The Issue At issues are whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is authorized to regulate child care facilities pursuant to sections 402.301-402.319, Florida Statutes. Section 402.310 authorizes the Department to take disciplinary action against child care facilities for violations of sections 402.301-402.319. Ms. Hall owns and operates the child care facility doing business as Children of Liberty pursuant to License Number C04DU0101. The facility is located at 232 East 19th Street, Jacksonville, Florida. Ms. Hall testified that she has operated the facility for 21 years. C.R. was born on October 21, 2013. C.R. was four years old on August 27, 2018, the date of the event that precipitated the investigation in this case. L.S. is the mother of C.R. She enrolled C.R. at Children of Liberty from November 2017 through early August 2018. As of August 9, 2018, L.S. withdrew C.R. from Children of Liberty in order to enroll him in “big boy school,” i.e., the voluntary pre-kindergarten (“VPK”) program at North Shore Elementary School (“North Shore”). Because of his age, C.R. was not yet eligible to attend kindergarten in a Florida public school. See § 1003.21(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. Therefore, C.R. was not a “school-age child” for purposes of Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.008, or the “School-Age Child Care Licensing Handbook” adopted by reference therein. Supervision of C.R. was governed by the Department’s “Child Care Facility Handbook,” adopted by reference in rule 65C-22.001(6). L.S. is a full-time nursing student during the week and works at Panera on the weekends. She testified that her only support system in Jacksonville is her grandparents, both of whom are in precarious health. L.S. stated that it would be very difficult for her to take C.R. to VPK given her school schedule. She was hesitant to place C.R. on a school bus at his young age. She had hoped that her grandparents would be able to help her get C.R. back and forth from the North Shore VPK program, but her grandfather told her that he was unsure of their ability to do so. After discussing the situation with Ms. Hall, L.S. re- enrolled C.R. at Children of Liberty because Ms. Hall agreed to take C.R. to and from his VPK program. L.S. would drop off C.R. at Children of Liberty at 7:30 a.m. C.R. would be given breakfast and then be driven to VPK by 8:00 a.m. Ms. Hall then would pick up C.R. in the afternoon and keep him at Children of Liberty until L.S. could pick him up at 4:30 p.m. North Shore requires its students to wear uniforms. The uniform for North Shore is royal blue, navy blue, or white shirts, and black, khaki, or navy blue pants. Parents sometimes send their children to school out of uniform, but the school sends reminders home to inform the parents of the correct uniform colors. Children are not sent home for being out of uniform. C.R.’s first day of being transported to North Shore by Ms. Hall was August 27, 2018. L.S. brought C.R. to Children of Liberty that morning. C.R. was dressed in the uniform for North Shore. L.S. testified that she had made it clear to Ms. Hall that C.R. was attending North Shore. L.S. was taken aback that morning when Ms. Hall mentioned that C.R. would be attending Andrew Robinson Elementary School (“Andrew Robinson”). L.S. corrected Ms. Hall, reminding her that C.R. was going to North Shore. Ms. Hall said, “That’s right, that’s right.” Ms. Hall denied that any such conversation took place and denied that L.S. ever told her that C.R. was attending North Shore. Ms. Hall testified that when L.S. first broached the subject of C.R.’s needing school transportation, she told L.S. that she drove only to Andrew Robinson. Ms. Hall believed that L.S. understood that Andrew Robinson was the only option for transportation from Children of Liberty to school. Ms. Hall testified that on two occasions prior to August 27, 2018, L.S. asked her to pick C.R. up from school in the afternoon. On both occasions, Ms. Hall drove to Andrew Robinson and did not find C.R. there. She assumed that C.R.’s grandparents had picked him up. Ms. Hall stated that she had no reason to believe she had driven to the wrong school because she never heard a complaint from L.S. about her failure to pick up C.R. C.R.’s enrollment form at Children of Liberty indicated “Andrew Robinson” as the school attended by the child. However, this form was completed by L.S. well before she enrolled the child in VPK. The “Andrew Robinson” notation was made later, apparently by Ms. Hall, and is therefore at best indicative of Ms. Hall’s state of mind on August 27, 2018.2/ Ms. Hall drove another child, K.A., to Andrew Robinson every morning. K.A. was born on January 12, 2013. She was five years old on August 27, 2018, and eligible to attend kindergarten at a Florida public school. Therefore, K.A. met the Department’s definition of a “school-age child.” On the morning of August 27, 2018, K.A. was wearing the uniform of Andrew Robinson. The Andrew Robinson uniform varies depending on the day of the week, but the uniform shirts are required to bear the school’s logo. However, as with North Shore, children are not sent home or disciplined for failing to wear the correct uniform. On this day, the Andrew Robinson uniform was green or pink shirts with khaki, blue, or black pants. Ms. Hall testified that she generally pays little attention to the uniforms the children are wearing. Her experience is that children often go to school out of uniform. The Children of Liberty transportation log for August 27, 2018, shows that C.R. and K.A. left the child care facility at 8:15 a.m. It is undisputed that Ms. Hall was driving the children in a van. Billing records for Ms. Hall’s cell phone show that she phoned or attempted to phone L.S. at 8:15 a.m. on August 27, 2018. The call lasted one minute. Ms. Hall phoned or attempted to phone L.S. again at 8:16 a.m. This call lasted two minutes. Ms. Hall had no explanation for why she phoned L.S. at the precise time she was also driving C.R. to school. She speculated that she must have been returning a call from L.S., but produced no documentation to support her theory. The Children of Liberty transportation log indicates that Ms. Hall dropped off C.R. and K.A. at Andrew Robinson at 8:18 a.m. Ms. Hall testified that she pulled up at the front of the school, made sure that the school patrol and teachers were at the drop-off point, and dropped off the children. Ms. Hall stated that C.R. told her that he knew where to go. She did not personally hand the child off to responsible school personnel at the drop-off point. Ms. Hall’s practice of dropping off the students was acceptable under Department standards for K.A., who was a school-age child. See Section 2.5.2, “Driver Requirements,” of the School-Age Child Care Licensing Handbook. However, C.R. was not a school-age child. Ms. Hall was required by Department standards to directly place C.R. into the care of an authorized individual from the school. See Section 2.4.1E of the Child Care Facility Handbook. Ms. Hall claimed that Department rules prevented her from leaving the van to ensure that an authorized individual took over supervision of C.R. However, the Department standard referenced by Ms. Hall requires only that the correct staff-to- child ratio be maintained during transportation. See Section 2.5.4.C of the Child Care Facility Handbook. Because Ms. Hall was dropping off both of the children in her van, nothing prevented her from exiting the van to make sure that C.R. was received by an authorized individual at the school. Had Ms. Hall escorted C.R. onto the Andrew Robinson campus, she likely would have learned the child was not enrolled at that school. The school patrol at Andrew Robinson realized that C.R. was not a student there. They brought C.R. to school staff, who took him to the main office. They looked through the child’s backpack and found paperwork indicating C.R. was enrolled at North Shore. They contacted their counterparts at North Shore, who in turn contacted C.R.’s family. L.S. testified that she learned of the situation from her grandmother, who had received the call from North Shore. She was not sure why they called her grandmother first, but shortly thereafter she got a call from the principal of North Shore. L.S. was informed that the school could not undertake the liability of transporting C.R. and that she would have to pick him up at Andrew Robinson and deliver him to North Shore. She drove to Andrew Robinson and picked up C.R., then headed to Children of Liberty to find out why Ms. Hall dropped her child off at the wrong school. C.R. was at the wrong school for at least an hour before his mother picked him up. Ms. Hall testified that L.S. cursed and threatened her bodily harm upon her arrival at Children of Liberty, although no physical altercation took place. L.S. conceded that she was very angry and used inappropriate language, though she said much of her anger was due to Ms. Hall’s refusal to take responsibility for taking C.R. to the wrong school. L.S. never took C.R. back to Children of Liberty after August 27, 2018. Ms. Hall testified that she believed C.R. was enrolled at Andrew Robinson. Her phone calls to L.S. during the drive to the school raise the question of whether she was in doubt about the matter. Her alteration of C.R.’s enrollment form, and her unlikely story about her two attempts to pick up C.R. at Andrew Robinson, also call into question her good faith belief that the child attended Andrew Robinson. As she stated repeatedly, Ms. Hall had no reason to drop off the child at the wrong school. Nonetheless, Ms. Hall took on the responsibility for C.R.’s safe transport to and from his VPK. Even giving full credit to her good intentions does not change the fact that she left C.R. at the wrong school and, in so doing, failed to supervise the child in accordance with the standards set forth in the Department’s rules and Child Care Facility Handbook.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order finding that Respondent provided inadequate supervision in violation of Section 2.4.1E of the Child Care Facility Handbook, and imposing a fine of $250.00 upon Terri Hall, d/b/a Children of Liberty Child Care Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Justification for Agency Action On August 14, 1992, the Manatee County Sheriff's office reported to HRS that a 911 emergency telephone call had been made reporting that an infant died apparently as a result of an accidental choking while at the day care facility owned and operated by the Petitioner, Alice P. White, d/b/a Miss Patty's Day Care Center. On or about August 17, 1992, an autopsy report on the infant found that the cause of death was sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), which was inconsistent with an accidental choking, and an HRS child day care facility licensing inspector placed a followup call to the Petitioner. Among other things, staffing at the facility on August 14, 1992, was discussed, and the Petitioner assured the inspector that staffing was adequate. They then discussed the incident itself. The Petitioner reported that the infant choked while the Petitioner was sitting in a rocking chair, holding the infant in her arms and feeding the infant. On August 19, 1992, the HRS inspector was instructed to return to the Petitioner's facility for documentation of proper staffing on August 14, 1992. When the HRS inspector arrived, the Petitioner was being interviewed by Manatee County Sheriff's office personnel. While the law enforcement interview was going on, the HRS inspector was able to observe that 18 preschool children were unattended in the bedroom of the Petitioner's son, an unlocked room that officially was not part of the facility. She also was unable to obtain any documentation that the facility was properly staffed on August 14, 1992. The HRS inspector prepared a Child Day Care Inspection Checklist for August 19, 1992, reporting that 18 children were not under direct supervision and that there were 36 children at the facility, six more than the maximum capacity for which the Petitioner's facility was licensed. On August 20, 1992, the HRS inspector returned to the facility because the Sheriff's office had referred the matter to HRS and HRS investigators were at the facility conducting interviews of the facility's staff. One member of the staff informed the HRS personnel that, on the day the infant died, the infant had been left in one of the rooms at the facility without direct supervision at least one time for approximately 30 minutes. When the Petitioner was confronted with the staff member's statement, the Petitioner confessed that she had made, and had been repeating, a false report as to what had occurred on August 14, 1992. In fact, the infant did not die of an accidental choking while the Petitioner was holding the infant in her arms. Rather, the infant was in one of the rooms at the facility without direct supervision; when the Petitioner entered the room and discovered that the infant was not breathing, she called 911 and tried to rescusitate the infant. She stated that she had made, and had been repeating, the false report on the incident in order to personally assume responsibility and to protect her staff from being made responsible. During a prior routine inspection on July 29, 1992, HRS cited the Petitioner for several violations, including insufficient staff ratio, in violation of F.A.C. Rule 10M-12.002(5)(a)(1), and failure to directly supervise, in violation of F.A.C. Rule 10M-12.002(5)(a)(2). On a reinspection on August 12, 1992, the deficiencies cited on July 29, 1992, were corrected; but, in light of the facts HRS learned on August 20, 1992, it appeared that two days later, on the day the infant died, the Petitioner was out of compliance again. In addition, similar violations were observed during inspections on January 13, 1992, and on April 12, 1989. Like all of the other minor violations observed during inspections of the Petitioner's facility over the years, the staff ratio and direct supervision violations were corrected by the time of the following inspection. In response to the inspection report for August 19, 1992, the Petitioner prepared a list of the facility's weak points and steps initiated to correct them. The Petitioner also voluntarily closed her day care center pending the completion of the HRS investigations. Underlying Administrative Proceedings On September 15, 1992, HRS filed an Emergency Final Order suspending the Petitioner's license. On September 21, 1992, HRS filed an Administrative Complaint. The Petitioner requested formal administrative proceedings on the Administrative Complaint, and it was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), where it was given DOAH Case No. 92-7148. Both the Emergency Final Order and the Administrative Complaint alleged the death of the infant and the false initial report and alleged that the infant actually was left alone without supervision for 30 minutes. Both also alleged that, during HRS' investigation of the incident on August 19, 1992, the following "items of noncompliance" were discovered: The center had 18 school aged children in part of the facility with no staff or direct supervision. This is a violation of Rule 10M-12.002(5)(a)2, F. A. C. The total number of children in the facility was 36, which exceeded the maximum licensed capacity of 30 for the facility. This is a violation of Rule 10M-12.001(2)(j), F. A. C. The staff-to-child ratio was not correct. This is a violation of Rule 10M-12.002(5)(a)1, F. A. C. Both also alleged all of the prior violations found during the inspection history for the facility. On or about October 24, 1992, based on the same information on which the Administrative Complaint was based, HRS gave notice of intent to deny the application which the Petitioner had filed for renewal of her child day care facility license. The Petitioner requested formal administrative proceedings on the intended denial, and it was referred to DOAH, where it was given DOAH Case No. 92-7447, assigned to the same hearing officer as Case No. 92-7148, and consolidated for further proceedings and for final hearing. Final hearing was held on May 12, 1993. The Recommended Order entered in Case Nos. 92-7148 and 92-7447 on May 28, 1993, found the Petitioner not guilty on all charges in the Administrative Complaint and recommended that her license be renewed "forthwith." Among other things, the Recommended Order found: The only charges in the Administrative Complaint regarding this incident [i.e., the death of the infant] is [sic] contained in paragraphs 5 and 8 of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraph 5 alleges the baby died and paragraph 8 alleges that Respondent had provided the sheriff's department with misinformation regarding the infant choking while she was feeding him and that this infant had been left alone for 30 minutes without supervision before being noticed by Respondent. No credible evidence to support the lack of adequate supervision of this infant before its death was presented. The discrepancies found during the quarterly inspections of the facility for the past 3 1/2 years were predominantly minor offenses such as inadequate record keeping, failure to document all staff had received prescribed training or innoculations, lack of current vehicle driver certificate, unsafe outdoor equipment, or minor food service violations, failure to provide employee background screening, inadequate staff to child ratio, inadequate bathroom supplies, and lack of immunization records. These are all classified as Class III violations as defined in Rule 10M-12.011(7)(c), Florida Administrative Code. * * * During the investigation at this day care center following the infant's death, and while the sheriff's deputies were on the scene questioning Respondent and her employees, three additional violations are noted in paragraph 7 of the Administrative Complaint. The first of these allege the center had 18 children in part of the facility with no staff present in the room. At the time this infraction occurred Respondent was out on the patio being interrogated by a deputy and another deputy had called the aide supervising the 18 children out of the room to question her. When Respondent returned inside the center and observed the aide being questioned by the deputy she sent another aide into the room with the 18 school age children. The second allegation was that there were 36 children in the facility although the center was licensed for only 30. Without attempting to justify the violation Respondent testified that this occurred a day or two before school started when the teachers had to be at school but the pupils did not. These excess children were children of teachers who requested Respondent to take them during the time these teachers had to be at school. As a favor to these mothers who had previously used her day care center Respondent temporarily exceeded her authorized number of children. The third violation resulted when Respondent left the children she was supervising to open the door to admit the HRS inspector who supervised the facility. While Respondent was opening the door to let the inspector into the facility the proper ratio of staff to child was not maintained. In response to the inspection reporting the lack of supervision of the 18 school age and excess children in the facility (Exhibit 20) Respondent prepared a list of the facility's weak points and steps initiated to correct them (Exhibit 23). law: On August 28, 1992 Respondent voluntarily closed her day care center pending the completion of all investigations (Exhibit 24). Among other things, the Recommended Order concluded, as a matter of Neither paragraph 5 nor 8 of the Administrative Complaint alleges a violation of either Section 402.310, Florida Statutes or Rule 10M-12.011, Florida Administrative Code which list the grounds for disciplinary action. Since all of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaint were corrected within the prescribed time frame, none of these violations constitute grounds for levying an administrative fine. (Class II violations, if timely corrected, are also not subject to the assessment of a fine) A fortiori, they do not constitute grounds for revocation or refusal to renew a license. Obviously the death of an infant at Respondent's facility on August 14, 1992 led to the decision to deny renewal of the license and the filing of the Administrative Complaint to revoke the license. However, there is no evidence linking any act of Respondent with the death of this infant. There is no dispute that the infant died of SIDS. The infant stopped breathing and had the aide been in the room at the time the infant stopped breathing it is unlikely this would have been noticed had the aide not been looking closely at the child. * * * 24. Even if the minor violations charged in the Administrative Complaint could now be considered to be grounds for revocation, Section 402.310(1)(b), Florida Statutes provides: In determining the appropriate disciplinary action to be taken for a violation as provided in paragraph (a), the following factors shall be considered: The severity of the violation, including the probability that death or serious harm to the health or safety of any person will result or has resulted, the severity of the actual or potential harm, and the extent to which the provisions of this part have been violated. Actions taken by the licensee to correct the violations or to remedy complaints. Any previous violations of the licensee. All of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaint are minor and were corrected forthwith. Respondent submitted a proposed plan to inhibit further violations by increasing staff and preparing written orders for staff guidance. As noted above this is the first Administrative Complaint ever filed against Respondent. From the foregoing it is concluded that there are no violations listed in the Administrative Complaint which were not timely corrected; that once timely corrected these alleged violations do not constitute grounds for further disciplinary actions; and Petitioner has failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, or even by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent committed any act which constituted grounds for revocation of her license. Over objection, the HRS Secretary allowed its personnel involved in the administrative litigation to file exceptions after the procedural deadline for filing exceptions. HRS' Final Order was rendered on November 1, 1993. It granted an exception to the finding in paragraph 8 of the Recommended Order on the ground that paragraph 4(o) of the Administrative Complaint also was a charge "regarding this incident" in that it charged the Petitioner "with filing a false police report." It also granted an exception to the finding in paragraph 9 of the Recommended Order on the ground that "there was insufficient evidence adduced upon which to base a finding of fact that inadequate staff to child ratios or lack of direct supervision constitute minor discrepancies." (It also was held that "it is the department's duty, not the Hearing Officer's, to interpret what is and is not a minor discrepancy.") The Final Order also observed: The AC also does not charge lack of direct supervision of the dead child. Therefore, the decision in this case does not turn on that issue. The Final Order also granted an HRS exception to part of paragraph 22 of the Recommended Order to the extent that it implied that HRS took action only because of the death of the child. The Final Order noted: "Although the child died from SIDS, counsel for the department is correct in pointing out that if the child had been under direct supervision at all times, the child might still be alive." In a footnote, the Final Order added: "If the department had alleged in the AC a specific lack of direct supervision as to the deceased child, and proved it at the hearing, this case might have turned out differently." Finally, the Final Order granted an exception disagreeing "with any general rule that once timely corrected, previous violations no longer constitute grounds for further disciplinary action." The Final Order observed: The violations cited and corrected over the 3.5 year period preceding the AC in this case are not sufficient to support denial or revocation of a license. That is not to say that in a proper case, previously corrected violations cannot support later disciplinary action. Having granted the foregoing exceptions, the Final Order's disposition of the case was: Based upon the foregoing, it is ADJUDGED, that Alice P. White, d/b/a Miss Patty's Day Care Center is not guilty of the charges legally alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The charge of giving false information to the police is not a violation, under these facts, of the child care licensure statute or rule. It is further ADJUDGED that the license to resume operations be issued forthwith . . .. The Final Order was not appealed. On December 16, 1993, the HRS personnel involved in the prosecution of the administrative proceedings moved for clarification of the Final Order and for remand to DOAH. This action was not appropriate, and on December 29, 1993, the Petitioner initiated action to enforce the Final Order by notifying HRS and the Attorney General of the Petitioner's intent to file an enforcement action under Section 120.69, Fla. Stat. (1993), as required by the statute. On January 14, 1994, an Order Clarifying Final Order was rendered, but in substance the order explained why no clarification was necessary and why the Final Order should be implemented. On or about January 24, 1994, HRS issued the Petitioner a "provisional license." Reasonable Attorney Fees The reasonable amount of time and labor required on this case was approximately 93 hours. (This does not include time spent after entry of the HRS Final Order.) HRS' expert questioned the 93 hours as being perhaps excessive, but she also conceded that she would not question the veracity of representations made by counsel for the Petitioner and that she only had a short period of time in which to study and consider the matter. The legal questions involved in the Petitioner's case were not particularly novel. The most novel question occurred after entry of the Final Order, when HRS inappropriately sought clarification of its own Final Order, and this should be taken into consideration in determining the appropriate fee. In addition, representation of the Petitioner was made difficult by her false reports as to the cause of death of the infant and her subsequent admission to the false reports. A fairly high level of skill was required to perform the legal service properly. The extensive general trial practice experience of counsel for the Petitioner enabled him to perform the service well even though he did not have exceptional experience specifically in the area of administrative law. He also was required to advise the Petitioner on related criminal, tort and bankruptcy matters, and his skills enabled him to do so. Not every specialist in administrative law would have been able to do as good a job in those areas. However, his lack of experience in the area of administrative law required him to expend considerable time devoted to researching pertinent law. There was no evidence that counsel's acceptance of the Petitioner's case precluded other employment. To the contrary, the evidence was that counsel is known for accepting notorious cases and that his practice is not adversely affected by this. The customary fee in Manatee County for handling a case like the Petitioner's ranges anywhere from $135 to $200 an hour. Counsel's fee for handling the Petitioner's case was totally contingent on any sums recoverable from HRS under any applicable statute for the award of attorney fees. If no award is recoverable, he would not expect the Petitioner to pay him any fee. The Petitioner was emotionally distraught during counsel's representation. This presented special problems in the representation and required counsel to expend more time than might otherwise be required for a case like the Petitioner's. Otherwise, the Petitioner's case did not impose any unusual time limitations on counsel. There was no amount of money at issue in the Petitioner's case. But at issue was the Petitioner's licensure, which was her means of earning a living. As for the results obtained, counsel's representation was, in the words of his expert, "devastatingly successful." In fact, it is not clear how counsel was able to achieve such a "devastatingly successful" result on the facts and law of the case. The key seems to have been in persuading the hearing officer and, ultimately, HRS that the Administrative Complaint did not allege lack of direct supervision or improper staff ratio on August 14, 1992, and in persuading the hearing officer that the Petitioner's false reports were of no consequence in the licensure proceeding. See Conclusions of Law 35-36, infra. To the extent not already addressed, the evidence was clear that the experience, reputation, and ability of the Petitioner's attorney is very good. The Petitioner's case would have to be classified as "undesirable." The case was notorious in the community. It involved the Petitioner's false reports as to the cause of death of an infant, to which the Petitioner later admitted. In addition, the Petitioner had no money to pay legal fees. If counsel had not taken the case on the generous terms he did, the Petitioner probably have had serious difficulty obtaining legal representation. Before agreeing to represent the Petitioner in her case, counsel had no prior professional relationship with her, and no future financially rewarding professional relationship with the Petitioner can be anticipated. There was no evidence of any awards in previous cases. Based on the foregoing factors, it is found that a reasonable attorney's fee for counsel representation of the Petitioner in her licensure proceedings is $18,600 (93 hours at $200 per hour.)
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed a Class I violation and should have a $500.00 administrative fine imposed, for the reasons given in the Administrative Complaint dated August 23, 2018.1/
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating child care facilities. Respondent holds license number C12MA0082 issued pursuant to chapter 402, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-22. It authorizes Respondent to operate a child care facility at 3815 26th Street West, Bradenton, Florida. The owner of the facility is Carina Piovera. First licensed in 1997, the facility provides child care for children ranging from the age of one to five. It employs five teachers and has a capacity of 35 children. Besides routine inspections by the Department every three months, for the last ten years, the facility has been inspected periodically by the Early Learning Coalition, which provides the facility with funding vouchers for families that cannot pay for full child care. Prior to this incident, Respondent never has been charged with a Class I violation. This class of violation is the most serious in nature and is one that could or does result in serious harm or death to a child. Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-22.010(1)(e)1. Based on a complaint by a parent that Ms. Piovera used excessive discipline on her 18-month-old son, A.M., the Department conducted a two-hour complaint inspection on June 20, 2018. The inspection resulted in the issuance of an Administrative Complaint alleging that Ms. Piovera used "inappropriate discipline" on the child, in violation of section 2.8A. and F., Child Care Facility Handbook (Handbook), incorporated by reference in rule 65C-22.001(6). The first section requires generally that a child care facility adopt a "discipline policy" that is consistent with section 402.305(12), while the second provision enumerates discipline techniques that are prohibited. The "inappropriate discipline" is described in the Administrative Complaint as follows: On May 30, 2018, K. Alejandra-Pacheco, a child care personnel, worked on an art project with one of the children in her care, while the other children were climbing up and down the chairs and taking off their shoes. Ms. Alejandra-Pacheco stated that she is not allowed to discipline the children, only the facility director, Carina Piovera. Ms. Piovera came into the classroom and made the children sit down. A.M., a one-year old toddler, was one of the children in the classroom. In it, Ms. Piovera is seen roughly handling A.M. by grabbing him, aggressively wiping his nose, having intense body language when talking to the child, forcefully pushing the child's chair into position at the table, and then aggressively put his hands on the table. A.M. is visibly afraid and upset, crying throughout his interaction with Ms. Piovera, who appears to be intimidating to the child. This incident was recorded by the facility camera. The Department employee who conducted the inspection did not testify at the hearing. However, a Department witness who viewed a video of the incident alleges that Ms. Piovera "used excessive force during hygiene and behavior redirection," and this was "severe, humiliating, or frightening to the child." The alleged incident occurred in the facility's toddler room. Six children, ranging in age from one to two years old, were in the room, along with a teacher, Ms. Pacheco. A surveillance camera, reloaded every 24 hours, is installed in each classroom to monitor all activities. The video is erased every 30 days by the security company, Swann Communication (Swann). If parents wish to watch their children in real time or within the 24-hour window before the camera is reloaded, they can download an application (app) on their cell phone, view the toddler room, and even make copies of the video. Ms. Piovera stated that she is "very comfortable" with video cameras in each classroom because parents are entrusting their children to her care and want to see how they are being treated. Although the original surveillance video long since has been erased, A.M.'s mother recorded a video of the incident on her cell phone using an app provided by a third party and not Swann. The video has been accepted in evidence as Department Exhibit 2. The video is fairly clear, is a "little fast," and is the only known recordation of the incident still available. Ms. Piovera testified that she has watched it more than 20 times. The Department's allegations are based wholly on its interpretation of the cell phone video. The incident itself lasts less than a minute. A.M., then 18 months old, and not a one-year-old, as stated in the Administrative Complaint, frequently had allergies or nasal problems, which caused a runny nose or cough. His mother authorized the use of a nebulizer for inhaling medications, but it never was used at the facility. The morning of May 30, 2018, was no different, and A.M. came to the facility that day with a runny nose. Although the mother denied her son had allergies, his runny nose was brought to her attention when she brought the child in that morning. She replied that she had been giving him medicine but "nothing was working." Around 10:21 a.m., and not 11:00 a.m., as stated in the Administrative Complaint, Ms. Piovera entered the toddler room to assist Ms. Pacheco in redirecting the children to a new activity, i.e., to sing a song and do art work, after efforts by Ms. Pacheco to have the children sit down and keep their shoes on were unsuccessful. Redirection is considered a form of discipline by the Department, but Ms. Piovera considers moving to a new task a routine action in caring for toddlers. Just before Ms. Piovera entered the room, A.M. and two other children were standing in their chairs and climbing onto the table. When A.M. saw Ms. Piovera enter the room, he immediately sat down in the chair. Ms. Piovera placed him in an upright position, adjusted his pants, and observed that his nose needed to be wiped and he had taken one shoe off. His nose had crusted mucous and the discharge was green. The child was crying at this point. The mother acknowledged that A.M. does not like having his nose wiped. Ms. Piovera needed two swipes with a tissue to clean A.M.'s nose. His feet lifted slightly when his nose was wiped, but this was because A.M. was trying to avoid having his nose cleaned. Ms. Piovera also put his shoe back on. Although A.M. began crying when she first touched him, no unusual force or pressure was used, and there were no marks or bruises on the child. Within a few seconds after his nose was cleaned, A.M. became calm, stopped crying, and placed his head on the table. The class then continued with painting activities. A Department witness acknowledged that there was no hitting, spanking, shaking, slapping, or pushing. However, based on her viewing of the incident, she contends Ms. Piovera "kind of twisted his body," "pulled his arms when she first grabbed him to get him to sit down in his chair," "appeared [to be] squeezing his arms," and "felt" there was "forcing or restricting movement" when she turned the child around. There is less than clear and convincing evidence to support these allegations. Around 2:15 p.m., the child was picked up by his mother. Although the mother had viewed the incident on her cell phone as it happened, she did not say anything to Ms. Piovera at that time or contact the Department to discuss any concerns.3/ Notably, when the incident occurred, the mother was in a dispute with Ms. Piovera over an unpaid bill ($1,345.00), which Ms. Piovera says still is outstanding. The mother contends the bill has been paid, but Ms. Piovera says the dispute is headed to small claims court. The mother withdrew the child from the facility that day without giving any explanation to Ms. Piovera, and he never returned to the facility. On June 13, 2018, A.M.'s mother raised the May 30 incident with Ms. Piovera for the first time in a series of text messages. Around the same time, she posted the video in a message on her Facebook page. On June 20, 2018, or three weeks after the alleged violation, A.M.'s mother reported the incident to the Department. The mother admits she always was behind in her payments, and, on the day she filed her complaint, she was asked by Ms. Piovera to stop by the facility and pay the balance owed. The Department requested that a child protective investigator (CPI) from the Manatee County Sheriff's Office investigate whether child abuse occurred. A Department representative and the CPI conducted a joint inspection on June 20, 2018. On July 16, 2018, the CPI issued a finding that the charge was unsubstantiated. Resp. Ex. A. Notwithstanding the CPI's determination, the Department points out that this proceeding involves a violation of Handbook standards, while the CPI was looking for indicators of abuse, which are governed by chapter 39. Thus, it contends that the CPI could have a non-substantiated finding in regards to abuse, but Ms. Piovera still could be cited for a rule violation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2019.
