Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(2). Lloyd A. Perry was formerly an employee of the Respondent, and a public employee within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(3). Dana E. Pratt was formerly an employee of the Respondent, and a public employee within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(3). Prior to February 17, 1976, Lloyd A. Perry was employed by the Citrus County Road Department for a period of over four years. Immediately prior to the time that his employment was terminated, Perry was a roller operator. Except for rare occasions when he performed work as a flagman, or other work in conjunction with his roller work, Perry operated a tandem road roller. For the several months prior to February, 1976, Perry had continuously operated the same roller machine. Prior to February, 1976, none of Perry's supervisors informed him that his work was unsatisfactory, reprimanded him for performing work in an unsatisfactory manner, or indicated to him in any way that his job was in jeopardy for unsatisfactory performance of his duties. Dana E. Pratt had been employed by the Citrus County Road Department for approximately five years prior to February, 1976. For four years prior to that date he had been a motor grader operator. Pratt had annually received formal evaluations and his evaluations had always been very good. Prior to February, 1976, Pratt had never been criticized for below average or unsatisfactory work. He had never received any written reprimand for unsatisfactory performance on the job. From approximately December, 1973 until February, 1976, Perry had operated the newest grader machine in use by the Citrus County Road Department. No one else had operated the machine since it was acquired by the Citrus County Road Department. During February, 1976, Thomas Hutchinson was the Citrus County Road Superintendent. William Hitt was thee Assistant Road Superintendent. Hutchinson and Hitt served under the direction of the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners. Perry, Pratt, and numerous other employees of the Citrus County Road Department had, prior to February, 1976, become dissatisfied with conditions in the Road Department, primarily the manner of direction given the department by Hutchinson and Hitt. On Sunday, February 8, 1976, Perry drafted a petition specifying numerous grievances against Hutchinson and Hitt. It was his intention to secure the signatures of employees of the Road Department on the petition, and to present it to the Board of County Commissioners. Perry sought the assistance of County Commissioner DeBusk in drafting the petition. DeBusk offered several suggestions and his daughter typed the petition for Perry. Perry secured six or seven signatures on that Sunday. He was the first person to sign the petition, and Dana Pratt was the third. On Monday, February 9, Pratt informed his office that he had business to attend to and would not be at work that day. He did not claim sick leave for the time he missed. Prior to work and during the lunch hour he called as many employees of the Road Department as he could. After working hours he waited at a business establishment called the "Country Store" which was located in close proximity to the place where Road Department employees checked out of work. Forty-six employees of the Road Department signed the petition. Dana Pratt assisted in soliciting people to sign the petition. There was no evidence offered at the hearing from which it could be determined that those persons signing the petition did so other than freely and voluntarily. On Tuesday, February 10, 1976, Perry called his supervisor, Mr. Hutchinson, and told him that he had business to attend to. Hutchinson asked him if he was going to solicit more signatures. Perry told him that he was not. The Board of County Commissioners was meeting on that date, and Perry presented the petition to the Board. Members of the Board discussed the petition at length during the meeting. One commissioner asked Perry if he was big enough to go back to work and forget about the matter. Perry said that he was. On February 11, 1976 Perry returned to work at the regular time. Rather than being assigned to his regular duty as a roller operator, he was assigned to flag traffic for a grader operator. He continued in that capacity until Tuesday, February 17. On that date, at approximately 11:00 or 11:30 A.M. Tom Morton, the grader foreman, informed Perry that his employment was terminated as of 1:00 P.M. on that date. Both Morton and William Hitt told Perry that they did not know why he was fired. Dana Pratt attended the County Commission meeting on February 10. He was asked about whether he threatened a Road Department employee named Langley with respect to signing the petition. Pratt told the County Commission that he did not threaten Langley, and no evidence was offered at the hearing to establish that he did. On February 12, 1976, Pratt used the new grader machine that he had been using for some time prior thereto. At the end of that day his supervisors informed him that he would be using the oldest machine in the Department thereafter. He began using it on February 13. It took some time to get it started on that date. It also took some time to get it started on Monday, February 16. This was an old machine, and had been difficult to start for some years prior to the time that it was assigned to Pratt. At 12:30 on February 17, 1976, Tom Morton informed Pratt that his employment was terminated as of 1:00 P.M. on that date. Pratt was never given any reasons for his termination. On February 17, 1976, the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners acted to terminate the employment of Perry and Pratt. These actions were taken upon the recommendation of Mr. Hutchinson. Ostensibly the reason for Pratt's termination was that he had marked out on sick leave on a day when he was not sick. Ostensibly the reason for Perry's termination was that he had been missing from the job for approximately an hour. The evidence would not support a finding that Perry and Pratt were fired for these reasons. These reasons offered by Hutchinson, and followed by the Board of County Commissioners, were used as a ruse. On February 18, 1976, the day after Pratt and Perry were fired, Hutchinson called a meeting of all employees of the Road Department. Hutchinson told the employees that he had nothing to do with the termination, but he also told them that he would tolerate no more petitions and that if anyone did not like working conditions at the Road Department they could leave. He said that he had four County Commissioners in his pocket, and he reminded the employees that unemployment in Citrus County was high. He told the employees that he would take care of any petitions they distributed. During the week the petition was distributed, Hutchinson told one employee of the Road Department, James Johnson, that Johnson could be put in jail for signing the petition. During that same week he told his assistant superintendent, William Hitt, that all of the men who signed the petition had to go. After Perry and Pratt were fired, Hutchinson told Hitt that he got two, and he would get the rest. The basis for Hutchinson's recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners that Perry and Pratt be terminated was the fact that they participated in the distribution of the petition, and presenting it to the Board of County Commissioners. There was no evidence offerred at the hearing to indicate that any members of the Board of County Commissioners knew Hutchinson was presenting false reasons for the terminations; however, they did act to adopt the recommendation. The Board of County Commissioners did know that Pratt and Perry were among the leaders in distributing the petition highly critical of Hutchinson's work, and was clearly on notice that Hutchinson may have ulterior motives in recommending their dismissal.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Department of Labor and Employment Security (Department), in implementing a workforce reduction that resulted in layoffs and demotions for employees, should have adopted by rulemaking, policies related to compensation reductions that occurred during the workforce reduction.
Findings Of Fact In 1999, a funding shortfall at the Department of Labor and Employment Security resulted in implementation of a workforce reduction plan. Petitioners Altamese Thompson and Sue Ezell were employees of the Department with permanent status in the Career Service system and whose employment and compensation were substantially affected by the Department’s workforce reduction program. Petitioner Florida Public Employees Council 79, AFSCME, represented the employees on collective bargaining issues affected in the workforce reduction. AFSCME members’ employment and compensation were substantially affected by the Department’s workforce reduction program. The 1999 workforce reduction was not the Department’s first experience with employee layoffs. In previous reductions, Department policy, set forth in LES Manual 1101.1.1.1 (October 1, 1996) was to retain, at existing salaries, as many employees as funding permitted. The Department policy was not adopted as an administrative rule. When the Department began to consider the workforce reduction of mid-1999, the Department apparently decided to increase the number of retained employees by reducing the salaries of workers who accepted "voluntary" demotions in lieu of layoff. By issuance of a "Change Notice" to LES Manual 1101.1.1.1, dated May 14, 1999, the Department redefined voluntary demotion to include "demotions requested by associates in lieu of layoff during workforce reduction pursuant to Chapter 60K-17, F.A.C." The revision also set forth a formula by which the compensation paid to employees who accepted voluntary demotion in lieu of transfer would be reduced. The change in the Department policy was not adopted as an administrative rule. Chapter 60K-17, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the rules applicable to reduction of Career Service employees through the layoff process. The rule essentially establishes what is generally identified as the "bumping" procedure utilized by state agencies when employee levels are reduced. Rule 60K-17.004(3)(j), Florida Administrative Code, states in part, "[w]ithin 7 calendar days after receiving the notice of layoff, the employee shall have the right to request a demotion or reassignment. " Rule 60K-17.004(3)(p), Florida Administrative Code, states that "[a]n employee who accepts a voluntary demotion in lieu of layoff and is subsequently promoted to a position in the same class in the same agency from which the employee is demoted in lieu of layoff, shall be promoted with permanent status." Chapter 60K-17, Florida Administrative Code, does not prohibit salary reductions implemented as part of a voluntary demotion. Rule 60K-4.007, Florida Administrative Code, governs "demotion appointments" in the career service system. The rule states that a "demotion appointment" includes assignment to a job class having a "lower maximum salary or having the same or higher maximum salary but a lower level of responsibility. Rule 60K-2.004, Florida Administrative Code, governs salary determinations upon appointment to employment. Rule 60K- 2.004(4), Florida Administrative Code, states, "[a]n employee who is given a demotion appointment in accordance with Chapter 60K-4, F.A.C., may be demoted with or without a reduction in base rate of pay. " Rule 60K-9.005, Florida Administrative Code, addresses a Career Service employee’s right to appeal employment actions to the Public Employees Relations Commission. Generally, an employee who has attained permanent status in the Career Service System can appeal employment actions to the Public Employees Relations Commission. However, Rule 60K-9.005(5)(c), Florida Administrative Code, states than "[a]n employee who receives a reduction in pay, a demotion, or a transfer shall waive all rights to appeal such action if the employee has signed a written statement that the action is voluntary." By certified letters dated May 24, 1999, Petitioners Thompson and Ezell were advised that "[d]ue to impending budget cuts" the Department was reducing the number of positions in the Department’s Division of Jobs and Benefits (where Petitioners Thompson and Ezell worked) and that "[r]egretfully, you will be adversely affected by this work force reduction on June 30, 1999, at the close of business." The May 24 letter included a form titled "STATEMENT OF CHOICE OF OPTIONS DUE TO LAYOFF SITUATION" which set forth available jobs and included an option allowing the employee to select a layoff rather than the job demotion. The form included a signature line that stated, "I understand that by selecting demotion as an option, I am requesting a voluntary demotion in lieu of layoff, and my pay upon such voluntary demotion will be subject to the newly revised Section 1101.1.1.1.9d of the LES Personnel Manual." The evidence fails to establish the content of Section 1101.1.1.1.9d of the revised LES Personnel Manual. The documents entered into evidence at the hearing are identified as 1101.1.1.1. There is no subsection 9d. Subsection (c)2.c. addresses pay upon voluntary demotion and states as follows: Associates requesting voluntary demotions must have their base rate of pay reduced by one-half (1/2) of the percentage/salary increase received upon promotion and/or reassignment. For example, if an associate received a 10 percent promotional increase, his/her base rate of pay must be reduced by 5 percent. Permanent career service associates who have not had a promotional increase will have their base rate reduced by 5 percent. The Division Director/Commission Chairman equivalent has authority to take final action provided, however, that any variations must be submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Administration for review prior to final action. This provision also applies to demotions to classes that are higher or lower than the classes held prior to promotion and/or reassignment. Ms. Thompson noted her preferences as to the available jobs positions and signed the form. Ms. Ezell noted her preferences as to the available jobs positions and signed the form, but wrote a notation on the form indicating her disagreement with the situation, in part stating, "I am not voluntarily requesting demotion. I have absolutely no other choice after 27 years. A pay reduction should not occur. " At hearing, both Ms. Thompson and Ms. Ezell suggested that being forced to accept a demotion and pay reduction in lieu of total layoff did not present an entirely voluntary choice. There is no evidence that the Department provided copies of the cited Personnel Manual revision directly to affected employees either before or after the May 24 letters were issued. There is no evidence that either Ms. Thompson or Ms. Ezell saw the revised Personnel Manual prior to signing the "STATEMENT OF CHOICE" forms. During the spring of 1999, the Division’s Director circulated a publication entitled "Friday Fax" to employees of the Department’s Division of Jobs and Benefits. The "Friday Fax" dated March 19, 1999 indicates that an employee demoted as part of the pending reduction in force would retain their current salary. This reflects the existing policy of the Department that had been applied in prior workforce reductions. There is no credible evidence that the Division Director was explicitly authorized to restate the Department policy in the March 19, 1999 Friday Fax. There is evidence that the Department executives were considering the possibility of salary reductions during the ongoing planning for the workforce reduction. By the following week, a new Division Director had been appointed. By April 2, 1999, publication of "Friday Fax" was suspended. A new publication "Just The Facts. . ." began to be issued by the Department’s Office of Communications and was circulated to agency personnel. On May 24, 1999, the same day that the workforce reduction letters were mailed to Petitioners Thompson and Ezell, an issue of "Just The Facts" was published which stated that demotions in lieu of layoff would incur salary reductions, and referenced the revised LES Personnel Manual section as "1101.1.1.1 9.d.(1)(6)(c)2.c."
Conclusions The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that it is a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that the Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that on or about December 2, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a certification certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the public employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Patrolmen, Patrolmen 1st class, Master Patrolmen, Evidence Technician, and Traffic Enforcement officer. EXCLUDED: All other employees of the Ocala Police Department including Sergeants who are shift commanders. The pleadings establish that during 1972, the Respondent, by and through its City Council, promulgated a City Ordinance (Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code) which regulates labor relations for its employees. Chapter 13B has remained in full force and effect and has never been approved by the Public Employees Relations Commission pursuant to Section 447.603, Florida Statutes (1975). Among other things, the ordinance provides that: "Solicitation for membership in a labor organization or the collection of dues therefor, or other internal affairs of a labor organization shall not be con- ducted by employees on working time, or on city premises. Labor organization literature, pamphlets, handbills and the like shall not be distributed in the work areas of the city premises at any time." (See Section 13B-8.) A summary review of the parties' joint exhibits demonstrate that Chapter 13B attempts to regulate nearly all aspects of a collective bargaining relationship. In PERC v. The City of Naples, 327 So.2d 41 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) the court determined that an entity may not assume jurisdiction of a public employee bargaining procedure until PERC has approved that procedure. In this case, no such approval has been granted by PERC as it is required pursuant to 447.603, Florida Statutes (1975). Further comparison of the provisions of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code and Chapter 447, Florida Statutes, lends support to the conclusion that Respondent's employees' collective bargaining rights are not on a parity with those rights guaranteed them by Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. For example, 13B-1(c) of the ordinance defines "supervisor" and section 13B-1(b) defines "employee". Supervisors are excluded from the definition of employee and thereby from collective bargaining whereas Chapter 447 contains no definition of supervisor and the Commission consistently determines that supervisors are entitled to protections guaranteed by Chapter 447. See CWA and Hillsborough County Hospital and Welfare Board, case no. 8H- RC-752-0175, 2 FPER 46 (1976); Hillsborough County PBA and Florida State Lodge, FOP and City of Tampa, 2 FPER 72 (1976). Additional distinctions are found respecting the definition of confidential employees and the determination by despondent in its code of "bargainable" subjects. It was noted that Respondent does not consider itself required to negotiate with respect to wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. See the May Department Stores Co., 191 NLRB 928 (1972). While Chapter 447 vests all authority respecting appropriate unit placement of employees with PERC, Chapter 13B-2(b)(1) authorized Respondent's City Manager to make such determinations. A further examination of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code reveals that it makes a striking distinction between the authority guaranteed employees respecting the proper bounds for solicitation-distribution rules. Chapter 447.509, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that during an employee's lunch hour, an employer may not restrict solicitation and distribution whereas Chapter 13B of the Respondent's Code restricts solicitation and distribution during working time and on the premises of the City, making no exception or distinction for lunch breaks and therefore Respondent's maintenance of such provisions amounts to unlawful interference, restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section 447.501(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Although the Respondent defends in part on the fact that no employee had been disciplined for violating the above referenced rules, legions of cases have held that the maintenance, without enforcement of an overly broad solicitation-distribution rule constitutes an unfair labor practice. (See for example Essex International, Inc., 211 NLRB 934, 86 LRRM 1411; Dreis and Krump Manufacturing, Inc., 221 NLRB 309, 90 LRRM 1647 (1975).
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it be ordered to: A. Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by the Commission, a notice substantially providing: that it will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce its employees in the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed them under the Florida Public Employees Relations Act; that it will upon request of the above-named employee organization, rescind the applicability of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code as it relates to the regulation of organizational rights of employees, without having been first approved by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Seymour H. Rowland, Jr., Esquire 105 Legal Center 19 N.W. Pine Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Jane Rigler, Esquire Staff Attorney Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald D. Slesnick, II, Esquire 2540 N.W. 29th Avenue Miami, Florida 33142
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. Council 79 is a labor organization whose business is to represent employees in matters involving public employers concerning contractural negotiations and the administration of bargaining agreements. Council 79 employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks during 1987 and 1988. Council 79 has elected officers. Blondie P. Jordan, a black female, is the elected president and chief executive officer of Council 79. Jordan has the authority to employ persons to assist her in carrying out the duties of Council 79. Until the fall of 1988, Cox, a white male, was one of those employed by Council 79, under Jordan. Cox was employed as the Regional Director of Region III (also referred to as Tampa Region) of Council 79, and reported to Jordan. Council 79, under Jordan, also employed several other white males in positions of authority. Those included: Charles Brannon, employed in March, 1988, as the Assistant to the President, who in the absence of Jordan ran the day to day operations of Council 79 Headquarters; Ted Buri, Regional Director in Tallahassee; John Crosby, Business Manager; Mark Neimeisser, lobbyist; and Ben Patterson, Chief Attorney. Council 79 has an Executive Board over which Jordan presides, but through which the Council is governed and operated. During 1987 and 1988, Nancy Serrano, Jimmy Newell, Wesley Leon and Craig Lehning were members of the Executive Board from Region III. Serrano, Leon and Lehning belonged to a group referred to as the "Solidarity Group" that opposed Jordan. During 1987 and 1988, Serrano, Newell, Leon and Lehning at Executive Board meetings complained to Jordan about the operation of Cox's office in Tampa, particularly about the office staff and Cox not being responsive to the membership of the local unions. However, during this same period of time there were presidents of local unions who complained to Jordan about how these same Executive Board Members were not being responsive to the local union, specifically in regard to how these Executive Board members were attempting to close the Regional Director's Office in Tampa, and advised Jordan that Cox and his staff were working well with the local unions. Also, one member of Cox's staff complained to Jordan about having to drive Cox to meetings and run the office while Cox absence attending to personal business. There was no written documentation that Jordan ever discussed these complaints with Cox or any of his staff, and even though Cox admitted to having heard these complaints, although not from Jordan, he dismissed them as being political because there were coming from the Solidarity Group that opposed Jordan. Notwithstanding Jordan's testimony to the contrary, there is insufficient evidence to show that Jordan discussed any of these complaints with Cox or that Jordan counseled or advised about correcting the problems before November 3, 1988. Apparently, Jordan left the day to day operation of Region II, including the Regional Office, to the discretion of Cox, and expected Cox to correct problems in the Region without being counseled or advised by Jordan unless Cox determined that Jordan's intervention was necessary or appropriate. Likewise, there was no documentation that Cox had ever been reprimanded or counseled about his performance. In fact, the only written documentation concerning Cox's performance (other than an incomplete report by Linoria Anthony which was not received as evidence) of any problems with Cox's performance was the report written by David McGhee to Jordan on November 1, 1988, after McGhee replaced Cox, having been appointed Acting Regional Director of Region III on September 14, 1988 by Jordan. On September 12, 1988, Cox was scheduled to attend a meeting with employees from the City of Fort Myers which McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero were also to attend. Cox was to meet privately with McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero before meeting with the employees from Ft. Myers. Before the meeting, Cox was observed around the pool area by Neimesser. Cox did not attend the private meeting with McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero but did attend the meeting with the Ft. Myers employees. On September 13, 1988, Neimesser reported to Jordan that Cox had failed to attend the private meeting. On September 14, 1988, as instructed by Jordan, Brannon informed Cox that he was relieved of his duties as Regional Director. Cox was not given an opportunity to explain his failure to attend the private meeting in Ft. Myers, Florida before relieving him of his duties as Regional Director. Although Cox was relieved of his duties as Regional Director, he continued in the employment of Council 79 assisting McGhee in negotiating contracts and other matters. By letter dated September 14, 1988, Jordan appointed David McGhee Acting Regional Director of Region III. McGhee, a black male, employed by the International which Council 79 was affiliated. McGhee was the Assistant Area Director for International and its staff person with responsibility for Region III. McGhee assumed the responsibilities of Acting Regional Director for Region III on September 14, 1988.. McGhee is not now nor has he ever been on the payroll of Council 79. McGhee is continues to be the Acting Regional Director for Region III, and in addition to reporting to Jordan, reports to Gilbert Escudero, a Hispanic male, Area Director for the International and to Gerald McEntee, a white male, president of the International. On September 19, 1988, Cox voluntarily entered Horizon Hospital for treatment. Upon entering Horizon, Cox described his condition as being depressed and unable to function. Cox also described a previous history of excessive alcohol intake to the point of intoxication every weekend since his early twenties. However, there was insufficient evidence to show that Cox was suffering from alcoholism. Cox did not advise Jordan or McGhee or anyone else in authority with Council 79 that he was entering Horizon for treatment, or more specifically that he was being treated for alcoholism. Although Jordan and other employees of Council 79 may have known that Cox consumed alcohol, even to the point of intoxication on occasions, there is insufficient evidence to show that either Jordan or any other employee of Council 79 were aware that Cox had a problem with alcohol, or more specifically that Cox was suffering for alcoholism. As requested by Jordan, McGhee, by letter dated November 1, 1988, reported the problems he had encountered in the Regional Office since assuming the duties of Acting Regional Director. The report basically advised Jordan of the the problems that had been reported earlier by Serrano, Newell, Leon and Lehning. Additionally, McGhee reported on Cox's failure to negotiate contracts with the city of North Port and Local 167, Hillsborough County before they expired on September 30, 1988. As requested by Jordan, Linoria Anthony prepared a report concerning Cox's failure to negotiate contracts for several local unions in Region III with their employers. However, this report, initially offered as evidence, was withdrawn because Council 79 was unable to furnish a complete copy. On November 3, 1988, Charles Brannon was instructed by Jordan to secure Cox's resignation or to terminate his employment with Council 79. Cox resigned after being given the choices by Brannon. Upon resigning, Cox was to be given certain concessions, including one month's severance pay. Council 79 failed to honor this agreement with Cox, and he obtain a judgment in the County Court of Hillsborough County which was eventually satisfied. While Jordan's decision to effectively terminate Cox's employment (discharge) without first counseling or advising Cox on the problems in Region III as reported to her, and giving him an opportunity to correct those problems may not have been the correct or morally right decision, there is sufficient competent, substantial evidence to establish facts to show that Jordan did not terminate Cox's employment because of his race (white) or alleged handicap (alcoholism).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner, Robert Cox, was not discharged due to his race or alleged handicap in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, and that the Petition For Relief be Dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statute, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the Respondent in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner The Petitioner did not file any Proposed Findings of Fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent The following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(3); 4(4); 5(4); 6(5); 7(6&7), 9(6); 10(9); 11(10); 12(11); 13(12); 14(13); 16(16&17); 17- 18(18); 19-20(14) and 21(19). Proposed finding of fact 8 is rejected as not being supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, except for thesecond phrase, that complaints did not stop, which is adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Proposed finding of fact 15 is neither material nor relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 125 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Robert Cox, Pro se 8514-#3, Daffodil Drive Hudson, FL 34667 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Patterson and Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, FL 32315
Findings Of Fact After the motion for continuance was again denied, petitioners declined to offer any evidence and petitioners announced that they would be pursuing certain supposed federal remedies.
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice under section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2011), by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race or sex, and if so, what remedy should be ordered.
Findings Of Fact Apalachee Center is a not-for-profit health center providing mental health and substance abuse services in the Big Bend region of North Florida, which employs over 15 people. One of its facilities is a 16-bed mental health residential facility in Tallahassee, Florida, primarily housing men who suffer from severe mental illness. Ms. Sandra Johnson, an African–American woman and Petitioner in this case, has been a Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) since 1984. She began working for Respondent in 2009 as the only LPN on duty on “B Shift Days” from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. at the Forensic Residential Program. Another LPN, Ana Degg, was a white woman who worked on the “A” shift, and was the lead forensic nurse and Petitioner’s acting supervisor, though she was not actually present during the shift Petitioner worked. Most of the residents in the facility in which Petitioner worked have been found incompetent by the criminal justice system and have been sent to the program by court order. Petitioner maintained their medications, monitored their health, and helped to ensure that they did not leave the facility. At the time she was hired, Petitioner was made aware of Apalachee Center’s policies prohibiting discrimination and had been advised to immediately report any suspected discrimination to the Human Resources Department. Ms. Candy Landry, the Human Resources Officer at Apalachee Center, is proud of Apalachee’s diversity record. Apalachee employs more African-Americans than whites. Ms. Degg had some conflicts with Petitioner immediately after they began working together, but later came to the conclusion that it was just a reflection of Petitioner’s personality. Ms. Degg said that she still continued to receive some staff complaints, mostly about Petitioner’s demeanor. She testified that Petitioner “came off as gruff.” Ms. Degg was very credible. Ms. Degg consulted Ms. Jane Magnan, Registered Nurse (RN) who was the Director of Nursing, and Ms. Jeanne Pope, the Director of Residential Services, as to the best way to handle the situation. Ms. Magnan and Ms. Pope each testified that they advised Ms. Degg to start with basic lines of communication and mentoring on a one-to-one level to see if the problem could be handled before anything went to the written stage. Ms. Degg provided some handouts on interpersonal relations and “soft skills” to Petitioner and her unit and tried to coach Petitioner on how to be a bit more professional in her interactions. Ms. Degg told Petitioner that staff was saying that Petitioner was rude and she asked her to talk to people a little differently. She said Petitioner responded by saying that that was “just the way she was.” Petitioner’s conduct did not change and complaints continued. Ms. Magnan, who had hired Petitioner, believed that Ms. Degg found it difficult to discipline Petitioner. Ms. Magnan also believed there was some resistance from Petitioner in acknowledging Ms. Degg, a fellow LPN, as Petitioner’s supervisor. Petitioner had no “write–ups” from the time of her employment at Apalachee in August or September of 2009 until January of 2011. On January 21, 2011, Petitioner was presented a memorandum dated January 7, 2011, to document a Written Supervisory Session on two incidents. First, the memorandum stated that Petitioner had been counseled for failure to give a report to the oncoming nurse who had arrived late for her shift. Second, it stated that Petitioner had been counseled for being rude and unprofessional in a telephone conversation with the Dietary Supervisor. The memorandum was signed by Petitioner and by Ms. Degg. Ms. Degg testified that in response Petitioner had denied that she had failed to give a report to the oncoming nurse, but that the other staff people had corroborated what the oncoming shift nurse had told her, so she believed it had happened. At hearing, Petitioner continued to deny that she had failed to give a report to the oncoming nurse and denied that she had been rude or unprofessional in her conversation with the Dietary Supervisor. In the months following the January “write-up,” Ms. Degg did not notice any change in Petitioner’s demeanor and continued to receive complaints. She noted that she did not personally consider Petitioner’s behavior to be rude, but others did, and she could understand why. On May 18, 2011, Petitioner was presented a memorandum dated May 10, 2011, to document another Written Supervisory Session. The memorandum indicated that Petitioner had been unprofessional in communications to a Mental Health Assistant (MHA) whom Petitioner supervised. It stated that Petitioner had used phrases such as “shut up” and “get out of my face” to the MHA and that Petitioner had previously been counseled regarding this issue. The Memorandum was signed by Petitioner and by Ms. Magnan and Ms. Pope. Ms. Magnan and Ms. Pope offered Petitioner training and assistance. On the memorandum, Petitioner wrote that she did not agree with the statement and that she was willing to learn. On May 27, 2011, Petitioner’s Employee Performance Evaluation for the period April 23, 2010, through May 15, 2011, was presented to Petitioner. It indicated “Below Performance Expectations” or “Needs Improvement” in several areas, including supervision of MHAs, training of staff, unit management, acceptance of responsibility, and attitude. Hand-written notes by Ms. Magnan and Ms. Dianne VanZorge, the RN supervising the forensic unit, commented on difficulties in communicating with staff, compromised staff morale, and lack of leadership. The report noted that various employees had brought Petitioner’s attitude to the attention of the Program Director and Director of Nursing. The evaluation was signed by Petitioner, Ms. Magnan, and Melany Kearley, the Chief Operations Officer. In conjunction with this unfavorable Employee Performance Evaluation, and in accordance with Apalachee policy, Petitioner was placed on a Corrective Action Plan, a 60-day period of Conditional Probationary Status. The memorandum advising Petitioner of this action explained that Petitioner should immediately take action to maintain a friendly and productive work atmosphere, demonstrate respect and courtesy towards clients and co-workers, and demonstrate initiatives to improve Petitioner’s job and the program. The memorandum advised that any further non-compliance could result in disciplinary action or termination of employment. Petitioner’s supervisor was changed to Ms. VanZorge. Petitioner knew Ms. VanZorge because they had worked together many years earlier. Petitioner was advised in the Corrective Action Plan that Ms. VanZorge would meet with her on a weekly basis to provide any needed assistance. At the time Petitioner was placed on probation, Ms. Magnan testified that Petitioner became angry. Petitioner asked if they wanted her to quit. Ms. Magnan encouraged Petitioner not to quit, telling her that that “we are going to work this out.” Ms. Magnan and Ms. VanZorge testified that they made sure that Petitioner acknowledged that resources and coaching were available to help her. Petitioner testified that leadership, nursing management, and supervisory resources were not subsequently provided to her as promised. On June 29, 2011, Mr. Alphonzo Robinson, an African-American MHA who worked under Petitioner’s supervision, submitted complaints about Petitioner to Ms. VanZorge and Ms. Pope. Ms. VanZorge and Ms. Pope then met with Petitioner regarding these complaints. A memorandum documenting the meeting with Petitioner, prepared the same day, states that an MHA reported that Petitioner had eaten a resident’s lunch. The MHA alleged that the resident had gone out on a morning community pass, asking staff to save his lunch for him until he returned. The memorandum states that when the resident returned, the MHA went to get his lunch for him, only to find Petitioner eating the last of the resident’s food in the staff kitchen. The MHA indicated that Petitioner denied eating the resident’s lunch, saying that it had been thrown away, and directed the MHA to give the resident another patient’s meal instead. Only an empty tray without food was found in the garbage. The MHA noted that another patient’s lunch could not be substituted because the first resident was diabetic and had special dietary needs. The memorandum also indicates that several other complaints were made against Petitioner by the MHA and discussed with her at the meeting. It was alleged that the Petitioner was continually rude to staff, asked residents to run errands for her, left the commode dirty with urine and feces, and used her hands to get ice from the ice machine. The memorandum noted that at the meeting, after an initial denial, Petitioner finally had admitted that she had eaten the resident’s lunch. It also noted that Petitioner had admitted that “a while back” she had asked residents to get Cokes for her, but that now she drank water. The memorandum concluded by noting that the expectations on Petitioner’s Corrective Action Plan had been reviewed, and that it was further discussed that Petitioner was not to eat any resident meals or ask them to perform errands. Petitioner had been instructed to buy a meal ticket or bring her own, clean up after herself, and adhere to infection control policy and universal precautions. At hearing, Ms. VanZorge testified that during the meeting Petitioner admitted having eaten the resident’s lunch, but stated she had not done that for a long while prior to that. Ms. VanZorge stated that Petitioner also admitted she had gotten ice with her hands once. Ms. Pope testified that Petitioner had initially denied eating the resident’s food, but then later during the course of the meeting had admitted that she had eaten it, and also admitted that she had sent residents to run errands for her. MHA Kim Jenkins, a white woman and the second MHA under Petitioner’s supervision, testified that she knew nothing about the allegations that Petitioner ate a resident’s lunch. She testified that the bathroom was a unisex bathroom and that Petitioner did leave it in an unsanitary condition almost every time she used it, although she had been too embarrassed for Petitioner to ever discuss that with Petitioner. Ms. Jenkins said she did try to discuss all of the other recurring issues with Petitioner. She testified that Petitioner was rude on a daily basis. She testified that she had seen Petitioner going through other staff members’ mail and opening it. She testified that Petitioner did get ice with her bare hands on several occasions. On cross-examination, Ms. Jenkins stated that she did not document any of these incidents and could not remember dates on which they occurred. Pressed to provide dates, Ms. Jenkins testified that the only approximate date she could remember was the time that Petitioner sent a client with a staff member to get two hot dogs for Petitioner and the client had ended up paying for the hot dogs. Ms. Jenkins said that she knew this occurred in October because Ms. Jenkins had been assigned to the unit for only about two weeks when it happened. Ms. Jenkins testified that she clearly remembered when this occurred because Ms. Jenkins had been “written up” by Petitioner shortly afterwards for stopping at a McDonald’s drive–through on the way back from a client’s doctor’s appointment to allow the client to buy some ice cream. Ms. Jenkins testimony was very credible. Petitioner testified at hearing that the allegations in the June 29, 2011, letter of Alphonzo Robinson were not true. She testified that she did not eat a patient’s food, never asked patients to buy sodas or candy for her, never left urine and feces on the toilet seat, and that he never caught her sleeping on the job. She testified that it was a public bathroom, and noted that anyone could have left it in that condition. She also stated that someone should wonder, “[W]hy was Alphonzo Robinson in ladies’ bathroom watching toilet seats? Apparently he needs to be monitoring the patient and not the lady bathroom.” Petitioner noted that in all of the allegations against her, “[I]t is their word against mine.” In a memo dated July 1, 2011, to Ms. Kearley, Ms. Pope recommended the termination of Petitioner’s employment with Apalachee Center. Ms. Magnan, Ms. VanZorge, and Ms. Pope were unanimous in this recommendation. On or about July 6, 2011, Ms. Pope accompanied Petitioner to the office of Ms. Candy Landry, the Human Resources Officer, where Petitioner was informed that her employment was terminated. Ms. Landry testified that Petitioner had violated policies of Apalachee and that the disciplinary process and termination of employment with respect to Petitioner had followed standard procedures. Ms. Landry testified that Petitioner’s replacement was also African-American. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Florida Human Relations Commission (Commission), alleging that Apalachee Center had discriminated against her based upon her race and sex on August 15, 2011. Her complaint alleged that non-African- American employees had never been disciplined without reason, as she had been. Her complaint stated an employee had made unwelcome comments that she was “fine,” “sexy” and “beautiful.” On December 20, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief, which was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. At hearing, Petitioner presented no evidence regarding similarly situated white employees. Petitioner presented no evidence that anyone ever made comments that she was “fine,” “sexy” or “beautiful.” She did testify that she made a note on June 20, 2011, regarding Alphonzo Robinson. Her testimony was as follows: Okay. Ready for Alphonso Robinson. This is what he states, “I’m looking for a wife. Bring your friend down here so I can look at her.” I informed Robinson to sit in day room with client. Let Kim Jenkins come from back there with the men. He states, “I don’t want to deal with the men. When I worked at Florida Hospital, we punish inmate.” I told him we don’t do that here. Social Service case managers do that. Group coordinator recommend –- group coordinators recommend treatment, member, nurse, case manager, and Ms. Pope. Robinson state, “I used to be a man that – that – I used to be a man that a husband was having problem with sex, I took care of his wife.” I stopped talking to him and just restrict everything to work only with Mr. Alphonzo Robinson. I gave this note to Ana Degg. I asked her please to address it with Ms. Pope. I never heard anything else about that. I did my job as I was told. I went by the instructions what the facility asked me to do. Petitioner testified that she prepared the note with this information on June 20, 2011, and gave it to Ms. Degg. This would have been a bit more than one week prior to Mr. Robinson’s complaints about her performance. Under cross-examination, Mr. Robinson denied that he had been sleeping on the job or had made inappropriate sexual remarks. He denied that he made the allegations against Petitioner because he was fearful he would be terminated and was attempting to get Petitioner fired first: Q You said – you made sexual statements, you told me that you had a new lady, that her husband had problems with sex, and you took care of the lady. After that I learned that, to stay out from around you, because I am a married lady. I have been married for 37 years. I don’t endure stuff like that. So after that, then later on you was in the room and you made a sexual comment. You – I said that is inappropriate, that’s not the kind of behavior – we do not come to work for that kind of behavior. * * * Q So Alphonzo – A Yes. Q -- after you made that comment, and then you said those statements, and then after that I approached you and told you that you cannot be sleeping at the desk, and then you decided to make these statements, to go to Dianne, Kim’s friend and all that, so they can get me fired before you get terminated, is that not true? A No, that’s not. Q You had never been sleeping at the desk? A No, I haven’t. There is no evidence that Petitioner mentioned the note or showed it to anyone at the Florida Commission on Human Relations in connection with her complaint of discrimination. She did not provide a copy of the note to the Division of Administrative Hearings or to Respondent prior to hearing. Petitioner testified that she found the note in her papers when she went through them. Ms. Degg was no longer Petitioner’s supervisor on June 20, 2011. Ms. Degg testified that she could not recall Petitioner ever complaining about anyone in the workplace sexually harassing her. Ms. Degg testified that she had received a written complaint about MHA Jenkins, but that she had never received any written complaint about MHA Robinson. Ms. Degg’s testimony that she did not receive the note was credible, and is accepted as true. Ms. VanZorge testified that Petitioner never complained to her about any type of sexual harassment by Mr. Robinson. Ms. Pope testified that Petitioner never complained to her about any sexual harassment. Ms. Candy Landry, the Human Resources Officer, testified that Petitioner never complained to her that she had been subjected to sexual harassment. She further testified that she was never aware of any allegations of sexual harassment of Petitioner from any source. The facts do not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of race or sex.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra Johnson 284 Centerline Road Crawfordville, Florida 32327 Thomas A. Groendyke, Esquire Douberley and Cicero 1000 Sawgrass Corporate Parkway, Suite 590 Sunrise, Florida 33323 tgroendyke@dc-atty.com Chris John Rush, Esquire Rush and Associates 1880 North Congress Avenue, Suite 205 Boynton Beach, Florida 33426 cjrushesq@comcast.net Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 kranerl@fchr.state.fl.us Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 violet.crawford@fchr.myflorida.com
Findings Of Fact On October 23, 1978, Petitioner was hired as secretary to W. J. Crist, president of Hygroponics, Inc. On February 26, 1979, W. J. Crist evaluated Petitioner's overall job performance as "good." With respect to cooperation, the Petitioner was rated in the category of "cooperates very well," the highest rating possible for that category of performance. With respect to job knowledge, she was rated as showing "unusual capacity," also the highest rating possible for that category of performance. On March 5, 1979, Petitioner received an increase in salary from $4.18 per hour to $4.51 per hour, based in part upon her increased responsibilities and in part upon demonstrated merit. Following is Hygroponics, Inc.'s office staff organization chart dated May 2, 1979: HYGROPONICS, INC. OFFICE STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART | President | /| W. J. Crist |\ / | | \ / | \ \ \ | Purch. Agent | | Controller | \ | Technical Service | | Dick Destival | | James Jobe |" \ | Dick Jeffery | | | | | "" \ | | " / | | " "\ | " / | | " \" | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | "\ "| | Marsha | | Liz | | Nell | | Arlene | | Carolyn | | Betsy | | | | | | | | | | | | | /|\ Direct lines of authority. Answerable to this person at all times " Indirect lines of authority. Answerable for secondary duties and when direct lines are not available. The above organizational chart does not include the company's chief executive officer. On occasion, members of the company's secretarial staff went directly to the chief executive officer with employment-related problems. In September, 1979, after James Jobe, the controller referenced in the above chart, left the company's employ, W. J. Crist, the company president, advised Petitioner that she was to become office manager. After that time, Petitioner assumed many of the duties of office manager. Petitioner inquired when she would receive a raise commensurate with her increased responsibilities, and was advised that this would be accomplished after the company hired a new controller. Emmett Singleton was hired to fill the position of controller on October 29, 1979. On December 11, 1979, Petitioner formally became acting office manager. On that date Petitioner was evaluated by Emmett Singleton, who rated Petitioner highest in the areas of decision-making and ability to organize, and lowest in the areas of acceptability and responsibility. Specifically, Singleton made the following comments concerning Petitioner's job performance: "Has difficulty in establishing satisfactory relationships with people"; "Average leader, conventional in manner and enthusiasm, conveys ideas but does not motivate group"; "Has problem with admitting an error or fault"; "Reluctant to accept job responsibilities. Supervision and follow-up often required"; "Considers job an eight to five task with scheduled breaks reguardless [sic] of status of workload"; "Employee is preoccupied with the position rather than a concern for getting the job done"; and, "Employee resents being monitored or controlled. Sometimes uncooperative and slow to respond to direction." In addition, members of the company management group, other than Emmett Singleton, commented on this evaluation that Petitioner "alienates co-workers," "Has experienced confusion in the scheduling of grower school," and expressed concern with Petitioner's "attitude." The controller noted on the evaluation form that he planned ". . .to work closely with [Petitioner] for the next 60 days and make an assessment during this time as to whether on [sic] not suited for office manager." Finally, Mr. Singleton noted on Petitioner's performance review form that Petitioner ". . .is classified as Acting Office Manager and is on probation with reguard[sic] to classification. No change in rate of pay is being made at this time. Employee will be reevaluated in 60 days on or about 2/10/80." In order to improve her skills in the area of acceptability and responsibility, Petitioner requested that Mr. Singleton issue a memorandum clarifying the lines of her authority especially since her subordinates had not been advised that she had been given supervisory responsibility over them. Her request was denied at that time because Singleton wanted to first determine whether she could handle the position. On January 12, 1980, Singleton reevaluated Petitioner's job performance. According to Singleton's rating, Petitioner had improved in the areas of acceptability and responsibility, which had been her weak points in the evaluation performed one month earlier. On this same day, Petitioner was reclassified from acting office manager to office manager, and received an increase in pay to $821.60 per month, retroactive to November 1, 1979. Petitioner also assumed the duties of payroll clerk and accounts payable in addition to the duties of office manager. Shortly after receiving this promotion, Petitioner advised employees of Hygroponics, Inc., that she was pregnant. W. J. Crist and Emmett Singleton acknowledged her pregnancy, and the latter inquired concerning her intentions regarding her employment. Petitioner responded that she intended to continue working for the company, and to return to work after the birth of her child. Hygroponics, Inc., had no maternity leave policy. No other female employee had ever given notice of pregnancy and stated her intention to return to work following childbirth. However, at least two other employees had become pregnant during the term of their employment with Hygroponics, Inc. One of these employees, in fact, suffered two miscarriages during her term of employment, and continued working with the company. Another female worker became pregnant, gave birth to a child, and returned to work without ever advising the company or the company ever being aware that she had been pregnant until after she had returned to work. On January 30, 1980, Petitioner submitted a memorandum to Eugene Crist, the company's chief executive officer. The memorandum suggested changes regarding the responsibilities of certain of the office personnel under her supervision. Petitioner had previously discussed these suggested changes with Emmett Singleton, her immediate supervisor, who advised her that he thought her suggestions were a good idea. At the time the memorandum was submitted to the company's chief executive officer, W. J. Crist, the president of the company, was out of the state. On January 30, 1980, Eugene Crist showed the memorandum to Emmett Singleton. The memorandum was then returned to Petitioner by the company's chief executive officer with a notation that the matters contained in the memorandum should be handled through Singleton. Two days later, on February 1, 1980, Singleton asked Petitioner for the memorandum. When Petitioner could not locate the memorandum, and offered to discuss the details of it with Singleton, Singleton advised her that there was no basis for conversation if she could not produce the memorandum. As noted above, Singleton had seen and read the memorandum two days previously when it was shown to him by Eugene Crist. Upon W. J. Crist's return to Florida, Singleton advised him that Petitioner had submitted a memorandum directly to the company's chief executive officer, and that when Singleton asked Petitioner to see the memorandum, she advised him that she had misplaced it. On February 8, 1980, W. J. Crist circulated a memorandum to the Hygroponics, Inc., executive staff concerning Petitioner's ". . .insubordination, poor attitude [and] defiance of executive orders. This memorandum provided, in part, as follows: It is my understanding that Carolyn recently drafted a memorandum on her proposed changes in office duties for many people, changes in accounting procedures, etc. I have been informed that she: "by-passed you, her immediate superior and by-passed me, her next-in-line superior." and delivered this memo directly to Gene, our CEO. Then when Gene informed her to "discuss the memo directly with you," she advised you "she did not even have the memo anymore." I find these actions, on Carolyn's part very distressing and feel we must take disciplinary actions with her. So - what are the problems. Her "uncooperative" and "attitude" problems outlined in your personnel evaluation of her on December 11, 1979 (which she acknowledged) when you put her "on probation," the first time, still persist. She demonstrated anything but teamwork in by-passing her two immediate superiors and going directly to our CEO. This is very bad for an employee to do but even worse for her since she is suppose [sic] to be a leader of our people in her slot as Office Manager. Her disregarding Gene's directive to discuss the memo with you was corrected only by your insistance[sic] that the two of you discuss it. Her statement to you that "she no longer had the memo" is also distressing. Has she destroyed it? This additional negative certainly weakens her argument that "she went directly to Gene because he was going out.[sic] (Original emphasis.) The above-referenced memorandum solicited the views of the company's executive staff as to whether to terminate Petitioner, discipline her in some fashion, or give her an opportunity to resign. The decision was unanimous among all five members of the executive staff to terminate Petitioner. No member of the executive staff questioned Petitioner before concurring in the decision to discharge her. Such a memorandum of concurrence was not the company's standard practice in discharging employees, which generally was for the discharge decision to be made by the employee's supervisor alone. Hygroponics, Inc., was, at all times material to this proceeding, a rather small organization, numbering at the most approximately fifty employees. As a result, many of the internal functions of the company were informal in nature. For example, there were no strict lines of authority for secretarial staff to air grievances or make suggestions. There was, however, a generalized procedure for employees to approach their immediate supervisor with any employment-related problems. There is no direct substantive evidence in the record in this cause from which it can be concluded that Petitioner was terminated from her employment because she was either female or pregnant. Further, whatever circumstantial evidence there is in this record to support such a contention is overcome by Respondent's demonstration that Petitioner was at best an employee of average ability who management viewed at times to be a problem employee. It appears, therefore, that the reason for Petitioner's discharge was an accumulation of events, culminating in her memorandum of January 30, 1980, being submitted to the company chief executive officer, and not for any reason relating to her sex.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the Petition for Relief, and denying the relief requested therein, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1983, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. White, Jr., Esquire 229 McKenzie Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 John F. Daniel, Esquire Post Office Box 2522 Panama City, Florida 32401 Dana Baird, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard E. Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner based on an alleged handicap.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as that term is defined in Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Respondent employed Respondent in January 1990. Respondent reassigned Petitioner to the Division of Recreation and Parks in 1993. At the time of his dismissal in October 2003, Petitioner was working as a park ranger at the St. Marks GeoPark in Wakulla County, Florida. Petitioner is a history aficionado. He enjoys researching Florida and Civil War history. He has authored a 200-page book entitled The Civil War in and Around St. Marks, Florida. He has written an article entitled "Forts in St. Marks during the War Between the States." Petitioner enjoys participating in history interpretations for the public. Several times in the past decade, Respondent nominated him for an award for his activities in history interpretations. Petitioner has constructed colonial-era equipment and musical instruments. Although they are his personal property, Petitioner has used them in displays for the public at state parks. Petitioner researched the historical accuracy of his projects both at home and at work. Petitioner had surgery in 2000 for a cervical herniated disc. After the surgery, Respondent made accommodations for Petitioner in the form of lighter duty assignments during his recovery period in keeping with his doctor's request. In a letter dated August 28, 2000, Petitioner's doctor set forth the specific type of work that Petitioner could and could not perform. The doctor released Petitioner to perform desk work, telephone duties, and visitor services but no maintenance duties. At all times relevant here, Thomas Nobles was Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Mr. Nobles and Petitioner have known each other since high school. However, they did not have a good relationship at work. In 2001, Petitioner filed gender discrimination charges against Mr. Nobles. Respondent conducted an investigation and exonerated Mr. Nobles. Mr. Nobles wrote several counseling memoranda and one reprimand, which criticized Petitioner's work performance. Among other things, Mr. Nobles warned Petitioner not to visit a music store in Tallahassee during work hours. In a memorandum dated July 19, 2002, Mr. Nobles discussed his concern over Petitioner's work habits that allegedly caused damage to a state-owned vehicle and other property and Petitioner's inability to complete paperwork. Petitioner responded to each of Mr. Nobles' criticisms in a memorandum dated July 28, 2002. On September 20, 2002, Mr. Nobles wrote a memorandum to document an earlier conversation with Petitioner regarding Mr. Nobles' concern that Petitioner was not keeping the park neat. In the memorandum, Mr. Nobles instructed Petitioner not to bring "personal projects" to work, specifically referring to a mandolin that Petitioner had been sanding in the park office. In a memorandum dated October 22, 2002, Mr. Nobles criticized Petitioner for reading a book about musical instruments. Mr. Nobles warned Petitioner not to let personal projects take priority over the park's appearance and cleanliness. On February 25, 2003, Petitioner called his office to provide his employer with the date of his second neck surgery, which was scheduled for March 5, 2003. During the telephone call, Petitioner asserted that he required further surgery due to his work-related injury. However, Petitioner never filed a workers' compensation claim; he believed that he was not eligible for workers' compensation due to a preexisting condition. After Petitioner's March 2003 surgery, Respondent returned to work. In a letter dated April 10, 2003, Petitioner's doctor released him to work running a museum. On or about May 7, 2003, Petitioner's doctor released him to light- duty work assignments, including no more than one hour of lawn maintenance at a time. In a letter dated July 29, 2003, Mr. Nobles' doctor once again restricted Petitioner's work assignments. Petitioner was not supposed to use heavy machinery or operate mowers, edgers, or similar equipment for prolonged periods of time. The doctor recommended that Petitioner avoid repetitive gripping and lifting. There is no evidence that Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with these accommodations. In the meantime, on July 23, 2003, Mr. Nobles requested Respondent's Inspector General to investigate a posting on the eBay Internet site involving a replica of a 1800s guitar, advertised as being made of wood from the Gregory House, a part of Torreya State Park in Gadsden County, Florida. The Inspector General subsequently commenced an investigation. Petitioner posted the advertisement for the guitar under his eBay site name. Petitioner makes replica mandolins and guitars and occasionally sells them on eBay. Petitioner bragged to at least one co-worker in 2003 that he had made a lot of money selling musical instruments on eBay. One of Petitioner's friends made the "Gregory House" guitar out of discarded roof shingles. Petitioner merely posted the advertisement on his internet site because his friend did not know how to use a computer. During the Inspector General's investigation, Petitioner admitted that he had accessed eBay at work but denied he had used it for bidding. An inspection of the hard drive of the computer at Petitioner's office revealed that someone using Petitioner's eBay password had accessed eBay four times from April-July 2003. Around the general time and date of one of those occasions, someone placed an eBay bid on the "Gregory House" guitar. Additionally, the computer at Petitioner's office had been used to access numerous musical instrument and/or woodworking Internet sites other times from April-July 2003. Petitioner was at work on most, but not all, of the days. A park volunteer admitted that she sometimes used the office computer to access eBay. Respondent's policy prohibits an employee from accessing the Internet for personal use if that use adversely affects the employee's ability to perform his job. Personal use of the Internet should be "limited to the greatest extent possible." Petitioner was aware of Respondent's Internet policy. Nevertheless, he used the Internet for personal reasons at work to access eBay and sites related to his woodworking business after he had been counseled not to let personal projects interfere with his park duties. This caused him to not be available to do park business and, therefore, adversely affected his ability to do his job. Petitioner violated Respondent's Internet use policy. Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment on September 25, 2003, for alleged rule violations, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and perjury. Petitioner appealed to the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), contending that Respondent lacked cause to discipline him. PERC appointed a Hearing Officer to conduct a hearing and issue a Recommended Order. The PERC Hearing Officer conducted a public hearing on October 28, 2003. The Hearing Officer issued the Recommended Order on November 10, 2003. In the instant case, the parties stipulated that they would not re-litigate issues previously litigated at the PERC hearing. The PERC Hearing Officer found as follows: (a) Respondent had cause to discipline Petitioner for violating the computer use policy; and (b) Respondent had discretion to discipline Petitioner by terminating his employment. On November 24, 2003, PERC entered a Final Order adopting the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent did not allow employees, other than Petitioner, to read books unrelated to work during office hours. In fact, Respondent did not terminate Petitioner for any of the following reasons: (a) because he read history books at work; (b) because he might file a workers' compensation claim for a work-related injury; (c) because he filed a gender discrimination against Mr. Nobles; or (d) because Respondent intended to eliminate his position. Rather, Respondent dismissed Petitioner for using the office computer for personal reasons. Respondent has fired other employees for the same reason. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner believed that he was physically incapable of performing the duties of his position. However, there is no evidence that Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with appropriate accommodations as requested by Petitioner's doctors.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen Gerrell, Jr. 10750 Kilcrease way Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Marshall G. Wiseheart, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, the Florida Equal Access To Justice Act?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The action in this case was initiated by the Respondent, a state agency. The Respondent was not a nominal party. Petitioner was the prevailing party in the administrative action brought against his license by Respondent in Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Veterinary Medicine vs. William H. Jernigan, D.V.M., Case No. 95-4487 in that Respondent voluntarily dismissed the case. Petitioner incurred attorney's fees and costs in excess of $15,000, and there is no dispute as to the reasonableness of attorney's fees and costs. There are no special circumstances which would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner's veterinary practice was organized as a sole proprietorship under the fictitious name of Sebring Animal Hospital located in Sebring, Florida. Petitioner is the sole proprietor of Sebring Animal Hospital, an unincorporated business. Both Petitioner and Sebring Animal Hospital are domiciled in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner through Sebring Animal Hospital employed less than 25 employees. At no time pertinent to this proceeding, did Petitioner and Sebring Animal Hospital have a combined net worth in excess of two million dollars. Petitioner is a "small business party" as that term is defined in Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes. On or about September 23, 1993, a dog was presented to the Sebring Animal Hospital for boarding and grooming. On or about October 1, 1993, a hospital employee, during the course of grooming the dog, left the dog unattended. While unattended, the dog either fell or jumped off the grooming table and accidentally hanged herself with a leash that was being used to restrain her. The dog's owner was notified of the accident on October 1, 1993. Petitioner was not present in the hospital at the time of the accident. The owner of the dog subsequently filed a complaint with the Respondent on March 28, 1995. An investigation of the incident was conducted by an investigator from the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Department). The investigator prepared an Investigative Report which included, among other things, the Investigator's interview with the complainant and Petitioner's response. The factual allegations of the incident contained in the Investigative Report are the same as those set out in findings of fact 9, 10, and 11. The Investigative Report was presented to the Probable Cause Panel (PCP) of the Board of Veterinary Medicine. The members of the PCP reviewed the Investigative Report prior to its meeting and discussed the Investigative Report at the PCP meeting on June 29, 1995. The PCP found probable cause and issued a Memorandum of Finding of Probable Cause but did not state the statutory violations upon which the finding of probable cause was based. The PCP directed the Department to file an Administrative Complaint. Although the Board's attorney was present at the PCP meeting on June 29, 1995, none of the panel members made an inquiry of the Board's counsel as to whether under the facts presented there was a violation of Chapter 474, Florida Statutes, specifically Section 474.214(1)(o), Florida Statutes. In fact, the PCP made no inquiry of anyone as whether the facts as presented constituted a violation of Chapter 474, Florida Statutes. Of all the evidence considered by the PCP, there was no evidence which would reasonably indicate that a violation of Chapter 474, Florida Statutes, had occurred. As directed by the PCP, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner alleging a violation of Section 474.214(1)(o), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, ORDERED that Petitioner's Application for Attorney's Fees is Granted and the Respondent shall forthwith pay Petitioner the sum of $15,000 for attorney's fees and costs. ORDERED this 18th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard T. Ferrell Secretary Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Sue Foster Executive Director Board of Veterinary Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Bert J. Harris, III, Esquire SWAIN, HARRIS, SHEEHAN and MCCLURE, P.A. 212 Interlake Boulevard Lake Placid, Florida 33852 James E. Manning, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suite Number 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
