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LEVITA PARKER vs ORANGE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 17-002555 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Apr. 28, 2017 Number: 17-002555 Latest Update: Oct. 12, 2017

The Issue Whether Petitioner, Levita Parker, was subject to a discriminatory practice by Respondent, Orange County Public Schools (Orange County), in violation of the sections 760.10 and 112.3187, Florida Statutes1/; and, if so, what remedy is appropriate.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female, who, at all times relevant to the discrimination allegation was (and is currently) employed by the Orange County Public Schools. Petitioner has been employed by Orange County for approximately 18 years. She is under contract as a “classroom teacher,” however she has been working as a behavioral specialist for the last 11 years. Petitioner is certified to teach Exceptional Student Education (ESE), Business Education and Education Leadership. Petitioner, along with the school principal and others, attended a “brain storming meeting” on October 5, 2016.4/ During that meeting, options were discussed on how to address the August 2016 resignation and departure of an ESE teacher. Many options were discussed, and later the assistant principal sent Petitioner an email directing her to assume responsibility for two classes on the following Monday. Petitioner refused to teach the two classes. In November 2016, Petitioner was presented with a “Directive.” In part, the directive provides: Under certain circumstances it becomes necessary to provide written clarification or guidance regarding the expectations of the district. Such letters are referred to as directives, and are not disciplinary in nature. (Emphasis added). Petitioner did not lose any pay for her failure to teach the two classes. For school years 2015-2016 and 2016-2017, Petitioner received “effective” or “highly effective” evaluations. Petitioner failed to identify the alleged protective whistleblowing action in which she participated. Petitioner failed to identify a causal connection between whatever the alleged protected activity was and the alleged adverse employment action. Petitioner failed to present any credible evidence that Respondent discriminated against her.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2017.

Florida Laws (4) 112.3187120.569120.57760.10
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KATHERINE E. OTTO vs DUVAL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 12-002475 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jul. 16, 2012 Number: 12-002475 Latest Update: Mar. 11, 2013

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Duval County Public Schools (DCPS), violated the rights of Petitioner, Katherine E. Otto, under the Florida Civil Rights Act, chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Ms. Otto filed a Complaint with FCHR, alleging race, sex, and age discrimination against DCPS, having been employed by the school district as a school teacher from December 2009 until September 2010. The Complaint alleges that Dr. Alvin Brennan, the principal of the Forrest High School, where Ms. Otto worked as a teacher: (a) announced at a staff meeting that he "prefers all black male young teachers"; (b) announced at another staff meeting that "anyone who takes off a Friday or a Monday . . . will be fired"; (c) verbally harassed Ms. Otto; and (d) discharged her for calling in sick. The face of the Complaint shows that it was signed by Ms. Otto on October 24, 2010 - only weeks after the last date of alleged discriminatory conduct on September 8, 2010. However, the "date stamp," which also appears on the face of the Complaint, shows that it was not received by FCHR until October 25, 2011. Notably, FCHR sent to DCPS a "Notice of Filing of Complaint of Discrimination" on November 10, 2011, which was stamped as received by DCPS on November 16, 2011. At the hearing, Ms. Otto could not explain the apparent delay of exactly one year and one day between the date she signed the Complaint and the date it was stamped as received by FCHR. Ms. Otto testified that she never actually typed the Complaint. Further, she stated the typed Complaint was inconsistent with a handwritten version she originally submitted to FCHR "a month or two before" October 24, 2010. Surmising at the hearing that "someone" at FCHR must have typed the Complaint, Ms. Otto testified that she signed and returned the document even though it showed that she was 11 years older than her actual age of 50 years. Ms. Otto's Petition for Relief contains accusations about harassment and "racists remarks" by Dr. Brennan, and adds that he and other DCPS personnel "committed purjery to [the Commission]" [sic] during its investigation of the Complaint. Unlike the Complaint, the Petition for Relief also states that Ms. Otto was "was fired for no reason" as opposed to being fired for calling in sick. At the final hearing, Ms. Otto testified that she did not know why she was fired, and it was only "possible" that she was fired due to her race, gender, or age. Ms. Otto testified that her Complaint and Petition were based on events in August and September 2010, shortly after Dr. Brennan became the principal of Forrest High School. By the end of the 2009-2010 school year, Forrest High School was identified as "critically low performing," having received consecutive "school grades" of "F" or "D" over the preceding school years. The District was, therefore, required to treat Forrest High School as a "turn-around school," and replace/"reconstitute" much of its staff and administrative team. Dr. Brennan, a veteran educator and administrator of 27 years, was selected by the superintendent to replace the principal at Forrest High School at the beginning of the 2010-2011 school year, since he had a successful track record for improving other low-performing schools. Dr. Brennan conducted various staff meetings just before and during the first two weeks of the school year. According to Ms. Otto, Dr. Brennan stated at one such meeting that anyone who took a Friday off would be fired. Ms. Otto testified that Dr. Brennan stated at another meeting that he prefers to hire young African-American men. Ms. Otto thereafter "felt like [she] was being harassed, discriminated against because [Brennan] was just going after white women." Despite these negative "feelings" about Dr. Brennan, Ms. Otto never made a complaint to the school district about him or his comments. Ms. Otto stated that she privately met with Dr. Brennan on only two occasions. During the first private meeting at the beginning of the 2010-2011 school year, Dr. Brennan "yelled" at Ms. Otto for speaking with state officials who visited Forrest High School due to its "turn•around" status. The second private meeting was on September 8, 2010, when Dr. Brennan purportedly "harassed" Ms. Otto for missing lesson plans, and "yelled" that she was fired. In the days leading up to the September 8 conference, Dr. Brennan and Assistant Principal Jeravon Wheeler visited Ms. Otto's class and warned her about missing lesson plans. At all times, Ms. Otto was aware that she was required to have lesson plans readily available in her class. During a scheduled classroom observation on August 31, 2010, Ms. Wheeler (once again) noted Ms. Otto's lack of lesson plans. A post-observation conference was to take place on Friday, September 1, 2010. There is conflicting evidence as to whether Ms. Otto was present on that date. The record contains a post-observation "teacher assessment instrument" which Ms. Otto apparently signed and dated on September 1, 2010. However, Ms. Otto claims to have called in sick after her observation and did not return to the school until September 8, 2010. When summoned to Dr. Brennan's office on the morning of September 8, 2010, Ms. Otto assumed he wanted to discuss her illness-related absence and her discussions with "people from the State." Ms. Wheeler also attended the September 8 conference with Ms. Otto and Dr. Brennan. Contrary to Ms. Otto's view, Dr. Brennan and Ms. Wheeler testified that the September 8 conference was actually called to: (a) discuss the classroom observation; present a "non-compliance letter" for Ms. Otto's repeated failure to provide lesson plans; and (c) place her on a "Success Plan" formulated to improve her overall teaching performance. Ms. Otto walked out of the September 8 conference before Dr. Brennan had the chance to provide her with the Success Plan and non-compliance letter. Dr. Brennan's contemporaneous handwritten notes on the non-compliance letter indicated that Ms. Otto abruptly quit during the September 8 conference and "walked off the job." Ms. Otto testified that she left the September 8 conference because Dr. Brennan was screaming at her and yelled that she was fired. She denied, however, that Dr. Brennan made any comments about race, gender, or age at that time. Dr. Brennan and Ms. Wheeler testified that Dr. Brennan neither raised his voice nor stated that Ms. Otto was fired during the September 8 conference. Rather, according to Dr. Brennan and Ms. Wheeler, it was Ms. Otto who became indignant during the September 8 conference, and who abruptly quit and walked out of the school after "throwing" her district-issued laptop on the desk of Dr. Brennan's assistant. Ms. Otto testified that she ultimately submitted lesson plans at some point after her August 31, 2010, observation, though that was disputed by Dr. Brennan. Regardless, Ms. Otto admitted during the hearing that she was "unprepared" during Ms. Wheeler's observation and the lesson plans entered into the record which she purportedly prepared for the August 31 observation were incomplete and inadequate. Dr. Brennan and Ms. Wheeler concurred that the lesson plans presented at the hearing were defective. Ms. Otto testified that she contacted a lawyer with the teacher's union immediately after the September 8 conference. Ms. Otto thereafter learned that Dr. Brennan did not have the authority to unilaterally fire her. Nevertheless, Ms. Otto advised the union lawyer that she would not go back to the school in any event because she was "allergic to it." Ms. Otto testified that the union lawyer gave her assurances that she would be reassigned to another school. These and other statements purportedly made by the union lawyer amounted to hearsay and were not corroborated by other, independent evidence. Shortly after the September 8 conference, Ms. Otto received from the school district a letter dated September 9, 2012, which indicated its recognition of Ms. Otto's resignation and encouraged her to contact the sender (Ms. Dawn Gaughan) with any questions. Ms. Otto did not respond to the September 9, 2012, letter, assuming that the union lawyer was securing her another teaching position in a different school. Ms. Otto testified that she called in substitutes on the days immediately following the September 8 conference using the school district's automated telephone system. However, she also stated that the personal identification number she needed to access the system was invalid at the time of her departure from the school. Having lost faith in the union lawyer's assurances, Ms. Otto testified that she eventually spoke with the school district human resources' personnel about the September 8 conference, but could not remember when that occurred. Ms. Otto subsequently filed a claim for unemployment compensation which was rejected on the grounds that she voluntarily resigned from her position. However, an Unemployment Compensation Appeals Referee ultimately determined that Ms. Otto was entitled to compensation because (during a telephonic hearing on the matter) the school district presented inadmissible hearsay to debunk Ms. Otto's assertion that she had been fired. At the hearing, Ms. Otto presented the testimony of Ms. Judith Julian, who claimed that she was "forced to resign" due to harassment by Dr. Brennan and Ms. Wheeler. Ms. Julian stated that Dr. Brennan "harassed" her by forcing her to park in the teacher's parking area, and Ms. Wheeler harassed her by "following" Ms. Julian on campus during a phone call. Ms. Julian had "no idea" whether such "harassment" was motivated by any animus toward her gender, age, or race, and also commented that she was "replaced" by a male Caucasian. According to Ms. Julian, lesson plans: (a) are "absolutely" important; (b) should be available at all times; and are part of a teacher's contractual duties. Ms. Julian testified that the only personal interaction she had with Dr. Brennan was during a classroom observation when Dr. Brennan stated that she was "a great teacher." Ms. Julian stated that she never heard Dr. Brennan make statements about Ms. Otto's race, gender, or age. Ms. Julian did not attend and, therefore, could not comment on the September 8, 2010, conference. She did, however, recall statements purportedly made by Dr. Brennan at a staff meeting regarding a preference to hire African-American teachers. Dr. Brennan and Ms. Wheeler testified that Dr. Brennan made no such announcement, though he did discuss the need for a staff which reflected the demographics of the community served by Forrest High School. Dr. Brennan also presented statistics showing that his hiring decisions had no appreciable impact on staff demographics at the high school. Rather, African-American staff members increased by only seven percent and the percentage of male teachers at the school actually decreased between the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school years. Regardless, the testimony and evidence of record show that school principals do not have unilateral authority to terminate a teacher. The testimony offered by Dr. Brennan and Ms. Wheeler was consistent with contemporaneous notes and statements they prepared in September 2010 as well as other written statements they later prepared for the School District's Office of Equity and Inclusion in November 2011. The collective bargaining agreement between the school district and the teachers' union, Duval Teachers United (DTU), stresses the importance of lesson plans and the expectation that teachers shall have them at all times. The agreement also provides that insubordinate conduct and failure to prepare lesson plans merit discipline up to and including dismissal. Further, the collective bargaining agreement also contains school district policies against harassment and directions on how to process complaints. Ms. Otto was aware of these policies and procedures, but never lodged any complaints against Dr. Brennan with school district officials. Based on the testimony and evidence of record, the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Ms. Otto resigned from her position during a September 8, 2010, conference with Dr. Brennan and Ms. Wheeler. Further, the evidence shows that Ms. Otto failed to provide timely and complete lesson plans despite several warnings from her superiors. This failure alone would support dismissal, as would Ms. Otto's insubordinate conduct or abandonment of her post. The Employment Complaint of Discrimination, filed with FCHR by Ms. Otto appears to be signed and dated by her on October 24, 2010, only 46 days after the last incident giving rise to her claim occurred. However, the date stamp from FCHR on that document is for October 25, 2011, more than 365 days after the September 8, 2010 incident. No explanation was given for this discrepancy in the dates on the complaint giving rise to this matter. Ms. Otto testified at the hearing that she "didn't care which way this case goes" and was "happy" just to be there.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Katherine E. Otto's Employment Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Katherine E. Otto Apartment 407 7740 Plantation Bay Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32344 Katherine E. Otto 785 Oakleaf Plantation Parkway, Unit 814 Orange Park, Florida 32065 David J. D'Agata, Esquire Office of the General Counsel 117 West Duval Street, Suite 480 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (7) 120.57120.595120.6857.105760.01760.10760.11
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TAMELA LANDRUM vs GLENN DORSEY INC., D/B/A MY HOME SPOT, 18-004737 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Sep. 11, 2018 Number: 18-004737 Latest Update: Apr. 23, 2019

The Issue Whether Respondent, Glenn Dorsey, Inc., d/b/a My Home Spot, is liable to Petitioner, Tamela Alisha Landrum, for employment discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“the Act”).

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in real estate property management which provides management services to homeowners’ associations (“HOA”), including managing the sale, lease, and maintenance of association property; organizing and staffing association board meetings; and enforcing association covenants and restrictions. Mr. Glenn Dorsey is Respondent’s owner. Petitioner is an African-American female and is a licensed Community Association Manager (“CAM”). Petitioner became employed by Respondent on May 23, 2016, as an Assistant HOA Manager.2/ Mr. Dorsey described Petitioner’s position as “the person responsible for how our communities appear.” She was handling contracted services such as pool maintenance, gate access, and landscaping “from writing the RFP, soliciting bids, comparing quotes to managing the vendor performance.” As her employer described, “A major portion of her job is managing the CCR [community covenants and restrictions] inspection schedule, performing the inspections and maintaining our database for CCR enforcement.” The description concludes that “Alisha is a licensed CAM and will soon be managing her own community association portfolio as the HOA Assistant Managers and Accounting Department are returned to full strength.” (emphasis added). According to Petitioner, she did not want to handle HOA board meetings, which occur in the evening and require the employee to stay for the duration of the meeting, which can be lengthy. In early September 2016, Petitioner was asked to cover an evening HOA meeting because Mr. Dorsey was double-booked for two different association meetings that evening. Petitioner was subsequently asked to cover additional evening HOA meetings. Between September 7, 2016, and August 22, 2017, Petitioner handled no less than 64 HOA regular and annual meetings for several different HOAs. On or about January 18, 2017, Mr. Dorsey transferred the responsibility for CCR inspections and enforcement to another employee. Petitioner complained that she was not compensated for working overtime to handle the HOA meetings. Petitioner repeatedly testified the company had no protocol for overtime. After-hour meetings created a personal hardship for Petitioner because they required her to incur additional childcare expenses. Apparently, a member of Petitioner’s family was initially providing childcare, but the arrangement broke down due to the inability to predict the length of HOA board and annual meetings. Petitioner testified that she verbally complained to both her direct supervisor and Mr. Dorsey about the hardship of after-hour duties and requested to be compensated with a salary increase and other benefits. Petitioner complained that her role and hours were changed significantly without any change in compensation. Mr. Dorsey scheduled a mandatory staff meeting for July 6, 2017, and included an agenda in the calendar invitation to staff. One of the agenda items is “meeting makeup time (next am come in late).” On August 16, 2017, Petitioner met with Mr. Dorsey and his assistant, Rachel Ward. At that meeting, they discussed renewal of her employment contract, and she addressed her concerns regarding her hours and compensation. Petitioner complained to Mr. Dorsey that she was not afforded a phone stipend, which was afforded to white managers, to compensate her for use of her personal cell phone for after-hour business. On August 18, 2017, Mr. Dorsey sent a letter to Petitioner “confirming” the August 16 meeting. In the letter, Mr. Dorsey acknowledged that Petitioner’s employment duties were “significantly different” than the duties she was hired for in May 2016. However, in the letter Mr. Dorsey justified the change in duties because of Petitioner’s poor performance of the original assigned duties, including estoppels, maintenance, and other administrative tasks, which he characterized “quickly became disorganized, delinquent, or incomplete.” Mr. Dorsey explained the change in duties as an attempt to “modify your role as to find a position in which you could succeed.” The letter concluded that Mr. Dorsey declined to change Petitioner’s compensation and benefits, or even enter into a new employment contract. Instead, Mr. Dorsey informed Petitioner that her employment would continue on a month-to-month basis, and that either party could terminate the agreement with 30 days’ notice. On August 21, 2017, Mr. Dorsey sent Petitioner the following electronic mail message: Alisha, Per your advisement today regarding your inability or decision not to attend HOA after-hour meetings, myHomeSpot.com will begin to cover those shifts without your participation effective immediately. Every other assistant is attending their portfolio meetings as this is a requirement of the position. We do not have a position at your rate of pay to provide you any extended exception. This is our advanced notice to you to terminate our employment arrangement on Oct. 14, 2017 as you are unable to meet the requirements of the current position. I provide you this date at the current pay rate to allow a smooth transition with someone who can perform the required duties, but, we can end with a 30-day notice to accommodate any changes if you notify us of this within 14 days from 8/22/17. On August 22, 2017, Petitioner sent Mr. Dorsey a letter which notified him she would no longer be available to work “beyond the published business hours” and requested she be returned to an 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. work schedule. However, the letter ended with notice of her immediate resignation. Petitioner’s Allegations In her Petition, Petitioner alleges that her change in job duties and hours, without appropriate compensation, was based upon her sex and race. She complains that she was not given a phone stipend afforded to white managers for use of their personal cell phones after business hours, and was forced to work after hours without overtime pay based on her race. Further, Petitioner alleges that Respondent unlawfully retaliated against her by responding to her complaints “with a write-up and termination notice.” Disparate Treatment Petitioner testified generally that she was paid less than, or denied benefits afforded to, white managers. Petitioner introduced no evidence on which to base a finding of the race of any employee, other than herself, in order to compare salary and benefit information. The record contains no documentation of which employees, if any, received a phone stipend. Absent this information, the undersigned cannot make a factual determination that Petitioner was denied the stipend which was afforded to male employees. Between the dates of May 23, 2016, and June 30, 2017 (slightly less than one month before her termination), Petitioner received the second highest amount of total wages of all Respondent’s employees during that timeframe. Petitioner received a total of $37,377.55 based on 2,051.25 total hours worked and 84.61 “absence hours.” An employee identified as AJ Ward was the only employee with higher total wages at $49,032.66. During that period, Petitioner worked fewer hours than employee Ward and incurred more “absence pay” than employee Ward. Petitioner further alleged that Mr. Dorsey manipulated her time entries in the company time management system, thereby artificially reducing her hours worked. The screenshots of time entries introduced by Petitioner are not sufficient evidence to support that allegation. Retaliation Only two days elapsed between Petitioner’s meeting with Mr. Dorsey, at which she voiced her concerns about uncompensated overtime and use of her personal cell phone after hours, and Mr. Dorsey’s letter giving Petitioner “advance notice” of her termination. Number of Employees The number of Respondent’s employees is a material issue in dispute. Respondent introduced its Department of Revenue Employer Quarterly Report (Form RT-6) for three separate quarters. For the quarter ending June 30, 2016, Respondent reported 15 employees in April and May 2016, and 14 employees in June 2016. For the quarter ending December 31, 2016, Respondent reported 13 employees in October, November, and December 2016. For the quarter ending March 31, 2017, the report identifies 15 employees in January, 14 in February, and 13 in March 2017. Respondent introduced a payroll details report for the pay periods between January 1 and August 31, 2017. The details report identifies only five employees. Petitioner did not challenge the reliability of the documents. Instead Petitioner argued that Respondent employed more than 15 employees when it was fully staffed. The evidence does not support a finding that Respondent employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks during either 2016 or 2017.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Discrimination Complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2019.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10 DOAH Case (1) 18-4737
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JANET D. MAYES vs GREAT SOUTHERN CAFE, 14-004578 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Parker, Florida Oct. 02, 2014 Number: 14-004578 Latest Update: Aug. 21, 2015

The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Great Southern Café is a restaurant located in Seaside, Florida. The restaurant is owned by James Shirley. As owner, Mr. Shirley did not generally involve himself in personnel decisions at the Café. Such decisions and the day-to- day management of the restaurant were the responsibility of the general manager, who at the time period relevant to this case was William “Billy” McConnell. Petitioner Janet D. Mayes is female. Petitioner has ADD, ADHD, OCD, and general anxiety disorder. She has been diagnosed with these conditions for 20 years and they are all controlled through medication. More importantly, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner’s disorders interfered with her ability to work or significantly impacted any other major life activity. Indeed, Petitioner has worked in the restaurant business for about 30 years and has held a variety of different positions during that time, often working long hours. Since her disorders did not interfere with any of Petitioner’s major life activities, the evidence did not demonstrate that such disorders were disabilities or handicaps for purposes of employment discrimination. Sometime around March 2012, Petitioner interviewed for employment with Respondent. She was initially hired as a hostess for the restaurant by the then general manager, Jim Ruby. Shortly thereafter, Mr. McConnell, who was then assistant manager, replaced Mr. Ruby as general manager. At the time, Mr. McConnell had 35-40 years of experience as a restaurant manager in Alabama and Florida and had managed the predecessor restaurant to Great Southern Café known as “Shades.” Mr. McConnell’s management philosophy was to be patient with employees, to train them in the right way, and to ask employees to do their best. He would give employees the benefit of the doubt, and when disciplinary action was necessary, would sit down and talk with the employee to build confidence in them. Mr. McConnell’s disciplinary style was informal and it was not his general practice to issue formal written discipline to employees. Mr. McConnell liked Petitioner’s work ethic and thought she did a good job as hostess. Under Mr. McConnell’s management, Petitioner was promoted by Mr. McConnell to relief manager in May of 2012. In August 2012, she was again promoted by Mr. McConnell to full manager. Mr. McConnell did not know about, nor was he provided with any documentation regarding, Petitioner’s disorders. Indeed, the evidence showed that Petitioner’s disorders were not so obvious that anyone who encountered her necessarily would have known about those disorders. There was no evidence that Petitioner ever sought any kind of accommodation from Respondent for her disorders. Since Mr. McConnell worked only the day shift and Petitioner usually worked nights, their paths did not often cross at work. However, the evidence demonstrated that Mr. McConnell occasionally used the term “bitch” to refer to Petitioner. The evidence also demonstrated that he did so not in a malicious or discriminatory way, but in a joking manner because of Petitioner’s actions that he witnessed or that were described to him. Petitioner conceded that it was “like it was a joke” when Mr. McConnell referred to her as a “bitch.” There was no testimony that Mr. McConnell used this term on repeated occasions so that its use rose to the level of harassment or that he used it to belittle or demean Petitioner. Sometime in April 2013, the Café catered a very large event known as “JazzFest.” Petitioner assisted Mr. McConnell in the planning and execution of this event for the Café. Her husband, William, who had been unemployed, was hired to help in food preparation at the event. In general, JazzFest was stressful for all those who worked the event. Both Mr. McConnell and Petitioner worked many extra hours at the festival. During the course of JazzFest, Mr. McConnell, as manager, permitted the employees to get food from the banquet line since they had been working all day without breaks for nutrition. Petitioner and her husband loudly and inappropriately berated Mr. McConnell in public and in front of other employees about allowing employees to get food from the banquet line. Mr. Shirley witnessed the confrontation and considered the display to be an inappropriate method by Petitioner to communicate her disagreement regarding Mr. McConnell’s management decision. Mr. McConnell also observed that during JazzFest, Petitioner was “too pushy” and “too bossy” with the staff without having any good reason for such treatment of employees. Additionally, Mr. McConnell observed that Petitioner was “not herself” and “wound up a little too tight” during JazzFest. Further, Mr. McConnell was aware that Petitioner had some recent personal stressors, such as her husband having issues with unemployment and one of her sons being arrested and incarcerated. He believed Petitioner’s behavior was due to the pressures in her family life combined with the pressure from working Jazzfest. Therefore, Mr. McConnell decided to give Petitioner a week off, with pay, for rest and relaxation. He hoped that Petitioner would come back refreshed and ready for the busy beach season after her break. Mr. Shirley knew of and supported the time off for Petitioner and hoped that Petitioner’s time away from work would ease some of the undercurrent of negative feelings that had built up between Petitioner and some of the employees. After Petitioner returned from her week off, Mr. McConnell received reports from some of his employees that Petitioner was being unreasonable, raising her voice and losing her temper “numerous” times. He also received reports that Petitioner was “hard to work for,” and “a bully.” In addition, owner James Shirley received some complaints from employees that Petitioner was “going off on people.” Indeed, her treatment of the employees had gotten to the point that several employees no longer wished to work with her. These employees were considered good employees and were part of the restaurant team. The evidence showed that it is very important for restaurant staff to function as a team and that maintaining good working relationships among team members is one important component of a good functioning restaurant. Mr. McConnell spoke to Petitioner about the subject of the complaints and asked why she was pushing the staff so hard and creating a bad environment. Petitioner said she would try to do better. During this conversation, Mr. McConnell did not remember asking Petitioner whether her meds were “out of whack,” but he has stated this to other people as a figure of speech in the manner of “get your act together.” The evidence did not show that Mr. McConnell’s use of the phrase was discriminatory, harassing or demonstrative of any knowledge of Petitioner’s alleged disability or perception of the same. After his talk with Petitioner, things improved for a couple of days. However, Mr. McConnell received more and similar complaints about Petitioner from the same employees who previously complained about her, with some indicating they would quit if Petitioner continued to work at the restaurant. Mr. McConnell feared that if something was not done about Petitioner some of his good team employees would leave and he would not be able to run the restaurant. The better evidence demonstrated that Mr. McConnell met with Petitioner and offered her two weeks’ severance pay. He spoke with her about her inability to get along with the employees and function as a team member at the restaurant. The meeting lasted about 20-30 minutes. Ultimately, Petitioner refused the severance pay, handed over her keys, and left. There was no credible or substantial evidence that Petitioner’s termination was based on disability, perceived or otherwise. Similarly, there was no credible or substantial evidence that Petitioner’s termination was based on her sex. Although Petitioner asserted harassment from Mr. McConnell, no evidence to support this claim was adduced at the hearing. Respondent hired and promoted Petitioner to a manager position, allowed Petitioner to hire her husband and son (and at least one of her son’s friends), and gave her a paid week off after JazzFest to refresh and relax from a stressful event. The evidence showed that Mr. McConnell gave Petitioner the benefit of the doubt, as he did with all his employees, and only decided to terminate her after talking with Petitioner and determining that giving her time off did nothing to eliminate the negative energy Petitioner was bringing to the job. Based on these facts, Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent discriminated against her based on sex or disability when it terminated her from employment. As such, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Thirston, II, Esquire Thirston Law Firm Post Office Box 19617 Panama City Beach, Florida 32417 (eServed) Timothy Nathan Tack, Esquire Kunkel Miller and Hament 3550 Buschwood Park Drive, Suite 135 Tampa, Florida 33618 (eServed) Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68760.10760.11
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FREDERICK BASS vs UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA, 95-002450 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida May 11, 1995 Number: 95-002450 Latest Update: May 08, 1997

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Fredrick Bass, was subjected to employment discrimination by the Respondent, The University of West Florida, on account of his race or disability or as retaliation because of his past filing of an EEOC complaint against a former employer.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a black male with a disability involving a post- traumatic, arthritic condition of the left knee. In his past work history, the Petitioner had been a firefighter. When he was thus employed, on one occasion, he filed a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the fire department where he was employed. The Respondent is the University of West Florida, a state agency. It became embroiled in the disputes at issue when it first advertised for the filling of a vacancy for the position of Senior Custodial Supervisor and, after the advertising and interviewing process described below, hired another black male with a disability, instead of the Petitioner. The Respondent advertised to fill the vacancy for the position of Senior Custodial Supervisor because of the death of the person who had previously occupied that position. There was an insufficient response to the first advertisement of the vacancy, and Dan Simpler, the Director of Building Services for the Respondent, who would supervise the occupant of that position, requested that the position be re-advertised. The Petitioner had not responded to the first advertisement, in any event. The second advertisement was issued in August of 1993. This time, the Petitioner was one of the applicants who responded. Several applicants withdrew after learning that the salary for the position would be at the lower-end of the advertised salary range and was insufficient for their needs. This left the Respondent with only three remaining applicants, who appeared to meet the minimum qualifications for the position. One of the three applicants was the Petitioner. The Respondent, in the conduct of its application and selection process, inquired of former employers, concerning whether they would give an applicant a favorable recommendation. The Respondent so inquired of the Petitioner's former employers. The Respondent was unable to obtain a favorable recommendation from any of the Petitioner's former employers. In response to Mr. Simpler's inquiry, the Chief of the Fire Department at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida, the Petitioner's most recent former employer, informed Mr. Simpler that he would not rehire the Petitioner if given the opportunity to do so. The Petitioner had informed Mr. Simpler that he believed that the Chief of the Fire Department would not give him a favorable recommendation because the Petitioner had once filed a complaint with the EEOC against that employer. In any event, Mr. Simpler deemed that having a pool of only three applicants gave the Respondent insufficient choices for the position. Therefore, he requested that the position be advertised for a third time in order to obtain a larger pool of applicants. In response to the third advertisement, a number of other applications were received. One of them was that of James O. Rankins, who is a male, African-American, who also has a disability. See Respondent's Exhibit 6 in evidence. Mr. Rankins' application reflected considerable supervisory experience, both during his service with the United States Army and his position as a Site Manager for Service Master, Inc. at the Monsanto plant near Pensacola, Florida. He retired from the United States Army as a Sergeant Major, the highest non- commissioned rank. In the opinion of Mr. Simpler and others involved in the hiring at the University, this demonstrated a high level of leadership capability. Since his military retirement, in his capacity as the Site Manager for Service Master, Inc., the maintenance contractor, at the Monsanto chemical plant near Pensacola, Florida, he had supervised 45 custodial personnel. He was responsible for cleaning and maintenance of 150 buildings and shops, as well as over 250 offices and restrooms. The Petitioner was an applicant in the third pool of applications in response to the third advertisement. Mr. Simpler learned of a former employer, Lanyap Corporation, and questioned the former owner concerning the Petitioner's previous employment at that firm. Larry Wiggins, the former owner of Lanyap Corporation, told Mr. Simpler that he would not rehire the Petitioner if given the opportunity to do so. Mr. Wiggins advised Mr. Simpler that the Petitioner had not been employed as a Supervisor by Lanyap Corporation, although the Petitioner had indicated that to be the case on his application for employment filed with the Respondent. The five persons on the Respondent's selection committee, charged with hiring to fill the subject position, considered the qualifications and experience of all of the applicants. After evaluating all of the applicants, with the assistance of personal interviews, the committee recommended that James Rankins be employed as the Senior Custodial Supervisor. Members of the selection committee recommended Mr. Rankins for the position based upon his superior qualifications and experience, including his demonstrated leadership and supervisory abilities. The Petitioner's race and disability were not factors in the selection process. Indeed, Mr. Rankins is an African-American, also with a disability, as shown by the Respondent's Exhibit 6 in evidence. Ms. Bertha Mae Jones is the staff member at the University who interviewed the Petitioner, as well as Mr. Rankins. Ms. Jones is black and has been employed at the University for 27 years. She does not recall hearing the Petitioner mention his handicap or disability but stated that it would not have mattered if he had one, as long as he could do the job in question. She also interviewed Mr. Rankins and felt that Mr. Rankins had much superior qualifications and experience. He demonstrated that he had had a long-term ability for good supervision. Because of his superior qualifications, Ms. Jones recommended that Mr. Rankins be hired instead of the Petitioner. None of the members of the selection committee, other than the Director of Building Services, knew that the Petitioner had filed an EEOC complaint against one of his former employers. The filing of that complaint was shown to have had no effect on the hiring decision made by the Respondent's selection committee. The selection committee's recommendation that Mr. Rankins be employed to fill the position of Senior Custodial Supervisor was forwarded to the head of the department and to the Vice-President for Administrative Affairs. The recommendation was accepted. Mr. Rankins, a black male with a disability, was hired by the Respondent to fill the subject position.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order concluding that the Respondent, the University of West Florida, did not commit an unlawful employment practice, by employing James O. Rankins to fill the position of Senior Custodial Supervisor, instead of the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2450 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The following numbers assigned to proposed findings of fact by the Petitioner do not correspond to any numbered paragraphs in the Petitioner's letter/proposed recommended order because there were no such numbered paragraphs. The Petitioner did prove that he belonged to a racial minority, and that proposed finding is accepted. The Petitioner's assertion that he was qualified for the position in question has not been proven, and that is rejected. The Petitioner's proposed finding that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected for the position, is rejected because he was found to be less qualified than the applicant chosen for the position. The Petitioner's proposed finding to the effect that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with his qualifications, is rejected as not in accord with the preponderance of the evidence. The relevant advertisement and interviewing process was that after the third advertisement, when the Petitioner remained an applicant and Mr. Rankins' application was received, the position did not remain open, Mr. Rankins was hired at the conclusion of that third advertisement and interview selection process. The remainder of the Petitioner's "proposed findings", in essence, constitute argument concerning the weight of the testimony and evidence but to the extent that he attempts to assert that it has been proven factually that Mr. Simpler had not talked to the fire chief, the Petitioner's former employer, because the telephone numbers at the relevant fire station were not the same as the fire chief's actual telephone number, does not prove that Mr. Simpler did not talk to the fire chief. In fact, it is found that he did. This proposed finding, to the extent that it is one, is rejected. The apparent proposed finding that the five board members on the selection committee found the Petitioner qualified, subject to the fact that it had received bad recommendations from former employers, is rejected as not in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence. In fact, the Petitioner was not the best qualified person for the position, Mr. Rankins was. These are the only proposed findings of fact that can be gleaned from the letter filed by the Petitioner. The remainder constitutes an attempt at legal and factual argument which do not constitute proposed findings of fact amenable to specific rulings. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-13. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Fredrick Bass 75 South Madison Drive Pensacola, Florida 32505 M. J. Menge, Esquire SHELL, FLEMING, DAVIS & MENGE Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32598 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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SANDRA HART vs SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY, 90-005133 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 15, 1990 Number: 90-005133 Latest Update: Jul. 27, 1992

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent denied Petitioner employment opportunities in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as a part-time employee on or about March 10, 1981. At the time of her employment Petitioner executed a statement acknowledging that the Respondent did not guarantee weeks or hours of employment and that her employment was dependent, in part, upon the demands of the business. Petitioner's job title throughout her employment with Respondent was "warehouse worker." At all times material to this case, Petitioner was assigned to the Orlando distributing center that serves as a warehouse for items shipped to and for Respondent's retail system. During her employment with Respondent, Petitioner received acceptable work evaluations but was not elevated to full-time employment status when job openings occurred. For the first year of her employment, Respondent utilized an employee review form which rated Petitioner on a scale of 1 to 7; the lower number indicated unsatisfactory, the higher number indicated distinguished performance. For that review period, Petitioner received all 4s on her review. The 4 rating evidenced that Petitioner's performance had been consistently good and had met the requirements of the job to which she was assigned. For the review period ending April 1, 1985, the Petitioner received four 4s and one 3. The 3 rating was in the category "working relations" and found her performance to be fair. The 3 rating indicated that for the period reviewed Petitioner's performance was generally satisfactory, but sometimes fell below an acceptable level. Later in 1985, the Petitioner filed an EEOC complaint against the Respondent and alleged that the company had treated her unfairly on account of her sex. Petitioner did not prevail on that complaint. The Petitioner's employee performance review issued on June 10, 1986, the next evaluation after her EEOC complaint, evaluated her performance at all 3s with one 4 in the category of job knowledge. Petitioner did not challenge this review and did not, at that time, allege that the less favorable review had been issued by the company in retaliation for the EEOC complaint. Subsequent to the 1986 review, Respondent's evaluation form was amended to compute an employee's performance on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being the unacceptable end of the scale and 5 indicating distinguished performance. For the review period ending April 12, 1988, Petitioner received all 3s which established that her overall performance again met the employer's expectations. Throughout her tenure with the Respondent, Petitioner sought to increase her work hours. Petitioner complained to the company that work assignments were given unfairly. In June, 1987, Mr. Maupin, manager of the center, issued a notice regarding a change in the scheduling practices for part- time employees. That notice advised employees that the length of service with the company would no longer be the determining factor in assigning part-time hours. The notice provided: "Other factors such as performance, availability when needed and work experience (such as driving skills) will also be considered when determining who will be scheduled." Petitioner continued to be scheduled for work and, in 1988, received the second highest number of hours worked for the center's part-time employees. Petitioner did not receive full-time employment with the Respondent. Two employees who had not worked in the warehouse as long as Petitioner were placed in full-time positions. Petitioner did not offer evidence as to the qualifications of those individuals to perform the work requested of them. The employment history of the individuals chosen by the employer, together with the training, skills and aptitudes of such individuals are all unknown. Petitioner's assertion that she had performed the work in the past and, therefore, was the better qualified to receive the full-time job has not been deemed credible or, in itself, sufficient to prove affirmatively that others chosen by the employer were less worthy of the jobs for which they were selected. To the contrary, the Respondent posted full-time job openings and allowed interested parties to apply for same and be reviewed for employment based upon individual merit.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's claim against this Respondent as Petitioner has failed to establish that the employer discriminated against her in retaliation for a prior assertion of discrimination. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-5133 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. Paragraph 4 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence or irrelevant. Paragraph 5 is rejected as irrelevant the petition filed in this cause does not allege Petitioner was unfairly disciplined. Paragraph 6 is accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 7 is accepted. The balance of the paragraph is rejected as argument, hearsay not corroborated by direct evidence, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 8 is rejected as irrelevant; it is undisputed that Petitioner perceived a bias against her, the evidence in this case does not, however, establish that such bias did exist. An employer's assessment that an employee has a poor attitude does not, of itself, lead to the conclusion that employer will, consequently, unlawfully discriminate against that employee. The first sentence of paragraph 9 is accepted. The balance of the paragraph is rejected as hearsay unsupported by direct evidence presented in this case or unsupported by the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 10 is rejected as unsupported by direct evidence presented in this case. Paragraph 11 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 12 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 13 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 14 is accepted. Paragraph 15 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 16 is rejected as speculative, not supported by the evidence in this case. Paragraph 17 is accepted. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraph 19 is accepted to the extent that the record reflects Petitioner retained an attorney to represent her; otherwise rejected as irrelevant or not supported by the record. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1 through 9 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 10, it is accepted that all of Petitioner's annual evaluations rated her work as acceptable. Paragraph 11 is rejected as inaccurate or contrary to the weight of the evidence. While Petitioner's reviews remained substantially the same, the forms and evaluation system did change. Important was that Petitioner's work was always deemed acceptable. With regard to paragraph 12, it is accepted that Petitioner worked forty days within the period described. Otherwise rejected as not supported by the record in this case. Paragraph 13 is accepted. Paragraph 14 is accepted but incompletely refers only to the delivery job; Petitioner had expressed an interest in two other jobs available. Paragraph 15 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence or an incomplete statement of fact. Petitioner did seek full-time employment with the Respondent. COPIES FURNISHED: Heather Morcroft 2431 Aloma Avenue Suite 285 Winter Park, Florida 32791 William E. Curphey Parker, Johnson, McGuire & Michaud 1300 Barnett Plaza 201 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Margaret Jones, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Ronald M. McElrath Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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ROBERT HARDISON, JR. vs. FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL MIAMI, 85-001715 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-001715 Latest Update: Aug. 28, 1986

The Issue This matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Florida Commission on Human Relations to conduct a hearing regarding a Petition For Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed by Petitioner against Respondent. The Petition For Relief alleges an unlawful employment practice under the Human Rights Act of 1977 in the form of Petitioner's discharge from employment as a Radio-Teletype Operator in December 1978 due to sexual discrimination. The Respondent answered the Petition and asserted that Petitioner was dismissed for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons (failure to attain a satisfactory level of job performance) while a probationary employee. The Respondent further asserted that Petitioner had never attained permanent status with the Respondent. At the hearing, the parties completed the filing of a Pre- Hearing Stipulation and Supplement thereto and Petitioner's Amendment thereof, pursuant to an earlier order requiring a pre- hearing stipulation. By stipulation the parties agreed to change the style of this case to reflect the Respondent as shown above instead of the Florida Highway Patrol.

Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Petitioner was hired on April 13, 1978, as a Radio- Teletype Operator for the Miami Station of the Florida Highway Patrol, a division of the Respondent. Petitioner was hired on a provisional status for six months or until he passed the required examination, whichever occurred first. The examination was still being prepared when Petitioner was hired. Petitioner had prior experience as a wrecker dispatcher and in electronics. He had received an Associate of Arts degree in Criminal Justice in December 1977. His wages were $824 per month. Chief Operator S. K. Wallace, a male, was Petitioner's immediate supervisor and trainer. Effective May 1, 1978, Sergeant Gracey, a uniformed member of the Patrol, became Communications Officer for Troop E and was Wallace's supervisor. Captain Garris was the Troop Commander at time of hire. Petitioner identified three females and two males, other than himself and Wallace, who were employed as radio operators at Troop E. One male operator may have been employed by the Department of Transportation. On August 22, 1978, Petitioner passed his Radio-Teletype Operator I examination and received a score of 90. Passing score was 70. By memo of September 25, 1978, Petitioner was advised by Col. Beach that effective August 22, 1978, he was no longer provisional and was probationary for six months as a result of passing the examination. On August 7, 1978, Petitioner signed an Employee Performance Evaluation with an overall rating of satisfactory. The employee status was shown as probationary and the rating period was from April 19, 1978, to October 19, 1979, a period of 19 months. The rater was Chief Operator Wallace, who signed the rating on July 11, 1978. On July 20, 1978, Sergeant Gracey wrote a memo to Captain Garris wherein he requested a sixty-day extension of Petitioner's probationary period. Sergeant Gracey stated that he did not feel Petitioner had progressed to a level of competency commensurate with his length of service. The memo mentioned areas of deficiency and stated that Petitioner had been counseled regarding them and informed of the extension request. The memo accompanied the initial evaluation. Captain Garris signed the bottom of the memo, indicating his concurrence and stating that both he and Sergeant Gracey disagreed with the rater (wallace). on September 27, 1978, Petitioner signed an Employee Performance Evaluation with an overall rating of conditional. The rating period was from April 13, 1978, to October 13, 1978. Petitioner's performance was rated by Wallace on September 15, 1978, reviewed by Garris, and also initialed by Sergeant Gracey. The rater's comments noted deficiencies in Petitioner's reluctance to apply his knowledge and in always seeking help from others. It also mentioned his slowness. Petitioner checked a box indicating his desire to discuss the rating with his reviewers. Petitioner also spoke with both Captain Garris and Sergeant Gracey about this evaluation. On October 9, 1978, Col. Beach wrote a memo to Petitioner about the conditional evaluation and the Executive Director's approval of the request for extension of probation for three months, from October 13, 1978, through January 12, 1979. This memo also mentioned counseling from Petitioner's immediate supervisor to assist him in improving his performance. Petitioner was the subject of a third evaluation, for the period from September 15, 1978, to November 27, 1978. This rating was by Sergeant Gracey on November 13, 1978. It was reviewed by Captain Carmody who succeeded Captain Garris as the Troop Commander. This evaluation was not signed by Petitioner. Accompanying the third evaluation and referred to therein was correspondence dated December 4, 1978, from Sergeant Gracey constituting the rater's comments. In this memo, Sergeant Gracey recommended Petitioner's termination due to unsatisfactory performance. He indicated a counseling session with Petitioner on or about September 25, 1978, after the initial conditional rating, at which time Petitioner's weaknesses were explained. Sergeant Gracey wrote that he had advised Petitioner that his most serious problem was the inability to obtain information and disseminate it properly and that Petitioner often got information confused, requiring extra supervisory assistance. Sergeant Gracey described counseling for specific errors on October 11, 1978, and November 11, 1978, which mistakes were later repeated. He also mentioned Petitioner's failure to meet deadlines set by Wallace concerning Petitioner's uniform. Sergeant Gracey discussed frequent errors prohibiting Petitioner's assignment for the solitary (midnight) shift and problems with Petitioner's voice quality. Captain Carmody transmitted the second conditional evaluation along with Sergeant Gracey's letter to Col. Beach with the Captain's concurrence. The original submission was dated November 27, 1978, and was re-submitted with all attachments after December 4, 1978. Captain Carmody mentioned therein the counseling Petitioner had received with no appreciable improvement shown. By letter dated December 12, 1978, Petitioner was informed by Col. Beach, with the approval of Chester Blakemore as Executive Director, of his dismissal on December 15, 1978, based on conditional ratings while a probationary employee. The letter stated that since Petitioner lacked permanent status, he had no appeal rights to the Career Service Commission. Petitioner's subsequent attempt at an appeal to the Commission was rejected on that basis. During 1978, Chief Operator Wallace was not a very effective supervisor. For the rating period from September 1, 1977, through September 1, 1978, Wallace was rated conditional. Wallace demonstrated inadequate supervisory techniques, he lacked the respect of his subordinates, he failed to set a good example, and he lacked leadership. In general, Wallace was a weak supervisor. At all times material, Sergeant Gracey was aware of the quality of Wallace's supervision of the radio-teletype operators. During the period from January 1, 1978, to December 31, 1979, the radio-teletype operators employed by the Florida Highway Patrol consisted of 65 male employees and 34 female employees. During the same period there were more females in the applicant pool for radio-teletype operators, both on a statewide basis and in the Miami area. During the period in question there was no pattern of discrimination in favor of female operators or against male operators. When Sergeant Gracey became the Communications Officer on May 1, 1978, he sought to professionalize the operators and procedures. Gracey thought that Chief Operator Wallace was doing a poor job of supervising the operators and for that reason gave Wallace a conditional evaluation. Gracey disagreed with Wallace's initial evaluation of the Petitioner, but Gracey could not change the evaluation because Gracey was not the Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Gracey did, however, write a memo of July 20, 1978, stating his disagreement with Wallace's initial evaluation of the Petitioner, and Gracey also sought an extension of Petitioner's probationary period. Sergeant Gracey counseled with the Petitioner about his job performance on several occasions. In November of 1978 Gracey met with the Petitioner and told him that he (Gracey) was going to recommend that the Petitioner be dismissed. Sergeant Gracey did not direct Chief Operator Wallace to issue the first conditional rating of the Petitioner. Sergeant Gracey did not express a preference for female operators to either Wallace or the Petitioner. The Petitioner was recommended for termination solely because of his failure to achieve a satisfactory level of performance during his probationary period, as extended. The deficiencies in Petitioner's job performance are described in Sergeant Gracey's memo of December 4, 1978. These included the inability to properly disseminate information, that information was often confused, that specific mistakes were counseled but subsequently reoccurred, that the Petitioner failed to adhere to deadlines set by Wallace, and that he required close supervision, could not be left alone in the radio room, and had a nervous and irritating voice quality. Sergeant Gracey recommended the Petitioner's dismissal for the reasons summarized immediately above. The recommendation was approved by Gracey's superiors and the Petitioner was dismissed from his employment with the Florida Highway Patrol effective December 15, 1978.

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued dismissing the Petition For Relief filed by Robert Hardison, Jr. DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of August, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark A. Cullen, Esquire CULLEN 6 SZYMONIAK, P.A. 1030 Lake Avenue Lake Worth, Florida 33460 Judson M. Chapman Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Enoch Jon Whitney General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties. In making these rulings and in finding the facts in this case, I have in many instances had to resolve direct conflicts in the testimony of opposing witnesses. In resolving conflicts between the testimony of the Petitioner and the testimony of witnesses called by the Respondent, I have generally accepted the testimony of the latter as more persuasive. In this regard, particular consideration has been given to the fact that some of the Petitioner's testimony is inconsistent and illogical. Consideration has also been given to the Petitioner's obvious interest in the outcome of the case. Yet another significant factor in weighing the conflicting testimony is that the testimony of Respondent's witnesses tended to be logical, corroborated by the documentary evidence, and convincing. Rulings on findings proposed by Petitioner Paragraph 1: Accepted as introductory material, but not as finding of fact. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted with additional findings for accuracy. Paragraph 4: Accepted. Paragraphs 5 and 6: Accepted in substance with additional details in the interest of accuracy and clarity. Paragraph 7: Accepted. Paragraphs 8 and 9: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 10: Accepted. Paragraphs 11 and 12: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: First sentence of this paragraph rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Remainder of paragraph rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 14: Accepted. Paragraph 15: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 16: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Although the statements the Petitioner attributes to Wallace were not specifically denied (they could not be denied by Wallace because he died several years before the hearing), they are inconsistent with other evidence and it is most unlikely that they were uttered or, if uttered, that they were uttered seriously. Paragraph 17: Consistent with the evidence, but rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 18: First sentence of this paragraph is accepted. The remainder is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 19: Accepted. Paragraph 20: Rejected as incorrect characterization of the evidence. Paragraphs 21 and 22: Consistent with the evidence but rejected as irrelevant. Rulings on findings proposed by Respondent Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7: Accepted. Paragraph 8: Rejected as irrelevant. The testimony about the statement attributed to the deceased Mr. Wallace is irrelevant both because it is unlikely that the statement was uttered, and even if uttered, it was erroneous. Paragraphs 9 and 10: Accepted. Paragraph 11: First sentence rejected because Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not persuasive. Second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16: Accepted. Paragraphs 17 and 18: Consistent with the evidence, but rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 19: Rejected as unnecessary summary of testimony, most of which testimony is rejected as unpersuasive or as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 20: Rejected for the most part as constituting a description of part of the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Accepted in part as a finding that Mr. Wallace was not a very effective supervisor at the time material to this case. Paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27: Accepted in substance, although as stated these paragraphs constitute descriptions of the testimony rather than proposed findings of fact. It would greatly facilitate the efforts of hearing officers, agency heads, and courts if all proposed findings of fact were written in a form which constituted the ultimate finding sought by the proposing party. Proposed findings which constitute nothing more than summaries of the testimony pro and con are truly not very helpful to th~se who must recommend, decide, and review cases under Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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DENNIS W. THOMAS vs UNIMAC COMPANY, INC., 94-002126 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Marianna, Florida Apr. 21, 1994 Number: 94-002126 Latest Update: Jun. 15, 1995

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been the victim of an unlawful employment practice by the alleged failure to re-hire him by the Respondent because of his alleged disability.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed as a machinist operating a "pega" machine for the Respondent at times pertinent hereto, in 1992 and 1993. On or about February 24, 1992, while he was home for lunch, the Petitioner apparently suffered a stroke. He was hospitalized and his wife and a nurse informed his employer of his medical condition. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. It is a manufacturer of commercial laundry equipment and employs more than 15 employees. Because of the medical condition related to his stroke, the Petitioner applied for and was granted a medical leave of absence on or about February 24, 1992 or shortly thereafter. There is apparently some question whether the Petitioner's supervisor actually signed the leave request, but the employer does not dispute that he was legitimately on a medical leave of absence until August 13, 1992. There is also some dispute concerning whether the Respondent employer knew that the Petitioner had suffered a stroke or not. The complainant's personnel file, however, contained two notes dated March 12, 1992 and August 17, 1992 from Dr. Watts, his treating and attending physician. The March 12, 1992 note confirmed that the Petitioner had been hospitalized and had had an abnormal cerebral imaging result, also suffered from hypertension and, at that time, was unable to return to work. The August 17, 1992 note from Dr. Watts stated that the Petitioner could return to work and stated that there were no restrictions on his activities. Thus, the evidence of record indicates that there was a basis for the Respondent to know that the Petitioner had a stroke or some type of disability between February 24, 1992 and August 17, 1992. Upon his release by his attending physician on August 17, 1992, without medical restriction of his activities, so that he could return to employment, there was no basis for the Respondent to believe from that point forward that the Petitioner had any disability. This is borne out by the Petitioner's own testimony revealing that he repeatedly sought re-employment with the Respondent during the period from August 1992 through February 1993 without advising the Respondent of any employment restrictions due to his medical condition or any purported disability. When the Petitioner returned to the Respondent's place of business on August 17, 1992 and sought to come back to work after his medical leave, the plant manager informed him that he had no openings for him at that time. There were two positions being filled at that time, but they were not positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. One was a position requiring skill at electrical schematic reading, which was an electrical assembly position. The Petitioner was not qualified for this position. The other position was as a "tig welder", a highly-skilled type of welding process. The Petitioner was not qualified to perform this, as well, because of his lack of knowledge of welding. The position, and similar positions, operating "pega" machines (machine tools), which the Petitioner had filled and performed prior to his illness, were all filled and unavailable at the time the Petitioner sought to return to work in August of 1992. Neither the Petitioner nor his physician had given any indication of when the Petitioner could return to work, prior to August 13, 1992, nor was there any communication with the Petitioner or his physician for six months during his leave of absence, other than the provision to the company of the physician's note in March 1992 concerning the brief description of his medical condition. Consequently, on August 13, 1992, when Mr. Rieff, the plant manager, received a note from the Petitioner's physician stating that he could return to work without restriction, there were no positions available for his type of skill and training. Therefore, the company recorded the Petitioner's status, as of August 1992, as being discharged due to the conclusion of his medical leave with no open positions suitable for him being available. The Petitioner testified that he sought employment several times during the period of August 1992 through January 1993 by attempting to contact or contacting Mr. Rieff. He stated that Mr. Rieff told him to check with him every two or three weeks because each time he spoke with him, Mr. Rieff informed him that no openings were available at that time. The Petitioner, however, filed no application for employment until he learned, from a visit to the state employment service office in February of 1993, that the Respondent was looking for a "pega machine operator". The Petitioner filed an application with the company at that time. Upon receiving the application or learning of it, Mr. Horton, Human Resources Director of the company, reviewed it and noted that the Petitioner had had previous experience with the company performing this same job. Mr. Horton had not been with the company at the time the Petitioner had left for his medical leave and, therefore, had no knowledge of his medical history, skills, abilities, and other past history with the company. Consequently, he consulted with Mr. Rieff concerning the advisability of re-hiring the Petitioner. Mr. Rieff advised against re-hiring the Petitioner because the Petitioner had had an attendance problem while he was employed by the company. In fact, although his other job skill and performance ratings were the highest, his attendance rating was the poorest in the company's system and means of rating performance. Consequently, because of Mr. Rieff's negative recommendation, on the basis of the Petitioner's past poor attendance record, which is substantiated by the evidence, Mr. Horton elected not to re-hire him. Mr. Horton did not know at that time of the medical history of the Petitioner because the medical records were housed in a different department of the company. Mr. Horton was the decision-maker for that employment decision. The employment action which resulted in the Petitioner filing the charge of discrimination at issue occurred when the Respondent failed to hire the Petitioner. The Petitioner maintains that it was on account of his medical condition or disability. The Petitioner verbally sought employment by contacting Mr. Rieff periodically from August 1992 through January 1993. On approximately January 7, 1993, Mr. Rieff effectively told the Petitioner that he would not hire him in the foreseeable future and that if he needed the Petitioner, he could call him. In February 1993, the application was actually filed by the Petitioner for employment, and Mr. Horton took the above negative action with regard to it. It is undisputed that the Respondent granted the Petitioner six months of medical leave. Whether or not the Respondent knew of the precise nature of the medical problem for which the Petitioner was given medical leave, the fact is established that upon the Petitioner being released by his treating physician with no restrictions and able to return to work, the Petitioner had no disability in terms of any impediment to his full employment, performing the full range of duties he had performed before the medical incident occurred in February 1992. Consequently, the Petitioner was not disabled from August 13, 1992 forward. The established reason that the Petitioner was not hired again by the Respondent company was because of his poor attendance record and not because of any perceived disability suffered by the Petitioner. In fact, at the times pertinent hereto when the decision at issue was made not to re-hire the Petitioner, the Petitioner suffered from no disability, and the Respondent had no perception that he did.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Commission on Human Relations dismissing the petition filed by the Petitioner, Dennis W. Thomas, in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2126 The parties were accorded the opportunity to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in the form of Proposed Recommended Orders. The Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact, which are accepted (Nos. 1-6) to the extent they do not conflict with or are inconsistent with the findings of fact made by the Hearing Officer. The Petitioner submitted a post-hearing pleading, in letter form, which really amounts to an argument as to the quantity, quality and weight to be ascribed to the evidence and included citation to the relevant statute, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, and a court case which merely is cited for the purpose of pointing out that employment cannot be denied a person on account of illness and disability. That principle is not in dispute in this proceeding. The Petitioner did not separately state proposed findings of fact which can be specifically ruled upon by the Hearing Officer. Nevertheless, all legal and factual issues alluded to in the Petitioner's pleading have been addressed and ruled upon in the body of this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis W. Thomas 4396 Clyde Lane Post Office Box 56 Marianna, Florida 32447 Roger W. Horton, III Human Resources Director Unimac Company, Inc. 3595 Industrial Park Drive Marianna, FL 32446-9458 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.10760.22
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ARTHUR R. JONES vs PROGRESS RAIL SERVICES, INC., 96-002768 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Green Cove Springs, Florida Jun. 11, 1996 Number: 96-002768 Latest Update: Oct. 16, 1997

The Issue The issue is whether respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged in the petition for relief filed on April 19, 1996.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this discrimination case, petitioner, Arthur R. Jones, alleges that in October 1993, when he was fifty-four years of age, he was unlawfully terminated from his position as a welder with respondent, Progress Rail Services, Inc. (PRS), on account of his age. After conducting a preliminary investigation of the claim, the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice occurred. Petitioner then filed his petition for relief realleging the same disparate treatment. Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of refurbishing railroad cars and is located in Green Cove Springs, Florida. Although there is no direct evidence as to the number of persons employed by PRS, through representation of its counsel in his opening statement, it can be inferred that PRS employed fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the year when the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or in the preceding calendar year. After taking a welding test, petitioner began employment with PRS in April 1992. Initially, he worked as a carpenter, but he was later transferred to a "weld out" position. The latter position involved physically demanding work and required petitioner and a co-worker, working as a team, to weld steel tops onto railroad car frames. During petitioner's tenure as a PRS employee, PRS had a progressive discipline policy which provided that an employee would receive a verbal warning, followed by a written warning, which was then followed by placement on probation. The fourth and final step was termination of employment. PRS's absenteeism and tardy policy was based on a point system. Employees received one point for tardy or early leave, and two points for absences. When the employee reached eight points, a verbal warning was given in accordance with the progressive discipline policy. A total of twelve points resulted in a written warning while sixteen points resulted in a period of probation. Eighteen points resulted in termination. On November 17, 1992, petitioner was given his first verbal warning regarding absenteeism. On March 24, 1993, petitioner again received a verbal warning for failing to report to work on time. On the March 24 disciplinary action form, petitioner was admonished by his supervisor to "come to work on time." On May 12, 1993, petitioner was given a written warning for absenteeism. On the disciplinary action form, the supervisor noted that petitioner "need(ed) to improve on come (sic) to work all work day." As of May 24, 1992, petitioner had accumulated seventeen points, and thus he was placed on probation for excessive absenteeism. His supervisor again warned him in writing "not (to) be late or absent," and if he was, "(i)t will result in your termination at (PRS)." All of the foregoing disciplinary actions were taken by supervisor O'Bryant. Sometime after May 24, 1992, petitioner began working under a new supervisor, Thomas M. Martin. On December 12, 1992, petitioner was given a verbal warning by Martin for "not wearing safety shoes." The warning was justified since petitioner was not wearing lace-up safety shoes as required by company policy. In May 1993, petitioner was transferred to a "weld-out" position under the supervision of Randy Cochran. On September 3, 1993, Cochran gave petitioner a written warning for "not doing (the) job assign(ed) to him!" Petitioner had been instructed to clean out a storage boxcar but was found reading a newspaper. He was advised in writing that he "need's (sic) to perform the job assign(ed) to him!" On October 1, 1993, petitioner was placed on probation for poor "work performance" due to not meeting established time standards for a particular job. Specifically, he was charged with "taking too long to do the work" by "spend(ing) 5.0 hours on (a job that) should have taken 2.0 hours to complete." He was told in writing to "(d)o (his) job within the time standards," or face possible "termination." After observing petitioner continually failing to meet established time standards during the next few days, on October 6, 1993, Cochran verbally warned petitioner that unless he "made the time standard" on the job he was working that morning, he would be terminated. When Cochran later observed petitioner "way behind" on his job, petitioner was terminated for poor "work performance." According to the disciplinary action form, petitioner was "not able to complete work within time standards." These time standards were uniformly applied to all welders regardless of age, and the dismissal was in conformity with PRS's progressive discipline policy. There is no credible evidence that PRS was motivated by discriminatory animus when it made this employment decision. Whether petitioner was replaced by another person, and if so, the age of that person, is not of record. When an employee leaves employment with PRS, an exit interview is conducted to identify any problems with employment policies and procedures, including management practices. Complaints made by the employee regarding unfair treatment, such as discrimination, are recorded on the exit interview form. When petitioner was discharged, an exit interview was conducted. During the interview, petitioner made no complaints regarding suspected age discrimination. Petitioner was not employed from the time of his discharge until November 16, 1994. On that date, he began collecting Social Security disability benefits. During the years 1991 through 1994, PRS discharged eighty-one employees. Of those, twenty-four were age forty or over. In 1995, respondent had one hundred fifty-seven employees, of which sixty-one were age forty or older. At hearing, petitioner contended that Randy Cochran, his supervisor from May 1993 until his termination, made discriminatory comments regarding his age. Specifically, petitioner contended that, on more than one occasion, Cochran called him an "old man" and threatened to fire him on account of his age. These allegations, however, are not deemed to be credible and are hereby rejected.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the the Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Arthur R. Jones Post Office Box 8 Satsuma, Florida 32189 Charles F. Henley, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 40593 Jacksonville, Florida 32203-0593 Dana A. Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10
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JOSEPHINE HAYES DAVIS vs ARBORS OF TALLAHASSEE, 00-002624 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 28, 2000 Number: 00-002624 Latest Update: Oct. 09, 2002

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this matter is whether the Petitioner was terminated from employment with the Respondent because of her race.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black female and is a member of a protected class. Respondent employed Petitioner at the time of the alleged discrimination. Petitioner was employed by Respondent for approximately three and a half months, from her date of hire on December 17, 1994, through her date of termination on March 30, 1995. She was fired for insubordination. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA). Her responsibilities as a CNA included taking care of patients and cleaning the facility. Her direct supervisor was Barbara Jean Gossett. Petitioner claims she was fired because of her race, alleging disparate treatment. To support this allegation, Petitioner cited an example of a white female who was having problems with her baby, whom Petitioner testified was sick, and that the white employee would come in for work when she was ready. Petitioner alleges the employee often reported late for work. Petitioner does not know the name of the employee, does not know who the white female talked to about reporting to work, and was not involved in any decision about whether the white female could or could not report late as a result of her child's ailments. Petitioner presented no other evidence or documents to support this allegation. Petitioner, when asked for any other basis for her claim of discrimination, cited an example of a woman who she claims never did what she was required to do, although she said the woman was in charge. Petitioner presented no other evidence or documents to support this allegation. Petitioner also alleges she was fired because of her race based on the way her supervisor, Barbara Jean Gossett, acted toward her. Petitioner also cited the varying way her supervisor verbalized instructions to the black and white staff. During examination by Respondent's counsel, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of Respondent's employee handbook on her first day of employment. She acknowledged that the purpose of the handbook is to notify employees of the rules and expectations and also to provide notice of behaviors that would lead to discipline or termination. She admitted that, based on the handbook, she knew what kind of behaviors were appropriate and what were considered inappropriate. She admitted that in the setting of a nursing home, punctuality was important. Petitioner admitted that there was a progressive disciplinary schedule in place for tardiness. She further admitted that under the schedule in place during her employment, an employee who was late seven or more times in a 90-day period would be fired. The supervisor, whom Petitioner claims was racist, however, did not fire Petitioner as the policy permitted. In fact, that same supervisor recommended a discretionary merit increase for Petitioner. Petitioner's performance evaluations show that as of March 14, 1995-approximately three months into her employment- she had been tardy nine times, absent three times, and had a performance rating below standard, which was the lowest rating permitted by the evaluation form. On March 29, 1995, Petitioner refused to clean an assigned work area during her shift. The employee handbook Petitioner received lists refusing a job assignment as number one on the list of behaviors that can lead to immediate termination and for which there is no progressive disciplinary schedule (as there is for tardiness and certain other offenses). As noted, Petitioner was fired for this incident. Finally, Petitioner admitted that she signed her Charge of Discrimination on June 18, 1996, and that it was filed June 20, 1996.

Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Joann Annichianrico Tandem Healthcare, Inc. Cherrington Corporate Center 200 Corporate Center Drive, Suite 360 Moon Township, Pennsylvania 15108 Josephine Hayes Davis Route 4, Box 4699-M Monticello, Florida 32344 James Garrity, Esquire McConnaughay, Duffy, Coonrod, Pope & Weaver, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street Post Office Drawer 229 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0229 Azizi M. Dixon, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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