcement of such violations via Administrative Fine Procedure. For this reason, we are reminding veterinarians of the seriousness of this issue and are providing the following guidelines and reminders: Veterinarians are responsible for the security and proposed use of all OCVI's and must take reasonable care to prevent misuse of them. Reasonable care means that the veterinarian must retain all copies of the OCVI until he or she has inspected the animal and fully completed and signed the document(s). Incomplete, blank, or unsigned OCVI books or certificates cannot be sold to, or be in the possession of, a pet seller whether they are a breeder, broker, or retail pet store. Possession by a seller of incomplete or unsigned OCVI or of OCVI books compromises the integrity and security of the documents for which the veterinarian is responsible. The issuing veterinarian's statement certifies that the vaccines, anthelmintics, and diagnostic tests were administered by or under the direction of the issuing veterinarian. The manufacturer, type, lot #, expiration date, and date of administration must be detailed in the appropriate blocks of all OCVI. Vaccinations and/or anthelmintics administered by anyone other than the issuing veterinarian must be confirmed and documented before listing them on the OCVI. "Vaccines given by breeder" is not an acceptable entry unless the vaccinations were administered by or under the direction of the issuing veterinarian who has personal knowledge that such vaccines were actually administered to the animal identified on the OCVI. OCVI should not be issued for a dog or cat that has been found to have internal or external parasites, excluding fleas and ticks. This includes, but is not limited to, coccidian and/or ear mites. The dispensing of medicine to be administered by the owner for treatment is not sufficient for the veterinarian to issue the OCVI. Such animals must be treated and be negative before the sale can occur. The statement attributed to Diana Fuchs (noted as Exhibit B above) was: You're correct because the Veterinary Practice Act seeks supervision and it clearly defines supervision. The pet law does not state "supervision," it says "direction." It doesn't say whether it's direct supervision, it says "direction." As an employer, you can direct an employee to do something. By and through the rule making process previously described the Respondent sought to promulgate a rule (5C-27.001) that by reference adopts and incorporates form DACS-09085, the OCVI for Intrastate Sale of Dog or Cat Revised in July 2007. The OCVI form provides, in part: ISSUING VETERINARIAN'S CERTIFICATION: I hereby certify that the described animal was examined by me on the date shown; that the vaccines, anthelmintics, and diagnostic tests indicated herein, were administered by me, or under my direction; said animal is found to be healthy in that to the best of my knowledge it exhibits no sign of contagious or infectious diseases and has no evidence of internal or external parasites, including coccidiosis and ear mites, but excluding fleas and ticks; and to the best of my knowledge the animal has not been exposed to rabies, nor did the animal originate from an area under a quarantine for rabies. The Petitioner's First Amended Request for Administrative Hearing provided: This petition is filed on behalf of The Humane Society of the United States ("The HSUS"). The HSUS is a nonprofit animal protection organization headquartered in Washington, (sic)DC. The HSUS Southeastern Regional Office is at 1624 Metropolitan Circle, Suite B Tallahassee, FL 32308. The HSUS is the largest animal protection organization in the United States, representing over 9.5 million members and constituents, including more than 500,000 members and constituents residing in Florida. For decades the HSUS has been actively involved in educating the general public regarding the persistent health and behavioral problems that are common among puppies marketed by retail pet stores. This suit is bought [sic] on behalf of the HSUS and its Florida members. The HSUS investigates puppy mill and pet store cruelty complaints and offers its members, constituents and the general public guidance and advice as to how to select healthy, well bred puppies. By ensuring that puppies sold in retail pet stores actually receive the statutorily mandated vaccines and antelmintics, the health and welfare of puppies will be improved. Further, by eliminating from sale puppies that harbor potentially dangerous zoonotic diseases, not only is the public health protected but breeding facilities where the puppies originate and the pet stores that market the puppies have incentive to improve the often overcrowded and unsanitary conditions to which causes the puppies to be infested with internal parasites. A recent email survey revealed that more than 70 HSUS constituents have purchased puppies from Florida pet stores. This petition is also filed on behalf of Richard and Sharon Chambers, 5920 Our Robbies Rd., Jupiter, FL 33458. The Chambers purchased two puppies from Precious Puppy in Jupiter, Florida, and were provided OCVI's, signed by Dr. Dale Mitchell, DVM, but stamped with the statement "Original Vaccines Done by Breeder or Breeder's Veterinarian." Accordingly, the Chambers cannot verify if the vaccines indicated on the health certificate, and "certified" by Dr. Mitchell, were actually administered to their puppies. One of the puppies developed kennel cough, in spite of supposedly having been vaccinated against it. The kennel cough progressed to pneumonia and required emergency veterinary care. This petition is also filed on behalf of Miriam Barkley, who lives at 600 SW 13th Avenue #7, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33312. Ms. Barkley purchased a Yellow Labrador Retriever puppy from Puppy Palace in Hollywood, Florida and was provided an OCVI. At 13 weeks of age the puppy has bilateral hip dysplasia with severe right sided coxal subluxation and will require thousands of dollars worth of surgery, if she is even a candidate for the surgery. Otherwise she must be euthanized. In spite of the requirement that each pet dealer provide consumers with a certificate of veterinary inspection signed by a veterinarian that certifies that "the animal was found to have been healthy at the time of the veterinary examination" the OCVI she was provided contains no such certification. This petition is also filed on behalf of Sheree Thomas, 874 Hibiscus Street, Boca Raton, FL 33486. Ms. Thomas was sold a puppy by Puppy Palace of Boynton Beach, and was given an OCVI upon which the attesting veterinarian's signature had been forged. Her puppy contracted distemper, a contagious disease for which the puppy had supposedly been vaccinated. Petitioner Connie Crews purchased two puppies from Puppy Palace in Hollywood, FL. One puppy, Trinity, suffered kennel cough that developed into severe bronchial pneumonia for which she was hospitalized. Petitioner Connie Crews incurred more than $4,000 in veterinary expenses saving Trinity's life. The other puppy, Neo, also had kennel cough, and suffers a bone defect in both shoulders. Petitioner Crews was provided an OCVI with each puppy, indicating that the puppies had been vaccinated for kennel cough. However, the OCVIs were not signed by the attesting veterinarian, Dr. William Rasberry, DVM, but rather had been stamped with a signature stamp which had been provided to the pet store. For purposes of this order the foregoing allegations have been deemed true or accurate. No evidence or stipulations of fact regarding the Petitioners was presented.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees as a prevailing small business party in an adjudicatory proceeding initiated by a state agency as provided under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, A.S., is the primary custodial parent of the child, A.S., who is now ten years old. At the time of the original incident, A.S. was a full time state wildlife law enforcement officer. On May 18, 1991, Respondent initiated a child protective services investigation in which resulted in the creation of FPSS Report 91-052785, wherein the Respondent proposed to confirm Petitioner as the perpetrator of abuse or neglect of his child. Petitioner requested and obtained a formal hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings. This resulted in the issuance of a Recommended Order, dated February 28, 1992, wherein this Hearing Officer recommended that Petitioner's name be expunged from the Abuse Registry. The Respondent rejected the recommendation and issued a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for expungement. The Final Order was appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal and subsequently to the Supreme Court of Florida which reversed the Final Order of the Department. On remand from the Court, the Department issued a Final Order on Remand, dated January 20, 1995, which expunged Petitioner's name from the Abuse Registry. Petitioner is clearly the prevailing party in this matter.
