Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Respondent’s request for dismissal, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and no license will be issued to TT of Orlando, inc. d/b/a Maserati of Orlando to sell Maserati automobiles manufactured by Maserati (MASE) at 4225 Millenia Boulevard, Orlando, (Orange County), Florida 32839. Filed December 1, 2011 4:03 PM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this 36 day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon [s SandraC. Lambert, Director Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 County, Florida. Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this _20%l>day of November, 2011. NOTICE OF APPETITES =m" Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. SCL:jde Copies furnished: C. Everett Boyd, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley and Scarborough LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Robert Craig Spickard, Esquire Kurkin Forehand Brandes, LLP 900 North Calhoun Street, Suite 1B Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John F. Walsh, Esquire AMSI-Automotive Management Services, Inc. 505 South Flagler Drive, Suite 700 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Donald St. Denis, Esquire St. Denis and Davey 1300 Riverplace Boulevard, Suite 101 Jacksonville, Florida 32207 William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Qablawi Auto Sales, discriminated against Petitioner, Carmen R. Cuevas, on the basis of her disability (hearing loss) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a woman who wears hearing aids. She provided no explanation for her hearing loss other than the fact that she was “hard of hearing.” No medical documentation was introduced by Petitioner to substantiate her claim of hearing loss, but it appeared she struggled at times to hear clearly. Respondent owns a small used auto sales business located in Cocoa, Florida. The manager of his business is James Devore. Some time in early October 2011, Petitioner came into the auto sales store to make a payment on a car she had purchased from the store. During a conversation with the store manager, Petitioner stated that she was looking for a job. The manager suggested that there may be an opening for her at the store. Petitioner filled out an employment application and it was submitted to Qablawi for review. An interview was conducted, and Petitioner was hired as a web sales agent. Qablawi said that he agreed to hire Petitioner because he liked her personality and she seemed able to do the required work. Petitioner told Qablawi about her hearing issues, but he advised her that the phones were state of the art, that there would be other people in the same office, and that he believed she would not have any problems. Petitioner said she had worked in a marketing job for nine years and had no problems using the telephone in that position. When Petitioner started work, she was trained by an employee named Jessica who was being promoted to another job. The training was conducted at Jessica’s desk within the office. The office was a small open room with five or six desks situated around the room. There was another web sales agent at one of the desks; the others belonged to the manager and outside car salesmen. Each desk had a computer and a telephone with each of those items “coded” to a specific employee. After her training was complete, Petitioner continued to work at Jessica’s desk for the remainder of the first week. When she came in the second week, she was assigned a new desk. The parties disagree as to where in the office the new desk was located: Petitioner said the desk was located right next to the door which was used for ingress and egress by employees and customers. The manager said her desk was right next to the desk where she had been trained. Upon review of all the evidence, the manager’s testimony (confirmed by Qablawi) is more credible. The two web sales agent desks were in one section of the office, the outside car salesmen desks were in another. Thus, it is most likely that Petitioner’s assigned desk was close to Jessica’s desk. On Saturday, October 15, 2011, Petitioner started her business day working at Jessica’s desk. When she returned to work after lunch that day, she found that she had been moved over to the next desk. She finished her work day, but felt like the new work space was not as preferable as Jessica’s desk. The two desks were basically side by side in an L-shape. On Monday, October 17, 2011, when Petitioner reported to work she placed her handbag, lunch, and other personal items on the desk just inside the front door. She then went to the manager and asked if she could be moved to Jessica’s old desk. Jessica had by that time moved on to her new position. The manager explained that her assigned work space was “coded” for her and that she needed to work in that space. Petitioner objected to the new work space on the basis that it was near a door and that she would be bothered by all the coming and going of employees and customers. (However, during her sworn testimony, Petitioner said that there was not much traffic in the office and she often worked in the room alone or with one other person.) The manager denied her request and said that Petitioner had to work where she was assigned. In response, Petitioner told the manager that if she could not work at the desk she wanted, she would leave. The manager called Qablawi and told him what had transpired. Qablawi said that if that was Petitioner’s decision, he could not do anything about it. When advised as to what Qablawi said, Petitioner asked for a ride back to her car and left the office. Petitioner did not call Qablawi or the manager after leaving the store. She did not inquire of Qablawi whether any accommodations could be made. Petitioner did not submit a letter of resignation, nor did she make any complaint about discrimination of any kind. Approximately one month later, Petitioner woke up to find that her car was missing. She called Qablawi to ask whether he had repossessed it because she was behind on payments. She understood that her car would be repossessed and did not object to that happening. Her call to Qablawi was simply to make sure he had the car and that it had not been stolen. Qablawi had been trying to help Petitioner by allowing late and short payments, but she still could not keep up. A short time later, Qablawi found out that Petitioner had filed a complaint against him for discrimination. An appeals referee from the Agency for Workforce Innovation conducted a hearing to discuss Petitioner’s complaint. During that hearing, Qablawi offered Petitioner her job back, but she did not accept his offer. No such offer was made at the final hearing in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying Petitioner, Carmen R. Cuevas's Petition for Relief in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2012.
The Issue The issue is whether Nissan North America, Inc.'s (Nissan) rejection of the proposed transfer of the equity interest in Love Nissan, Inc. (Love), from Robert Halleen and Chad Halleen to Marilyn Halleen, is in violation of the laws regulating the licensing of motor vehicle dealers and manufacturers, maintaining competition, providing consumer protection and fair trade and providing minorities with opportunities for full participation as motor vehicle dealers, as set forth in Sections 320.61-320.70, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Nissan is a "licensee" as defined by Section 320.60(8), Florida Statutes. Love is a "motor vehicle dealer" as defined by Section 320.60(11)(a)1, Florida Statutes. Love serves a territory centered on Homosassa, Florida. Nissan and Love are parties to a Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Agreement), which is an "agreement" or "franchise agreement," as defined by Section 320.60(1), Florida Statutes. Robert Halleen and Chad Halleen became owners of Love as the result of a 1999 gift of the equity of Love from Robert's father and Chad's grandfather. Subsequent to the donation, Robert became a 90 percent owner of Love and Chad became a ten percent owner. Robert Halleen and Chad Halleen entered into the Agreement with Nissan on March 4, 1999. Since that time Robert Halleen has served as the Dealer Principal and Principal Owner of Love Nissan, and Chad Halleen has served as the Executive Manager and Other Owner. The Agreement has never been amended. The Agreement clearly states that Nissan relied on the personal qualifications of the Principal Owner, Other Owner, and Executive Manager in entering into the Agreement. In addition to personal qualifications, the Agreement recites expertise, reputation, integrity, experience, and ability, as characteristics expected of the Principal Owner, Other Owner, and Executive Manager. Since Robert and Chad Halleen became owners of Love the dealership has never met the regional average sales penetration. The regional average sales penetration is the measurement used by Nissan to evaluate the sales performance of each of its dealers. Subsequent to the inception of the Agreement, Nissan has issued multiple Notices of Default to Love citing Love's poor sales performance. In an effort to facilitate Love's success, Nissan contracted their primary market area on several occasions. This and other efforts to bolster Love's performance failed. As a result, Nissan issued a Notice of Termination of the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement between itself and Love, dated April 1, 2004. This precipitated a protest and a formal hearing before Administrative Law Judge Ella Jane Davis who recommended that DHSMV dismiss the protest and ratify the Notice of Termination. As noted above, DHSMV has not issued a final order. Because it has not, and because an appeal could follow, Nissan has not yet entered into a franchise with a new dealer for the Homosassa primary market area. It is Nissan's intention to award the area to a qualified minority candidate. Eleven days after the issuance of Judge Davis's order, on July 25, 2005, Robert and Chad Halleen notified Nissan of their intent to sell all of their stock in Love to Marilyn Halleen. In a short letter to Nissan, the selling price was said to be $100 with an increase to $5,000,000 should the sale ultimately be made to a third party. The dealership, if sold on the open market, would bring much more than $100. It could sell for as much as five million dollars. The letter also averred that there would not be a change in the executive management. The decision to sell all of the stock in Love to Marilyn Halleen was made by Robert Halleen. Chad Halleen was instructed by his father to comply with his decision to sell and he did as instructed. Prior to the issuance of Judge Davis's Recommended Order, Robert and Chad Halleen decided that if the termination case had an unfavorable outcome, they would avoid it by selling Love to a family member. They attempted to give effect to this course of action by discussing with Robert Halleen's father the possibility of transferring ownership to him. Robert and Chad Halleen desired to keep the dealership in the family and to ensure that Chad remained employed. Pursuant to the contemplated transfer to Robert Halleen's father, Chad Halleen would continue as Executive Manager, which was also the case in the proposed transfer to Marilyn Halleen. The discussion with Robert Halleen's father did not ripen into a course of action. During their tenure at Love, Robert and Chad Halleen informally divided the operational responsibilities between themselves. Chad Halleen was primarily responsible for the sales department and Robert Halleen focused on supervising the day-to-day operations of the parts, service, and accounting departments. However, it is clear that Robert Halleen, has been since the inception of the Agreement, and was, at least up to the date of the formal hearing, in ultimate overall charge of all of the operations of Love. Robert Halleen asserted at the hearing that he would abandon his role in the management of Love. Love attempted to prove that Chad Halleen was capable of successfully managing the operation without the aid of his father. However, the evidence taken as a whole, indicated that he had never operated the dealership without the assistance of Robert Halleen and that he would have difficulty doing so without that assistance. Subsequent to the proposed transfer, the management of Love would, allegedly, consist of Marilyn Halleen and Chad Halleen. They would be, under the Agreement, the "executive management," which is the term used in the Agreement to describe the Dealer Principal and the Executive Manager. It is not necessary under the Agreement, for a Dealer Principal to be actively involved in the daily business of the dealership, and because a Dealer Principal may own dealerships in more than one geographical area, it is not unusual to find a Dealer Principal who is not active in the day-to-day management of dealerships she or he owns. However, in this case it is contemplated, and Marilyn Halleen has so stated, that she and Chad Halleen would operate the business together. Currently, Marilyn Halleen's participation in the operation of the dealership has been working as a bookkeeper in the accounting department. Marilyn Halleen stated that should the transfer be approved, she would make the decisions about running the dealership, how the dealership is capitalized, new car sales, used car sales, allocation and ordering, marketing, management of the parts and service departments, and all of the other myriad responsibilities incumbent on a manager of an automobile dealership. However, her work experience does not qualify her to successfully accomplish all of these tasks and this plan is contrary to the assertion in the notice to Nissan that there would be no change in executive management. Marilyn Halleen has never owned a dealership or any other business. Her management experience is limited to filling a position as an office manager in a Buick dealership many years ago. In various automobile dealerships she has worked as a title clerk, receptionist, cashier, and in a warranty department. Prior to becoming bookkeeper at Love she worked full-time selling cosmetics for Mary Kay. Nissan was unaware of the details of Marilyn Halleen's business experience, or lack of it, at the time they determined that they would reject the proposed transfer. However, the notice to Love that the proposed transfer was rejected, dated September 20, 2005, recited in the attachment that the rejection was based on Nissan's belief the transfer was a sham. Marilyn Halleen's lack of experience is evidence tending to prove that the transfer was a sham. To find as a fact that Robert and Chad Halleen were really going to give Marilyn Halleen complete ownership and control over Love would require a suspension of disbelief. Having observed the lackluster performance of Robert and Chad Halleen over a five-year period, Nissan reasonably concluded that Marilyn Halleen was unlikely to ramp up Love's performance. Although Section 320.943(2), Florida Statutes, does not require that a transfer of an equity interest be at arms- length, the fact that a purported transfer is not an arms-length transaction, when considered with other evidence, may tend to demonstrate, as it does in this case, that the purported transfer is a sham. The fact that the purchase price is remarkably below market value does not in every case mean that a purported transfer is a sham. Under the facts of this case, however, the below market sales price tends to prove that the purported transfer is illusory. The evidence, taken as a whole, proves that the purported transfer is an artifice or device designed to avoid the consequences of the poor performance of Love while under the command of Robert and Chad Halleen. Thus the proposed transfer is not a real transfer; it is a sham designed to avoid Judge Davis's Recommended Order upholding the termination. Marilyn Halleen, although a human being separate from her spouse and off-spring, cannot be considered "any other person or persons." She is the alter ego of Robert and Chad Halleen and, should the transfer be approved, the evidence demonstrates she will be a mere agent or tool of the current owners and the inept management of Love will continue. It was not proven that Marilyn Halleen lacked good character as that term is used in Section 320.643(2), Florida Statutes, which governs the transfer of an equity interest in a dealership. The question of whether or not the proposed transfer involved a change in executive management at Love, which might trigger consideration of Section 320.643(1) or 320.644, Florida Statutes, a question advanced by Nissan, at the hearing, and in Nissan's Proposed Recommended Order, need not be addressed for the reasons set forth in paragraph 23, above. In order for those sections to be invoked there must first be a valid transfer.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order stating that pursuant to Nissan's verified Petition for Determination of Invalid Proposed Transfer Pursuant to Section 320.643, Florida Statutes, and Notice of Rejection of Proposed Transfer, no transfer under Section 320.643, Florida Statutes, is proposed and Nissan's rejection of it was proper. Further, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles should enter a Final Order dismissing Robert Halleen and Chad Halleen's Petition for Determination of Wrongful Turndown. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 S. Keith Hutto, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP 1320 Main Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201 Dean Bunch, Esquire Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312-1267 John W. Forehand, Esquire Lewis, Longman & Walker, P.A. 125 South Gadsden Street, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1525 Alex Kurkin, Esquire Pathman Lewis, LLP One Biscayne Tower, Suite 2400 Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Carl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0600 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 56-year-old female. Petitioner has over 26 years of retail sales experience. Petitioner had both outside sales and store management experience, but most of her experience was as a retail floor salesperson. Petitioner worked as a salesperson at GM Appliance, a retail appliance business currently owned and operated by Respondent. She had worked for GM Appliance for over 21 years. Petitioner was a good and capable salesperson. She had never been formally reprimanded in her 21 years with GM Appliance. According to Respondent's owner and manager Todd Williams, there were no problems at all with Petitioner's performance. She was qualified as a salesperson. In 2004, Williams Corporation, a single shareholder entity owned by Mr. Williams, purchased GM Appliance from its previous owner, Curtis Murphy. Mr. Murphy was retiring after owning GM Appliance for many years. Mr. Williams had worked with Mr. Murphy as a wholesaler and was relocating to the Panama City area from Atlanta. At the time of the GM Appliance purchase, Mr. Williams was approximately 40 years old. As would be expected when taking over a business, Mr. Williams made some changes at GM Appliance. He created a new outside sales position. He created and hired a new sales manager. He opened two offices outside of Panama City. Mr. Williams made all the business decisions at GM Appliance. As he was the sole shareholder and owner, Mr. Williams had the sole authority to hire and fire employees. Under Mr. Williams, GM Appliance did not have any formal written employment policies. Respondent has no sexual harassment or anti-discrimination policies and no process on how to handle employment complaints related to age or sex. GM Appliance has no written employee evaluations or job descriptions. If someone had a complaint, he or she needed to "take it to the EEOC," according to Mr. Williams. As a result of Mr. Williams' hiring and firing decisions, the GM Appliance workforce became decidedly younger in Panama City, especially in the sales positions. Since purchasing GM Appliance through 2010, Mr. Williams hired Matt Davis (born 1970) as a sales manager; Ashley Williams (born 1976) in an outside sales position; Kris Westgate (born 1979) as inside sales and delivery; and Amy Farris (born 1982) as inside sales and administrative. In 2010, two sales persons also remained on the staff of GM Appliance from the former owner: Bobby Tew (aged 63) and Petitioner (aged 54). Both primarily worked inside sales. Mr. Williams' hiring decisions made the culture at GM Appliance more "youth" oriented. There was much more juvenile and sexual talk. Mr. Williams was overheard saying that Petitioner wore old women clothes. Some members of GM Appliance's younger workforce often called Petitioner "Mama" or "Old Mama" to her face and behind her back. As a result of the worldwide economic slowdown, the business environment deteriorated for GM Appliance in 2008. To save money, GM Appliance began to cut back on its operations and expenses. In late 2010, unable to stem the tide of losses, Mr. Williams decided he needed to cut additional staff from the sales department in Panama City. Of the six salespeople working in Panama City, he laid off the two oldest: Mr. Tew and Petitioner. The four younger sales persons kept their jobs, but one, Kris Westgate, was reassigned to the warehouse instead of laid off. Also, the two highest paid salespersons, Ashley Williams, Todd Williams' brother, and Matt Davis, remained employed with GM Appliance. Ashley Williams and Davis annually made $45,000 and $80,000, respectfully. Petitioner, at the final hearing, identified the three younger employees retained following her termination as evidence of discriminatory intent: Margaret Walden, Amy Farris, and Matt Davis. Matt Davis, aged 46, was the sales manager and Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Petitioner reported directly to Matt Davis. Amy Farris, aged 30, was originally hired as a secretary to the outside salesman. Although she would sometimes come on the sales floor, her job was to provide support for outside sales. During the course of her employment, her duties expanded to include purchasing agent and SPIFF (manufacturer's incentive program) administrator. Respondent employed outside salespersons and other salespersons (retail sales associates) such as Petitioner, who worked the showroom floor. Outside salespersons reported directly to Respondent's president, Mr. Williams. Margaret Walden, aged 45, was an outside salesperson in Respondent's office in Destin, Florida, and was responsible for developing and maintaining relationships outside the office with client contractors in Destin and South Walton County. A showroom was not maintained at the Destin office. All three identified co-workers held positions with different duties and responsibilities from the position held by Petitioner. Petitioner was not replaced, and no younger (or older) sales associate was retained in a similar position. In July 2011, Respondent hired 51-year-old Steve Williams as a sales associate. This hire was made after the Charge of Discrimination was filed by Petitioner. Steve Williams, a former Sears appliance salesman and manager, solicited a job with Respondent as Respondent had not advertised an available position. After being told repeatedly that Respondent was not hiring sales associates, he offered to accept compensation on a commissioned sales basis. Prior to terminating Petitioner, Respondent terminated six employees, ages 25 (outside sales), 27 (purchasing agent), 52 (warehouse/delivery), 41 (warehouse manager), 59 (accounting manager), and 45 (outside sales) from a period beginning on May 8, 2008, through July 31, 2009. Prior to discharge, Petitioner and the only other associate salesperson on the retail showroom floor, Mr. Tew, had their hours reduced to four days a week. In addition and during Petitioner's tenure, Respondent made changes in the corporation's 401-K plan, health insurance, paid leave, and overtime compensation all changes designed to save money. Mr. Tew was terminated on the same day as Petitioner, September 7, 2010. Janice Heinze (aged 66), Jeff Reeder (aged 54), and Angus Thomas (aged 70), all employees at the Panama City location and all older than Petitioner, were retained by the company. Respondent hired his father (a 1099 contractor), aged 68, to assume outside sales duties at the location in Foley, Alabama, and Cindy Powell, aged 54, was hired to answer the telephone there. Kelly Hill, aged 45, was hired to replace Ms. Walden upon her subsequent resignation and relocation. Petitioner and Mr. Tew were laid off with the intent to rehire. There were no performance or other identified issues with their employment. Mr. Williams stated that he wanted to bring them back to work. Petitioner had better objective sales qualifications than the younger salespeople that were retained. According to the latest records that GM Appliance had, Petitioner was the highest profit margin generating salesperson in Panama City. Mr. Tew had the second highest profit margin. Petitioner and Mr. Tew also had more sales experience and seniority than any of the younger retained workers. Petitioner earned approximately $40,000 in total over the past three years of her employment and has been unemployed since she was laid off in 2010.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding Respondent did not commit the "unlawful employment practice" alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Daniel Harmon, Esquire Daniel Harmon, P.A. 23 East 8th Street Panama City, Florida 32401 Robert Christopher Jackson, Esquire Harrison Sale McCloy 304 Magnolia Avenue Post Office Box 1579 Panama City, Florida 32402-1579 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Subaru of America, Inc. (Subaru) is entitled to an exemption under Section 320.642(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), from the protest filed by Performance Motors, Inc., d/b/a Lindell Subaru (Lindell) to Subaru's appointment of Conley Subaru, Inc. (Conley) as the successor motor vehicle dealer to Tom Stimus Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., d/b/a Tom Stimus Subaru (Stimus) in Bradenton, Manatee County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: 1. Lindell is a Subaru dealer located at 3480 Bee Ridge Road, Sarasota, Sarasota County, Florida. 2 Conley has been approved by Subura to be a Subaru dealer if Conley's application is approved by the Department. Conley will be located at 800 Cortes Road West, Bradenton, Manatee County, Florida. Stimus was a previous Subaru dealer located 2503 First Street West, Bradenton, Manatee County, Florida. Stimus's former location and Conley's present location are within two miles of each other. Stimus was a Subaru dealer with an area responsibility consisting of Manatee County, Florida, pursuant to a dealership agreement with Subaru dated June 8, 1990. Before the termination of its Subaru dealership agreement, Stimus filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the case of In re Tom Stimus Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Case No. 91-7864-8P1. Upon Stimus filing its petition with, and the petition being accepted by, the United States Bankruptcy Court (bankruptcy court), all of Stimus' assets came under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. On June 14, 1991, the day that Stimus filed its bankruptcy petition, stay relief was ordered. Stimus' bankruptcy petition operated as a stay of any action by Subaru to terminate Stimus' dealership agreement, until such time as the bankruptcy court granted relief from the stay to Subaru. On August 19, 1991, the bankruptcy court entered an order directing Stimus not move, sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of any of its assets and to cease all business operations effective immediately. Stimus ceased operations of its Subaru dealership more than 12 months prior to August 28, 1992, the date the successor dealer's (Conley) application for a license was submitted to the Department. Subaru was aware of the bankruptcy order and that Stimus had ceased doing business. On August 28, 1991, the Department cancelled Stimus' license as a dealer in franchised motor vehicles. On October 30, 1991, Stimus filed a motion to assume and assign executory contract (Subaru of America). By this motion, Stimus sought bankruptcy court permission to assign its Subaru franchise to Joseph Iacuone. Subaru filed its response to Stimus' motion on November 12, 1991, and its supplemental response on December 2, 1991. On January 2, 1992, bankruptcy court entered an order granting Stimus' motion to assume and assign, allowing Subaru 45 days to approve or disapprove of the proposed franchise. On February 12, 1992, Subaru filed its notice of the disapproval of the proposed franchise transfer to Joseph Iacuone. Thereafter, on March 12, 1992, Subaru filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay to terminate Stimus' dealer sales and service agreement. On May 13, 1992, the bankruptcy court entered an Order Modifying Automatic Stay to Permit Subaru of America - Southeast Region to Terminate its Dealership Agreement with Debtor (Stimus). Pursuant to the bankruptcy court order, Subaru, by letter dated May 20, 1992, terminated Stimus' dealership agreement effective June 4, 1992. By letter to the Department dated August 27, 1992, and received by the Department on September 1, 1992, Subaru approved of the appointment of Conley as the successor Subaru dealer to Stimus in Bradenton, Manatee County, Florida. By this letter, Subaru requested that the appointment of Conley be exempt from protest pursuant to Section 320.642(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1991). On August 28, 1992, Conley submitted its application for license as a motor vehicle dealer to the Department at its Region VIII office located at 323 10th Avenue West, Palmetto, Florida 34221. Region VIII includes Manatee County, Florida. The Department refused to accept Conley's application package on August 28, 1992, and the application was not filed on that date, for the following reasons: (a) the package did not include an original dealer bond as required by the Department, but only a copy thereof; (b) the package did not include a filed copy of the applicant's articles of incorporation as required by the Department, but only an unfiled copy thereof; (c) the package did not include evidence of completion of the dealer training program, as required by the Department and; (d) the package did not include a facility inspection report, as required by the Department. The Department subsequently accepted Conley's application package on December 8, 1992. By letter dated October 19, 1992, the Department issued a notice to Lindell, among others, of proposed agency action, i.e., the issuance of a motor vehicle dealer license to Conley to operate as a Subaru dealer in Bradenton, Manatee County, Florida. Lindell filed a notice of protest with the Department on or about November 3, 1992. The Department has refused to issue a motor vehicle dealer license to Conley based upon the protest by Lindell. Lindell is the only Subaru dealer located in Sarasota County, Florida. Stimus was the only Subaru dealer located in Manatee County, Florida. Presently, there is no Subaru dealer located in Manatee County, Florida. Should a license be issued to Conley, it would be the only Subaru dealer located in Manatee County, Florida. 25 Conley's Subaru dealership will be located on the premises (10 acres) where Conley's Buick dealership is presently located. Conley will service the Subaru automobiles in it existing service area and display new Subaru automobiles in its existing showroom. The balance of the Subaru automobiles not in the showroom will be located in a specific area on the premises. The specific area has yet to be designated by Conley. Conley is ready, willing and able to open as the successor Subaru dealer to Stimus in Bradenton, Manatee County, Florida, except for the issuance of its motor vehicle dealer license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, enter a Final Order granting Petitioners exemption from protest in accordance with Section 320.642(5)(a), Florida Statutes, and dismissing the protest filed by Lindell. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-6942 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner Subaru's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 19 have been adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 26. Respondent Lindell's Proposed Findings of Fact: Respondent Lindell presented its proposed findings of fact in unnumbered paragraphs contained in its memorandum of law under the title "Statement of Facts". The paragraphs have been numbered 1 through 9 for purposes of this Appendix. Proposed finding of fact 1 is covered in the Preliminary Statement. Proposed findings of fact 2 through 9 have been adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 26. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Room B439, Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 John M. Brennan, Esquire Post Office Box 285 Orlando, Florida 32802-0285 Damian M. Ozark, Esquire 2401 Manatee Avenue Bradenton, Florida 34205 J. Michael Lindell, Esquire 620 Blackstone Building 233 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Enoch Jon Whitney, Esquire General Counsel Neil Kirkman Building Tallahasse, Florida 32399-0500 Mike Alderman, Esquire Office of thew General Counsel Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue Whether Respondent, Cox Cable, discriminated against Petitioner, Janice B. Campbell, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“the Act”), sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes, by disciplining and then terminating her, in retaliation for her participation in a protected activity under the Act.
Findings Of Fact Cox Cable (Cox) is a provider of telephone, internet, cable, and digital television service in several regions of Florida. Cox is an employer within the meaning of the Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Petitioner was employed by Cox in its Pensacola office from May 2000, until her termination on March 19, 2012. Petitioner held a number of different positions during her tenure with Cox, including Quality Control, Customer Care Representative and Retention Representative. Petitioner joined the Customer Retention Department in July 2010, as a Retention Representative. The primary duty of a Retention Representative is to take calls from existing customers who are requesting termination or downgrade of their existing service and save those customers for Cox. Cox trains Retention Representatives to use a “call flow” with these customers. The call flow is a quality guideline that shows representatives what offers can be made to the customer at the time of the call. When a customer or potential customer calls Cox, they encounter an automated menu of services and are directed to a specific department based on their menu selections. For example, an existing customer with technical or billing questions is routed to the Customer Care Department; a customer moving out of the area is routed to the Account Services Department; and an existing customer who wishes to downgrade or disconnect service is routed to the Retention Department. Calls waiting for a representative in a particular department are “in the queue” for that department. Calls should be answered in the order received. While a Retention Representative’s primary job is to save existing customers, they may sell services to those customers as a secondary duty. For example, a retention representative may try to save the customer money by offering to provide services the customer is receiving from another provider (e.g., telephone) with services currently provided by Cox (e.g., cable) in order to reduce the customer’s overall service cost while retaining the customer. The term for this practice is offering to “bundle” services. Cox maintains a policy against Retention Representatives taking calls transferred directly to their line from representatives in other departments in order to sell services. This practice is known as “direct transfer calls.” Retention Representatives, however, are not prohibited from taking all sales calls. They may handle, for example, a call from a customer looking to purchase services when that call comes into the retention queue (presumably because the caller pressed the incorrect key). In fact, the Retention Department has sales goals set by Cox corporate office. When goals are set for a particular product or service, Cox provides incentives to boost sales of the particular product or service. The call flow provides Retention Representatives with a tool to sell upgrades to existing services based on availability of promotional offers. The Retention Department was formerly part of the Inbound Sales Department. In May 2010, just two months before Petitioner joined, Retention was created as a separate “stand alone” department with a focus on saving existing customers. The authority of the Retention Representatives with respect to selling services was subject to much confusion during the separation of the Retention Department from the Incoming Sales Department. On September 14, 2011, the Retention Managers, Shannon Boyd-Tibbs and Daniel Lister, met with all the Retention Representatives in a “huddle” to explain the types of calls they could and could not receive. The group meeting was followed up the same day by one- on-one meetings between the Retention Supervisors and each of the Retention Representatives under their supervision. On September 14, 2011, following the huddle meeting, Petitioner met with Ms. Boyd-Tibbs who reviewed with her a document titled “Sales Performance Expectation Clarification.” The “Sales Performance Expectation Clarification” provides, among other expectations, “Closed sales should not be transferred from one sales representative to another which may impact commission or performance metrics” and “Sales representatives are not permitted to transfer sales to another representative, which would cause an increase in commissions or sales performance.” Petitioner acknowledged receipt of the “Sales Performance Expectation Clarification” by her signature dated September 14, 2011. Six days later, Retention Supervisor, Daniel Lister, further clarified the issue in an email to all Retention Representatives on September 20, 2011, stating “[I]f a sales call comes into the queue, you will be able to take care of this customer. It does not mean you should take calls that are sent directly to you by a representative from billing or various other departments.” The reasons for prohibiting direct transfer calls are three-fold. First, the practice skews the Retention Department’s sales goals, which are based on the prior year’s numbers. If sales are up based on direct transfer calls in the prior year, the current year’s sales goal is inflated and may be unattainable. Second, the practice causes customers in the retention queue to wait longer for a representative, potentially causing them to become more irate and less likely to be retained. Finally, it is unfair to other Retention Representatives who compete for incentives and bonuses based on sales. Petitioner admits taking direct transfer calls from a number of sales representatives. Despite management’s clarification of the company policy in September 2011, Petitioner continued the practice throughout the remainder of the year and into 2012. On March 13, 2012, Petitioner was suspended with pay for continuing to take direct transfer calls. Her supervisor, Ms. Boyd-Tibbs, met with Petitioner and explained the basis for her suspension. During Petitioner’s suspension, Ms. Boyd-Tibbs and Mr. Lister requested and reviewed a number of reports documenting Petitioner’s direct-transfer sales and confirming Petitioner’s disproportionate sales numbers. The final decision to terminate Petitioner was made by Dennis Huber, supervisor of both Mr. Lister and Ms. Boyd-Tibbs, but only after consultation with Human Resources and the Customer Care Sales Manager. Petitioner was terminated on March 19, 2012. Ms. Boyd-Tibbs delivered the news over the phone to Petitioner. Petitioner claims she was terminated in retaliation for reporting unethical behavior by another Retention Representative, Belinda Thompson. Petitioner claims Ms. Thompson inflated her performance numbers by failing to disconnect customers who requested termination of service, transferring certain calls back to the queue, giving unauthorized credits to customers, and other questionable practices. The evidence shows Petitioner did complain to Ms. Boyd-Tibbs about Ms. Thompson’s sales practices, which were investigated by Cox and found the complaints to be unsupported. Rather than showing that Petitioner was retaliated against, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner was terminated by Cox on March 19, 2012, for violating company policy against taking “direct transfer” sales calls from other representatives in different departments.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Discrimination Complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Frank Pope incorporated Porcine Motors Inc., in 1972, and has operated a used car lot at 16928 South Dixie Highway under that name since that time. He also leases cars. In 1974 the annual corporate report was not filed by Perrine Motors Inc., and the corporation was dissolved, by proclamation. Pepe was unaware that his corporation had been dissolved. In about 1978, Pepe leased part of his used carlot to James P. Fashik, who also sold used cars under the name of "Jamiel." This lease extended until 1980, when Fashik's sister, on October 1, 1980, obtained a corporate charter in the name of Perrine Motors, Inc., and opened a used car lot et 17750 South Dixie Highway. This lot is operated by Fashik. The sign on the business at 17750 South Dixie Highway is "Jamiel's at Perrine Motors" with the same size lettering throughout except for "at", which is smaller lettering. At all times from 1972, until recently, the signs at the used car lot at 16928 South Dixie Highway read "Perrine Motors." After obtaining the corporate name, "Perrine Motors, Inc.," the new corporation advised Pepe that he could no longer use that name. On November 17, 1980, Pepe was issued a corporate charter in the name of "Frank Pepe's Perrine Motors, Inc." It is this name that Petitioner seeks to have rescinded. To prove the deceptive similarity of these names, Petitioner called three witnesses besides Fashik. Ludwig Blaha purchased two cars from Jamiel while he was located at 16920 South Dixie Highway and attempted to call him after his relocation to explain he would be late for a monthly payment. He used the phone number on the card he obtained from Jamiel and testified the phone was answered by someone at Pepe's who said, "Jamiel is dead." The phone number on the card was Fashik's number which did not stay at 16928 South Dixie Highway after Fashik left. When Blaha drove down South Dixie Highway, he readily found Jamiel at his new location. Jack Coler was advised that Fashik needed an accountant and attempted to call him for an appointment. He looked in the yellow pages of the telephone directory and called the number listed for Perrine Motors. This number was answered at Pepe's. Coler then drove to Fashik's business location at 17750 South Dixie Highway. Michael Johnson, in April, 1981, left a deposit check at Perrine Motors, Inc., on a car he was interested in. He shortly thereafter changed his mind and attempted to call Perrine Motors, Inc. to toll them not to deposit his check. He called the number in the phone book and got Pepe's. He dialed information and called the number given. He again got Pepe's. He then drove down to Perrine Motors, Inc. at 17750 South Dixie Highway. The yellow pages section of the Miami telephone directory was printed before Perrine Motors, Inc. was incorporated October 1, 1980. It was sometime later before the necessary information was presented to the telephone company so the correct phone number for Perrine Motors, Inc. could be obtained from the information operator. The signs at 16928 South Dixie Highway were not changed to read "Frank Pepe's Perrine Motors" until after April 1 1981 although Pepe testified he contracted with a painter to change the signs shortly after he incorporated on November 17, 1980. While operating his used car business at 16928 South Dixie Highway, Fashik was using Pepe's address, premises and license. He now claims that after he acquired the right to use the name "Perrine Motors, Inc.", the name "Frank Pepe's Perrine Motors, Inc." is deceptively similar to "Perrine Motors Inc." As a result of this similarity, some of his advertising benefits Pepe, some of his supplies and billings are misdirected, and the telephone book shows Perrine Motors located at Pepe's address. At the time of the hearing, the yellow pages had not yet been reprinted to correctly reflect the address of Perrine Motors, Inc. at 17750 South Dixie Highway, but when next reprinted, it will contain the correct telephone number and address.
The Issue Whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner in discharging him contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a white, middle-aged male. He was employed by the Respondent until approximately June 2003. His employment was "at will," which is to say that he was not employed pursuant to a contract. The Respondent is a family-owned corporation engaged in the sales of motorcycles, motor scooters, personal watercraft, their parts and accessories. It sells Honda, Kawasaki, and Skeedoo products and is a family-oriented business. It has a standard of employee conduct, and provides its employees copies of its employee handbook. The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent for a number of years prior to 1995, when the Petitioner left to start his own computer sales business. When that business failed, the Petitioner returned to work for the Respondent in approximately 1999, and worked for the Respondent as a parts and accessories salesperson until he was terminated near the first of June 2004. The Petitioner alleges that he was discharged because of his religious beliefs, and testified in his own behalf. On or about March 27, 2003, the Petitioner was waiting on a customer who had purchased several items from him. After the sale was concluded, the Petitioner was engaged by a customer in a religious discussion in which the customer attempted to sway the Petitioner to the customer's fundamentalist, Christian beliefs. The Petitioner was unable to disengage himself from the customer, although from the Petitioner's comments he was engaged in a discussion of his alternative religious beliefs with the customer. During this discussion, another employee approached the Petitioner and asked him in a whisper what was going on. The Petitioner testified that he told the employee, in a whisper, words to the effect that he could not get free of "this asshole who is trying to convert me!" The employee asked in a conversational voice, "Whose the asshole?" This brought forth a question from the customer, "Did you call me an asshole?" The Petitioner answered, "Yes!" or words to that effect. There is no question or controversy that the Petitioner called or intimated that the customer was an asshole. The Respondent's General Manager, Richard McGraw, became aware of the Petitioner's comment to the customer, and as a result the Petitioner was counseled on that date regarding the use of offensive language in the business and warned that any further use of profanity or obscenity on the premises would result in his termination. Religion was not part of their discussion at that time or at any other time. The Petitioner had received a disciplinary report in October of the prior year for passing bad checks to the Respondent. There is no controversy that the Petitioner tendered the Respondent the checks or that he was disciplined. On May 20, 2003, Marion Jones, the owner's wife and an officer in the company, was walking to her office and passed the Petitioner, who was on the telephone at the parts counter of the store. He was talking on the telephone with a parts supplier, and was commenting to the supplier's representative about Fred Marzloff, the Petitioner's direct supervisor. It is uncontroverted that the Petitioner said of Marzloff, "He is a fucking idiot." Ms. Jones brought this matter to the attention of McGraw. On the same day, May 20, 2003, another incident occurred in which the Petitioner was abrupt and rude with a customer for whom parts had been ordered. Although there were extenuating circumstances concerning the ordering of the parts, the Petitioner's conduct was unprofessional, inappropriate, and did not seek to defuse a bad situation, but only made it worse. On May 24, 2003, McGraw observed the Petitioner intervene in a sale by another parts clerk, and take credit for a sale that had been initiated by the other clerk. Sales are on commission, and this disadvantaged the other clerk. The Petitioner admitted taking credit for the sale, and excused his conduct at hearing indicating that he was ringing up a sale and put his initials on it by force of habit. On May 28, 2004, McGraw terminated the Petitioner for the comments overheard by Ms. Jones, for the Petitioner's conduct with the customer over the parts and for the Petitioner's taking credit for the sale. The Petitioner refused to sign the disciplinary reports; however, none of the participants in the meeting at which the Petitioner was terminated or his other counseling sessions mentioned any discussion of religion other than the Petitioner's describing the customer's discussion of religion as being what caused him to call the customer an asshole. The Petitioner did not controvert the essential facts of the incidents. The Petitioner asserts that his declaration that he was an atheist at the counseling session regarding calling the customer an asshole was the basis for his being disciplined. McGraw testified that he was a non-believer, and that his sole reason for discharging the Petitioner was the Petitioner's repeated disregard of customer relations that included the use of obscene and profane language in the sales area, confrontational behavior with customers, and failing to maintain an appropriate professional relationship with fellow employees. The Petitioner presented no credible evidence that the grounds given for his discharge were pretextual or that showed he had been treated differently from similarly situated employees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter its final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: John H. Waaser Route 5 Box 4975 Lake Butler, Florida 32054 Thomas A. Daniel, Esquire Thomas Daniel, P.A. 623 North Main Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner has standing to protest the establishment of an additional motorcycle dealership; and, if so, whether Petitioner is adequately representing this line of motorcycles in the relevant territory or community pursuant to section 320.642, Florida Statutes (2018).1/
Findings Of Fact Tropical Scooters is located at 11594 Seminole Boulevard, Largo, Florida 33778. It has been in the business of selling scooters and other motorized vehicles for ten years. Michele Stanley is the owner and manager of Tropical Scooters and she has knowledge regarding its purchasing and franchise agreements, inventory, and sales figures. Although no franchise agreement was offered into evidence, Ms. Stanley testified Petitioner has an agreement with a distributor, Pacific Rim International, d/b/a Ice Bear ATV (Ice Bear), to sell YNGF motorcycles. Ice Bear has been supplying Petitioner with YNGF motorcycles for approximately two and a half years. Tropical Scooters has had a good relationship with this distributor and has encountered no problems selling the YNGF line. In the last 18 months, Tropical Scooters has sold 137 YNGF units and currently has 23 units at its showroom. Ms. Stanley discovered that Respondents had applied with the Department to establish a YNGF motorcycle dealership at 9145 66th Street North, Pinellas Park, Florida 33782, from the February 22, 2018, notice published by the Department in the Florida Administrative Register.2/ Subsequently, Tropical Scooters filed a timely complaint with the Department challenging Respondents’ application. Ms. Stanley was familiar with the proposed location of the new dealership and stated that it was four miles “as the crow flies” from the Tropical Scooters showroom. Tropical Scooters is an existing dealership that sells YNGF motorcycles and is within 12.5 of the location proposed by Powersports and Motrac for the new dealership. Therefore, Tropical Scooters has standing to bring this challenge pursuant to section 320.642(3). There was no evidence that Tropical Scooters’ representation of the YGNF line of motorcycles was inadequate in its community or territory as described in section 320.642(2)(b).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department denying the new dealership application of Respondents for the sale and service of Sanmen County Youngfu Machine Co., Ltd., vehicles at 9145 66th Street North, Pinellas Park, Pinellas County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2018.
