The Issue The issue to be resolved herein concerns whether the Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this proceeding. Embodied in that general issue are questions concerning whether the Petitioners are the prevailing parties; whether they meet the definition of "small business" parties, including the net worth amounts, enumerated in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as well as whether the disciplinary proceeding against both Petitioners was "substantially justified". See Section 57.111(3)(e) , Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating the practices of real estate salesmen and brokers by the various provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Included within those duties is the duty to investigate conduct by realtors allegedly in violation of Chapter 475 and related rules and to prosecute administrative penal proceedings for which probable cause is found as a result of such investigations. At times pertinent hereto, both Ms. Maxwell and Ms. Cosyns, (then Pauline Sealey) were licensed realtors working as independent contractors for Mariner Properties, Inc. and V.I.P. Realty Inc. The complete file of the underlying proceeding DOAH Case No. 86-0140, was stipulated into evidence. That file included the Administrative Complaint filed against these Respondents and the Recommended and Final Order, which Final Order adopted the Recommended Order. The findings of fact in that Recommended Order are incorporated by reference and adopted herein. During the Petitioner's case, counsel for Petitioner voluntarily reduced the attorney's fees bills for both Petitioners such that Ms. Maxwell's bill is the total amount of $2,695.50 and Ms. Cosyns' bill is $17,200, rather than the original amounts submitted in the affidavit. Respondent acknowledged in its proposed Final Order that the fees and costs submitted by the Respondent were thus reasonable. The testimony the Petitioners presented through depositions, transcripts of which were admitted into evidence into this proceeding, was unrefuted. That testimony demonstrates that both Ms. Cosyns and Ms. Maxwell were prevailing parties in the administrative proceeding referenced herein brought by the Respondent, Department of Professional Regulation. They were individually named as Respondents in the Administrative Complaint whereby their professional licenses were subjected to possible suspension or revocation for alleged wrong doing on their part. There is no dispute that they were exonerated in that proceeding and are thus prevailing parties within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Petitioners are also "small business parties". In that connection, they both were independently licensed Real Estate professionals during times pertinent to the underlying proceeding and were acting in the capacity of independent contractors for all the activities with which the administrative complaint was concerned. Each established that her net worth is below the limit provided by Section 57.111 as an element of the definition of "small business party". The reasonableness of the fees having been established in the manner found-above and the Petitioners having established that they meet the definitional requirements of prevailing small business parties, there remains to be determined the issue of whether the proceedings against the two Petitioners were "substantially justified", that is, whether the proceeding had a "reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a State agency." See Section 57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes. The facts concerning each Petitioner's case regarding the three counts of the Administrative Complaint relating to them are as found in the Recommended Order incorporated by reference herein. Respondent Maxwell was charged in the complaint with having worked in conjunction with an office manager, Mr. Hurbanis of V.I.P. Realty, in conspiring with him to submit a fraudulent real estate sales contract to a lending institution for purposes of financing. This allegedly involved submitting a contract to the lending institution with an inflated purchase price in order to secure one hundred percent financing, the scheme being more particularly described in that portion of the findings of fact in the Recommended Order related to Jean Maxwell. In fact, Ms. Maxwell did not work in the realty office as charged in the Administrative Complaint, but rather was employed by Mariner Properties, which may have been a related company. The contract in question, although alleged to be fraudulent was, in fact, a bona fide contract which was a legitimate part of the Real Estate transaction submitted to the bank for financing purposes, about which the bank was kept fully advised. All details of the transaction were disclosed to the lender. Maxwell was specifically charged with concealing the true contract from the lender in order to enhance the percentage of the purchase price that the bank would finance, done by allegedly inflating the purchase price in a second contract submitted to the bank. It was established in the disciplinary proceeding that no such concealment ever took place. In fact, Ms. Maxwell was purchasing a lot from her own employer, Mariner Properties. Two contracts were indeed prepared for the purchase of Lot 69, a single family lot on Sanibel Island. In fact, however, the difference of $42,875 and $49,500 in the stated purchase price, as depicted on the two contracts, was the result of continuing negotiations between Ms. Maxwell and the seller, who was also her employer. The difference in the two prices depicted on the contracts was the result of, in effect, a set-off to the benefit of Ms. Maxwell, representing certain employee discounts and real estate commission due from the employer and seller to Ms. Maxwell, the purchaser. As Petitioners' composite Exhibit 5 reflects, the lender involved, North First Bank of Ft. Myers, Florida, was fully apprised of all the details concerning this transaction at the time it was entered into and the loan commitment extended and closed. Mr. Allan Barnes, the Assistant Vice President of North First Bank revealed, in the letter contained in this exhibit in evidence, that there was no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts to his institution by Ms. Maxwell. This letter is dated April 18, 1984. The other related letter in that exhibit, of May 2, 1984 from attorney Oertel to attorney Frederick H. Wilson of the Respondent agency, thus constitutes notice to the agency well before the complaint was filed, that no concealment or misrepresentation to the lender involved had occurred and the charges were requested to be dismissed. In spite of the fact that the agency was on notice of this turn of events well before the filing of the Administrative Complaint, it proceeded to file the complaint and to prosecute it all the way up to the date of hearing, requiring Ms. Maxwell's attorney to attend the hearing to defend her interests. At the hearing, counsel for the Department acknowledged that there was no basis for prosecuting Ms. Maxwell and voluntarily dismissed the complaint as to her. The Respondent's witness, Investigator Harris, in his deposition taken September 11, 1984, acknowledged that he did not discuss any details concerning the investigation, with attorney Frederick Wilson, who prepared the complaint, nor did he confer with him by telephone or correspondence before the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the complaint was prepared solely on the basis of the investigative report. The investigative report came into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. It reveals that Mr. A. J. Davis the president of Mariner Group and Mariner Properties, who was Jean Maxwell's employer and the owner of the lot in question, signed one contract and his Executive Vice President signed the other. In spite of this, the investigative report does not reveal that the investigator conferred with either Ms. Maxwell, or the sellers concerning this transaction. He conducted a general interview of A.J. Davis concerning the alleged "problem" in his office of "double contracting," but asked him no questions and received no comment about the Jean Maxwell transaction whatever. Nor did the investigator confer with Mr. Allen Barnes or any other representative of North First Bank. If the investigation had been more complete and thorough, he would have learned from Mr. Barnes, if from no one else, that the bank had knowledge of both contracts and all details of the transaction underlying them and there had been no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts regarding the transaction by Ms. Maxwell. This information was learned by attorney Oertel as early as April 18, 1984 by Mr. Barnes' letter, referenced above, and it was communicated to the agency by Mr. Oertel on May 2, 1984. Nevertheless, the complaint was filed and prosecuted through to hearing. Therefore, the prosecution and filing of the Administrative Complaint were clearly not substantially justified. If the Department had properly investigated the matter it would have discovered the true nature of the transaction as being a completely bona fide real estate arrangement. Former Respondent, Pauline Sealy Cosyns was charged with two counts, III and V, in the Administrative Complaint at issue. One count alleged, in essence, that Ms. Sealey had engaged in a similar fraudulent contract situation regarding the sale of her residence to a Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Floyd. The evidence in that proceedings revealed no concealment of any sales contract occurred whatever with regard to the lending institution or anyone else. The facts as revealed at hearing showed Ms. Cosyns and the Floyds, through continuing negotiations after the original sales contract was entered into, amended that contract and executed a second one, in order to allow Ms. Cosyns to take back a second mortgage from the Floyds. This was necessary because Mr. Floyd, an author, was short of the necessary down payment pursuant to the terms of the original contract, because his annual royalty payment from his publishers had not been received as the time approached for closing. The second contract was executed to allow for a second mortgage in favor of the seller, Ms. Cosyns, in order to make up the amount owed by the Floyds on the purchase price agreed upon, above the first mortgage amount. The testimony and evidence in the disciplinary proceeding revealed unequivocally that the lending institution, Amerifirst Mortgage Company, was fully apprised of the situation and of the reason for the two contractual agreements. The $24,000 second mortgage in question is even depicted on the closing statement issued by that bank. There was simply no concealment and no effort to conceal any facts concerning this transaction from the lender or from anyone else. The investigation conducted was deficient because the investigator failed to discuss this transaction with the lender or with the purchasers. He discussed the matter with Ms. Sealy-Cosyns and his own deposition testimony reveals, as does his investigative report, that he did not feel that he got a complete account of the transaction from her. She testified in her deposition, taken prior to the instant proceeding, that she indeed did not disclose all facts of the transaction to him because she was concerned that he was attempting to apprehend her in some "legal impropriety". Therefore, she was reluctant to be entirely candid. The fact remains, however, that had he conducted a complete investigation by conferring with the lender and the purchasers, he would have known immediately, long before the Administrative Complaint was filed and the matter prosecuted, that there was absolutely no basis for any probable cause finding that wrong-doing had occurred in terms of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Thus, the facts concerning the prosecution as to Count III against Pauline Sealy-Cosyns, as more particularly delineated in the findings of fact in the previous Recommended Order, reveal not only that Ms. Cosyns was totally exonerated in the referenced proceeding, but that there was no substantial basis for prosecuting her as to this count at all. Concerning Count V against Ms. Cosyns, it was established through the evidence at the hearing in the disciplinary case that she was merely the listing agent and did not have any part to play in the drafting of the contract nor the presenting of it to the lender. Because there was no evidence adduced to show that she had any complicity or direct involvement in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction involved in Count V of the Administrative Complaint at issue she was exonerated as to that count as well. It is noteworthy here that a statement was made by counsel for the agency, appearing at pages 20 and 21 of the transcript of the proceeding involving the Administrative Complaint, which indicates that the agency, based upon its review of certain documents regarding Counts III and V, before hearing, felt that indeed there might not be a disputed issue of material fact as to Mrs. Cosyns. The agency, although acknowledging that a review of the documents caused it to have reason to believe that it was unnecessary to proceed further against Ms. Cosyns nevertheless did not voluntarily dismiss those counts and proceeded through hearing. Be that as it may, the investigation revealed that Ms. Cosyns acknowledged that she knew that there were two contractual documents involved, but the investigation also revealed that Ms. Cosyns was only the listing agent. The selling agent was Mr. Parks. The investigation revealed through interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Parks and Mr. Hurbanis, the office Manager of V.I.P. Realty, that Ms. Cosyns, as listing agent, was merely present when the offer from the buyers was communicated to the office manager, Mr. Hurbanis, and ultimately to the sellers, the Cottrells. There was no reason for the investigator to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the drafting of the contracts nor with the communication of them to the lending institution involved. That was done by either Mr. Parks or Mr. Hurbanis or by the buyers. The investigation (as revealed in the investigative report) does not show who communicated the contract in question to the lender. The investigation was simply incomplete. If the investigator had conferred with the buyers, the sellers and especially the lender, he could have ascertained-whether the lender was aware of all the facts concerning this transaction and whether there was any reason to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the arrangement and the details of the transaction. It was ultimately established, by unrefuted evidence at hearing, that indeed Ms. Cosyns did not have anything to do with the transaction, nor the manner in which it was disclosed to the lender. The fact that she was aware that two contracts had been prepared did not give a reasonable basis for the investigator to conclude that she had engaged in any wrong-doing. The report of his interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Hurbanis and Mr. Parks, as well as Donna Ross, does not indicate that he had a reasonable basis to conclude that Ms. Cosyns had engaged in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction, including the conveyance of a bogus contract to the lending institution involved, nor for that matter, that Mr. Hurbanis or Mr. Parks engaged in such conduct. In order to ascertain a reasonable basis for concluding whether Ms. Cosyns was involved in any wrongful conduct, he would have had to obtain more information than he did from these people or confer with the lender, the buyer or the seller, or all of these approaches, before he could have a reasonable basis to recommend to the prosecuting agency that an Administrative Complaint be filed against her concerning this transaction. In fact, he did not do so, but the Administrative Complaint was filed and prosecuted through hearing anyway, causing her to incur the above-referenced attorney's fees. It thus has not been demonstrated that there was any substantial basis for the filing and prosecution of Count V of the Administrative Complaint against Ms. Cosyn. Thus she is entitled to the attorneys fees referenced above with regard to the prosecution of the Administrative Complaint in question.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner presented one witness that had audited the books and records of Respondent. This audit revealed that Respondent had handled some 350 transactions involving mortgages and that on approximately 50 of those transactions the Respondent had withheld a commission more than authorized by statute or department rule. The witness testified to only a few of those transactions shown on his work sheet attached to a deposition admitted into evidence. Thereafter Respondent stipulated that if asked about all of the other transactions shown on the work sheet, this witness, and the auditor who performed the balance of the audit, would testify the same for those other transactions, viz. that the worksheet figures were extracted from the records of Respondent and the authorized commissions shown thereon were computed using either the statutory method or the rule method and that both methods would give the same results. These figures show that the Respondent overcharged the borrower on approximately 50 transactions as alleged. On approximately 2/3 of the transactions the funds were remitted to a master broker, and on the other 1/3 the funds were remitted to the borrower. Further, that the notes and mortgages were received by Respondent for delivery to his client some 4 to 6 weeks after he had disbursed the money from his trust account. Upon expiration of Petitioner's case Respondent renewed his motions for dismissal and further moved for dismissal on the grounds that the funds for a majority of the transactions involved were remitted to another broker, and for those remitted directly to the borrower (developer) the charges were not excessive but those actually proposed by the borrower-developer. This motion was denied and Respondent then testified in his own behalf. Richard Zaloudek percent has been a licensed mortgage broker since 1960 and is also a licensed real estate broker. He has been in the mortgage brokerage business since 1948. Prior to obtaining his mortgage broker's license he dealt in FHA mortgages which were exempt. He renewed his license automatically each year until September, 1975 when he received no response from the Comptroller's Office to his application for renewal. Since a valid license is required to operate as a mortgage broker, Respondent has been unable to so act since the expiration of his license in September, 1975. When Respondent was approached by the master broker representing Mortgage Development Corporation to sell mortgages for it, he questioned the legality of such transactions. He was presented with a copy of the opinion of the office of the Comptroller, Division of Securities, dated January 10, 1973. This indicated that the notes secured by mortgages that he was being solicited to sell complied with the statutes and rules affecting securities. Thereafter he advertised in the news media that he had these high interest paying notes secured by mortgage for sale. When a client came into his office to invest he would take their investment, deposit same in his trust account, and then forward to the master broker or borrower the deposit less the commission the borrower and master broker had authorized him to deduct. Thereafter the note and mortgage was mailed to Respondent who presented it to the investor. As a result of many people losing money in investments in promissory notes secured by mortgages on land, newspaper coverage of various facets of the land development industry became widespread. In several cases the various mortgage brokers, such as Respondent herein, were named in these articles in the newspapers; and press reports were issued by the Comptroller's Office that certain licenses, including that of Respondent, had been revoked. Because of the adverse publicity, not only did Respondent's mortgage brokerage business drop off and stop completely when his license was not renewed in September, 1975, but also his business as a real estate broker suffered. Respondent's testimony that he lost real estate listings totaling some two million dollars was not rebutted. Nor was his testimony that this represented a loss of some $70,000 in income.
Findings Of Fact The pleadings in this case, Petitioner's Notice of Intention to Suspend" and Respondent's "Petition for Formal Hearing" establish the following uncontroverted facts: William D. McCaffrey is a mortgage solicitor holding license number HK0007207. The Department of Banking and Finance is charged with the responsibility and duty of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Mortgage Brokerage Act, including the duty to suspend the license of those persons registered under the act for violations of the terms therein. William D. McCaffrey has been convicted of a federal offense and is presently in federal custody at the Federal Correctional Institute in Montgomery, Alabama. On November 13, 1985, Respondent pled guilty to "Interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained credit cards, in violation of title 15 U.S. Code, Section 1644(b) as charged in count 6 of the Indictment". (Petitioner's Exhibit #2) Count 6 of the indictment provides: Count Six On or about December 13, 1982, defendants WILLIAM D. McCAFFREY and WILLIAM BARTRAM III did knowingly, with unlawful and fraud- ulent intent, transport and cause to be transported in interstate commerce from Clarkston, Georgia, by way of Nevada, to the District of Arizona, a fraudulently obtained American Express Credit Card in the name of William Smith, knowing said credit card to have been fraudulently obtained. All in violation of Title IS, United States Code, Section 1644(b), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1) The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona in case #CR 85-53 PHX adjudged William D. McCaffrey guilty as charged and convicted, sentenced him to imprisonment for 5 years, and ordered that he pay a fine of $10,000 and make restitution to American Express in the amount of $5,481.27. (Petitioner's Exhibit #2 Judgement and Probation/Commitment Order)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing it is recommended that a final order be entered suspending Respondent's mortgage solicitor's license for a period of two years. DONE AND ORDERED this 23rd day of October 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert K. Good, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Clyde Taylor, Jr., Esquire 1105 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert Thomas Brown, is registered with the Board of Real Estate (hereafter "Board") as a real estate salesman. The Respondent's application for registration was approved by the Board, and on December 22, 1978, he was issued a salesman's license. Question 6 of the Respondent's application filed with the Board reads as follows: Have you ever been arrested for, or charged with, the commission of an offense against the laws of municipality, state or nation including traffic offenses, (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations) without regard to whether convicted, sentenced, pardoned or paroled? In response to this question, the Respondent inserted the work "no." The Respondent knew the answer he supplied to Question 6 was false because of a prior arrest and conviction for burglary in Kent County, Delaware in 1967. The Respondent was adjudicated guilty and received a one year suspended sentence. The Respondent was served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing in this proceeding by certified mail on or about October 29, 1979.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's real estate salesman's license be revoked. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 14th day of November 1980. SHARYN S. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Thomas Brown 604 Avenue "E" Southeast Winter Haven, Florida 33880 Robert Thomas Brown Post Office Box 612 Winter Haven, Florida 33880 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether Respondent's real estate broker's license should be disciplined for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in any business transaction, pursuant to Section 475.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes(1983).
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, Respondent Thomas F. Steffan Jr. was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0402257. Respondent has since been issued a license as a real estate broker, same license number. Mr. and Mrs. Walther Ellis were the owners of certain property located on Windsor Road, Bonita Springs, Florida. Mr. and Mrs. Ellis listed their property for sale with Wesley Brodersen of Gulder Real Estate, Inc. in Bonita Springs, Florida. The Respondent was employed at Gulder Real Estate, Inc. during the time that the Ellises listed said property with Gulder Real Estate, Inc. On or about May 23, 1984, the Respondent solicited and obtained a Catherine A. Griffin as a prospective purchaser of the Ellis' property. Mrs. Griffin submitted a contract for sale and purchase, witnessed by Respondent, which contract for sale and purchase the Respondent in turn submitted to the Ellises. Pursuant to the terms of the May 23, 1984 contract for sale and purchase, Mrs. Griffin had placed down a total deposit of $5,000.00. The Ellises rejected the terms of sale (offer) as expressed in the May 23, 1984 contract for sale and purchase. Thereafter, Mrs. Griffin, as buyer, along with her husband, Donald Griffin, who is not a buyer in the transaction but was intimately involved in the negotiations, continued to express an interest in the property and the Ellises continued to express an interest to sell the property. In July, 1984, contract negotiations were once again begun and Mr. Griffin informed the Respondent what terms would be acceptable to his wife, Catherine A. Griffin. Mr. Griffin further requested that the signatures of Mr. and Mrs. Ellis be obtained first on a new contract for sale and purchase setting out the terms he had dictated to Respondent. Somewhere during this time period, Mr. Griffin directed Respondent to have completed a survey of the property at the Griffins'expense. Respondent next communicated with Mr. Ellis and a new contract for sale and purchase was prepared by the Respondent and signed by Mr. Ellis personally and signed by Mr. Ellis for Mrs. Ellis with Mrs. Ellis' express consent and permission. Subsequent thereto, the Respondent brought the new contract for sale and purchase to the Griffins. In the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Donald Griffin the Respondent presented the offer. Mr. Griffin immediately signed the new contract for sale and purchase in the presence of both Respondent and Mrs. Griffin on the line indicating he was signing as a witness to the buyer's signature/execution. However, as this contract (offer) was physically handed by Mr. Griffin to his wife for formal execution, it was further reviewed by Mr. Griffin, who became aware that the terms of purchase contained in the new contract for sale and purchase were not as he had dictated them to the Respondent. Mr. Griffin advised his wife not to accept the offer, instructed her not to sign, and, in fact, the new contract for sale and purchase was not signed or accepted by Mrs. Griffin. Respondent requested that the Griffins think about the offer for a while longer and they agreed to do so over an extended vacation. While the Griffins were on vacation, the Respondent, apparently believing the offer contained in the second contract for sale and purchase would eventually be accepted, notified Mr. Ellis that the offer had already been accepted. Believing that the offer had been accepted by a bona fide purchaser, Mr. Ellis requested a copy of the signed contract. Due to the fact that the Respondent did not have a contract signed by a bona fide buyer (Catherine A. Griffin) but believing that one would be obtained in the very near future because Donald Griffin had signed the second contract and because Donald Griffin had indicated that he could finance the entire operation by himself, the Respondent caused a photo copy of the signature of Catherine A. Griffin to be placed onto the second contract without the permission , consent, or knowledge of either Donald Griffin or Catherine Griffin. The altered copy of the second contract is apparently no longer in existence and did not come into evidence. The only real point of contention in the parties' respective proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is concerning what representation was made by Respondent to Mr. Walther Ellis concerning who had accepted the second contract. Respondent admits he represented to Mr. Ellis that Mr. Griffin, controlling the transaction for buyers, had accepted the second contract. Mr. Ellis maintained that Respondent represented to him that the second contract had been accepted on his terms but he is not clear·whether Respondent told him Mrs. Griffin accepted it or who accepted it. (Walther Ellis Deposition Page 22). Mrs. Ellis's testimony presents no independent confirmation of any of this as her information in all respects is second-hand. Mr. Brodersen's testimony is that the Respondent's representation to him was that "the Griffins" had accepted the second contract for purchase and sale and that Respondent told Mr. Ellis the same thing in Brodersen's presence and also told Brodersen that the last copy of the signed contract had been mailed to Mr. Ellis by Respondent the day previous to this three-way conversation. Mr. Brodersen thought Mr. Ellis never got the fraudulent contract but testified further that Respondent later admitted to Brodersen that he had altered this copy of the second contract so as to fraudulently reflect Mrs. Griffin's signature and further admitted to Brodersen that he, Respondent, had mailed that fraudulent copy to Mr. Ellis. Mr. Brodersen never saw the fraudulent contract. Mr. Ellis testified to receiving in the mail a copy of the second contract with a suspicious-looking set of signatures which he turned over to his attorney. The parties stipulated the attorney does not now have the contract copy. By itself, the testimony of Investigator Jacobs that Respondent by telephone admitted falsifying Mrs. Griffin's signature onto a copy of the second contract for purchase and sale and further admitted destroying one copy of the fraudulent contract would fail as not having the proper predicate for voice identification. However, in light of Mr. Ellis's and Mr. Brodersen's testimony, Mr. Jacobs' testimony on Respondent's creation of the fraudulent document is accepted as corroborative pursuant to Section 120.58 Florida Statutes. The remainder of his testimony is rejected. At no time did Catherine A. Griffin and/or Donald Griffin as her agent or on his own behalf accept the Ellis' offer contained in the second contract for sale and purchase nor did Catherine A. Griffin nor Donald Griffin ever execute the second contract as a buyer. The transaction was never closed and Mrs. Griffin was returned her deposit money when she requested it in September 1984. Mr. Ellis admits having told Respondent he was not anxious for the deal to close and did not care if the deal failed to go through. Mr. Griffin spoke at length and with considerable feeling at the hearing of his desire that Respondent not receive a permanent record as a result of a single mistake committed while under stress from Respondent's father's medical condition. That Respondent was under such stress when all this occurred was confirmed by Mr. Brodersen.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered whereby Respondent Thomas F. Steffan Jr.'s licenses as a real estate salesman and broker be suspended for a period of one year and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James T. Mitchell, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation-Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas F. Steffan Jr., Pro Se 18645 Sandpiper Road Ft. Myers, Florida Harold R. Huff, Director Department of Professional Regulation-Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Bangert was a licensed real estate salesman with State of Florida license number 0312002. On or about May 1, 1986, Cynthia Green (now Cynthia Tyson) listed her house at 408 Lakeview Drive, Altamonte Springs, Florida, under an exclusive right of sale contract with J. Scott Jones, a licensed real estate broker. Through his broker, Help U. Sell (Thomas Jafek and Thomas Jafek II), Bangert offered $64,900.00 to Ms. Tyson for the Lakeview house. The contract for sale offered a $1,000.00 deposit note, with two mortgages, including a balloon mortgage, payment of $3,000.00 fix-up costs by the seller, and cash to the seller at closing in the amount of $15,659.00 The offer was rejected by Ms. Tyson. J. Scott Jones negotiated over the telephone with Thomas Jafek II, and then with Bangert. The basic requirement of Ms. Tyson was that she wanted $50,000.00 net at closing. She also wanted a cash deposit, as she had a previous negative experience with a deposit note. J. Scott Jones does not recall that he told Bangert that a cash deposit was required, but he knows the issue came up sometime during the telephone discussion. He did not speak to both Jafek and Bangert at the same time. A second contract offer was signed by Bangert and was accepted by Ms. Tyson on August 30, 1986. The purchase price and method of payment was set out as follows: PURCHASE PRICE $ 68,500.00 PAYMENT: Deposit(s) to be held in escrow by Help-U-Sell of College Park, upon acceptance in the amount of $ 1,000.00 Subject to AND [sic] assumption of Mortgage in good standing in favor of To Be Obtained having an approximate present principal balance of $ 40,000.00 Purchase money mortgage and note bearing interest at 9 percent on terms set forth herein below, in the principal amount of 360 payments of 189.10 to Balloon at 60th mo. $ 23,500.00 Other Purchase Money Mortgage @ 10 percent in a single payment at 60th mo. $ 5,000.00 Balance to close (U.S. cash, LOCALLY DRAWN certified or cashier's check), subject to adjustments and prorations $ 68,500.00 (Petitioner's Exhibit #4) The Contract also provided for the $50,000.00 net at closing to the seller. Bangert gave Thomas Jafek a deposit note in the amount of $1,000.00. Jafek did not know how to put a note in a trust or escrow account, so he held it in his files at Help U. Sell. Jafek had dealt with Bangert before in real estate transactions and had acted before as the escrow agent. In those dealings Bangert only put down notes, never cash. Jafek understood that Bangert's role was as a principal buyer and that Bangert intended to assign the contract for sale. The transaction was initially scheduled to close on September 26, 1987. On September 30, 1986, the parties agreed to extend the closing until October 10, 1986. When J. Scott Jones met with Bangert to get the extension signed, he learned that a note, rather than cash deposit had been made. The transaction never closed. For reasons that are not material to this proceeding, Bangert did not appear at the closing. Cynthia Tyson retained an attorney, Garrick N. Fox, who sent letters to Jafek and to Bangert on October 17, 1986. The letter to Jafek provides, in pertinent part: As per the contract for sale and purchase, your company holds one thousand dollars in escrow and we may [sic) hereby make demand that you remit to this law office the one thousand dollars held in escrow as partial damages for the default of the contract. (Petitioner's Exhibit #6) The letter to Bangert does not mention the deposit, but states that the contract is in default. The final paragraph states: It is my sincere desire that we can settle this matter amicably without the necessity of litigation. If you can close on this contract forthwith, all of these problems can be settled. If not I would appreciate it if you would have your attorney contact [sic] so that we can immediately take the proper steps to minimize Miss Green's damages. (Petitioner's Exhibit #7) The attorney never made an oral demand on Bangert for the $1000.00. Jafek did not consider his letter to be a present demand, but rather a statement of intent to make a demand in the future. Jafek did not tender the note and the $1000.00 was not paid. Bangert had no intent to make a cash deposit. He claims that he told "Tom Jr." " (Thomas Jafek II) to type "a deposit note" on the second contract offer, but that even without that language, a note, rather than cash, was not precluded by the contract terms. Bangert intended that the transaction take place and did not have an intent or motive to defraud the seller. If the transaction had closed, he claims he would have honored the note. As far as he knows, Jafek still has the note. Bangert claims also that it was an oversight that he did not reveal his real estate license status on the contract. The Jafeks knew he was a real estate salesman. Further, he and Scott Jones were teaching at the same real estate school and he felt that Jones should have known his status. He did not intend to hide the fact of his license from anyone. His business in the last three years has been actively serving as a principal buyer and seller for other parties. Bangert's liability on his note is not at issue. In the absence of clear evidence of his knowledge of the seller's conditions, I cannot find that he is guilty of fraud in putting a note cash on deposit. Nor did he deliberately misrepresent a material fact to the seller by failing to disclose that he was a licensed real estate salesman. Ms. Tyson never met Bangert. Both parties were dealing at arms length through their own brokers. Conclusions of Law The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. and Section 455.225(4) F.S. Section 475.25(1) F.S. provides that the Florida Real Estate Commission may impose discipline if it finds that a licensee, (b) Has been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction... DPR has the burden of proving the allegations of this complaint through evidence that is clear and convincing. Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2nd 292 (Fla. 1987). It is apparent now that Ms. Tyson wanted a cash deposit as one condition of accepting an offer to buy her property. It is not clear that the condition was communicated to Bangert by either his broker, Thomas Jafek, II, or by Ms. Tyson's broker, J. Scott Jones. Without this material evidence it cannot be established that Bangert deliberately engaged in a subterfuge. Without evidence of dishonest or illicit intent, there is no guilt under Section 475.25(1)(b), F.S. Morris v. Department of Professional Regulation 474 So.2nd 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). No rule nor provision of law has been cited to require a real estate licensee to reveal his status as such when engaging in the purchase and sale of property in his personal capacity. Nor was evidence produced that would establish and justify such a policy by the Board. In Santaniello v. Department of Professional Regulation 432 So.2nd 84 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1983), the court upheld the Board's right to determine that a broker violated Section 475.25(1)(b) F.S. when he failed to reveal that a purchaser was his mother-in- law. In that case, the court observed that the broker owed his allegiance to the sellers and was obligated to inform them of anything which might influence their decision to sell. Because of that, the existence of the mother-in-law relationship was deemed a material fact. No such foundation for a duty to inform was established here, therefore there was no violation of section 475.25(1)(b) F.S.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint against Larry G. Bangert be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of December, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Office Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3044 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by Petitioner. Adopted in paragraph #1. Adopted in paragraph #2. Adopted in substance in paragraphs #3 and #4. Adopted in substance in paragraph #4. Evidence did not establish that Bangert was aware of the cash deposit condition by Ms. Tyson. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. The face of the contract does not require cash. Adopted in paragraph #7. Adopted in paragraph #8. Adopted in paragraph #6. Adopted in substance in paragraph #7. Adopted in paragraph #11. Adopted in paragraph #7. Adopted in part in paragraph #10. Bangert contended that the contract did not specify cash. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in paragraph #9. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Copies furnished: DOAH Case No. 87-3044 James R. Mitchell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32802 Larry G. Bangert 103 Cashew Court Longwood, Florida 32750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Exhibit 2 evidences some 13 arrests of Petitioner, most of which are for the offense of larceny. Although this document is hearsay, Petitioner readily acknowledged that in 1980 and 1984 he was a drug addict and supported his habit by stealing. Exhibit 3 consists of 6 convictions of grand theft and burglary on August 1, 1980, another count in 1984 and one count of attempted grand theft on October 26, 1990. The period between 1980 and 1984 was a period in Petitioner's life immediately following his discharge from the armed forces. On October 26, 1990, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of grand theft following a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of obtaining or using or attempting to obtain or use the property of another with intent to deprive the owner of the use thereof of personal property of the value of $300 or more. Petitioner testified that in 1990 his 19 year old stepson, who was preparing to enter college, while driving Petitioner's pickup truck, stopped near a parked vehicle and attempted to steal personal property therefrom, but fled when someone observed him. The license number of the pickup was traced to Petitioner. The stepson confessed his actions to Petitioner and when the police arrived, Petitioner, who already had a criminal record that could hardly be blemished further, told the police that he was the driver of the pickup. He was charged with the offense of attempted grand larceny, pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty and was sentenced to 5 years in prison of which he served some 7 months. The stepson graduated from college and is now married, gainfully employed, and raising a family. When submitting his application for licensure, Petitioner further testified that he researched the definition of moral turpitude, spoke to his lawyer and other people regarding his conviction of grand larceny, and was told that the offense did not necessarily constitute an offense involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, Petitioner assumed that he had not been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude and marked item 5 on his application "No" which asked if he had ever been found guilty of a crime involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that he told Respondent's employees, with whom he discussed his application for licensure, of his criminal record and was told this was not disqualifying. Accordingly, he spent the money to obtain the required mortgage broker education certificate and to take and pass the examination for mortgage broker license, only to be told after these efforts that he could not qualify for licensure.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued denying the application of Stephen J. Matala for a licensure as a mortgage broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen J. Matala 32414 Marchmont Circle Dade City, Florida 33525 Lisa L. Elwell, Esquire Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance 1313 Tampa Street, Suite 615 Tampa, Florida 33602-3394 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact Kenneth M. Olson, Jr., is a registered real estate broker with the FREC and Active Firm Member of Olson and Associates Real Estate, Inc., a corporate broker registered with the FREC. A copy of the Administrative Complaint was forwarded to the last address of Defendants registered with the FREC by certified mail numbers 4747 and 4748 and the notice of hearing was forwarded to the same address by certified mail numbers 4613 and 4614. Accordingly the Hearing Officer had jurisdiction over the Defendants and the offenses. By contract dated September 17, 1975 (Exhibit 6) Joseph J. Pillucere contracted to purchase real property from Paul L. Nave. The contract provided, inter alia, for a $500 earnest money deposit, $9500 down payment at closing with purchaser to assume existing first mortgage of approximately $28,000; and the seller taking back a purchase money second mortgage in the amount of $17,000. Thereafter, at the time scheduled for closing, the purchaser failed to produce the additional down payment required, execute the second mortgage and assume the existing first mortgage. After receiving conflicting demands from buyer and seller for the return of the earnest money deposit Defendant requested an advisory opinion from the FREC in accordance with Section 475.25(1)(c) FS. On May 13, 1976 an advisory opinion (Exhibit 5) was given by FREC to the Defendant, with copies to both parties to the contract, advising Defendant that the earnest money deposit should-be disbursed to the seller. The deposit has been disbursed to neither party to the contract.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Santaniello holds real estate broker license number 0186475, and was so licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. Santaniello is the active broker for Respondent, Sunair Realty Corporation, which holds license number 0213030. Mr. Don M. and Mrs. Agnes C. Long own two lots in Port Charlotte which they purchased as investments. By letter dated June 8, 1981, Respondents forwarded a "Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase" on each of these lots to the Longs. The documents established that Anni Czapliski was the buyer at a purchase price of $1200 per lot. Respondent Sunair Realty Corporation was to receive the greater of $120 or ten percent of the felling price for "professional services." The letter and documents were signed by Respondent Santaniello. Anni Czapliski was Bernard Santaniello's mother-in-law at the time of the proposed sale. This relationship was not disclosed by Respondents and was not known to the Longs at the time they were invited to contract with Respondents for sale of the lots. The Longs rejected the proposed arrangement for reasons not-relevant here.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), and fining each $500. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert J. Norton, Esquire Suite 408 First National Bank Building Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Mr. C.B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Frederick Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 R.T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April.
Findings Of Fact Robert & Gilman, Inc. at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate broker by the State of Florida. Delair A. Clark at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate salesman by the State of Florida. Residential property owned by William L. and Frances Crummett was listed with J.B. Steelman, Jr. real estate broker and put on Multiple Listing Service. On June 17, 1972, immediately after the For Sale sign was erected, Respondent, Delair A. Clark, presented an offer to the sellers on this property which was accepted by sellers on the same date presented (Exhibit 9). This contract provided the purchase price of $28,500 with a $300 earnest money deposit, the usual clauses in a form contract for sale and purchase, and two special clauses to wit: "A. Subject to: Buyer being reassigned to central Florida prior to June 22, 1972. In the event the assignment does not materialize by June 23, 1972 deposit will, be returned in full and contract will be null and void. B. Subject to: Buyer obtaining a 90 percent conventional loan for a period of 25 years or an FHA loan for 30 years." By telegram dated 6/20/72 (Exhibit 8) buyer confirmed re-assignment to Orlando, thus satisfying condition A in the contract. Buyers thereafter asked for earlier occupancy than originally called for. Since special arrangements would have to be made by sellers, Mr. Crummett asked for an amendment to the contract to increase the earnest money deposit to $1,000 of which $500 would be non-refundable if contract was not consummated. This amendment was duly executed by the buyers on July 15, 1972 and by the sellers. A copy thereof was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 11 which provides: "SPECIAL CLAUSE" "C. An additional deposit of $700 will be made on July 17, 1972, of which $500 will be non-refundable in the event the referenced contract is not consumated (sic)." This amendment was forwarded to the sellers by Respondent's Roberts & Gilman letter of July 17, 1972 which amendment was executed by the sellers upon receipt and mailed back to Roberts & Gilman. The July 17, 1972 letter was signed by Judy L. Rostatter of the sales processing department. A copy of the check received from the buyers was not enclosed although the letter stated it was enclosed. Prior to receipt of this amendment Crummett was advised by Richter, the buyer, that he had mailed a $700 check to Roberts & Gilman made payable to Crummett. Crummett was also advised by Respondent Clark that the check had been received. Since closing was scheduled to be held within a couple of days Crummett requested Clark to hold the check and he would endorse same at closing. Crummett never saw the original check for $700. On the day originally scheduled for the closing (circa July 18, 1972) Crummett received a telephone call from Respondent Clark to the effect that the appraisal on the property had come in some $3,000 below the asking price and inquiring if Crummett would accept $26,000 for his property. The latter advised he would not and, after some heated words, Crummett hung up. At this time it was evident to Respondent Clark and the sellers that the sale would not be consummated. Clark put a memo in the file dated July 28, 1972 saying: "Return checks of $700 + $300 in estrow (sic) to Richter. Seller advised we had no contract." A few weeks later, on August 3, 1972, after making several phone calls to Roberts & Gilman without success, Crummett had the listing broker, J.B. Steelman, write a letter (Exhibit 7) to Gilman making demand for the $500 deposit refund. By letter dated August 11, 1972 (Exhibit 6) Roberts and Gilman replied that they considered the contract had been terminated by the seller and saw no "justification by the seller to claim any escrow that has been returned to the buyer". This letter was signed "Dan T. Gilman /b.c." Several months later, in the spring of 1973, Crummett went to the office of Roberts and Gilman and obtained a photostatic copy of the check dated 7/15/72 that had been made by J.A. Richter in the amount of $700. This was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 12. At the hearing Dan G. Gilman, President of Roberts & Gilman, Inc. denied any recollection of any part of this transaction or ever having heard of the incident prior to the investigator from the FREC coming to inquire about the incident. At the time of this transaction the realtor's office was very busy with several branch offices and some 120 salesmen handling transactions in eight or ten counties in central Florida. He has no recollection of dictating Exhibit 12 or anything about the incident but his secretary at that time was Beverly Cass. It was standard practice for a broker to review every contract before trust account money was disbursed or refunded. His initial testimony that numerous people in the office had authority to sign his name to letters going out of the office was recanted when he was recalled as a witness after the close of the Commission's case. He then stated he never authorized anyone to sign his name to a document having legal implication. Clark testified that the first time he ever saw Exhibit 11, the amendment to the contract, was when shown to him by the investigator for the FREC. Likewise he claims never to have seen or received the $700 check signed by Richter. With respect to the return of the deposit to Richter, (after being shown Exhibit 13) his recollection of the cancellation of the contract was that Richter was not re-assigned to the Orlando area. This was the only contract ever handled by Clark which involved the return of an escrow deposit. He has no recollection of talking to any member of the realty firm regarding clearing the return of the escrow deposit to Richter. Exhibit 5 is a photocopy of the check by which the $300 earnest money deposit was returned to Richter. It is obvious that the contract for the sale of the residential property herein involved was amended to provide for an additional deposit from the buyers and a clause which required the buyer to forfeit one half of his deposit in the event the transaction was not consummated. It is incomprehensible that such an amendment to the contract could be made without the knowledge of the salesman or the broker. It therefore appears that the Defendants either: (1) are not telling the truth; (2) have faulty memories; (3) allowed the duties normally performed by brokers to be carried out by secretaries; or (4) operated a realty company in a slipshod manner without due regard to the duties and responsibilities imposed upon brokers and salesman by the real estate license law.
