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SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY vs. ALEXANDRO ALFONSO, 81-003072 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-003072 Latest Update: Jul. 26, 1982

Findings Of Fact During the 1981-82 school year the student was enrolled as a seventh grade student at H. H. Filer Junior High School in Dade County, Florida. On October 21, 1981, the student left his home carrying a knife, with the intention of not attending classes on that day. The student met his girl friend and a friend, Ivan Martinez, at a cafeteria adjacent to the campus of H. H. Filer Junior High School. Upon learning that his girl friend intended to attend classes that day, the student, while still off campus, gave the knife to Ivan Martinez to keep for him, with the understanding that Martinez would not attend classes that day. Thereafter, Martinez decided to go to class, and gave the knife to Eddie Hidalgo to keep. Hidalgo then decided to attend class also, where he was discovered by a teacher in possession of the aforementioned knife. Hidalgo was sent to the principal's office after the knife had been discovered and, during questioning by the principal, implicated the Respondent. Although the Respondent admitted to the principal that the knife belonged to him, he denied having the knife on his person on the school grounds. However, the student was suspended for ten days and, on November 20, 1981, was administratively assigned to Jan Mann Opportunity School North. While serving his ten-day suspension as a result of the knife incident, the Respondent was charged with trespassing on the campus of H. H. Filer Junior High School. There is no evidence in the record of this proceeding concerning either the facts surrounding or the disposition of this trespass charge or several other trespass charges which occurred after Respondent had been administratively assigned to Jan Mann Opportunity School North and which are, therefore, immaterial to the issues involved in this proceeding. Petitioner called the principal at H. H. Filer Junior High School as its only witness in this proceeding. The principal had no direct knowledge of any incidents of disruptive behavior engaged in by the Respondent prior to the date of his assignment to Jan Mann Opportunity School North. None of the students' records were produced at final hearing, nor were any teachers or other witnesses who might have direct knowledge of any incidents of disruptive behavior called to testify. The principal testified generally about the student's excessive rate of absences during the 1980-81 school year, and noted poor conduct grades for the student during that same period. Indeed, these earlier incidents appear not to have had any effect on the decision to seek the student's reassignment for, when questioned about whether the student had the above-described knife in his possession on campus the principal testified ". . . there was evidence . . . to indicate that the knife was in his possession on school grounds, or we would not have made the recommendation based on what we made the recommendation on." It therefore appears that the sole triggering cause for seeking Respondent's reassignment to Jan Mann Opportunity School North was the allegation that he possessed a knife while on school property.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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JOHN WINN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs DIANE NEVILLE, 06-000775PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Mar. 02, 2006 Number: 06-000775PL Latest Update: Jun. 02, 2024
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KAREN SIEBELTS vs. BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 88-004697 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004697 Latest Update: Jun. 29, 1989

The Issue Did Respondent Siebelts commit the offenses set forth in the petition for dismissal (Case No. 88-4697) and the amended administrative complaint (Case No. 89-0189) filed against her? If so, what discipline should she receive?

Findings Of Fact Based on the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Karen Siebelts has held a State of Florida teaching certificate since 1976. Her current certificate was issued May 1, 1986, and covers the areas of elementary education, elementary and secondary reading, and secondary social studies and psychology. For the past thirteen years Siebelts has been employed by the School Board of Broward County as a classroom teacher. During the early stages of her employment, she taught at Melrose Park Middle School. She then moved to Perry Middle School, where she taught a class of emotionally disturbed sixth graders. Her performance at these two schools was rated as acceptable. In November, 1979, Siebelts was assigned to teach at Charles Drew Elementary School, a neighborhood school located in the predominantly black Collier city area of Pompano Beach. The charges lodged against Siebelts are based on specific acts she allegedly committed while she was a Chapter I Reading/Math and Computer teacher at Charles Drew providing remedial instruction to students whose test scores reflected a need for such special assistance. On January 22, 1985, while seated with her fifth grade students at a table during a reading lesson, Siebelts inadvertently kicked one of the students in the shin. The incident occurred as Siebelts was moving her legs to a more comfortable position. The force involved was minimal and produced no visible injuries. The student immediately demanded an apology from Siebelts. Siebelts responded to this demand with silence. She neither apologized nor said anything to suggest that she had intended to kick the student. Earlier in the lesson, Siebelts had directed the student to stop talking. The student had defied the directive and continued to talk. It was not until approximately three minutes after the student's initial defiance of the directive, however, that the kicking incident occurred. Nonetheless, the student suspected that Siebelts had intentionally kicked her because of her failure to obey Siebelts' order that she not talk. When the student came home from school that day she told her mother that Siebelts had intentionally kicked her during class. The mother immediately reported the incident to the principal of the school, Hubert Lee. The matter was referred to the School Board's Internal Affairs Unit for investigation. The requested investigation was conducted. Following the completion of the investigation, a written report of the investigator's findings was submitted to the administration. No further action was taken regarding this incident until approximately three and a half years later when the instant petition for dismissal was issued. Siebelts was annoyed when she learned that the student and her mother had accused her of wrongdoing in connection with the January 22, 1985, kicking incident. On February 19, 1985, she expressed her annoyance in front of her fifth grade class and in their presence threatened to take legal action against those students and parents who had made libelous or slanderous statements about her or had otherwise verbally abused her. She told the students that they and their parents would be subpoenaed to court and if they did not appear they would be incarcerated. The principal of the school was informed of these remarks shortly after they were made, but it was not until the instant petition for dismissal was issued on August 22, 1988, that Siebelts was first formally charged with having made the remarks. Before coming to work on January 28 1986, Siebelts took a codeine pain medication that her physician had prescribed. When classes started that morning she was still under the influence of the medication. She was listless and drowsy. Her speech was slurred and she appeared incoherent at times. She also had difficulty maintaining her balance when she walked. Because Siebelts had been taking this medication "on and off" since 1979, she had been aware of these potential side effects of the medication when ingesting it on this particular occasion. A teacher's aide in Siebelts' classroom concerned about Siebelts' condition summoned the principal, Hubert Lee, to the classroom. When he arrived, Lee observed Siebelts seated at her desk. She was just staring and seemed "to be almost falling asleep." The students were out of control. They were laughing and making fun of Siebelts. After questioning Siebelts and receiving an answer that was not at all responsive to the question he had asked, Lee instructed Siebelts to come to his office. Siebelts complied, displaying an unsteady gait as she walked to Lee's office. In Lee's office, Siebelts insisted that she was fine, but conceded that she was "on" prescribed pain medication. Throughout their conversation, Siebelts continued to slur her words and it was difficult for Lee to understand her. Pursuant to Lee's request, Dr. Lorette David, Lee's immediate supervisor, and Nat Stokes, a School Board investigator, came to Lee's office to observe and assess Siebelts' condition. A determination was thereafter made that Siebelts was not capable of performing her instructional duties that day, which was an accurate assessment. She therefore was sent home for the day. Because of her impaired condition, rather than driving herself home, she was driven to her residence by Dr. David. Although she believed that she was not suffering from any impairment, Siebelts did not protest the decision to relieve her of her duties because she felt that any such protest would have fallen on deaf ears. Following this incident, Siebelts was issued a letter of reprimand by Lee. She also was referred to the School Board's Employee Assistance Program because it was felt that she might have a substance abuse problem. Siebelts agreed to participate in the program and received counselling. At no time subsequent to January 28, 1986, did Siebelts report to work under the influence of her pain medication or any other drug. During the 1987-1988 school year, Siebelts and two other Chapter I teachers, Rosa Moses and Mary Cooper, occupied space in Charles Drew's Chapter I reading and math laboratory. Their classrooms were located in the same large room and were separated by makeshift partitions. Siebelts is white. Moses and Cooper, as well as the aides who were assigned to the laboratory during that school year, are black. In October, 1987, Moses complained to Principal Lee that Siebelts was not teaching her students, but rather was constantly engaging in loud verbal confrontations with them that disrupted Moses' lessons. Lee had received similar complaints about Siebelts from others. He therefore asked Moses to advise him in writing of any future classroom misconduct on Siebelts' part. Siebelts continued to engage in conduct in her classroom which Moses deemed inappropriate and disruptive. On November 4, 1987, for the last five minutes of one of her classes, she loudly exchanged verbal barbs with her students. Her yelling made it difficult for Moses and Cooper to teach their lessons. On November 5, 1987, throughout an entire 45-minute class period, Siebelts was embroiled in a verbal battle with a student during which she made derogatory remarks about the student's size. She called the student "fat" and told her that she "shake[d] like jelly." The student, in turn, called Siebelts "fruity" and likened her to a "scarecrow." On that same day during a later class period, Siebelts took a student by the arm and, following a tussle with the student, placed him in his seat. Thereafter, she made belittling remarks to the other students in the class. She said that they were "stupid" and "belonged in a freak show." She also referred to them as "imbeciles." Siebelts further told her students that their "mothers eat dog food." On November 25, 1987, Siebelts commented to the students in one of her classes that they would be able to move around the classroom with greater ease if they were not so fat. As she had been asked to do, Moses provided Lee with a written account of these November, 1987, encounters between Siebelts and her students, but Lee did not take any immediate action to initiate disciplinary action against Siebelts. Although she did not so indicate in her report, Moses believed that the unflattering remarks that Siebelts had made to the students on these occasions constituted racial slurs inasmuch as all of the students to whom the remarks had been addressed were black and in addressing these remarks to the students as a group she had referred to them as "you people." Moses thought that "you people" had meant black people in general, whereas Siebelts had intended the phrase to refer to just the students in the classroom. At no time during any of these reported incidents did Siebelts make specific reference to the students' race, nor did she specifically attack black people in general. The target of her demeaning and insulting remarks were those of her students whose unruly and disrespectful behavior she was unable to control. Her efforts to maintain discipline and promote learning in the classroom had failed. She had become frustrated with the situation and verbally lashed out at her students. Unfortunately, these outbursts only served to further reduce her effectiveness as a teacher. On March 1, 1988, Siebelts was involved in an incident similar to the one which had occurred more than three years earlier on January 22, 1985. As on the prior occasion, Siebelts was sitting at a classroom table with her students. Her legs were crossed. When she repositioned her legs, her foot inadvertently came in contact with the top of the head of a student who was crawling under the table to retrieve a pencil the student had dropped. The student had been told by Siebelts not to go under the table but had disobeyed the instruction. She had been under the table for approximately a minute and a half before being struck by Siebelts foot. The blow to the student's head was a light one and produced only a slight bump. Nonetheless, after getting up from under the table, the student, a brash fourth grader who had had confrontations with Siebelts in the past, threatened to physically retaliate against Siebelts. Siebelts did not say anything to the student and the class ended without the student following through on her threat. Following this incident, Siebelts telephoned the student's mother at home to discuss the student's classroom behavior. The call was placed sometime before 9:00 p.m. The conversation between Siebelts and the mother soon degenerated into an argument. They terminated the discussion without settling their differences. Lee subsequently met with the mother. He suggested that a meeting with Siebelts at the school be arranged. The mother indicated to Lee that she would not attend such a meeting unless school security was present. She explained that she was so angry at Siebelts that she was afraid that she would lose her composure and physically attack Siebelts if they were in the same room together.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission issue a final order suspending Karen Siebelts' teaching certificate for two years and that the School Board of Broward County issue a final order suspending Siebelts until the reinstatement of her teaching certificate. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of June, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NOS. 88-4687 AND 89-0189 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties: Commisioner of Education's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance in the Findings of Fact portion of this Recommended Order. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Siebelts was not charged with having made threatening remarks the day after the January 22, 1985, kicking incident. These threats were allegedly made, according to the charging documents, on February 19, 1985. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Insofar as it asserts that Siebelts engaged in name-calling on dates other than those specfied in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint otherwise, it is accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Furthermore, the witness whose testimony is recited in this proposed finding later clarified her testimony and conceded that Siebelts did not use the precise words quoted in this proposed finding. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence to the extent that it suggests that Siebelts made "racial comments" on the dates specified in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint. Insofar as it states that such comments were made on other occasions, it is rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. According to the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint, Siebelts threatened her students with legal action on February 19, 1985. This proposed finding, however, relates to alleged threats of legal action made by Siebelts during the 1987-1988 school year. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Siebelts' Proposed Findings of Fact First unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Second unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and :incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Third unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as unnecessary; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Fourth unnumbered paragraph: Rejected as more in the nature of a statement of opposing parties' position than a finding of fact; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Fifth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; seventh sentence: Rejected as subordinate; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; tenth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; eleventh sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; twelfth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Sixth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Seventh unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony (The exculpatory testimony of Siebelts which is summarized in the first three sentences of this paragraph has not been credited because it is contrary to the more credible testimony of other witnesses) fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Eighth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as subordinate; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; ninth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Ninth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Tenth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Superintendent of School's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance, except for the fourth sentence, which has been rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Accepted and incorporated in substance except to the extent that it asserts that Siebelts "advised the students that they and their parents would be placed in jail because of the lies and the slander." The preponderance of the evidence reveals that she actually told them that they and their parents would be incarcerated if they did not appear in court when summoned. First sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second and third sentences: Rejected as more in the nature of argument concerning relatively insignificant matters than findings of fact addressing necessary and vital issues. Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it suggests that Siebelts had alcohol on her breath. Any such suggestion has been rejected because it is contrary to the testimony of Investigator Stokes. Stokes, who has been employed by the School Board as an investigator for the past 20 years, testified that he was standing one or two feet away from Siebelts and did not detect the odor of alcohol on her breath. In view of his experience regarding the investigation of these matters, his testimony has been credited. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Siebelts made inappropriate remarks regarding the students' clothing or other matters on dates other than those specified in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint, it has been rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Insofar as it asserts that Siebelts made derogatory remarks about black people in general on the dates specified in these charging documents, it has been rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. To the extent that this proposed finding indicates that Siebelts otherwise insulted the students in her class on the dates specified in the charging documents, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. The "disparaging remarks" which are the subject of this proposed finding were purportedly made during the 1984-1985 school year. The "disparaging remarks" referenced in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint were allegedly made, according to these charging documents, during the 1987-1988 school year, more specifically, on November 4, 5, and 25, 1987. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. The "critical" remarks referred to in this proposed finding were allegedly made prior to the 1987-1988 school year. First sentence: Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial to the extent it references reactions to "disparaging" and "critical" remarks that were purportedly made prior to the 1987-1988 school year. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of the testimony of Siebelts' former students and colleagues rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it reflects that Moses actively monitored Siebelts classroom conduct "through December of 1987." The preponderance of the evidence establishes that such active monitoring actually ceased November 25, 1987; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent it indicates that Noses heard Siebelts tell her students that they "were dirty and needed baths." This comment was purportedly overheard, not by Moses, but by Margaret Cameron, a teacher's aide who had left Charles Drew prior to the commencement of the 1987- 1988 school year; fourth and fifth sentences: Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. These proposed findings are based on Cameron's testimony regarding offensive comments she had allegedly overheard while an aide in Siebelts' classroom. These pre-1987-1988 school year comments, however, are not mentioned in either the petition for dismissal or the amended administrative complaint. First sentence: As this proposed finding correctly points out, Siebelts' insulting comments only served to heighten the students' hostility and anger toward her. There is no persuasive competent substantial evidence, though, to support the further finding that these comments "resulted in several physical altercations between the students;" second sentence: Rejected inasmuch as there no persuasive competent substantial evidence that there was any "heated verbal exchange" on November 5, 1987, between Siebelts and the student which preceded their "altercation." The preponderance of the evidence establishes that the verbal battle with her students occurred immediately after this incident; third sentence: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Although she may used physical force during her encounter with this student, it is unlikely that she actually "tossed" him into his seat. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected inasmuch as there is no persuasive competent substantial evidence to support a finding that Siebelts telephoned the student's mother as a result of the incident near the air-conditioner. The preponderance of the evidence does establish that Siebelts did telephone the mother on a subsequent occasion, but there is no indication that Siebelts threatened the mother or otherwise acted inappropriately during this telephone conversation. Although the mother asked to have security personnel present during a parent-teacher conference with Siebelts, the preponderance of the evidence reveals that this request was not the product of any threats that Siebelts had made against the mother. First sentence: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Siebelts' testimony that the contact was unintentional is plausible and has been credited. The circumstantial evidence presented by Petitioners (including evidence of prior confrontations between Siebelts and the student) raises some questions regarding the veracity of Siebelts' testimony on this point, but such evidence is not sufficiently compelling to warrant the discrediting this testimony. Given her penchant for verbalizing to her students her thoughts about them, had Siebelts intended to kick the student as a disciplinary measure, she undoubtedly would have made this known to the student, rather than remain silent as she did; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it suggests that immediately after kicking the student, Siebelts had a "smirk on her face." To this limited extent, this proposed finding is not supported by any persuasive competent substantial evidence; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Rejected as not supported by any persuasive competent substantial evidence; second, third, fourth and fifth sentences: Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. To the extent that this proposed finding suggests that Siebelts' behavior at school on January 28, 1986, and her verbal attack of her students on November 4, 5, and 25, 198', reduced her effectiveness as a teacher, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Insofar as it indicates that other conduct in which she engaged resulted in a reduction or loss of effectiveness, it has been rejected as either contrary to the greater weight of the evidence (other conduct specified in charging documents) or beyond the scope of the charges (other conduct not specified in charging documents). COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Whitelock, Esquire 1311 S.E. 2nd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Edward J. Marko, Esquire Suite 322, Bayview Building 4,1040 Bayview Drive Post Office Box 4369 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33338 Virgil L. Morgan, Superintendent Broward County School Board 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Thomas P. Johnson, Ed.D. Associate Superintendent Human Resources Broward County School Board 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Craig R. Wilson, Esquire Suite 315 1201 U.S. Highway One North Palm Beach, Florida 33408-3581 Karen B. Wilde Robert F. McRee, Esquire Executive Director Post Office Box 75638 Education Practices Commission Tampa, Florida 33675-0638 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Florida Administrative Code (3) 6B-1.0016B-1.0066B-4.009
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ALACHUA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs KAREN TRIVETTE, 14-006003TTS (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Dec. 18, 2014 Number: 14-006003TTS Latest Update: Jun. 02, 2024
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JOHN WINN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs DIANE NEVILLE, 06-003661PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Sep. 25, 2006 Number: 06-003661PL Latest Update: Jun. 02, 2024
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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs BRIAN RONEY, 16-003897PL (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Jul. 13, 2016 Number: 16-003897PL Latest Update: Mar. 27, 2017

The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 6A-10.081(3)(a) and 6A-10.081(5)(d), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact The Florida Education Practices Commission is the state agency charged with the duty and responsibility to revoke, suspend, or take other appropriate action with regard to teaching certificates as provided in sections 1012.795 and 1012.796, Florida Statutes. § 1012.79(7), Fla. Stat. (2016). Petitioner, as Commissioner of Education, is charged with the duty to file and prosecute administrative complaints against individuals who hold Florida teaching certificates and who are alleged to have violated standards of teacher conduct. § 1012.796(6), Fla. Stat. (2016). Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate 829054, covering the areas of Education, Leadership, Physical Education, Social Science, and Exceptional Student Education, which is valid through June 30, 2018. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent was employed as an Exceptional Student Education Teacher at Holly Hill School in the Volusia County School District. Holly Hill School is a combined K-8 school. During the time in question, Respondent shared a small office with Ms. Pollok and Mr. Edwards. The office was formerly a teachers’ lounge/lunchroom. It still had a counter, sink, and refrigerator, and had bathrooms that continued to be used on occasion by other teachers. Each of the three teachers who shared the office had their own desk. The office also included two smaller tables at which the teachers could provide service to their ESE students when necessary. At the start of the 2013-2014 school year, Ms. Pollok knew Mr. Edwards, who had been in the ESE program, but did not know Respondent. The incidents described herein occurred between the start of the 2013-2014 school year on August 13, 2013, through late November, 2013, when Respondent was removed from the classroom. Racial Comments Over the period of time in question, Respondent made numerous statements of a racial nature. While on hall duty between classes, Respondent would occasionally call African-American children “Bebe’s kids.” The reference was to an animated television show in which “Bebe’s kids” were unruly and ill-mannered African-American children. Mr. Edwards understood the comment to be derogatory, and noted that the children hearing the comment would occasionally react, even to the point of commenting that they did not want to be referred to as such. Respondent’s statements were also heard by Ms. Burnam-Hoyt, who likewise understood the term to be derogatory, and observed that the children at the receiving end of the comment looked shocked. She advised Respondent that he should not call them that name. Ms. Pollok testified that Respondent routinely called children “nappy” during hall duty when students transition from one period to the next. The comments were directed to middle school students, whose reactions were perceived by her as being ones of humiliation or embarrassment.1/ Mr. Edwards testified that he heard Respondent refer to African-American children as “nappy,” though not with the frequency with which he called them “Bebe’s kids.” Respondent testified that he only called one child “nappy” at the request of the child, an ESE student -- though not one of his students -- who wanted to be called “napster” or “nappy.” There was no competent, substantial evidence to support that claim. No other teacher substantiated such a request, and Mr. Edwards and Ms. Burnam-Hoyt testified credibly that the term was used more broadly. In any event, as stated by Ms. Fisher, there would be no reason to address any student by that type of obviously inappropriate term, even if requested. Mr. Edwards perceived Respondent’s comments as inappropriate, and they made him uncomfortable. He believed, rightfully, that the comments made Ms. Pollok uncomfortable as well. There was no evidence that any student’s learning ability or mental health was actually adversely affected by Respondent’s racially-demeaning statements. Nonetheless, under the circumstances described herein, Petitioner proved that Respondent failed to make reasonable effort to protect students at Holly Hill School from humiliation and embarrassment, conditions reasonably understood to be harmful to their learning environment and their mental health. Sexual Comments Over the period of time in question, Respondent repeatedly made statements of a sexual nature. On occasion, when Ms. Pollok arrived to work in less than a cheerful mood, Respondent would state to the effect of “What's the matter, Pollo[]k, why are you grumpy? Am I going to have to go downstairs and talk to your husband about how to wake you up properly?” The first time he made the comment, he accompanied it with hip thrusts and grunts, i.e., sounds that people make when they're having sex, thus accentuating the sexual nature of the comment. The first time Respondent made the statement, Ms. Pollok felt awkward, left the office, and went to her husband’s classroom (he was also a teacher at Holly Hill School) where she stayed until the school day started. When he continued to make such statements on a more regular basis, it made her uncomfortable. Mr. Edwards heard Respondent make the statement to Ms. Pollok on one or two occasions. Respondent denied having ever made the comments, attributing them to Mr. Anderson, who laughingly took credit. Regardless of whether Mr. Anderson may have also made comparable statements, the testimony of Ms. Pollok and Mr. Edwards that Respondent made the statements at issue is more credible, and is accepted. Ms. Burnam-Hoyt, who enjoys a well-known and long-term relationship with her wife, would occasionally visit the office. On one occasion, while in the presence of Mr. Edwards, Respondent told Ms. Burnam-Hoyt that she looked nice that day and said “I wish you would switch teams.” Though she gave an off-hand reply, Ms. Burnam-Hoyt did not discuss her sexuality, especially in the workplace, and was offended by the comment. On several other occasions, when Ms. Burnam-Hoyt was not in the room, Respondent commented in the presence of both Ms. Pollok and Mr. Edwards that he wished “she didn’t bat for the other team.” On one occasion, when Ms. Pollok had returned from ESE training and asked Respondent about his day, he replied that “it was pretty boring until your old boss, what's her name, Mandy [Elzy], bent over and showed me her boobs.” Respondent commented, with regard to Anna Garces, that “she was spicy and he'd like to make her his consuela.” When Donna Mounts, a P.E. instructor, would come to the office, Respondent’s favorite phrase was that he “would like to mount Coach Mounts.” Respondent did not make the statement directly to Ms. Mounts, but he made it in the office on a routine basis. Respondent commented regarding Marcie Lockamy, an African-American assistant principal, that “I don’t normally do black ladies, but she’s pretty hot . . . I’d get at that.” Respondent’s denial that he made the statement, or that he even knew who Ms. Lockamy was, was not convincing. Respondent’s comments were repetitive, and he would make some statement every day. Ms. Pollok and Mr. Edwards told Respondent that he should “tone it down.” In particular, Mr. Edwards testified credibly that he advised Respondent “at different points” that his comments about women were not appropriate, not only because of his own view of the matter, but because he believed them to be disturbing to Ms. Pollok. The requests and recommendations had no identifiable effect. Mr. Anderson’s testimony in this case, apparently designed to exonerate Respondent and transfer responsibility for many of the statements to himself, was not persuasive, and in several instances, conflicted with the more credible testimony of other witnesses.2/ Respondent’s general defense to his sexual comments was that he was just “joking around,” that they occurred when he and the target of his comments “were talking and laughing and having a good time in between classes,” that they were a “jovial gesture,” and the like. He denied that they were perceived as offensive by any the persons within earshot, a statement denied by the persons exposed to his comments. Individually, Respondent’s comments could be categorized as puerile. Collectively, and over time, they rose to the degree that they created a hostile, abusive, offensive, and oppressive environment in the small office that constituted the workplace for the three teachers. Threatening Comments The Administrative Complaint alleges that, over the period of time in question, Respondent made “threatening comments to or around [Ms. Pollok].” As to comments regarding Respondent’s prior work- history as a police officer, Mr. Edwards testified credibly that they were nothing more than “experiences that people have or wanted to share.” Mr. Edwards did not take those statements as threatening. When Respondent discovered that he was being investigated by Holly Hill School, he was understandably upset. He made some comments that expressed his frustration. However, Mr. Edwards testified that Respondent did not threaten him or Ms. Pollok. Respondent admitted to being upset and frustrated, but denied either expressing, or having the intent to harm anyone. The comments, under the circumstances, were not so out of line as to objectively constitute a threat to one’s safety or welfare. Under the circumstances described herein, Petitioner did not prove that Respondent’s allegedly threatening statements created a hostile, intimidating, abusive, offensive, or oppressive environment in violation of rule 6A-10.081(5)(d). Holly Hill School’s Response Ms. Pollok complained of Respondent’s behavior to various administrators at Holly Hill School, including Mr. Strother, and went so far as to request a reassignment of her duties so as to avoid Respondent. On November 1, 2013, Mr. Strother spoke with Respondent. The conversation was “short and brief,” and non-specific, with Mr. Strother generally advising Respondent to “be cognizant of conversations you're having and what you're saying around other people.” On or about November 4, 2013, Ms. Pollok renewed her complaint to Mr. Strother about Respondent’s comments about “the ladies,” and their looks and sexual preferences. Mr. Strother could tell that the comments made Ms. Pollok uncomfortable. Mr. Edwards had also spoken to Mr. Strother regarding Respondent’s comments. As a result of those complaints, Mr. Strother sent out an email directing all teachers to have “professional conversations,” and to lead “by example with appropriate conversation.” Though the email was not specific, included other topics, and was sent to a number of Holly Hill School employees, it nonetheless should have placed Respondent on notice to heed not only Mr. Strother’s earlier advice, but also the earlier admonitions from Mr. Edwards and Ms. Pollok to “tone it down.” It did not have the intended effect. On November 20, 2013, Ms. Pollok reported Respondent’s unabated comments about women and those made towards students to Ms. Fisher. Ms. Pollok was upset and crying during their discussion. Ms. Fisher then spoke with Mr. Strother to confirm Ms. Pollok’s earlier complaints. Ms. Fisher reported the allegations to the school district, and on November 21, 2013, an investigation of Respondent’s conduct was initiated. The investigation delved into the sexually-inappropriate comments, and extended into areas that are not the subject of this proceeding, for which Respondent received a reprimand. As to the comments directed to students, which were determined to be violative of principles of professional conduct and school board policy for failing to protect students or exposing them to excessive embarrassment or disparagement, Respondent was suspended without pay for five days, and transferred from Holly Hill School.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent violated section 1012.795(1)(j) and rules 6A-10.081(3)(a) and 6A-10.081(5)(d). It is further recommended that the Education Practices Commission impose a suspension of the Respondent's educator certificate for a period of one year, and a probationary period of one year upon his return to teaching in any public or private school in Florida on such reasonable terms and conditions as the Educational Practices Commission determines are necessary to prevent recurrences of the conduct proven in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 2017.

Florida Laws (6) 1012.011012.791012.7951012.796120.569120.57
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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs CLAUDINE ETIENNE, 16-007187PL (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 08, 2016 Number: 16-007187PL Latest Update: Jun. 21, 2017

The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent, Ms. Claudine Etienne, violated section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2011),1/ and implementing administrative rules, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what is the appropriate sanction.

Findings Of Fact The Commissioner is responsible for investigating and prosecuting allegations of misconduct against individuals holding educator's certificates. Ms. Etienne holds Florida Educator's Certificate 845026, covering the areas of English and mathematics, which is valid through June 30, 2018. At all times relevant to the complaint, Ms. Etienne was employed as an English teacher at Miami Springs High School in the Miami-Dade County School District. On or about January 20, 2012, an unknown student ignited a smoke bomb or large firecracker in a locker in Ms. Etienne's classroom. Ms. Etienne was unsure what the device was or how it was ignited. Smoke was generated from the device, and it filtered into the classroom. One or more students requested to leave the room because of the smoke. In her deposition, Ms. Etienne indicated that at the time of the incident, she was aware that one of the students assigned to her class, C.E., had asthma because she had a conversation with C.E.'s mother in December about it. Ms. Etienne testified that she did not recall C.E. asking her to leave the room on the day of the incident, however, and in fact did not remember if C.E. was even in class that day. Ms. Etienne did not believe the smoke was sufficiently serious to require her to allow the students to leave the room. She was uncertain how to proceed until administrators who had been called arrived in the classroom. Ms. Etienne instructed the students to stay in the room until an administrator arrived. One student subsequently required medical attention as a result of the smoke inhalation. In her written statement, C.E. stated that paramedics came to the school to assist her because she could not breathe after her exposure to the smoke in the classroom.2/ Ms. Etienne later received a verbal reprimand from the school district.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order finding Ms. Claudine Etienne in violation of section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes, through her violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a), issuing her a letter of reprimand, and assessing a fine against her in the amount of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2017.

Florida Laws (4) 1012.7951012.796120.569120.57
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PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs JAMES J. MCCABE, 90-001140 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Feb. 23, 1990 Number: 90-001140 Latest Update: Jun. 13, 1990

The Issue The issues presented for determination are the following: Whether Respondent has violated rules of the School Board of Palm Beach County so as to constitute misconduct in office. If Respondent has committed misconduct in office, what penalty is to be imposed, including whether Respondent is entitled to back pay and in what amount.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Dr. James McCabe, was employed by Petitioner, Palm Beach County School Board, as the Assistant Principal for Student Services in charge of special education at Crestwood Community Middle School. In this capacity, Respondent's duties include the supervision of the students and teachers in special education. He is responsible for parent contact and involvement in addition to student discipline. He manages the dropout prevention and honors program. Additionally, he has other administrative duties which relate to the migrant and alternative education programs. Although he is primarily assigned to the special education program, he assists in other areas such as school-wide discipline. On December 14, 1989, in the early afternoon, Respondent was called to Mr. Mundt's shop class with Mrs. Satchel, another Assistant Principal for Student Services, by the school's walkie-talkies. Responden1t was informed by Mr. Mundt, the shop teacher, that a baseball card worth in excess of $50 was missing. The baseball card had been displayed in the same class during the beginning of the period. The period was split by a lunch break. It was after the students returned from lunch that Respondent and Ms. Satchel were called to investigate its loss. The parties stipulated that, "Presumably, it [the card] had been taken by someone in the class." According to Respondent, the card was owned by a student with cerebral palsy. The student was limited physically and could not participate in sports at the school. He collected baseball cards as his sport. When they arrived, Respondent took charge of the male students while Ms. Satchel assumed the responsibility for the female students, as the logical separation of duties. Respondent asked the boys to go to one side of the room and told them that he would like the baseball card to appear on the table. He told them he would turn his back to them, and that if the baseball card appeared, that would be the end of it. Respondent then turned his back, and the baseball card did not appear. Prior to this incident, thefts of other valuable merchandise had occurred around the area of the shop class. A wallet was stolen from a teacher's car which was parked immediately outside the shop class just a week prior to the incident at issue. Respondent did not think that a particular student had stolen the card. Instead, he reasonably suspected that someone in the group had taken it. The period was coming to an end and another class was due in the room. Respondent did not attempt a lesser method of searching the boys for the baseball card, nor was a lesser method of searching the boys proven at the hearing. Instead, Respondent, in accordance with the procedure at Crestwood, instructed the boys to all go down to the clinic which is not within the immediate vicinity of the shop class where they were temporarily detained. He chose to remove the boys from the classroom because he did not want to subject them to the confusion from the incoming class or to any unnecessary embarrassment which might be caused by questioning them in front of it. He also wished to protect the learning environment for the incoming students. The clinic is a three room complex. To avoid unnecessary embarrassment of the students, Respondent took one student at a time into one of the outer rooms of the complex. He then asked the student to remove his shirt. He felt the shirt and handed it back to the student. He then requested their shoes and socks and handed those back after searching them. He then asked for the students outer pants. He did not request that any student remove his undergarments; their underpants and undershirts or T-shirts, if any, remained on. As Respondent completed his check of each piece of clothing, he handed the article back to the student. If the student was slow in completing his dressing, he then asked that student to finish dressing in the back of the room. At times, while the slow student was completing his dressing, the next student was asked to come in and commence the disrobing procedures. At times, more than one student was in the room. One was tying his shoes while the other was handing his shirt to Respondent. Respondent believed that he had the right to search the students to the extent necessary after having received instruction to that effect from school security and after having read the school board rule on detention, search and seizure. He apologized to the group for having to perform the search in this manner which was necessary under the circumstances. According to Respondent, sometime during the search, a couple of boys came into the room and asserted that one of the boys, who had not been searched at the time, had the card. The boys suggested that Respondent search just this one student and stop the search of each student. In reply, Respondent said, "I don't want to embarrass him anymore than anybody else. I really don't want to put any suspicion on him. Let's just take him in the normal course of events, when his turn comes up," and continued the search of each student in his charge. Each student cooperated with Respondent. Out of the twelve or thirteen students involved, only one student objected to the search procedure. In response to the objection, Respondent gave the student the opportunity to call the school security or to call his mother and ask her to come to the school. The student chose neither option and participated in the search. As Respondent reached the last student, Mr. Hagan, the principal at Crestwood, came into the room and asked Respondent to step outside. He told Respondent that he did not see how the school could benefit from the search and told him to stop the search. The baseball card had not been located at that point. Respondent stopped immediately. If Mr. Hagan believes that a teacher or administrator is not effective at his school, there is a procedure for asking that teacher or person to be removed from the staff. Mr. Hagan chose not to commence the procedure in this instance. Prior to this incident, searches of students occurred at Crestwood, but no search had involved the removal of the students clothes. The guidelines for detention, search and seizure of students in the Palm Beach County School District is contained in Palm Beach County School Board Rule 5.18(5). The rule authorizes school personnel, such as Respondent, to temporarily detain students for questioning, upon reasonable indication of wrongdoing, and to search, to the extent necessary, students upon reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. The rule, however, does not establish the permissibility or impermissibility of any specific search procedure, i.e., pat down, strip search or other means of locating the missing items. Although the School Board gives periodic seminars, and Respondent has attended every seminar at which his attendance was required, no seminar has given specific instruction on the procedures to be used when searching students. Respondent had read the rule on detention, search and seizure prior to the December 14 incident. Also, prior to the incident, Respondent had requested the advice of the school security director assigned to Crestwood, Mr. Willie Noland, about his right to search and has discussed procedure relating to specific incidents with Mr. Noland. From Mr. Noland, Respondent was assured that he had the right to search students. One incident, in particular, on which Respondent sought Mr. Noland's advice involved a student who allegedly had threatened another student with a knife. Respondent was asked to look into the threat fifteen minutes prior to the end of the school day. When Respondent asked the student if he had a knife, he voluntarily emptied his pockets. Respondent did not ask him to remove his clothes. Unfortunately, the student did have a knife lodged in the mid-seam of his trousers. After that incident, Mr. Noland advised Respondent that students do not hide things in their pockets. Instead, Mr. Noland recommended checking down in the student's waistbands and in their shoes and socks for the missing items. Mr. Hagan had also informed the school personnel not to be alone with students and to avoid situations which could be embarrassing. His purpose in giving the admonition was to avoid the potential for child abuse allegations. It was with the direction given by Mr. Noland and Mr. Hagan, combined with Respondent's understanding of the governing rules, that he undertook the type of search he performed. With reasonable concern that he might be subjecting himself to a potential child abuse allegation and in a diligent attempt to locate the missing baseball card, Respondent chose to ask the students to remove their clothes, rather than search the clothes while on their bodies. Under the circumstances, the search procedure was necessary and reasonable. After the December 14 incident, Respondent, as was his usual behavior, cooperated completely with the directives of his superiors. He voluntarily completed an incident report in which he related the facts surrounding the search. An investigation into the incident by the School Board was performed, and a report from the investigation was given to the Superintendent of the Palm Beach County School District. Without performing a personal investigation, talking with Respondent or with Respondent's coworkers about the incident, the Superintendent suspended Respondent and recommended to the School Board that Respondent be suspended without pay and terminated. The Superintendent based his recommendation on his belief that Respondent's conduct violated the school board rule and the Code of Ethics and Principles of Professional Conduct for educators in Florida to the extent that his effectiveness in the school system was impaired. The School Board accepted Respondent's recommendation and this proceeding ensued. At the time of the incident, Crestwood had four assistant principals in addition to Respondent. At the hearing, three of the four, each of whom had worked with Respondent, had observed Respondent and had shared responsibilities with him, unanimously agreed that his performance in the school system up to the time of the incident was effective and each agreed that they would not object to his return to the school. The fourth was not asked the questions at the hearing. Also, approximately eighty signatures appear on a petition in support of Respondent's effectiveness from the faculty and staff of Crestwood to Petitioner dated January 17, 1990. l6. Since 1964, except for a brief period, Respondent has been involved in education and primarily working with, teaching about or studying exceptional students. His tenure in the Palm Beach County School District began as Director of Special Education in September 1, 1981 where he was assigned until June 30, 1983. From August 1983 to June 1986, Respondent served in the capacity of a Specialist in Education. In July, 1986, Respondent was appointed as an Assistant Principal at Gove Elementary School. At the request of Mr. Hagan, Respondent was transferred to the Crestwood Community Middle School in January, 1987 and has served in his present capacity since then. While employed as an assistant principal, Respondent has received nothing but outstanding evaluations. Respondent holds a regular instructional certificate in the area of administration and supervision. Respondent is a credible individual, and an experienced educator who has the interest of his students as his main concern. At no time during the incident in question, did Respondent intend to embarrass or disparage any of the students. Instead, in his best professional judgment, under the circumstances, he attempted to protect the students from unnecessary embarrassment and made reasonable efforts to protect the learning environment of all the affected students.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Palm Beach County issue a Final Order reinstating Respondent with full back pay and benefits retroactive to January 24, 1990. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of June, 1990. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1990.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57 Florida Administrative Code (3) 6B-1.0016B-1.0066B-4.009
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