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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs ROSEMARY GROSSMAN, 14-002543PL (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Land O Lakes, Florida May 29, 2014 Number: 14-002543PL Latest Update: Mar. 14, 2025
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GIOVANNI L. CAMPODONICO vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, 01-000257 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 17, 2001 Number: 01-000257 Latest Update: Aug. 02, 2001

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner successfully completed the Civil/Sanitary Engineer Examination on April 14, 2000, of the Board of Professional Engineers.

Findings Of Fact On April 14, 2000, Petitioner took the Examination. The minimum score required to pass the Examination was Respondent notified Petitioner that he had not successfully completed the Examination, having received a score of 69. The Examination is a national examination and is graded by national examiners, i. e., the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying (NCEES). A separate scoring plan is used for grading each essay question. A separate scorer is used for each essay question, generally scores a given question for all of the Examination. The identity of the candidate/examinee by name is not revealed; the candidate/examinee is given a number and is identified by the number given to him/her. By letter dated September 19, 2000, Petitioner notified Respondent that he was challenging essay questions numbered 120, 124, and 211 on the Examination and that he was requesting a re- scoring of those questions. Petitioner completed a Request for Review of Examination Item form for each question and included, from his point of view, why he should be afforded additional credit and what score he should receive for each question. Petitioner's Examination was returned to the NCEES for review and rescoring. NCEES' rescorer used the same scoring plan that was used for the Examination. NCEES' rescorer recommended that Petitioner receive no additional points for questions numbered 120, 124, and 211 and included a detailed rationale for the recommended score of each challenged question. NCEES determined that Petitioner was not entitled to additional credit and further determined that Petitioner's total raw score of 47, equivalent to a total score of 69, would not be changed. The maximum score achievable for each essay question was ten points, with points subtracted for various reasons as provided in the scoring plan. The score for each essay question was rounded to the next highest even number, resulting in a score of 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, or 10. For question numbered 120, Petitioner received a score of eight points. Petitioner challenges only one part of question numbered 120, regarding his computation of the ultimate bearing capacity for a given footing. For question numbered 120, Petitioner ignored the correction in the requirement for the mid-height water table. He quoted an equation from a reference material but failed to include the correction for the water table in his equation. Furthermore, even though Petitioner incorrectly calculated the effective weight of the soil, he failed to include in the question what he had calculated. The scoring plan for question numbered 120 requires a two-point reduction if the correction for the water table is ignored. Petitioner failed to correctly answer the challenged portion of question numbered 120. Petitioner should receive a score of eight points and, therefore, should not receive any additional points. For question numbered 124, Petitioner received a score of 6 points. Petitioner challenges only one part of question numbered 124, regarding his determination of the maximum sight distance obtainable in the given situation. Petitioner contends that the challenged part was improper, arbitrary, subjective, and open to interpretation. The challenged part of question numbered 124 asked the candidate to determine the maximum distance from the eye to the top of a six-inch high object on the road. It is clear that the challenged part asked for the determination as to how far one can see in a straight line before something obstructs one's view. In making the determination, no additional factors were to be considered, such as what the headlight factor was, or what the ability of a car to stop was, or what the conditions of the road were, or any other factor. Petitioner assumed additional factors. He assumed the sight distance for a sag vertical curve as a stopping sight distance. In calculating the distance, Petitioner made no reference to the obstruction in the calculation formula. His answer had a numerical difference from the correct answer of more than ten percent. The difference was 69 percent. The challenged part of question numbered 124 was not arbitrary, capricious, improper, subjective, or open to interpretation. According to the scoring plan, Petitioner's answer for question numbered 124 requires a two point reduction. Petitioner failed to correctly answer the challenged portion of question numbered 124. Petitioner should receive a score of six points and is, therefore, not entitled to receive any additional points. For question numbered 211, Petitioner received a score of four points. Petitioner challenges the question to the extent that he asserts that he answered 75 percent of the question correctly and, therefore, should receive a score of at least six points. Question numbered 211 is a two-part question. Petitioner admits that he made numerical errors in his solution and that he failed to answer the second part of the question. Petitioner contends that he had insufficient time to answer the second part and that, if he had sufficient time, he would have performed re-calculations and would have been able to demonstrate his understanding of the principles of pumps in series and pumps in parallel. Regardless of Petitioner's contention, his failure to answer the second part of the question was what was before the scorer and re-scorer and was reasonably determined to demonstrate that he failed to understand the development of a pump curve for pumps in series. Failure to demonstrate understanding of the development of a pump curve for pumps in series constitutes, according to the scoring plan, a fundamental error. Because of his errors in the solution and his failure to answer one part, the scoring plan requires that Petitioner receive a score of four points. Petitioner should receive a score of four points and is, therefore, not entitled to receive any additional points. Petitioner's answers were not arbitrarily or capriciously graded. The grading was not devoid of logic and reason. The scoring plan was properly used. At hearing, Petitioner demonstrated a great deal of knowledge regarding the challenged questions. However, he failed to demonstrate such knowledge on the Examination. Petitioner's score on the Examination should not be changed and, therefore, should remain at 69. Petitioner has not obtained the minimum score required to pass the Examination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Engineers enter a final order finding Giovanni L. Campodonico ineligible for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2001.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.5720.03471.005471.038768.28 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61-11.010
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GREGORY NEIL BROWN vs FRANK T. BROGAN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, 97-001391F (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderhill, Florida Mar. 17, 1997 Number: 97-001391F Latest Update: Jun. 11, 1997

The Issue This is a proceeding pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, in which the only disputed issues concern whether the Petitioner is a small business party and whether the Respondent was substantially justified in bringing the underlying proceeding.

Findings Of Fact The findings of fact which follow are based on “the pleadings and supporting documents, and the files and records of the Division of Administrative Hearings.” See Rule 60Q-2.035(7), Florida Administrative Code.1 In DOAH Case No. 96-4290, the Commissioner of Education filed an Administrative Complaint against Mr. Brown. By means of that Administrative Complaint, the Commissioner sought to take disciplinary action against Mr. Brown on the basis of allegations of misconduct by Mr. Brown in connection with his employment as a coach with the Dade County School System. An investigation was conducted prior to filing the Administrative Complaint and at the time the Administrative Complaint was filed, the agency had in its possession affidavits and other evidence which, if believed, were sufficient to establish the charges alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Prior to filing the Administrative Complaint, the evidence collected during the investigation was reviewed by agency legal counsel for the purpose of determining whether there was probable cause to file an Administrative Complaint. Upon review, the evidence appeared to be sufficient to warrant the issuance of an Administrative Complaint. Following discovery in the underlying case, the agency re-evaluated its position and, on the advice of counsel, decided to file a voluntary dismissal of the Administrative Complaint. The decision to dismiss the Administrative Complaint was based on the fact that, following discovery, the agency had serious doubts that it could prove its case by the required “clear and convincing” standard. At the time of the filing of the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Brown was the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business. His principal office was in this state. He was domiciled in this state. He had fewer than twenty-five employees and a new worth of less than two million dollars. At the time of the filing of the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Brown was not an employee of the Dade County Public School System. Rather, he was performing part-time coaching services essentially as an independent contractor.

Florida Laws (2) 120.6857.111
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VERNON JACKSON vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 02-002672 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Quincy, Florida Jul. 05, 2002 Number: 02-002672 Latest Update: Jan. 30, 2003

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification for working in a position of trust with disabled adults and children pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Since 1979, Petitioner, Vernon Jackson (Petitioner), has been employed by the Department of Children and Family Services (Respondent) or its predecessor government agency, with the exception of a period in 1996-97. He is presently classified as a psychiatric aide. Petitioner worked in a unit of the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, which provides care to the patients of the facility, and he is a caregiver. It is in that capacity that he is subject to the employment screening requirements of Chapter 435 of the Florida Statutes. On August 23, 1980, Petitioner's girlfriend, Willie Thomas, got into an argument with a 17-year-old girl named Gwendolyn Arnold. When the argument between Thomas and Arnold escalated into a physical fight, Petitioner became involved in the fray. Arnold's 15-year-old brother also joined in the activity. As a result of the incident, Petitioner was charged with the misdemeanor offenses of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest without violence, and battery. Petitioner pled guilty to all three of the charged offenses. Adjudication of guilt was withheld by the court. Petitioner paid a fine of $50, plus costs, for the first two counts, disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence, and a fine of $100, plus costs, for the battery charge. In conjunction with the battery charge he was placed on probation for a period of one year. Petitioner's next criminal episode also involved Willie Thomas, his earlier girlfriend. On April 16, 1981, Petitioner was arrested and pled guilty to trespassing at Thomas’ home. He was required to pay a fine of $50. Although, adjudication was again withheld, he was placed on probation to run concurrently with his earlier probation sentence. Some months later, on November 19, 1981, Petitioner pled guilty to disorderly conduct involving a public brawl with two men. He paid a fine of $75 and adjudication of guilt was withheld. Employment screening at the Florida State Hospital was commenced in 1997 for positions of employment similar to that held by Petitioner. Petitioner's 1980 offense and 1981 plea was overlooked until this year. On or about April 20, 2002, after discovery of the battery offense, a decision was made to remove him from a caregiver position pending resolution of his request for an exemption. With a birth date of January 21, 1960, Petitioner was 20 years of age at the time of his first offense and 21 years of age when he last committed a criminal offense. Several supervisors of Petitioner testified that he was at all times a caring and diligent worker. Those supervisors included Karen Alford (“He was good.”); Freddie Culver (described Mr. Jackson as showing a lot of care and kindness); and Helen Conrad (“Excellent”). The parties stipulated that Julia Thomas and Barry Moore would testify to similar conclusion and opinions as to the quality of Petitioner's employment. Petitioner’s performance appraisals were at least satisfactory.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting Petitioner an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2002.

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CHARLES W. LEVERSON | C. W. L. vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 98-000985 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Quincy, Florida Mar. 02, 1998 Number: 98-000985 Latest Update: Aug. 10, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a request by Petitioner, Charles W. Leverson, Sr., for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. If the request is approved, Petitioner would be allowed to return to work as a unit treatment rehabilitation specialist in a unit for developmentally disabled adults at Florida State Hospital (FSH). Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of approving or denying such requests. In a preliminary decision entered on an unknown date, a DCFS committee denied the request principally on the ground that Petitioner had minimized or denied the gravity of his disqualifying offenses. Petitioner is now barred from doing such work because of disqualifying offenses which occurred on December 16, 1990, and March 24, 1992. On the first date, Petitioner was arrested for the offense of aggrevated battery on his wife, a misdemeanor under Section 784.04, Florida Statutes (1990). On the second date, Petitioner was again arrested for five offenses, including battery on his wife in violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1991). As to the first charge, on January 26, 1993, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of battery and was placed on one year's supervised probation. He was also required to "[s]pend 15 weekends in the county jail." In addition, Petitioner was ordered "not [to] possess or consume any alcohol during the term of [his] probation," and to "[c]ontinue with counseling" (of an undisclosed nature). As to the second charge, Petitioner was found guilty by a jury on July 24, 1992, of committing battery on his wife in violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes. A "not guilty" verdict was entered as to the remaining four charges. The record does not indicate the sentence, if any, that he received for this offense. Petitioner successfully completed all terms of his probation. Since his arrest in March 1992, he has not consumed any alcoholic beverages. This is an important consideration since both disqualifying offenses occurred when he was intoxicated. Petitioner began working at FSH on September 26, 1979. He was first employed as a support service aide but was eventually promoted to the position of unit treatment rehabilitation specialist, a position involving supervision of developmentally disabled adults. Because of a background screening which occurred in 1997, Petitioner's disqualifying offenses were discovered, and he was forced to resign effective February 12, 1998. He has requested an exemption so that he can return to his employment. Since being forced to resign some four months ago, he has not been employed. The two disqualifying offenses involve battery on Petitioner's long-time wife, Shirler. In both cases, she suffered injuries serious enough to require treatment at a local hospital. Shirler says, however, that Petitioner has "changed" since his 1992 arrest, and he no longer drinks, is communicative with her and the three children, and is a good father. Petitioner attends church, is a member of a lodge in Quincy, Florida, and has a much better attitude since he stopped drinking. He has received good work evaluations during his most recent years of employment at FSH. Former co-workers and supervisors attested to the fact that Petitioner has good rapport with his co-workers and residents, and he performs his stressful job with a "cheerful" and "pleasant" attitude. He was also described as one of the "better" employees in the forensic unit. In March 1987, or more than eleven years ago, Petitioner received a five-day suspension because of an altercation with an inmate in the FSH forensic section laundry room. The suspension was meted out after Petitioner became involved in an argument with an inmate and drew an opened knive in a threatening fashion. Although Petitioner denied that the blade was exposed, testimony by a co-worker established that it was exposed in a threatening fashion. The altercation was resolved, however, before any violence occurred. In mitigation, it was established that Petitioner's possession of a knive in the laundry room was not unlawful since it was necessary for him to use a knive to open the sealed buckets of detergents. On October 13, 1993, Petitioner received a written reprimand for "Abusive and/or Threatening Language." On that occasion, Petitioner was instructed by his supervisor to help fold some laundry in the laundry room. Petitioner replied that he would not and told him "to get off my fucking back." Petitioner also pointed his fist at the supervisor in a threatening manner and "threatened to kick his butt." On June 27, 1994, Petitioner was suspended for fifteen work days effective July 8, 1994, for using threatening and/or abusive language towards a supervisor. This disciplinary action was taken after Petitioner had again refused to comply with instructions by his supervisor. On that occasion, he became "real mad," called her a "motherfucker," shook his fist at her, and threatened to "get her." Although the supervisor stood her ground against Petitioner, she was "afraid" for her safety. Petitioner was less than candid in describing the incidents which led to him receiving disciplinary action by his employer in 1987, 1993, and 1994. He has, however, expressed remorse for striking his wife in 1990 and 1992, and he regrets the embarrassment he caused his wife and children. For the last four years, Petitioner has had a blemish-free record at FSH, including good evaluations from his supervisors and a reputation as one of the "better" employees in his section. Given these considerations, it is found that Petitioner has sufficiently rehabilitated himself since the disqualifying incidents, and that he will pose no threat to the FSH clients and inmates.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949

Florida Laws (3) 120.569435.07784.03
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WILLIE B. SMITH vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 03-000197 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Chattahoochee, Florida Jan. 22, 2003 Number: 03-000197 Latest Update: Aug. 11, 2004

The Issue Whether the Petitioner was discriminated against based upon his race when he was disciplined for absenting his post contrary to Chapter 760.10, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Willie B. Smith, is an African-American male. He is now and was at the time of the incidents involved in his complaint employed by the Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services, at Florida State Hospital as a guard in the forensic (prison) unit. The Petitioner is part of a bargaining unit that is represented by the Florida Police Benevolent Association. On November 15, 2001, at approximately 1:05 a.m., the Petitioner contacted his Shift Supervisor, Jimmie Williams, an African-American male, and requested to leave his assigned post in Tower B and go to Unit 3 at the hospital and pick up food from a fish fry. Williams approved the Petitioner’s leaving his post to get the food and to return to his post after getting the food. At 2:35 a.m., Williams was contacted on the radio by the Control Room Officer, Johnny Smith, who indicated that the Petitioner wanted to talk to him on the telephone. Williams provided Johnny Smith a telephone number at which the Petitioner could reach him, and the Petitioner called Williams a short time later. The Petitioner informed Williams that he had spilled diesel fuel on his uniform and asked permission to take the remainder of the shift off. Williams asked the Petitioner where he was, surprised that the Petitioner was some place other than at his post. The Petitioner refused to identify where he was, and Williams denied his request for leave. Realizing that the Petitioner was not at his post, Williams proceeded to Tower B and manned that post until the Petitioner arrived there at 3:04 a.m. When he arrived at Tower B, Williams asked the Petitioner where he had been, and the Petitioner stated he had been at the Florida State Hospital gas station. Williams had checked the Florida State Hospital gas station looking for the Petitioner and was aware that the Petitioner had not been there. At this point, angry words were exchanged and the Petitioner admitted that he had not been at the gas station. Williams wrote up an incident report that initiated a formal investigation into the Petitioner's having absented himself from his post while on duty without proper authorization. The Petitioner was advised of the investigation, and he requested that the PBA represent him in the investigation pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. At the Petitioner's specific request, Steve Mears, from the Tallahassee Office of the PBA, represented the Petitioner in this matter. During the course of a break in a meeting held with regard to the investigation, the Petitioner mentioned to Mears voluntarily changing duty stations, and Mears raised this request with representatives of the Respondent, including William T. Parker, now Chief of Security. As a result, the Petitioner was re-assigned from the forensic unit to the central forensic unit because this was the only place where there was a vacancy. His shift and days off remained the same, which did not constitute a transfer under the terms of the contract. Such a re-assignment was not subject to being grieved under the terms of the bargaining agreement. See testimony of Parker and Mears. The Petitioner's days off changed from the first and third weeks of the month to the second and fourth weeks of the month, but the days of the week remained the same. Although the evidence supports a finding that this move was voluntary, it is not material because, under terms of the bargaining agreement, such a re-assignment was not subject to a grievance. The investigation established sufficient cause for the Respondent to issue an official letter of reprimand to the Petitioner for absenting his post without permission. Pursuant to internal policy, the Petitioner's new supervisor, Roger Howell, who had had nothing to do with the incident upon which the reprimand was based, issued the letter. See testimony of Howell and Bryant. The Respondent introduced the Employee's Handbook, dated Mary 29, 2001, which the Petitioner had received. The book contains the Standards for Disciplinary Action, which include absences without authorized leave. This provision provides that for the first occurrence of Absence Without Authorized Leave, the section under which the Petitioner was disciplined, the violator can be given a range of punishments from a written reprimand to dismissal. See testimony of Bryant. Evidence was received that these penalties have been imposed upon employees of the Respondent without regard to race or gender. See testimony of Williams. At the hearing, the Petitioner expressed his concern that his reprimand had been signed by someone who had no knowledge of the incident, and stated that he felt he had permission to leave his post. He also introduced a doctor's excuse (Petitioner's Exhibit 2); however, the date of the doctor's visit did not relate to the date of the incident. The supervisor who signed the letter of reprimand and the personnel specialist who prepared the letter testified that it was policy for an employee's supervisor to sign the reprimand, even if he or she personally did not have knowledge of the events. Mr. Williams testified regarding his authorization to the Petitioner to leave his post to get food. He was very credible. He expected the Petitioner, in accordance with regular procedure, to leave his post, get his food, and return to the post immediately, being absent from the Tower for approximately 30 minutes. This was the normal process for getting food during a shift. The Petitioner was gone for two hours, and gone for over an hour without Williams being aware that Tower B was not covered. There was significant evidence introduced that none of the actions complained of by the Petitioner were motivated by racial animus. The disciplinary action taken by the Petitioner was at the lower end of penalties that could have been imposed. The complainant, Williams, was also an African-American. The PBA representative, whom the Petitioner specifically requested over the regular one at the hospital, testified regarding the events leading up to the Petitioner's re-assignment. The Petitioner sought a change of assignment and voluntarily accepted the change. See the testimony of Mears and Parker. There was no evidence adduced to show pretext.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief filed by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Anita L. Davis, Qualified Representative 708 Brag Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Jacqueline H. Smith, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Human Relations Commission 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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