Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. Jul 28 2009 10:37 a7/2e/28e89 18:28 B589222679 DCA LEGAL PAGE @4/ae FINAL ORDER NO. DGA09-GM-266 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE LHEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct Waite have been furnished to the persons listed below in the manner described, on this ay of July, 2009. a Zp 2 Paula Ford fency Clerk Florida Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 U. §. Mail: Jerry Coleman, Esq- Jerry Coleman, PI. 201 Front Street, Suite 203 Key West, Florida 33041 Derek V. Howard, Esq. Monroe County Attorney's Office 1111 12" Street, Suite 408 Key West, Florida 33040 Barton W. Smith, Esq. Barton Smith, P.L. 309 Whitehcad Street Key West, Florida 33040 Richard E. Grosso, Esq. Everglades Law Center, Inc. 3305 College Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 Robert N. Hartsell, Esq. Everglades Law Center, Inc. 818 U.S. Highway 1, Ste. 8 North Palm Beach, Florida 33408-3857 Sherry A. Spiers, Esq. Robert C. Apgar, Esq. Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jul 28 2009 10:37 a7/2e/28e89 18:28 B589222679 DCA LEGAL PAGE @5/@8 FINAL ORDER NO. DCA09-GM-266 Richard Barfield, Esq. Navy Office of the General Counsel Naval Facilities Engineering Command Southeast United States Navy Box 30, Building 903 Jacksonville, Florida 32212-0102 Hand Delivery: Richard E. Shine, Esquire L. Mary Thomas, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Jul 28 2009 10:37 a7/2e/28e89 18:28 B589222679 DCA LEGAL PAGE 86/88 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, Petitioner, and PROTECT KEY WEST AND THE FLORIDA KEYS, INC., d/b/a LAST STAND AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, Intervenor, vs. Case No. 08-2035GM MONROE COUNTY, Respondent , and ROBBIE”"S SAFE HARBOR MARINE ENTERPRISES, INC.; SAFE HARBOUR PROPERTIES, LLC; AND KW RESORT UTILITIES CORP., Intervenor.
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be certified by Respondent as a minority business enterprise.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jupiter Environmental Laboratories, Inc. (Jupiter), is an environmental testing laboratory established in October 1995. The services performed by Jupiter include testing samples of water, oil, soil, and waste water in accordance with the Environmental Protection Agency standards. Jupiter also tests for inorganic and organic compounds by mass spectrography and gas chromatography. Jupiter is owned 70 percent by Glynda Russell, a female, and 30 percent by her husband, Edward Dabrea, who is a non- minority. Prior to forming Jupiter, Ms. Russell had not worked in a laboratory such as Jupiter. Her work experience had been in real estate and selling women's apparel. According to Ms. Russell she did gain some knowledge and experience in environmental testing because she was a customer of testing laboratories while she was in the real estate business. She became familiar with the Environmental Protection Agency's requirements while she was investigating environmental impacts when she was a realtor. Mr. Dubrea has a degree in earth science (geology) and has done post graduate studies in geoscience (organic geochemistry). He has extensive work experience in environmental testing laboratories. Both Ms. Russell and Mr. Dabrea are jointly liable for a $50,000 loan from the Small Business Administration and a $15,000 line of credit. Ms. Russell has also incurred debt of over $100,000 on her personal credit card for Jupiter's expenses. The company has three equipment leases which Ms. Russell signed and indicated she was personally liable. Ms. Russell also signed the lease for the space occupied by the business. Ms. Russell is the president of the corporation. Her duties include directing all marketing, sales, and financial operations. She is responsible for recruiting and hiring personnel, maintaining state certifications, prioritization of work flow (sample pick-up, sample log-in and report generation), bid pricing, selection of subcontracting laboratories, customer service and purchasing of supplies. Mr. Dabrea is the Technical Director for the company. In addition to working for Jupiter, he does freelance research. His resume states that his work at Jupiter includes the following: Planned and organized all technical details for new laboratory, including equipment requirements and analytical supplies. Received and setup instrumentation, performs necessary calibrations. Coordinates information with Laboratory Director and QA/QC Officer. Develops new methods and provides research assistance to clients with unusual assessments. Coordinates between laboratory and governmental agency to ensure compliance. Submits performance evaluation studies to E. P. A. for certification on quarterly basis. Responsible for ensuring adequate instrument capacity for continued growth of the company. Cliff Ross, a non-minority, is the Laboratory Director and works part-time for Jupiter. Start-up funds for Jupiter were contributed by Ms. Russell and Mr. Dabrea. Ms. Russell contributed $25,000 in cash, and computer equipment worth approximately $8,000. Mr. Dabrea contributed an $11,000 truck and $5,000 in computer equipment. Ms. Russell contributed 67 percent and Mr. Dabrea contributed 32 percent. Jupiter is certified in certain categories of environmental water testing by the State of Florida, Department of Health, pursuant to Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. In order to acquire such certification, tests must be performed in the laboratory by qualified technical personnel with the proper educational credentials. In order to acquire the certification for Jupiter, the tests were performed by Mr. Dabrea and Mr. Ross. Ms. Russell is not technically or educationally qualified to perform the tests required for certification. It is not necessary to have the certification to operate an environmental laboratory, but many companies acquire the certification as a marketing tool. Ms. Russell indicated in her response to the denial of her certification that "current market conditions make it all but impossible to get work without it." (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1.) Ms. Russell can perform the extractions. Once the extractions are done for certain types of testing, the testing is automated. She cannot do chromatography. The Quality Assurance Director for Jupiter is Pamela Shore-Loeb. Her duties include responsibilities for all quality assurance and quality control requirements to ensure continued State of Florida laboratory certifications and project management to a growing client list. She, along with Ms. Russell, developed the quality assurance manual used by the business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner, Jupiter Environmental Laboratories, Inc., meets the requirements of Rule 38A-20.005(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code, but does not meet the requirements of Rules 38A- 20.005(3)(c), (d)1, 4 and (6) and (4)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Consequently, the final order should deny Jupiter Environmental Laboratories, Inc.'s application for certification as a minority business enterprise. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph L. Shields, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Hartman Building, Suite 307 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Glynda E. Russell, President Jupiter Environmental Laboratories, Inc. 220 Venus Street, Suite 16 Jupiter, Florida 33458 Douglas L. Jamerson, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Edward A. Dion, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue The issue is whether to approve, approve with conditions, or deny Top Flight's development application approved by the Board on July 26, 2004. That decision approved a Flexible Development application to permit a reduction on the side (east) setback from 10 feet to 5.85 feet (to pavement) and an increase of building height from 35 feet to 59 feet from base flood elevation of 13 feet MSL (with height calculated to the midpoint of the roof slope) in association with the construction of 62 multi-family residential (attached) units at 1925 Edgewater Drive, Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact On September 25, 2003, Top Flight filed a Flexible Development Application for Level Two approval of a comprehensive infill for redevelopment of properties located on the southeast corner of the intersection of Sunnydale Drive and Edgewater Drive and just north of Sunset Pointe Road in Clearwater, Florida. A Comfort Suites motel is just north of the property, while a Chevron gasoline station sits on the south side. The property is located within the Tourist zoning district, which allows condominiums as a permitted use. The project, as originally proposed, involved the construction of a seventy-seven unit, seven-story (including covered parking), luxury condominium on a 2.572-acre tract of land now occupied by 32 motel units and 9 rental apartments with ancillary structures, which the developer intends to raze. The original application requested a deviation from the requirement in the Code that structures in the Tourist zoning district not exceed 35 feet in height. Under flexible development standards for that zoning district, however, a structure may be built to a maximum height of between 35 and 100 feet. (Although the City staff is authorized to approve requests for a deviation up to a maximum height of 50 feet without a hearing, Top Flight was requesting a flexible deviation to allow the building to be constructed an additional 25 feet, or to a height of 75 feet. This was still less than the 100 feet allowed under flexible development standards.) On December 24, 2003, Top Flight filed a second application which amended its earlier application by seeking a reduction of the front yard setback on Sunnydale Drive from 25 feet to 17 feet to allow the placement of balcony support columns within the setbacks. Without a deviation, the Code requires a minimum 25-foot front yard setback. The second application continued to seek a deviation in height standards to 75 feet. Because of staff concerns, on February 5, 2004, Top Flight filed a third Flexible Development application for the purpose of amending its earlier applications. The matter was placed on the agenda for the March 16, 2004, meeting of the Board. At the meeting on March 16, 2004, the City's staff recommended that certain changes in the design of the building be made. In order to make these suggested changes, Top Flight requested that the matter be continued to a later date. That request was granted, and the matter was placed on the agenda for the April 20, 2004, meeting. At the April 20, 2004, meeting, Board members again expressed concern over the height of the building, the lack of stair stepping, and the bulk, density, and height. Because of these concerns, Top Flight requested, and was granted, a 90-day continuance to address these concerns. Appellant, who was present at that meeting, did not object to this request. The matter was then placed on the agenda for May 18, 2004, but because of a notice problem, it was continued to the July 20, 2004, meeting. During the April 20, 2004, meeting, the Board allowed Top Flight's architect, Mr. Aude, and a City Planner III, Mr. Reynolds, to make their presentations prior to asking if any persons wished party status. (Section 4-206.D.3.b. provides that, as a preliminary matter, the chair of the Board shall "inquire of those attending the hearing if there is any person who wishes to seek party status.") Mr. Reynolds was not sworn, even though Section 4-206.D.3.d requires that all "witnesses shall be sworn." After the presentations by Mr. Aude and Mr. Reynolds, Appellant was given party status. Therefore, Appellant could not cross-examine the two witnesses immediately after they testified. However, Appellant did not request the right to examine those witnesses nor did she lodge an objection to the procedure followed by the Board. Also, assuming that Mr. Aude and Mr. Reynolds were treated as experts by the Board, there is no indication that either witness submitted a resume at the hearing. (Section 4-206.D.5.a. requires that "[a]ny expert witness testifying shall submit a resume for the record before or during the public hearing.") However, no objection to this error in procedure was made by any person, including Appellant. Based on the concerns of staff and Board members at the April 20, 2004, meeting, and to accommodate objections lodged by nearby residents, Top Flight modified its site plan by reducing the height of the building from 75 to 59 feet (which in turn reduced the height of the building from six stories over parking to four) and increasing the number of parking spaces. Other changes during the lengthy review process included decreasing the side (rather than the front) setback from a minimum of 10 feet to 5.85 feet and preserving two large oak trees on the property. The proposed height was significantly less than the maximum allowed height in the Tourist district (100 feet), and the proposed density of 59 units was also considerably less than the maximum allowed density on the property (30 units per acre, or a total of 77 on the 2.57-acre tract). The application, as amended, was presented in this form at the July 20 meeting. Documents supporting the various changes were filed by Mr. Aude in February, March, April, May, and June 2004, and are a part of the record. At the hearing on July 20, 2004, Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Aude again testified in support of the application, as amended. The staff report prepared by Mr. Reynolds was made a part of the record. (Section 4-206.G provides that the record shall consist of, among other things, "all applications, exhibits and papers submitted in any proceeding.") The report found that "all applicable Code requirements and criteria including but not limited to General Applicability criteria (Section 3-913) and the flexibility criteria for attached units (Section 2-803.B) have been met." The Board accepted this evidence as the most persuasive on the issue. The Board further accepted the testimony of Mr. Aude, and a determination in the staff report, that the project would be compatible with the character of the neighborhood. In doing so, it implicitly rejected the testimony of Appellant, and other individuals, that the height of the building was inconsistent with the character of the neighborhood. Finally, the Board accepted Mr. Reynolds' recommendation that the application should be approved, subject to eighteen conditions. The vote was 4-2 for approval. During the July 20, 2004, meeting, Mr. Reynolds was cross-examined by another party, Mr. Falk. Although given the right to do so, Appellant did not question the witness. All parties, including Appellant, were given the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Aude, but none sought to do so. The parties were also given the opportunity to ask questions of Top Flight's counsel, who gave argument (but not evidence) on behalf of his client. Although members of the public, and Appellant, were limited in the amount of time allowed for statements to three minutes, all persons who gave testimony or made statements that day, including Appellees, were urged by the chair to limit their remarks. Finally, Top Flight's counsel was allowed to make a closing argument at the meeting, at which time he used a demonstrative exhibit (a "chart" containing the names of area residents who supported the project), which was shown to Board members. (The same information can be found in the City files, which are a part of this record and contain correspondence from numerous area residents, some supporting, and others opposing, the project.) Although Appellant was not shown a copy of the document, the record does not show that she objected to the use of a demonstrative exhibit, or that she requested to see a copy. Mr. J. B. Johnson was appointed to the Board sometime after the April 20, 2004, meeting. At the July 20, 2004, meeting, he made the following statement concerning Top Flight's application: I can't speak for everybody here. Some people have lived here a short period of time. In view of every word that I have heard, every word that I have read, and I've been keeping up with this for several months because several months ago I had telephone calls from your area. I don't know how you could satisfy everybody. It's impossible, but I do know this, this is a great project. One that would be good for the City. One for the area, good for the area and I will support this. Appellant has not cited to any evidence showing that Mr. Johnson did not review the record of the prior meetings or the application file before he cast his vote. Further, Appellant did not object to Mr. Johnson's participation. On July 26, 2004, the Board entered its DO memorializing the action taken on July 20, 2004, which approved Top Flight's application. In the DO, the Board made the following findings/conclusions supporting its decision: The proposal complies with the Flexible Development criteria per Section 2-803.B The proposal is in compliance with other standards in the Code including the General Applicability Criteria per Section 3-913. The development is compatible with the surrounding area and will enhance other redevelopment efforts. The decision also included 18 Conditions of Approval and a requirement that an application for a building permit be made no later than July 20, 2005. On August 3, 2004, Appellant filed her Appeal Application seeking a review of the Board's decision. The Appeal Application set out two relevant grounds (without any further specificity): that the Board's decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the Board departed from the essential requirements of the law. On August 19, 2004, the City referred the Appeal Application to DOAH. The specific grounds were not disclosed until Appellant presented oral argument and filed her Proposed Final Order.1
The Issue Whether Interstate-Tallahassee West has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Purchase of the Property. In the Spring and Summer of 1985, Thomas W. Anthony began an inquiry relative to the purchase and development of 21.5 acres (original tract) located at the intersection of Capital Circle West and I-10. (R-2, pp. 11-15.) On December 11, 1985, a Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase was executed between Rehold, Inc. and C. Gary Skartvedt, Thomas W. Anthony, and Mary J. Price, d/b/a Denver West Joint Venture (Denver, Colorado) for the purchase of the original tract. (Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase.) On March 14, 1986, the Interstate-Tallahassee West Partnership Agreement was executed and Interstate purchased the original tract from Rehold, Inc. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 1.) At the time of the closing on the initial purchase of the original tract, the property was zoned C-2, with the exception of a small portion in the northwest corner of the tract which was zoned A-2. (R-2, pp. 34-35, Preliminary Plat approved on January 18, 1990.) Development Chronology. During 1987 and 1988 the original tract was held to realize growth potential in terms of Interstate's economic investment. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) In 1989, Interstate began negotiations for the sale of a portion of the original tract to Kent C. Deeb (Deeb). (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On June 26, 1989, Broward Davis and Associates, Inc. prepared a drawing of easement location and depiction of a 25 year flood line relative to the portion of the original tract which was the subject of the negotiations between Interstate and Deeb. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2, R-2 p. 20.) On September 12, 1989, Tilden Lobnitz and Cooper, Inc., (Consulting Engineers) recommended a reconfiguration of the original tract relative to the location of high voltage power lines. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On October 11,1989, final descriptions of the lakes on the original tract were prepared for Interstate by Broward Davis and Associates. (Chronological Listing of Events p. 2.) On November 13, 1989, a sketch depicting a revised legal description of a proposal to subdivide the subject property was prepared for Interstate by Broward Davis and Associates, Inc. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On December 7, 1989, an Environmental Assessment of the site was prepared for Interstate by Jim Stidham and Associates. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On December 14, 1989, Deeb executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement which contemplated the conditional purchase of 6.98 acres of the original tract from Interstate. Interstate signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement on December 27, 1989. (Purchase and Sale Agreement, p. 8.) Interstate contends the execution of this Purchase and Sale Agreement resulted in it incurring substantial contractual obligations and argues that these obligations (along with other items and events) are elements in support of "common law vesting" of its development rights. This agreement is the subject of expanded discussion later in this Final Order. The services that Interstate obtained during 1989 (as described in paragraphs 6-11 above) were related to the eventual consummation of the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb. (R-2, pp. 20-21 and 27, Chronological listing of Events, p. 2.) On January 18, 1990, the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission approved Interstate's Preliminary Plat of the subject property. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 3.) On April 4, 1990, the Tallahassee City Commission approved Interstate's previously filed application to rezone a portion of the subject property from A-2 to C-2. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 3.) Interstate entered into a written Utility Agreement with the City on or about July 10,1990. (Letter of agreement dated June 25, 1990 from Henry L. Holshouser, Director of Growth Management, to Interstate Tallahassee West.) The Utility Agreement is the subject of expanded discussion later in this Final Order. On August 20, 1990 a Vested Rights Application covering 6.98 acres of the original tract, which is the subject of the Purchase and Sale Agreement between Interstate and Deeb, was approved. (Letter dated August 21,1990 to Kent Deeb from Mark L. Gumula, Director of Planning, Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission, containing CERTIFICATION OF VESTED STATUS.) The Vested Rights Application for the approximately 15.6 acres remaining of the original tract was disapproved by the Staff Committee and that portion of the property is the subject of this appeal. (R-1, p. 17.) Interstate has not prepared a specific building or development design for the property which is the subject of this appeal. (R-2, p. 97, R-1, p. 5.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had no specific building plans for the property which is the subject of this appeal. (R-2, p. 38.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not chosen a specific land use for the property. (R-2, pp. 38-39.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not made application for environmental permits for the property. (R-2, pp. 49 and 98.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, the only infrastructure that had been constructed on the original tract are two storm water ponds which were built in the 1970's, and prior to Interstate's purchase of the property. (R-2, pp. 86, 87.) Interstate was never assured by the City that the property could be used for any specific use such as a motel, apartments or offices. Interstate and the City made no commitments as to any specific uses of the property. (R-2, pp. 47-48.) The City advised Interstate by letter dated August 13, 1990, that the 2010 Comprehensive Plan requires Planned Unit Development zoning for an office park (which is by definition an office building or buildings of more than 40,000 square feet). (Letter from Martin P. Black, City's Chief of Land Use Administration, to Interstate Tallahassee West, dated August 13, 1990.) The City did not advise Interstate that it could not build such an office building on its property. (R-2, pp. 45, 46, and 100.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not requested a determination from the City as to whether the 2010 Comprehensive Plan would prohibit development of the property as the market might dictate. (R-2, p. 40.) At the hearing in this case, Interstate presented the testimony of Mr. Deeb regarding the existence of a master environmental permit for the original tract which was in place before Interstate purchased the property. (R-2, p. 67.) However, Interstate offered no evidence that such permit contemplated any specific use or density regarding development of the property. Costs Associated with Interstate's Property. Interstate purchased the original tract in 1986 at a cost of $748,000. (R-2, p. 17; Development Expenditures.) The cost to purchase the property was not incurred in reliance on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $325,063.82 in interest on acquisition loans, pursuant to the property purchase. (Development Expenditures.) The interest cost on acquisition loans was not incurred in reliance on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $46,824.95 in Ad Valorem taxes on the property. (Development Expenditures) These costs were not incurred based on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $28,839.75 on engineering and survey work on the property. (Development Expenditures) The costs of the engineering and survey work during 1989 were substantially incurred by Interstate in conjunction with the negotiations of the potential sale of the 6.98 acre parcel of its property to Deeb. (Chronological Listing of Events, pp. 2-3; R-2, p. 27.) These costs were not incurred based upon any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $8,500.00 in legal and miscellaneous fees associated with development of the original tract and the potential sale of the 6.98 acres to Deeb. (Chronological Listing, Development Expenditures) Interstate has failed to prove that these costs were incurred based on any representation of the City. The Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb. Negotiations between Interstate and Deeb regarding The Purchase and Sale Agreement began in the Spring of 1989. (R-2, p. 20.) Deeb executed the agreement on December 14, 1989, and the Interstate partners signed the agreement on December 27, 1989. (Purchase and Sale Agreement, p. 8.) Interstate does not assert that the City was privy to this agreement and has failed to prove that it relied on any representation of the City in entering into this agreement or in incurring any costs or future obligations pursuant to the agreement. Interstate was aware that the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was being developed when the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission approved Interstate's Preliminary Plat on January 18, 1990. (R-2, p. 50.) Interstate knew that the Comprehensive Plan "was coming" at the time Mr. Anthony (partner in Interstate) understood that the original tract was to be subdivided in order to "cut out" a site for Deeb so as to "key on him" as to the development of the property. (R-2, p. 46.) The Preliminary Subdivision Plat drawing, subsequently presented to the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission, is dated November 29, 1990. (Preliminary Subdivision Plat as approved on January 18, 1990.) The testimony of Thomas W. Anthony that Interstate would not have entered into the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb if it knew that it would not be able to move forward with C-2 development of the remaining lots is accepted. (R-2, p. 36.) However, Interstate has failed to prove that it relied on any representation of the City that it could so proceed upon adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The Utility Agreement. The Utility Agreement (previously described in paragraph 16) was executed by the City on June 25, 1990. The agreement was signed by on behalf of Interstate on June 29, 1990, by C. W. Harbin and Tommy Faircloth, and on July 10, 1990, by Mr. Anthony. This agreement outlines what Interstate and the City have each agreed to do in terms of Interstate's proposed development. The agreement describes Interstate's proposed development activity in general terms as "commercial development". In this agreement, the City makes no representation or commitments relative to any specific land use or specific density concerning Interstate's property. Interstate has failed to prove that the City, in executing the Utility Agreement, made any representation upon which Interstate relied in incurring any costs or future obligations. The Preliminary Plat Approval. The Preliminary Plat Approval of January 18, 1990, does not contemplate any specific uses, intensities or designations. (R-2, pp. 47-48.) Interstate has failed to prove that the approval of the Preliminary Plat constitutes an act or representation upon which Interstate relied in incurring any costs or future obligations. The A-2 Rezoning Approval. Interstate has failed to prove that it relied upon the act of the City, in approving Interstate's request to rezone a portion of the original tract from A-2 to C-2 in incurring any costs or future obligations. Interstate's Application for Vested Rights. On or about July 25, 1990, Interstate filed an application for vested rights determination (Application), with the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department. (Application VR0008T.) The Following information concerning the development of the subject property is contained on the Application: "Kent C. Deeb" is listed as the "owner/agent". Question 3 lists the name of the project as "Interstates Tallahassee West." The project is described as a "Four Lot Subdivision." The project location is described as "lots 1 and 2 Block A Commonwealth Center." The total project costs are estimated at $2.5 Million." Progress towards completion of the project is listed as: A. Planning: "Plans; Rezoning; Subdivision Plat Approval; Utility Agreement for Extension with the City"; B. Permitting: "Existing with the original Commonwealth Center Development; C. Site Preparation: "Zoning, Platting, and Plans"; D. Construction: "Original Holding Ponds". Total expenditures to date attributed to the progress towards completion of the project are listed as $1.325 Million. The form of government approval allowing the project to proceed is listed as "Original Plat; Rezoning; Subdivision Plat." On August 20, 1990, a hearing was held to consider the application before the City's three member Staff Committee. Kent C. Deeb appeared and testified for Interstate. By letter dated August 21, 1990, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning for the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Department, informed Interstate that the Application had been denied. During the hearing before the undersigned, Interstate stipulated that it sought approval of its Application based upon "common law vesting" and not upon "statutory vesting," as those terms are defined in City of Tallahassee Ordinance 90-0-0043AA.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Dale K. Niemann and Janet R. Niemann, own property on Devon Drive, in Clearwater, Florida, which is approximately two houses down the street from the Respondent, John Blakely. On or about May 25, 1990, Mr. Blakely requested two variances from the Development Code Adjustment Board of the City of Clearwater. It was his intention to seek the variances in order to extend his present dock approximately twenty-five feet (to a length of eighty-nine feet) and to allow the dock to be positioned 8 feet from an extended side property line. The Petitioners oppose the requests and argue that the extension is not necessary to make reasonable use of Respondent's dock. Further, they claim that, if allowed, the dock extension, together with the boat lift the Respondent proposes, will interfere with their view of the water. The proposed dock extension will not obstruct navigational activities. The natural shoaling process has resulted in the accretion of sand and silt along the Respondent's property. As a result, during low tides it is difficult to utilize the existing dock and would be impossible to use it for the proposed boat lift. Also, there is a grass flat landward of the proposed boat lift site upon which the Respondent's construction will not infringe. The construction of the lift at the terminus of the existing dock might disrupt that grass bed. The Respondent will not financially gain from the granting of the requested variances. The approval of the variances will not impair an adequate supply of light or ventilation to the adjacent properties, nor substantially diminish or impair the value of the surrounding property. The approval of the variances will not adversely affect the public health, safety, order, convenience or general welfare of the community. The approval of the variances will not violate the general spirit and intent of the Development Code. While the approval of the variances may alter the Petitioners' view from the side window of their residence, such alteration should not materially detract or injure their property or the property or improvements of others in the neighborhood. Other structures which Respondent could construct without the approval of variances could be more detrimental to the neighborhood.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this appeal are whether the decision of the Board to approve Flexible Development Application FLD2019-01002 (Application) filed by Edgewater Valor cannot be sustained by substantial competent evidence before the Board, or that the decision of the Board departed from the essential requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact Edgewater Valor proposes to develop an 80-unit attached dwelling with 164 associated off-street parking spaces on 2.931 acres of property it owns. The property is located at 1026 Sunset Point Road and 1919 Edgewater Drive in Clearwater, Florida. The proposal consists of three buildings and a structured parking platform with a pool and deck on the west side of the parking platform. Sixty percent of the 164 parking spaces is garage parking, with the rest as exposed surface parking. Two of the buildings, both in the T district, are proposed at a height of 86 feet measured from base flood elevation. The third building, in the MDR district, is proposed at a height of 38 feet measured from base flood elevation. The buildings in the T district are set back 152 feet from the east property line. The building in the MDR district is set back 75 feet from the east property line. The proposal includes landscaping and setbacks that exceed the Board's requirements for approval. The Application requests Level Two approval of flexibility for a building height of 86 feet from base flood elevation in the T zoning district. A Level One approval allows a building height of up to 50 feet, and up to 100 feet as a Level Two approval. The Application also requests Level Two approval of flexibility for an attached dwelling use in the MDR zoning district. The attached dwelling has a building height of 38 feet from base flood elevation, where up to 40 feet is allowed as a Level Two approval and flexibility from lot width in the MDR zoning district. Edgewater Valor owns 2.437 acres of the property which is zoned T with an underlying Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use category of Resort Facilities High (RFH). The remaining 0.494 acres is zoned MDR with an underlying Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use category of Residential Medium (RM). The property to the north of the proposed development is zoned T and is currently developed as a Comfort Suites hotel. The property to the south is zoned Office (O), MDR, and Preservation (P). There is a vacant automobile service station adjacent to the proposed development to the southwest, and a multi-family development to the south across Sunset Point Road. The property to the east is zoned MDR and P with single-family detached dwellings and attached dwellings further east along Sunset Point Road. The property to the west is zoned Commercial (C) and P. EDNA's boundaries are Sunset Point Road north to Union Street, and Edgewater Drive east to Pinellas Trail. The neighborhood consists of 400 homes that are mostly single-family, single-story detached dwellings. The proposed development would be located in the southwest corner of the neighborhood at the intersection of Edgewater Drive and Sunnydale Drive. The Comfort Suites hotel is located directly across from the proposed development on the opposite corner of Sunnydale Drive and Edgewater Drive. Sunnydale Drive travels east away from Edgewater Drive and dead-ends as a cul-de-sac with mostly single- family detached dwellings.
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G14-22.012 is an invalid exercise of legislatively delegated authority in violation of section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2014).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner BBP is an association of harbor pilots that performs the pilotage services at PortMiami. BBP consists of pilots licensed by the State of Florida in accordance with chapter 310, Florida Statutes. Petitioner PEPA is an association of harbor pilots that performs the pilotage services at Port Everglades. PEPA consists of pilots licensed by the State of Florida in accordance with chapter 310. FHPA is a statewide organization representing the interests of Florida’s approximately 100 state-licensed harbor pilots, the membership of which is comprised of the eleven local pilot associations that serve each of Florida’s 14 deep-water ports. BBP and PEPA are members of FHPA. Chapter 310 governs pilots, piloting, and pilotage in the waters, harbors, and ports of Florida. Section 310.141, Florida Statutes, requires that, except in certain narrow circumstances, all vessels shall have a licensed state pilot or deputy pilot on board to direct the movements of the vessel when entering or leaving ports of the state or when underway on the navigable waters of the state’s bays, rivers, harbors, and ports. Section 310.011 creates the 10-member Board of Pilot Commissioners (“BOPC” or “Board”); each member is appointed by the Governor “to perform such duties and possess and exercise such powers relative to the protection of the waters, harbors, and ports of this state as are prescribed and conferred on it in this chapter.” In addition to other responsibilities, the Board determines the number of pilots in each port (section 310.061) and disciplines licensed pilots when appropriate (section 310.101). Although the BOPC has numerous statutory responsibilities, setting the rates of pilotage in each port is not one of them. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G14-22.012 (“challenged rule” or “rule”) is entitled “Determination of Disputed Issues of Material Fact; Formal or Informal Hearings.” 5. Rule 61G14-22.012 cites section 310.151(1)(c) as specific authority. The challenged rule lists as “Law Implemented” sections 310.151 and 120.57. The former Pilotage Rate Review Board originally adopted the rule in 1995. When the Legislature amended chapter 310 in 2010, the former Pilotage Rate Review Board’s name was changed to the Pilotage Rate Review Committee (“PRRC” or “Committee”). The Committee consists of seven members, all of whom are also members of the BOPC. The PRRC is responsible for setting rates of pilotage in each port. On November 5, 2014, the BOPC/PRRC published a notice in the Florida Administrative Register announcing a telephone conference call meeting for consideration of “Rate Review Committee Rules.” PRRC members voted at that meeting to repeal rule 61G14-22.012, but determined they did not have enough information to know if a Statement of Estimated Regulatory Costs was required. On December 11, 2014, the BOPC/PRRC published a second notice in the Florida Administrative Register announcing a telephone conference call meeting for consideration of “Rate Review Committee Rules.” At that meeting, the PRRC voted to reconsider its original vote to repeal rule 61G14-22.012, but because the issue of potential reconsideration had not been properly noticed, no official vote on reconsideration was taken. On January 7, 2015, the BOPC/PRRC published a notice in the Florida Administrative Register announcing a meeting on January 22, 2015, and January 23, 2015. Among the subjects noticed for consideration was “Reconsideration of Repeal of Rule 61G14-22.012, F.A.C.” This matter was considered by the PRRC on January 23, 2015. By a 5-2 vote, the Committee voted against repealing rule 61G14-22.012. FCCA is a trade association representing cruise lines that are subject to pilotage fees pursuant to chapter 310, Florida Statutes. FCCA has filed petitions to reduce the rates of pilotage in both PortMiami and in Port Everglades.
The Issue Whether the proposed amendment to Rule 40E-7.653, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact In July 1996, the Governing Board of the Respondent, South Florida Water Management District (District), adopted Chapter 40E-7, Part VI, Florida Administrative Code, which is called the Supplier Diversity & Outreach M/WBE Contracting Rule. Rule 40E-7.611(1), Florida Administrative Code sets forth the purpose of the rule as follows: The rules under this Part establish policies and procedures designed to remedy documented disparities in District contracting and the present effects of past marketplace discrimination. The rules under this Part implement specific recommendations of the District's Minority Business Availability and Utilization Study ('Study') as developed by MGT of America, Inc., dated August, 1995 and made a part of the District's Supplier Diversity & Outreach Program ('Program'). The rules under this Part shall apply to all competitive solicitations for commodities, construction, professional, and other contractual services, including change orders and amendments. The Supplier Diversity & Outreach M/WBE Contracting Rule became effective September 25, 1996. Prior to the effective date of the rule, the District had a minority and women business enterprise (M/WBE) program, but had no rules governing the program. Under the pre-rule policy governing the M/WBE program, the standards for determining eligibility for certification were less stringent than those adopted by rule in 1996. Beginning in October 1995, the District issued certification eligibility determinations for three-year periods. Prior to that time certifications were for a period of one year. The District maintains a database of firms which have been certified as M/WBE's and uses that database to generate lists of eligible firms for specific solicitations. The list for any particular solicitation is project-specific based on the opportunities for M/WBE participation afforded by the project. For example, if a contract calls for plumbing, but not electrical services, the list of eligible M/WBE firms would be limited to plumbing contractors. At the time that the Supplier Diversity & Outreach M/WBE Contracting Rule was adopted in July 1996, the District did not address in the rule how pre-rule certified M/WBE firms would be affected by the certification eligibility requirements in Rule 40E-7.653, Florida Administrative Code. Based on the District's database, there were approximately 370 to 380 firms which had been certified as M/WBE's prior to September 25, 1996, the effective date of Chapter 40E-7, Part VI, Florida Administrative Code. Some of the pre-rule certified firms are presently providing services to the District under existing contracts. On December 19, 1997, the District gave notice by publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly of proposed amendments to Rule 40E-7.653, Florida Administrative Code. A Notice of Change was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on February 28, 1998. The proposed amendment to Rule 40E- 7.653, Florida Administrative Code, which is at issue states: For purposes of this rule, a firm shall be considered a District certified M/WBE only if the firm has applied for and been granted certification by the District after September 25, 1996. Firms certified prior to September 25, 1996, shall be counted toward the M/WBE goal attainment only if: the firm is either a prime contractor or subcontractor for a particular District contract executed prior to the effective date of this rule; or the firm is listed on the M/WBE vendor list for particular District solicitation issued prior to the effective date of this rule. In either case, the firm shall only be counted toward M/WBE goal attainment for that particular contract or solicitation. As part of the proposed rulemaking process, the District sent notice to all potentially affected firms recommending that the firms voluntarily apply for recertification prior to the effective date of the proposed rule. Carolyn Williams, the Director of the Office of Supplier Diversity and Outreach at the District, described the notification process as follows: We, when we initially entered into rule adoption, we sent a notice to all those interested and impacted firms and advised them that the District was undertaking this process and asked them to voluntarily submit their application for recertification, because at some point if the proposed rule was adopted, there would be an effective date and those firms then who had not come in to reapply for certification and did not fall within the exceptions under this proposed rule would no longer be considered certified by the District. The firms who fell within the two exceptions in the final rule language would be protected, and those firms who came back in to be recertified before the effective date of this rule would be protected, but anyone who did not would fall off the list. The rule initially had a May 1 effective date. We put a time, a series of dates in place to try to ensure that we notified all persons appropriately so they could get their certifications in, the application in. We had a March 30 deadline for all firms interested in recertifying prior to the effective date of the proposed rule, which was May 1. So again, if you didn't fall within the exceptions, the two exceptions, and you were certified prior to the rule, the original date of the rule, if you did not reapply by that May 1 date or we had not made a decision with regard to your status by that time, you would no longer be considered by the District. Gulf Construction, Inc. (Gulf), was sent notice but did not submit an application for recertification. During the final hearing, counsel for the District acknowledged that Gulf was a pre-rule certified M/WBE. (Transcript at 66 and 67).
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Florida Administrative Rule 61G15-22.011(2) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Peter J. Singhofen is a licensed professional engineer in the State of Florida. He is the President and sole stockholder of Petitioner Streamline. In the 1980’s, Mr. Singhofen had a need for and developed engineering software that specialized in stormwater management for the terrain found in Florida. The software had to be specific to Florida because the terrain in the state is different from the terrain in many other parts of the country, and the Florida Statutes and rules governing stormwater management are some of the most stringent in the country. The software that Mr. Singhofen developed uses the Interconnected Channel and Pond Routing model (ICPR). This system performs complex calculations utilized in stormwater management and planning. It was the first proprietary model to be formally reviewed and accepted as a nationally accepted hydraulic model. ICPR is also extensively used by local and state government agencies throughout Florida, both to review stormwater permit applications as well as for the development of stormwater management master plans. Some of the users of Petitioners’ software are the Southwest Florida Water Management District, Department of Environmental Protection, South Florida Water Management District, St. Johns Water Management District, and Department of Transportation. Indeed, ICPR may be the most popular program of its type in the State of Florida. Streamline sells the stormwater management software and offers training and technical support for the software it sells. Clearly Petitioners have a direct financial interest in the engineering software they developed and own. As part of its business, Streamline conducts eight-to- ten workshops each year. Many of the state and local agencies that use ICPR send their engineers to these training programs. These workshops take three days. The first two days consist of intense lectures supported by hands-on exercises on computers provided by Petitioners. On the third day participants perform a "real world" project, using aerial photographs and survey notes to work on the project. The evidence was clear that these workshops are not “shill” presentations that are tantamount to product promotions or advertisements. Florida Statutes require licensed professional engineers to obtain a minimum of four professional development hours in the licensees' area of practice each biennium, or two hours per year. The Board approved Streamline as a CE provider during the 2001-2003 and 2003-2005 bienniums. However, Streamline's application for approval for the 2005-2007 biennium was denied as a result of amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-22.011(2), effective August 8, 2005. The amendment to the Rule in question reads as follows: . . . The continuing education provider shall not have any financial or commercial interest, direct or indirect, in any technology that is the subject of the instruction. The denial, and thus the Rule, has the potential to affect Petitioners’ substantial interests in its product since their training can no longer qualify for CE credits for the engineers who need training and technical support in order to better use this complex software. The Notice of Rulemaking published in the Florida Administrative Weekly listed the authority for the Rule as Section 471.017(3), Florida Statutes. Section 471.017(3), Florida Statutes, grants the Board rulemaking authority and requires that the CE rules be consistent with the guidelines of the National Council of Examiners for engineering and Surveying (NCEES) for multijurisdictional licensees. The Notice of Rule Development published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, as well as the Notice of Rulemaking, stated the purpose and effect of the Rule was to include a prohibition of conflict of interest as an added requirement for Board approval of CE providers. The same reason was provided in the Additional Statement to the Secretary of State under the Statement of Facts and Circumstances Justifying Proposed Rule. However, there was no discussion or finding by the Board prior to engaging in rulemaking that a CE provider who taught about technology over which he or she had a commercial interest would be engaging in a conflict of interest. In fact, the NCEES guidelines do not contain such a prohibition. According to the Board’s Director, the statement that the purpose and effect of the Rule was to avoid a conflict of interest was "erroneous" and that "it was erroneous three times if it was published three times." Indeed, other than minor references in various minutes of Board meetings, there was very little official Board discussion about the Rule prior to its adoption. The evidence on the rationale behind the Rule showed that there was general concern by the Board over prohibiting “shill” CE courses that were nothing more than product promotions or advertisements. The fact that the published purpose of the Rule was erroneous is a material failure to follow the rulemaking process since notice to the public of the Rule’s purpose is an important aspect of rulemaking. Notably, the Board does not directly approve individual courses. It approves CE providers. Under the Rule the courses must be offered or sponsored by an approved CE provider. NCEES model rules do recognize that a governmental authority may approve CE providers. In Appendix C, the guidelines indicate that provider approval be contingent upon the provider permitting a Board to attend courses and review course material to determine whether the course meets the standards of the Board. In the process of applying for CE provider status, the Board requires the applicant to provide course descriptions, syllabuses, and a list of courses intended to be provided. Section 456.025(7), Florida Statutes, mandates that: [e]ach board . . . shall establish, by rule, a fee not to exceed $250 for anyone seeking approval to provide continuing education courses or programs and shall establish by rule a biennial renewal fee not to exceed $250 for the renewal of providership of such courses. The fees collected from continuing education providers shall be used for the purposes of reviewing course provider applications, monitoring the integrity of the courses provided, covering legal expenses incurred as a result of not granting or renewing a providership, and developing and maintaining an electronic continuing education tracking system. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-22.011 provides that: The Board retains the right to audit and/or monitor courses [61G15-22.011(7)], which the guidelines require the provider to permit; The Board retains the right to review course materials [61G15-22.011(7)], which the guidelines require the provider to supply; The provider must provide a description of the type of courses or seminars the provider expects to conduct [61G15- 22.011(3)(a)] and a sample of intended course materials [61G15-22.011(3)(d) and the course curriculum [61G15-22.011(3)(f)], which the guidelines require a provider to supply; The provider must demonstrate the education and/or experience necessary to instruct engineers in the conduct of their practice [61G15-22.011(2)], which reflects the guideline requirement that providers ensure instructors are qualified; The provider must list anticipated locations to conduct the course [61G15- 22.011(3)(3)], which the guidelines require the provider to supply after the course is presented. Based upon information an applicant has provided, the Board has in the past denied applications for CE providers proposing to offer "shill" courses. Additionally, an existing rule of the Board, as well as NCEES guidelines, specifically provides that equipment demonstrations or trade show displays do not qualify as continuing education activities. See Fla. Admin. R. 61G15- 22.005. The evidence was not clear on how denial of CE provider status, because the provider had a financial interest in the technology which is the subject of a CE course, would prohibit “shill” courses without limiting otherwise legitimate CE courses such as the one here. Indeed, the most logical person to present a course on the software at issue here would be Petitioners, since they are the developers of the software. The NCEES guidelines at Section 2 set forth model rules for continuing professional competency. NCEES guideline 2B4 defines course/activity as any qualifying course or activity with a clear purpose and objective that will maintain, improve, or expand the skills and knowledge relevant to the licensee's field of practice. Rule 61G15- 22.002(5) defines course/activity as any qualifying course or activity with a clear purpose and objective that will maintain, improve or expand the skills and knowledge relevant to the licensee's area of practice. Clearly, Petitioners’ workshops meet these definitions. NCEES guideline 2C sets forth the ways licensees can earn the necessary CE credit through patenting inventions, active participation as an officer in professional or technical societies, authoring published papers, articles, books or accepted licensing exam items, teaching or instructing college courses or continuing education courses, completion of college courses, CE courses, correspondence, televised, videotaped and other short courses or tutorials, seminars, in-house courses, attendance at workshops, professional and technical presentations made at meetings, conventions or conferences. Similarly, Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-22.003, sets forth qualifying activities for the area of practice requirements and generally lists the same types of activities as the NCEES guidelines. Petitioners’ course specifically falls within both the NCEES guidelines and the Board’s rules defining qualifying activities for CE credit. Thus, the Board’s amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-22.011 results in a qualifying activity being excluded from such recognition, and thereby is inconsistent with NCEES guidelines. Such inconsistency is outside of the Board’s rulemaking authority and the amendment to Florida Administrative Rule 61G15-22.011(2) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
