The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on May 4, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American woman who was employed by Respondent from July 2000 until her termination on January 24, 2001. At the time she was hired, the staff at the store location where Petitioner was employed was comprised of mostly black females. Initially, Petitioner held the position of hotline operator. In December 2000, she became an assistant manager of the store and another African-American woman, Latasha Green became the store manager. According to Petitioner, problems began to arise after she and Ms. Green were promoted to managerial positions. While an assistant manager, Petitioner's duties included closing the store and taking deposits to the bank where she had a key to the store's safe deposit box. On January 5, 2001, Petitioner and Ms. Green attended a meeting with their supervisor, Jason Rudd, a white male. This meeting was upsetting to Petitioner because of comments made to her and to Ms. Green by Mr. Rudd. In particular, Mr. Rudd commented that there were too many "dark clouds" in the store, which Petitioner interpreted to be racist remarks. At the January 5, 2001, meeting, Petitioner learned that a white male, Jason Smith, was going to be brought in as the new store manager. With this change in personnel, Ms. Green was demoted from store manager to assistant manager and Petitioner was demoted from assistant manager to hotline operator. When Petitioner was demoted, she did not receive a cut in pay. Petitioner informed Mr. Rudd that it was her intention to leave her employment with Respondent because her sister was ill. She informed Mr. Rudd that January 25, 2001, would be her last day. However, she was terminated on January 24, 2001. Between January 4 and January 24, 2001, three white males were hired, and four black females, including Petitioner and Ms. Miller, were discharged. The reason for her termination on the Report of Employee's Termination form was "not working out." However, on the same form, her job performance, attendance, and cooperation were rated as "good." Additionally, the form had a blank following the question, "Would you rehire this employee?" The blank was filled in, "yes." Petitioner filed for unemployment compensation and initially received $512.00 in unemployment benefits. However, after a telephone hearing, the Division of Unemployment Compensation informed her that she must repay the $512.00. At the time of her discharge, Petitioner was earning approximately $250.00 per week. Petitioner seeks back pay, the $512.00 in unemployment compensation, and a verbal apology from Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent engaged in unlawful discrimination and paying Petitioner $50.00 in back pay. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2003.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's suspension in March 2004 and subsequent dismissal in March 2004 were not, in fact, imposed in consequence of her gross insubordination (which insubordination Respondent allegedly used as a pretext for the adverse employment actions), but rather were in truth retaliatory acts taken by Respondent because Petitioner had filed a charge of discrimination against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction contained a statement of undisputed material facts, which provided as follows: A. [a.] [Petitioner Diane] Scott [("Scott")] was employed as a teacher's aide in the Monroe County Public School System for approximately 13 years. The [Monroe County School] Board [(the "Board"), which is the governing body of Respondent Monroe County School District,] suspended [Scott] without pay in March 2004 pending termination for just cause. Scott timely requested a formal hearing. [b.] On August 18, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Robert E. Meale of the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH") conducted a formal hearing in DOAH Case No. 04-2060 to determine whether Scott's employment should be terminated. Judge Meale issued a Recommended Order on October 25, 2004, holding, on the basis of extensive findings of fact, that Scott had "repeatedly refused to obey direct orders, essentially to allow the school system to function as an educational resource, free from her harassment of other employees trying to do their jobs." Judge Meale recommended that the Board terminate Scott's employment for just cause, i.e. gross insubordination. [c.] On November 16, 2004, the Board entered a Final Order adopting Judge Meale's Recommended Order in its entirety. Scott did not appeal the Final Order. B. [d.] In November 2004, Scott filed with the FCHR and the EEOC a Charge of Discrimination, signed November 12, 2004 (the "Charge"), wherein she alleged that the Board had retaliated against her for having filed an earlier charge of discrimination. The Charge was received by the FCHR on or about November 22, 2004, and docketed as Charge No. 150-2005-00405. [e.] In the Charge, Scott stated the "particulars" of her claim against the Board as follows: I am black. I filed a charge of discrimination under 150-2004-00146. In retaliation, Respondent placed papers in my fie [sic] that pertained to someone else and papers that were not signed by me. In further retaliation, Respondent placed me on suspension. I believe all of the above occurred in retaliation for filing the aforementioned charge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.[1] Scott also alleged that the unlawful retaliation took place between the dates of August 18, 2004, and August 24, 2004.2 [f.] . . . Charge No. 150-2004-00146 (the "Prior Charge"), which allegedly triggered the Board's allegedly retaliatory acts, had been brought against the Board in November 2003. . . . [To repeat for emphasis,] the retaliation claim asserted in the [present] Charge is based on alleged adverse employment actions that the Board took, allegedly, in response to Scott's filing the Prior Charge in November 2003. [g.] In her Charge Scott alleged that the Board's unlawful retaliation consisted of (a) placing papers in her personnel file that didn't belong there and (b) putting her on suspension. Regarding the allegedly spurious papers, . . . [f]ive . . . are . . . documents pertaining to another teacher's aide in Monroe County whose name is "Diane M. Scott." (Petitioner Scott is also known as Diane Hill Scott but not, so far as the record reveals, as Diane M. Scott.) The papers relating to the "other" Diane Scott are: (1) an Oath of Public Employee form dated December 20, 1996; (2) an Employer's Statement of Salary and Wages dated April 24, 2001; (3) an Employer's Statement of Salary and Wages dated March 13, 2002; (4) a Civil Applicant Response dated December 20, 1996, which notes that the individual (identified as "Diane Marie Scoh") had failed to disclose a prior arrest; and (5) a copy of the school district's anti-discrimination policy, apparently signed by the other Ms. Scott on August 23, 2002. [h.] In addition to these five papers, Scott claims that her personnel file contained an unsigned copy of the school district's anti-discrimination policy, bearing the handwritten note "Diane Hill Scott refused to sign——8/24/00." Scott asserts that before last year's administrative hearing, she had never seen this particular document. Because of that, she alleges, its presence in her file is evidence of discriminatory retaliation. [i.] Regarding the alleged retaliatory suspension [on which the Charge is based in part], Scott [actually] was referring to three separate suspensions: (1) a three-day suspension in May 2003; (2) a three-day suspension in October 2003; and (3) the suspension in March 2004 that was part and parcel of the proceeding to terminate Scott's employment. It is undisputed that Scott was in fact suspended from employment on each of these three occasions. However, [by] a letter to Scott from the Director of Human Resources dated October 3, 2003, [the Board had] formally rescind[ed], as the product of "error and miscommunication," the three-day suspension Scott was to have served that month. [j.] On April 26, 2005, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on Scott's Charge against the Board. In this notice, the EEOC stated that it was unable to determine whether the Board had violated Scott's civil rights. Thereafter, on May 12, 2005, the FCHR issued Scott a Right to Sue letter. Scott timely filed a Petition for Relief ("Petition") with the FCHR on June 6, 2005. The FCHR immediately transferred the Petition to DOAH, initiating the instant action. The undersigned hereby adopts the foregoing as findings of fact. Following the principle of estoppel by judgment (discussed in the Conclusions of Law below), it is found that, prior to being suspended from employment in March 2004, Scott repeatedly had refused to obey direct orders; she had been, in other words, grossly insubordinate at work. The evidence in the record is insufficient to persuade the undersigned——and consequently he does not find——that the Board used Scott's gross insubordination as a pretext for taking adverse employment actions, namely suspension and dismissal, against Scott. The evidence is likewise insufficient to establish, and thus it is not found, that the Board in fact suspended and discharged Scott in retaliation for filing the Prior Charge. It is determined, therefore, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Board did not unlawfully retaliate against Scott when it terminated her employment on the ground that she had been grossly insubordinate, which misbehavior constitutes just cause for firing a teacher's aide, see §§ 1012.01(2)(e) and 1012.33(1)(a), Fla. Stat., and hence is a legitimate, non- retaliatory basis for taking adverse employment action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding the Monroe County School District not liable to Diane Scott for retaliation or unlawful discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2006.
The Issue The issues are whether the Respondents committed unlawful employment practices against Petitioner, and if so, to what relief is she entitled.
Findings Of Fact In the spring of 1994, Respondent CSD began operating a residential detention program for juvenile offenders pursuant to a contract with the Department of Juvenile Justice. The purpose of the program, commonly known as Hamilton House, was to provide redirection to the lives of its youthful residents/clients. Hamilton House had 48 beds divided between two dormitories. Respondent CSD assigned each resident to the appropriate dormitory, level six or level eight, depending on the type of security and rehabilitative services required. The program included an educational program as well as facilities for vocational and recreational activities. Respondent CSD employed Petitioner, a 51 year-old white female, as a resident advisor at Hamilton House from March 24, 1994 through June 30, 1996. Petitioner initially worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift in the level six dormitory. At times she served as the acting shift supervisor though she was not paid a supervisor's wages. When Petitioner began working for Respondent CSD, she lived with her elderly mother, Lotus Musgrove, whose colon cancer was in remission. At that time, Mrs. Musgrove was able to live independently and did not need a caretaker. On April 24, 1994, some of the clients managed to gain access to a bottle containing an alcoholic beverage. Petitioner and other employees received a verbal warning for failing to adequately monitor the behavior and movement of the clients. A training letter was placed in each employee's personnel file. In May of 1995, Respondent CSD hired Bobby Williams, Sr., as a resident advisor in the level eight dormitory. Mr. Williams is a black male. He eventually assumed the position of shift supervisor for the entire facility. There is no evidence that Petitioner sought this full-time position or a similar supervisory position at any time during her employment with Respondent CSD. In October of 1995, some of the clients accused Petitioner and another staff member of inappropriate conduct including, but not limited to, furnishing them with prohibited magazines and movies. As a result of the allegations, Respondent CSD suspended Petitioner and her co-worker without pay on October 18, 1995. By letter dated October 20, 1995, Respondent CSD advised Petitioner in writing that there was insufficient evidence of misconduct to warrant termination of her employment. However, the letter stated that Petitioner had violated company policy and procedure by allowing a youth to leave his room for extended periods after curfew. Respondent CSD paid Petitioner and her co- worker for the time they were suspended during the internal investigation. Respondent CSD subsequently reassigned Petitioner and her co-worker to work in a different dormitory and on a different shift. The change in time and location of their work shift was necessary to ensure there was no contact between them and the clients who had accused them of improper conduct. Petitioner was assigned to work the 3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. shift in the level eight dormitory. In a written statement dated October 23, 1995, Petitioner objected to the change in her shift. She preferred to continue working the 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. shift. She asserted that, during the day, she took care of her 78 year-old mother who had cancer. Respondent CSD did not immediately honor Petitioner's request. On or about November 24, 1995, Petitioner voluntarily purchased some supplies in the amount of $20.98 from a retail store. The supplies included the following: hand sprayers, cotton swabs, hydrogen peroxide, rubbing alcohol, highlighters, marker, Sharpies, and other miscellaneous items. Petitioner requested reimbursement from Respondent CSD because she intended to use the supplies at work. Respondent CSD declined to reimburse Petitioner for the supplies. There is no evidence that Respondent CSD ever authorized the purchase of the supplies. On December 11, 1995, a resident in the level eight dormitory attempted to discard a container of contraband tobacco. Petitioner detected his effort and responded appropriately. She received a letter of commendation for exemplary action which was placed in her personnel file. On January 23, 1996, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Juvenile Justice made a formal and final determination that "[i]t is inconclusive that staff members Julie Toughton and Alice Musgrove engaged in improper conduct with clients." On or about February 1, 1996, Petitioner took a box of pens and pencils from a client's desk. The client became upset and exhibited inappropriate behavior toward Petitioner. As a result of the client's tantrum, Petitioner took token-economy points from the client. Petitioner filed a written complaint dated February 4, 1996, with Respondent CSD after learning that one of her supervisors, Mike Myers, changed the client's point sheet. Petitioner's February 4, 1996, statement also asserted that Supervisor Myers was mishandling clients' mail. She complained that he was logging clients' mail and making the clients read their personnel mail to him. According to Petitioner, handling client mail was the responsibility of "line staff." On one occasion in February 1996, Petitioner was 30 minutes late reporting to her assigned duty station in the dormitory. She spent that time in the administration building because she refused to work with one of her co-workers. Supervisor Myers was responsible for changing Petitioner's time sheet to reflect a 30-minute deduction in regular time. On another occasion in February 1996, Petitioner and other employees worked two hours of overtime due to a crisis situation with one of the clients. Petitioner elected to "bank" the overtime rather than receive time-and-one-half of overtime pay. The other employees chose to receive overtime pay. Petitioner was off from work on February 22-23, 1996. When Petitioner arrived at work on February 24, 1996, her time sheet was not with the time sheets of other employees. Petitioner's time sheet was locked in a supervisor's office until February 26, 1996, because the supervisor was not at work. There is no indication in the record whether Petitioner's time sheet was locked up inadvertently or due to a dispute over Petitioner's wages. On March 1, 1996, Petitioner filed a written grievance with Respondent CSD regarding her pay. She claimed that Supervisor Myers was harassing her and discriminating against her by changing her time sheet without her knowledge. Specifically, Petitioner complained that Mr. Myers cheated her out of 30 minutes of regular time on one occasion and two hours of overtime on another occasion. She complained that her time sheet was locked in a supervisor's office for four days. On March 4, 1996, the Program Director, Dale Edwards, agreed that Petitioner should not be penalized for one-half hour of regular pay because she was in the administration building during the disputed time. Additionally, Mr. Edwards directed Supervisor Myers not to change an employee's time sheet without prior approval. He also requested that Petitioner furnish documentation that the company owed her for the two hours of overtime. Mr. Edwards was under the mistaken impression that the dispute over Petitioner's time sheet had been resolved. In March of 1996, Petitioner was working the midnight shift in dormitory eight consistent with her written request dated October 23, 1995. On March 18, 1996 and March 27, 1996, Petitioner made written requests for a change to the 7:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m. shift. Petitioner specifically wanted to replace a Ms. Aikens on the morning shift. Respondent CSD did not honor Petitioner's request. However, there is no evidence showing that Ms. Aiken's position was ever filled, and if so, whether Respondent CSD selected a person of a different race or a younger to file the position. Petitioner was absent from work between April 8, 1996, and April 16, 1996, on April 22, 1996, and on April 29, 1996, due to illness and/or medical appointments. While she was absent, her inner-office mail box became so full that the mail had to be removed. The administrative manager gave Petitioner's mail to her supervisor. On April 23, 1996, Supervisor Myers completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal for the period March 14, 1995 through March 14, 1996. Petitioner disagreed with the determination that she had difficulty communicating with others. Petitioner's mental health counselor, Christine Clark, sent Mr. Edwards an unsolicited letter dated April 23, 1996. According to the letter, Ms. Clark was treating Petitioner for family/employment related stress reduction. The letter states as follows in pertinent part: Due to the demands of her home environment, caretaking of her elderly mother who is dying from colon cancer, I am recommending that Ms. Musgrove be reassigned new working hours, namely a day schedule of approximately 8:00 AM until 5:00 PM in order to effectively and efficiently facilitate the evening and night care of her mother. In addition, Ms. Musgrove appears to have unresolved issues regarding her personnel file and salary still due to her for 30 minutes or .5 hour pay as well as two hours uncompensated work from several weeks ago. I personally read your approval for this compensation but apparently this has still not yet been indicated on her pay check. There also remain the allegations of her misconduct charges that appears not to be fully resolved. As an employee she does have the legal right to have these fully addressed and challenged. From my understanding that although the misconduct charges have been dropped, there are still areas that compromise Ms. Musgrove's reputation as a resident advisor. Mr. Edwards did not disclose the contents of Ms. Clark's letter to any employee of Respondent CSD other than his superiors, who advised him to get a release from Petitioner before responding to the letter. After receiving Ms. Clark's letter, Mr. Edwards had a telephone conversation with Petitioner's mother because Petitioner was not at work or at home. During the conversation, Mr. Edwards inquired about the mother's health. Mr. Edwards learned that Mrs. Musgrove's cancer had been in remission since 1993 and that she no longer required assistance with daily living activities. Mr. Edwards did not disclose any information regarding Petitioner's employment status, medical condition, or personal business to Mrs. Musgrove. Petitioner's sister placed an unsolicited telephone call to Mr. Edwards several days after he talked to Mrs. Musgrove. The purpose of the call was to thank Mr. Edwards for his concern over Mrs. Musgrove's health. During the telephone call, Mr. Edwards and Petitioner's sister did not exchange any information relating to Petitioner's employment, medical condition, or personal business. On April 29, 1996, all staff at Hamilton House received a memorandum advising them as follows, in pertinent part: As a result of the recent competitive bid conducted by District 3, Department of Juvenile Justice, Gator Human Services has been awarded the contract to operate the Hamilton County Youth Treatment Complex starting July 1, 1996. The memorandum also included information regarding the transfer of operations to the new service provider. Respondent CSD advised employees that, if requested, it would supply Gator Human Services the name, position title, hire date, and current salary of each employee of record. Respondent CSD stated that no other information would be given to the new organization without the consent of the employee. On May 1, 1996, Mr. Edwards wrote two memoranda regarding Petitioner's pay. First, Mr. Edwards directed the administrative manager to pay Petitioner for .5 hours of regular wages out of the company's petty cash fund and to get a receipt for the payment. Second, he directed the resident life manager to allow Petitioner to leave work two hours early (with pay) at a time of her choosing within the next work week. Petitioner could not "bank" the time indefinitely because Respondent CSD's contract was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1996. Mr. Edwards phoned Petitioner at home on May 2, 1996, to request a written release so that he could respond to Ms. Clark's letter. Petitioner wrote that release on May 3, 1996. The release gave Mr. Edwards permission to disclose confidential information to Ms. Clark. On May 3, 1996, Petitioner signed a written acknowledgment that receipt of $4.06 in payment for .5 regular hours would end the issue of the .5 regular hours owed to her. On May 10, 1996, Respondent Gator informed the staff at Hamilton House of the procedure for handling applications for employment with Respondent Gator's new program, Tiger Success Center. Applications were due on or before May 28, 1996. Interviews were to be scheduled between May 28, 1996, and June 7, 1996. Applicants would be advised of the final selections and employment offers by June 14, 1996. Respondent Gator requested that each applicant take a copy of their most recent performance appraisal to their employment interview. By letter dated May 13, 1996, Mr. Edwards responded to Ms. Clark's inquiry. First, he explained that questions regarding Petitioner's compensation had been resolved. Second, he stated that letters from the Department of Juvenile Justice and from the Office of the Inspector General had been added to Petitioner's personnel file, clearing her of all misconduct allegations. Third, he explained that the day shift would be the least desirable shift in terms of stress reduction because the activity level of the residents is highest during the day. Mr. Edwards also revealed that Petitioner's mother was treated successfully for cancer in 1993 and that her current health failed to support the need for a change in Petitioner's shift. Finally, Mr. Edwards noted that he had to consider the needs of the residents and other staff. A copy of Ms. Clark's inquiry and Mr. Edwards' response were placed in Petitioner's personnel file. Neither of the documents were disclosed to unauthorized persons. On May 22, 1996, the employees at Hamilton House received another memorandum advising them that after June 30, 1996, Respondent CSD would no longer operate the facility. The employees were encouraged to apply for employment with the new organization. Petitioner was scheduled for an employment interview on May 30, 1996. However, the interview was rescheduled because she was unable to keep the appointment. Petitioner's application for employment with Respondent Gator is dated May 31, 1996. She also furnished Respondent Gator with copies of three performance appraisals. Petitioner's signature on the application authorized Respondent Gator to make inquiries of references and former employers regarding her general character and past performance. There is no evidence that Respondent Gator ever made any such inquiries about Petitioner. A panel of three people representing Respondent Gator interviewed Petitioner. The panel asked her the same questions that they asked other applicants. Petitioner was very negative and critical of the existing program and Respondent CSD during her interview. After the interview, each member of the interview panel tallied their score sheets independently. All three agreed that Petitioner should not be given further consideration for employment with Respondent Gator because of her negative attitude and low interview scores. On June 13, 1996, Petitioner received a memorandum from Respondent Gator stating that the company was unable to offer her a position of employment. That same day, Respondent Gator offered employment to every other Hamilton House staff applicant except one black male, Mr. Humphrey. Respondent Gator hired a black female, Latasha Bristol, who worked in the level eight dormitory with Petitioner. Ms. Bristol is younger than Petitioner. However, she was not hired to replace Petitioner. Respondent Gator hired Ms. Bristol to work in the level six dormitory. Respondent Gator offered an employment position to a white female, Lucy Oxendine. Ms. Oxendine was over 60 years old at the time. She declined to accept a job with Respondent Gator for personal reasons. Mr. Edwards was hired by Respondent Gator to continue as program director after July 1, 1996. However, neither he nor any other employee of Respondent CSD shared any information about Petitioner with Respondent Gator or had any input into Respondent Gator's decision not to hire Petitioner. Respondent Gator based its decision not to employ Petitioner solely on the results of her interview which was very negative. On June 14, 1996, the staff at Hamilton House received a memorandum stating that anyone interested in accepting employment with Respondent Gator must sign up on June 19, 1996. On June 14, 1996, Petitioner's doctor faxed a medical excuse to Respondent CSD stating that Petitioner could not return to work for an undetermined period of time. The document indicates that Petitioner's diagnosis involved anxiety, depression, and work-related stress. The doctor commented that Petitioner was the primary caretaker of her mother who was terminally ill with cancer. The doctor's June 14, 1996, fax was received by Respondent CSD in the administrative manager's office. It was on her desk for a brief period of time before it was delivered to Mr. Edwards. There is no credible evidence that any employee of Respondent CSD disclosed the contents of the fax to unauthorized persons. Petitioner's doctor did not give her permission to return to work until after July 1, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that FCHR enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Charges of Discrimination against both Respondent CSD and Respondent Gator. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: H. B. Stivers, Esquire Levine and Stivers 245 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Faye Musgrove Post Office Box 657 Live Oak, Florida 32064 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Did the Respondent engage in a discriminatory employment practice by suspending the Petitioner from work?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Joeann F. Nelson, is a Black female. In 1997, she was employed as an aide working with developmentally disabled persons at Sunrise Community, Inc. The Respondent, Sunrise Community, Inc. (hereafter “Sunrise”) is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. On or about April 24, 1997, the Petitioner was suspended from her employment for a number of days by Sunrise. The Petitioner filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (hereafter “the Commission”) on May 8, 1997, alleging that her suspension was racially motivated, and a violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The staff of the Commission investigated the complaint, and issued its Determination of No Cause on May 16, 2000. At the same time, the Commission gave the Petitioner notice of her right to an administrative hearing on the Commission’s findings. The Petitioner, while employed by the Respondent, was asked by her immediate supervisor to participate in taking residents of the facility to their group home. The Petitioner refused to take the residents complaining that another co-worker was scheduled to take the residents on the day in question. The supervisor told the Petitioner that the person who was scheduled to take the residents was too old to handle that job, and the Petitioner got into an argument about this matter. As a result of this refusal to take the residents and the argument, the Petitioner was suspended for a number of days. The refusal to follow the directions of her supervisor regarding her work and the confrontational argument with the supervisor over being asked to do a specific task that was within her job duties generally were sufficient cause for discipline. The Petitioner did not show that she was singled out or treated differently because of her race, either in being asked to perform the task or in being suspended for refusing to do the task. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a second complaint with the Commission on June 30, 1997, and raised additional issues regarding her discharge when she asked for her formal hearing on the Commission’s determination of no cause on the original complaint. However, the only matter properly before the undersigned in these proceedings is her suspension.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the complaint upon a finding that there was no cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: JoeAnne Nelson Post Office Box 76 Crawfordville, Florida 32326 Steven M. Weinger, Esquire Kurzban, Kurzban, Weinger, Tetzeli, P.A. 2650 Southwest 27th Avenue Second Floor Miami, Florida 33133 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on January 7, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this discrimination case, which has an extremely limited factual record and is replete with hearsay, Petitioner, Thornton Alan Bline, who was 52 years of age in October 1997, contends that Respondent, Automax and Pearson Group, unlawfully terminated him on account of his age. Respondent denies the allegation and contends that Petitioner was terminated because of poor performance. A preliminary decision on the merits of the claim was never reached by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Respondent is a car dealer that began business in the summer of 1997. Although there is no specific evidence on the issue of whether Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the law, monthly compensation reports received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2 reflect that during August and September 1997, Respondent employed five team leaders, including Petitioner. Thus, the total number of employees would have been greater. Even so, the record does not show the precise number of persons employed by Respondent, and the undersigned is unable to determine if Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the law and thus subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Petitioner was hired by Respondent on May 30, 1997, as a floor manager. That position required Petitioner to manage a small team of salespersons who assisted customers in purchasing automobiles. The team's performance was measured by the number of automobiles (units) sold each month. In August and September 1997, Petitioner's team had the lowest sales volume of any team. More specifically, in August 1997, out of 80 units sold by all teams, Petitioner's team sold only 10 units; in September 1997, out of 97 units sold by all teams, Petitioner's team sold only 4. At hearing, Petitioner agreed that these numbers were accurate and that his sales "were down" during that period of time. On October 1, 1997, Petitioner was summoned to the office of the general manager, "Bud" Holian, who advised him that he was being terminated due to low sales performance. At that brief meeting, Holian explained that he "felt bad" about the decision, especially "with all [Petitioner had] done," but that he had to let Petitioner go. Petitioner contended that during the conversation, Holian had also stated that the company needed "someone younger and fresher to liven up the team." He further contended that another floor manager named "Rick" overheard the conversation and could confirm these remarks. However, Rick did not appear and testify. Neither was there was any other corroborating or independent evidence to confirm this allegation. Holian, who is older than Petitioner, denied making the comment. He also established that after Petitioner was terminated, he hired two other salesmen who were older than Petitioner. Finally, the record does not show who replaced Petitioner and the age of that individual. In light of the foregoing, there is insufficient evidence to find that Respondent's employment decision was grounded on discriminatory animus in any respect, or that a discriminatory reason motivated the employer in its actions. Rather, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that Petitioner was terminated solely because of poor sales performance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thornton Alan Bline 5720 Northeast 4th Street Ocala, Florida 34470 Bernard B. Holian, General Manager Automax and Pearson Group 1918 Southwest 17th Street Ocala, Florida 34470 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was terminated from his employment with the Respondent in the Hospitality Department at the Grand Floridian Hotel on or about March 18, 1993 on the basis of his national origin (Hispanic-Dominican Republic), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent at its Grand Floridian Hotel as a valet/greeter/bellman in the Hospitality Department during the relevant period of time, including March of 1993. The Petitioner is of Hispanic origin from the Dominican Republic and is a member of a protected class. In approximately October of 1988, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent at the Contemporary Hotel as a valet/greeter. In April of 1989, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for not logging in a piece of luggage. The Petitioner did not grieve the April 1988 written reprimand. In May of 1989, the Petitioner transferred to the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel, where he was a valet/greeter/bellman. In February of 1990, the Petitioner received an oral reprimand for three separate incidents of improperly logging luggage. 9. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the February, 1990 oral reprimand. In August of 1990, the Petitioner again received an oral reprimand, this time for mixing up luggage while loading it into vehicles. The luggage had to be mailed to each rightful owner at the Respondent's expense and caused an inconvenience to the guests. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the August 1990 oral reprimand. In December of 1991, the Petitioner mishandled luggage by failing to tag all of a guest's bags. In May of 1992, the Respondent's management discussed with the Petitioner his failure to tag a piece of luggage. In July of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for failing to log in a guest's luggage. The Petitioner's verbal reprimand in July of 1992 was the result of a direct complaint by a guest, who was required to search for a piece of his own luggage in the Hotel's storage room. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the July 1992 verbal reprimand. In September of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for approaching a guest to discuss splitting a tip with a bellman, an impermissible practice. The Petitioner was not suspended for this incident. In December of 1992, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for failing to follow proper procedures regarding a guest's luggage on two separate occasions. The Petitioner did not grieve the December 1992 written reprimand. The Respondent decided not to consider the two incidents in December of the Petitioner's luggage-mishandling as separate incidents for progressive discipline purposes, even though such action was permissible under the collective bargaining agreement. The Respondent's decision not to consider the two December 1992 incidents separately for progressive discipline purposes was based upon the Petitioner's length of service and his good performance in other areas. The Petitioner had a good attitude, had good people skills, and had received good guest comments during the course of his employment. In December of 1992, the Petitioner understood that he was in the progressive discipline process. In January of 1993, the Respondent met with the Petitioner and offered to remove him from the responsibility of handling luggage by putting him in a non-tipped, dispatcher position. Also, in January of 1993, the Respondent and the Petitioner's union representative were working together to preserve the Petitioner's job. The Petitioner was reminded by his union representative about his previous reprimands and that one more incident would cause his termination. The Petitioner was told by his union representative that the purpose of moving him to a dispatcher position was to get him away from the luggage-handling area. The Petitioner was told that if he remained free of similar reprimands for one year, he could return to the tipped position of valet/greeter with no loss of seniority. After initially refusing the dispatcher position, the Petitioner accepted. The Petitioner was given the shift that he requested when he was transferred to the dispatcher position. In February of 1993 while on duty as a dispatcher, the Petitioner received a three-day suspension, without pay, for using poor judgment. He interrupted a valet while the valet was servicing a guest. The Petitioner did not grieve the February 1993 suspension. The Petitioner's action as a dispatcher of interrupting a valet was grounds for the valet to grieve such actions to the union. The suspension in February of 1993 for the Petitioner's poor judgment as a dispatcher was not the basis for his termination. The Petitioner requested a reclassification back to valet/greeter/bellman position. The Petitioner understood that one more incident of any kind would result in his immediate termination. The Petitioner requested the change from dispatcher back to valet/greeter/bellman for personal financial reasons; and his union representative also advised him that if one more incident of any kind occurred, he would be terminated. On March 16, 1993, the Petitioner mishandled luggage. The Petitioner did not properly log in a guest's luggage (a garment bag). 35. The Petitioner was terminated on March 18, 1993 for poor job performance. The progressive discipline which the Petitioner received was consistent with the union contract. The contract provides that an employee can be terminated for the next offense following a single written reprimand. The Petitioner had the opportunity to grieve all of the reprimands he received, and his union representative was aware of the actions taken in connection with the Petitioner's employment. The Petitioner grieved his termination, and that grievance was denied. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence of any similarly-situated employee who was not terminated for mishandling luggage on as many occasions as he had. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence regarding any discrimination against other Hispanic employees, other than his own belief, speculation or conjecture. The Petitioner understood that the Respondent's management was closely checking into everyone's performance. Management asked all of the employees at the Grand Floridian Hotel to help the Hotel earn a five-star rating. The Petitioner was never part of the Respondent's management and did not attend manager meetings. During the course of his employment, the Petitioner was chosen to train other employees because he knew the proper procedures for his valet/bellman/greeter position. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for handling luggage received from guests. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for logging in and handling bags. The Petitioner received copies of the Respondent's policies and procedures for a valet/bellman, including luggage handling. The Petitioner did not report many of the alleged discriminatory actions of his co-workers to management. The Petitioner conceded that on those occasions when he did make reports to management, these alleged actions stopped. The Petitioner received the overtime and schedules which he requested because of his seniority. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Orlando, Florida, work site has increased from 1993 to 1996. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel has either remained the same or increased from 1992 to 1995. In January of 1993, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department was 14, of which 11 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. In February of 1996, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department (including valets, bellmen, greeters and dispatchers) was 16, of which 12 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. The Petitioner failed to produce any evidence of an overall plan by the Respondent's management to eliminate minorities, including Hispanics, from employment at the company. The Respondent allows employees to review their employment records at any time upon request. The Petitioner presented only his own beliefs, speculation or conjecture as a basis for his claims of national origin discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which denies the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3990 The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-20, 22-31, 33-39, 41-61. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or as comment on the evidence: paragraphs 21, 32, 40. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Jorge V. Jimenez 2716 FDC Grove Road Davenport, Florida 33837 Myrna L. Galligano, Esquire Garwood, McKenna & McKenna, P.A. 731 North Garland Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Dana C. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner was unlawfully terminated from her position with Respondent because of her race (Caucasian), in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (hereinafter "FCRA"), Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following relevant facts are determined: Respondent is a corporation, licensed to do business in Florida, that provides cleaning services to business clients; and is an employer, as that term is defined, under the FCRA. Petitioner began her employment with Respondent on January 1, 1997. Petitioner was hired as a restroom cleaner, and remained in that position until her termination from employment with Respondent on August 6, 1998. Throughout her employment with Respondent, Petitioner's supervisors were: Cecilia Haimes ("Haimes"), a Caucasian female; Danna Hewett ("Hewett"), a Caucasian Female; and Carlos Ramirez ("Ramirez"), an Hispanic male. Additionally, throughout her employment with Respondent, Petitioner was assigned to work at the Orange County Convention Center ("OCCC"). Hewett began her employment with Respondent as a restroom cleaner. Shortly thereafter, she was promoted by Ramirez to the position of lead restroom cleaner. Shortly after that, she was once again promoted by Ramirez, to the position of supervisor. As a supervisor, Hewett supervised Petitioner. Hewett became Petitioner's supervisor in or around August 1997. In her capacity as supervisor, Hewett was informed by other employees at OCCC that Petitioner was spreading rumors and gossiping about alleged affairs between certain employees and/or supervisors. Hewett and Ramirez discussed Petitioner's behavior, and they concluded that such behavior was extremely disruptive to the work environment. Specifically, such behavior by Petitioner affected employee morale and employees' respect for their supervisors. Based on these allegations, Ramirez contacted Ronald Jirik ("Jirik"), the Central Florida Regional Manager, to inform him of Petitioner's behavior. Upon meeting with Hewett and Ramirez, Jirik informed Ramirez to meet with Petitioner to try to get her to stop spreading such rumors. Ramirez met with Petitioner shortly thereafter. He attempted to resolve the problem and instructed her not to gossip or spread rumors. However, the problem persisted. Jirik contacted Ramirez to follow up on whether or not Ramirez was able to resolve the problem. Ramirez informed Jirik that he was unable to stop the rumors, and that he believed that Petitioner was continuing this improper behavior. Jirik then informed Ramirez that it would probably be best if Petitioner was transferred from the OCCC, and be given the option to transfer to another facility that was of equal distance from her home. Jirik is Caucasian. Jirik suggested that Petitioner be transferred to the Orlando Sentinel building due to the fact that, based on the information in Petitioner's personnel file, this location would have been of equal distance from her home. Additionally, such a transfer would not have changed any of the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment, including but not limited to, pay, benefits, responsibilities, or shifts. Based on the foregoing, Ramirez met with Petitioner and she was offered a transfer to the Orlando Sentinel building location. However, Petitioner refused to accept the transfer. Thereafter, Petitioner's employment with Respondent was terminated on August 6, 1998. The evidence proved that Ramirez reprimanded Spanish- speaking and Caucasian employees in the same manner. Additionally, there was no credible evidence to show that Ramirez gave any form of favoritism to Spanish-speaking employees. Respondent's reason for terminating Petitioner was based on Respondent's perception that her conduct was disruptive to the work force. The allegation that Petitioner was terminated based on a discriminatory animus is unsubstantiated by the testimony and other evidence. There is no evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on her race (Caucasian).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Attas-Kaplan, Esquire Fisher & Phillips, LLP 450 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 800 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Mary J. Hall 1821 Ernest Street Maitland, Florida 32794 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by terminating her employment in violation of the Age Discrimination Employment Act.
Findings Of Fact Lombardi started her employment as a judicial assistant with Dade County in 1971. Judge Mattie Belle Davis was the first judge who hired Petitioner. Judicial Assistants serve at the pleasure of the appointing Judge.1 Judge Bruce Levy hired Lombardi as his judicial assistant after Judge Davis retired. In December 2004, Judge Levy lost his re-election bid and Petitioner no longer had a full-time position as a judicial assistant with a judge. Lombardi started working in the temporary pool of judicial assistants. The position allowed Petitioner to retain her benefits while seeking a permanent judicial assistant position. While serving in the pool, Petitioner worked for Judge Leon Firtel from February 14, 2005, through February 28, 2006, before he let her go. Petitioner then worked for Judge Rosa Rodriguez from April 1, 2006, through May 23, 2007, until she let her go. Petitioner last worked for Dade County when she served as retired Judge Roger Silver's ("Silver") judicial assistant from September 1, 2007, until January 7, 2008. Lombardi was terminated in Silver's chambers with a bailiff and Ms. Suarez from Human Resources present. Silver informed the Petitioner her services were no longer needed and he was letting her go. Petitioner questioned why she was being terminated; however, Silver did not provide an explanation. Silver terminated Petitioner because he was not happy with her work performance. Silver testified that Petitioner had the following problems regarding her work: taking lunch breaks beyond the one hour he had discussed with her; numerous complaints from attorneys; selling Avon at the work place; not answering the phones and allowing calls to go to voicemail; and repeatedly setting unnecessary hearings on the docket. Prior to terminating Lombardi, Silver inquired with Human Resources about a replacement and was informed that he could not be assured that he would be able to get a temporary assistant to replace Lombardi due to the unavailability of funding. He still choose to terminate Petitioner because, "[he] felt having no one was better than what [he] had under the circumstances." Petitioner was not able to go back in the "temporary pool" of judicial assistants as she had in the past after Silver terminated her. In 2008, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit had a hiring freeze whereby the temporary pool was no longer funded. Human Resources eventually sent Elizabeth Gonzalez, whose date of birth is May 26, 1965, to Silver as a temporary judicial assistant. Silver had never met Gonzalez prior to her coming to work for him. There was no discussion of age when Silver requested a judicial assistant or when Gonzalez was assigned to him. Gonzalez served as Silver's temporary judicial assistant for a number of weeks and, when personnel advised him he could hire someone, including Gonzalez, Silver hired Gonzalez on or about March 10, 2008, because he was pleased with her work. Gonzalez worked with him until his retirement in December 2008. At the time when Petitioner filed her Charge of Discrimination, Petitioner was unaware of the exact age of her replacement. Petitioner's date of birth is May 18, 1948.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2009.
Findings Of Fact James A. Bitting, Petitioner, was first employed by Crawford and Company in its Tampa office as a property appraiser in October 1973, and remained so employed until he was terminated in July 1988. Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident in 1983 while on company business and sustained back injuries which thereafter was the source of lower back pain if he remained in one position (either standing or sitting) for an extended period. However, he made no claim and submitted no medical evidence of this handicap until after his termination from employment by Respondent. In 1987 and 1988, claims cases at Crawford decreased, and the regional office began telling the Tampa office that they should look to a reduction of personnel. Satellite offices at Brooksville and Plant City were closed and the adjustors in charge of those offices were brought in to the Tampa office. At the time of his termination there were four outside adjusters at the Tampa office with Respondent being the only designated property adjuster. The others dealt primarily with casualty claims. Property claims had declined to a point there were insufficient claims to occupy one adjuster full-time and Petitioner was being given a few simple casualty claims. The regional office and the Tampa office generally agreed that one appraiser should be terminated. At the time this determination was made Respondent had the lowest evaluations of the four adjusters. Further, he had received the second phase of a progressive discipline notice (Ex. 2) stating his work performance was unsatisfactory due to non-compliance with work standards. Petitioner presented no evidence to support his contention that his age was a proximate cause of his termination, other than his bare allegation that during this period no employee under 40 was terminated. Substantial evidence was presented that Respondent continues to have numerous people in it's work force older than 50 and 60 years of age. During the presentation of his case, Petitioner referred repeatedly to the failure of Respondent to provide him with a comfortable office chair in which he could sit without hurting his back. Although several employees of Respondent were aware that Petitioner had a back problem, Petitioner, prior to his dismissal, never presented any medical evidence that he needed special equipment, or was physically unable to perform any tasks. He had continued to climb ladders to the roofs of houses when necessary in his job as property adjuster. Following Petitioner's termination, his job was not filled. Respondent, as part of their reorganization, moved another adjuster into the department vacated by Petitioner, but this employee brought with her workers compensation claims which consumed 75-80% of her time. Later Respondent also transferred into the Tampa office a property general adjuster to drum up more casualty business. Upon his arrival he did the property claims formerly done by Petitioner using about 10% of his work time, and spent 80-90% of his time soliciting new business. A property general adjuster is qualified to handle complex claims involving industrial losses while a property adjuster like Petitioner is limited to handling less complex residential claims.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner has failed to prove that his termination from employment by Crawford and Company was influenced by Petitioner's age or handicap, and that his Petition for Relief be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: G. G. Harvey Manager, CFE Post Office Box 5047 Atlanta, GA 30302 James A. Bitting 11730 Marjorie Avenue Tampa, FL 33612 Louis P. DiLorenzo, Esquire One Lincoln Center Syracuse, New York 13202-1355 Dana Baird General Counsel and Acting Executive Director Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1990.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a payroll clerk with Respondent because of her race, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Prior to November 1994, Petitioner was employed by Markings and Equipment Corporation, first as a receptionist, later as a payroll clerk for several years. She had a good working relationship with management and staff. In November 1994, Edward T. Quinn and two other investors purchased the assets of Markings and Equipment Co. and established a new corporation named Mill-it Striping, Inc., a Florida corporation. On November 7, 1994, Mill-It Striping began operations. Edward T. Quinn was named Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer. Petitioner and one other person were retained as office staff. Other employees of the former owner were retained as field workers in their same positions. Petitioner and the other employees were retained on a 90-day probationary period. All employees were required to complete application forms for the new company. The organization of the company was revamped and operating policies were changed. Petitioner and Quinn became embroiled in disputes over policy and procedures on a nearly daily basis. Quinn's management style was gruff and unprofessional. Foul language was directed toward Petitioner's work by Quinn on a regular basis. There was insufficient evidence to prove that Quinn's derogatory remarks of a social nature were directed toward Petitioner. On December 5, 1994, Petitioner was terminated from her position as a payroll clerk. Quinn alleged that Petitioner was terminated because of her poor work performance and reporting to work late on more than one occasion while on probation. Petitioner, who is an African-American female, was replaced in her position by a Caucasian female. Respondent's company presently has been administratively dissolved, as of September 24, 1999. There is no evidence that the corporation is active, is a subsidiary to another company, or that it has any remaining assets.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Coleman, Acting Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Edward T. Quinn as former Vice President Mill-It Stripping, Inc. 107 Shore Drive Longwood, Florida 32779 Valerie A. Roberts Post Office Box 543 Maitland, Florida 32751 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
